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The Rabta chemical factory fire: Rethinking thelawfulness of anticipatory self‐defenseChristopher C. Joyner aa Department of Political Science , The George Washington University , Washington, DC,20052Published online: 09 Jan 2008.

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The Rabta Chemical Factory Fire:Rethinking the Lawfulness of Anticipatory

Self-Defense

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

Department of Political ScienceThe George Washington UniversityWashington, DC 20052

Abstract The fire in Libya's Rabta chemical factor in March 1990 may have beenan accident, a hoax perpetrated by the Qaddafi government, or an act of foreignsabotage designed to set back Libya's development of chemical weapons.International law does not generally condone the use of force against another stateexcept in self-defense. Given the Libyan government's support for terrorist groups, itsanti-Western ideology, and its incipient production of poison gas, the Rabta factorymight be perceived as a genuine threat by Western governments. A case for necessitycan therefore be made to justify sabotage of the Rabta factora as "anticipatory" orpreemptive self-defiiese. If indeed the fire was sabotage, it was carried out withpremeditated proportionality and minimum loss of life. Caution must still beexercised to prevent anticipatory self-defense from being abused as a legal license bygovernments to intervene at will into the internal affairs of other states.

At the end of the day, responsibility for preventing proliferation of chemicalweapons lies with Western governments, who must impose more stringent restrictionsbanning sale and export of that production technology abroad. International lawprovides regulations for state conduct in foreign relations, but the law does notenforce itself. It remains for national governments to uphold those rules.

Introduction

On March 14,1990, fire broke out in the main building of the suspected chemical weaponsfactory complex at Rabta, Libya. The fire burned for 5 hours and caused extensive dam-age. Two workers were reported killed in the blaze, and Libyan authorities supposedlyarrested five workers at the plant, including three Libyans and two foreigners.1

The Libyan government, interestingly enough, officially characterized the incidentas a "terrorist attack," and sealed its borders with Tunisia.2 Widespread speculationsurfaced that the fire was sabotage and that the perpetrators had crossed over into Libyafrom Tunisia. In the immediate aftermath of the blaze, Libya's official news agency,JANA, speculated that the fire might have been sabotage by the United States and Israel.Two days later, however, Mu'ammar Qaddafi declared his suspicions that West Germanyhad carried out "this act of sabotage."3

The timing of the incident was especially intriguing. Only 7 days before the U.S.government had branded the Rabta plant as "dangerous and becoming more so" becauseof its potential to produce chemical weapons for use by terrorists.4 Marlin Fitzwater, thepresident's press secretary, had refused on March 6 to rule out military action to prevent

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80 C. C. Joyner

the plant from producing poison gas. Although Libya had repeatedly denied that inten-tion or capability, and Qaddafi had asserted the plant had been built to make pharmaceu-ticals, the United States in early March called for "vigorous efforts to stop the operationof the Rabta facility."5

In Cairo on March 15, a group called the Organization for the National Wing of theLibyan Army claimed responsibility for the blaze. The group told West German televi-sion in a recorded message that it had started the fire at Rabta after confirming thatchemical weapons were being produced there. This claim was not taken seriously by theLibyan government, largely because the group had not been active before and wasrelatively unknown.6

The origin of the fire at Rabta remains a mystery. Reports in late March 1990 haveeven suggested that the "fire" may have been a hoax perpetrated by Qaddafi to dispelinternational political pressures against the chemical factory that had mounted over theprevious 6 weeks.7 This possibility notwithstanding, in the absence of persuasive evi-dence, the assumption remains that the Rabta fire could have been set deliberately by anagent at the behest of a foreign government. The question for international law thenbecomes whether such a destructive act of sabotage can be justified, just as in the pastcertain obvious breaches of international law have come to be condoned due to thespecial circumstances at hand. Examples here include the kidnapping by Israel ofAdolph Eichmann in 1960 from Argentina; the armed rescue in 1977 by Israeli forces of108 civilians being held hostage by Palestinian terrorists who had hijacked a Frenchairliner and landed at Entebee, Uganda; and the bombing by Israel of Iraq's nuclearreactor at Osirak in 1981.

The Legal Issues

Two sets of fundamental legal issues collide in the case of the Rabta fire; nevertheless,they still must be addressed head on. First, does Libya have the lawful right to build achemical weapons plant, or to manufacture chemical weapons, or to stockpile them forlater use, or even to sell them to other states? Second, does Libya's acquisition ofchemical weapons capability entail a real threat to international peace and security ingeneral and to the national security of any state or states in particular?

Regarding the lawfulness of acquiring chemical weapons capability, Libya is a partyto the 1925 Geneva Protocol,8 the preeminent international agreement in 1990 restrictingchemical gas weapons. The chief prohibition arising from this instrument is against aparty's first use of chemical weapons in a conflict. The prohibition, however, does notextend to production, stockpiling, or trade in chemical munitions. Until international lawis strengthened, Libya does have the lawful right to build the Rabta facility, to produceand test chemical weapons, to stockpile them, and to sell them to foreign buyers. Thatlawful right applies to all states, irrespective of their reputation or well-known supportfor the activities of terrorist groups in the past.

While clearly permissible under current international law, might any other stateconsider Libya's recently acquired capacity to produce, test, store and sell chemicalweapons agents an actual threat? Related to this, could such perceived threats be consid-ered sufficiently real to motivate certain governments to resort to skullduggery to crippleLibya's production capability of those weapons? Considerable evidence is available tosuggest that such apprehensions are real, and that some governments could have beenpersuaded to take preemptive action in anticipatory self-defense.

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Rabta Chemical Factory Fire 81

If the past is prologue, the United States plainly had motives to carry out suchskullduggery. Dislike by the United States of Libyan policy generally and Qaddafi per-sonally is longstanding, real, and no secret. Several incidents during the past decadehave fueled this animosity between the U.S. government and Qaddafi. One only needs torecall the downing in self-defense of two Libyan fighters by U.S. jets over the Gulf ofSidra in 1981. Then there was the episode in the Mediterranean Sea in March 1986 whena U.S. naval task force crossed "the line of death" demarcating the Gulf of Sidra, theLibyans initiated aggressive action, and U.S. planes countered by sinking a number ofLibyan gunboats and disabling several antiaircraft batteries on shore. In April 1986, inresponse to the bombing of a West Berlin disco purportedly done with Libyan complic-ity, the United States launched an air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi aimed at hittingbarracks and facilities used to train terrorists. Most recently, in January 1989, followingreports that the Rabta plant was nearing chemical weapons production capability, twoLibyan MiGs confronted U.S. Navy jets over the Mediterranean in a battle that endedwith both Libyan planes being shot down. The point here is plain: Given their legacy ofhostilities during the 1980s, Libya has good reason to suspect that the United Statesmight have had a hand in the Rabta fire.

There is a good cause for suspecting Israel's possible involvement as well. UnderQaddafi, Libya has sworn itself an enemy of the Jewish state. Libya's long support ofthe Palestinian Liberation Organization and its terrorist activities against Israel in the1970s and 1980s boldly highlights that point. Qaddafi has made his antipathy towardIsrael quite clear and has even rationalized the acquisition of chemical weapons as amilitary deterrent to Israel's nuclear arsenal. It also bears mentioning that Israel mayhave been eager to improve relations with the United States. This ambition would retainhigh priority given recent tensions between the Bush administration and the Shamirgovernment over Secretary of State Baker's plan for elections leading to peace in theregion, as well as increased pressures in Congress to cut foreign aid to Israel in order tomake more aid available to Eastern Europe, Panama, and Nicaragua.

A third candidate for possible complicity in the Rabta fire is West Germany. Bonn maywell have been eager to atone for the fact that one of that country's firms, Imhausen-Chemie, played a major part in constructing the Rabta facility by laundering essentialequipment through fraudulent end users in Asia. Other West German companies have beenlinked to Libya's recent acquisition of air tanker refueling capacity for long-range deliverysystems, in addition to reported assistance of West German groups in developing newsurface-to-surface missiles for Libya with ranges of up to 450 miles. Work on this latterproject has been done recently at the missile test range at Tauwlua. In sum, Bonn may haveacted to compensate for the illegal transfer by German firms of technology used to manu-facture chemical agents and to enhance Libya's delivery systems capability.9

Not to be overlooked in the list of suspects are Egypt and Iraq. Egypt has long beenwary of Qaddafi's capricious foreign policies in the region, and Qaddafi has long threat-ened Egypt because of its peace with Israel. Though relations are purportedly morecordial now, there remains no love lost between these two North African governments.Similarly, Iraq is concerned that Libya might sell chemical weapons to Iran. Cause doesexist for serious concern. Libya was one of only two Arab states that supported Iran inthe 8-year long gulf war (the other was Syria). Although Libya and Iraq share a commonantipathy toward the state of Israel because of the Palestinian question, Saddam Husseinhas not hidden his contempt for Qaddafi's decision to back revolutionary Iran underAyatollah Khomeini, both rhetorically and militarily.

Given the existence of the political will and motives by certain states to act against

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82 C. C. Joyner

Libya, the question of what plausible legal arguments might be available for justifyingforeign government-sponsored sabotage of the Rabta factory arises. For such an actionto be lawful, it must actually qualify as an act of self-defense. United Nations Charterlaw contains the essence of contemporary international law in this regard.

Self-Defense and UN Charter Law

The preeminent purpose of the United Nations is to enhance international peace andsecurity. Toward that end, articles 2 and 51 of the charter in effect codify customarycontemporary international law pertaining to aggression and self-defense. Article 2,paragraph 3, requires that states settle international disputes by peaceful means. Thecore prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter law is contained in article 2, para-graph 4. The provision simply but emphatically avers that *'[a]ll members shall refrainin their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or political independence of any State. . . . " The principal exception and legalcounterweight to this prohibition on the use of force is the customary right to resort toself-defense. This right of individual or collective self-defense is preserved in the UNCharter by article 51, which in full provides that "Nothing in the present Charter shallimpair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attackoccurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has takenthe necessary measures to maintain international peace and security." Consequently,the only lawful force that can be taken against a state is that force which is done in self-defense.

Here again, a pivotal point surfaces in the calculation of self-defense: Is it a prereq-uisite requirement under international law that a state must be attacked by armed forcebefore an act of self-defense can be undertaken against another state? Put another way,must a government wait until it is victimized by an armed attack before it responds inself-defense? Article 51 is silent on that question. Nonetheless, state practice and theevolution of modern international law suggests that under normal circumstances govern-ments do not have the lawful right to calculate and launch an attack on another state inthe belief that someday they might be attacked. Were this case to be made permissible,acts of "anticipatory" or preemptive self-defense would amount to a legal license toattack one's potential enemies on grounds that one day they might attack you. Suchblatant invitations to resort to force would hardly promote stability or cooperation ininternational relations. The overall consideration in the Rabta case, however, hinges onwhether Libya's acquisition of chemical weapons should be regarded as normal circum-stances.

It is important to keep in mind that immediately preceding the Rabta fire, Libyaneither attacked any other state by armed force, nor had been implicated in any recentterrorist activities that might furnish just cause for some state to retaliate legally in self-defense. Under a strict interpretation of UN Charter law, therefore, if the Rabta fire hadbeen set through foreign sabotage, that act would breach international law. Clearly, suchan overt act would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya. The onlylegal caveat that might be used to justify the permissibility of such an act of sabotageunder international law is that if the Rabta facility with its ability to manufacture chemi-cal weapons was shown to constitute an actual and immediate threat to other states, somuch so that some measure of anticipatory self-defense was deemed vitally necessary. Asubstantial case could be made on this basis.

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Rabta Chemical Factory Fire 83

Anticipatory Self-Defense and International Law

Anticipatory self-defense can be supported under international law if and only if thedanger to a state is demonstrated to be real and imminent, not merely hypothetical orconceivable. Such preemptive self-defense is exceptional and should be employed onlyin a situation where compelling evidence unmistakably indicates a threat of imminentattack, thus the necessity to act becomes essential. In the words of Secretary of StateDaniel Webster in the Caroline Case of 1837, the requirements for anticipatory self-defense involve a "necessity of self defense [which is] instant, overwhelming, leavingno choice of means, and no moment of deliberation."10

The right of self-defense is not perforce a passive right. It surely embodies the rightto impair or weaken the military capability of an assailant and to deflate his will in orderto discourage and prevent further violence. Key in this case of the Rabta fire werewhether that facility was actually producing chemical weapons, and if so, should thoseweapons be considered an actual threat to international peace and security in general andto any states in particular? How one stands on these issues will determine how the law isto be interpreted.

Essential for any claim of self-defense under traditional international law are theelements of necessity and proportionality. Necessity conjures up the notion of immediacyof the danger presented. This raises the issue of linkage, that is, the causal connectionsrequired "to justify action against a state for terrorist involvement. Traditionally, self-defense connotes quick action taken in immediate response to an attack or verified threat.

This aspect of necessity prompts critical questions concerning the reality and credi-bility of the threat posed by Libya's production of chemical weapons. Does sufficientevidence exist to support the allegation that the Rabta plant was producing chemicalweapons? If so, is there any real reason to suspect that the Libyans might use theseweapons against other states? Reliable intelligence assessments concluded that the Rabtafacility was indeed capable of producing chemical weapons. Furthermore, persuasiveevidence is available that indicates Libya is in the advanced stages of acquiring long-range delivery systems.

The Rabta facility, located in the Libyan desert about 50 miles south of Tripoli, wasconstructed during the late 1980s with the assistance of West German and other Euro-pean firms. While Rabta has been the target of suspicions for several months, chemicaloperations are believed to have begun only recently. Major technical problems thatdelayed full-scale production stemmed from the lack of a suitable water supply for theplant's operation. In addition, a number of industrial accidents occurred, including onein which toxic chemicals leaked during a production test run in late 1988.

The reported efforts by Libya to acquire chemical weapons are of special concern tothe United States not only because the Qaddafi government is viewed as hostile andantagonistic to U.S. interests, but also because Libya has already demonstrated that it iswilling to use chemical weapons. Reliable reports indicate that Libya used chemicalweapons, which had probably been acquired from Iran, in an attack against Chadianforces in 1987.

West German intelligence sources investigating the involvement of that country'sfirms in the construction of the Rabta plant have concluded from blueprints and photo-graphs that the Rabta complex is designed to produce chemical weapons, most probablymustard gas and nerve gases such as Tabun, Sarin, and Soman. These same sourcesreported that the plant had produced up to 50 metric tons of lethal mustard gas during1989, and put the production rate in early 1990 at 40-45 metric tons per day."

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84 C. C. Joyner

This situation has been independently confirmed by U.S. intelligence sources. TheU.S. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded in late 1989 that Libya had achieved chem-ical weapons capability and had accelerated efforts to put the Rabta chemical arms plantinto full-scale production. U.S. intelligence assessments in early 1990 estimated thatLibya had produced some 30 metric tons of chemical weapons during 1989.n

Other disturbing signs have contributed to growing concern about the Rabta plant inrecent months. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officials reported that the Libyans hadcompleted a building used to process gas into plastic containers, which could be placedinto bombs. That intelligence assessment also reported that Libya had filled enoughcontainers to produce 150 bombs. Noteworthy, too, is that the Rabta factory was re-cently put under the administration of the Libyan military. It has also been determinedthat the Libyans are constructing underground storage sites around Tripoli that could beused to house precursor chemicals for poison gas. Taken together, these findings point-edly indicate that in early 1990 Libya not only was pursuing a chemical weapons pro-gram, but also that the program was fairly advanced and most likely had become opera-tional.

Closely related to the notion of urgent necessity is the credibility of the threat. Forchemical weapons to be effectively used, fail-safe delivery systems are required. Chemi-cal weapons generally can be delivered to targets in three ways: by artillery, aircraft, ormissiles. The Libyan military is well on its way to acquiring impressive inventories ofall these means. Libya is known to have an array of artillery pieces that could be used asshort-range delivery systems. Of more acute concern, however, have been Qaddaffi'sefforts to acquire a long-range capability. The Libyan air force now has at least sevenTu-22 and 16 Su-23 and Mirage bombers capable of delivering chemical weapons grav-ity bombs. The geographical reach of these aircraft has been extended through theacquisition and conversion of C-130 planes into a tanker fleet, and reports in March1990 indicate that Libya is also seeking to purchase a faster commercial aircraft, such asa Boeing 707, to be converted into a refueling tanker.13

Perhaps the most disturbing developments have come with Qaddafi's initiatives inmissile weapons delivery systems. Libya already has FROG-7 and Scud-B systems.Reports have circulated that Libya is developing a surface-to-surface missile with arange of over 400 miles. Even more alarming, Qaddafi is reportedly acquiring a numberof Brazil's Orbita missiles, which have a range in excess of 550 miles, and Libya hasundertaken negotiations with the Peoples Republic of China to acquire the DF-3 missile,which has a range of nearly 1600 miles. Either of these two missile systems would placemost of the Mediterranean basin within range of Libyan chemical weapons attack.

This body of evidence strongly suggests that Libya not only is adding a significantchemical arms inventory to its military arsenal, but also is embellishing that capabilitywith an impressive, effective long-range delivery system.

Another nonquantifiable but pivotal element in the calculation of threat perception isthe responsibility factor. Libya's conduct of foreign policy over the past two decades hasbeen earmarked by ideological fervor and a certain caprice associated with the personal-ity of Mu'ammar Qaddafi. Such a situation has bred uncertainty and unpredictability infixing those patterns of international behavior that are so important in defining theperimeter of international law. If international law is to function properly, there must beregularized behavior by governments to allow for patterns of expectations to develop. Inthis way, leaders can foresee what other governments should do in different internationalsituations, under various circumstances. In the case of Libya, that predictability of inter-national conduct has been complicated by ideological ambitions and the personal consid-

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Rabta Chemical Factory Fire 85

erations of Qaddafi. The point here is plain: Given the legacy of Qaddafi's behavior, hisideological aspirations, and public support for terrorist groups, it is difficult for othergovernments to be confident that Libya's foreign policy behavior will be predictable,much less responsible. That concern doubtlessly has become magnified with the abil-ity recently acquired by Libya to produce and stockpile chemical weapons, andwill become even more acute as Libya's long-range delivery systems are found to bereally credible.

The second critical criterion under international law for justifying an action taken inself-defense is the need for proportionality. Actions taken in response to an armedattack—or in immediate anticipation of such a threat—must be proportional to that attackor threat. Response must be of no greater degree and intensity than the attack. Theprinciple of proportionality is difficult to apply because it involves notions of valuejudgments. The key issue for appraising proportional means usually turns on whetheradequate efforts were made by governments to minimize damage in response, that is, tokeep reactive violence down to a minimum level.

If the fire at Rabta were indeed an act of foreign sabotage, it seems compelling toassert that considerable efforts were made to minimize the impact of that act on civilianand other innocent populations. If the Rabta chemical factory were the target of sabo-tage, the perpetrators clearly made serious efforts to keep human suffering and collateraldamage down to a minimum. The fact remains that many casualties were avoided.Although this situation was obviously facilitated by the plant's location 50 miles into thedesert, well beyond the threat to civilian population centers, it bears remembering thatonly two deaths were reported to have occurred—not 10, or 50, or all the workers in theRabta complex. Any death is regrettable, and a paucity of numbers does not make an actlawful. It does indicate, however, a genuine effort to restrain violence, which surelyshould be appreciated within the context of international law.

Of equal importance is the fact that no attack took place against the authority struc-ture of the Libyan government. One real difficulty with the legal application of propor-tionality in recent times is that attacks are often made by governments against otherstates in the name of self-defense, but the bounds of proportionality become skewedwhen these attacks are planned and executed with the apparent intent of removing aleader or government from the scene. One can see the implications of this legal problemin recent actions by the United States, for instance, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, thebombing raid against Libya in April 1986, and the intervention into Panama in 1989.Although a permissible case can be made for such policy in terms of the national securityinterests of a state, little justification for such acts is available under internationallaw. Self-defense is only self-defense. It does not entail the overthrow of a legitimateforeign government, no matter how disliked the leadership. This prohibition is especiallyappropriate in the absence of a declared state of belligerency. In the case of Libya andthe fire at Rabta, there was no threat against the authority structure of Libya.

Conclusion

The Rabta case points up four dilemmas for contemporary international law that must beconsidered as the world in general and the Middle East in particular moves all too rapidlyinto a chemical weapons balance of terror. First, does the rigid, restrictive interpretation ofthe right of self-defense in international law place unacceptable limitations on governmentsto protect legitimate national security interests? Second, does a state have the right to

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employ a modicum of force to protect its nationals, or other innocent civilians, fromanticipated injury or harm? That is, does Libya's well-known policy of state support fortransnational terrorism, compounded by the reality that the chemical weapons plant atRabta was approaching full-scale production, supply sufficient justification for some for-eign government to undertake a sabotage action against Libya? Third, to put this into legalperspective, is a greater good served by violating the niceties of international law in orderto prevent a monumental wrong that not only appears conceivable, but in fact may inevita-bly occur? The critical weakness here of course revolves around who may determine this"greater good," and whether every state retains that "right" at the expense of all otherstates. Fourth, might the message sent by the Rabta fire be that sabotage remains the onlyrestraint on the proliferation of chemical weapons? If so, does that mean that diplomaticefforts to restrain proliferation of chemical arms through international legal means havefailed? Can it be that the only effective recourse left is to destroy through stealth thosechemical plants in states whose governments are either irresponsible or dangerous or both?The jury is still out on these questions.

Some things are more certain, however. Neither international law nor the UN Char-ter was designed or intended to strap governments into a legal straightjacket and renderthem knowingly vulnerable to international lawlessness or terrorism. Stated bluntly,international law is not supposed to be a suicide pact. A government should nothave to wait until its population is decimated by chemical weapons to take some ac-tion at suppressing the threat, if indeed that threat is real, credible, and persistent.

In a real sense the case of the fire at Rabta provides the international communitywith a means to focus international attention on the problems of chemical weaponsproliferation throughout the Third World. It is true that, in June 1990, the United Statesand the Soviet Union—the world's two largest producers of chemical weapons—signed abilateral accord limiting the production of chemical weapons. This no doubt will behailed as a major arms control success. That accomplishment, however, carries noinhibitions on or deterrent value for other chemical weapons producers, states likeIran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea, or for that matter, Egypt andIsrael.

Resort to sanctions after the fact is also too little too late. Moreover, the evidencesuggests that sanctions do not have adequate deterrent effects, even if applied. Plantinspection by international observers is also flawed. Chemical weapons factories may beeasily converted to legitimate kinds of production facilities—pharmaceutical or pesti-cides plants, for example—and then reconverted back again to chemical weapons pro-duction in a few hours. That situation, coupled with the concern by industry in theWest to safeguard its technological secrets against international competition, makesit extremely difficult to perform verification with any degree of confidence orcertainty.

In the final analysis the only sure way to keep chemical weapons out of the hands ofaggressive, dangerous Third World governments is to prevent Western sources fromexporting that technology to those countries. Sabotage may afford temporary relief, butit will not be a permanent cure. That can only come with the political will by allgovernments to accept and enforce prohibitions on the manufacturing, testing, stockpil-ing, and selling of chemical weapons. Until that day comes, the world will remain anincreasingly dangerous place. And international law on the subject regrettably is likelyto remain captive more to the exigency of circumstances, rather than the propriety ofactions.

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Notes

1. R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick Tyler, "Libyan Plant Extensively Damaged; Five WorkersArrested; U.S. Says Chemical-Arms Capability Is Blunted," Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1990, p.A1.

2. R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick Tyler, "Fire Strikes Chemical Plant in Libya; U.S. SuspectsFacility Produces Poison Gas," Washington Post, Mar. 15, 1990, p, Al .

3. Ibid.4. "Libyan Poison Gas Plant Burns; Tripoli Claims Plot; Bush Says U.S. Not Involved,"

Washington Times, Mar. 15, 1990, pp. Al , A8.5. Ibid., p. A8.6. Abdelazia Barrouhi, "Libya Points Finger at W. Germany," Washington Times, Mar. 16,

1990, p. Al .7. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "Damage in Libyan Fire Reassessed as U.S. Sees Possible Hoax,"

Washington Post, Mar. 31, 1990, p. A28.8. League of Nations Treaty Series, "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," done atGeneva June 17, 1925, no. 94 (1925), p. 65.

9. See Serge Schemann, "German Is Charged in Libyan Case," New York Times, Mar. 23,1990, p. A10.

10. Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841, British and Foreign State Papers, 29 (1840-1841), 1138. For discussion of the Caroline Case, see John Bassett Moore, Digest of InternationalLaw (1906): 409-414.

11. See Schemann, "German Is Charged," p. A10, and Barrouhi, "Libya Points Finger," p.A10.

12. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Intelligence Aides Say Libya Is Again Making ChemicalArms," New York Times, Mar. 5, 1990, p. Al , A5.

13. Michael R. Gordon, "Libya Takes Key Step to Extend Range of Bombers," New YorkTimes, Mar. 29, 1990, p. A15.

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