The Red Army in Romania by Constantin Hlihor; Ioan ScurtuReview by: Aurel BraunSlavic Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 146-147Published by:Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2697002 .

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146 Slavic Review

has added new data to our knowledge of Romanian-German relations in the late interwar years. A careful study of the evidence presented by the author and of those relations in the context of European history may lead to different conclusions, however.

Following a coherent summary of Greater Romania's political history prior to 1936, Haynes systematically analyzes the acquisition of power by Marshal Ion Antonescu and his associated leaders of the Iron Guard. Justifiably, Haynes focuses on the gradual weakening of Romania's historic bonds with France and, to a lesser degree, with England, and the corollary strengthening of ties with Nazi Germany. She attributes these changes to Roma- nia's anticommunism, fear of Soviet revisionism, and the growing political power of the virulently anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic Iron Guard.

It is indeed true that the Franco-Russian rapprochement of the 1930s under the socialist government headed by Leon Blum elicited support for a shift in Romania's foreign relations from opponents of 'Judeo-communism." Despite misgivings about France's readiness to protect Romania against possible Russian actions, however, King Carol remained faithful to commitments to the Little Entente and its patron, France. The alteration of Romania's foreign relations was ultimately determined by the rise of the Romanian extreme right, the pro-German Iron Guard and the equally anti-Semitic, anti- communist, and pro-Nazi League of National Christian Defense and by the growing aware- ness on the part of the king and his entourage of the weakness of France and England in opposing the Drang nach Osten of a militarily superior, imperialist Nazi Germany.

It was only Realpolitik for Carol and his ministers and camarilla to seek coexistence with an ever more aggressive Nazi Germany. Romania's ensuing rising dependence on German good will and military assistance, especially after Munich, may indeed be attrib- uted to the inability of the Franco-British allies to guarantee the security of their friends and allies in eastern Europe.

Haynes stresses fear of Soviet revisionism and military action as a primary factor in Ro- mania's turn toward Germany and its seeking German guarantees of her territorial in- tegrity. Whereas Soviet revisionism was indeed a major factor, the Romanian governments were far more concerned about Hungarian revisionism. Surely, after the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of August 1939 the Romanians had no illusions about Germany guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Bessarabia. But they did harbor illu- sions about Germany's guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Transylvania. Haynes sug- gests that the Vienna Diktat, which divided Transylvania between Hungary and Romania, stunned the Romanian representatives, and she attributes the decisions to Joachim von Ribbentrop, whose foreign policy was presumably at variance with Adolf Hitler's. In fact, the author suggests that Hitler's powers of decision in foreign affairs were limited. The view that the party and government organs were at odds in matters of foreign policy is also invoked with respect to Germany's relations with the Iron Guard prior to the Guard's for- mal ascent to power as a partner of Ion Antonescu's government. A careful study of the his- tory of Romania, of the Iron Guard, and of German-Romanian relations would raise ques- tions of interpretation. So would the author's reliance on secondary sources, including memoirs and statements by individuals who were not necessarily objective. Thus, the clas- sic work on German-Romanian relations by Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu (1954), has not been superseded by Rebecca Haynes's meritorious but inconclusive study.

STEPHEN FIsCHER-GALATI University of Colorado

The Red Army in Romania. By Constantin Hlihor and loan Scurtu. Portland, Ore.: The Cen- ter for Romanian Studies, 2000. 288 pp. Appendix. Notes. Index. $49.95, hard bound.

More than a decade after the overthrow of the Ceau*escu regime, Romania remains one of the saddest places in eastern Europe. In contrast to Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and most of the other states in the region that are successfully making the transition to de- mocracy and markets, Romania seems to be mired in political turmoil, economic chaos, and rampant corruption. The elections for the presidency in parliament last year rein-

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Book Reviews 147

forced the image of a country unable to right itself. Boris Kalnoky, writing in the influen- tial German paper Die Welt (27 November 2000), rather harshly, but not inaccurately, ob- served, "Romania, one of the neediest and most backward in Europe, took another giant step in the wrong direction at the weekend as millions of desperate voters cast their bal- lots for former communists and right-wing extremists in presidential and parliamentary elections." This book, which deals with the presence of Soviet troops on Romanian soil from 1940 to 1958, provides a specific historic analysis. By focusing not only on the eco- nomic impact but also on the effects of Soviet military occupation on the people, culture, and spirituality of Romania, Constantin Hlihor and loan Scurtu hope to explain the rather unfortunate Romanian "particularism" that has made the country one of the laggards of postcommunist transition. Interestingly, the authors conclude with the statement: "What is certain is that Romanian society is still paying its [i.e., Soviet occupation] costs" (195).

Hlihor and Scurtu start with the Soviet invasion of 28June 1940 of Bessarabia, north- ern Bucovina, and the county of Herta, but the primary focus is the occupation of the rest of Romania from 1944 to 1958. It is the story of humiliation, exploitation, and betrayal. Romania's decision to switch sides in August 1944 did little to save the country from Soviet occupation and the imposition of communist rule. Despite the nationalism of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceau*escu, the two dictators who primarily shaped commu- nism in Romania, little appeared in scholarly works that dealt with the Soviet occupation during their rule. Hlihor and Scurtu, two senior historians, provide useful new material that helps shed light on the nature of the occupation, the machinations of the various Soviet officials and Romanian communists during the 1944-1958 period, supply valuable data on the specifics of the economic exploitation, and highlight the steps that led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1958. They also add a helpful appendix of 35 revealing doc- uments. Some of these, such as Nikita Khrushchev's letter of 17 April 1958 cleverly ratio- nalizing the Soviet withdrawal from Romania as evidence of a peace-loving policy and a means of alleviating international tensions, should be of interest not just to specialists on Romania but also to students of Soviet foreign policy.

There is little doubt that the Soviet occupation had a devastating economic, political, and social impact on Romania. Moscow drained Romania of many resources and played a seminal role in transforming the tiny Romanian Communist Party into a huge mass party that imposed its control on every facet of Romanian life. The book also traces the development of that strange Romanian political oxymoron, "national communism." Gheorghiu-Dej was a clever political survivor who manipulated both his countrymen and Soviet leaders to achieve personal and national goals. Yet the authors, in examining the decision to withdraw the Soviet forces in 1958, do not pay sufficient attention to the neg- ative aspects of national communism that later also permeated Ceau?escu's rule. Perhaps one of the primary reasons why Moscow was willing to withdraw from Romania when it in- sisted on keeping troops in several other east European states was that it came to view Ro- manian national communists as ruthless but dependable guardians of totalitarian rule.

In leaving the impact of Soviet occupation open-ended, the authors suggest a partic- ular kind of victimology, and this is where the book is perhaps most inadequate. All the communist states in eastern Europe suffered, yet Romania has been the least successful in recovering. Though Hlihor and Scurtu do provide data on Soviet economic exploitation, their work is one of comparative inference rather than analysis. Yet without that compar- ative context, it is difficult to adequately assess the impact of the occupation. The authors' seeming attribution of Romania's fundamental problems to external causes then may well be overstated. Without taking anything away from the genuine suffering of the Romanian people under Soviet occupation or in any way excusing Soviet rule, the danger of such vic- timology is that it fails to appreciate the primacy and responsibility of domestic factors and actors and the need to transcend the past.

AUREL BRAUN University of Toronto

The Nationality Question in the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, 1918-1939. By Mikko Ketola. Series of the Finnish Society of Church History, no. 183. Helsinki: Suomen

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