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The Virtues of Thrasymachus Author(s): T. D. J. Chappell Source: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182424 . Accessed: 03/03/2014 10:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 186.19.176.131 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 10:54:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Virtues of Thrasymachus

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Page 1: The Virtues of Thrasymachus

The Virtues of ThrasymachusAuthor(s): T. D. J. ChappellSource: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182424 .

Accessed: 03/03/2014 10:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

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Page 2: The Virtues of Thrasymachus

The Virtues of Thrasymachus

T.D.J. CHAPPELL

'We should at least consider the possibility that justice is not a virtue. This suggestion was taken seriously by Socrates in The Republic, where it was assumed by everyone that if Thrasymachus could establish his premise - that injustice was more profitable than justice - his conclusion would follow: that a man who had the strength to get away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life. It is a striking fact about modern moral philosophy that no one sees any difficultly in accepting Thrasy- machus' premise and rejecting his conclusion, and it is because Nietzsche's position is at this point much closer to that of Plato that he is remote from academic moralists of the present day.'

(Philippa Foot: 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1958-1959), 99-100)

Thrasymachus' statement of an alternative to standard views about justice in Republic Bk.I sets the challenge which Republic Bks. II-X must answer. If this is not a serious challenge, if Thrasymachus' alternative view of justice is not interesting, plausible or coherent, it is not clear why moral philoso- phers should bother with The Republic at all. Here I will offer an in- terpretation of Thrasymachus' alternative view of justice which does make his view out to be interesting, and plausible, and coherent. My interpreta- tion differs in one way or other from some very well known interpretations; I hope it will become clear what, if anything, my interpretation achieves that these others do not.

Consider the conflicts between these seven understandings of Thrasy- machus:

Phronesis 1993. Vol. XXXVIII/J (Accepted September 1992)

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1. Thrasymachus makes no clear point; on Plato's depiction he is merely confused. (So Macguire, in Phronesis XVI (1971) 142-163.)

2. Thrasymachus is a revolutionary who wants to turn society upside down: he rejects 'Conventional Justice' in favour of 'Natural Justice'. (The entry on Thrasymachus in Pauly-Wissowa's Encyclopadie embrac- es (2): 'Die These rep.338c, daB das btXaLOV von Natur nichts anderes sei als der Nutzen und Vorteil des Starkeren . . . entspricht der De- struktion des Rechtsgefuihles und der ethischen Normen'.

3. Thrasymachus is a Thucydidean cynic. (Alasdair Maclntyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1985), ascribes to Thrasymachus the 'Thucydidean' thesis that 'Arete is one thing, practical intelligence quite another'.)

4. Thrasymachus' position is the same as Callicles' in the Gorgias. (Shorey, the Loeb translator of The Republic, Vol. I, p.64: 'The actual ruler or shepherd of the people . .. tends the flock only so that he may shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants. . .. [Thrasymachus] thinks, confirms (sic) this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias'.)

5. Thrasymachus is a Nietzschean immoralist. (So Shorey again, in his Loeb translation of The Republic Vol. I, p.x: 'Thrasymachus . .. affirms the immoralist thesis that justice is only the advantage of the . .. stronger' (p.x) - a thesis which Shorey goes on to call, not only 'Nietzschean', but 'sophistic', 'Machiavellian', and 'Hob- besian'.)

6. Thrasymachus believes that justice means obedience to the laws. (So G.F. Hourani, Phronesis VII (1962), 110-120.)

7. Thrasymachus means to recommend injustice as a way of life. (So, famously, G.B. Kerferd (Durham University Journal, IX (1947-8), 19-27; Phronesis IX (1964-5), 12-16: 'Thrasymachus . .. makes it clear that his own ideal is for everyone to seek his own interest, and he regards justice as always involving the contrary, namely seeking another's in- terest, and injustice as always involving seeking one's own interest'. So also Philippa Foot, to judge by her suggestion, above, that Thrasy- machus' thesis is that 'a man who [has] the strength to get away with injustice [has] reason to follow this as the best way of life'.)

It will already be clear that, of these seven views, I disagree most strongly with (1). Yet even (1) seems, prima facie, quite plausible. After all, Plato does make Thrasymachus say all of the following':

' All translations from Plato in this paper are my own.

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A. qud yCE ?yO EvaM t6o 8xaLov oiUx akko Tt - T toIO XQErTiOVo;

upEQov - 'I say that justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger.' (338c)

B. TLOETat &e yE toiig v6'ovU ?xaoTNTI r Xl rtleo; t6o CMtl tpovQOV ... EWVaL & Ct3E W11VaV TOUTO bLXXaLOV T0L5 aQXoEvoL; Ecvat - 'Each kind of government makes laws in its own interest, and, by so enacting, proclaims to its subjects that this is justice. . . (338e)

C. TOf)T' OVUV ?xrLuV, J PE'XTLOTE, O XEyO EV CaTtaOCttg TCtu Jto06Xr

TCLTov EivwL &,xalov, Tro Tl'r XaOEOrviXULCg &Qx#; ~UtRE'Qov - 'This then, my good sir, is what I say is one and the same justice in all states: the interest of the government in power.' (338e)

D. i1 jiEv 6xaton3v1 xTo t6 &'xaLov CXXOTQLov ayaOOv T4) 6VTL -

'Justice and the just are in reality the other person's good.' (343c)

A-D all look incompatible. A will not square with B or C: it is not obviously a necessary truth that 'the stronger' is always going to be the ruler, or (a member of) the government in power. (Unless we define 'stronger' to mean 'more politically powerful'; but who says we have to do that?) Socrates points out at an early stage that B and C are not consistent with each other, either: those in power might be wrong about what was in their interest, and so make laws intended to be in their own interests, but not actually in their own interests (339e). As for D, this undermines all the other theses. If justice is, with D, the other's good, then how can the stronger, or a government, or the rulers, be just in pursuing their own interest - as A, B and C require?

So this evidence could easily be taken to support Macguire's claim (1) that Thrasymachus is simply lost in these perplexities. But in fact these perplexities can be solved. This is the question to ask: Is Thrasymachus' thesis a descriptive thesis about justice, or a prescriptive thesis?

For my purposes here, this distinction between the 'prescriptive' and the 'descriptive' might as well be exhaustive. It is not, of course: there are plenty of other interesting things to do with words besides prescription and description (cp. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1,23). But I have been unable to think how any of those other activities could be relevant to the elucidation of Thrasymachus' thesis (though naturally I welcome sug- gestions). Therefore I will proceed upon the basis that, if Thrasymachus' thesis about justice says anything worth hearing, and does not fit the one of these two alternatives, then it must fit the other.

This is how I shall be using the distinction. If Thrasymachus' project regarding the social practice called LxaLoru'v1 is simply to observe and

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describe it, I will say that he has a descriptive thesis about justice. Whereas, if Thrasymachus' project regarding justice is to make reference to justice in order to offer us reasons to behave or live in a certain way, I will say that Thrasymachus has a prescriptive thesis about justice. I shall argue that Thrasymachus does not have a prescriptive thesis about justice, and does have a descriptive thesis about justice.

One important complication which will appear in this. Although Thrasy- machus does not hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, he does hold a prescriptive thesis about a character trait which is, very often though not always, coextensive with the character trait of justice. This fact makes it look at times almost as if Thrasymachus does hold a prescriptive thesis about justice itself, rather than about the other character trait with which it very often coincides. But I shall argue that this appearance is deceptive. if Thrasymachus ever prescribes justice or just behaviour, he does so, as Aristotle would say, only xaxa oaufP3E0Pxo6;, and not essentially.

II

If Thrasymachus did hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, what form could it take? Note first that neither Thrasymachus nor Socrates thinks, as we are often inclined to think, that 'a just person' means pretty much the same as 'a good person' and that the word 'justice' is, or can be, simply a (rough) synonym for the phrase 'moral rightness'. Many modern moral philosophers, for example Professor Hare, have tended to talk as if 'It would be just to do F' were often or even usually a straightforward equiv- alent to 'It would be morally right to do F'. But however this may be for us, it cannot have been so for Socrates and Thrasymachus, for the reason noted by Mrs. Foot in my epigraph. The modern moral philosophers suppose that someone who is told that it would be 'morally right' to do something cannot go on to question this without making a mistake. It is, they say, merely incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I have to do what is morally right?'. If, tacitly or openly,they accept the rough-synonym view of the meaning of 'justice', they must presumably think that 'What reason do I have to do what is just?' is similarly incoherent. But Thrasymachus and Socrates apparently do not think it merely incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I have to do what is just?'. However else Socrates may try to meet Thrasy- machus' attack on justice, it is not by accusing him of this kind of incoher- ence. It follows, as Mrs. Foot notes, that Thrasymachus and Socrates must mean something rather different from these modern theorists when they talk of 'justice'. Their concept is more specific, less grandiosely all-embrac-

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ing, 'thicker' as Bernard Williams would say2. In particular, 'justice' for them is not only a concept which might be used in the justification of particular deeds or ways of living. It is a concept which itself stands in need of justification, by reference to the more basic notion of that flourishing human life to which justice or injustice may or may not be seen as contrib- uting, and to question which is (perhaps) what they would find puzzling in the way that modern theorists find it puzzling to question why we should do what is 'morally right'.

It seems, then, that there are two prescriptive theses about justice, either or both of which Thrasymachus might be offering us. (I) He may be answering the question 'How should we behave?' by replying 'We should behave in such and such a way, because it's just to behave like that'. Or (II) He may be answering the more basic question 'But why should we be just?' by replying 'Because it's a human excellence to be just'. Form I of the prescriptive thesis will say that, in general, 'x is just' provides creatures like us with a reason of some sort for doing x. Form II of the prescriptive thesis will say that, in general, justice is a good thing to have in your character, a character trait which is important or even essential to a flourishing human life: in other words, a virtue.

Although I and II are logically distinct theses, there is no problem about supposing Thrasymachus to be asserting both. Rather, as we shall see, there is a problem about supposing him not to be asserting both theses of such a pair. For, evidently, I prompts the question 'Why does "x is just" provide creatures like us with a reason of some sort for doing x?' and, plausibly, II answers this question. I is a thesis about one level of practical reasoning: namely, our motivation for doing certain sorts of actions rather than others. II is a thesis about another level of practical reasoning: namely, our motiva- tion for pursuing certain sorts of developments in our characters rather than others. Within the framework of an ethics of virtue, I and II are comple- mentary theses.

I now argue that Thrasymachus does not argue either for I or for II, nor (III, IV) for these theses in 'inverted' forms.

Suppose that Thrasymachus is arguing for I. Then he is recommending certain forms of behaviour by reference to their being just. Why should we do what is in the interest of the stronger, or obey the laws, or promote the interest of the prevailing government, or promote the good of others? Given I, the Thrasymachean answer will be: 'Because it's just to do so'.

2 V. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy(London: Collins, 1985), Chapter 7.

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The obvious problem facing this is simply that Thrasymachus' remarks about justice, if construed in this way as recommendations about how to act, contradict each other. This can be shown by comparing only the first and the last of Thrasymachus' four remarks, A and D3.

Suppose, with I, that 'x is just' gives us a reason to do x, and, with A, that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger. Then it follows that 'x is in the interest of the stronger' gives us a reason to do x. But now suppose, with D, that justice is also 'another's good'. By parity of reasoning, 'y is another's good' will also give us a reason to do y. But what if I am the stronger in some situation, and my good conflicts with some other person's? In that case, it may be true both that 'x is another's good', and that 'not-x is in the interest of the stronger'. In which case, apparently, I have reason to do both x and not-x; which is absurd.

So Thrasymachus is not arguing for form I of the prescriptive thesis: that, in general, 'xis just' provides creatures like us with a reason of some sort for doing x.

What about form II of the prescriptive thesis: that justice is a virtue, a desirable trait to have in your character? Thrasymachus is not arguing this either, for at 348c he explicitly denies that justice is a virtue:

SOCRATES: Come now, what will you say about justice and injustice? One of them, I suppose, is a virtue on your view, and the other a vice? THRASYMACHUS: Yes - why not? SOCRATES: Justice, I take it, is the virtue, and injustice the vice? THRASYMACHUS: Is that likely, you sweet fool, when I say that in- justice is profitable (XvoTEkEXv) but justice isn't? SOCRATES: Then what do you mean? THRASYMACHUS: The opposite. SOCRATES: What, that justice is a vice?! THRASYMACHUS: Well, no - but it is naive simplicity (;naviU yEvvCtav

EVJYIOELaV).

In my technique for refuting the idea that Thrasymachus' doctrine about justice is primarily a prescriptive one, and in my emphasis upon definition D of justice, I am, of course, influenced by Kerferd's classic treatment (Durham University Journal 1947-8, as cited). However, (i) I spell the argument out differently to Kerferd, who makes no use of any distinction between levels of practical reasoning; and (ii) my conclusion is different from his. Unlike him I do not use this technique to argue that Thrasymachus thinks injustice is a virtue, but (on the contrary) to argue that Thrasymachus thinks that neither injustice nor justice is either a virtue or a vice.

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SOCRATES: You mean then that injustice is duplicity (xaxo'OElav)? THRASYMACHUS: No: injustice is practical intelligence (EviouXktcav).

This passage makes it quite clear that Thrasymachus rejects form II of the prescriptive thesis just as emphatically as he rejects form I. Not only does he deny that 'x is just' gives us a reason to do x. He also denies that human beings, in general, have any reason to think that justice is a virtue, a necessary part of the good life. Therefore, when Thrasymachus says (e.g.) that 'Justice is the interest of the stronger', there are two meanings, corre- sponding to the two forms of the prescriptive thesis, which we certainly cannot attach to these words. (I) We cannot construe him as meaning 'Do what is in the interest of the stronger, because doing that is just (and a flourishing human life necessarily involves justice)'. And (II) we cannot construe him as meaning 'Do what is just, because doing that is doing what is in the interest of the stronger (and a flourishing human life necessarily involves doing what is in the interest of the stronger)'. For 'justice' - it has turned out - is not a term of either level of Thrasymachean practical reasoning. No Thrasymachean action is motivated by the thought that 'Doing this is doing a just action'; and the Thrasymachean agent has no reason to try to develop in himself the character trait of justice, for that trait has - on Thrasymachus' view - nothing to contribute to human flourishing.

This still leaves two other ways of arguing for a prescriptive reading of Thrasymachus: namely the inverse forms of theses I and II. Why not say that Thrasymachus means to argue (III) that 'x is unjust' states a reason for us to do x? Or (IV) that injustice is a virtue?

A simple argument shows that, for the same reason for which he could not hold I, Thrasymachus cannot consistently hold III either, 'X is just' (we saw) could not state a coherent Thrasymacean reason for us to do x, because Thrasymachus defined justice both as 'the interest of the stronger' and as 'another's good'. So if I was the stronger, and doing x was just because it was in my interest, but doing not-x was just because it was another's good, then it would follow that I was committed to doing both x and not-x. Pari passu: 'x is unjust' can't state a coherent Thrasymachean reason for us to do x. For if I am the stronger, and doing not-x is unjust because it is contrary to my interest, but doing x is unjust because it is contrary to another's good, it follows that I am committed to doing both not-x and x.

IV, the claim that Thrasymachus holds that injustice is a virtue, is (in Socrates' phrase, 348e), fj&q (oT;QEc?)EQov, a rather tougher proposition. It certainly admits of at least some defence from the text:

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348dl-2: SOCRATES: Thrasymachus, do the unjust seem to you to be intelligent (PQ6vLlVLoL) and good (aEyaOo0)? THRASYMACHUS: Yes - those who are able to be completely unjust ...

348e 1-4: SOCRATES: ... But this is what made me wonder: that you put injustice in the class of virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes. THRASYMACHUS: But that is just what I do.

348e7-349a3: SOCRATES: Now it is clear that you are going to say that [what is unjust] is good (xakcov) and strong, and that you will render to it all the additions that we rendered to what is just - since you have dared to put it [sc. what is unjust] in [the class of] virtue and wisdom (rEL&bi yFe xai Ev &'eETi aiT'o xait oopqt eloPX&oAag OrEvat). THRASYMACHUS: What a good prophet you are.

The first and simplest way to defend IV would be to say this: that if Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue, then he must for that very reason hold that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue. But at 348c, where Thrasymachus certainly asserts that justice is not a virtue, he also denies that justice is a vice:

SOCRATES: Then what do you mean? THRASYMACHUS: The opposite. SOCRATES: What, that justice is a vice?! THRASYMACHUS: Well, no. . (oi)x...

So Thrasymachus does not think that justice is a vice, and injustice is a virtue, simply because justice is not a virtue. But might he not hold that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue on other grounds? A second, and more subtle, line of argument for IV might point to what comes next at 348c:

THRASYMACHUS: Well, no - but it is naive simplicity (3navic yEvvatcav vIOEMav).

SOCRATES. You mean then that injustice is duplicity (xaXoiOELav)? THRASYMACHUS. No: injustice is practical intelligence (EvBouXkLav).

Here, it can be argued, Thrasymachus identifies justice and naive simplic- ity, and injustice and practical intelligence. Now he clearly holds that naive simplicity is a vice, and that practical intelligence, as opposed to duplicity, is a virtue. In which case Thrasymachus must, surely, hold that justice is a vice

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(namely, naive simplicity), and that injustice is a virtue (namely, practical intelligence).

Thrasymachus nowhere actually affirms the conclusion which this second argument attributes to him, that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue. However, he does say that 'the unjust are intelligent (qwevLlioL) and good (&yctOo')' (348dl-2); and he does say that he 'puts injustice in the class of virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes' (348el-4; 348e7- 349a3). So can we not infer, without further ado, to the conclusion that he thinks that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue?

No: for at least three reasons. First, to say that injustice is 'in the class of virtue and wisdom' (ev CIwETij xat oopL'ct FQ?t), but that justice is 'in the opposite classes' (Ev ToL; EvavUtot;), is not equivalent to saying that injustice simply is virtue (or wisdom). If Plato wants Thrasymachus to say that 'injustice is virtue', why does Thrasymachus not say precisely that, rather than what he actually says: that 'injustice is in the class of virtue and wisdom'? (And notice how he sticks to this double formulation. The unjust are not good, they are 'intelligent and good'; injustice is not virtue or a virtue, it is 'in the class of virtue and wisdom'.)

Conceding that Thrasymachus means it when he observes that injustice is 'in the class of virtue and wisdom' does not prevent us from denying that injustice is itself a Thrasymachean virtue. For that observation might mean rather that for Thrasymachus injustice is characteristic of the virtuous or excellent man, without itself being one of the cardinal character traits that make him a virtuous man. It might mean that his injustice is a secondary feature of his character, an incidental consequence of his having some other characteristic which is cardinal, essential to his excellence. (What other characteristic? If we take 'virtue and wisdom' as a hendiadys, then we can make room for the suggestion that the characteristic in question is 'the virtue of wisdom'; where 'wisdom' is taken of course in a suitably Thrasy- machean sense - i.e., as equivalent to 'practical intelligence'.)

The second reason is that, if Thrasymachus does hold IV, that justice is a vice and injustice is a virtue, then it will be very odd if he does not also hold III, that 'x is unjust' states a reason for doing x. If he holds IV without holding III, then he supposes that there is a virtue of which he cannot say how practical reasoning articulates it in action; but how can anything which has no specifiable way of affecting action be a virtue? Yet we have already seen why he cannot hold II1, any more than he can hold I: because given Thrasymachus' own explicit remarks about justice, it yields contradictory practical imperatives.

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The third point is that this second argument depends crucially upon there being a strict identity between injustice and practical intelligence. For it is argued that (a) injustice is (the same as) practical intelligence; (b) practical intelligence is a Thrasymachean virtue; and therefore (c) injustice is (the same as) a Thrasymachean virtue. But Thrasymachus rejects this argument because he rejects (a). For (a) to be true is for this to be true: any behaviour is practically intelligent behaviour if and only if it is unjust behaviour: (Vx) (Px <-> Ux). But this biconditional is doubly falsified, for Thrasymachus clearly holds that there can be both unjust behaviour which is not practically intelligent behaviour, and practically intelligent behaviour which is not unjust behaviour. This is a consequence of Thrasymachus' remarks, for example at 344c, about the need for full or perfect injustice to be accompa- nied by power:

'Thus, Socrates, injustice is stronger, and more liberated, and more masterly than justice when it comes to the full (Nxavds yLyvot )..

Thrasymachus does not hold that any unjust act I do exemplifies my practical intelligence: only the unjust act which is calculated to match my power. Acting in accord with Thrasymachean practical intelligence, there- fore, cannot simply mean acting unjustly; rather it must mean acting as unjustly as you can get away with. It follows from this that practical intelligence and injustice are, on Thrasymachus' view, not only not identi- cal; in many situations they are actually inversely proportionate to each other. Glaucon's story of Gyges in Bk.II brings this point out well. Com- pare two men, equally empowered, who both want to do what Gyges did, but neither of whom has Gyges' ring. The one who tries to do what Gyges did without the ring is the more unjust, but the one who restrains himself, knowing he will never get away with it, is the more practically intelligent.

Thus Thrasymachean practical intelligence and Thrasymachean injustice cannot be identified: hence injustice is not shown to be a Thrasymachean virtue just because practical intelligence is. This completes my argument against prescriptive thesis IV, which was the last prescriptive thesis still available. So, if it is coherent at all, Thrasymachus' thesis cannot, in any of these senses, be a prescriptive thesis.

III

Consider now the proffered alternative: that Thrasymachus' thesis is a decriptive thesis.

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In this case, Thrasymachus is not primarily concerned to tell us why, as a matter of policy, we should choose justice (or for that matter injustice). His main concern is to tell us what, as a matter of fact, justice is like; to observe and describe the social practice called bxa1orC'v1, justice.

What is the nature of that social practice, according to Thrasymachus? For him justice is neither a virtue nor a vice; it is a device. Consider in its context what I labelled (4):

'You do not realise, Socrates, that justice and the just is in reality another person's good (that is, it is the stronger and the ruling person's interest) and one's own injury - if one obeys and complies. But injustice is the opposite, and gives control over those who are in truth simple and just (Tiv d;g a'kTJ06g EiMi0OX6V Te xai btxaiwv). But they, since they are being controlled, do what is in the interest of the one who is stronger.' (343c-d)

Thrasymachus believes that justice is a device in this sense: that it is a trick played on the naive by the cunning, to make the naive give up any ad- vantages they may have over the cunning. He gives us what are clearly meant as descriptions of how this works in social practice:

'The just person always come out the worse in his encounters with the unjust person. For one thing, suppose they co-operate together in some partnership. When the partnership is dissolved, you will invariably find that the just person comes away, not with more, but with less than the unjust person. Again, take their relations with the city. Whenever there are taxes of some sort to be paid, the just person contributes more than the average amount, and the unjust person less; but whenever there are benefits to be claimed, the just person gains nothing, and the unjust person gains a lot.' (343d)

For another example of what Thrasymachus means when he describes the just person as E"Thr'I;, naive or simple, take the deed of the Anglo-Saxon general Beorhtnoth, fighting the Vikings at the Battle of Maldon in 991 A.D.:

'The Northmen and the English were . . . separated by an arm of the river; filled by the incoming tide, it could only be crossed by a . . . causeway, difficult to force in the face of a determined defence . . . But the Vikings knew, or so it would seem, what manner of a man they had to deal with: they asked for leave to cross the ford, so that a fair fight could be joined. Beorhtnoth accepted the challenge and allowed them to cross. This act of pride and misplaced chivalry proved fatal. Beorhtnoth was slain and the English routed . . .'

(J.R.R. Tolkien's account: The Homecoming of Beorhtnoth (London: Unwin, 1975, p. 149-150)

Beorhtnoth's failure, in Thrasymachus' eyes, would not be to do with a fatal flaw in his character of pride and misplaced chivalry', as Tolkien suggests

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(in line with the Maldon poet's 'ofermode': v. The Battle of Maldon, lines 85-954). For Thrasymachus, Beorhtnoth's fatal flaw would be his lack of ?Fi4oukXa, practical intelligence: his inability, or refusal, to see through the social practice of justice. He fails to see that the institution of justice is simply not something which humans have any need of if they are to live flourishing lives; on the contrary, to act according to justice is, in normal cases, to choose to contribute to the flourishing of others' lives at the expense of one's own flourishing. Justice as a social institution is, then, the embodiment of a trick; a trick which the stronger play on the weaker, which rulers play on their faithful subjects, and which the Vikings play on Beohrt- noth - with the very natural result, as Thrasymachus would see it, that Beorhtnoth not only ceases to have a flourishing life, but ceases to live at all.

If this is Thrasymachus' descriptive thesis about justice, then there are four interesting consequences. First, it becomes apparent that Thrasy- machus is not an 'immoralist' - if by this it is meant that, in Shorey's words, 'Thrasymachus' "Umwertung aller Werte" reverses the normal applica- tion' of all moral terms. For (i) Thrasymachus does not reverse, simply hold the mirror image of, any standard moral views at all. He may believe that justice is not a virtue, but he does not, ipso facto, believe that justice is a vice; nor that injustice is a virtue. And (ii) he does not express disagreement with all standard moral views; he expresses disagreement with standard moral views about justice. What his views are of the other virtues in Plato's list-temperance, courage and wisdom - we do not hear. We certainly have no reason to think that he would deny that courage and wisdom have at least some importance for human flourishing.

Secondly: we have seen that Thrasymachus' thesis about justice is a descriptive one, and not a prescriptive one. But we can now see that, quite apart from his descriptions of the nature of justice, Thrasymachus does have a general prescriptive thesis, a view about what human flourishing is, and a more specific prescriptive thesis, a view about what character traits enable one to flourish, both of which have a bearing on our attitude to justice. Thrasymachus believes that human flourishing consists roughly in this: in getting for oneself as much as possible of what are uncontroversially agreed, in our society as much as in his, to be clear and obvious examples of good things to have: money (343e), property and valuables like treasure (344b), and power over others to bend them to my will (344b). Now one

'Text and translation of The Battle of Maldon can be found in R. Hamer, ed., A Choice of Anglo-Saxon Verse (London: Faber, 1970).

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character trait which we need to obtain this sort of good life is practical intelligence. For practical intelligence involves knowning how to use the device justice; and so what is prescribed for us about justice is that we should use it, as the device it truly is, to help us achieve just these sorts of good things. But this recommendation, that by putting practical intelli- gence to work we use justice as a device, is not a prescriptive thesis about justice, but about practical intelligence.

Thirdly, and consequent to this, Thrasymachus' stated or implicit view of human flourishing may even suggest that he has a list of four cardinal virtues to rival Plato's. At 344c he mentions three of these virtues: 'Thus, Socrates, when it comes to the full, injustice is stronger and more unrestrained and more imperious than injustice . . '. Why is injustice to be preferred to justice? As we have seen, not because it is itself a virtue; rather because it is, in general and as a rule, more in accordance with the Thrasymachean virtues of Strength ('ioxtU3), of Unrestraint (XEvuOEQcta; for the justifi- cation of my translation cp. Gorgias 492c), and of Imperiousness (bEolo-

tEa). What is the fourth Thrasymachean virtue? It is not Injustice, for reasons we have already seen. It is rather that quality of mind which, Thrasymachus says, discerns the realities of the social institution of justice, and of which he sees unjust behaviour as being, normally, a manifestation: namely Practical Intelligence, cv3ouVXca.

IV

The fourth consequetice of this descriptive understanding of Thrasyma- chus' thesis about justice is that we can now reconcile his remarks about justice, A-D, with which we began, and also sort out the sheep from the goats among the commentators' opinions about Thrasymachus, 1-7.

First, then, his observation that justice is 'another's good' (D) means that going in for justice entails doing like Beorhtnoth, entails being persuaded or duped by the other person into giving up all your advantages over her. So when Thrasymachus says that justice is 'the interest of the government in power' (C), he will mean that whatever government is in power, it will, wittingly or not, be playing exactly this confidence trick of justice on its subjects. In persuading them or legislating for them to act justly, it will be causing them to do what is in fact in its own interest. If the Thrasymachean account of virtue is right, perhaps the citizens would do much better for themselves, and for their own interests, if they did not generally act justly by (to take one prominent example) 'obeying the laws' (B). But they are being deluded by their rulers into thinking that they have some good reason to act

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justly. And in being so deluded, they are in truth acting as weaklings, not in their own interest, but 'in the interest of the stronger' (A). Here 'the stronger' could mean either 'those who (already) have the strength of character to see through the trick of justice', or 'those who by seeing through the trick of justice, and seeing how to use it as a device or weapon, have become the stronger'; or perhaps it could refer to both groups.

As for the commentators: (1) Evidently we do not have to think, with Maguire, that Plato's Thrasymachus is just confused. (2) So far from his being a political revolutionary, Thrasymachus' view is that all political structures tend to have the same effect (338b). The only way in which they influence human flourishing is that those at the top of political structures flourish, and those at the bottom do not. The ideal situation, because it maximises one's power over others, is to be a tyrant (344a). That he believes this, however, does not mean that Thrasymachus is arguing that such a situation exemplifies 'Natural Justice' (a good thing) as opposed to 'Conventional Justice' (a bad thing), or that a tyrannical constitution is the best one. Thrasymachus' question is: 'Best for whom?'. Your justice is good for me and bad for you, and my justice is good for you and bad for me; but there is for Thrasymachus no interesting sense in which any old justice, yours or mine indifferently, is either good or bad without qualification. (That is the point of his rejection of the prescriptive theses, and of the assertion that justice is neither a virtue or a vice, but a device.) So likewise, a tyranny is the best constitution for the ruler and the worst for the ruled; but there is no sense in Thrasymachus' eyes, in calling tyranny a good or bad state of affairs without reference to some person's good or bad. In short Thrasymachus is neither a revolutionary nor a fascist; he's an opportunist.

(3) No doubt Thrasymachus's remarks do bear comparison with, e.g., the speeches of the Athenian envoys to Melos (Thucydides 5.84-116) - speech- es which express just the kind of belief in 'Naturrecht' which Pauly-Wisso- wa foists on Thrasymachus. (So for example Thuc. 5.89: 'Justice, in human affairs, is judged according to the balance of compulsion: those with an advantage do whatever they are able to, those at a disadvantage suffer whatever they have to'.) On the other hand, Maclntyre seems wrong to say that Thrasymachus would agree with the 'Thucydidean' thesis that aQETin is one thing, practical intelligence quite another'. For of course Thrasy- machus rejects Plato's conceptions of &QETf and of practical intelligence, and so must also reject the Platonic ways of connecting them. But Thrasy- machus' reason for rejecting these Platonic views is precisely that Thrasy- machus has his own conceptions of what a'QEnT and practical intelligence

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are. But this fact gives us no reason to think that Thrasymachus cannot have his own way of connecting practical intelligence and azQvri. Rather, if I am right, then Thrasymachus' conception of practical intelligence is in fact a crucial component of his conception of a'QETij.

(4) In the Gorgias we find Callicles asserting several doctrines for which my argument suggests there is no evidence in Thrasymachus' remarks. For one thing, Callicles' argument (unlike Thrasymachus') does depend upon an opposition of 'Naturrecht' and 'Conventional Justice' (To xa-t'a qprv xakXOv xai bLxctLov, Gorgias 491e; Tlan7aUC' (pUOLV OUVOiRaTQa &vOQdrnwv, 492c). For another, Callicles' attack is not merely on justice's pretensions to be a virtue, but also, explicitly, on temperance's: 'Since [the many] are unable to arrive at the fulfillment of their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice through their own unmanliness' (Gorgias 492b). Thirdly, Calli- cles says that 'Luxury and intemperance and unrestraint, if they are backed with force, are virtue and happiness; (492c: xTuqpi xati axokaoIa xai eXvErea, eav etLxouQIav exi', Tofx' Ot'Tv CLxQEIJ xctE EU- batLovLa). This may suggest that Callicles' list of virtues differs from Thrasymachus' list; although possibly, if one bears in mind the evidence of 492a, where courage and practical wisdom (avbQQIEa and Q6vLoL;) are mentioned, they can be harmonised. The idea would be that Callicles' list of four cardinal virtues runs thus: IQVi / &xoXaoLt / XEU0EuOE, E'Itxoi-

QLa, cavbELLa, cpQOVrjoL;. It can, therefore, be correlated one-one, though not necessarily identified, with Thrasymachus' list of cardinal vir- tues, which runs thus: 'kEU0E(`a, Xg, 6Fecso7U ta, Eci4ouMXa. This way of seeing things would have the further consequence that there is an interesting sense in which Callicles is an immoralist and Thrasymachus is not. For one of the names of one of Callicles' virtues is &xokaoLta, which is normally considered a vice. So Callicles does stand at least one standard virtue on its head: something which Thrasymachus, at least in what he says explicitly, does not do.

(5) Thrasymachus would have agreed with Nietzsche that only weaklings go in for justice, and that the true opposition in values is between 'good' and 'bad', not between 'good' and 'wicked'. Again, Thrasymachus would have found much to admire in the character of the Nietzschean super-man; Nietzsche's Ubermensch and Thrasymachus' XQEITTwv have much in com- mon.

On the other hand, consider Nietzsche's words in the section of Also Sprach Zarathustra, entitled 'Of the Virtue that makes small':

'I have found this hypocrisy the worst among them: that even those who

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command affect the virtues of those who obey. "I serve, you serve, we serve" - so here even the hypocrisy of the rulers intones - and alas, if the first ruler is only the first servant!'

Nietzsche deplores the 'hypocrisy' of the ruler in pretending to the virtues of his subjects (like the Pope, who is Servus servorum Dei). He deplores this kind of behaviour because he thinks that it stunts and warps the development of the Ubermensch. Thrasymachus, by contrast, would ap- plaud this sort of hypocrisy as a piece of riU3ouXta; as Glaucon says in his recapitulation of Thrasymachus' views, EOX4TI yt CEbxLa bO6XELV 8&-

xaLov [01 OVTa, 'the height of injustice is to seem just without being just' (361a). The person in this situation, in fact, gets the best of both worlds: for she gets all the good repute and honour of justice, without having to suffer any of its disadvantages. Thrasymachus would no doubt agree with Nietzsche that, if one is foolish enough to think justice a virtue, then one can damage one's soul. But provided justice is recognised to be a device and not a virtue, and used accordingly, it can be a very useful thing to the superior person on Thrasymachus' view. In short: Nietzsche thinks that the so-called virtue of Justice, and indeed all 'slave morality', is a device of the weak for preventing the strong from getting too great an advantage over them; whereas Thrasymachus, on the contrary, thinks that Justice is a device of the strong for keeping the weak in their place.

(6) Houranian conventionalism is disposed of by my remarks about the compatibility of A-D in Section I. And lastly (7) the Kerferd/Foot view, that Thrasymachus argued from the premise 'that injustice was more profit- able than justice' to the conclusion 'that a man who had the strength to get away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', is also, if I am right, to be rejected. For my view has the consequence that injustice, as such, will not be Thrasymachus' 'best way of life'; for considerations of justice and injustice will not feature at all in Thrasymachean practical reasoning, or not at least (to borrow a phrase from Aristotle) as supplying 'premisses of the good'. Hence, though it might on my interpretation of Thrasymachus' view be true 'that a man who had the strength to get away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', such a Thrasymachean agent's reason to live some form of the unjust life could not be: 'Because this life is unjust'. The injustice of his preferred life is not central, but incidental, to the practical reasoning on account of which he chooses to live that way. For it is true that the person of Thrasymachean virtue does, typically but not always, do what is unjust; but he does not do what is unjust under the description 'act of injustice', but under the descrip- tion 'act of ci4ouXv(a'. His reasons for living like that would be given, not

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by reference to a supposed virtue of injustice; but by reference, firstly, to the Thrasymachean conception of the flourishing human life which I have tried to develop, and, secondly, to the human character traits (especially 'ri4ouia) by which the good life so conceived is to be rendered attain-

able: which is to say, by reference to the virtues of Thrasymachus5.

Wolfson College, Oxford

' I am grateful to Malcolm Schofield and Roger Crisp for written comments on earlier drafts. In conversation, Steven Everson and David Charles gave useful criticisms. Elizabeth Telfer, Richard Stalley and Mary Haight made valuable points when I presen- ted one form of the paper at Glasgow University, as did Roger Trigg at Warwick University. I am also indebted to my pupils David Kensinger and James MacLain of Williams College, Massachussetts, U.S.A., for obliging me, in Trinity Term 1992, to think harder about Thrasymachus.

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