The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos

8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos

1/29

The Significance of Plato's "Cratylus"Author(s): Georgios AnagnostopoulosSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1973), pp. 318-345Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126422.

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2/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF

PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

JLn

the

introduction

to

his translation

of

the

Cratylus

H. N.

Fowler

explains

the

nature

and

assesses

the

significance

of

the

dia

logue

in

the

following

words

:

The

Cratylus

cannot

be

said

to

be

of

great

importance

in

the

develop

ment

of

the Platonic

system,

as

it treats

of

a

special subject

somewhat

apart

from

general

philosophic

theory;

its interest lies rather in its

technical

perfection

and

in

the

fact that

it

is

the

earliest

extant

attempt

to

discuss the

origin

of

language.

Linguistic

science

was

in

Plato's

day

little

more

than

a

priori

speculation,

not

a

real science

based

upon

wide

knowledge

of

facts;

but

this

dialogue

exhibits such

speculation

conducted

with

great

brilliancy

and

remarkable

common

sense.1

Fowler's

view

that the

Cratylus

is

concerned

with

the

origin

of lan

guage

and

that

it

is

not

of

great

philosophical

significance

is

shared

by

many

other

schoars

among

whom

we

may

include

A. E.

Taylor,

Paul Shorey, W. Lutoslawski, U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, and Paul

Friedl?nder.2

It is

undoubtedly

true

that the

Cratylus

deals

with

a

problem?what

Fowler

calls "a

special

subject"?which

is

not

dis

cussed

in

any

other

of

Plato's

dialogues.

And

it

is

perhaps

this

fact

1

Plato,

"The Loeb

Classical

Library,"

Vol. VI

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1953),

p.

4.

2

Cf. A. E.

Taylor,

Plato: The

Man and his

Work

(New

York:

Meridian

Books, 1956), p. 78;

Paul

Shorey,

What

Plato Said

(Chicago: University

of

Chicago

Press, 1933),

p.

259;

W.

Lutoslawski,

The

Origin

and

Growth

of

Plato1

s

Logic

(London:

Longmans,

1897),

p.

228;

U. Wilamowitz-Moelen

dorff,

Platon

(Berlin,

1959),

pp.

220-29;

G. S.

Kirk,

"The

Problem

of

Cratylus,"

American Journal

of Philology,

LXXII,

1951,

p.

226;

Paul

Fried

l?nder,

Plato,

An

Introduction

(New

York:

Harper

and

Row,

1964),

p.

32,

writes

:

"The

Cratylus

is

much

more

like

a

medley

of

merry

pranks

than

a

scientific treatise

in

linguistics;" also,

Max

Leky,

Plato als

Sprachphilosoph

(Paderhorn,

1919).

For

other

views about

the

scope

of

the

Cratylus,

cf.

Proclus,

In

Platonis

Cratylum

Comment;

K.

Lorenz

and

J.

Mittelstrass,

"On

Rational

Philosophy

of

Language

:

The

Programme

in

Plato's

Cratylus

Re

considered,"

Mind,

LXXVI;

R. H.

Weingartner,

"Making

Sense

of the

Cratylus,11

Phronesis, XV, I, 1970; Norman Kretzmann, "Plato on the

Correctness

of

Names,"

American

Philosophical

Quarterly,

8,

April,

1971;

and the

works,

which

I

think

contain

some

of

the

most

perceptive

discussion

of

the

dialogue,

by

George Grote,

Plato,

II

and Richard

Robinson,

"The

Theory

of

Names

in

Plato's

Cratylus,17

"A

Criticism

of Plato's

Cratylus,11

in

his

Essays

in

Greek

Philosophy

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1969).

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

PLATO'S CRATYLUS

319

coupled

with the

claim

that the

"special

subject"

with

which the

dialogue deals is the origin of language that has led many scholars to

the conclusion

that

the

Cratylus

is

of

no

philosophical significance.

Although

it is

not

altogether

clear

how this conclusion follows

from

the

premises,

logical

validity

will

not

be

our

concern

here.

Instead,

I

will

argue

here

that

neither

the

premise

that the

dialogue

is

con

cerned

with

the

origin

of

language,

nor

the

conclusion that it

is of

no

philosophical

significance,

is

true

in

the

case

of the

Cratylus.

In

section

I

of

what

follows,

I

will

briefly

discuss the

reasons

for

taking the Cratylus to be concerned with the origin of language and

explain

what the

question

is

which

concerns

Plato

in

the

Cratylus,

viz.,

what is

the

correctness

of names?

I

will

then

state

the

two

answers

to

this

question

he

considers,

i.e.,

conventional and natural

correctness

;

finally,

I will

explain

the

criticisms that Plato advances

against

the

two

answers

and,

in

particular,

the

sense

in

which he

"believed"

the

theory

of the

natural

correctness of

names.

In

sec

tion

II,

I

will

turn

to

the

question

of

the

significance

of

the

dialogue.

By

this

I

mean

to

try

to

answer

the

following

two

questions

:

1)

Why

does

Plato

raise

the

question

of

the

correctness of

names

in

the

first

place?

i.e.,

What

philosophical

problem

is

he

trying

to

solve

by

seeking

a

theory

about the

correctness

of

names? and

2)

How

would

each

of

the

two

theories about

the

correctness

of

names

examined

in

the

Cratylus

solve

Plato's

problem?

We shall then

see

that

the

importance

of

the

dialogue

for

us

is

not

so

much that

it

is

the

first

attempt

at

providing

an

empirical linguistic

theory,

nor

that

it is

the earliest

extant

attempt

to

discuss the

origin

of

language;

but

rather that it is

perhaps

the earliest

attempt

to solve a

perennial

philosophical

problem

about the

relation

between

the

nature

and

structure

of

language

and

the nature and structure of

the

world

in

order

to

use our

knowledge

of

the

nature and structure

of

the former

to

arrive

at

knowledge

of

the

nature and structure of

the latter.

I

Is

the

Cratylus

concerned

with

the

origin

of

language?

This

question

is

difficult

to

answer,

partly

because

it is

not

altogether

clear

what

we are

supposed

to

understand

by

"the

origin

of

language,"

and

partly

because it is

not

obvious what kind of

evidence

would

show

that

the

Cratylus

is,

or

is

not,

concerned with

the

origin

of

language.

Depending

on

what

we

understand

by

"the

origin

of



4/29

320

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

language"

we

might

find

some

remarks

in

the

dialogue

that

seem

to

say something about the "origin" of language, but, I will argue here,

to

take

these remarks

as

evidence

that

the

dialogue

is

about

(or

is

concerned

with)

the

origin

of

language

is

a

mistake.

We

cannot

however

here

deal

with all

the

possible

ways

of under

standing

"the

origin

of

language."3

Let

us

focus

on

the

most

im

portant

ones or on

those

for

which

we can

find

some

relevant

remarks

in

the

dialogue.

For

our

purposes

then

we

might

say

that

when ask

ing

about

the

origin

of

language

one

might

be

asking

for

an

empirical

theory (or account)

of

:

(a) the conditions that give rise to language ;

(b)

the

function of

language;

or

(c)

the

"history"

of

language:

that

is,

its

original

form

and how

it

developed

into

its

present

form,

or

the

way?e.g.,

by

an

act

in contrast

to

a

natural

development?

language

came

into

being,

or

the

beings

that

created

language.

Though

(a)

seems

intuitively

to

be what

one

concerned with

the

origin

of

language

should

be

seeking,

hardly

any

philosophers

have

tried

to

find

the conditions

that

give

rise

to

language.

Plato

in

the

Cratylus

is

not

searching

for

the conditions

that

give

rise

to

language

:

this is

not

what

Socrates

and his

interlocutors

discuss,

and

he

produces

no

empirical

(or

any

other

kind

of)

theory

as a

potential

answer

to

such

a

question.

Now

there is

a

sense

in

which

what

satisfies

(a)

might

be

an

account

describing

the

need(s)

which

give

rise

to lan

guage,

and

this

is

often the

way

philosophers

have

interpreted

(a).

Interpreting

(a)

this

way

brings

out

clearly why

philosophers

have

almost

always

taken it

to

be

connected

with

(b)

:

they

take the need

that

gives

rise

to

X

to

be the function that

X

has,

performs,

or

fulfills.

Thus Locke

speaks

of our need to communicate our ideas as

giving

rise

to

language,

where

communicating

our

ideas is the

function

of

language

;

and

Russell

thought

at

some

point

that

our

need

for

com

manding

others is what

gives

rise

to

language,

commanding

others

being

the function of

language

at

least

in

the

early stage

of its

develop

ment.4

One

might

question

the

sense

or

explanatory

power

of

such

accounts,

but

this is

not

our

concern

here. Our

concern

is

with

3

For

a

useful

discussion

of

the

problem

of

the

origin

of

language

see

J.

Diamond,

History

and

Origin of

Language

(New

York:

Philosophical

Society,

1959).

4

Cf.

Locke,

An

Essay Concerning

Human

Understanding;

Book

III,

ch.

2;

and

B.

Russell,

An

Inquiry

into

Meaning

and

Truth

(Baltimore:

Penguin

Brooks, 1965),

ch.

1.



5/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

PLATO'S CRATYLUS

321

settling

the

question

whether Plato

in

the

Cratylus

was

searching

for, or gives, such an account of the origin of language. It is true

that

at

one

point

(423A-C)

Plato

discusses

some

possible

ways,

or

means,

we

might

employ

if

we

wished

or

needed

to

represent

(?rj\ovv)

the

nature

of

things,

e.g.,

by

means

of

gestures,

signs.

One

such

way

is with

language

or

names.

It

is

clear,

however,

that

what

he is

searching

for

is

not

the need that

gives

rise

to

language

(names),

but

the

necessary

and

sufficient conditions that

a

phonetic

unit,

and

specifically

a

simple

one,

must

fulfill

in

order

to

do

what it is

supposed

to

do:

to

represent

or

reveal

(?rjXovv)

the

nature

of

things. That

this is

what

Plato

is

searching

for

is

clear

from the

statement of

the

problem

by

Socrates

at

422E

:

Well,

then,

how

can

the earliest

names,

which

are

not

as

yet

based

upon

any

others,

make clear

to

us

the nature of

things,

so

far

as

that

is

possible,

which

they

must

do

if

they

are

to

be

names

at

all ?

And it

is also clear from

the conclusion of this

part

of

the

discussion,

a

conclusion

concerning

the

necessary

and

sufficient

conditions for

naming,

and

not

concerning

the

need that

gives

rise

to

language

(names)

:

A

name,

then,

it

appears,

is

a

vocal imitation

of

that

which

is

imitated,

and he

who

imitates

with

his

voice

names

that

which he imitates

(423B).

Let

us now

consider

the

second

possible

interpretation

of

"the

origin

of

language,"

that

is,

our

interpretation (b).

Is

giving

the

function

of

something

giving

an

account

of

its

origin?

Intuitively

this

seems

not to

be

so

in

many

cases.5

But

let

us

assume

that it

is so since philosophers have always been concerned with the function

of

language.

Is

the

Cratylus

then

a

search

for,

or

concerned

with,

the function

of

language?

It is

true

that

at

one

point

(388B)

Plato

(or

Socrates)

raises

a

question

about the function

of

language (names)

and

offers

a

ready

answer

to

it.

But it

is clear

from

the

argument

5

E.g.,

an

account

of

the

function

of

the

heart need

not be

an

account

of

its

origin.

More

importantly

some

philosophers

have

claimed

that

giving the function of something is giving an essential attribute of

it,

whereas

the

origin

of

something

is

an

empirical

account.

This

is

certainly

the

view

of

both

Plato

and

Aristotle

who

gave

a

metaphysical interpretation

to

the

problem

of

essence

;

for

a

recent

more

linguistic

or

conceptual

interpretation

of

this,

cf.

Philippa

Foot,

"Goodness

and

Choice," Proceedings

of

the Aristo

telian

Society,

Supl.

Vol.

XXXV

(1961),

where

it is

claimed

that the

function

of

some

things

is

part

of

the

meaning

of

their

names.



6/29

322

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

that the

reason

this

question

is

raised is that

an

answer

to

it

can

also

be used for answering the main question of the dialogue: i.e., the

question

of

the

correctness

of

names.

This is

clear

again

from

the

conclusion

the

argument

reaches

at

389C-390,

i.e.,

the conclusion

that

certain

conditions

(Plato

terms

them

"natural

correctness")

are

necessary

in

order

that

a

phonetic

unit

perform

the function of

naming.

We

might

say

then that

an

account

of the

function of

names

is needed

for

solving

some

other

problems,

and

Plato

does

offer

a

brief

account

which is indeed difficult

to

understand.

But this is

not what the participants

in

the dialogue

are

primarily concerned

with

:

Socrates

and his

interlocutors

do

not

discuss,

debate,

or

examine

the

question

of the function

of

language

and

they

do

not

consider

alternative

theories

of

the function

of

language.

The

quest

for

the

origin

of

language

in

sense

(c),

the

"history"

of

language,

sometimes

takes the

form of

a

question

about its

original

form and its

development

into

its

present

form from

the

original

one

:

Russell,

for

example,

considers the

possibility

that

language

in

its

original

form consisted

of

imperatives,

from

which its

present

diver

sity

of forms

developed.

There

seem

to

be

two

sets of

remarks

that

might

lead

someone

to

suppose

that

the

Cratylus

is

concerned

with

the

origin

of

language

in

the above

sense.

The first

consists

of

Socrates'

remarks

in

the

later

part

of the

dialogue

about

the

changes

language

has

undergone,

mostly

for

the

worst

from

an

earlier

more

perfect

state.

These remarks have

not,

and

I

think

correctly,

been

taken

seriously

by

many;

but

even

if

they

are

taken

seriously

they

hardly

provide

any

evidence

that

the

aim

of

the

dialogue

is

to

give

an account of the

origin

of

language by

discovering

its

original

state and

showing

how

its

present

form

emerged

from

that

original

state.

The

other

set of remarks that

might

lead

one

to

suppose

that

Plato is

concerned

with the

origin

of

language

as

the

original

form

of

language

and

its

subsequent

development

consists

in

Socrates'

dis

cussion

of

simple

names

:

the

particles

(elements)

out

of

which

the

rest of

the

names are

made.

Plato himself calls

these

simple

names

"first"

or

"earliest"

(xpc?ra)

names

in contrast

to

the

complex

ones

which he calls "latest" (Cerrara) (422C, D). This, however, should

not

mislead

us.

For

although

Plato

talks about

the "first"

(simple)

names

out

of

which

language might

be

constructed,

he thinks

of

"first"

names

here

in

the

logical

sense

and

not

in

the

temporal

sense?

although

they

might

be

temporally

first

also.

This

point

is

clear



7/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

323

from

the

passage

where he embarks

upon

the discussion

of

simple

names, where he calls these basic particles of language not "first,"

or

"earliest"

names,

but

the

"elements"

(aroLxela)

and

goes

on

to

make clear

what he understands

by

"element."

But

let

us

bear

in

mind

that

if

a

person

asks

about

the

words

by

means

of

which

names are

formed,

and

again

about

those

by

means

of

which

those

words

were

formed,

and

keeps

on

doing

this

indefinitely,

he

who

answers

his

questions

will

at

last

give

up

;

will

he

not?.

.

.

Now at

what

point

will

he be

right

in

giving

up

and

stopping?

Will

it not

be when he

reaches the

names

which

are

the

elements

(aroixela)

of

the

other

names

and

words? For

these,

if

they

are

the

elements,

can

no

longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For

instance,

we

said

just

now

that

?Ya#??>

was

composed

of

ayaarap

and

?obv,

and

perhaps

we

might

say

that

?obv

was

composed

of

other

words,

and those

still others

;

but if

we ever

get

hold

of

a

word

which

is

no

longer

composed

of

other

words,

we

should be

right

in

saying

that

we

had

at

last

reached

an

element

(orrouxelov),

and

that

we

must

no

longer

refer

to

other

words

for

its

derivation

(421E-422B).

It

is clear

from

the

above that Plato's

concern

here is with

the

ques

tion of

analysis

or

definition

of

names

by

analysis,

which

is

a

logical

question

and

procedure,

and

not

with

the

development

of

language

from an earlier and simpler state.

There

are

two

other

ways

of

understanding

(c),

the

origin

of

language

as

its

"history" (which

have been

more

influential

in

the

traditional

interpretations

of

the

Cratylus

and

for

which

the textual

evidence

for

taking

the

dialogue

to

be

about the

origin

of

language

seems

to

be

stronger

than

anything

we

have

discussed

so

far).

The

first

is

to

take

(c)

to

be

a

quest

for

the

way(s)

language

came

into

being.

Thus

Plato

talks about

"conventions"

(^vv?rjxrj)

and

"agree

ments" (ofjidkoyia) by

which

names are

given

and

contrasts this view

to

another that claims

that

names

have

some

particular

relationship,

described

as a

"natural

correctness,"

to

what

they

name.

And

many

have

taken this

as

evidence

that

the

dialogue

is

about

the

origin

of

language

since it tries

to

determine whether

names

are

posited,

or

come

into

being,

by

an

act of

convention

and

agreement.6

This,

how

ever,

is

a

total

misunderstanding

of

what

Plato is

doing

here. In

the

first

place

the distinction between

names

by

convention

and

agree

ment

on

the

one

hand and

natural

names

on

the

other is

not

a

distinc

6

Cf.

R.

Robinson,

"The

Theory

of

Names

in

Plato's

Cratylus,11

op.

cit.,

pp.

110-16

for

an

excellent

discussion

and

criticism

of

the

views

of

Proclus,

Leky,

Steinthal,

A. E.

Taylor

and

others

who,

claim

that

Plato's

problem

is

to

find

whether

language (names)

has

been

posited

or

is

natural.



8/29

324

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

tion

between

names

that

are

posited by

an

act

(convention

or

agree

ment) and names that are not posited. For clearly the theory which

Plato

contrasts to

conventionalism does

not

claim that

names are

not

posited

in

some

way

or

other.

Plato often talks

about the

name

maker

or

lawgiver

that makes

or

gives

the

naturally

correct

names.

Moreover,

actual

acts

of

agreement

or

convention

are

not

even

nec

essary

for

what Plato calls

"names

by

convention

or

agreement."

When he

comes

to

explain

at

435A-B what

convention and

agreement

amount

to,

he

clearly

states that

custom

or

habit would

do

as

well

for his

purposes?and

no

one

would

want to

call

these

acts. This

is

not,

of

course,

surprising

at

all.

For,

in

the second

place, questions

about convention

or

agreement

and

natural relation

in

names are

not

questions

about the

way

names come

into

existence,

but

questions

about

the

way

names are

correct

(see below),

although

an

answer

to

this

question

might imply

an

answer

to

the

question

about

the

way

names

came

about. We

can

say

then

that

when Plato

is

trying

to

determine

whether

names are

conventional

or

natural

his

concern

is

not

so

much

a concern

with

the

"history"

of

names,

as

with the

necessary

and sufficient

conditions for

naming?and

determining

the

latter

is

not

an

empirical question.

The last

way

of

understanding (c)

is

as a

question

about

the

beings

that

created

language.

And

this

way

of

understanding

it

has

undoubtedly

been

the

most

influential

in

advancing

the

claim

that

the

Cratylus

is about the

origin

of

language.

Here

one

would

cite

as

support

of his

claim

Plato's remarks about the

"namemaker,"

"lawgiver,"

"the

ancient

wise

men

who

made

names."

As

Richard

Robinson says, these remarks, presenting a picture of a man (or men)

who created

language,

have led

some

scholars

to

claim "that

Plato

is

trying

to

write

a

history

here,

trying

to

describe what

happened

when

men

began

to

talk."7

Robinson

seems

to

me

to

be

right

when

he

argues

that

the

figure

of

the "namemaker"

has

been

misconstrued

as an

actual

historical

figure.

Yet he

goes

to

the other

extreme him

self when he

claims that the namemaker

or

lawgiver

is

a

myth

for

Plato.

Something

which is

not

history

need

not

be

myth

:

it

might

be something of much greater importance than either history

or

myth

in

relation

to

certain

philosophical

questions.

Robinson

seems

to

see

this

himself when he writes

that

"he

[the

namemaker

or

lawgiver]

7

Ibid.,

pp.

105-06.



9/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

325

is

someone

who

ought

to

exist

if

names

are

to

be

correct,

rather than

someone who has existed."8 But if Plato argued that the lawgiver,

or

namegiver,

ought

to

exist

if

names

are

to

be

(naturally)

correct,

it

is

not

simply

a

myth

for him?it

is

a

consequence

of

some

other

views

or

claims.

It

seems,

as

it

will

be

explained later,

that

the

figure

of

a

lawgiver,

or

namemaker,

is

an

important

element

in

one

view

of what Plato

calls

"the

correctness

of

names"?as

important

as

social

contracts

or

non-deceiving gods

are

for

some

other

philo

sophical positions.

In

any

case

Plato's

remarks

about namemakers

and

lawgivers

are

not

to

be taken

as

evidence

that

the aim of

the

dialogue

is

to

find what

beings

created

language,

since Plato's

remarks

are

not meant to

be about

any

such historical

beings.

What

then

is the

question

of the

Cratylus?

The

question

of

the

dialogue

is

about the

correctness

(?p?brns)

of

names.

It

is

stated

at

the

opening

of

the

dialogue

:

this

is

what

Hermogenes

and

Cratylus

are

discussing,

and

they

then

invite

Socrates

to

take

part

in

their

dispute. Indeed,

almost the

whole

of

the

dialogue

is

an

attempt

to

find

an

answer

to

the

above

question

or

to

examine

some answers

to

it

and their

consequences.9

But what is

this

question?

A

name

for

Plato is

a

certain

sound, phonetic

unit

or

segment

;

it

is,

as

Plato

calls it

(383B),

a

part

of

our

voice

(?x?piov

(p

vijs)

that

is

used

to

name

something.

The

question

of

the

dialogue

is then this:

What

is

the

relation

(the

necessary

and

sufficient

conditions)

between

a

phonetic

unit

P

and

a

"thing"

(entity)

T

in

order that P

be the

name

of

T?

Or,

as

Plato

sometimes

puts

it

:

What is

the relation

between P

and

T

such that

P

means

what it

names

(T)

?

It

is in

response

to

this

ques

8

Ibid.

9

It

might

be useful

at

this

point

to

give

a

brief

outline

of

the structure

of

the

dialogue.

The Bound with

Hermogenes:

A.

Statement

of

the

various

claims of

conventionalism and natural correctness

(383-385B)

;

B.

Criticism

of

one

form

of

conventionalism

:

naming

by

fiat

(385-386E)

;

C.

Criticism

of

the

main

thesis

of

conventionalism and

development

of

an

argument

in

terms

of

the

function

of

names

in

support

of

natural

correctness

(386E-391)

;

D.

Etymological

accounts of

many

names

and

an

account of

what

the

rela

tion of

natural

correctness

is

(391-428).

The

Bound with

Cratylus:

E.

A

consequence

of the

theory

of natural correctness: true-false and correct

incorrect

names

(428-434C)

;

F.

An

argument

against

the

claim

that

natural

correctness

is

a

necessary

condition

for

naming

(434C-435D);

G.

The

problem

of

acquiring

knowledge

of

things:

whether

it

can

and

should

be

acquired through

the

names

of

things

or

the

things

themselves

(435D-439C)

;

H.

The

nature

of

the

objects

of

knowledge:

can

they

be

in

flux?

(439C

end).



10/29

326

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

tion that

the

two

theories about

the

correctness

of

names are

given

in

the Cratylus: conventionalism (propounded by Hermogenes) and

natural correctness

(propounded

by

Cratylus).

The

two

theories

in

brief

are

as

follows.10

Hermogenes

claims

that

convention

or

agreement

to

use

P to

name

T

is

a

sufficient

condi

tion

for P

to

be

the

name

of

T;

that

is,

no

particular

relationship

between the

phonetic

unit

P

and

thing

T

is

necessary

in

order

that

P

be the

name

of

T:

convention

to

use

P for

naming

T

is

sufficient.

Cratylus,

on

the other

hand,

claims

that

a

certain relation

between

P

and

T

is

necessary,

as

well

as

sufficient,

in

order

that P

be

the

name

of

T. P must

reveal

(?rj\ovp)

the nature of

T in

order

to

be

its

name.

And

P

reveals

the nature of

T

if

and

only

if

the

elements

of

P

correspond

to

and

imitate

(ixiix?cr&ai)

phonetically

the

nature of

T.

The

analysis

of P into

its

elements

stops

at

the smallest

phonetic

units,

the

letters,

which

are

taken

to

be

the elemental

names.

These

elemental

names

reveal the

nature

of

what

they

name

by

being pho

netic imitations

(?ja/jLelcraai)

of

the

nature

(ova?a)

of

what

they

name

(423E). Thus Socrates and Hermogenes agree that the sound p

imitates

motion

and

that it

"appeared

to

be

a

fine instrument

expres

sive

of

motion

to

the

namegiver

who

wished

to

imitate

rapidity,

and

he

often

applies

it

to

motion"

(425D).

Similarly,

it

is claimed

that

the

sounds

r

and

?

imitate

binding

and rest

;

that

the

sounds

a

and

77

imitate

greatness

;

that

o

imitates

roundness,

etc.

There

is

no

doubt

that

this notion

of

phonetic

imitation

is

obscure.

Plato

and

Socrates

seem

to

be

aware

of this. But

they

also

seem

to

be clear

about

its

importance

for the

theory

of natural correctness. Thus at 425D

Socrates

says,

"It

will,

I

imagine,

seem

ridiculous

that

things

are

made manifest

(xar??rjXa)

through

imitation

in

letters

and

syllables

;

nevertheless

it

cannot

be otherwise." He

goes

on

to

argue

that the

relation

of the

elemental

names

to

what

they

name

is

the foundation

of the

theory

and unless

it is

explained

what

the relation

is,

no com

plete

account

of

the

correctness

of

names

would have been

given.

101

give

here

only

the most

important

claims

of

each

theory.

Plato

presents

each

theory

as

consisting

of

three

different,

though related,

claims.

I

have

discussed

these

in

detail

in

my

paper,

"Plato's

Cratylus:

The

Two

Theories

of

the

Correctness

of

Names,"

The Beview

of

Metaphysics,

June

1972,

pp.

691-736

(hereafter

referred

to

as

"Two

Theories

of

Correctness").



11/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

327

Moreover,

if the

elemental

names were

found

not

to

be

naturally

correct, the theory of natural correctness would lose its significance.

What then

is

the

picture

of

language

that

emerges

from

Plato's

discussion of

naturally

correct

names? At

424C Socrates

attempts

to

give

an

account of

a

language

consisting

of

naturally

correct

names.

He

says

:

When

we

have

properly

examined

all

these

points,

we

must know

how

to

apply

each letter with

reference

to

its

fitness

(?/xot?r^ra),

whether

one

letter

is

to

be

applied

to

one

thing

or

many

are

to

be

combined

;

just

as

painters,

when

they

wish

to

produce

an

imitation,

sometimes

use only red, sometimes some other color, and sometimes mix many

colors,

as

when

they

are

making

a

picture

of

a

man

or

something

of

that

sort,

employing

each

color,

I

suppose,

as

they

think

the

par

ticular

picture

demands

it. In

just

this

way, we,

too,

shall

apply

letters

to

things

using

#

one

letter

for

one

thing,

when that

seems

to

be

required,

or

many

letters

together,

forming

syllables,

as

they

are

called,

and

in turn

combining

syllables,

and

by

their

combination

forming

nouns

and

verbs.

And

from

nouns

and

verbs

again

we

shall

finally

construct

something

great

and

fair

and

complete.

We

might

view the above

as

a

vision

of

an

ideal

language.

In

such

a language its constituents and structure would correspond to the

constituents

and

structure of

the world. This

one-to-one

correspon

dence between

language

and

the world would

even

be

pushed

down

to

the smallest

phonetic

unit

of

language,

the

letter.

Here then

one

would

have

a

language

which is

completely isomorphic

with

the

world,

its

nature

and

structure

reflecting

the

nature and

structure of

the

world.

Language

would

be,

as

Socrates

says

in

so

many

places,

an

imitation

(?i^rnia)

or

picture

(e?x?p,

?^o?co/xa)

of

the world.

In

such

a

language each

term would

wear

its semantic

import

on

its

sleeve.

The

elemental constituents would be

phonetic

imitations

of

what

they

name

and

the

semantic

import

of

the

complex

ones

would

be

determined

by

that

of their

components.

If

the

main

question

of

the

dialogue

and

the two

answers

to

it

that Plato

considers

are

what

we

described

above,

we

might

want

to

ask

:

What

is

the result

of

the discussions

in

the

dialogue

regarding

this

question

and

the

two

theories considered?

We

must

answer

this question before we attempt to examine the problem of the sig

nificance

of

the

dialogue. Although

there

are

minor

differences

of

scholarly

opinion

as

to

what the

result

of the

discussion

about

the

two

theories

are,

most scholars

concur

that Plato

refutes

the natural

correctness

theory

and

sides

with

a

modified

version

of

Hermogenes'



12/29

328

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

conventionalism.11

For

our

purposes

it will

be

enough

to

consider

Richard Robinson's position, since it is the most forceful statement

of,

and

also

gives

some

evidence

in

support

of,

the

claim

that Plato

refutes

the

theory

of natural

correctness and

accepts

the

convention

theory

of

names.

Robinson

argues

that

Plato

did

not

believe

the

nature-theory

of

names

which

Socrates

develops

in

the

dialogue,

because

we

find

that

the

arguments

he

advances

in

support

of

the

theory

are

weak

or

bad,

whereas

those

against

it

are

unchallengeable

ones

:

The above evidence suggests that Plato believed that there is no

natural

Tightness

of

names.

The

Cratylus

itself

suggests

the

same

after

we

have

critically

examined

and

weighed

the

arguments

which

his

"Socrates"

there

produces.

...

I

conclude that

the

appearance

of

Plato's

distributing

himself

equally

on

both

sides

of

the

question

is

deceptive.

In

favour

of

the

nature-theory

he

produces

only

argu

ments

that

are

weak

or

bad;

against

it

he

produces unchallengeable

arguments;

and

he

probably

felt

this

himself.12

It

is

not

altogether

clear

what it

means

to

believe

in

a

theory

of the

type

under

discussion

here

and

what

kind

of

arguments

can

be

ad

vanced

against

such

a

theory.

So

let

us

first

see

how

the

theory

can

be

criticized

and

then

consider

the

arguments

that

supposedly

are

brought

against

it

in

the

dialogue

and

what

they

show.

We

will

then

be

in

a

position

to

make

some

sense

of,

or

even

determine,

whether

Plato

believed

the

theory.

Now

if

one

were

to

claim that

X

is

a

necessary

and

sufficient

condition

for

Y, provide

some

arguments

to

support

his

claim,

and

spell

out

what

X

is?and

this is

what

Plato does

in

advancing

the

nature-theory?the

way

to criticize such a

theory

would be to show

that

the

arguments

advanced

to

support

the

claim

are

inconclusive,

weak,

or

bad

;

or

to

show,

by

providing counter-examples,

that

X

is

neither

a

sufficient

nor

a

necessary

condition. We will

first

consider

Robinson's

claims

about

the

supposed

arguments

Plato advances

in

support

of the

theory,

which Robinson

finds

"weak

or

bad."

The

11K. Lorenz and J.

Mittelstrass,

op.

cit.

;

R. H.

Weingartner,

op.

cit.

;

Paul

Friedl?nder,

op.

cit.;

A.

E.

Taylor,

op.

cit.;

U.

Wilamowitz-Moellen

dorff,

op.

cit.

An

exception

is Norman

Kretzmann,

op.

cit.

12

R.

Robinson,

"A

Criticism

of Plato's

Cratylus,11

op.

cit.,

pp.

121,

125;

Robinson

goes

even to

the

point

of

writing

that "His

[Plato's] writing

of the

Cratylus

may

have

been

a

sort

of

a

purgation

of

the

nature-theory

from

his

mind,"

ibid.

p.

122.



13/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

329

arguments

for the

theory

are,

according

to

Robinson,13

the

argument

from 385 to 386D (i.e., part B of our outline, cf. fn. 9 above) and

the

argument

from

386E

to

390E

(i.e.,

part

C of

our

outline).

It

is

not

surprising

that Robinson

finds

B

a

bad and

a

vague

argument

for

the

theory

of

natural

correctness

since the

argument

is

not

at

all

an

argument

for

the

theory.

B

is,

as

Robinson is

aware,

two

arguments

:

from

385-385D Socrates

attacks

one

of

Hermogenes'

claims

on

behalf

of

conventionalism,

that

one

can

name

by

fiat,

by

showing

that

this

claim

is

inconsistent

with

the

position

that truth

and

falsity

are

applicable to

names

;and from 385D-386C he continues his attack

on

Hermogenes'

claim

by

considering

the

consequences

of

giving

up

the

position

that

truth

and

falsity

are

applicable

to

names

and

showing,

to

Socrates'

satisfaction,

that this last

move

leads into

the

doctrines

of

Protagoras

and

Euthydemus,

doctrines

which

Hermogenes

is

not

eager

to

embrace.14

These

arguments

then

are

not

bad

or

weak

arguments

for the

theory

of natural

correctness, they

are

not

argu

ments

for

it

at all

;

they

are

criticisms

of

one

form of

conventionalism.

C however is

an

argument in support of the theory of natural

correctness.

There

Plato

argues

that

a name

is

a

kind

of

instrument

with

a

certain

function;

that

in

order

to

perform

this function the

material

(sounds)

of

names

must

bear

a

certain

relationship

to

the

things

named;

and

that

names

must

be made

according

to

certain

principles,

by

the

man

who

has the

skill,

in

order

that this

relation

ship

be

realized.

Now

what is the

problem

with

this

argument?

Robinson

writes,

This

argument

is not so much an argument as a free

development

of

the

nature-theory

on

the

assumption

that

a

name

is

a

tool

like

a

shuttle.

It

contains

no

undeniable

observations

like

those

which

attack

the

nature-theory

at

the

end

of

the

dialogue.

It

all rests

on

the

easily

deniable

assumption

that

a

name

is

a

tool

like

a

shuttle.

.

.

,15

There

is

no

doubt

that

there

are

problems

with

Plato's

argument,

although

Robinson's

account

and

criticism

seem

to

be unfair

to

13

Ibid.,

pp.

123-25.

141

have

explained

what

naming

by

fiat is

and how

it is

related

to

conventionalism

in

"Two

Theories

of

Correctness"

and

have

examined

in

detail

the

arguments

given

against

it

in

a

forthcoming

paper

on

"False

names

in

the

Cratylus."

15

R.

Robinson,

"A Criticism

of

Plato's

Cratylus,11

op.

cit.,

pp.

124-25.



14/29

330

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

Plato.16

But it is

questionable

that

we can

draw

any

conclusions

about Plato's beliefs concerning the nature-theory even if Robinson

were

correct

in

claiming

that

the

argument

is

really

"a

free

develop

ment"

of

the

theory

itself and "it

all

rests

on

the

easily

deniable

assumption

that

a

name

is

a

tool

like

a

shuttle."

For,

suppose

that

Plato's discussion rests

on

the

assumption

that

names

have

a

function and

are

instruments

(tools),

like

shuttles

or

other

instruments

;

what

can

we

conclude

from

this

about Plato's

"beliefs"

concerning

the

theory

of natural correctness

of

names?

The fact

is

that

the

assumption

that

some

things

have

a

definite,

often

a

single, function,

and

that

certain conditions

are

necessary

and

sufficient

for

performing

these

functions,

is such

a

pervasive

assumption?if

it

can

be called

so?in

Greek

thought

that

one

is

justified

in

drawing

a

conclusion

opposite

to

Robinson's

concerning

Plato's

beliefs.

Plato

uses

the model

of

function

constantly

and

where

one

would

hardly expect

it.

Aristotle, using

the

same

model,

commits

the

fallacy

of

composition

in

arguing

from

the fact

that

eyes,

ears,

etc.

have

a

function

to

the

conclusion

that

man

has

a

function

;

and he

sees no

difficulty

in

answering

negatively

the

ques

tion:

"Are

we

then

to

suppose

that,

while

the

carpenter

and

the

shoemaker

have definite

function

or

business

belonging

to

them,

man

as

such

has

none,

and

is

not

designed

by

nature

to

fulfill

any

func

tion?"17

If

this then

is

their

way

(model)

of

thinking,

although

perhaps

a

wrong

one,

we

should conclude

that Plato

took the

argu

ment

under discussion

very

seriously.

But

what

are

the

arguments

that Plato

brings against

the

theory

of natural correctness and what do they show? Robinson writes:

The

considerations

which

"Socrates"

finally

brings

forward

against

the

theory

(434-39)

are

upon

reflection

undeniable

truths.

The

pas

sage

is

as

adamantine

an

argument

as

you

can

find

anywhere

in

Plato.

(i)

It

certainly

is custom

that

enables

us

to

understand

each other

when

we

do

;

and

the

power

of

custom is

wholly independent

of

whether

the

name

we

use

resembles

its

nominate

or

not;

and

(ii)

however

much

names

might

resemble

things,

it

certainly

must

be

possible

to

learn

about

things

otherwise

than

from

their

names;

and

it

must

be

better

to do

so.

I

feel

sure

that

every

reasonable

man

who

reflects

on

these

matters to

the

extent

of

writing

or

studying

the

Cratylus

becomes convinced of them.18

le

?f "Two Theories

of

Correctness,"

section

III.

17

Nicomachean

Ethics,

1097b29-1098a.

18

R.

Robinson,

"A

Criticism

of

Plato's

Cratylus,11

op.

cit.,

pp.

121-22.



15/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

PLATO'S CRATYLUS

331

To

consider

(ii)

first

:

the

argument

from 435E-439B

is

presented

against Cratylus' claim that the only way of learning and teaching

about

things

is

through

their

names.

Socrates

in

this

argument

denies that

learning

and

teaching

about

things

is

possible

only

through

names.

And this

is

not

an

argument

against

the

theory

of

natural

correctness,

but

against

a

different

claim.

Robinson's

(i),

part

F

of

our

outline,

however,

is

an

argument

against

the

theory.

Plato here

gives

a

counter-example

by

presenting

a

name

(axXnp?rris)

where

the relation

between

the

name

and what it

names,

though

a

necessary

condition

according

to

the

theory

of

natural

correctness,

does

not

obtain,

and

yet

the

name

is

a name.

This

then is

a

counter

example

to

the claim

of the

theory

that the relation

of

natural

correct

ness

is

a

necessary

condition

for

naming.

There

is

nowhere

an

argu

ment

that

the

relation

is not

a

sufficient

condition. The

passage

then

is

an

"adamantine

argument" only against

one

claim

of

the

theory.

It

does

not

prove

that

custom

(or

convention)

is

a

necessary

condition

for

naming,

as

Robinson

seems

to

imply.19

Rather it

simply

states

that

in

the

case

of

axXrjpOTrjs

and

many,

or

even

most,

other

cases

it

is

custom

(or

convention)

that enables

us

to

understand

each

other,

i.e.,

that

custom

(or

convention)

is

a

sufficient

condition.

What

we can

conclude

then

is

that

Plato

thinks that

both

the

natural

correctness relation and

custom

(or convention)

are

sufficient

conditions

for

naming.

But

what does

this

mean

for

Plato,

who

sees

names as

a

kind

of

instrument

with

a

certain function?

In

the

Republic

he defines

the function

F

of

X

as

that which

X

alone

can

do

or can

do

better

than

any

other

thing.20

In

the

first

case

X

would

be the necessary condition for

(performing) F,

whereas in the second

it need

not

be;

X

simply

does

F

better

(or

best).

A

natural

name

19

In

fact,

there

is

no

argument

at

all

to

prove

that

convention

is

a

necessary

condition.

I

have discussed this

in

detail in "Two

Theories

of

Correctness,"

but

briefly

Plato's

discussion

at

this

point

could

be taken

as

showing: (a)

natural

correctness is

not

a

necessary

condition;

(b)

natural

correctness is

not

a

sufficient

condition

;

(c)

convention is

a

sufficient

condi

tion;

(d)

convention

is

a

necessary

condition.

Plato

really gives

a

counter

example

to show (a) and none to show (b) ;he gives no argument to

support

(d);

and

although

he thinks he has

shown

(c),

there

is

really

no

argument

to

show

that

it is

convention,

and

not

something

else,

that

accounts

for

the

counter-example

he

gives.

20

Cf.

Bepublic 352E;

I

have

argued

in

"Two

Theories

of

Correctness,"

section

III,

that

Plato

uses

"function"

in

the

Cratylus

in

the

sense

he

uses

it

in

the

Bepublic.



16/29

332

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

then,

even

if not

a

necessary

condition

for

performing

the

function

names perform, might be what performs this function better than

anything

else.

Indeed,

after

Socrates

advances the

argument

that

the relation


is

not

a

necessary

condition,

Plato

not

only

gives

no

argument

to

show

that

some

other kind

of

names

is

better

than

natural

names,

but

even

goes

on

to

say

that

natural

names

would

be

preferable?they

would

be better

instruments

:

I

myself

prefer

the

theory

that

names

are,

so

far

as

possible,

like

the

things

named.

.

. .

Probably

language

would

be,

wTithin the bounds

of

possibility,

most

excellent

when

all its

terms,

or

as

many

as

pos

sible,

were based on

likeness,

that is to

say,

were

appropriate,

and

most

deficient

under

opposite

conditions

(435C-D).

We

may

conclude

then

that

no

fatal

arguments

are

advanced

against

the

theory

of natural

correctness.

Robinson is

in

error

when

he claims

that Plato advances conclusive

arguments

against

the

theory

and that

we can

conclude

from

this that

he did

not

believe

the

theory.

Our

account

has

shown, contrary

to

Wilamowitz

and

in

agreement

with

Grote,21

that

at

the

end

of

the discussion of

the

two theories in the Cratylus Plato (and Socrates) still thinks that

natural

names are

preferable

to

names

by

custom

(or

convention).

The

account of

Grote

that Robinson criticizes

and

rejects

is

the

cor

rect account of Plato's

position regarding

the

two

theories

:

George

Grote,

however,

who

was

a

perceptive

and

judicious

interpreter

of

Plato,

thought

that

Plato at

the

end

of

his

Cratylus

was

still

believing

that

names

having

natural

rectitude

were

possible

and

desirable,

though

not

actual.22

Our question is then to find why Plato thought that natural names,

or a

naturally

correct

language,

were

preferable

and

why

he raised

the

question

of the

correctness of

names

at

all.

II

When

the

criticism

of the

theory


is

con

cluded

at

435D

and Socrates

expresses

his

preference

for

a

language

consisting

of

natural

names,

he

says

to

Cratylus:

"But

now answer

the next question. What is the function of names, and what good

21

U.

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,

op.

cit.,

p.

223;

George

Grote,

op.

cit.,

p.

543.

22

R.

Robinson,

"A

Criticism

of

Plato's

Cratylus,11

op.

cit.,

p.

125.



17/29

THE

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

PLATO'S

CRATYLUS

333

do

they

accomplish?"

The discussion then

moves

to

a

new

topic

and proceeds as follows :

CRA.

I

think, Socrates,

their

function

is

to

instruct,

and this is

the

simple

truth,

that he

who

knows

the

names

knows

also

the

things

named.

SOC.

I

suppose,

Cratylus,

you

mean

that

when

anyone

knows

the

nature

of

the

name?and

its nature is that of

the

thing?

he

will

know

the

thing

also,

since

it

is

like

the

name,

and

the science

of

all

things

which

are

like

each other

is

one

and

the

same.

It

is,

I

fancy,

on

this

ground

that

you say

whoever

knows

names

will knowr

things

also. CRA.

You

are

perfectly

right.

The

above,

I

think,

can

be taken

as a

clue

to

seeing

the

significance

of

the

dialogue,

that

is,

to

seeing

what

philosophical problem

Plato

thought

might

be

resolved

by

finding

what

the

correctness of

names

is.23

I

want

to

provide

some

evidence

for

the

suggestion

that the

search

for

the

correctness

of

names

is related

to

Plato's search

for

a

method

(or way)

of

inquiring

after and

discovering

the

nature of

things.

These

problems

seem

to

have concerned Plato

from

the

earlier

dialogues

through

some

of

the

late

ones.

In

this

sense

then

the

Cratylus

does

not

merely

treat

"of

a

special subject

somewhat

apart

from

general philosophic

theory,"

as Fowler and others

claim;

but is

intimately

connected

with

the

epistemological

and

metaphysical

problems

Plato raises

and discusses

in

other

dialogues.

The

reasons

for

raising

the

question

of

the

correctness

of

names

are,

briefly,

these

:

The

main

concern

of

Socrates

and

Plato,

as

pre

sented

in most

of

the earlier

dialogues,

is

to

give

definitions

or

accounts

of the nature

of various

things.

Certain

assumptions

which

underlie

the

Socratic

conception

of

definition and the

procedure

of

obtaining

23

Professor

D. J.

Allan

has

suggested

that

in

the

Cratylus

Plato

is

concerned

with

refuting

a

view which

Cratylus

(and

perhaps

some

other

Heracliteans)

seems

to

have

held,

that

the

aim

of

human

wisdom

is to

learn

the

(naturally

correct, true)

names,

"The

Problem

of

Cratylus,"

American

Journal

of Philology,

LXXV, 1954,

pp.

283-84.

Although

some

elements

of

Plato's

thought

could

perhaps

be

found

in

some

current

views?and

this

is

quite

true with

some

dialogues?it

wrould

be

too

strong

a

claim

if

one were

to

say

that

the

only

point

of

the

Cratylus

is to

criticize such

current

views.

For,

(a)

The

theory

of

natural

correctness

is

developed

in

the

dialogue

by

Socrates (and not by

Cratylus)

; (b) Although Plato

puts

in the mouth of

Cratylus

that

the

only

way

to

acquire knowledge

is

by

investigating

names,

it is

Socrates

who

analyzes

and

gives

substance

to

this

view

;

and

(c)

Plato

does

not in

the

end

refute

the

view

that

knowledge

of

things

can

be

arrived

at from

knowledge

of

(the

laws

of)

names,

though

he does

raise

some

prob

lems

about the

availability

of

a

naturally

correct

language

and

our

knowing

that

it is

a

naturally

correct

one

(see below).



18/29

334

GEORGIOS

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS

definitions

give

rise

to

certain

problems

about the

method

of

inquiring

after

and

discovering

the

nature

of

things.

In

the

Cratylus

Plato

explores

the

possibility

of

using

the

name

(phonetic

unit)

of

a

thing

in

order

to

inquire

after

and

discover the

nature

of that

thing.

But

in

order

to

do

that,

one

would have

to

know

the

relation

between

a

name

and

what

it

names

;

that

is,

one

would

have

to

know

what

the

necessary

and sufficient

conditons

are

for

a

phonetic

unit

to

be

a

name.

And this is

the

question

of

the correctness

of

names

that

Plato raises

in

the

Cratylus.

Now

of

the

two

theories he

considers

as

possible

accounts

of the

correctness

of

names,

one

would

not

solve

his

problem regarding

the method of

inquiry

and

discovery,

but the

other

would.

If conventionalism

were

the

true account

of

the

cor

rectness

of

names,

then

the

name

could

not

be used

to

inquire

after

and

discover the

nature

of that

which

it

names.

But

if

the natural

correctness

theory

Avere

the

true

account

of

the

relation

between

names

and

things,

then he

would have solved

his

problem

about

inquiry

and

discovery.

Plato

sees,

however,

that

natural

correct

ness

need

not

be

the

way

names are

correct,

and also that

there

are

other problems with using the name as a means of discovering the

nature of

what

it

names.

Nonetheless,

it

is

instructive

for

us

to

see

how the

two

theories

of

the

correctness of

names

would,

or

would

not,

have

solved his

problem

about

inquiry

and

discovery,

and

why

in

the

end

neither

could be

used

for

inquiring

after and

discovering

the

nature

of

things.

What then

was

the

context

in

which

Plato's

problem

about

in

quiry

and

discovery

arose,

and

how would

an

account

of

the

correct

ness

of

names

Documents

The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos