The U-2 Meeting the Needs of the War Fighter

8/9/2019 The U-2 Meeting the Needs of the War Fighter

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THE AIR FORCE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM

OCTOBER 16-17, 2007

The Evolution of Air and Space Power – Know the Past, Shape the Future

The U-2, Meeting the Needs of the Warfighter: an Evolution in

Operations

Chris M. Mayse

The U-2 was originally designed and conceived to provide the national command

authority with strategic intelligence data essential in formulating policy. Those charged

with that task today still use data collected by the U-2 to aid their decision making

process. However, over the years an evolution in mindset, technology and tactics has

occurred allowing the warfighter on the ground to receive information on current

battlefield conditions collected by high altitude intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR) assets in near-real-time.

The U-2 Dragon Lady was a product of the Cold War. Tensions between the

West and the Soviet Union escalated quickly following the end of the Second World

War. In his ‘Sinews of Peace’1 address, Winston Churchill popularized the term “the

Iron Curtain,” a term coined by Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Public Enlightenment and

Propaganda for the Third Reich, which he used to describe the complete lack of

information coming from areas occupied by Soviet troops during World War II. By the

1950s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a completely closed society.

The United States and its allies knew little about the USSR except that its stated goal was

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to replace democracy and capitalism, where ever such institutions existed, with

communism. Decision makers in the United States were anxious to uncover the

economic and military capabilities and potential of this deadly adversary. In 1953, Jack

Carter, who worked in the development and planning office at the Lockheed Corporation,

suggested the need for an aircraft which could over fly the Soviet Union at extreme

altitudes collecting information about that secretive society. This was the birth of the U-2

and high altitude ISR.

If asked, most people still identify the U-2 as the spy plane flown by Francis Gary

Powers during the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s. The information collected

during those flights allowed President Eisenhower to determine that the suspected

bomber gap between the United States and the USSR was nothing more than a façade

erected by Soviet leaders. Photographs taken during U-2 missions over the Soviet Union

revealed no significant military build-up and helped lay to rest fears that the communists

were planning a surprise attack against the West, thus allowing President Eisenhower to

avoid growing Congressional and public pressure to escalate the on-going arms race.

Others might associate the U-2 with the Cuban missile crisis of the Kennedy

administration. They might remember Adlai E. Stevenson, Jr., then the US ambassador

to the United Nations (UN) presenting photographs of missile sites under construction at

a meeting of the UN Security Council or they might remember Major Rudolph Anderson,

who became the sole casualty of the conflict when his U-2 was shot down by a surface-

to-air missile over Cuba on October 27, 1962. These events are certainly important

milestones along the evolutionary path of high altitude intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance.

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The first flights over the Soviet Union were surveillance missions; systematic and

passive observations of the area and its people. This information became part of a dataset

used to aid strategic decision making. The overflights of Cuba in the 1960s represented

reconnaissance missions intended to collect information on specific targets. The data

collected during these missions did not find its way into the hands of national decision

makers, the intended customers, until hours, sometimes days, after the completion of the

flight.

Decision makers continued to rely on the U-2 for strategic surveillance

throughout the decade of the 1960s and into the 1970s. By 1978 the Soviet Union had

fielded a huge military machine. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) could not match those forces tank for tank and hoped superior technology;

training and intelligence would counter this massive threat. The Pentagon revealed in its

Fiscal Year 1979 budget a request for funding of “the TR-1, a new version of the

Lockheed U-2, updated for tactical reconnaissance.”2 It was hoped the TR-1 would be

able to provide theater commanders with the near-real time intelligence necessary to

counter the Soviet threat in Europe. A new role was beginning to emerge for the U-2.

Operations conducted by the TR-1 represented a significant step in the evolution

of mindset, technology and tactics. The aircraft, virtually identical to the U-2, was

assigned to the 17th Reconnaissance Wing, and operated from Alconbury, England flying

Olympic Distant missions above the Artic Circle and Creek Specter missions along the

German and Czechoslovakian border, the Barent’s Sea, Baltic Sea and North Africa.3

Data from these tactical reconnaissance missions was down linked to a ground station

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named METRO TANGO, located at Hahn AB, Germany and provided near real-time

images to the U.S. Army V Corps in Germany.4

During Creek Specter missions, aircraft were equipped with the new Advanced

Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) that provided an all-weather, day-night, long-

range mapping capability.5 These new systems represented a significant evolution in

technology, which allowed the warfighter on the ground access to near real time

intelligence concerning the disposition of Soviet forces.

The tactics used by the TR-1 pilots during these tactical reconnaissance missions

remained relatively unchanged from the tactics used during strategic surveillance

missions. The TR-1 pilot still flew “alone, unarmed, and unafraid.” The aircraft was still

considered a national asset and remained under the control of the Strategic Air Command

(SAC). Under the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) the missions

were generated by the Strategic Reconnaissance Office (SRO) with little or no input from

the warfighter on the ground. The missions were flown along specified tracks from

which the pilot was not allowed to deviate. 6 During these missions, the pilot turned the

sensors on and off as directed but was not otherwise actively engaged in the operation.

The pilots did not have the necessary security clearances or need to know where the

sensors were pointed or what data was being collected. These missions did not represent

an evolution in tactics. They did, however, represent and evolution in mindset.

The pilots who flew Creek Specter missions began to understand the purpose of

the mission was to support the warfighter on the ground. The information collected

provided the near real-time intelligence the theater commander needed to provide for the

defense of Europe. The customer was not a national decision maker who might not

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receive the data for days, but rather was a warfighter on the ground that needed to

immediately know the condition of the battlefield. An evolution in mindset occurred

during these missions. Lieutenant Colonel Jon L. Huggins, the 9th Reconnaissance

Squadron Assistant Director of Operations, who flew many of those missions said, “It

really hit home for me during those missions how much of what we did was meant to

take care of those guys on the ground when we started going tank-to-tank with the bad

guys.”7 The TR-1 pilot began to feel a direct connection with the warfighter on the

ground.

It was not only the pilots who experienced an evolution in mindset as a result of

TR-1 operations in Europe. The warfighter on the ground came to rely heavily on the

data provided by high altitude reconnaissance. Theater commanders, realizing what the

platform could provide, demanded more and more of the TR-1 and the ISR community.

Decision makers within the ISR community also experienced an evolution in

mindset as a result of the Creek Specter missions. They came to realize that tactical

reconnaissance provided by high altitude reconnaissance assets had the potential to

change the out come of battle by providing the warfighter on the ground a clear, accurate

and near real-time picture of the battle space. Robert Ray, a retired TR-1 pilot who flew

many Creek Specter missions said, “I think one thing the TR-1 program did was open the

gate more for support for the European ground fighters and the primary emphasis was on

that; providing that support.”8 The community was not yet ready to turn over control of

the ISR asset to theater commanders because the evolution in mindset had not progressed

to that degree.

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The next major step in the evolution in mindset, technology and tactics occurred

in 1990 and 1991 during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm undertaken in

response to Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait. On 6 August 1990 the 9th

Reconnaissance Wing, home of the U-2, was alerted for possible deployment to the

Middle East. The first two U-2s landed at Taif, Saudi Arabia on 17 August and the first

two TR-1s from the 17th Reconnaissance Wing arrived from Alconbury on 23 August.

Aircraft and personnel were assigned to the 1704th Reconnaissance Squadron.9 Aircraft

numbers increased in the run up to war and by the opening of Desert Storm 30 pilots

were flying six U-2s and six TR-1s during reconnaissance missions from Taif. This

represented the largest U-2 operation to date.10

Prior to the aircraft’s arrival, David Bonsi then a Major assigned to United States

Central Command (CENTCOM) deployed at Riyad, Saudi Arabia was tasked with setting

up the ground stations for the U-2s. The first ground station, called Senior Blade, was

placed in Riyad then considered to be the safest place in the county from potential attack

by Saddam’s forces. This location limited U-2 operations somewhat. The aircraft were

still tethered to the ground station and the line of sight data link only reached to the

northern border of Saudi Arabia. Aircraft operating beyond that range had to store their

collection on tape and download it once they came within range of the ground station.11

A second ground station (dubbed son-of-Blade) soon arrived in-country and

Major Bonsi wanted to position it further north to allow the U-2 greater tethered range.

He found an army unit stationed at King Khaled Military City (KKMC) near the northern

border of the country. At first the army was reluctant to allow the ground station to

operate in its area of responsibility since army units would have to provide for its

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defense. Major Bonsi discussed the matter with the army brigadier general in command

of the unit at KKMC, showed him the images collected by the U-2 and explained their

importance to the warfighter on the ground. After a little convincing, and the promise

that the general could place his own people with the ground station for access to the

collections, the ground station began operating.12 This is yet another example of the

evolution in mindset as the ground commander realized what high altitude ISR could do

for him.

Missions flown during Desert Shield were similar to the Creek Specter missions

flown in Europe. During Creek Specter missions, the TR-1s looked for indications that

Soviet forces were coming through the Fulda Gap. During Desert Shield U-2s and TR-1s

flew missions looking for indications that Iraqi troops were moving toward Saudi

Arabia.13 They also identified likely future targets for bombing missions in the event that

hostilities erupted. Tactics used during these operations were similar.

Missions flown during Desert Storm initially focused on bomb damage

assessment. Almost immediately, however, the focus shifted to locating SCUD missile

launchers. The missions usually involved a U-2 or TR-1 on tether to the ground station

searching for likely launch locations. Within ten minutes of target acquisition by the U-2

or TR-1 sensor the theater air control center had approximate coordinates ready for the

strike aircraft.14 Near real-time intelligence provided by high altitude reconnaissance was

available to the warfighter.

An evolution in mindset and tactics became evident during these missions. Prior

to Desert Shield, the U-2 and the intelligence community had experimented with the idea

of dynamic retasking. Dynamic retasking involved sending the U-2 off of its assigned

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track. During Desert Storm if the analyst on the ground reviewing the collection

provided by the U-2 saw a potential target he could upload new coordinates for the pilot

which would take him off the black line of the assigned track. Photo interpreters

assigned to the ground station could then evaluate the data downloaded from the U-2 and

determine if an immediate strike was warranted.15 This willingness and ability to leave

the assigned track represented a significant evolution in the mindset of the personnel

assigned to the ground station, the theater commander and the man in the cockpit making

high altitude ISR much more flexible and responsive to the needs of the warfighter on the

ground.

Another evolution in mindset which occurred during Desert Storm involved the

control of the platform itself. During Desert Shield and at the beginning of Desert Storm,

the aircraft was still considered a national asset, one closely controlled by SAC. When

Major Bonsi received a mission request from the CENTCOM intelligence office, he had

to forward it to SAC headquarters for approval.16 Personnel at SAC headquarters would

then plan out the mission and send the tasking back to the reconnaissance squadron at

Taif. This manner of doing business was cumbersome, time consuming and inefficient

and the problem was only exacerbated by time differences between Omaha and Saudi

Arabia. Sometimes by the time SAC returned its mission approval to Taif the window of

opportunity on the target collection had closed and the mission had been overcome by

events.

Something had to be done to make the system more responsive to the warfighter.

Major Bonsi presented the problem to those at SAC who controlled the U-2. He

explained that he felt it was necessary to shift control of the asset to the theater. A

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shooting war required that Major Bonsi be able to call the commander of the

reconnaissance squadron at Taif directly, provide him target coordinates and allow his

people to plan and execute the mission. Realizing that it was absolutely critical to

provide the warfighter with the most accurate and timely reconnaissance possible, SAC

relented and Major Bonsi’s plan was put into effect.17 The willingness of SAC to release

control of the U-2 to the theater commander represented a significant evolution in

mindset. “The Gulf War demonstrated the requirement of airborne reconnaissance assets

to be fully integrated and synchronized into a Joint Task Force to achieve strategic and

operational goals” according to Colonel Keith E. Gentile.18

Another evolution in mindset and tactics occurred during Desert Storm when the

U-2 was included in the Air Tasking order (ATO). While the U-2 was not part of any air

package, coalition fighters did sometimes fly MIGCAPs nearby to protect the aircraft

from Iraqi fighters. Inclusion in the ATO provided friendly aircraft the knowledge of

where U-2s would be operating that day. The U-2 pilots also stayed in contact with

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to avoid any friendly fire

incidents.19 The U-2 pilots still flew “alone, unarmed and unafraid” but now they were a

part of an air team if not part of an air package. It should be noted that in some instances

the U-2 was not allow to proceed into the target area without Wild Weasel escorts.

Yet another evolution in mindset and tactics could be seen in the U-2’s growing

direct support for the warfighter. During a mission to locate Iraqi troop movements west

of Basra, Iraq on 27 February, Captain Dan Sanders was informed that a major battle

between Iraqi and Coalition forces was underway. He deviated from his assigned track

and brought his sensors to bear on the battlefield. Data he collected allowed friendly

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forces to withdraw and Apache and Cobra helicopters to strike at the Iraqi tanks. He then

noticed Iraqi reinforcements moving into the area. He relayed the information and again

brought his sensors to bear acquiring new targets for coalition forces. Using the data

collected by the U-2, coalition forces destroyed 350 Iraqi vehicles including 23 T-72

tanks.20 The U-2 pilot’s involvement with the warfighter on the ground became more

proactive and dynamic representing a tremendous evolution in mindset.

Another evolution in tactics and mindset evolved from a reluctance of the ground

commanders to accept products outside their comfort zone. The ground commanders

liked the near real-time intelligence provided by the U-2 sensors but they wanted

hardcopy products. Hard copy photographs could be generated by data colleted by

SYERS and ASARS sensors but it took time to process and the resolution left much to be

desired. Adapting to the desires of the warfighter, U-2 pilots began flying H camera

missions. The camera system was designed to take photographs from a stand off angle.

When ground commanders received those photographs they were pleased with the

products but wanted greater resolution. This was achieved by shifting the collection to a

nadir or straight down shot. Ground commanders where thrilled with the results.21 This

willingness on the part of the U-2 community to change its tactics reflected an evolution

not only in the tactics employed but also in the mindset of the U-2 pilot who was now

constantly thought of how to get useable high altitude ISR intelligence quickly into the

hands of the warfighter. It also represented a significant change in the mindset of the

ground commander who having seen what HAISR could do for him demanded more

timely, flexible products.

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The dynamics of the ground war also drove an evolution in mindset and tactics.

Prior to Desert Storm, U-2 pilots would complete their conventional mission planning a

day in advance of the flight. During Desert Storm the pilot often did not know where

they were going until just before take off. Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Masucci

relates:22

I was in the jet already to fly a specific mission…and just prior to closing up the

canopy for engine start; the mission planner came out with a new set of boards

and a new mission track. The first several INS points were the same (as it wasalmost an hour to the Iraqi border) so I just had to “fat finger” in the remaining

points into the INS. And…once I was able to establish LOS link with the

ground station, they were able to push the new track up and finish the upload…so I only actually manually entered around 3 or 4 points. I used the remaining

“five minutes” before crossing the border to go over the mission and review the

target area and known threats.

This represented a significant evolution in mindset and tactics on the part of the U-2 pilot

and the community at large and again is representative of the desire to provide the

product needed by the warfighter on the ground.

The original plan for Operation Desert Storm released by General Norman

Schwarzkopf had no provisions for airborne reconnaissance. In the six weeks of Desert

Shield the U-2 flew 284 sorties representing over 2,700 flying hours. During Desert

Storm the U-2 flew 260 sorties representing over 2,000 flying hours. The platform

provided approximately 50 percent of all imagery intelligence and 30 percent of the total

intelligence of the war .23 The vast majority of this information was tactical intelligence

collected by a high altitude ISR platform and delivered into the hands of the warfighter in

a matter of minutes. Missions flown during Desert Storm and Desert Shield resulted in a

tremendous evolution in mindset, technology and tactics by those in the U-2 and

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intelligence community as well as the theater commander and the warfighter on the

ground.

The warfighters on the ground also experienced a significant evolution in mindset

having seen over and over again the value of high altitude ISR. General Colin Powell

said, “No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary

as did our field commanders. Intelligence support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm was a success story.”24 The warfighter found the picture of the battle space

provided by high altitude ISR to be invaluable. The more they got the more they wanted.

The next major step in the evolution in mindset, technology and tactics occurred

during Operation Northern and Southern Watch, the United Nations dictated operations

to enforce the no fly zones designated in Iraq following the end of Desert Storm. The

U-2 had not been a part of the air package during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Major

B. L. Bachus flew the first U-2 mission across the Iraqi border during Desert Storm going

deep into the country without the promised tactical air cover. Although he returned

safely, he told the then 9th Reconnaissance Wing historian he felt “like a burglar who

broke into a policeman’s house without a gun and the policeman is expected home at any

minute.”25

Things changed dramatically during Northern Watch and Southern Watch. It was

during those operations that the U-2 became the heart of the air package. Lieutenant

Colonel Huggins, who flew many Northern and Southern Watch missions from Prince

Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, said “At the daily briefs everyone focused on

where the U-2 was going and what it was doing.”26 Fighter aircraft assigned to fly the

Watch missions dropped bombs on communication nodes or emitters as required but

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those operations represented only secondary or tertiary missions for the fighter aircraft.

Their primary mission was to make certain the U-2 was safe. This represented a

significant evolution in the mindset and tactics for Air Force planners and operators.

The close association between the fighter pilots and the U-2 pilots gave rise to a

greater understand of the limitations and capabilities of each type of airframe. Lieutenant

Colonel Huggins said, “It was important in understanding what they could do for us and

what we could do for them.”27 This experience, along with the combat experience

recently acquired during Desert Storm, helped develop a U-2 pilot force that tended to be

much more mission involved and proactive and helped prepare them for the missions

flown in support of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Missions flown during Northern Watch/Southern Watch may represent an

evolution in mindset within Air Force leadership regarding the importance of high

altitude ISR and aerial reconnaissance at large.28 In its infancy the Air Force was used in

an observation role. Fighter aircraft emerged in an attempt to deny enemy air forces the

ability to conduct reconnaissance and pursuit aircraft emerged into order to protect those

reconnaissance assets. Bombers were developed to exploit targets identified by

reconnaissance assets. During Watch missions, the entire focus of the operation again

revolved around the reconnaissance aircraft.

An evolution in technology is also apparent during Watch missions. When the

U-2 became a part of the air package, it was necessary to upgrade its Identification

Friend/Foe (IFF) capability. During Desert Storm, the U-2 only had an IFF system

similar to what might be found in small private aircraft. It did not have the Mode 4

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capability that would identify it to other friendly aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Huggins

explained that this presented a concern for U-2s returning from cross boarder missions in

a “communications out” situation where the radio had failed. Without the ability to

identify itself, the U-2 could easily have become the target for friendly fire from ground

or air based assets. The addition of Mode 4 to the aircraft’s IFF was an important

evolution in technology dictated by the tactical environment.

The next step in the evolution of mindset, technology and tactics for high altitude

ISR came during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. Although modest in scope, the

ability to conduct beyond-line-of-sight operations (BLOS) was an important evolution in

technology. Images from the U-2 were transmitted to a Mobile Stretch (MOBSTR) van

located in Italy. The data was then retransmitted to a satellite and then bounced back to

the Designated Ground Station (DGS) at Beale AFB. The data was then analyzed and

sent back to the European theater .29 The technology was new and there were significant

bandwidth limitations. Nevertheless, the ability to conduct BLOS resulted in an

evolution in mindset and technology among operators and users alike.

The change in mindset regarding the employment of high altitude ISR that

emerged during the Kosovo operations began at the grassroots among the U-2 pilots and

the intelligence experts who exploited the information gathered during the U-2 missions.

According to many, at the heart of that change in mindset was the squadron commander

then Lieutenant Colonel Keith E. Gentile. It was Lieutenant Colonel Gentile who

suggested the development of a U-2 tactics office within the squadron that later grew into

a U-2 wing tactics office. Those assigned to the tactics office began exploring ways in

which the airframe could be used tactically to support the warfighter on the battlefield.

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Those ideas were then presented to senior leadership within the wing and the ISR

community at large.30

Lieutenant Colonel Gentile also encouraged U-2 pilots assigned to his squadron to

get more involved in the concept of joint operations encouraging them to attend weapon

schools and to begin thinking in more tactical terms. He tried to involve the U-2

community in as many joint exercises as possible sending LNOs to participate in the

planning and execution of those exercises in an effort to educate participants on the

capability and potential of high altitude ISR. Colonel Gentile had first addressed the

issue in 1996 when he said, “Every effort must be made to include intelligence staffs,

platforms, and operators in training exercises and not just ‘script’ the reconnaissance

assets and intelligence cycle.”31 He also encouraged his pilots to learn the back end of the

ISR architecture including ground station operations.32

The missions flown in support of Allied Force did not involve the dynamic

retasking of the U-2, but did lay the groundwork for such retasking. During Allied Force

missions, U-2 pilots flew the black line but because they were now in direct contact with

analysts on the ground, those analysts could and did ask the U-2 pilot to re-fly portions of

the black line adding newly discovered items of interest to the collection deck. The

potential to retask the aircraft while airborne first used during Desert Storm evolved over

time and came to fruition during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Missions flown during Northern Watch/Southern Watch and over Kosovo and the

resulting evolution in mindset, technology and tactics helped prepare the U-2 pilot for the

mission required during OEF and OIF. Critical evolutions in technology also paved the

way for OEF and OIF missions. The U-2 could now operate entirely beyond-line-of-site

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using reach back. The U-2 downloaded its data to a ground station which transmitted the

information to a satellite which then downloaded the data to a Designated Ground Station

(DSG) within the United States. Analysts at those ground stations exploited the data and

sent target information back to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Analysts

at Beale AFB, in contact with the U-2 pilot during the mission, could analyze the data

and, if necessary, dynamically retask the aircraft for another look at the target. The

perfection of beyond-line-of-sight technology, begun in the late 1980s, made high

altitude ISR missions in support of OEF and OIF possible.33

The evolution in mindset and tactics has continued to progress during OEF and

OIF. Now more than ever, the high altitude ISR has the ability to dramatically and

immediately influence the outcome of battles and provide support for the warfighter on

the ground. During Desert Storm, U-2 pilots began to become more proactive and

engaged in the operation. That evolution in mindset continued during Operation Allied

Force and has reached new and greater heights during OEF and OIF. The U-2 pilot,

while engaged in his assigned target collection, monitors strike frequencies on his radio

for troops-in-contact calls and can immediately respond with an offer to bring his sensors

to bear on the battle thus providing near real time tactical reconnaissance to the

warfighter on the ground helping to identify targets and threats. The ability and

willingness of the U-2 pilot to engage in the battle space at this level, and the willingness

of the warfighter on the ground to utilize a high altitude ISR asset during the rapid flow

of battle is truly representative of the evolution that has occurred over the years

The need to conduct strategic surveillance of the USSR during the Cold War gave

birth to the U-2. During the first decades, the U-2 was a national asset strictly controlled

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by the intelligence community. The intelligence data collected by high altitude ISR

assets was carefully channeled to its intended customers, the national command authority.

The need to counter the threat of the massive Soviet military machine contributed to the

evolution in technology, mindset and tactics. New customers, the theater commander and

the warfighter on the ground were added to the mix. Intelligence gathered by high

altitude ISR assets helped the theater commander plan the defense of Europe. War on the

Arabian Peninsula further contributed to the evolution in technology, mindset and tactics

and the need to provide near real-time intelligence to the warfighter demanded the

intelligence community and the operators develop better and faster ways of putting the

data collected by high altitude ISR assets into the hands of the warfighter on the ground.

Those challenges and the evolution in technology, mindset and tactics continued during

Northern Watch and Southern Watch missions and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

Today in OEF and OIF, the U-2 is being used in dynamic new ways. No longer tethered

to the black line of the 1960s, the U-2 pilot is a proactive element of the ATO monitoring

his radio for troops-in-contact calls so that he might redirect his sensors into the fight.

The evolution in technology, mindset and tactics continues as the intelligence and ISR

community, and the operators strive to put the best intelligence data into the hands of the

warfighter on the ground or in the air.

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1 The History Guide, Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe, “Sinews of Peace,” available on the Internet at

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html accessed on 16 Jul 07.2 Pocock, Chris 50 Years of the U-2 The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady”, Schiffer Publishing, LTD,2005, pg 291.3 Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Robert Ray, DET 11/CT1, 06 Jul 07; Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with

David Bonsi, DET 11/CT1, 06 Jul 07; Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Lt Col Jon L. Huggins, 9RW/ADO, 06 Jul

07.4 Wilson, Charles P. Col., Strategic and Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance in the Near East , The Washington Institute for

Near East Policy, 1999, pg 21-23.5 Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System

(ASARS) available on the Internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/asars-1.htm accessed 14 Jul 07.6 Intvw, Mayse with Ray.7 Intvw, Mayse with Huggins.8 Intvw, Mayse with Ray.9 Cross, Coy F. II, 9RW/HO, The Dragon Lady Meets the Challenge: the U-2 in Desert Storm, 1996, pg 24.10 Ibid, 35.11 Intvw, Mayse with Bonsi; Cross, pg 3912 Intvw Mayse with Bonsi.13 Cross, pg 38.14 Cross, pg 3615 Cross, pg 40.

16 Intvw Mayse with Bonsi; Cross, pg 37.17 Ibid.18 Col K. E. Gentile, “The Future of Airborne Reconnaissance,” 27 Mar 1996.19 Cross, pg 38; intvw Mayse with Huggins.20 Cross, pg 40.21 Cross, pg 41; intvw Mayse with Bonsi.22 Cross, pg 42; interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Lt Col Michael J. Masucci, 9RW/CAG, 27 Jun 07.23 Cross pg 44.24 Rpt (U), DOD, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress,” Apr 92, C-1, available on the Internet at

http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA249390 accessed on 16 Jul 07.25 Cross, pg 38; intvw Mayse with Huggins.26 Intvw Mayse with Huggins.27 Ibid.28

Intvw Mayse with Ray29 Pocock, pg 318.30 Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Stephanie M. Roberts, Civ Contractor, 9OSS/OSK, 06 Jul 0731 Col K.E. Gentile, “The Future of Airborne Reconnaissance,” 27 May 199632 Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Col Keith E. Gentile, 9RW/CV, 19 Jul 07.33 Interview, Chris Mayse, 9RW/HO with Lt Col Soren K. Jones, 9OG/CD, 15 Jul 07.

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html

http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/asars-1.htm


http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA249390


http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html



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The U-2 Meeting the Needs of the War Fighter