Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387380

that the combined vote for the traditional two main partiesdropped: in the case of Ireland in 2011, it was the lowestever (Gallagher, 2011,142). There is thus the same pattern ofone party being rejected, but not all of the gains going totheir traditional rival.

Will a change in government lead to recovery for anotherEuropean country suffering from the crisis, as seen in EUstates such as Ireland? If evidence from the first year afterthe election is a guide, the answer is that Spain is still onrocky shores. Shortly following the election the new PPadministration announced that the financial situation of thecountry was worse than they expected. As such, in its firstyear in office it pursued hard austerity measures, includingsome policies beyond itsmanifesto that surprised somewhovoted for them. Such initiatives included: pursuingaVATrisefrom 18% to 21%; reducing pay to civil servants; increasingthe ease with which businesses could fire workers anddecreasing indemnity; slashing the R&D budget; supportingthe privatization of healthcare; and receiving a bail-out ofaround V40 billion for troubled Spanish banks as agreed toby Eurozone finance ministers. Despite these measures, nopanacea seems to have become immediately manifest: bythe end of its first year in power, its most ‘notable achieve-ment’ has been to attain one of the highest levels of unem-ployment – in both Europe and democratic Spain’s history –

at over 25%. The consequence has been some of Europe’sbiggest demonstrations in 2012,whichweremetwith policeviolence. Of course, staunch supporters of the PP wouldcontend that its policies so far and its legitimate use offorce were necessary to confront the crisis. More criticalobservers, however, would respond that these actions havesolved nothing and are simply reflective of choices thatwould have otherwise ideologically guided theparty,with orwithout any crisis. Only time will tell who is right.

* Tel.: þ1 412 648 7407; fax: þ1 412 648 7002.E-mail address: raj.chari@tcd.ie.

Acknowledgements

I thank Michael Gallagher, José Elguero, Martin Hooper,Robert Johns, Koji Kagotani, Gary Murphy, and Isabel Rozasfor constructive comments on earlier drafts.

References

Chari, R., July 2000. The March 2000 Spanish election: a ‘critical election’?West European Politics 23 (3), 207–214.

Chari, R., November 2004. The 2004 Spanish election: terrorism as acatalyst for change? West European Politics 27 (5), 954–963.

CIS, 2011. Estudio 2917. Available at: http://datos.cis.es/pdf/Es2917mar_A.pdf.Colomer, J.M., 2005. The general election in Spain, March 2004. Electoral

Studies 24 (1), 149–156.El Mundo, 2011a. Rajoy, vencedor sin K.O. Available at: http://www.

elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/11/08/espana/1320746050.html.El Mundo, 2011b. Mayoría abrumadora para el PP y debacle socialista,

según los sondeos. Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/11/13/espana/1321179511.html.

El País, 2011a. Zapatero convoca el 20-N para que “otro Gobierno décertidumbre”. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/07/29/actualidad/1311929850_613039.html.

El País, 2011b. La indignación inquieta a la izquierda. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/05/16/actualidad/1305580548_268992.html.

El País, 2011c. Sin luces sobre la economía. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/11/07/actualidad/1320705125_905462.html.

El País, 2011d. Cómo están y qué esperan las principales formacionespolíticas. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/11/14/actualidad/1321267757_438600.html.

Field, B.N., 2009. The parliamentary election in Spain, March 2008.Electoral Studies 28 (1, March), 155–158.

Fraile, M., Lewis-Beck, M.S., 2012. Economic and elections in Spain(1982–2008): cross-measures, cross-time. Electoral Studies 31, 485–490.

Gallagher, M., 2011. Ireland’s earthquake election: analysis of the results.In: Gallagher, M., Marsh, M. (Eds.), How Ireland Voted 2011. Palgrave,Basingstoke, pp. 139–172.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.01.002

The parliamentary elections in Serbia, May 2012

Andrew Konitzer*

Center for Russian & East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 4417 WWPH, 230 South Bouquet St., Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 15 August 2012Accepted 2 January 2013

On 6 May 2012 Serbia held its fifth post-Milosevic par-liamentary election alongside local and early presidentialelections. The outgoing government, the first post-Milosevic government to survive an entire term, dissolved

amidst a major economic crisis and growing populardiscontent with the Serbian political system. The split andsubsequent decline of the largest anti-EU party on theSerbian political scene (The Serbian Radical Party – SRS)meant that, for the first time since 2000, the question ofwhether Serbia should work towards EU membership didnot feature prominently in the election. Instead the maincontenders focused on the economic crisis, unemployment

Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387 381

and which party would be best placed to bring Serbia into atroubled EU on favourable terms. The election was markedby the poor showing of the main party in the outgoinggovernment, a surprisingly strong outcome for the SerbianSocialist Party (SPS), and difficult coalition negotiationswhich resulted in the creation of a government consistingof parties which only recently promoted nationalist andlargely anti-EU policies.

1. Background

The outgoing government consisted of the DemocraticParty (DS)-led “For a European Serbia” coalition, theSerbian Socialist Party–Party of Pensioners–United Serbia(SPS–PUPS–JS) coalition, G17þ and others. While analystshad initially questioned the viability of this rather largeand diverse coalition, the government survived amidst agrowing economic crisis until the end of its four-yearmandate and also achieved a number of important stepstowards Serbia’s EU membership. In December 2009, theEU granted White Schengen list status for Serbian citizensallowing them to travel freely in Europe for a period of 90days. On 1 March 2012 Serbia officially achieved EUcandidate status with the start date of negotiations to bedetermined. Still, the months leading up to the electionwere characterized by rampant unemployment and agrowing sense that Serbia’s economy was grinding to ahalt. Furthermore, ongoing negotiations over relationsbetween Serbia and Kosovo cast a shadow over Serbia’s EUaccession process. Frequent and contradictory media re-ports perpetuated uncertainty over whether Serbia wouldbe required to recognize Kosovo’s independence as acondition of joining the EU. The election campaign beganamidst growing popular discontent with the outgoinggovernment and the Serbian political and party system as awhole.

2. Electoral system

Like previous contests, the election took place under aclosed list proportional system using the D’Hondt methodto determine the distribution of seats in a 250-seatparliament. Territorially, the country constitutes a single-nation-wide constituency. A 5% threshold exists with theexception of parties representing national minorities. Partylists are not subject to higher thresholds. Amendments tothe election law in 2011 stipulated that every third candi-date on a party list must be a woman, that the practice of“blank resignations” be eliminated, and that parties mustrespect the order of candidates on party lists whenassigning mandates.1 The election also introduced a singlerevised voter registration list.

1 “Blank resignations” (blanko ostavke) were an instrument for Serbianparties and coalitions to exert control over deputies in the parliament.Upon taking their seats, deputies would sign an undated resignationforms that could then be dated and put into effect if said deputyattempted to leave the parliamentary faction or otherwise fell afoul of theparty or factional leadership. In effect this meant that parties and fac-tions, not deputies, “owned” their mandates.

3. Main contenders

A total of 18 parties and coalition lists participated inthe election. Major developments during and following the2008 election challenge the “old regime/pro-reform”

scheme often used previously to categorize Serbian parties(Bochsler, 2008; Konitzer, 2009). During the 2008 elec-tions the “old regime” SPS was reconciled with formerarch-rival “pro-reform” party DS in a pro-EU coalitiongovernment. Immediately following the election, the “oldregime” SRS underwent a major split which resulted inparty Vice-President Tomislav Nikoli�c forming the SerbianProgressive Party (SNS), which by most accounts absorbedmuch of the SRS membership and the bulk of its electoralsupport. SNS portrayed itself as a “modern” right-of-centerparty which supported Serbia’s EU membership whilestrengthening ties with Russia and China (Konitzer, 2011).Hence, the 2012 elections were contested by a mixture ofrecently recast parties with old-regime roots andreformist, pro-democratic parties which could no longereasily claim a monopoly on democratic values and supportfor the EU.

While SPS’s position as a major party in an increasinglyunpopular coalition presented a certain challenge, it capi-talized on the fact that Da�ci�c and the party could be iden-tified with major successes in the ministries that theycontrolled (particularly the Ministry of Internal Affairs) andcould distance themselves from unpopular decisions in therealm of economics and finance. SPS ran a decidedlypopulist campaign as a party of social justice offering athird option to the DS and SNS heavy-weights. Da�ci�c care-fully balanced a favourable stance towards the EU withmore critical “pro-Serbian” statements including criticismof the IMF and a “membership on our terms” approach toEurope. As in the 2008 election, SPS was joined by the Partyof United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS) and DraganMarkovi�c“Palma’s” United Serbia (JS).

SNS led a coalition under the slogan “Let’s Get SerbiaMoving” (Pokrenimo Srbiju). The coalition entered electionsin the advantageous position of the main rival to a gov-ernment struggling through an economic crisis. Its primarychallenge was to maintain the support of its former Radicalelectoral base while avoiding the ire of key internationalactors and drawing in new voters by demonstrating its pro-EU credentials. The party largely duplicated DS’s platformregarding the EU while focussing on themes of law andorder. SNS also suggested that, while the EU was the maingoal of Serbia’s foreign policies, doors to the east, particu-larly to Russia, remained open. Thus SNS maintained itscredentials as a party which would maintain close ties withRussia – a stance which appealed to a significant portion ofthe Serbian electorate.

As the core party of the incumbent governing coalition,DS faced the challenge of deflecting the criticism levelled atany government ruling during an economic crisis, whilefocussing on achievements over the past term. DScontinued to drive home the message that the ruling coa-lition had made certain advances towards EU membershipand that, as a recognized pro-EU party with ruling experi-ence, it was the best option to continue Serbia’s road to-wards the EU under difficult economic and diplomatic

Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387382

conditions. DS also pointed to some major existing or po-tential international investments (some which unravelledafter the election). The campaign also contained sugges-tions that SNS was not really a reformed party and that itlacked an experienced cadre to navigate Serbia’s currentchallenges. DS contested the election in coalition with anumber of smaller parties under the slogan “Choice for aBetter Life” (Izbor za bolji �zivot.)

The United Regions of Serbia (URS) and the LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) are two smaller parties which haveplayed (in the case of URS under the name G17þ) importantroles in post-2000 Serbian politics. Having fallen out withthe governing coalition in February 2011, G17þ PresidentMlaCan Dinki�c launched a new party vehicle, URS, whichunited G17þ with a disparate array of smaller local partiesand attempted to capitalize on Serbia’s traditional centre-periphery cleavage. During the campaign the partyemphasized its economic and financial expertise and pre-sented a platform of decentralization, smaller, more effec-tive government, and increased support for agriculture.�Cedomir Jovanovi�c’s LDP contested the race as the “U-Turn”(Preokret) coalition with Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian RenewalMovement (SPO) and other parties. The coalition stuckwithits traditional themes, calling for a fundamental reform ofSerbian government institutions, economics and societyalong liberal lines, acceptance of Kosovo’s independenceand an uncompromising pro-EU stance.

DSS, SRS and the new “Doors for the Life of Serbia” (Dveriza �zivot Srbiji) party constituted the only anti-EU parties inthe race. DSS promoted a policy of “neutrality” and a non-compromising stance on Kosovo which in effect amountedto opposition to Serbia’s membership in both NATO and EU,instead favouring closer ties to Russia and China. Vojislav�Se�selj’s SRS took a slightly more “radical” stance with anexplicit “anti-EU, pro-Serbia” platform. Dveri portrayed theEU as a threat to traditional Serbian values and symbols.

As in previous elections, the 2012 campaign was alsomarked by a number of minority parties representing,among others, Serbia’s Hungarian, Bosnian and Albanianminorities. One peculiarity among “minority parties”was aprotest party called “None of the Above” (NOPO) whichtook advantage of the lower threshold for minority partiesby including one member who represented the Vlach mi-nority on the party list.

4. Campaign

The tone of the 2012 election campaign differed fromprevious races in that issues such as economics, corruptionand governing competence eclipsed formerly prominentissues like attitudes towards EU accession and the status ofKosovo. With the exception of campaigning by the anti-EUparties described above, EU references focused mostlyupon which parties would be best situated to advance thecountry towards membership. With regard to Kosovo, allmajor actors except the LDP-centred coalition maintainedtheir no-recognition rhetoric, but most indicated theirwillingness to continue constructive (however defined)negotiations.

With the bulk of the campaign focused on economicissues, the ruling and opposition parties engaged in very

predictable campaign behaviour. The ruling DS defendedits record during a global economic crisis and questionedboth the credibility of the opposition’s plans and thecompetence of its cadre. Opposition parties such as SNSpointed to various dismal economic indicators and laidresponsibility for Serbia’s economic woes squarely at thefeet of the outgoing government. Towards the end of thecampaign, one prominent Serbian political analyst charac-terized the campaign as “boring,” complaining that theglobal economic crisis dictated the context of the race (B92,2012a).

The campaign was also marked by the electorates’heightened sense of disenchantment with the political andparty system. This was most sharply manifested in the so-called “white ballot” (blank or despoiled ballots) move-ment, led by intellectuals critical of what they felt was theoutgoing government’s failure to implement critical re-forms. Following DS and Tadi�c’s poor showing in the elec-tions, white ballot supporters were criticized for allegedlycontributing to the victory of old-regime forces since whitelist voters would have most likely supported liberal partiesand the outgoing president.

An OSCE report indicated that the elections “providedvoters with a large degree of choice.and were charac-terized by a respect for fundamental rights and freedoms”(OSCE, 2012.) However, there were accusations that theRepublican Broadcast Agency (RRA) was biased towardsthe government. Furthermore, questions arose regardingthe veracity of the new voter registration list includingaccusations that certain voters were erased from the re-cord. Finally, during the week following the election anumber of opposition parties complained of electoral theftand discarded ballots. None of the claims were substanti-ated but the handling of the complaints suggested thatfurther improvements were required in managing electiondisputes.

For the first time since its unilateral declaration of in-dependence in 2008, the Kosovo government also chal-lenged the holding of both local and state-level elections onits territory. After considerable debate between Serbia,Kosovo, Albania and certain members of the broader in-ternational community, it was agreed that local electionswould not be held on the territory of Kosovo but that theOSCE would organize parliamentary and presidentialelections.

5. Results

Despite the simultaneous elections for president,parliament and local governments, turnout in the electionwas 57.8% - the lowest in any post-2000 parliamentarycontest. Of the 18 lists that competed in the elections, 11won seats in the new parliament. The proportion of votescast for parties that failed to cross the threshold was 11.9per cent and the effective number of parties in the legis-lature increased from 3.5 in 2008 to 4.9 in 2012 (countingcoalition lists as single parties). This increase is partlyattributable to the broader distribution of the vote in anelection which featured smaller electoral coalitions andreduced portions of the vote for the two major contenders(Table 1).

Table 1Results of the parliamentary elections in Serbia, May 2012 and May 2008.

Party – leader 2012 2008

Votes Votes % Seats Votes % Seats

Choice for a Better Life (DS) – Tadi�c 863,294 22.1 67 – –

For A European Serbia (ZES) – Tadi�c – – – 38.4 102United Regions of Serbia (URS) – Dinki�c 215,666 5.5 16 – –

Let’s Get Serbia Moving (SNS) – Nikoli�c 940,659 24.0 73 – –

Serbian Radical Party (SRS) – �Se�selj 180,558 4.6 – 29.4 78Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – Ko�stunica 273,532 7.0 21 – –

Democratic Party of Serbia–New Serbia(DSS-NS)–Ko�stunica

– – – 11.6 30

Socialist Party of Serbia–Party of UnitedPensioners of Serbia–United Serbia(SPS–PUPS–JS) – Da�ci�c

567,689 14.5 44 7.6 20

U-Turn (LDP-SPO) – Jovanovi�c 255,546 6.5 19 – –

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – Jovanovi�c – – – 5.2 13Hungarian Coalition – Pastor 68,323 1.8 5 1.8 4Coalition of Pre�sevo Valley Albanians 13,384 0.3 1 0.4 1All Together – Emir Elfi�c 24,993 0.6 1 – –

None of the Above (NOPO) 22,905 0.6 1 – –

Bosniak List for a European Sand�zak – Ugljanin – – – 0.9 2SDA Sand�zak 27,708 0.7 2 – –

Others 465,618 11.9 – 2.4 –

Totals 3,739,317 95.6 – 97.8 250Invalid votes (%) 170,995 4.4 – 2.1 –

Total votes (turnout) 3,912,904 57.8 – 61.4 –

Eligible voters 6,770,013 – – – –

Effective number of electoral/parliamentary parties – 6.9 4.9 3.9 3.5

Notes: Totals do not reach 100% due to rounding and because the Serbian Republican Election Commission calculates vote percentages based on number ofvotes cast, including invalid votes. For consistency, the same formula is used.Source: Serbian Republican Election Commission (http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs).

Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387 383

Several observations stand out from the election re-sults. Support for the DS-led coalition clearly declinedfrom 2008, suggesting that the party bore the brunt ofvoter dissatisfaction with the outgoing coalition. SPS,which as late as 2008 appeared to be in danger of politicalextinction, nearly doubled its vote share from the previouselection and established itself as “king-maker” in subse-quent coalition negotiations. SNS’s success, while largelypredicted in pre-election polls, confirmed that TomislavNikoli�c and Aleksandar Vu�ci�c had successfully absorbedSRS’s voter base following their split with the radicals andmade inroads with new voters. The failure of the SRS togain a single seat in the parliament itself constituted amajor development. This party had featured in everySerbian legislature since the early 1990s and had won themost votes in the 2003, 2007 and 2008 elections. This leftDSS as the only party in the parliament with an explicitlyanti-EU platform. Finally, the white ballot movement hadlittle discernible impact on the election results aside froma doubling of the proportion of invalid ballots (4.4%) fromthe previous election.

Looking at the electoral map in 2012, DS-led “Choice fora Better Life” generally enjoyed its highest levels of supportin the northern half of the country with its strongestshowing in Vojvodina. Support for the SNS-led “Let’s GetSerbia Moving” coalition was generally higher in thesouthern half of Serbia. However, it should be noted thatSNS also enjoyed some of its highest levels of support inand around Belgrade – even beating DS in its formerbastion. The pattern of support for SPS–PUPS–JS carried

over from the 2008 election with support increasing in thesouthern portions of the country, particularly in andaround Kosovo. DSS’s strong showing in Kosovo is indica-tive of the party’s uncompromising stance on the issue ofKosovo’s independence.

6. Government formation

In the immediate aftermath of the election, most ana-lysts agreed that the SPS–PUPS–JS coalition was the majorwinner of the contest and that the socialists held the key toany future government. Analysts also anticipated that DSPresident Boris Tadi�c would win the second round of theRepublican Presidential election and that DS and SPS–PUP–JS would eventually form the new government. On 9 May,SPS–PUPS–JS and DS announced an informal agreement tocontinue their political cooperation (B92, 2012b). At thesame time, Da�ci�c allayed concerns that he would seek thepremiership in a new government by announcing hispreference for continuing to head the Ministry of InternalAffairs.

However, the second round of the presidential elections(20May) resulted in a surprise win for SNS leader TomislavNikoli�c and radically changed the calculations of thevarious political actors involved in coalition negotiations.Within days of the elections, analysts indicated that “allcombinations were possible” and SPS showed signs ofwavering in its intent to form the next government withDS (Bakovi�c, 2012). Still, negotiations between SPS–PUPS–JS and DS continued. During the last week of May, Da�ci�c

Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387384

and other SPS officials publicly supported the idea that DSshould take the premier’s position. On May 27th, Tadi�cagreed to accept the premiership in an anticipated coali-tion with SPS–PUPS–JS and other smaller parties (B92,2012c).

Events during the first half of June gradually set thestage for radical changes in the coalition negotiations. Themain impetus was the question of which smaller partieswould fill out a majority (at least 126 deputies) for thefuture ruling coalition. During Ivica Da�ci�c’s visit withMilorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpksa (the Serbianentity in Bosnia Herzegovina), Dodik expressed his oppo-sition to the LDP’s participation in any Serbian government.In turn Da�ci�c indicated that SPS would not enter intogovernment with a party that claimed that RepublikaSrpska was founded on genocide, thus threatening theparticipation of LDP in any coalition government (B92,2012d). During the same period, rumours indicatingRussian pressure on Da�ci�c to form a coalition with SNSseemed to be confirmed by Da�ci�c’s sudden decision to visitRussia on 6 June (Vesti Online, 2012). On 8 June, URSPresident MlaCan Dinki�c claimed that DS was responsiblefor a media report falsely tying him to corrupt privatizationdeals. Dinki�c’s subsequent insistence that DS admit towrongdoing further reduced the likelihood of DS and URSentering a coalition (B92, 2012e). On 11 June, Ivica Da�ci�cannounced that he would only form a coalition with bothURS and LDP in order to avoid creating a governmentdependent on a party (LDP) whose stance towards Repu-bika Srpska differed so greatly from that of SPS. The situ-ation became even more acute when, on 17 June, SPS andURS formally agreed to enter any coalition governmenttogether (B92, 2012f). On 22 June, stories emerged thatIvica Da�ci�c had changed his stance on the premiership andwould seek this position from DS as a requisite for SPS’sparticipation in coalition negotiations (B92, 2012g). On 26June the LDP leader indicated that his party could notparticipate in any government (B92, 2012h). Hence, at theend of June, DS’s only remaining coalition option (asidefrom a grand coalition with SNS) included a party (URS)with which nearly all ties had been broken and a minorcoalition partner whose president now insisted on takingthe premier’s position. Whether intentionally or not, Da�ci�cand Dinki�c established the necessary conditions to justifybreaking off negotiations with DS and turning to an eagerlywaiting SNS leadership. On 28 June, with negotiationsclearly ground to a halt, SPS President Ivica Da�ci�c was givena mandate from President Nikoli�c to form the government(B92, 2012i). He immediately announced his intent to enterinto negotiations with SNS, URS and other parties. None-theless, negotiations between the new prospective coali-tion partners continued for nearly another month amidstfrequent speculation about conflicts regarding the distri-bution of portfolios and control over public enterprises.

On 27 July, the parliament finally voted for a new gov-ernment consisting of 17 ministers and 19 members. IvicaDa�ci�c took the premier position while other members ofSPS took the ministries of Health, Transportation, andDevelopment, Science and Technology. As the largest coa-lition member in terms of parliamentary seats, SNS tookseven posts. These included SNS Acting President

Aleksandar Vu�ci�c who would simultaneously act as DeputyPresident for Defence, Security, and the Fight Against Cor-ruption and Crime and as Minister of Defense. URS took keyministries related to the EU and the economy, notably partypresident MlaCan Dinki�c who became Minister of Financeand Economics. PUPS President Jovan Krkobabi�c becameVice President and Minister of Labor and Social Policy, andtwo other minority party leaders also took part in thegovernment.

Specific proposals within the coalition agreementincluded a renewed commitment to oppose Kosovo’s in-dependence, the acceleration of the EU integration process,maintaining negotiations with the IMF and World Bank,judicial system reform and a balanced foreign policy opento all nations (B92, 2012j). Certain proposals gave somesense of the difficulties facing such a diverse coalition. Ef-forts to expand social programs and increase state inter-vention in the economy were clearly tied to the campaignpromises and platform of SPS–PUPS–URS. At the same time,a commitment to reduce government spending, work withinternational financial organizations and decentralizegovernment neatly corresponded with planks in the URSplatform. The focus on anti-corruption and anti-crime ef-forts echoed statements made (at times against their newcoalition partners) by SNS prior to and during thecampaign. Questions remained as to whether some ratherobvious contradictions arising from this “all things to allparties” agreement would create future insurmountabletensions within the government.

Looking ahead, the new government faced the acutechallenges of maintaining cohesion across a programmati-cally diverse set of parties – some of which were very recentarch-nemeses – under one of the most challenging eco-nomic and financial periods in recent Serbian history.Furthermore, the “old-regime” background of the twomajorcoalition partners meant that the government would beunder close scrutiny from the liberal opposition, civil societyorganizations and the western international communitythat had shown the previous government more leniencewhenever policies or statements conflicted with their in-terests. On the international front, Serbia would continue toface the challenge of maintaining relations with a strugglingEU while maintaining a policy of non-recognition forKosovo. Relations with Russia, the United States and thecountry’s regional neighbours would also test the diplo-matic skills of a new president and government.

References

B92, 2012a. Orlovi�c: Ova kampanja je dosadna. 2 May.B92, 2012b. Dogovorena koalicija DS-SPS. 9 May.B92, 2012c. DS: Tadi�c kandidat za premijera. 27 May.B92, 2012d. Da�ci�c: Jo�s nema ve�cine za vladu. 2 June.B92, 2012e. Dinki�c: Ne sa onim ko kleveta. 8 June.B92, 2012f. Da�ci�c: Mi ho�cemo i URS, DS ih ne�ce. 11 June.B92, 2012g. Da�ci�c zahteva mesto premijera od DS. 22 June.B92, 2012h. LDP odustao od formiranja vlade. 26 June.B92, 2012i. Da�ci�c dobio mandat za sastav vlade. 28 June.B92, 2012j. Koalicioni sporazum SNS-SPS-URS. 10 July.Bakovi�c, B., 2012. Vlada: Sve kombinacije mogu�ce. Politika 21 May.Bochsler, D., 2008. The parliamentary election in Serbia, 21 January 2007.

Electoral Studies 27 (1), 160–165.Konitzer, A., 2009. The parliamentary election in Serbia, May 2008.

Electoral Studies 28 (1), 141–145.

Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 370–387 385

Konitzer, A., 2011. Speaking European: conditionality, public attitudes andpro-European party rhetoric in the western Balkans. Europe-AsiaStudies 63 (10), 1853–1888.

E-mail address: Konitzer@pitt.edu.

OSCE, 2012. Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early PresidentialElections, 6 and 20 May 2012. OSCE, Warsaw.

Vesti Online, 2012. Rusi nagovaraju Da�ci�ca da ostavi DS. 8 July.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.01.001

The 2012 Latvia language referendum

David LublinAmerican University, Department of Government, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20016, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 7 May 2012Accepted 29 December 2012

This referendum on constitutional amendments to addRussian as an official language in Latvia is the latest skir-mish over the status of ethnic non-Latvians, primarilyethnic Russians, and the Russian language since Latvia’sresumption of independence at the end of the Sovietoccupation in 1991. Although peaceful and with a decisivenegative result, the referendum highlighted and exacer-bated the political divisions that remain between theLatvian majority and Russian-speaking minority overethnic and linguistic issues.

The proposed constitutional amendments would havealtered Sections 4, 18, 21, 101, and 104 of the Constitutionof Latvia. The changes would have made Russian a secondofficial language in addition to Latvian. The amendmentswould further have explicitly made Russian a secondworking language of state and local governments and anacceptable, legal means of communication between citi-zens and the government. Finally, the amendmentswould have altered the oath for members of the Saeimaso that they promise to strengthen “the Latvian languageand the Russian language as the only official languages”instead of solely the Latvian language. In short, theamendments would have given Russian equal legal statusto Latvian and ended the constitutional mandate for thepromotion of Latvian as the single state language in thepublic sphere.

1. Background

Fluctuations in the ethnic Latvian share of the popu-lation and the loss of Latvia’s independence at the onsetof World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union haverendered language debates highly sensitive and salient inLatvia. Both the Soviet and Nazi German occupations hadsevere impacts on the ethnic composition of Latvia. Priorto World War II, the 1935 Census indicated that ethnicLatvians comprised 77 per cent of the population. The

Soviets murdered or deported roughly 35,000 people in1941; an additional 50,000 died fighting against the So-viets in the Nazi-organized Latvian Legion with another80,000 captured members of the Legion deported toSiberia after the War. Despite these losses, the share ofethnic Latvians rose to 83 per cent by 1945. The Nazisexterminated most of Latvian Jewry, close to 5 per cent ofthe prewar population, during the Holocaust. Most BalticGermans, over 3 per cent of the prewar population,resettled in Germany during the War or fled in advance ofthe return of Soviet forces.

Actions taken by the Soviets after the War dramaticallyreduced the ethnic Latvian share of the population. TheSoviets deported or killed an additional 119,000 people in1949. Immigration by ethnic non-Latvians, mainly ethnicRussians, during the Soviet occupation further reducedthe ethnic Latvian population share from 62 per cent in1959 to 52 per cent in 1989. Though Russian speakershave a long history of settlement in Latvia, most currentRussian speakers arrived relatively recently. Even by 1989,after decades of immigration, only a slight majority ofethnic Russians claimed Latvian birth with the sharemuch smaller for Belarussians and Ukrainians (Dreifelds,1996).

Migration since the resumption of Latvian indepen-dence has begun to reverse these trends. Ethnic Latviansformed just under 60 per cent of the population in 2011.Ethnic Russians comprise the largest ethnic minority at 27per cent of the population. The next two largest ethnicminorities, ethnic Belarussians and ethnic Ukrainians,together form an additional 6 per cent of the population.Politically, both smaller minorities have close ties to ethnicRussians as most arrived during the Soviet period andprefer Russian, heavily promoted as the interethnic linguafranca by the Soviets, to Latvian.

The status of the Russian language and citizenship forethnic non-Latvian immigrants from elsewhere in the So-viet Union have been matters of contention both domes-tically and for Latvia’s relations with Russia and the EU. TheBaltic country in which the state nationality formed the