The Political Warfighter

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A Hundred Years of Irregular WarfareMaj M W Shervington PARA

Wars might be won without fighting battles - T.E. Lawrence, 1917 1

1 Please see Major Shervingtons full dissertation online atwww.smallwarsjournal.com for his extensive notesand references.

TOOLKITS

History is littered with irregular wars2

inwhich the actions of guerrillas, insurgents andterrorists have defied the authority of stronger,more conventional forces. Since 1990, therehas been an average of 25 internal conflictsevery year. 3 The preponderance of suchwarfare, and the measures that have developedto counter it, necessitates a careful examinationof the definitions and causes of this specificstyle of warfare set against an historical

backdrop.

Irregular Warfare comprises militaryoperations in which one or more sides includeirregular forces or employ irregular methods. 4 The rules and ethics governing regular warfaredo not apply. Irregular warfare tends to marryespecially low conduct with characteristicallyhigh-minded motives. 5 In prescribing anirregular strategy, the protagonist is able to

employ a range of tactical effects or modes of conflict 6 that include insurgency, guerrillaaction and terrorism.

Current British military doctrine 7 definesinsurgency as an organised movement aimed

at the overthrow of constituted governmentthrough the use of subversion and armedconflict. It is an armed political struggle, thegoals of which may be diverse. Generally, aninsurgent group attempts to force politicalchange by a mixture of subversion,

propaganda, political and military pressure,aiming to persuade or intimidate the broadmass of the people to support or accept such

change.8

Current events in Iraq have forced theBritish Army to re-examine this definition:Insurgency is competition involving at leastone non-state movement using means that

In choosing violence, the insurgent can pick from his

toolkitof irregular warfare the tactical instruments that he

believes will deliver that objective.

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S MALL W ARS J O U RNAL SWJ Magazine

Volume 4February 2006


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2 Feb 2006 Small Wars Journal


include violence against an establishedauthority to achieve political change. 9 Theverbosity of the definition tells the practitionerthat insurgent movements will use all methodsand tactics at its disposal to achieve a politicalaim. Bard ONeill offers a less-prescriptivesynopsis: Insurgency may be defined as astruggle between a non-ruling group and theruling authorities in which the non-rulinggroup consciously uses political resources(organisational expertise, propaganda anddemonstration) and violence to destroy,reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacyof one or more aspects of politics. 10 Inchoosing violence, the insurgent can pick fromhis toolkitof irregular warfare 11 the tacticalinstruments that he believes will deliver thatobjective. 12 In short, the insurgentdemonstrates that he is capable of prosecutinga broad tactical battle as part of a politicallystrategic campaign. Examining the evolution of this capability over the 20th Century is bestfocused by looking at four issues: theconditions from which revolt appeared; theinsurgent leaders strategy and operationalphilosophy; the tactics that were employed; theoutcome of the campaign and the way that itaffected subsequent insurgencies.

FOUNDATIONS AND FACES OFINSURGENCY IN THE 20THCENTURY

The history and evolution of insurgencyin the 20th Century is dominated by a triage of ideological clashes, wars about nationalism orliberation or both, and uprisings based on theeffects of industrialisation and globalisation. 13

While the pendulum bounced haphazardlybetween all three, seven campaigns inparticular had a disproportionate influence.These were the Arab Revolt and T.E. Lawrence(1916-1919); the Peoples War in rural Chinaand Mao Tse-tung (1930s); Latin America andErnesto Che Guevara (1960s), the growth of

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urban insurgency in Palestine (1947), Cyprus(1956) and Brazil (1967) under MenachemBegin, George Grivas and Carlos Marighelarespectively; and the current menace fromradical Islamist militancy (since 1960) that iscurrently personified by Usama Bin Laden but isarticulated by thousands and potentiallymillions of others. 14

REVOLT IN ARABIA

The Arabs had been long sufferingvictims at the hands of Ottoman imperialists ina way that cannot be imagined in sufficientlyhorrible terms. 15 Believing that Ottomanpolicies discriminated against them on thegrounds of race and nationality the Arabswanted to be rid of the Turks and claim Arabia

IN THIS ISSUEARTICLES

A Hundred Years of Irregular Warfare 1by Maj M. W. Shervington PARA

The Political Warfighter 16 by Mr. Erik Evans

Are More Troops Needed in Iraq? 25by Carlos L. Yordan, Ph.D.

4th Generation Warfare 27 by Capt John W. Bellflower, Jr., USAF

Weve Done This Before 33by LTC Brent C. Bankus (Cavalry, AUS, Ret.)

The Necessity for Psychological Operations Support to Special Operations 38Forces during Unconventional Warfareby MAJ Gregory J. Reck, USA

WISDOM FROM THE PAST

An Afternoon with Bernard Fall 21 By LtCol W. G. LeftwichMarine Corps Gazette, February, 1969

FEATURES

About Small Wars Journal 36


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for themselves but did not know how to setabout it. When the Ottoman Empire aligneditself with Germany during World War One theAllied Powers, and Britain in particular,encouraged Hussein, the sharif of Mecca andhis son Faisal, to lead the Arab peoples in revoltby promising [them] a future state of theirown. 16 Although Britain offered materialsupport in terms of arms, it had no intention of committing British troops to the Turkish Fronten masse. It did offer a small band of intelligence officers and Arab specialists, one of whom was T.E. Lawrence, arguably one of themost influential theorists of the twentiethcentury in terms of revolutionary war. 17 Knowing that the Arabs were unused to formaloperations, Lawrence calculated that theywould only taste victory if he formulated a styleof revolutionary warfare by painstakinglydiscarding the conventional military doctrineprevalent in the British Army at the time. In hisbelief, armies were like plants, immobile as awhole, firm rooted through long stems to thehead. We [the Arab tribes] might be like avapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdomslay in each mans mind, and as we wantednothing material to live on, so perhaps weoffered nothing to killing. 18

Lawrences strategy relied on threetactical elements one algebraic, onebiological, a third psychological. 19 Thealgebraic examined the pure science of achieving victory, and to this Lawrence analysedthe numerical strengths of the Turkish Armyagainst which the Arabs were pitted. Hereached the conclusion that to hold Arabia theTurks would have need of a fortified post everyfour square miles, and a post could not be lessthan 20 men, so the requirement would be600,000 men for the area they were trying tocontrol, whereas they only had 100,000

available. 20 The biological factors would re-balance the superior numbers of men andmaterials that philosophers had traditionallycalculated to achieve victory. The Arabs couldnot afford casualties for though they maymake only a brief hole, rings of sorrow widenout from them; in material terms, the TurkishArmy were in constant short supply so that ourcue should be to destroy not the Army but thematerials. 21

The third element was psychological andwould concern not only shaping Turkish mindsto the war in which they were now engaged, butthe Arabs who had to either fight it or be a part

of it. In helping to achieve this, Lawrenceregarded the printing press as the greatestweapon in the armoury of the moderncommander 22 in persuading Turkish soldiersand the Arabs that victory was inevitable. Anacquiescent Arabian population wasfundamental to achieving this objective; victorywould be theirs when we had taught thecivilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: thepresence or absence of the enemy was asecondary matter. 23 Lawrence summed up hisoperational philosophy: In fifty words: Grantedmobility, security (in the form of denyingtargets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (theidea to convert every subject to friendliness),victory will rest with the insurgents, for thealgebraical factors are in the end decisive, andagainst the perfections of means and spiritstruggle quite in vain. 24

The tribes of Arabia waged a very specificguerrilla campaign against an occupyingTurkish Army. It avoided direct confrontationwhen and where possible, preferring the hitand run tactics on Turkish outposts and supplylines. In short, the Arab Revolt witnessed thevictory between 1916 and 1919 of 3,000 Arab


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tribesmen over a Turkish force of up to 50,000soldiers. 25 Lawrence had been the firstpractitioner to articulate the nature of insurgentwarfare. Mao Tse-tung would be the next.

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THEPEOPLES WAR

Following the dissolution of the ManchuQing Dynasty in 1911, China had been shapedby the internecine politics of warlordism, agrowing nationalist movement among theurban centres and a burgeoning communistsector in the ruling party. Mao, one of thefounding fathers of the Chinese CommunistParty in 1921, had fled persecution from thepurges of the ruling nationalist party, and soonbegan to formulate revolutionary aspirations toseize power for the Communists. Mao hadrecognised that a potentially revolutionarysituation exists in any country where thegovernment consistently fails in its obligationsto ensure at least a minimally decent standardof life for the great majority of its citizens. 26 This was the case in China. Millions of ruralpeasants lived in squalid conditions where thebenefits of education, health and employmentwere denied in preference to the urban centres.The schism between urban and rural Chinawould dictate the revolutionary movement thatMao intended to lead. Chinas struggle would,according to Mao, be both ideological andnationalistic. Victory over the ruling urbanclasses for the predominantly rural massesdepend on a strategy that involved anintangible quartet of time, space, will, andsubstitution. 27

Mao needed time to build theorganisational strength of the party and the willand determination to win among bothcommunists and the population at large upon

whose support they were entirely dependent forultimate victory. 28 Space would be traded fortime by avoiding battles with conventionalforces and surrendering territory. Substitutionforced the movement to find the means of drawing upon what strengths were possessedin order to offset weaknesses such aspropaganda for weapons, subversion for airpower, and political mobilisation for industrialstrength. 29

A campaign for national liberation basedon three phases would follow. The first phasewould be one of organisation, consolidationand preservation in which military operations

would be sporadic and limited. This pre-revolutionary phase, the strategic defensive,would concentrate on building will and trainingand organising the peasants into subversive

elements to enable the guerrillas to live amongthe population as little fishes in the ocean. 30 The second phase would involve sporadicmilitary attacks on enemy outposts and patrolscoupled to a philosophy of eroding the faith of the people in the government while enhancingthe cause celebre of the insurgents to defeatthe government. This strategic stalemate

would concentrate on establishing bases,increasing the tempo of operations and trainingunits for the decisive third phase. This wouldbe the strategic offensive in which therevolutionary movement would be organisedinto regular military units and inflict a defeat onthe constitutional military in conventional

Mao insisted that the political and military organisation run separately

but in parallel with each other..


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battle. Every phase should occursimultaneously, so that the revolution is self-fulfilling and ever-lasting. 31 It poured anotherfoundation onto Lawrences uncompromisingbelief in Clausewitzs most famous dictum thatwar is a continuation of politics by othermeans. Mao insisted that the political andmilitary organisation run separately but inparallel with each other. 32

Maos philosophy on guerrilla warfare,extensively published after the Communistvictory in 1949, gained wide currency. However,the philosophys success must be interpretedwithin a broader understanding of China in the

late-1930s, particularly concerning the Japanese invasion in 1937. This had largelyeradicated the China-based threats to Maosmovement, effectively clearing the way for hisaccession to power. However, the success of acommunist-inspired revolution in a period of great instability in the world after the SecondWorld War precipitated a number of revolutionaries to copy his philosophy in theirreach for power in their own countries. Between1950 and 1970 there were at least teninsurrections across the globe in which Maosmodel, or the Marxist ideology from which itwas inspired, was the chosen vehicle. 33 Not allof these were successful; revolutionary modelstend to work only in the country in which it wasborn and, on more occasions than not, areentirely terrain dependent. The relevance is inthe fact that his philosophies were studied andadapted and did inspire other revolutionarymovements, regardless of their eventualoutcome. Latin America in the 1960s was aparticularly fertile continent for revolutionaryaspirations.

GUEVARA, FOCO AND LATINAMERICA

Ernesto Che Guevara was born inArgentina in 1928 and had trained as a doctorbefore travelling through South America. Hewas in Guatemala in 1954 when the CIAmanufactured the overthrow of a left-winggovernment; the uprising convinced Guevara inthe strength of revolution. He fought alongsideFidel Castro in Cuba between 1956 and 1959. 34 He then travelled throughout Latin Americaduring the 1960s and attempted to export hisrevolutionary ideas.

Whereas most theories of revolution seemto agree that certain preconditions must be metif a revolutionary situation is to arise, Guevarastheory was built on the basis that only aminimum level of discontent with agovernment would be sufficient to createobjective conditions favourable to revolutionand to kindle the first spark. 35 Therevolutionaries themselves would create theconditions from which the people would wantto revolt. 36 Once this level had been reached,military forces would provide the foco forrevolution by exposing the corruption ingovernment and the sufferings that it inflictedon the people. The foco would be the smallmotor of revolutionary dissolution. 37 It wouldstrike from its base in the countryside becausethe guerrilla fighter is above all an agrarianrevolutionary. 38

Guevaras attempts to export his modelthroughout Latin America in the 1960s failedbecause foco was built on the false premise of revolutionary success in Cuba in which theconditions for revolution certainly did exist. 39 Castros victory in Cuba where the conditionseither the minimum levels of discontent did


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not exist or the intrusion by revolutionary,multi-national armies bent on a form of regime change was not welcomed. 40 Also,Guevaras deliberate engineering of a ruralinsurgency movement ultimately ignored therural to urban migration that had seen urbancentres at an alarming rate. Guevaras greatestfailure was in Bolivia, where his efforts atimplanting foco was intended to subsequentlystart a chain reaction of foquismo throughArgentina, Brazil and Peru. Bolivias land reformprogramme and its nationalisation of the tinmines had enriched great swathes of the ruraland urban populations, depriving Guevara of anything like the seeds of disenfranchisementthat were vital for his movement to mature. Thetin mining community regarded his [Guevaras]small band of assorted followers Cubans,Peruvians, a few Bolivians and one East Germanwoman as aliensthe Bolivian army was moreof a peoples army than the foco. 41 Guevarawas killed in Bolivia in October 1967, his focotheories largely discredited and abandoned.

A PASSAGE OF RITE: URBANINSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

The over-emphasis on insurgenciesseizing power from a rural base had generateda swathe of counter-arguments from theoristsand practitioners who extolled the virtues of revolution with an urban insurgency core. Thisfrequently spilled over into urban terrorism, atrend demonstrated by the Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA) resistance to British rule. 42 Indeed

just as urban insurgency developed as a vehiclefor revolution in conjunction with growingurbanisation, so too did the frequency of attacks on innocent civilians, deliberate orotherwise. The bond between urban insurgencyand terrorism is now indivisible. A number of protagonists emerged to demonstrate the

growing attraction of this relationship. Principalamong these were Menachem Begin in Palestine(1944-48), George Grivas in Cyprus (1956) andCarlos Marighela in Brazil (1967).

BEGINS PALESTINIAN WAR

By 1943, British administrative control of Palestine had generated a sense of extremeresentment among the local population.Frustrated by the British refusal to lift itsimmigration laws to allow more Jews into thecountry, and contemptuous that the British hadseemingly reneged on its commitment to giveindependence to Palestine, a number of Jewish

resistance movements appeared. One of thosewas Irgun, a right wing organisation that wasled by Menachem Begin. For Irgun and Begin,the time had come to fight and to breakthrough the gates from within. 43 Beginannounced that all the hopes that beat in ourhearts have evaporated without a trace. Wehave not been accorded international status, no

Jewish army has been set up, the gates of thecountry have not been opened. Our people are

at war with this regime war to the end 44

Begins fight was to be a political strugglepursued by military means, in which Britainwould be targeted directly through a precisebombing campaign that would deliberately,tirelessly, [and] unceasingly destroy itsprestige in the eyes of the internationalcommunity. 45 Palestine would be turned into aglass house into which the worlds attention

would be focused. He would achieve this bywelding terrorist tactics to an extremelysophisticated propaganda machine thatencouraged each of the insurgent organisationsto run its own illegal radio station and anunderground paper 46 so that the propaganda


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of the deed [of violence] 47 would achieve theaim.

Between September 1946 and July 1947,there were over 600 British military casualties,

the majority resulting from road mines, aparticularly lethal form of attack which injuredthe vehicle driver and the occupants. Britishcounter-tactics typically failed and theinsurgents who planted the mines usuallyescaped undetected. 48 There were a selectnumber of attacks on the intelligence andsecurity apparatus, and more than 90 attackson economic targets involving over 20 trainderailments and attacks on the oil pipeline. 49

The selection of economic targets had the dualpurpose of increasing both the financial burdenof the Palestinian government by raising thedirect and indirect security costs (and thustaxes), and the number of troops that wereassigned to protect those targets, thusreducing the number of troops that could beinvolved in counter-insurgency operations.Begins campaign was also exported to Italy,

Germany and Austria where the BritishEmbassies were all bombed. 50 The terroristcampaign cost 338 British lives and led to thehandover of the territory to the United Nationsin 1948. Israel was granted independence ayear later. Attention would now turn to the

further evolution of urban insurgency inCyprus.

GRIVAS, EOKA AND CYPRUS

Urban insurgency was given another shotin the arm by George Grivass EOKA (NationalOrganisation of Cypriot Fighters)-led campaignin Cyprus between 1953 and 1956. Hiscampaign against British colonial rule began in1953 with the political objective of achievingenosis (union) between Cyprus and Greece. Thiswould be fought by directing a guerrilla war asthe sole instrument of the political aimpursued. 51 Conditions for revolution were ripe,

with British taxes incurring the wrath of virtually all Greek Cypriots. 52

Grivass strategy was built around thebelief that national liberation movements musthave the complete and unreserved support of the majority of the countrys inhabitants. 53 Thepurpose was to win a moral victory through aprocess of attrition, by harassing, confusingand finally exasperating the enemy forces, with

the object of achieving our main aim. He alsobelieved in spending a great deal of time in thepreparatory phase, building the will of thepeople and organising the insurgencymovement. He attached great significance tothe secrecy behind the insurgencys movement,but discarded Maos 3rd phase believing thatthe insurgency could deliver the objective byitself.

EOKAs terrorist campaign bombed Britishgovernment offices in Cyprus, murdered Britishsubjects and displayed a wanton disregard forCypriot life by inflicting terrorist atrocities inbroad daylight, killing women, children andmembers of the clergy. 54 Other than bombing,his chosen methods of attack included arson,sabotage, raids on police armouries, street

Britain would be targeted directly through a precise bombing

campaign that would deliberately,tirelessly, [and] unceasingly

destroy its prestige


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murder and mining. 55 The campaign swungbetween rural and urban theatres. DuringNovember 1956, there were 416 terroristincidents in which more than 35 people died; inApril 1957 EOKA exploded 50 bombs andassassinated two British soldiers. 56 As thestruggle increasingly took on the spectacle of acivil war a political solution becameprogressively more attractive. Eventually, EOKAhalted its demands for enosis and a Republic of Cyprus was declared in 1959.

The significance of Grivass campaign isfound in his own admission that he appliedcertain principles and methods which were

applicable to the special case of Cyprus. In myopinion that was one of the principal reasonsfor our military success. 57 He not only fused hismilitary campaign to a political objective butstudied the historical offerings at hand, inparticular Mao and Guevara. He adapted bothmodels to create an urban and rural insurgencymovement which successfully employedterrorism and guerrilla warfare. As Grivasscampaign was interpreted by others asachieving political success, so the evolution of urban insurgency continued. The strugglewould now move back to Latin America.

MARIGHELAS BRAZILIAN DREAM

The evolution of urban insurgencyreceived fresh impetus with the publication inthe late 1960s of the revolutionary theories of Brazils Carlos Marighela. Considered by many

as possibly the most widely read, known andimitated theoretician and practitioner of urbanguerrilla warfare 58 , Marighela had been acommunist activist for over 40 years until heformed the Action for National Liberation (ALN),a revolutionary movement that intended todestroy the present Brazilian economic,

political and social system 59 Achievingsuccess would be dependent on adapting therevolutionary models of Che Guevara and FidelCastro to suit conditions in Brazil at the time.Rapid urbanisation had exposed several deep-running sores within Brazilian society, not leastthe burgeoning shanty towns with their highunemployment and feeble prospects. Marighelarightly identified that the city would be theprimary battleground for his revolutionaryconcepts to take hold. 60

Marighelas revolutionary philosophyrevolved around inflicting specific acts of terrorism in order to generate a government

response. That response would be eitherconciliatory or brutally repressive; either way itwould serve to further alienate the population.The city offered both soft targets and theperfect landscape on which the populationcould effectively judge that response. AlistairHorne, who analysed the impact of Marighelaswork on the Algerian Independence movementin the 1950s, summed up his strategy:Marighelas essential philosophy was that aresort to blind terrorism would inevitablyprovoke the forces of law and order into anequally blind repression, which in turn wouldlead to a backlash by the hitherto uncommitted,polarise the situation into two extreme campsand make impossible any dialogue of compromise by eradicating the soft centre. 61 The ALN would also follow a strict propagandacode tied to the careful use of masscommunications and the media. His Minimanualconfirms this approach: The coordination of urban guerrilla 62 action, including each armedsection, is the principal way of making armedpropaganda. These actions, carried out withspecific and determined objectives, inevitablybecome propaganda material for the masscommunications system. Bank assaults,


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ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms,the rescue of prisoners, executions,kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the warof nerves, are all cases in point. The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressivetechnique, based on the direct or indirect useof mass means of communication and newstransmitted orally in order to demoralise thegovernment. 63

Tactically, Marighela initiated a series of actions that would be designed to bespectacular, targeting Brazilian authorities aswell as multi-national companies in order toweaken the economy by driving foreign capital

out. 64 His principal techniques were letterbombs, assassinations and politically motivatedkidnappings. These included kidnapping the USAmbassador to Brazil and demanding therelease of 15 prisoners; both the Ambassadorand the prisoners were released. 65

Ultimately Marighelas theories failedbecause the governments response, thoughbrutally repressive, did not have the desired

effect of alienating the population. It seemedimpervious to the claims of the insurgents andincreasingly rejected their violent tactics. 66 Asurvey carried out in Rio de Janeiro in 1969showed that 79% of the citys inhabitantsrejected terrorism. 67 Ultimately, the insurgentsfailed to develop a rural component tocomplement their urban strategy and theirattacks did not themselves threaten thegovernment. 68 Marighelas fate dovetailed with

that of his theories and he was eventually killedin a police ambush in 1969, an operation whichgovernment forces labelled as the biggestsuccess of the 1969 counter-guerrillaoperations. 69 Up until this moment,insurgencies were regional and based looselyaround the communist ideology. That would

face competition in the 1970s as a highlypoliticised strain of Islam emerged from theMiddle East. It dominates insurgency andterrorism to this day.

RUMBLINGS OF POLITICAL ISLAM

By the 1970s insurgency had evolved intoa revolutionary competition between rulinggovernments and those forces that used avariety of means to challenge their legitimacy. Ithad progressed from a solely rural affair intoone that swayed between the city and thecountryside depending on what the conditionsgave the insurgents the best chance of success.

It had discarded the concept of violent strugglefor pure violences sake and replaced it with aformula whereby violent struggle could only besuccessful if there was a political goal in sight.That political goal had alternated between thetwin ideological pillars of Marxism andCapitalism which, for much of the 20thCentury, elevated insurgency to Cold Warobjectives. And as the Cold War thawed after1991, so the new ideological pillar,

representative of radical Islam, was erected.Sayyid Qutb, one of the small handful of theorists behind Islams resurgence, is clear:The communists failed. The nationalist leadersfailed. The secularists totally failed. Now thefield is empty of all ideologies exceptIslamNow at this most critical time whenturmoil and confusion reign, it is the turn of Islam, of the umma to play its role. Islams timehas come. 70 As the century drew to its violent

close, global insurgency would be added to therepertoire of irregular war strategy. RadicalIslams cause was given a powerful boostcourtesy of the last of the superpower proxywars which took place in Afghanistan in 1979,in the last of the superpower proxy wars.


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In 1979, several massive events shookthe Muslim world. A peace deal was signedbetween Israel and Egypt, 71 Ayatollah Khomeiniseized power in Iran under the banner of theIranian Revolution, 49 American citizens werehostages in the US Embassy in Tehran, 72 aradical Islamist group seized control of theGrand Mosque at Mecca, and the Soviet Unioninvaded Afghanistan. 73 Each of these eventswould now be played out in the Afghan theatrewhere a new strain of jihadist insurgency wouldemerge.

JIHAD!

Afghan communists had seized powerduring a coup in 1978. The Soviet Union, evermindful of the threat to its interests fromPakistan and Iran, both of whom were Americanallies, had signed a treaty of friendship with theAfghan leaders that bound the two countriesfirmly together. The ruling parties 74 subsequently initiated a series of policies of radical agrarian reform, compulsory literacy,and the imposition of socialism, through

thousands of arrests and summary execution 75 that alienated large swathes of a traditional andtribal-based population. Following this, theKhalq faction disposed of the Parcham in avicious purge. In April 1979 there was a generaluprising after which the government lostcontrol of the countryside. The Soviet Unionintervened on 26 December 1979 to halt thegovernments slide and the cracking of theSoviet socialist edifice. 76

The invasion sparked great consternationthroughout the West, particularly in Americaand Britain. Occurring during the closing weekof a tumultuous year, the US Congress almostimmediately granted millions in foreign aid to aresistance movement and promised to support

a resistance movement. The resistance thatemerged was initiated by Islamic religiousnetworks across the Muslim world; it wouldtake the form of jihad, or Holy War. Those thatwould inflict would fight under the banner of Islam as Mujahidin or Warriors of God.

The call for jihad, positively encouragedby America, galvanised seven Sunni Muslimresistance movements from across the Muslimworld to repel the impious invader andliberate a land of Islam (dar el-Islam) under thebanner of an Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin(IUAM).77 Saudi Arabia, custodian of the TwoHoly Places of Islam (Medina and Mecca) and

therefore defacto leader of Islam, viewed itsinvolvement in Afghanistan as part of itsstruggle for that leadership. That struggle hadbeen given fresh impetus after KhomeinisRevolution had swept him to power earlier inthe year. A resurgent Shi`i Iran could threatenSunni hegemony. Saudi leadership of Islam,already threatened by revolt earlier in the yearat the Grand Mosque, could not suffer anotherreversal. Therefore, the Saudi governmentdecided that it would not only financiallysupport the Sunni-based Mujahidin but that itwould export, on an industrial scale 78 , itsWahhabist and Salafist 79 interpretation of Islamto Pakistan. 80 The exporting of petro-Islam tothe scores of medrassahs (religious schools) inPeshawar after 1979 reinforced Saudi Arabiasintent for the war in Afghanistan to be foughtunder the banner of Islam and jihad.

Thousands of Wahhabist Sunnis fromacross the Muslim world travelled to the NorthWest Frontier, and from there into Afghanistan,to join forces with the Afghan resistancemovement. This force was perceived by theWest as freedom fighters and by Saudi Arabiaas the vanguard of the Umma and the jihad. 81


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The seven resistance groups, the PeshawarSeven, had diverse political, ideological, andreligious views which were patchily united bythe CIA under the common objective of establishing an Islamic government inAfghanistan under the Shari`a code of law. 82

On arrival in the region, the volunteersmet with Afghani soldiers, Pakistani militaryand CIA operatives in training camps andcentres along the border regions of Pakistanand Iran. 83 There they learned the necessities of guerrilla warfare - ambushes, sabotage, small-arms weapon training, use of terrain,concealment and demolitions. Particular

attention was paid to teaching mine warfare. 84 From those centres, small detachments of

mujahidin, totalling between 90,000 to250,000 guerrilla fighters, 85 were funnelled intoAfghanistan. Armed with a wide selection of light weapons, mortars, DShK machine gunsand, increasingly after 1986, hand-held Stingerantiaircraft missiles, the detachments carriedout widespread sabotage of bridges, pipelines

and electricity pylons, extensive road mining,attacks on small Soviet garrisons, andoccasionally participating in combat as part of alarger, more powerful regimental formation. 86

At their peak, the Soviets had over120,000 men in Afghanistan supported by over30,000 men operating in Soviet territory. In all,

some 642,000 men were rotated throughAfghanistan over the whole campaign. Inaddition to the 13,000 dead or missing, Sovietforces lost over 300 helicopters and over 1,300armoured personnel carriers. 87 In 1989,President Gorbachev ordered the Red Army towithdraw from Afghanistan, providingconfirmation that the war had destroyed themyth of a (superpower) in the minds of Muslimmujahidin young men. 88 Among them werethree individuals who would come to articulatethe struggle in a much broader, and for theWest more menacing, sense. Those individualswere Abdallah Azzam, Ayman Muhammed al-Zawahiri, and Usama bin-Laden.

ABDALLAH AZZAM AND THE SIXPILLARS OF ISLAM

Abdallah Azzam, a professor of IslamicLaw from Palestine and Jordan and founder of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, hadtravelled to Pakistan during the 1980s tosupport the Afghan resistance movement. InPeshawar, where he was the best known ArabIslamist 89 he founded the Council of IslamicCoordination, an Arab-based charity under theaegis of the Red Crescent of Kuwait and SaudiArabia. From there, he founded the Bureau of Services to the Mujahidin to receive, supervise,and organise all these people. 90 Azzamspriorities lay in demonstrating that jihad inAfghanistan was the moral and financialobligation of every Muslim. He proclaimed, andpublished articles in a series of jihadistnewspapers to support his assertions that if the enemy has entered Muslim lands, the jihadbecomes an individual obligation according toall doctors of the law, all commentators of theSacred Texts, and all scholars of tradition(those who assembled the words of theProphet). 91 Afghanistan was merely the first

It was Azzams epic, mythic,fantastical language that was to become the standard mode of expression for jihadi radicals

over the next decade.


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land usurped by infidels and it was theindividual duty of every Muslim to reclaim thatland. The struggle would not lapse there, butwill remain an individual obligation until allother lands which formerly were Muslim comeback to us and Islam reigns within them onceagain. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara,Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia 92 In doingso, Azzam told his followers that jihad had tobecome the 6th pillar of Islam, to which everyMuslim must subscribe. 93

Although other clerics called for jihad,Azzams proclamations were given extra kudosbecause what he called for [in Afghanistan]

actually came about. 94 He became theideologue of the Arab Afghans deliveringhugely charismatic and knowledgeable sermonsabout Islamic law, jihad and the persuasiveallure of martyrdom. It was Azzams epic,mythic, fantastical language that was tobecome the standard mode of expression forjihadi radicals over the next decade. 95 In1984, Azzam founded a movement to providelogistics and religious instruction to themujahidin; it was known as Al-Qai`da al-Sulbah (or the solid base). 96 This base wouldenable jihad to be exported throughout theworld as part of a cosmic struggle 97 in pursuitof an Islamic caliphate. A few months later,Azzam and his two sons were murdered by acar bomb. The yawning gap that his deathcreated was quickly filled by Ayman Muhammedal-Zawihiri, a medical student of his fromEgypt.

KNIGHTS UNDER THE BANNER OFTHE PROPHET98

Al-Zawahiri, born in Egypt in 1951, hadbecome radicalised at an early age through theteachings of Azzam and the writings of spiritual

leaders of radical Islamist groups. One of thesewas Sayyid Qutb, who urged his Islamistfollowers to launch something wider. 99 ForQutb division in the world was stark, In theworld there is only one party, the party of Allah;all of the others are parties of Satan andrebellion. Those who believe fight in the causeof Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in thecause of rebellion. 100 Al- Zawahiri becamefurther radicalised when he was imprisoned,along with thousands of others, for theassassination of Egyptian President Sadat in1981.

On his release three years later, he was

asked to go to Afghanistan to take part in arelief project. He found the request a goldenopportunity to get to know closely the field of

Jihad, which could be a base for Jihad in Egyptand the Arab world, the heart of the Islamicworld where real battle for Islam exists. 101 Previous attempts at inciting jihad in Egypt hadfailed because the Nile Valley falls between twodeserts without vegetation or water whichrenders the area unsuitable for guerrillawarfare 102

Following a second prison term ended in1984, he returned to the incubator of Afghanistan where jihad could acquire practicalexperience in combat, politics andorganisational matters. 103 This had not beenthe case elsewhere because wars were foughtunder nationalist banners mingled with Islamand sometimes even withcommunist

banners. 104 It was during this second period in1987 that al-Zawahiri met the third individualin the pack, Usama bin Laden. Theirpartnership, founded in Afghanistan, wouldflourish into a multinational organisation. Itsspiritual leader was al-Zawahiri.


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USAMA AND THE CULT OFPERSONALITY

Usama bin Ladens history and currentinvolvement in transnational terrorism is nowinfamous. Born in 1957 as one of 57 children toa Saudi construction magnate, it is estimatedthat bin Laden inherited roughly $300 millionwhen his father died in 1967. 105 As the onlychild to not volunteer for an overseas universityeducation, bin Laden enrolled into the AbdulAziz University in Jeddah, which was then acentre for Islamic dissidents from all over theworld. It was here that the bin Laden wasexposed, and seemingly hypnotised, by thefiery sermons of Abdallah Azzam andMohammed Qutb. 106 The massive events thathad shaken the Muslim world in 1979 occurredin the same year that bin Laden left university,and they left a deep impression on him. 107

Bin Laden first travelled to Peshawar in1980, and by 1984 was firmly ensconced there.He set up various charitable organisations forthe mujahidin and worked at Azzams al-Jihadnewspaper, the standout paper in the region atthe time. 108 Azzam was a huge influence on binLaden through his ability to fuse Islamistscholarship with contemporary issues affectingthe Muslim world. By adhering to the Azzamline of the sixth pillar, bin Laden became knownin Afghanistan chiefly as a person whogenerously helped fund the jihad. 109 Workingalongside Azzam in the Bureau of Services, binLaden realised that jihad in Afghanistan wouldincreasingly depend on a complex network of charities, sympathisers and financiers. Thoughhe did fight, his principal contribution was inthe financial support he donated and thecontacts he made with the mujahidincommanders. These contacts formed thefoundation for al-Qai`da, which literally

translated means the [Data] base. 110 AlthoughAl-Qai`das and Usama bin Ladens greatestimpact was still to come, by 1988 he began toextol the virtues of a worldwide jihad and hisattention increasingly turned to Palestine.

The Red Army withdrew in early 1989leaving a puppet regime whose time in powerwould be immediately challenged. Pakistan,wishing to see an Islamic government inAfghanistan, continued to support themujahidin in their unfulfilled quest for power.In one of the last major tactical battles of thewar, the mujahidin attacked Jalalabad with theintention of seizing it as the new administrative

capital of the country. The attack failed andonly served to expose the serious infightingamong the myriad of mujahidin factions. ForBin Laden and other fanatical Islamists, the in-fighting represented fitna (strife or divisionwithin Islam), a state of affairs which wasexpressly forbidden in the Qur`an. 111

The jihadist war in Afghanistan had bothshort and long-term effects. In the short term,

Soviet forces were defeated by a guerrilla armywho had adapted the tactics and strategies of Mao, Guevara, Begin, Grivas and Marighela toachieve their political objectives of installing anIslamic government, though it would takeanother few years for the Taliban to seizepower. The longer-term effects were more far-reaching. The Arab leaders viewed this Afghanwar as a training course of the utmostimportance to prepare Muslim mujahidin to

wage their awaited battle against thesuperpower that now has sole dominance overthe globe, namely, the United States. 112 Fuelledby Azzams exhortations to violence 113 , inwhich anything but armed struggle is rejected,the Afghan war had re-asserted the Arab belief in their cosmic struggle for a pure and just


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Islamic state, something that had not occurredsince the Prophets death 1,300 years ago. Thatwas the new political objective to which thisglobal insurgency would fight to achieve.

INSURGENCY IN A NEW CENTURY

Two events in this new century haveforced the world into what Dr Stephen Metz haslabelled another age of insurgency analogousto the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. 114 The first event was 9/11 and the potentialthreat from a resurgent militant Islam; thesecond event is the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. After nearly four

accumulated years of highly charged debate anew category that Dr John Mackinlay haslabelled a global insurgency has emerged. 115

Both these events have forced WesternGovernments and the United States inparticular, to push the study of insurgency andirregular warfare to the forefront of military andpolitical debate. There are now a growingnumber of politicians, military academics,

strategists, historians and investigative journalists who are examining the subjects andprofessing another theory (and often a

prescriptive solution) to subjects that remainfraught with perils. 116

The study of insurgency has revealed anumber of core themes or principles. Support

of the people is critical enabling the insurgentto blend in. Insurgencies will inflict hit and runtactics and avoid pitched battle until theinsurgent forces are ready. Throughout the20th Century, insurgents used propaganda andthe media as a weapon. All insurgencies havebeen fused by a political ideology, a drive foran alternative political structure to replace thecurrent power base. Above all, insurgents havecompeted for power with the government and

have used every means at their disposal inorder to win. By contrast, counter-insurgencyforces have not been given the same freedomof manoeuvre than conventional forces, as thenext chapter will illustrate.

Major Mike Shervington serves in the British Army.This article is Chapter 2 from his dissertation SmallWars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessonsfrom Iraq.

Editors Note: Major Shervingtons full dissertation,including his extensive footnotes and references fromthis chapter, omitted here for space, are available onlineat SWJ.


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The Political WarfighterMr. Erik Evans

War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. 1

- Mao Tse-Tung

In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep solders out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake. 2

- Marine General Samuel B. Griffith

Our fighters have gone through a dogged political education... 3

- General Vo Nguyen Giap

1 Mao Tse-Tung, , On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Period of the War of Resistance Against

Japan Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. p. 1522 Sameul B. Griffith, On Guerrilla Warfare, Chicago: Universityof Illinois Press, 1961. p. 83 Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War, Peoples Army, Honolulu:University Press of the Pacific, 2001. p. 60

In classic Maoist warfare the politicalindoctrination of the populationsconsciousness is the principle task of the

guerrilla fighter. The guerilla is in essence apolitical warfighter that wages war against hisenemy in the political and military realms. He isreadily capable of conducting politicalcampaigns to convince or coerce the populationto back the insurgency while mounting combatoperations against enemy forces. Conversely,foot soldiers in a counter-insurgency campaignoften have no political component to theirmission. Their directive is to seek out and

destroy guerrillas in the military battlespace,

not to politically energize the passions of thepeople against the insurgent movement.Whereas, the political guerrilla stirs, captures

and channels the hatred and animosity of thepeople against the insurgent infrastructuresenemies (i.e. a constituted government or anoccupying army). The guerrilla acts as apolitical force that supercharges the insurgentorganizations political campaign. Meanwhile,the apolitical counter-insurgent actor gives nopolitical advantage to the cause that he serves.


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Mao Tse-Tung believed thatunderstanding the relationship between politicsand war was essential to prosecuting successfulmilitary campaigns. His ideas closely echoedthe sentiments of 19 th century Prussian generalCarl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz contended thatwar develops in and springs forth from thewomb of politics. 1 Mao concurred, In a word,war cannot for a single moment be separatedfrom politics. 2 Clausewitz argued that war isemployed to further political objectives in thesame way that other political means (i.e.diplomatic cables, sanctions etc.) are utilized. Itdiffers only from other political conflicts in thatit is resolved through bloodshed. 3 Mao similarlystated, ...that politics is war without bloodshedwhile war is politics with bloodshed. 4

Mao emphasized the importance of politics in guerrilla warfare. He stated that,Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare mustfail. 5 He believed that the guerrilla must havea precise conception of the political goal forwhich he is fighting and the politicalorganization to be used in attaining that goal. 6 Mao saw political training as the keycomponent in the development of a politicallycharged foot soldier. Military arts were not thesole or principal concern of the guerrilla. Maostated that, The fighting capacity of a guerrillaunit is not determined exclusively by militaryarts, but depends above all on politicalconsciousness, political influence, setting inmotion the broad popular masses,disintegrating the enemy army, and inducing

1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , edited by Peter Paretand M. Howard, New York: Knopf, 1993. p. 1732 Mao, p. 1533 Clausewitz, p. 1734 Mao, p. 1535 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961. p. 436 Mao, p. 88

the broad popular masses to accept ourleadership. 7 Political training gave the guerrillaan effective knowledge base that he could useto fulfill his primary objective; politicalmobilization of the population.

The goal of political mobilization is totransform a disorganized and inert populationinto a politically organized and energized body.The first step in political mobilization is theestablishment a political aim and politicalprogram to support that aim. Politicalmobilization does not involve the merepresentation of the political aim and program

to the population. Rather it is a metaphysicalbonding with the population that connects thepolitical aim and program intimately with thepeoples lives. Mao stated, Our job is notrecite our political program to the people, fornobody will listen to recitations; we must linkthe political mobilization for the war with thedevelopments in the war and with the life of thesoldiers and the people, and make it a

7 Mao Tse-Tung, Basic Tactics: Political Work, 1937http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm#ch15

Giap stated that in Vietnams war against foreign powers, political

activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than

propaganda. Counter-insurgency

doctrine often reverses this strategy with resulting failure.


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continuous movement. 1 Mobilization binds thepopulation, army and government together intoa coherent war machine. Why did Mao viewpolitical mobilization of the population as thekey to success in war? The answer lies within ananalysis of the Clausewitzian trinity and howMao applied it to the Sino-Japanese war.

Clausewitz argued that war differed fromother political expression in that it is producedand governed by three dominant tendenciesknown as the paradoxical trinity: (1) Theelements of primordial violence and animositywhich mainly concern the people; (2) Probabilityand chance which the army and its commander

must contend with on the battlefield and; (3)Wars subordination to the political realm,which is the sole concern of the governmentand its ability to reason the politics of conflict. 2 Clausewitz contended that during 18th centuryEuropean warfare, the peoples role in war wasextinguished. 3 During that time periodEuropean governments did not turn theelements of primordial violence and hatred thatare latent in the people against their enemies.War was the business of governments andarmies alone.

The French Revolution reintroduced andreemphasized the elements of primordialviolence and pure hatred in warfare. Clausewitzstated that, in 1793 a force appeared thatbeggared all imagination. Suddenly war againbecame the business of the people - a peopleof thirty millions, all of whom considered

themselves to be citizens. 4 Warfare in Europe

1 Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: The Period of the War of Resistance

Against Japan Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific,2001. p. 1522 Clausewitz, p. 1013 Clausewitz, p. 7124 Clausewitz, p. 715

was no longer just the business of governmentsand their armies. The French had the advantagebecause their political structure was designedto arouse and capture the violence of the wholepopulation. The political framework of European governments was structured tosupport small professional armies and couldnot channel the might of the people againstFrance.

Clausewitz criticized Europeangovernments for believing that they could stopthe power of the French with the governmentand army alone. He stated, It was expectedthat a moderate auxiliary corps would be

enough to end a civil war [French Revolution];but the colossal weight of the whole Frenchpeople, unhinged by political fanaticism, camecrashing down on us. 5 Radical alterations inthe political character of European governmenthad to be undertaken to defeat France.Napoleons armies were destroyed onceEuropes statesmen recognized the nature of politics that brought the masses and all theirenergy into war. 6 During the early Sino-

Japanese war Mao came to the conclusion thatthe Chinese resistance against the Japanese wassimilarly making the same mistake that theEuropean governments did during theNapoleonic wars.

Mao argued that the Chinese resistancewas not accessing the hatred and animosity of the people. He argued that Chinese resistanceamounted to a ...partial war because it is being

waged only by the government and the army,and not by the people. It is precisely here thatthe chief reason for the great loss of territoryand for the many military setbacks during the

5 Clausewitz, p. 6276 Clausewitz, p. 737


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last few months is to be found. 1 From Maosperspective, the Chinese needed to stir thepassions of the people against the Japanese. Hecondemned Chiang Kai-shek and theKuomintang for suppressing the role of thepeople in war. He wrote, The [Kuomintang]think the Japanese aggressors can be defeatedby the governments efforts alone, but they arewrong. A few battles may be won in a war of resistance fought by the government alone, butit will be impossible to defeat the Japaneseoppressors thoroughly. This can be done onlyby a war of total resistance by the wholenation. 2 The politicization of the soldier andpolitical mobilization of the population werethe solutions to Chinas problems. Note thatMaos references to the army, government andpeople are akin to Clausewitzs trinity.

Clausewitz and Mao lambasted militarytheorists who denied that there was an intimaterelationship with politics. They both blamed theloss of wars in their respective time periods onleaders who eschewed the role of thepeople/primordial violence in war. Warfare wasnot just the business of governments and themilitary. The North Vietnamese communistsalso believed that tapping into the primordialviolence of the people through politicalmobilization would bring victory in battle.Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap said,Many a time the political force of the massescrushed enemy mopping up operations andsuccessfully protected our compatriots livesand property. 3 The force of the people wouldenergize the military and government into anawesome war machine. Giap wrote, In a

1 Mao,.p. 492 Mao, .p.25 3 Vo Nguyen Giap, The South Vietnam People WillWin, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. p.21

revolutionary war, the peoples politicalsuperiority will be translated into a materialforce capable of turning the table on theenemy, overcoming all difficulties andhardships to defeat in the end an enemy who atfirst was several times stronger. 4 The Chineseand Vietnamese armies garnered stunningwartime success in the application of politicalmobilization in their war planning.

Insurgent groups that have tapped intothe violent passions of people through politicalindoctrination pose a dangerous threat tocounter-insurgent forces. For example,Hezbollah developed a psychological-political

campaign that successfully channeled theviolence and hatred of the Shiite populationagainst Israel. 5 Hezbollah emulated Maosdictum that, The political goal must be clearlyand precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their nationalconsciousness awakened. 6 Ibrahim Moussawi,a spokesman for Hezbollah, stressed thesignificance of instructing the populace in theinsurgent infrastructures political agenda:

We [Hezbollah] give as much support aspossible to the people living in theoccupied zone, making them aware thatthe eventual outcome of the war is alsoabout their freedom. Obviously, this hascertain serious psychologicalimplications for those trying to counterour efforts. We have been more

4 Giap, p. 365

For discussion on Hezbollahs successful tactics againstIsrael see Clive Jones, Israeli Counter-InsurgencyStrategy and the War in South Lebanon, Small Wars and

Insurgencies , Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1997), p. 82-108, AlJ. Venter Middle East Mind Games: Interview WithHezbollah Soldier Of Fortune . January 1998: p. 63, andBrendan OShea, Israels Vietnam? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , Vol. 21, No.3 (Jul-Sep 98). p. 207-2206 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare , Chicago:University of Illinois Press, 1961. p. 89


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successful in achieving this objectivethan the enemy [Israelis] in recent

times. 1

A central component of Islamic militant-

political groups, such as Hezbollah, has been topoliticize the masses through educational,social and religious programs. The MuslimBrotherhood and its splinter groups, such asHAMAS and the Egyptian Gamaa Islamiyya,have made a political and spiritual connectionto the masses through their grassroots social-political programs. A Gamaa Islamiyya tractstated, The social activities of the Gamaa havehad great effect on the people, this is the secret

of the spiritual union for the Gamaa withpeople from amongst the poor in particular. 2 The insurgent movements religious-spiritual-political connection with the people allows it tocontrol and channel their violent passions.

Giap stated that in Vietnams war againstforeign powers, political activities were moreimportant than military activities, and fightingless important than propaganda. 3 Counter-

insurgency doctrine often reverses this strategywith resulting failure. Military activities becomemore important than political activities andfighting becomes more important thanpropaganda. The apolitical counter-insurgencycampaign is doomed against politically chargedinsurgent movements. As the lone insurgentfighter moves through the countryside and thecity, he brings with him something moredestructive to his enemy than bombs, bullets or

1 Ibrahim Moussawi in interview with Al J. Venter Middle East Mind Games: Interview With Hezbollah,Soldier Of Fortune, January 1998. p. 632 Sheikh Rifaey Ahmad Taha, The Islamic State inEgypt is Approaching,www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/egypt.htm3 Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War, Peoples Army,Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. p. 79

bayonets; a political message. He uses thispolitical message to spin a political webbetween himself and the people that nets thecounter-insurgent forces trying to destroy him.

The answer to the politically chargedguerrilla fighter is the development of apolitically charged counter-insurgency fighter,a political warfighter. A political warfighter thatunderstands the political aim and politicalprogram of the counter-insurgency campaign.A political warfighter who can galvanize theprimordial violence and hateful instincts of thepeople against the insurgent enemy. A politicalwarfighter that can unlock the political

fanaticism of the people just as the Frenchrevolutionaries, Napoleon, Mao Tse-Tung andVo Nguyen Giap did in past wars. The politicalwarfighter is the spark. The political message isthe fuel. The peoples hatred and animosity arethe fire. The fire that forges a successful warmachine.

Erik Evans. completed a B.A. in History from UCSB and an M.A. in National Security Studies. His research focus is on

insurgency/counter-insurgency and the role of small arms inwarfare. He is currently attending a gunsmithing program in

Lakewood, Colorado.


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AN AFTERNOON WITH BERNARD FALLLtCol W G Leftwich, USMC

A tribute to the memory of a gifted writer who knew his subject implicitly,including the Marines with whom he lived and died.

Copyright Marine Corps Association, 1969 .Published in the Marine Corps Gazette, Feb, 1969

Reprinted with permission.

Editors Note: Bernard Fall is well known to students of Small Wars. Imagine our surprise when we found this articlerecounting his afternoon spent with another well known warrior (yes, Marine, that Leftwich). The Marine Corps Gazette hasbeen extremely generous with granting us this reprint from their archives. The Gazette now has its archives online.

TWO years have passed since Dr. BernardB. Fall, author, lecturer and Indo-China expert,was killed near Hue in Vietnam. Thisanniversary recalls a memorable afternoonspent with him only two days before hedeparted on his final trip in December, 1966. Iwas researching on Vietnam, and Dr. Fall, theacknowledged authority, was a valued source if his always busy schedule permitted. When Icalled for an appointment, he agreed withcharacteristic courtesy but warned that he wasin the midst of preparing to leave. This wasobvious when I arrived at his Washington home.His roomy study already overgrown with booksand manuscripts was further cluttered withobvious preparations for the trip. He was tocontinue his study of Vietnam on aGuggenheim Fellowship and expected to spenda year abroad. He said that Gen. Wallace M.Greene, then Commandant, requested that hespend some time with the Marines, and he hadagreed to do so. Indeed, his last days were withthe 3rd MarDiv.

I had met Dr. Fall only casually on aprevious occasion, but was impressed as alwayswith his cordiality and contagious enthusiasm.

He needed little less than an unsolicited visitorat that time, but he devoted the better part of an afternoon to random discussion, interruptedperiodically by phone calls from people seekinghis time. An enthusiastic and uninhibitedconversationalist, he talked freely on all aspectsof the 20 years of the war he had studied soavidly. On several occasions he referred to hisvast library of books and periodicals. I wasstartled and complimented that he had read anarticle I had written previously on some smallunit actions in Vietnam. He charitably didn'tmake any comment on its quality or accuracy,but in the course of the afternoon he did citethe inaccuracy of several other current articlesin military periodicals. He obviously readvirtually everything written on his favoritesubject and made copious marginal notes. Ishuddered at the thought that my unscholarlyofferings might be the subject of such intensescrutiny.

I gave Dr. Fall some photos taken in theCentral Highlands of monuments to the ill-fated Mobile Group 100, which succumbed to aseries of Viet Minh ambushes along famedRoute 19. This was a subject dear to his heart,


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French technique that might serve us welltoday: the GAMO's (Groupes AdministratesMobiles Operationales), 150-man mixed unitsthat contained government officials as well asprotective troops. Their mission was to moveinto newly cleared areas and govern untilcivilian authority could return. Frenchcommanders disliked them because theircommands had ultimately to provide securityfor them. This tidbit never got into any of hisbooks, but offers food for thought as apotential combination of CAC's andRevolutionary Development Cadres.

Dr. Fall with obvious relish produced histhen unpublished book Hell in a Very SmallPlace. "This is the most authoriative book onDien Bien Plut," he stated, "because only I hadaccess to the French secret files." He pointedout the many diagrams used and citedespecially those showing the tonnages of bombs dropped on Viet Minh supply lines.Interdiction of primitive lines of communicationaccomplished "zilch," then he said,accomplished little before in Korea, and is notmuch more effective now. Too bad theAmerican command didn't advise the French of their failures in Korea in time to revise tactics inIndo-China, he concluded.

A discussion of Dien Bien Phu naturallyfollowed, and he cited the outgunning of theFrench artillery as the key factor. The Frenchexpected to destroy the Viet Minh artillery, of

which intelligence knew, throughcounterbattery fire. They couldn't conceive of their own loss of air adjustment, the placing of Communist guns on the forward slope of surrounding hills, or the inability of Frenchaviation to penetrate the flak and destroy theguns. I raised the question as to whetheranyone had ever talked to the French engineerofficer about what was essentially anengineering seige problem. "I have," heannounced, and then he described an interviewwith one Maj Sudrat now stationed in Paris, whowas mildly amused that no one had everbothered to question him about Dien Bien Phu.The analysis of the engineering problem iscovered in detail in Hell in a Very Small Place. Inessence, Sudrat advised Gen DeCastries that36,000 tons of fortification material would beneeded to make the strongpoints invulnerableto 105mm fire. Only 4,000 was forthcoming;

"Casualties don't mean

anything to them . . ."


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hence the fate of the garrison was sealed whenseige conditions evolved. Dr. Fall felt the choiceof Gen DeCastries was an incongruous one inview of his personal background and theimpending defensive nature of the battle. Anaggressive, offensive minded excavalryman,DeCastries did not properly appreciate thedefensive implications of terrain. Anothercommand complication, added the writer, wasthe complexity, as yet unresolved, of multiplebattle groups operating together. His booktreats this situation in intriguing detail as well.

Inevitably the talk turned to the presentstruggle, and the author predictably waxed

most eloquently and forcefully: "Americanshave to grow up in foreign policy. We can't bearto see anyone fall on their faces withoutpropping them up. Our children get hurt, andwe immediately pat them on the back and say'I'll take care of it, kid, don't worry.' This is partof our advisory problem," he elaborated. "OurAmerican take-charge attitude is our owngreatest enemy. We get so emotionally involvedwith the so-called emerging nations thateverything that happens is interpreted in termsot an American defeat or victory.

I asked him of course what he thoughtwas the state of progress. "We'll win when weultimately get the 10 or 11 to 1 superioritythat's needed. By that time American firepowerwill have destroyed everything in the countryanyway; then what'll you have?" I asked aboutthe magnitude of enemy losses, and he replied

with feeling: "Casualties don't mean anything tothem; they do to us because we're round eyes;we've got to quit thinking in terms of our ownconcepts of loss." On helicopters, he stated thathe doubted the validity of the air cavalryconcept because helicopters were simply too

vulnerable to carry the total transportationload.

On chivalry in war: "The Viet Minhsoldiery used to show compassion toward

wounded and frequently left them to be pickedup by ambulances at predesignated spots. Thepolitical commissars changed all this at DienBien Phu, but the failure of the FrenchCommand to agree to truces had earlier souredthe atmosphere. Today all traces of chivalry aregone."

The afternoon slipped away in myenthrallment with the author's animated flow of

commentary. I departed with a sheaf of notesand apologies for disrupting his packing. I hadan occasion to call him two days later on theeve of his last departure for Vietnam. Iconcluded the call with a humorous rejoinder to"stay away from Route 14," the scene of his1965 ambush. He laughed and said he wouldconfine his activities to Route 1, which he knewbetter. This was sadly prophetic. On 21February 1967, he was killed by a mine near his

self-titled "Street Without Joy."

The nation thus lost a gifted writer withunique insight into a tortured area about whichwe still know too little. Often controversial,occasionally seeming outrageously biased, hewas ever the probing scholar. More importantlyto me, he retained an unflagging considerationfor the trooper, be he French, American orVietnamese. This appealing quality was amply

demonstrated that December afternoon.

LtCol Leftwich (USNA, Class of '53) was an advisor tothe RVN Marines in 1965-66, later devised a mock Vietnamese village at Quantico for training purposes.

He is now Special Asst and Aide to the Under secretaryof Navy.(bio as published in 1969)


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Are More Troops Needed in Iraq?By: Carlos L. Yordan, Ph.D.

Editors Note this article is derived from Dr. Yordans op-ed published in the Bangor Daily News on 29 Nov, 2005.

Congress and the American people havequestioned the Bush administrations Iraqstrategy. As demands for the withdrawal of U.S.troops intensify, the presidents response is tostay the course. A new strategy is needed, butto make this happen there has to be a shift inhow people think in the Pentagon and the White

House.

Looking back, the Bush administrationsbiggest weakness is its unwillingness tointegrate lessons learned in post-conflictoperations during the 1990s. While the majorityof Americans trusted the U.S. militarys abilityto defeat Saddam Husseins forces, there weremany questions regarding post-war operations.The then US Army Chief of Staff, General EricShinseki, told members Congress in February2003 that based on his experiencecommanding peacekeeping forces in Bosniathat it will take several hundred thousandstroops to stabilize post-war Iraq. Fearing thatthese remarks could weaken support for thewar, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, PaulWolfowitz, dismissed these comments, re-emphasizing that post-war Iraq could not becompared with Bosnia because Iraq did nothave a history of ethnic conflict.

Shinsekis views also countered toSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeldsapproach to transform the military. Peopleforget that the war against the Taliban, thoughan impressive display of U.S. power, was notreally planned by the Pentagon. The plan was

developed by the Central Intelligence Agency inthe late 1990s. The war in Iraq was a chance forRumsfeld to prove that a high tech and moremobile military could accomplish its objectivesin more efficient fashion. There is no doubt thatthe quickness of the war supports Rumsfeldsvision that less can accomplish more, but as

some critics have pointed out in the last years,post-war operations run against this logic.

Do we need more troops in Iraq? Bushrepeatedly states that his decisions have beeninformed by military commanders assessmentsof their needs in Iraq. It is difficult to saywhether the president is in direct contact withhis commanders on the field or if commandersviews are being filtered by senior civilianPentagon officials. Indeed, countless newsstories capture the growing disconnect betweenWashington insiders and field commanders.Commanders tell reporters they need moretroops to achieve the missions objectives,while Pentagon military and civilian leadersexplain that more troops are not needed.

To achieve Quinlivans ratio, the American-led coalition should have deployed around 500,000

troops in Iraq.


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In the end, the president has been illinformed. More troops were needed in themonths after the war and more are still neededtoday. Building on the experience of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, JustinQuinlivans research shows that the chances of achieving post-conflict stabilizationdramatically increase when interveners werewilling to deploy 20 troops per 1,000inhabitants in post-war societies. In the case of Bosnia, NATO deployed 23 troops per 1,000inhabitants, while the ratio in Kosovo was 24 to1,000. As a point of comparison, SaddamHusseins security and military services were solarge that it amounted to 43 security personnelper 1,000 Iraqis. So, it is no surprise that U.S.forces did not have the manpower to securepost-war Iraq. In May 2003, there were only 6coalition troops per 1,000 inhabitants. Toachieve Quinlivans ratio, the American-ledcoalition should have deployed around 500,000troops in Iraq.

Do we need more troops in Iraq? TheWhite House contends that we have enough.Some senior officials contend that the growingnumber of Iraqi troops will help the U.S.-ledMultinational Force (MF) stabilize Iraq. This ishighly doubtful for at least two reasons. First,even with Iraqi troops, the MF is short of the 20per 1,000 formula noted above. If thePentagons numbers are correct the MF, whichis made up of around 165,000 troops, is closelyworking with 221,000 trained Iraqi troops andpolice personnel. If Quinlivans researchfindings are right, the MF still needs around110,000 troops. Second, and more importantly,this research is based on post-conflict societiesthat did not experience the type of instability

Iraq is experiencing today. Thus, the Pentagonmay have to actually deploy more troops, if theBush administration is to successfully stabilizeIraq in the short to medium term. Ideally, aportion of the forces should be designated forwar-fighting, while the other should beresponsible for military training andpeacekeeping.

Based on this research, it is clear thatmore troops are required in Iraq, but anincrease of current force levels will probablynot take place. The Bush administration, asnoted in the presidents recent speeches onIraq, is still embracing Rumsfelds assessments

that more troops are not needed. Only time willtell whether this is the right decision. However,Americas presence in Iraq for the last 33months demonstrates that the Bushadministrations repeated efforts to stabilizeIraq have been unsuccessful. One importantreason for these failures is the lack of troopsavailable to pacify and secure Iraq. Seeing thatthe current plan repeats this same mistake,victory is not assured. A new strategy is neededand it must be built around Quinlivansfindings; more troops will stabilize Iraq, easingthe countrys democratic transition.

Carlos L. Yordan is Assistant Professor in International Relations at Drew University, where he teaches courseson the Middle East, U.S. national security policy, and terrorism. He earned his Ph.D. in International

Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Failing to Meet Expectations in Iraq: A Review of the Original U.S. Post-War Strategy, Middle East Review of

International Affairs (March 2004); and Oversimplifying Iraqs Challenges: Bushs Fort Bragg Speech and the Declining Support for the Mission, Historia Actual (forthcoming, January 2006).


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4 th Generation WarfareCaptain John W. Bellflower, USAF

Welcome to the fourth generation of warfare. 1 Although some commentators wouldargue that this term is misleading since fourthgeneration war is nothing new, its resurgenceas a primary method of engaging in conflictwith world powers is new. Building upon theteachings of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh andChe Guevera, todays insurgents have redefinedtheir understanding of centers of gravity andhave broadened the field of war. Recognizing acomplete inability to defeat the military mightof the United States, and seeking to avoidmassing their forces for inevitable defeat, non-state actors such as Al Qaeda have turned to amodern, asymmetric approach to war. Throughmaneuver, an enlargement of the battlefield toinclude the whole of society, and decreasedreliance on centralized logistics, todaysinsurgent forces, although technologicallyinferior to U.S. military forces, provide aformidable opponent. Fourth Generation War(4GW) insurgents seek to combine guerrillatactics with a willingness to fight across thepolitical, economic, social, and militaryspectrums to convey a message that willachieve the strategic goal of changing theminds of the enemys policymakers. 2

Proponents of 4GW suggest that we areembarking upon a new era in warfare thatresults in the breakdown of the nation-states

1 While Fourth Generation War involves conflict betweena nation-states military and an irregular, non-state actor,the first three generations of modern war focused, inturn, on massed manpower, then massed firepower, andfinally on maneuver. Thomas X. Hammes, TheEvolution of War: The Fourth Generation, Marine CorpsGazette 78 (1994), 35.2 Id.

monopoly of war and calls for the developmentof new methods to combat warfare that run thespectrum of society. At least one commentatorhas argued that

[n]o matter how many search anddestroy missions are initiated againstterrorist sites, no matter how manyterrorist operatives are targeted forassassination, terrorist planners . . .ceaselessly emerge from the anonymityof the crowd, supported both overtlyand surreptitiously by rogue regimes . .., to reap their vengeance and havocupon innocent civilians . . . and allsymbols of established society. 3

It has been said that technology and firepoweralone cannot win this type of war whereinenemy combatants are composed of decentralized cells capable of blending into thepopulation at will. How, then, can it be done?

Despite arguments to the contrary, the UnitedStates has previously engaged in this type of warfare and the lessons learned from thoseconflicts stand ready to be incorporated intotodays strategy and tactics. Given the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thelikelihood of similar engagements in the future,an understanding of those past lessons iscrucial. The hard won lessons of past smallwars teach us that 4GW cannot be won solely by

second and third generation tactics.It is generally agreed that a small war is

one in which a traditional nation-state armed

3 Harold A. Gould, and Franklin C. Spinney, FourthGeneration Warfare Is Here! (University of Virginia,Center for South Asian Students, Fall 2001), available athttp://www.virginia.edu/soasia/newsletter/Fall01/warfare.html.


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force is engaged in combat with an irregulararmed force. 1 From that starting point, thediffering attributes of a particular small war areas varied as the locations in which small warsare fought. Regardless of the specific nature of any particular small war, they bear a strikingresemblance to 4GW. Indeed, history providesnumerous examples of small war scenarios thatare directly analogous to military engagementswe face in the 4GW era. Is an article thatdiscusses American troops hunting a warlord,speaking of the [small war] pursuit of PanchoVilla in 1916 or [the 4GW pursuit of]Muhammed Farah Aidid in 1993 or Osama binLaden in 2001? 2 Is Americas invasion of asovereign country to overthrow a dictatorialregime in favor of self-government by thepeople, a small war in Mexico in 1914 or 4GWin Iraq and Afghanistan in the present day?

The commonalities between small warsand 4GW, apart from similar objectives, owemuch to the nature of the opponent and thelocation of the engagement. Perhaps notcoincidentally, it is these common attributesthat serve as the enemys strength. Thecombatant likely to be faced in a small war or4GW relies upon mobility and superiorintelligence regarding terrain and the troopmovement of his opponent and is notencumbered with supply to the same degree asregular forces. 3 This provides the insurgentwith an ability to attack at his own choosingand then to disperse once he has drawn blood

1 See, e.g., C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principlesand Practice , 3d ed. (Lincoln: University of NebraskaPress, 1996), 21; United States Marine Corps (USMC),Small Wars Manual (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1940), 1-2.2 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books,2002).3 Callwell, at 52-3, 87.

thereby avoiding singular defeat by a regularforce. The location of these engagements canbe anywhere the nation-state has a perceivedinterest, be it military, economic, or purelysocial. Throughout history, and even today, wesee that these engagements often occur in the

inhospitable terrain of unexpected places.Thus, despite Americas technologicaladvantage, we often face an opponent of unknown strength and quality in a place weknow little about. This initially puts U.S. forcesat a disadvantage because the insurgent will

often be able to develop an operational ortactical method to counter Americastechnological advantages. The insurgent doesthis by controlling the pace of war, refusingbattle, and drawing the invader deep intohostile country were he becomes overextendedand vulnerable. To counter these insurgentadvantages, U.S. forces must employ a strategythat combats the insurgent militarily, socially,and politically.

Writing in 1896, C.E. Callwell laid out theblueprint for a strategic approach to combatinginsurgents. Recognizing that the insurgent,owing to his mobility, is at a strategicadvantage over the regular force, Callwellargued that the object in a small war is to force

While in regular warfare, a hatred of the enemy is often developed

among the regular troops to instill courage and a willingness

to fight; this is counter- productive in small wars.


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the insurgent to fight so the regular forcestactical advantages of firepower and disciplinecould prevail. 1 Once the battle is forced, merevictory is not enough. The enemy must notonly be beaten. He must be beatenthoroughly. 2 This is the essence of whatCallwell teaches, for the mere expulsion of theopponent from the ground [he occupies] is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualtylist in the hostile ranks. 3

Although Callwells reliance upon attritionto win the day is grounded in secondgeneration warfare (2GW), 4 he steals a pagefrom the insurgent and combines this approach

with third generation warfare (3GW) maneuverand mobility. First, the theater of operations isdivided into sections that are fortified withdefensive posts and supply depots to supportmobile columns of troops that will patrol thearea. 5 Once this is done, the commander ineach area can focus upon defeat of theinsurgents within his area. This isaccomplished by maintaining mobile columnsof lightly-equipped troops ever-ready to closewith and destroy an insurgent force before ithas time to disperse into the populous. 6

In addition to tactics calculated to inflict ahigh casualty rate among the insurgents,Callwell also addresses the need to strike themwhere they live. This becomes necessary whenthere is no identifiable objective such as acapital city, stronghold, or organized army forthe regular force to focus on capturing or

destroying. It is then that the regular force

1 Ibid. at 90-1.2 Ibid. , at 151.3 Ibid. 4 William S. Lind. Understanding Fourth GenerationWar, Military Review 84 (2004), 12.5 Callwell, at 131-4.6 Ibid. at 136.

must hunt [the enemy] from their homes and .. . destroy or carry off their belongings. 7 Thus,a method for driving the insurgency to failure isthrough the destruction of its means of existence. This can be done through theburning of crops and stores of grain and otherfoodstuff, through the capture of livestock, andthe burning of villages. 8 To be effective,however, this strategy must be conductedmethodically; a ring of fortified posts must beestablished around the area sought to bepacified and vigorous patrols conducted so thatan insurgent force is unable to escape. 9 Theobjective in this method is, as it is throughoutCallwells approach, to force the insurgent tofight whereby the regular force can annihilatehim.

Throughout its campaigns between theworld wars in every clime and place, the UnitedStates Marine Corps borrowed heavily upon theteachings of Callwell and recorded its practicalexperiences in a manual designed to pass onlessons learned from one generation toanother. Agreeing with Callwell to a point, theMarines understood that the enemy must besought out, attacked vigorously, and pursueddoggedly to ensure complete victory. 10 However, recognizing that the small wars of itsgeneration lacked the imperial quality of that inCallwells generation and were usually a phaseof, or an operation taking place concurrentlywith, diplomatic effort, 11 the Marines eschewed

7 Ibid. at 146.8 Ibid. at 40, 133.9 Ibid. at 147.10 USMC, at 5-8(d). The Marines also subscribed toCallwells strategy of dividing the theater of operationsinto military districts and utilizing mobile columns fromfixed bases to engage the enemy and deny them respite.

Ibid. at 5-8, 5-13 through 5-25.11 Ibid. at 1-7(c).


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the heavy-handed, attrition-based strategyfavored by Callwell for a more tactful approach.

Since diplomatic efforts were not yetexhausted, the Marines approach to small wars

reflected the limits tha

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