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© Kamla-Raj 2015 J Soc Sci, 43(1): 39-51 (2015) The Politics of Land in Zimbabwe’s Communal and Resettlement Areas: A Case Study of Gutu District, Zimbabwe * Nicholas Govo * , Patrick Dzimiri ** and Richard Rachidi Molapo ** University of Venda, South Afrca KEYWORDS Traditional Leader. Land Tenure Systems. Communal and Resettlement Areas. FTLRP ABSTRACT The discourse of land, power and politics in Zimbabwe has caused polemic and counter-polemic debates and the contestation between traditional leaders and local government structures remains a grey area. Communal and resettlement areas have been characterized by conflicts with the major area of contestation being, control of land and other natural resources. It can be argued that the conflict between traditional institutions and the local government is basically over control of land, hegemony and recognition; hence a struggle of accumulation and power. Despite improved relations between traditional leaders and the state in the post-independence phase, traditional leaders continue to be manipulated by the state for political ends, undermining their precolonial role as custodians and guardians of the land. By the same token, it is argued that the perpetual manipulation of traditional leaders by the state have rendered them powerless in land issues distorting their meaningful contributions to the development of their communities. Such a development brings into question the legitimacy of traditional leaders who were imposed on their communities by the colonial and postcolonial state for political reasons, without embracing the customs of the land in the appointment and installation of traditional authorities. On the other hand, it can be noted that the power and influence of traditional authorities is such that politicians seeking elected office compete with them at their peril. Thus the influence of traditional leaders, either as objects of manipulation or as beneficiaries of a manipulative system should not be underestimated in understanding political developments in Zimbabwe. Gutu District has been taken as a test or experiment to find explanations about the socio-political trajectories of land, power and politics in Zimbabwe’s communal and resettlement areas. ** These are the co-authors who supervised this Thesis. INTRODUCTION The discourse of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe has been subjected to polemic and counter-polemic arguments and two questions need to be addressed. Firstly, how can develop- ment in rural areas be achieved when traditional leaders lack ‘real’ power, especially in the ad- ministration of land, which is the niche of liveli- hood in Zimbabwe’s rural communities? Second- ly, should modernization be the issue of discard- ing traditional institutions and values; ‘Throw- ing away the baby with bathwater’ (Yaw 2006), or there is a need to accommodate and retain some of the desirable elements of indigenous African systems to eliminate friction, especially in land ownership and utilization in communal and resettlement areas. Whilst the colonial re- gimes across Africa viewed African indigenous political systems with contempt, it must be not- ed that postcolonial African leaders were no better. Soon after independence, little was done to correct the distortions left by the colonial leg- acy on land, power and politics in rural areas. Most nationalist leaders who took over govern- ments in Africa at independence had received Western education and they viewed tradition as anachronistic and antithetical to progress (Davidson 1992). In Zimbabwe, the traditional land tenure systems were not given deserving attention and this has resulted in conflicts on matters relating to land ownership in communal and resettlement areas. Traditional leaders have shown that they could not be easily thrown out of rural politics, especially on matters relating to land which they continue to see as their source of power and legitimacy and rural communities are different from urban areas in that they still practice and believe in the hereditary powers of the traditional leaders. Among the Shona of Zimbabwe, the element of totems, kinship and clans is still highly re- garded as it gives the rural societies a sense of oneness, unity and belonging. Given that the institution of traditional authority is deep-root- ed in kinship, totems and clans, traditional lead- * Nicholas Govo has just completed a MA (Africa Studies) in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Venda. This paper is an extract from his MA Thesis titled; The Conflict between Tradition and Modernity: The History of the Relationship between the State and Traditional Leaders in Gutu district, Zimbabwe, 1960 to 2010.

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© Kamla-Raj 2015 J Soc Sci, 43(1): 39-51 (2015)

The Politics of Land in Zimbabwe’s Communal and ResettlementAreas: A Case Study of Gutu District, Zimbabwe

*Nicholas Govo*, Patrick Dzimiri** and Richard Rachidi Molapo**

University of Venda, South Afrca

KEYWORDS Traditional Leader. Land Tenure Systems. Communal and Resettlement Areas. FTLRP

ABSTRACT The discourse of land, power and politics in Zimbabwe has caused polemic and counter-polemicdebates and the contestation between traditional leaders and local government structures remains a grey area.Communal and resettlement areas have been characterized by conflicts with the major area of contestation being,control of land and other natural resources. It can be argued that the conflict between traditional institutions andthe local government is basically over control of land, hegemony and recognition; hence a struggle of accumulationand power. Despite improved relations between traditional leaders and the state in the post-independence phase,traditional leaders continue to be manipulated by the state for political ends, undermining their precolonial role ascustodians and guardians of the land. By the same token, it is argued that the perpetual manipulation of traditionalleaders by the state have rendered them powerless in land issues distorting their meaningful contributions to thedevelopment of their communities. Such a development brings into question the legitimacy of traditional leaderswho were imposed on their communities by the colonial and postcolonial state for political reasons, withoutembracing the customs of the land in the appointment and installation of traditional authorities. On the otherhand, it can be noted that the power and influence of traditional authorities is such that politicians seeking electedoffice compete with them at their peril. Thus the influence of traditional leaders, either as objects of manipulationor as beneficiaries of a manipulative system should not be underestimated in understanding political developmentsin Zimbabwe. Gutu District has been taken as a test or experiment to find explanations about the socio-politicaltrajectories of land, power and politics in Zimbabwe’s communal and resettlement areas.

**These are the co-authors who supervised this Thesis.

INTRODUCTION

The discourse of traditional leadership inZimbabwe has been subjected to polemic andcounter-polemic arguments and two questionsneed to be addressed. Firstly, how can develop-ment in rural areas be achieved when traditionalleaders lack ‘real’ power, especially in the ad-ministration of land, which is the niche of liveli-hood in Zimbabwe’s rural communities? Second-ly, should modernization be the issue of discard-ing traditional institutions and values; ‘Throw-ing away the baby with bathwater’ (Yaw 2006),or there is a need to accommodate and retainsome of the desirable elements of indigenousAfrican systems to eliminate friction, especiallyin land ownership and utilization in communaland resettlement areas. Whilst the colonial re-gimes across Africa viewed African indigenous

political systems with contempt, it must be not-ed that postcolonial African leaders were nobetter. Soon after independence, little was doneto correct the distortions left by the colonial leg-acy on land, power and politics in rural areas.Most nationalist leaders who took over govern-ments in Africa at independence had receivedWestern education and they viewed tradition asanachronistic and antithetical to progress(Davidson 1992). In Zimbabwe, the traditionalland tenure systems were not given deservingattention and this has resulted in conflicts onmatters relating to land ownership in communaland resettlement areas. Traditional leaders haveshown that they could not be easily thrown outof rural politics, especially on matters relating toland which they continue to see as their sourceof power and legitimacy and rural communitiesare different from urban areas in that they stillpractice and believe in the hereditary powers ofthe traditional leaders.

Among the Shona of Zimbabwe, the elementof totems, kinship and clans is still highly re-garded as it gives the rural societies a sense ofoneness, unity and belonging. Given that theinstitution of traditional authority is deep-root-ed in kinship, totems and clans, traditional lead-

*Nicholas Govo has just completed a MA (Africa Studies)in the Department of Development Studies at theUniversity of Venda. This paper is an extract from hisMA Thesis titled; The Conflict between Tradition andModernity: The History of the Relationship betweenthe State and Traditional Leaders in Gutu district,Zimbabwe, 1960 to 2010.

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40 NICHOLAS GOVO, PATRICK DZIMIRI AND RICHARD RACHIDI MOLAPO

ers continue to influence the social, political andeconomic life of rural communities. The Zimba-bwean constitution also recognizes the exist-ence of traditional leaders as indicated in theTraditional Leaders Act of 2000. On the otherhand, the local government, through its electedcouncilors and village committees representsmodern and democratic systems which also havethe blessings of the government as provided bythe constitution. Such a scenario widens the riftbetween the two institutions. The state as theagent of social and political control becomesthe principle focus of this conflict. The continu-ing dialectical clash between the forces of mo-dernity, especially the local government reformsand the persistent strength of traditional leader-ship is an issue in many African countries. Thesource of the problem is that traditional author-ity constitutes a form of local government interms of indigenous laws. With the establish-ment of colonialism and modern forms of gov-ernment, most of what used to be the preroga-tives of the traditional leaders were taken by thestate organs. The local government, through itsmunicipalities took over the land rights and allo-cation powers, creating a myriad of problems inthe administration of rural communities.

The overall assumption for the paper is thatthe contestation between traditional authorityand modern governance structures is a result ofthe perpetuation of the colonial legacy of ex-ploiting traditional systems for political ends.This paper, therefore, argues that as long as tra-ditional leaders do not own land, they are likelyto influence their communities not to cooperatewith the local government and other develop-ment agencies, making it difficult to develop ru-ral areas. The paper also posits that a return tothe traditional land tenure system, when tradi-tional institutions once prevailed, will empowercommunities to manage land and other resourc-es more sustainably. The implicit assumptionbeing that traditional land tenure systems werecharacterized by collective action and commonproperty management regimes for the commongood of the community.

Methodologically, a qualitative approach wasused because this is about feelings, interactions,attitudes and aspirations of the people. Issuesrelating to chieftaincy and government are com-plex and sensitive and as such, a qualitative re-search method is appropriate when dealing withsuch issues.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The discourse of land, power and politics inZimbabwe’s communal areas and resettlementsneeds to be placed in the historical context ofthe precolonial land tenure system and the im-pact of the colonial and postcolonial state’s pol-icies on the politics of land. Scholars do acknowl-edge that Africans across Africa had politicalsystems which served their social, economic andreligious needs from as late as the Iron Age todate, (Ayittey 1992: Davidson 1992: Mandela1994: Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). Such systems weredeeprooted in the African culture. Atim et al.(1996), note that, no people lived without a rec-ognized authority which protected land, per-formed rituals, negotiated peace and resolvedconflicts. Studies by Beach (1984), on the Sho-na speaking people of Zimbabwe, notes that asin many African communities, ultimate politicalcontrol resided in the ownership of land, whichwas vested in the guardian spirits (mhondoro)of ancestors, who pass it to chiefs and othertraditional leaders as its custodians. Politicalauthority was wielded by a chief who was theleading member of a patrilineal lineage thatclaimed descent from the spirits who sanctionedall rituals. Certainly, a traditional leader couldnot exist without land and a tribe, and land wasthe major basis of economic power (Beach 1984).Traditional leaders were the ‘custodians’ or‘guardians’ of the land and land was the proper-ty of the ancestors, parceled to the people whoowned it and a traditional leader held it in truston behalf of the people (Bourdillon 1979). Cus-tom and tradition were clear in the indigenouslaw that a traditional leader be in control of theland as the link between the sacred (spiritualworld) and the people.

The striking point in this paper is that thetraditional land tenure system gave the land tothe traditional leaders who in turn oversaw itsallocation and use in a way that every house-hold had access to this ‘niche’ of the politicaleconomy. Indeed, the traditional land tenuresystem stressed communal activity in agricul-ture, with some of the hardest work during theyear being done by working parties (Nhimbe) inthe fields of each household in succession. Graz-ing lands and hunting grounds were also com-munally owned, giving each member of the com-munity a responsibility in conservation and sus-tainable environmental management. To that

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POLITICS OF LAND IN ZIMBABWE 41

effect, the capitalist political economy did notonly undermine traditional authority over landissues, but it also robbed Africans of their richindigenous environmental knowledge. Under-neath, resources like minerals were mined by allmembers of the community, but with strict con-trol by the traditional leaders. Whilst some tra-ditional leaders exploited much of the mineralscompared to the ordinary people, control mea-sures demonstrate a reservoir of African indige-nous knowledge geared for sustainability. It wasthe duty of the traditional leader to administerthe allocation and use of land with agreementwith his councilors who enjoyed the trust of themembers of the community and land formed thebackbone of any traditional authority. As such,the ownership, control, allocation and manage-ment of land was an important issue, just likehow the land issue continue to be a pertinentmatter in present day politics.

Among the Shona of Zimbabwe, the tradi-tional ruler was and is still given clods of theearth at his installation and this symbolizes histrusteeship over land grants and his right togrant or cede land from an individual or a groupof people under his jurisdiction. He was/is alsogiven a hoe which symbolizes his right to workthe land, including digging minerals. There wasa well-established hierarchy where the kinggranted land to territorial chiefs, who in turngrand land to the headmen, who also gave thevillage heads some powers to allocate land toindividual households. This assured that everyhousehold had a share of land. Among theKaranga of the southern parts of Zimbabwe, theinstallation ceremony of a chief and headmanstill follows the traditional system describedabove, but constitutionally, the District Admin-istrator (DA) through the local government andthe Rural District Council (RDC) claims authori-ty over land ownership and use.

The African traditional land tenure systemwas subsequently changed by the advent ofcolonialism. Colonialism and its ‘modern’ sys-tem of administration subdued the century’sestablished African traditional authority, and inland matters, the white settlers became the dejure land authorities. The Order in Council of1894 gave the British Crown sovereignty overall land in Zimbabwe and this conflicted with theAfrican communal ownership which had tradi-tional leaders as the custodians of the land andthe supreme land allocators. In the process,

colonial legal codes attempted to regulate landrights on the basis of private ownership thatoften mixed uneasily with traditional practicesthat allowed indigenous groups access withoutensuring ownership or title. It can be arguedthat the codification of the racial division of landthrough the Land Apportionment Act (1931) safe-guarded the interests of the minority white farm-ing community. The racial bias of the colonialstate’s land allocation became the source of con-flict throughout the colonial period. Traditionalleaders continued to allocate land, but the colo-nial government had the power to force themout of their traditional land once the land wasearmarked for either commercial farming or othercapitalist purposes.

The Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of1951 was based on the premise that productionin African reserves would be boosted through asystem of private ownership of land rather thanthe communal or customary rights to land thatexisted hitherto. Its implementation which includ-ed reducing the size of land units and the num-ber of cattle that individuals could hold, under-mined the power of the chief’s control over theland (the source of their power), as well as vari-ous conservation measures such as contour-ridging antagonized the African rural popula-tion and provided a fertile recruiting ground forthe nationalist movements. The attempts atchanging the African land tenure systemsthrough the privatization of land ownershipfailed to address the problems of overcrowdingand landlessness in the rural areas. The NLHAas noted by Moyana (1999) was a ‘leap in thewrong direction’ as it was ‘a wrong prescriptionfor the wrong illness’; because what the Afri-cans in rural areas needed were not contour-ridges, but more land to settle the African popu-lation which was ever-increasing. By 1960, thetraditional land tenure system was effectivelydestroyed. Accordingly, landlessness and over-crowding in the native reserves made it difficultfor the traditional land tenure system to suffice.In the process, traditional leaders were renderedpowerless in land matters, subsequently erod-ing their legitimacy in the eyes of their people.

After independence, the new government ofZimbabwe inherited a bifurcated land tenuresystem based on racially skewed colonial poli-cies that divided commercial (largely White) andcommunal (largely Black) areas. In its modern-ization drive, the postcolonial state has failed

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considerably to mitigate the role of traditionalleaders and local government in matters of landownership and management in communal andresettlement areas. The ZANU-PF led govern-ment sidelined traditional leaders on land mat-ters by enacting various laws. The CommunalLands Act (1982) gave the District Councilspower over land administration and allocation.The Rural District Act (1988) also created a localgovernment that excluded the traditional lead-ers the management of land. The Chiefs andHeadmen Act (1988) did not recognize the insti-tution of the village head. This shows how thepost-colonial state trembled over the powers ofthe traditional leaders during the first decade ofindependence. Makumbe (1998) argues that allthese legal enactments were part of the processof disempowerment of traditional institutions, ameasure purportedly designed to punish themfor their pre-independence role as functionariesof colonial oppression.

It is however important to note that therewas tension between the newly appointed RDCsas most chiefs, headmen and village heads de-fied the laws and continued to allocate land tothe people and to preside over community courts.Villagers continued to refer land matters and vil-lage disputes to the traditional leaders, exacer-bating the tension between the inherent privi-leges of traditional leaders as the custodiansand chief allocators of land and the acquiredprivileges of the government’s RDCs. Conse-quently, chieftaincy and its role over land own-ership and allocation equation have thrown com-munal and resettlement areas into the meltingpot. The sharp turn which was taken by the gov-ernment towards re-empowerment of traditionalleaders after 1997 has confounded many, and assuch its explanation presents problems. A gov-ernment which started by circumscribing thepowers of the traditional leaders suddenly start-ed to give them more powers and it has beenargued that this was a strategy employed by theZANU-PF government to curtail the influenceof the MDC in rural areas (Makumbe 1998).Mugabe’s government increasingly engaged inbrinkmanship and demagoguery that keptZANU-PF in power through hook and crook andthis time around, land and its connectivity totraditional leaders was used as the triumph card.No wonder why traditional leaders were foundin the forefront in the reclamation of and restitu-tion to ancestral lands during the Fast Track

Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). However, anew struggle for power emerged especially be-tween ZANU-PF politicians and war veteranson one hand and traditional leaders on the angleland reform would take. The later stressed resti-tution while the former emphasised on land re-distribution without necessarily denoting togoing back to original ‘ancestral lands’.

It is against this historical backdrop, begin-ning from the racially skewed and demographi-cally impractical land tenure systems broughtby colonialism and partly maintained by thepost-colonial government that the present-dayconflicts in both communal and resettlement ar-eas can be epitomized as a ‘crisis of land man-agement’. Traditional and modern land tenuresystems could not mix well in Zimbabwe’s ruralareas where the people still practice and acknowl-edge traditional authority and its land tenuresystems. That land has been used as a manipu-lative tool for political expediency, especially inrural areas makes the discourse of land, powerand politics in Zimbabwe’s communal and reset-tlement areas an open one.

SITUATING THE POLITICS OF LAND,BELONGING AND POWER IN

ZIMBABWE’S COMMUNAL AREAS

In Zimbabwe, as in other former colonies,land is a highly emotive and politicized issue(Sims 2011). The major problem in Zimbabwe’scommunal and resettlement area is the incom-patible relationship between democraticallyelected organs of government and traditional(mainly hereditary) structures of social order. Thetwo institutions derive their power and legitima-cy from totally different angles and sources, withtraditional leaders using traditional laws of theland and customary laws while local governmentorgans claim their power from elections and theconstitution and this has provided a surface forconflict. Rural communities are still largely inthe hands of traditional leaders who are viewedby their communities as the custodians of theland and other resources according to customand tradition. With the establishment of localgovernment boards, land rights were transferredto the local municipalities who assumed a newrole of Rural District Council (RDC) which madethe RDC the de jure land authorities in commu-nal and resettlement areas. Friction over theownership and allocation of land between the

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POLITICS OF LAND IN ZIMBABWE 43

RDCs and the traditional leaders became visibleas the later viewed land as their birthright. Dis-trict Councils, which are represented by electedcouncilors, become irrelevant in this equationof kinship and this brings problems in the ad-ministration of land in rural areas. People in com-munal and resettlement areas configure the tra-jectories of belonging when approaching theland issue. By taking land as a benchmark innegotiating the politics of belonging, the con-flation of people from different areas and differ-ent traditional authorities engendered new poli-tics of belonging which has widened the divi-sions between those who see themselves asautochthons or the owners of the land and thoseviewed as outsiders (Mujere 2010). Using thediscourse of old homes (matongo) and ances-tral burial places (mapa), chiefs and headmenhave sought to reconfigure their traditionalboundaries and return to their lost ancestrallands, every time when land reform takes place(Mujere 2010).

This problem has been evidenced by howchiefs, headmen and village heads have contin-ued to allocate land to the people, even thoughthey are not the ‘legal owners’ according to lawslike the RDC Act (1988) Communal Lands Act(1982) which transferred powers over land toRural District Councils. According to the Com-munal Lands Act (1982), for example, traditionalleaders should only have power in communalareas and the Act makes the resettlement areasout of bounds for traditional leaders. Even dur-ing FTLRP, the war veterans wielded more powerin allocating land to the landless peasants, yetthis was supposedly a prerogative of the chiefs.Whilst the traditional leaders took the FTLRP asan opportunity to reclaim ancestral land lost dur-ing colonialism, the government and other socio-political forces like war veterans do not view theland reform from a restitution angle.

The perpetual manipulation and politiciza-tion of land and traditional leadership in Zimba-bwe presents a problem. Sims (2011) notes thatthe land issue has been abused as ZANU-PFstruggled to retain its political power and legiti-macy. During the 2000 parliamentary elections,for example, ZANU-PF slogan was, “Land is theeconomy, and economy is land”. In such a way,land was politicized and racialized to the effectof opening up the wounds of the SecondChimurenga. Consequently, the FTLRP assumedthe name “Third Chimurenga” in the same man-

ner as the war for liberation of the 1970s wasdirected against the Whites. Land has also beenused as the platform for indigenization and theBlack empowerment discourse without neces-sarily following the restitution and reclamationangle. To this effect, land has been used as apolitical gimmick or as a triumph card for theruling party. Traditional leaders have been andare still being reduced to the level of politicalagents for political leaders and this is dilutingtheir mandate of serving rural communities in anon-partisan manner. The stipends and salariesthe chiefs are getting have made some to sidewith the state even if some of the policies aredetrimental to their communities. A new culturehas emerged where chiefs who are supposed toowe allegiance to spirit mediums and ancestorswere leading lives that revolved around the dol-lar orbit defused by those in political power andthis trend is problematic in as far as the chiefsmay be induced not to challenge some govern-ment decisions (The Zimbabwean 2013). Fromthe late 1990s to the present, traditional leadershave been manipulated by the ZANU-PF gov-ernment for political expediency and in somecases they pursued undemocratic principles intheir areas. This has compromised the positionof the African traditional authorities since theerosion of their powers translates into loss oflegitimacy.

The Politics of Land in Zimbabwe from1980-1999

Local government reform measures adoptedby the new government of Zimbabwe at inde-pendence in 1980 were largely inspired by thestate’s modernization initiatives which soughtto undermine the authority of traditional institu-tions in judicial and land issues. The decentral-ization process increased the control of the cen-tral government on local communities, under-mining and distorting the powers and roles oftraditional leaders. Although the traditional lead-ers were not removed, their powers of adjudica-tion and land allocation were transferred to thedistrict councils. The local government wasmade into an extension of the state (central gov-ernment) with the RDC placed under direct su-pervision of the minister of local government.The failure by the new government to co-opttraditional leaders into formal state mechanismin the first two decades of independence lies at

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the heart of the confusion surrounding localgovernment and land administration in commu-nal areas.

A study by Ncube (2011) shows that thepost-colonial government of Zimbabwe bor-rowed much from its predecessors in as far asthe treatment of the African traditional leadersand their role over the land issue is concerned.While retaining the appearances of indigenousauthority, many chiefs were effectively coercedinto becoming agents of the state with little orno power over the land. Makumbe (1998) alsoshows that soon after independence, little wasdone to correct the distortions left by the colo-nial legacy and in its efforts to establish a one-party state on the Marxist-Leninist Socialistmodels; the ZANU-PF government relegated tra-ditional leaders to the periphery. The VillageDevelopment Committee (VIDCO) and the WardDevelopment Committee (WADCO) took thecenter stage in mobilizing the rural communitiestowards a Socialist state and members of thesecommittees were drawn mainly from ZANU-PFYouth and Women’s Leagues. They became defacto community heads, relegating the traditionalleaders as ZANU-PF craved to create a ‘strongstate’ and a ‘weak society’ to pave way for one-party state. In this way the state penetrated rightaway to the village level.

The Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982) stipu-lated that chiefs and headmen could only exer-cise authority in communal areas, meaning thatfarms and resettlement areas were out of boundsfor the traditional leaders. The act also excludedthe traditional leaders in land administration anddid not recognize the institution of the villagehead. Furthermore, the Act did much to under-mine the position of traditional leaders in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Mandondo (2000) notes thatthe Communal Lands Act (1982) took away thepowers of the chiefs to allocate land, a preroga-tive vested in them by the Smith Regime duringthe 1960s through the Tribal Trust Land Act of1967.

Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2009) showed thatthe Communal Lands Development Plan (1988)left the traditional leaders with little more than aspiritual function as they were not made part ofthe planning of communal lands. It is importantto note that the roles of traditional leaders asspiritual leaders also contest with the Church,trimming their influence in rural areas. The RDCAct (1988) established a local government that

excluded the traditional leaders and the RDCswere made the legal authorities of land in com-munal areas. Chapter 29 (13) also provides forthe powers and functions of the Rural DistrictCouncil (RDC) and their committees. Item 25 ofthe Act, which is on allocation of communal landstates that the District Administrator (DA)’s of-fice prepares the land use plan for the villageand issues a settlement permit to the head ofeach household in the village. The RDC and theDA shall keep an accurate record of all settle-ment permits issued to each household. Item 26states that no land shall be allocated except withthe approval of the appropriate RDC, which shallbe the administrative authority with overall con-trol over the use and allocation of all communalland.

The Land Tenure Commission (1994) recom-mended that traditional leaders be re-empow-ered but the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) didlittle to empower traditional leaders on land mat-ters. Although chiefs became direct appointeesof the president, they only retained the power tooversee collection of rates and levies for theRDC. Their power over land is still problematicas Section 26 (1) states that no land shall beallocated except with the approval of the appro-priate District Council while Section 26 (4) statesthat no inhabitant shall dispose communal landby himself without the approval of the villagehead. There is also lack of clarity on the admin-istration of resettlement areas. The TraditionalLeaders Act (2000), Section 5, stipulates that thechief shall be responsible for taking traditionaland related administrative matters in resettlementareas, including nominating persons for appoint-ment as headmen by the minister. According tothe Act, the minister has the power to authorizea chief to exercise authority over certain reset-tlement areas provided that the declared area isa single resettlement ward and does not fall un-der the authority of more than one chief. By side-lining traditional leaders from the managementof resettlement areas, a gulf in the managementof these areas was created and according toNcube (2011), this precipitated a crisis of man-agement in resettlement areas.

Chapter 29:17 of the Traditional Leaders Act(2000) states that the president shall appointchiefs to preside over communities inhabitingcommunal land and resettlement areas using theprevailing customary principles of succession,if any, applicable to the community over which

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the chief is to preside. The president may, wherehe is of the opinion that good cause exists, re-move a chief from office. The section also pro-vides for the payment of such salary, allowanc-es, gratuities and pensions as the president mayfix from time to time. This according to Ncube(2011) was a political courtship of traditional lead-ers by the state after the formation of a formida-ble opposition party-the Movement for Demo-cratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The way theZANU-PF government made a U-turn and start-ed to give cosmetic powers to traditional lead-ers when confronted by the opposition MDChighlighted how traditional powers continue tobe pawns in the political survival strategy ofgovernments facing political challenges.

The Traditional Leaders Act (2000) went onto put the traditional leaders under the directcontrol of the president and the minister of localgovernment who is also an appointee of the Pres-ident. The Act also gives the President, whothrough the minister could dissolve any RDCand could dismiss a chief to pursue ‘public in-terest’. It can therefore be argued that the mod-ernization drive and the decentralization processfailed to empower traditional institutions in therunning of rural communities. The traditionalinstitutions are continuously at a loss as it wasput under direct control of the state, living littleroom for customary initiatives to suffice.

However, despite the efforts by the govern-ment to clip the powers of traditional leadersover land issues, there is evidence in Gutu Dis-trict that traditional leadership is still powerfulin rural areas and in practice, chiefs, headmenand village heads allocate land to the people, afunction that legally belongs to the district coun-cils. Traditional leaders in the district, as in oth-er parts of the country are defiant to most of theActs passed by the government since indepen-dence. The Communal Land Act (1982) whichvested control over land in the President andthe RDCs was ignored by most traditional lead-ers who in practice continued to allocate land totheir people on the basis of their tradition.

Village heads Dhumukwa, Mashate andMadzivanyika shared among themselves an areawhich used to be a water chain and allocated itto landless newly-weds in their villages in 1985.Dhumukwa explained how they went about itand the argument as he put it was as follows:

This land used to be the fields of our forefa-thers before the colonial period and we do not

see any sense in keeping it as a water chainwhile our children need land to plough.

It can be noted that whilst the formal reset-tlement programme was taking its shape duringthe early years of the 1980s, there was also in-formal resettlement which was going on in thevillages, mainly as a way of reversing the much-hated NLHA of the 1950s and address landless-ness in the rural areas. What makes it even moreinteresting is that even the newly establishedpro-government VIDCOs were at some pointsworking together with the village heads in allo-cating land unofficially. The acts by the villageheads in continuing to allocate land during the1980s was also unstoppable as almost everyonethought that the end of the war meant that allthe land which was vacant outside the commer-cial farms and which was made water chains bythe NLHA was now up for grabs. It also needsto be remembered that by giving the RDCs landrights, the new government was failing to fulfillthe promises it made during the war of libera-tion. The land issue was well-articulated at ev-ery political gathering (pungwe) for it was in-deed the rallying point during the secondchimurenga, and the masses thought that theend of the war signifies the rectification of theNLHA. This situation gave birth to a plethora ofproblems and conflicts between the traditionalperspective of land and belonging and the newgovernment’s modernization drive. Even whenthe Chiefs and Headmen Act (1988) excludedthe traditional leaders in land administration, theinhabitants of the communal areas continued torefer most land matters and requests to the tra-ditional leaders. The same Act also failed to rec-ognize the position of the institution of the vil-lage head, but village heads continued to as-sume their duties in land allocation and theywere encouraged by the chiefs and headmen.

An elder who is a member of the Gumbo clanin Mutero village under chief Nyamandi said thatthey were not even intimidated about the ban-ning of the institution of the village head. Hesaid,

We were village heads and we still remainvillage heads no matter what comes. Govern-ments come and go, but our right to lead thisvillage was bestowed upon us by our foregonefathers.

Such sentiments shows how gravitated is theconflict between traditional and modern systemsof government in rural politics. As shown above,

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in the past, the chiefs, headmen and village headscrafted defiance as a tactic to resist the modern-ization process and this on its own had devas-tating effects in the development and transfor-mation of rural areas.

VIDCOs and WADCOs who took over muchof the planning and mobilization in rural areassoon after independence were mainly formerpolitical commissars and ZANU-PF combatants.However, despite VIDCOs and WADCO’s his-tory during the liberation struggles, they stillfound it difficult to dislodge the traditional lead-ers from rural politics. They were viewed as ille-gitimate structures by communities and in mostcases they gave up. The District Administratorswho replaced the District Commissioners werenot accountable to local communities but to cen-tral government and as a result the government’stop-down approach was often resisted by ruralcommunities and their traditional leaders, whosometimes failed to cooperate with civil servantsdeployed to their areas without local consulta-tion. This created conflicts and confusion in theadministration of rural areas, retardingdevelopment.

However, despite the confusion over landownership and administration, traditional lead-ers have proved indispensable to the ZANU-PF’s survival strategies. As both the state andthe ruling party’s legitimacy began to slip dur-ing the late 1990s, ZANU-PF sought to consol-idate its power in the rural areas. The govern-ment moved to rekindle its alliance with chiefsand reasserted chiefly authority over rural pop-ulations. Traditional leaders were now supposedto play an important role in consolidating whatMamdani (1996) have described as ‘decentral-ized despotism’. This was a clear throwback tothe colonial era during the 1960s. Political court-ship of traditional leaders by the state furthercontinued post-1999 after the formation of a for-midable opposition party: MDC. The Tradition-al Leaders Act (2000) made chiefs very powerfulactors in Zimbabwe’s political landscape, usurp-ing that role from the elected councilors. Chiefsat some points (especially during the run to elec-tions) received untaxed allowances, 15 timeshigher than the elected councilors in addition tobenefits from rural electrification schemes andsubsidized vehicles (Ncube 2011). The effect hasbeen to elevate the status of chiefs above thatof elected councilors who mostly belonged tothe opposition MDC. Thus, the struggle for po-

litical space in rural areas, deliberately construct-ed by ZANU-PF exacerbated the tension be-tween elected councilors and the traditionalleaders.

The Traditional Leaders Act (2000) restoredthe jurisdiction of the traditional leaders in as-pects relating to rural communities, most of whichhave been removed in 1982 through the Com-munal Lands Act. The Traditional Leaders Act(2000) purports to have completed the so-calledre-empowerment of the traditional leaders in ju-dicial and land issues in the communal areas. Itis however important to mention at this juncturethat the Act was a mere political courtship oftraditional leaders by the ZANU-PF-led govern-ment, without giving them ‘real power’ in landmatters. Lack of clarity on the duties of the twoinstitutions made land ownership and allocationa contentious issue. Section 26 (1) states that,‘noland shall be allocated except with the approvalof the appropriate District Council’. Section 26(4) states that, ‘no inhabitant shall dispose com-munal land used by him without the approval ofthe village head’. Section 9 (19) provides for thechiefs and headmen to have a role in land alloca-tion. Munro (1998) notes,

Many years after independence, the ques-tion of who controls the land in Zimbabwe’srural areas-the state or the people, individualor community, RDC or traditional leader-re-mained complex, conflictual and unresolved.

It can be argued that in many cases the rolesconferred on chiefs by this Act were a replica ofthe colonial roles of chiefs. The Act also pittedthe traditional leaders against the elected coun-cilors who were mainly from the opposition MDCparty. By keeping and maintaining populationrecords from the village level and by influencingthe day-to-day lives of their communities, thetraditional leaders were made to play a role intwisting voters towards ZANU-PF and they be-came ‘vote banks’ for the ruling party.

Traditional leaders who supported the MDCwere under constant threats from the securityorgans of the state. Some were either dethronedor had their privileges withdrawn. As noted byNcube (2011),

Such developments underline a serious adul-teration that the institution of chieftaincy hasundergone in the post-colonial period. In theprocess, chiefs have lost their historical role ascustodians of the land and culture, and becomepolitical agents and puppets of the post-colo-

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nial state. Instead of protecting their subjects,they often participate in their oppression.

This is a sad and perhaps one of the greatestbetrayals of the people by their traditional lead-ers and the state after independence. Perhaps,Gluckman’s (1963) argument that in African po-litical life, men were rebels and never revolution-aries, holds water. According to this school ofthought, there was no meaningful overthrow ofan old socio-political order in favour of new so-cio-political structures and values. In Zimbabwe,as noted by Scholz (2005),

Despite the rhetoric of a glorious socialistrevolution brought about by the armed strug-gle, the colonial structures and Rhodesian wayof life persists. Up until post-2000 era, the post-colonial period did not resemble a revolution.

The Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), for example,were renamed the Communal Lands and AfricanPurchase Areas became small-scale commercialfarms, but the colonial structure and administra-tion pattern of land remained largely intact. Fur-thermore, the manipulation of traditional leadersin both the colonial and post-colonial states hascontinued to undermine traditional authority,eroding their roles over land administration.

Land and Politics During the FTLRPand Beyond

There is a never-ending debate on what real-ly prompted the land invasions in Zimbabwe.What is clear however, is by the beginning ofthe 1990s, it was clear that the country faced acrisis over land use and allocation (Muzondidya2009). By 1987, the population in the country’sCommunal Lands had risen to 5.1 million and thenational average population density was 36 peo-ple per square kilometer, up from 3.9 million and27 in 1982 (Muzondidya 2009). The failure of thegovernment to deliver land in the wake of con-tinued land hunger posed a challenge to nation-al stability as peasants and traditional leadersbecame more militant in their demands. Duringthe 1990s, land occupations expanded in form ofcontent, as peasants, sometimes led by chiefsand local war veterans sporadically invaded notonly private land but also state land (Moyo 2000).This exacerbated the already strained relationsover land ownership and administration betweentraditional leaders and RDCs. This time around,a third factor, namely the war veterans emergedas a formidable force and source of authorityover land matters.

The problem became more acute because ofthe difference between traditional leaders andother social forces on the angle of the resettle-ment programme. For many traditional leadersand landless peasants, the FTLRP was an op-portunity to reclaim their traditional land alien-ated during the colonial period. Traditional lead-ers wanted the process to take the restitutionangle which would see them reestablishing theirtraditional boundaries which existed prior tocolonialism. This was in contrast with the poli-cymakers and war veterans who saw the FTLRPas a way of giving landless people land to cor-rect the imbalance created by colonialism. Theydid not attach the traditional claims of belong-ing and land was to be given to anyone in needof it without necessarily relating to the claims ofancestral land. As a result, resettlement areashave become a melting pot as traditional leadersand war veterans are fighting for space to ad-minister and control the resettlement areas. Thelack of a clear policy on how resettlement areasshould be administered also contributes to theconflict between traditional leaders, war veter-ans and the RDC’s Lands Committees as will beshown in the discussion below.

It has to be noted that the farm invasionswere started by Chief Svovse of Hwedza whenhe led his people into white-owned farms aroundMarondera District, marking the land invasionsimmature. The case of Chief Svosve and his peo-ple shows the vital yet neglected trajectory ofthe role of traditional leaders and their angle ofrestitution and return to the ancestral lands inthe land reform discourse. Traditional leadersaround the country followed suit and to them,the FTLRP was reclamation of the land of theirancestors lost during the colonial era. The issueof belonging is central to the land issue in manysocieties across Africa. In traditional Africa, be-longing is linked to the traditional attachment orconnection of an individual or clan to the ances-tral graves. Ancestral graves and other tradi-tional sacred places provide stages where be-longing and boundaries are negotiated. TheShona cosmos strongly believes in the livingdead, who form a part and parcel of the func-tioning of the family and the clan. Graves are thesymbolic focal point of human attachment to aplace: the living and the dead, the social and thematerial all connect ‘here’. The matrix of landand belonging is shaped by a sense of originwhich is rooted in the location where ancestors

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were buried and propitiated. The desire to re-turn to the traditional land alienated during thecolonial period was one of the major factors thatfuelled land occupations and to traditional lead-ers the FTLRP took the angle of reclamation andrestitution of ancestral land (Mujere 2010). Thiswas in direct conflict with what the policymak-ers, war veterans and other socio-political forc-es practically wanted.

Whilst the traditional leaders took the resti-tution angle in the FTLRP, President RobertMugabe and most war veterans saw the landreform as the ‘Third Chimurenga’, where theywere in a real war with the enemy and this timearound the enemy was the MDCs and its so-called Western sponsors. All those who differedwith such sentiments were dubbed ‘enemies ofthe state’. Local government officials consid-ered to be opposition supporters were dismissedby local war veteran committees (Raftopoulos2009). Traditional leaders who were suspectedto side with the opposition were not spared theaxe and some were dethroned. War veterans as-serted their leadership over the implementationof the FTLRP, sidelining local development struc-tures of the RDCs and traditional leaders. In theprocess, the land reform process started by tra-ditional leaders was hijacked by the war veter-ans and some ZANU-PF youths. During the fasttrack process, the role of traditional leaders inbeneficiary selection was dramatically overrid-den by war veterans who, together with manyother landless people, saw the FTLRP as a wayof simply giving land to the landless Zimbabwe-ans without necessarily embracing the issue ofrestitution (Moyo and Yeros 2007).

On the other hand, the FTLRP provided tra-ditional authorities with the opportunity to pur-sue an agenda akin to land restitution as theyhave been making a number of claims both sub-stantiated and unsubstantiated over the newresettlements which they viewed as their ma-tongo (old homes). The FTLRP provided the tra-ditional leaders who are the custodians of cul-tural heritage places with the opportunity to re-claim lost ancestral lands and sacred places andin some instances demand restitution. As Cha-kanyuka (2007) puts it;

For the government, FTLRP was meant toreturn land to the dispossessed indigenous peo-ple; yet, for most rural communities it was notonly access to fertile land but also restorationsof cultural links with the land of the ancestors.

Hence from the beginning, the FTLRP was ac-companied by claims based on ancestral linksto the land.

Traditional leaders have genuine reasons forreclaiming the sacred place of their ancestors asthe Traditional Leaders Act (2000) gives themthat mandate as the custodians of the culturalheritage of the nation. One of the aims of thetraditional leaders as outlined in the Act is topromote and uphold cultural values, particular-ly the preservation of extended family and thepromotion of traditional life. Thus the non-rec-ognition of such claims by the policymakers onthe one hand and the war veterans on the otherbrewed conflicts.

Formerly, the government through the Com-munal Lands Act (1982) and the Chiefs and Head-men Act (1982) stipulated that traditional lead-ers could only exercise authority in communalareas meaning that farms and resettlement areasare out of bounds for the traditional leaders. Eventhe Traditional Leaders Act (2000) is not veryclear on the position of traditional leaders in re-settlement areas. The Act emphasizes on tradi-tional leaders to ensure that communal land isallocated in terms of the Communal Land Act(Chapter 20:04). This limits the powers of tradi-tional leaders to communal areas and is in directconflict with the new trajectory brought by theFTLRP, where traditional leaders seek restitu-tion and want to recast their authority in thoseformerly alienated lands.

The FTLRP has led to the general marginal-ization of traditional leaders as the managementof the newly resettlement areas has been theresponsibility of Village and District Committeesas well as war veterans and Base Commandersand the government seems to have continuedwith its policy of sidelining traditional leaders inthe actual administration of resettlement areas,choosing to work with the elected village com-mittees and councilors. Traditional leaders havehad to compete for space with the elected com-mittees and councilors, making the resettlementareas a melting pot in as far as tradition andmodern forms of land administration is con-cerned. The supreme land authority in the reset-tlement farms is the District Lands Committeewhich is chaired by the DA. The committee hasthe responsibility of identifying land and allo-cating it to other beneficiaries without relatingto any customary law. It also has the power towithdraw offer letters given to plot holders in

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the event of the violation of the offer conditionsor absenteeism from the plot. The new villagecommittees in the resettlement areas stronglyresemble the VIDCOs created during the early1980s.

What is important to note is that the electedcommittees work with almost complete disregardfor traditional authorities and this has height-ened the tension between traditional leaders andthe elected organs. A committee member in theMazare resettlement area which is directly un-der the jurisdiction of Chief Makore explainedtheir relationship with the traditional leaders asfollows:

…We are an elected body mandated by thegovernment through the District Lands Com-mittee to manage this resettlement area. Chiefsand headmen must not forget that their powersare confined to the communal areas where au-thority is hereditary and lineage based…

This shows the severity of the conflict be-tween the traditional leaders and the elected or-gans in the resettlement areas.

The other source of conflict in resettlementareas is over the appointment of village heads.Traditional authorities are pushing for the es-tablishment of village heads (maSabhuku) inthe resettlement areas that would be answerableto the chiefs and headmen and would ensurethat the authority of traditional leaders is notneutralized by that of the village committees. Atthe moment, though no village heads have beenlegally appointed in the resettlement area of Velosiin Gutu west, headmen Mutema and Musaraappointed representatives in the villages as des-ignates who work towards the allocation of landto new farmers and ensuring that traditional cus-toms such as sacred holidays and sacred placesare respected. The headmen see this as the pre-cursor to the appointment of substantive vil-lage heads under their authority. There are heat-ed problems especially between Headman Mute-ma and Headman Musara over the control ofVelosi resettlement. The duo makes claims ofthe area with Musara arguing that the area is inMasvingo District and not Gutu according tothe delimitation exercise undertaken by the gov-ernment between 2003 and 2005. Mutema main-tains that the area is under his jurisdiction be-cause the delimitation exercise was only a re-cent issue which also failed to respect his offi-cial precolonial and boundaries. This has wit-nessed bad blood being drawn between the two

headmen. Putting Headman Mutema’s claimsinto consideration, it can be noted that the gov-ernment had little respect on the precolonialboundaries of traditional leaders and this illus-trates how the state always trembles on the pow-ers of traditional leaders. This is also a throw-back to the actions of the Delineation Officerswho had little respect for traditional leaders dur-ing the 1960s, conveying the argument that inmany ways, the postcolonial state is a replica ofthe colonial state in so far as the undermining ofthe powers of traditional leaders over land isconcerned.

In many instances, war veterans, prominentZANU-PF activists and members of the ZANU-PF Youth and Women’s League largely domi-nate the village committees and they combinetheir political clout and the authority they haveas elected members to command respect in vil-lages and determine policy. In the process, theymanage to sideline the traditional leaders in thewhole administration of the resettlement areas.In fact, they have become chiefs and headmenin their own right, assuming all the duties of thechief, headman and the village head. What makesthe whole scenario more complex are the contin-ual agitations by the traditional leaders for thereestablishment of the traditional boundaries thatexisted prior to colonization as a means to out-maneuver war veterans in the control of reset-tlement areas.

The Ministry of Lands and Resettlement dis-empowered the traditional leaders in a similarfashion as the 1980s when they were often por-trayed as the ‘conservative guard’ of the oldand ‘unproductive’ system in the communal ar-eas. This time around the major reason for side-lining the traditional leaders was to reward thewar veterans and ZANU-PF activists for suc-cessfully carrying the banner of land reform inline with the party’s indigenization philosophywhich has seen the party managing to recoverits support base in the rural areas. It becomesclear therefore that the government was not keento involve the traditional authorities in the agrar-ian reform. This also explains why the govern-ment was reluctant to give the land reform a res-titution angle which would have created politi-cal space for traditional leaders as the legitimateclaimants of the ancestral lands lost during thecolonial period. The divergence of policy, imag-ination and interests provided a surface of fric-tion between traditional leaders, war veterans,

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politicians and other government organs furtherretarding meaningful development of rural andresettlement communities.

As shown in the paper, lack of clear policyand the politics of manipulation and patronagehave led to conflicts between traditional lead-ers, RDCs, Land Committees and elected coun-cilors in the administration and development ofrural areas, making one argue that the develop-ment of underdevelopment in rural areas is part-ly a result of the perpetual manipulation andmarginalization of traditional leaders. The waytraditional leaders have been lured and some-times coerced to work for the state has left adent on their legitimacy and instead of maintain-ing the tradition of overseeing the well-being oftheir societies, they have worked for the oppres-sion of their communities. Thus, the communaland resettlement areas became the center stageof ZANU-PF’s political activities since 2000, withthe traditional leaders and war veterans champi-oning the path for the ruling party, but for differ-ent reasons. The relationship between the stateand traditional leaders unfolds characteristical-ly with even serious ambiguities during the FTL-RP; with the ZANU-PF government attemptingto satisfy both war veterans and traditional lead-ers but failing to clarify their roles in the landreform process and in sustainable land manage-ment after land reform.

CONCLUSION

Traditional leaders have been reduced to civilservants and in the process they have been po-liticized, undermining their power over land. Af-ter being used as instruments of control andcoercion by the colonial and postcolonial states,the roles of traditional leaders have not material-ized and their inputs in developing rural commu-nities have been rubbed off. Both the colonialand postcolonial states have done little to mod-ernize the institution of traditional authority, es-pecially over land. Instead, the governmentshave manipulated the traditional leaders in a waythat strip off their power over land. It can benoted that the relationship between traditionalleaders and the state has been characterized bycollaboration, conflict, exclusion, accommoda-tion and manipulation. However, on the whole,traditional authority lost its value and signifi-cance on more important issues like land owner-ship and allocation. The state has been using

traditional leaders to build its power and legiti-macy on the one hand while traditional leadersalso used the state which they often serve onpartisan lines to claim for preferential access tostate resources like electrified rural homesteads,cars, salaries and farm mechanization implements.As the institution of traditional authority andlocal government claimed its influence and le-gitimacy from totally different angles, it hasproved to be difficult to create functionary chem-istry between traditional leadership and localgovernment. A local government institutionalsystem with an integrated development meth-odology promoting people-centered local devel-opment and a clear clarification of the roles oftraditional leaders has proved difficult to attain.As part of concluding remarks, authors’ prof-fers that political participation should encom-pass osmosis from modernity as well as fromtraditional good sense. By the same token, thispaper recommends that there is a need to stopthe politicization of traditional leaders so thatthey can deliver their duties fairly, impartiallyand in a non-partisan manner for the benefit ofrural communities. If chiefs are to have real pow-er, they should retain the power over land andother resources in their jurisdictions. Tradition-al land tenure should be allowed to suffice, as itis based on participation of the community asdrivers of development. On the whole, the papermanaged to justify its assumption that colonialand postcolonial states embraced the panaceaof the state’s quest for hegemony and how itappealed to institutions such as that of tradi-tional authority to accomplish its goals. There isa persistent tendency of the authoritarian na-ture of the state in local government, makingtraditional leaders semi-autonomous players inlocal politics.

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