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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A VOLUME 7 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 3 NOVEMBER 2002 IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS

Think Tanks and Policy

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Page 1: Think Tanks and Policy

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

VOLUME 7 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 3

NOVEMBER 2002

IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICYIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

THE ROLE OF THINK TANKSTHE ROLE OF THINK TANKS

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“Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated.”

— Richard Haass Director of Policy and Planning U.S. Department of State

“There are moments in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy where think tanks have had a decisive impact in reshaping conventional wisdom and setting a new course on a key strategic issue.”

— Ronald D. Asmus Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German MarshallFund of the United States, and Adjunct SeniorFellow, Council on Foreign Relations

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the unique role played by publicpolicy research and analysis organizations, or “think tanks,” in the formulation of U.S.foreign policy. A leading State Department official outlines the principal benefits thatthink tanks offer to U.S. policy-makers. Two experts review the history and evolution ofthink tanks’ involvement in U.S. foreign policy and cite the recent proliferation of theseinstitutions around the world. Two think tank presidents and an executive vice presidentexplain how a leading U.S. think tank operates, the special role of a think tank created bythe U.S. Congress, and how one of the nation’s largest think tanks works with the U.S.military. Finally, three case studies show the influence of think tanks on two key policyissues and demonstrate how to establish a think tank, using Honduras as an example.

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THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State

THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

CONTENTS

_ A POLICY-MAKER’S VIEW

THINK TANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A POLICY-MAKER’S PERSPECTIVE 5

By Richard N. HaassDirector of Policy and Planning, Department of State

_ AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

THINK TANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AN HISTORICAL VIEW 9

By Donald E. AbelsonProfessor, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario

THINK TANKS AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 13

By James G. McGannSenior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute

_ HOW THREE THINK TANKS FUNCTION

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: HOW A THINK TANK WORKS 19

By Strobe TalbottPresident, The Brookings Institution

RAND: HOW THINK TANKS INTERACT WITH THE MILITARY 22

By Michael D. RichExecutive Vice President, RAND

THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE: A HANDS-ON APPROACH TO RESOLVING CONFLICT 26

By Richard H. SolomonPresident, United States Institute of Peace

_ CASE STUDIES

HAVING AN IMPACT: THINK TANKS AND THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE 29

By Ronald D. AsmusSenior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION: INFLUENCING THE DEBATE ON MISSILE DEFENSE 32

By Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, The Heritage Foundation

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

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AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002

A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON ESTABLISHING A THINK TANK: THE CASE OF HONDURAS 35

By Amy Coughenour BetancourtAdjunct Fellow of the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

_ FACT SHEETS

THE REVOLVING DOOR 39

THINK TANKS IN BRIEF 42

_ A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: BIBLIOGRAPHY 45

Spotlighting other views

THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A SELECTION OF INTERNET SITES 46

Links to resources on related issues

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Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policyformulation, the role of think tanks is amongthe most important and least appreciated. A

distinctively American phenomenon, the independentpolicy research institution has shaped U.S. globalengagement for nearly 100 years. But because thinktanks conduct much of their work outside the mediaspotlight, they garner less attention than othersources of U.S. policy — like the jostling of interestgroups, the maneuvering between political parties,and the rivalry among branches of government.Despite this relatively low profile, think tanks affectAmerican foreign policy-makers in five distinctways: by generating original ideas and options forpolicy, by supplying a ready pool of experts foremployment in government, by offering venues forhigh-level discussions, by educating U.S. citizensabout the world, and by supplementing official effortsto mediate and resolve conflict.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

Think tanks are independent institutions organized toconduct research and produce independent, policy-relevant knowledge. They fill a critical void betweenthe academic world, on the one hand, and the realmof government, on the other. Within universities,research is frequently driven by arcane theoreticaland methodological debates only distantly related toreal policy dilemmas. Within government,meanwhile, officials immersed in the concretedemands of day-to-day policy-making are often too

busy to take a step back and reconsider the broadertrajectory of U.S. policy. Think tanks' primarycontribution, therefore, is to help bridge this gapbetween the worlds of ideas and action.

The rise of modern think tanks parallels the rise ofthe United States to global leadership. They firstemerged a century ago, during the progressive era, aspart of a movement to professionalize government.For the most part, their mandate was avowedlyapolitical: to advance the public interest by providinggovernment officials with impartial, policy-relevantadvice. Early examples included the Institute forGovernment Research (1916), the forerunner of theBrookings Institution (1927). The first think tankdevoted solely to foreign affairs was the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, founded in 1910to investigate the causes of war and promote thepacific settlement of disputes. These tasks assumedurgency with the outbreak of World War I, whichgenerated passionate debate over America's properglobal role. During the winter of 1917-1918, ColonelEdward House, an adviser to President WoodrowWilson, discretely assembled prominent scholars toexplore options for the postwar peace. Known as“The Inquiry,” this group advised the U.S. delegationat the Paris Peace Conference and, in 1921, joinedwith prominent New York bankers, lawyers, andacademics to form the Council on Foreign Relations.The first generation of think tanks helped build andmaintain an informed domestic constituency forglobal engagement, keeping the internationalist flame

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THINK TANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A POLICY-MAKER'S PERSPECTIVE

By Richard N. HaassDirector of Policy and Planning

U.S. Department of State

From the perspective of U.S. policy-makers, today's think tanks offer five principal benefits,according to Ambassador Richard N. Haass, who is Director of Policy and Planning at theState Department. He says they generate “new thinking” among U.S. decision-makers,provide experts to serve in the administration and Congress, give policy-makers a venue inwhich to build shared understanding on policy options, educate U.S. citizens about theworld, and provide third-party mediation for parties in conflict.

_ A P O L I C Y - M A K E R ’ S V I E W

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flickering during the years between the Americanrepudiation of the League of Nations and the comingof the Second World War.

A second wave of think tanks arose after 1945, whenthe United States assumed the mantle of superpowerand (with the outbreak of the Cold War) defender ofthe free world. Many such institutions received directsupport from the U.S. government, which devotedmassive resources to defense scientists andresearchers. The RAND Corporation, initiallyestablished as an independent non-profit institutionwith Air Force funding in 1948, launched pioneeringstudies of systems analysis, game theory, and strategicbargaining that continue to shape the way we analyzedefense policy and deterrence decades later.

Over the last three decades, a third wave of thinktanks has crested. These institutions focus as muchon advocacy as research, aiming to generate timelyadvice that can compete in a crowded marketplace ofideas and influence policy decisions. The prototypeadvocacy think tank is the conservative HeritageFoundation, established in 1973. The liberal Institutefor Policy Studies plays a similar role.

At the dawn of the 21st century, more than 1,200think tanks dot the American political landscape.They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in scope,funding, mandate, and location. Some, like theInstitute for International Economics (IIE), the Inter-American Dialogue, or the Washington Institute forNear East Policy, focus on particular functional areasor regions. Others, like the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS), cover the foreign policywaterfront. A few think tanks, like Brookings, havelarge endowments and accept little or no officialfunding; others, like RAND, receive most of theirincome from contract work, whether from thegovernment or private sector clients; and a few, likethe United States Institute of Peace (USIP), aremaintained almost entirely by government funds. Insome instances, think tanks double as activist non-governmental organizations. The International CrisisGroup, for example, deploys a network of analysts inhot spots around the world to monitor volatilepolitical situations, formulating original, independentrecommendations to build global pressure for theirpeaceful resolution.

THE IDEA FACTORY

From the perspective of U.S. policy-makers, today'sthink tanks offer five principal benefits. Theirgreatest impact (as befits their name) is in generating“new thinking” that changes the way that U.S.decision-makers perceive and respond to the world.Original insights can alter conceptions of U.S.national interests, influence the ranking of priorities,provide roadmaps for action, mobilize political andbureaucratic coalitions, and shape the design oflasting institutions. It is not easy, however, to grabthe attention of busy policy-makers already immersedin information. To do so, think tanks need to exploitmultiple channels and marketing strategies —publishing articles, books, and occasional papers;appearing regularly on television, op-ed-pages, and innewspaper interviews; and producing reader-friendlyissue briefs, fact-sheets, and web pages.Congressional hearings provide another opportunityto influence policy choices. Unencumbered byofficial positions, think tank scholars can afford togive candid assessments of pressing globalchallenges and the quality of government responses.

Certain historical junctures present exceptionalopportunities to inject new thinking into the foreignpolicy arena. World War II offered one such instance.Following the war's outbreak, the Council on ForeignRelations launched a massive War and Peace Studiesproject to explore the desirable foundations ofpostwar peace. The participants in this effortultimately produced 682 memoranda for the StateDepartment on topics ranging from the occupation ofGermany to the creation of the United Nations. Twoyears after the end of the war, the Council's marqueejournal, Foreign Affairs, published an anonymousarticle on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Thearticle, which was in fact authored by U.S. diplomatGeorge Kennan, helped establish the intellectualfoundation for the containment policy the UnitedStates would pursue for the next four decades. Thenin 1993 Foreign Affairs published Harvard politicalscientist Samuel P. Huntington's “The Clash ofCivilizations,” a seminal contribution to the debatesurrounding American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Since September 11, 2001, studies byCSIS, Heritage, and Brookings have all contributedto the discussions within the government over the

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proper strategies and organizations needed toconfront the terrorist threat at home and abroad.

Presidential campaigns and transitions are idealoccasions to set the foreign policy agenda. As MartinAnderson of the Hoover Institution explains, “It isduring these times that presidential candidates solicitthe advice of a vast number of intellectuals in orderto establish policy positions on a host of domesticand foreign policy issues. Presidential candidatesexchange ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign trail. It's like a national test-marketing strategy.” The most celebrated caseoccurred after the 1980 election, when the Reaganadministration adopted the Heritage Foundation'spublication, “Mandate for Change,” as a blueprint for governing. A more recent instance was a 1992report by IIE and the Carnegie Endowment proposingan “economic security council.” The incomingClinton administration implemented this proposal increating a National Economic Council (a body thatcontinues today).

PROVIDING TALENT

Besides generating new ideas for senior governmentofficials, think tanks provide a steady stream ofexperts to serve in incoming administrations and oncongressional staffs. This function is critical in theAmerican political system. In other advanceddemocracies, like France or Japan, new governmentscan rely on the continuity provided by a largeprofessional civil service. In the United States, eachtransition brings a turnover of hundreds of mid-leveland senior executive branch personnel. Think tankshelp presidents and cabinet secretaries fill this void.Following his election in 1976, Jimmy Carter staffedhis administration with numerous individuals fromthe Brookings Institution and the Council on ForeignRelations. Four years later, Ronald Reagan turned toother think tanks to serve as his brain trust. Duringtwo terms in office, he drew on 150 individuals fromHeritage, the Hoover Institution, and the AmericanEnterprise Institute (AEI).

The current Bush administration has followed asimilar pattern in staffing the upper echelons of itsforeign policy apparatus. Within the StateDepartment, senior officials with think tank

backgrounds include the Undersecretary for GlobalAffairs, Paula Dobriansky, previously senior vice-president and director of the Council on ForeignRelations' Washington office; the Undersecretary forArms Control and International Security, John R.Bolton, formerly vice-president of AEI; the AssistantSecretary for East Asia and the Pacific, James Kelly,previously president of the Pacific Forum of CSIS(Honolulu); and the Assistant Secretary-designate forInternational Organization Affairs, Kim Holmes,formerly vice-president at the Heritage Foundation.At the Pentagon, meanwhile, Peter W. Rodmanassumed his position as Assistant Secretary ofDefense for International Security Affairs after astint as director of national security programs at theNixon Center.

In addition to supplying experts for incomingadministrations, think tanks provide departingofficials with institutional settings in which they canshare insights gleaned from government service,remain engaged in pressing foreign policy debates,and constitute an informal shadow foreign affairsestablishment. This “revolving door” is unique to theUnited States, and a source of its strength. In mostother countries one finds a strict division betweencareer government officials and outside analysts. Notso in America. Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell'spredecessor as Secretary of State, once headed theCenter for National Policy. Her former deputy,Strobe Talbott, is now president of the BrookingsInstitution — where I previously served as vice-president and director of foreign policy studies.Having divided my career between governmentservice and think tanks, I can testify to the insights tobe gained by combining ideas and practice. Over thepast quarter century, I've alternated stints at theNational Security Council, the Defense and StateDepartments, and on Capitol Hill with time atBrookings, the International Institute for StrategicStudies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and theCarnegie Endowment.

CONVENING PROFESSIONALS

In addition to bringing new ideas and experts intogovernment, think tanks provide policy-makers withvenues in which to build shared understanding, if notconsensus, on policy options among what my former

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Harvard colleague Ernest May has labeled the“foreign policy public:” the opinion makers andshapers drawn from across the professions. As a rule,no major foreign policy initiative can be sustainedunless it enjoys a critical base of support within thebroad foreign policy community. Among think tanks,the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations hasbeen most adept at this convening role, hostinghundreds of meetings annually in New York,Washington, and major cities around the country. ForU.S. officials, events at major think tanks offer non-partisan settings to announce new initiatives, explaincurrent policy, and launch trial balloons. For visitingforeign dignitaries, the opportunity to appear beforeprominent think tank audiences provides access to themost influential segments of the U.S. foreign policyestablishment.

ENGAGING THE PUBLIC

Even as they convene elites, think tanks enrichAmerica's broader civic culture by educating U.S.citizens about the nature of the world in which theylive. The accelerating pace of globalization has madethis outreach function more important than ever. Asthe world becomes more integrated, global events andforces are touching the lives of average Americans.Whether the issue is ensuring foreign markets forfarm exports, tracking the spread of infectiousdiseases, protecting U.S. software from piracy abroad,ensuring the safety of American tourists overseas, orsafeguarding our ports against terrorist infiltration,the U.S. public has a growing stake in foreign policy.Eighty World Affairs Councils, scattered around theUnited States, provide valuable forums in whichmillions of adults and high school students candiscuss international events. But formal think tanks,too, are increasingly engaging U.S. citizens. In 1999,the Aspen Institute launched a GlobalInterdependence Initiative, “a 10-year effort to better

inform, and more effectively motivate, public supportfor forms of U.S. international engagement that areappropriate to an interdependent world.”

BRIDGING DIFFERENCES

Finally, think tanks can assume a more active foreignpolicy role by sponsoring sensitive dialogues andproviding third-party mediation for parties inconflict. As part of its congressional mandate, theU.S. Institute of Peace has long facilitated suchinformal, “Track II” negotiations, as well as trainingU.S. officials to mediate long-running disputes. Butother, more traditional think tanks have also extendedtheir mandates to participate actively in preventivediplomacy, conflict management, and conflictresolution. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the CarnegieEndowment hosted a series of meetings inWashington, bringing together leading South Africanpoliticians, clergy, businessmen, laborrepresentatives, academics, and exiled liberationfigures, as well as members of Congress andexecutive branch officials. These gatherings,occurring over eight years, helped establish the firstdialogue and built understanding on South Africa'sfuture during a delicate political transition. Likewise,CSIS has launched projects to improve ethnicrelations in the former Yugoslavia, to bridgereligious-secular divisions in Israel, and to facilitateGreek-Turkish dialogue.

Such unofficial initiatives are delicate undertakings.But they have great potential to build peace andreconciliation in conflict-prone regions and war-tornsocieties, either as a complement to U.S. governmentefforts or as a substitute when an official Americanpresence is impossible. In the darkest corners of theworld, they can serve as the eyes, the ears, and eventhe conscience of the United States and theinternational community. _

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U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002

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As the tragic events of September 11, 2001began to unfold, network executives andjournalists in the United States scrambled to

find policy experts capable of answering two criticalquestions: why were two of America’s greatestsymbols of economic and military prowess — theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon — attacked?And who ultimately was responsible for orchestratingand coordinating these heinous acts?

To provide millions of viewers with answers to theseand other questions, journalists quickly flippedthrough their rolodexes to locate policy experts atdozens of American think tanks. Their frantic searchsoon paid off. Indeed, even before the initial shock ofwhat had transpired sunk in, policy experts fromsome of America’s leading foreign and defense policythink tanks began to appear on the major televisionnetworks to share their insights. Over the nextseveral weeks and months, the visibility of think tankscholars in the media continued to increase.

The willingness of think tanks to participate in themedia frenzy surrounding September 11 came as nosurprise to scholars who have witnessed theirincreasingly active involvement in the policy-makingprocess. Since think tanks are in the business ofdeveloping, repackaging, and marketing ideas topolicy-makers and the public, they could hardly passup an opportunity to comment on one of the mosttragic days in contemporary American history.

Gaining access to the media, however, is only one ofthe many strategies think tanks rely on to shapepublic opinion and public policy. My purpose is not simply to describe the activities ofthink tanks in the United States, nor to speculate onthe level of influence that these institutions may ormay not have. Instead, I will briefly explore theevolution and proliferation of American think tanksand highlight the various strategies they rely on tocontribute to foreign policy decision-making. As aresult, it will become clear why think tanks in theUnited States have become an integral feature of the country’s political landscape and why policy-makers in Congress, the Executive Branch, and thewider federal bureaucracy often turn to them forpolicy advice.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN THINK TANKS

Scholars who have studied the growth anddevelopment of American think tanks generally agreethat the highly decentralized nature of the Americanpolitical system, combined with the lack of strictparty discipline and the large infusion of funds fromphilanthropic foundations, have contributed greatly tothe proliferation of think tanks in the past quarter-century. Unfortunately, they cannot seem to agree onwhen the first think tank was created in the UnitedStates or what in fact constitutes such an entity. As a result, rather than trying to define what a think

THINK TANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By Donald E. AbelsonProfessor, Department of Political Science

University of Western Ontario

While think tanks, in recent years, have become “a global phenomenon,” U.S. think tanksare distinguished from their counterparts in other countries by their ability “to participatedirectly and indirectly in policy-making” and by “the willingness of policy-makers to turn tothem for policy advice,” says Donald Abelson, professor of political science at the Universityof Western Ontario and the author of two books on think tanks.

_ A N H I S T O R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E_ A N H I S T O R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

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tank is — a difficult and frustrating task given theenormous diversity of their population — scholarshave resigned themselves to identifying major wavesor periods of think tank growth. However, in thisarticle, I will treat think tanks as non-profit, non-partisan (which does not mean non-ideological),research-oriented institutes among whose primaryobjectives is to influence public opinion and public policy.

A few observations should be made. First, althoughthe term “think tank” was employed originally in theUnited States during World War II to refer to a secureroom or environment where defense scientists andmilitary planners could meet to discuss strategy, thisrather narrow usage of the term has since beenexpanded to describe over 2,000 U.S.-basedorganizations that engage in policy analysis andapproximately 2,500 other similar institutionsworldwide. A think tank might invoke images of anorganization like RAND, one of America’s premierforeign and defense policy research institutions,which has over 1,000 staff members and an annualbudget in excess of $100 million, or it may be used todescribe a more modest policy shop such as theWashington-based Institute for Policy Studies, anorganization with less than two dozen staff membersand a budget in the $1 million to $2 million range.

In chronicling the history of American think tanks,particularly those engaged in the study of foreignpolicy, it is important to keep in mind the tremendousdiversity of the think tank community. It is alsonecessary to recognize that while think tanks share acommon desire to shape public opinion and thepolicy preferences and choices of decision-makers,how they seek to exercise policy influence dependson their mandate, resources, and priorities.

THE FIRST GENERATION: THINK TANKSAS POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

The first major wave of foreign policy think tanks inthe United States began to emerge in the early 1900s,largely as a result of the desire of leadingphilanthropists and intellectuals to create institutionswhere scholars and leaders from the public andprivate sectors could congregate to discuss anddebate world issues. Three institutions in particular

began to make their presence felt in the first decadesof the 20th century: the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace (1910), established by Pittsburghsteel baron Andrew Carnegie; the Hoover Institutionon War, Revolution and Peace (1919), created byformer president Herbert Hoover; and the Council onForeign Relations (1921), an institution whichevolved from a monthly dinner club to become one ofthe most respected foreign affairs institutions in theworld. Two other think tanks, the Institute forGovernment Research (1916), which later mergedwith two other institutes to create the BrookingsInstitution (1927), a Washington icon, and theAmerican Enterprise Institute for Public PolicyResearch (1943), a highly respected conservativethink tank, would in time begin to focus considerableattention on a wide range of foreign policy issues.

These and other think tanks created during the firstdecades of the 20th century were committed toapplying their scientific expertise to a host of policyissues. Functioning, in the words of Brookingsscholar Kent Weaver, as “universities withoutstudents,” think tanks like the Carnegie Endowmentand Brookings assign the highest priority toproducing quality academic research. They publishbooks, journals, and other material that is intendedfor different target audiences. Although scholarsfrom these institutions occasionally provided adviceto policy-makers when they were first established,their primary goal was not to directly influencepolicy decisions, but to help educate and informpolicy-makers and the public about the potentialconsequences of pursuing a range of foreign policyoptions. In part, the willingness of policy research-oriented think tanks to remain detached from thepolitical process stemmed from their commitment topreserving their intellectual and institutionalindependence, something many contemporary thinktanks have been prepared to sacrifice.

THE SECOND GENERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF GOVERNMENTCONTRACTORS

In the aftermath of World War II, the need forindependent foreign policy advice became even morecritical for American policy-makers. Faced with theincreased responsibilities of becoming a hegemonic

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power in a bi-polar world, decision-makers inWashington required the insight and expertise ofthink tanks that could help them develop a coherentand sound national security policy. By 1948, policy-makers knew where to turn. The RAND Corporationwas created in May 1948 to promote and protect U.S.security interests during the nuclear age.

In addition to filling a void in the external policyresearch community, RAND ushered in a newgeneration of think tanks — government contractors— policy research institutions largely funded bygovernment departments and agencies whoseresearch was intended to address specific concerns ofpolicy-makers. In the ensuing years, RAND wouldinspire the creation of several other governmentcontractors including the Hudson Institute (1961) andthe Urban Institute (1968).

THE THIRD GENERATION: THE RISE OFADVOCACY THINK TANKS

No other type of think tank has generated moremedia exposure in the last three decades than the so-called advocacy think tank. Combining policyresearch with aggressive marketing techniques, afunction they share in common with many interestgroups, advocacy-oriented think tanks havefundamentally altered the nature and role of the thinktank community. Unlike think tanks in the early partof the 20th century that were reluctant to becomeembroiled in policy debates, advocacy think tanksincluding the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), andthe CATO Institute (1977) welcome opportunities toinfluence both the direction and content of foreignpolicy. As the U.S. think tank industry has becomemore competitive, most think tanks have come torealize the importance of capturing the attention ofthe public and the minds of policy-makers.

THE FOURTH GENERATION: LEGACY-BASED THINK TANKS

The newest type of think tank to emerge in theforeign policy-making community is what some havereferred to as “legacy-based.” Legacy-based thinktanks, including the Carter Center in Atlanta and theWashington, D.C.-based Nixon Center for Peace and

Freedom, are think tanks created by formerpresidents intent on leaving a lasting legacy onforeign and domestic policy. They produce a widerange of publications, hold seminars and workshops,and conduct research in a number of policy areas.

EXERCISING POLICY INFLUENCE: THE STRATEGIES OF U.S. THINK TANKS

Think tanks are in the business of developing andpromoting ideas, and like corporations in the privatesector, they devote considerable resources tomarketing their product. Unlike corporations,however, think tanks measure success not by profitmargins (after all, they are registered as independentnon-profit organizations) but by how much influencethey have in shaping public opinion and policy. Inthis sense, think tanks have come to resemble interestor pressure groups that compete among other non-governmental organizations for political power andprestige. Despite some notable differences betweenthink tanks and interest groups, the distinguishingcharacteristics between the two have, over time,become increasingly blurred.

Think tanks vary enormously in terms of size, staff,and institutional resources, but they all rely to acertain extent on both public and private channels toexercise policy influence. Of the approximately2,000 think tanks in the United States, close to 25percent are considered independent or free standing.The vast majority are affiliated with universitydepartments.

Publicly, think tanks rely on a host of strategies toconvey their views to policy-makers and the public.These may include: holding public conferences andseminars to discuss various foreign policy issues;encouraging resident scholars to give lectures atuniversities, rotary clubs, etc.; testifying beforelegislative committees; enhancing their exposure inthe print and electronic media; disseminating theirresearch; and creating web pages on the Internet.

Privately, experts at think tanks may seek to becomeinvolved in foreign policy by: accepting cabinet, sub-cabinet, or other positions in the federal government(following government service, many policy-makersreturn to or take up residence at a think tank); serving

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U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002

as advisers during presidential elections, on transitionteams, and on presidential and congressionaladvisory boards; inviting selected policy-makersfrom the Department of Defense, the StateDepartment, the National Security Council, the CIA,and other intelligence gathering agencies toparticipate in private workshops and seminars; and byproviding policy-makers in Congress, the ExecutiveBranch and throughout the federal government withpolicy briefs and relevant studies on current foreignpolicy issues — the trademark of the HeritageFoundation, known as the quintessential advocacythink tank.

ASSESSING POLICY IMPACT: AREAMERICAN THINK TANKS INFLUENTIAL?

Until very recently, scholars and journalists assumedthat think tanks were a uniquely Americanphenomenon and that those situated in and aroundWashington, D.C. were particularly influential. Bothassumptions need to be addressed. First, although theUnited States is home to some of the mostdistinguished think tanks in the world, think tankshave emerged in significant numbers in mostdeveloped and developing countries. In Canada,Great Britain, Germany, Australia, indeed in most ofEastern and Western Europe, and throughout Asia,the Middle East and Africa, think tanks have come tooccupy a more visible presence in recent years.Funded by philanthropic foundations, corporations,international organizations such as the World Bankand political parties, think tanks have become aglobal phenomenon.

What makes think tanks in the United States unique,besides their sheer number, is the extent to whichmany have become actively involved in the policy-making process. In short, what distinguishesAmerican think tanks from their counterparts in otherparts of the world is not how well-financed someinstitutions are. Rather, it is the ability of Americanthink tanks to participate both directly and indirectlyin policy-making and the willingness of policy-makers to turn to them for policy advice that leads

some scholars to conclude that U.S. think tanks havethe greatest impact on shaping public policy.Unfortunately, very few scholars have looked closelyat how policy influence is achieved and the variousobstacles that must be overcome to measure or assessthe influence of think tanks. At the very least, it isimportant to recognize that think tanks exercisedifferent types of policy influence at different stagesof the policy-making cycle. While some think tankslike the American Enterprise Institute and theHeritage Foundation are effective at helping to frameparticular policy debates such as the ongoing debateover missile defense, others, including RAND, aremore influential in working closely with policy-makers to evaluate the costs and benefits ofdeveloping new military technologies.

As the number of think tanks in the United States andthroughout the international community continue togrow, there will be a tendency to infer that theirinfluence is on the rise. However, before such aconclusion is reached, scholars and journalists needto pay closer attention to how think tanks havecontributed to specific foreign policy debates andwhether policy-makers in different branches,departments, and agencies have heeded their advice.Only then can more informed observations abouttheir role and impact be made.

Think tanks have emerged as visible and, in manyrespects, important players in the policy-makingcommunity. Yet, the fact that they have proliferatedin great numbers tells us more about the culture,society, and politics of the United States than aboutthe extent to which this diverse set of organizationsinfluences the policy-making environment andspecific policy decisions. There is no doubt thatthink tanks can and have made valuable contributionsto American foreign and domestic policy. Thequestions that scholars continue to struggle with arehow much of an impact and in what specific ways?Answers to these and other questions will go someway in providing additional insight into the role andfunction of these organizations and their place in theAmerican foreign policy-making process. _

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We live in turbulent times where the onlyconstant is change, where the unthinkablehas become a dark reality and where the

line between domestic and international politics isincreasingly blurred. The promise and peril ofglobalization has transformed how we viewinternational relations and opened the policy-makingprocess to a new set of actors, agendas, andoutcomes. International relations was once theexclusive domain of diplomats, bureaucrats, andstates, but today’s policy-makers must consider adiverse set of international actors when formulatingforeign policy that includes organizations such asCNN, al-Jazeera, the International Campaign to BanLandmines, Greenpeace, Deutsche Bank, al-Qaeda,the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), and the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC). While these actorswere not born of globalization, they have beenempowered by it. Consider the simple fact that in1950 there were only 50 nation states and a limitednumber of intergovernmental and non-governmentalorganizations operating in the world and one beginsto understand the complexity and unique challengepolicy-makers face when trying to fashion aneffective foreign policy. The challenges for U.S.policy-makers are even more daunting givenAmerica’s superpower status, global commitments,and the range of transnational actors and issues itmust confront on a daily basis.

In this increasingly complex, interdependent, andinformation-rich world, governments and individualpolicy-makers face the common problem of bringingexpert knowledge to bear in governmental decision-making. Policy-makers need basic information aboutthe world and the societies they govern, how currentpolicies are working, possible alternatives, and theirlikely costs and consequences.

For policy-makers in many countries it is not a lackof information that politicians and governmentofficials are confronted with but an avalanche ofinformation and paper. Indeed, policy-makers arefrequently besieged by more information than theycan possibly use: complaints from constituents,reports from international agencies or civil societyorganizations, advice from bureaucrats, positionpapers from lobbyists and interest groups, andexposes of the problems of current governmentprograms in the popular or elite media. The problemis that this information can be unsystematic,unreliable, and/or tainted by the interests of thosewho are disseminating it. Some information may beso technical that generalist policy-makers cannotunderstand it or use it. Some information may bepolitically, financially, or administrativelyimpractical, or contrary to the interests of the policy-makers who must make decisions based oninformation that they often feel is less than adequate.Other information may not be useful because itdiffers too radically from the worldview or ideology

THINK TANKS AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

By James G. McGannSenior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Policy-makers have increasingly turned to independent public policy research organizations, commonly known as “think tanks,” for information and analysis that is timely, understandable, reliable, accessible and useful, says James G. McGann, a SeniorFellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and President of McGann Associates. The challenge for the new millennium, he says, “is to harness the vast reservoir ofknowledge, information, and associational energy that exist in public policy researchorganizations in every region of the world.”

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of those receiving it. In developing and transitionalcountries, the basic data needed to make informeddecisions often does not exist and must be collectedand analyzed and put into a form that is usable byparliamentarians and bureaucrats.

In politics, information no longer translates intopower unless it is in the right form at the right time.Governments and policy-makers are often moved toseize the moment because the right social andpolitical forces are in alignment or because a crisiscompels them to take action. In either case, theyoften move quickly and make decisions based onavailable information, which does not always lead tothe most informed policy. In short, policy-makersand others interested in the policy-making processrequire information that is timely, understandable,reliable, accessible, and useful.

There are many potential sources for thisinformation, including: government agencies,university-based scholars, research centers, for-profitconsulting firms, and international agencies. But incountries around the world, politicians andbureaucrats alike have increasingly turned to aspecialized group of institutions to serve their needs.Independent public policy research and analysisorganizations, commonly known as “think tanks,”have filled policy-makers insatiable need forinformation and systematic analysis that is policyrelevant. This information imperative led to thecreation of the first think tanks — Royal Institute forInternational Affairs (1920), Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace (1910), Kiel Institute forWorld Economics (1914), and the BrookingsInstitution (1916) — in the early part of the 20thcentury, and it continues to be the primary forcebehind the proliferation of public policy researchorganizations today. The international civil societymovement has also helped to stimulate interest inthink tanks as an alternative source of information onissues of international, national, and local concernand as potential critics of the policies of nationalgovernments and international organizations that canspeak with an objective voice independent ofgovernment and the business community.

1

For most of the 20th century, independent publicpolicy think tanks that performed research and

provided advice on public policy were anorganizational phenomenon found primarily in theUnited States, with a much smaller number inCanada and Western Europe. Although think tanksexisted in Japan for some time they generally lackedindependence, having close ties to governmentministries or corporations.

2There has been a

veritable proliferation of “think tanks” around theworld that began in the 1980s as a result of the forcesof globalization, the end of the Cold War, and theemergence of transnational problems. Two-thirds ofall the think tanks that exist today were establishedafter 1970 and over half were established since 1980.

The impact of globalization on the think tankmovement is most evident in regions such as Africa,Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and parts of SoutheastAsia, where there was a concerted effort by theinternational community to support the creation ofindependent public policy research organizations. Arecent survey conducted by the Foreign PolicyResearch Institute’s Think Tanks and Civil SocietiesProgram underscores the significance of this effortand documents the fact that most of the think tanks inthese regions have been established in the last 10years. Today there are over 4,500 of these institutionsaround the world. Many of the more establishedthink tanks, having been created during the Cold War,are focused on international affairs, security studies,and foreign policy.

Think tanks exist in almost every country that hasmore than a few million inhabitants and at least amodicum of intellectual freedom. For most of thelast century, the vast majority of think tanks werefound in the United States, but now for the first timethe number of think tanks worldwide exceeds thenumber in the U.S.

3Think tanks now operate in a

variety of political systems, engage in a range ofpolicy-related activities, and comprise a diverse set ofinstitutions that have varied organizational forms.And while all think tanks perform the same basicfunction — i.e., to bring knowledge and expertise tobear on the policy-making process — not all thinktanks have the same degree of financial, intellectualand legal independence. The challenge facing allthink tanks is how to achieve and sustain theirindependence so they can speak “truth to power.”

4

14

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Typology for Autonomous and Affiliated Public Policy Think Tanks

DateOrganization Established Organizational Type

Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany) 1964 Political Party

Jaures Foundation (France) 1990

Progressive Policy Institute (U.S.) 1998

China Development Institute (PRC) 1989 Government

Institute for Political & International Studies (Iran) 1984

Congressional Research Service (U.S.) 1914

Institute for Strategic & International Studies (Malaysia) 1983 Quasi Governmental

Korean Development Institute (Korea) 1971

Woodrow International Center For Scholars (U.S.) 1968

Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (Pakistan) 1947 Autonomous & Independent

Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) 1990

Institute for International Economics (U.S.) 1981

European Trade Union Institute (Belgium) 1978 Quasi Independent

NLI Research Institute (Japan) 1988

Center for Defense Information (U.S.) 1990

Foreign Policy Institute, Hacettepe University (Turkey) 1974 University Affiliated

Institute For International Relations (Brazil) 1979

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1919Stanford University (U.S.)

Political Party Affiliated — Formally affiliated with a political party.Government Affiliated — A part of the structure of government.Autonomous and Independent — Significant independence from any one interest group or donor andautonomous in its operation and funding from government. Quasi Governmental — Funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the for-mal structure of government. Quasi Independent — Autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or con-tracting agency that provides a majority of the funding and has significant influence over operations ofthe think tank.University Affiliated — A policy research center at a university.

Taking into consideration the comparative differencesin political systems and civil societies, I havedeveloped the following categories that attempt to

capture the full range of think tanks that can be foundaround the world today.

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In the United States you can find every variety ofpublic policy organization while the rest of the worldtends to have think tanks of a more limited scope andvariety. Think tanks outside the United States fallinto three main categories — university affiliated,government affiliated, and political party affiliated —and tend not to enjoy the same degree of autonomythat their American counterparts do.

Irrespective of their structure, think tanks havebecome a permanent part of the political landscape,so much so that they are now an integral part of thepolicy process in many countries. Think tanks ofvarious sorts have performed many differentfunctions including:

• the carrying out of research and analysis on policyproblems;

• providing advice on immediate policy concerns;

• the evaluation of government programs;

• the interpretation of policies for electronic andprint media, thus facilitating public understandingof and support for policy initiatives;

• facilitating the construction of “issue networks”that involve a diverse set of policy actors who cometogether on an ad hoc basis around a particularpolicy issue or problem; and

• providing a supply of key personnel to government.

While the emergence of think tanks has not alwaysbeen viewed by the political establishment as anunalloyed good, think tanks have nonetheless hadmore positive than negative influence on the policyprocess. This is particularly evident in manydeveloping and transitional countries where thinktanks have served as a catalyst for change that hashelped transform the political landscape and create avibrant civil society.

While historical and political traditions in otherregions of the world differ significantly from those ofthe United States, and while every country has its

own specific set of policy problems and needs, someuseful lessons can be distilled from the U.S.experience. The origins of think tank culture in theUnited States are bound up in America’s progressive-era traditions of corporate philanthropy, the sharpdistinction between legislative and executivebranches of government, weak political parties, thepublic commitment to openness and independence,and the inclination of the public and their electedofficials to trust the private-sector to interface withand to provide assistance to government. Thesefactors combine to provide very few barriers topolicy analysts, ideologues, and entrepreneurs whowant to enter the marketplace of ideas and contributeto the policy-making process. Finally, think tankshave grown in prominence because there is aperception that think tanks can often do whatgovernment bureaucracies cannot.

Specifically, think tanks are:

• more effectively future-oriented than governmentresearch functionaries, who work in anenvironment in which efforts at creative disruptionare rarely rewarded.

• more likely to generate reconfigured policyagendas, while bureaucracies thrive on the security-maximizing environment of standard operatingprocedures.

• better able to facilitate collaboration amongseparate groups of researchers for a commonpurpose because they have no permanent vestedinterest in any one domain.

Furthermore, they aid the intellectual synthesis thatcomes from breaking down bureaucratic barriersbecause they are:

• better able than government agencies todisseminate relevant policy research withingovernment and externally to policy elites, themedia, and the public.

• better suited to deal with the cross-cutting nature ofglobal policy issues.

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• better able to convene and engage stakeholders inthe policy-making process.

• better able to “telescope” the policy process —from data collection to knowledge/policy creation.

• better able to conceive the means ofimplementation than government bureaucracies,which may be internally segmented by departmentand area of specialization.

Despite the efforts of some scholars and policy-makers to question the potential transferability ofU.S.-style independent think tanks to other regionsand countries of the world, many policy-makers andcivil society groups from around the globe havesought to create truly independent, free standingthink tanks to help their governments think. So whilethe transferability of the Brookings Institution,RAND Corporation, or Heritage Foundation model toother countries and political cultures may be debated,the need and desire to replicate the independence andinfluence these institutions enjoy is unchallenged.

The transnationalization of the think tank movementhas often been encouraged and funded by theinternational donor community and privatefoundations in the United States, Europe, and Japan.Along with the international flow of funds has comean internationalization of think tank staff. Programslike those run by the Brookings Institution, CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, NationalInstitute for Research Advancement, WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars, the GermanMarshall Fund, Atlas Economic ResearchFoundation, and other organizations provideopportunities for staff from think tanks anduniversities in the developing and transitionaleconomies to come and consult with their peers sothat they can exchange information and ideas aboutinternational issues and learn about best practices forhow to create and sustain an independent publicpolicy organization.

Think tanks in the United States have also beenactively engaged in exporting their scholars, brandsof policy analysis and organizational structures to

other countries. The Urban Institute, the HeritageFoundation, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,and Hudson Institute have actively promoted theirapproach to policy analysis, to groups in Africa, Asia,Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. The Urban Institute, Carnegie Endowment, andHeritage Foundation have gone so far as to establishoverseas affiliates.

Advances in information systems andtelecommunications have greatly expanded the scopeand impact of collaboration between institutions andscholars. Bilateral and multilateral exchanges aretaking place every day as technological advancesallow think tank staff to communicate and operatemore effectively across international boarders. TheInternet enables think tanks around the world toconnect with each other in a way that wasunthinkable just a few years ago. Global forums,conferences, and debates now take place regularly onthe World Wide Web. Collaborative research projectsinvolving researchers from 20 or more countries arenow commonplace. Recently, institutions such as theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace’s GlobalPolicy Program, the World Bank’s GlobalDevelopment Network, the United Nation’s GlobalPublic Policy Network, and the Foreign PolicyResearch Institute’s Think Tanks and Civil SocietiesProgram have created partnerships with think tanksaround the world in an effort to create globalnetworks that will analyze global issues, attempt toshape foreign policies, and influence the programsand priorities of international institutions. Inaddition, an equal number of regional networks havebeen organized in Europe (Transition PolicyNetwork, Trans European Policy Studies Associationnetwork and Partnership for Peace network), Asia(Association of Southeast Asian Nations Institute ofStrategic and International Studies network), Africa(African Capacity Building Foundation network), andLatin America (Atlas Foundation network) to achievesimilar objectives.

The growth of public policy research organizationsover the last two decades has been nothing less thanexplosive. Not only have these organizationsincreased in number, but the scope and impact of

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their work has expanded dramatically. Still, thepotential of think tanks to support and sustaindemocratic governments and civil societies aroundthe world is far from exhausted. The challenge forthe new millennium is to harness the vast reservoir ofknowledge, information, and associational energythat exist in public policy research organizations inevery region of the world. It is essential that the U.S.State Department and other international agencies ofthe U.S. government take immediate steps to workwith, and through think tanks, to help develop andsustain a global network of policy institutes that willspan physical, political, and disciplinary boundaries

in the pursuit of solutions to some of the emergingand enduring policy problems of our time. _

1. See James G. McGann and Kent R. Weaver, eds. Think Tanks and CivilSocieties: Catalysts for Ideas and Action; Transaction Publications 2000.See also Jeffrey Telgarsky and Makiko Ueno, Introduction: Think Tanksand a Changing Japan, in Telgarsky and Ueno, eds., Think Tanks in aDemocratic Society: An Alternative Voice, (Washington, D.C.: The UrbanInstitute, 1996), p.3.

2. Telgarsky and Ueno, Introduction, p.2.

3. According to recent data collected by the FPRI Think Tanks and CivilSocieties Program there are over 4,500 think tanks worldwide,approximately 1,500 of which are found in the United States.

4. Wildavsky, Aaron, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of PolicyAnalysis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1979)

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The raw material that think tanks work with isideas. Think tanks — more properly publicpolicy research organizations — assess the

validity and utility of the ideas that form the basis forpolicy, and they develop new ideas upon which thepolicies of the future might be based. James AllenSmith, an historian who has written a number ofbooks about think tanks, has described them in thetitle of one of his volumes as “The Idea Brokers.”

The Brookings Institution is one of the oldest thinktanks in the United States. The precursor of thepresent-day Brookings — the Institute forGovernment Research — was established inWashington in 1916 by a St. Louis businessman andphilanthropist named Robert Brookings. He later setup two related organizations, the Institute forEconomics and the Graduate School of Economicsand Government.

Robert Brookings established these organizationsbecause he saw that businesses in the early part of the20th century were benefiting from the relatively newdisciplines of economic research and organizationalmanagement, and he believed that government alsocould benefit. The three research organizations werecombined in 1927 to form the Brookings Institution,which initially focused on domestic social andeconomic policy. International studies were notadded to the Brookings research agenda until afterWorld War Two.

Brookings is organized into three major researchareas: Foreign Policy Studies, Economic Studies, andGovernance Studies, though those departmentaldistinctions are increasingly blurred as the Institutiontakes on the cross-disciplinary issues that define ourglobalized world. Our organizational structure alsoincludes several research centers, focused on areassuch as the Middle East or functional issues such aseducation policy.

Robert Brookings once said, “Underlying allBrookings activities is a belief in the necessity offraming issues accurately and impartially, ofpresenting ideas without ideology.” Since its earliestdays, Brookings has provided policy-makers and thepublic with timely, applied research that is aimed atfinding solutions to America’s most complex policychallenges.

Over the decades, ideas emanating from Brookingsplayed a key role in the mobilizations for World WarsOne and Two; the creation of the Federalgovernment’s budget process, civil service system,and Social Security; the development of the MarshallPlan; the imposition of price controls during WorldWar Two; the use of sanctions to punish and influencerogue states; the organization of the National SecurityCouncil and other foreign policy and defensestructures; the commitment to promote developmentin poorer countries; the evolution of U.S. policytoward post-Soviet Russia; and many other policies.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: HOW A THINK TANK WORKS

By Strobe TalbottPresident, The Brookings Institution

The goal of The Brookings Institution, and all other think tanks, is "to provide the policycommunity with analysis and conclusions to use as the basis for developing new policies,and for modifying or retiring existing policies," says Brookings President Strobe Talbott."One of our most challenging tasks," he says, "is to identify early on the new andimportant issues our nation and the world will confront in the future" and bring them to the attention of policy-makers and the public.

_ H O W T H R E E T H I N K T A N K S F U N C T I O N

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Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the research herehas been refocused to concentrate more intently ongenerating ideas and insights that will lead to thedevelopment or revision of policies concerningrelations between the West and the Islamic world; theproper balance between vigilance against terrorismand protection of civil liberties; the conflict betweenIsrael and the Palestinians; the need to adjusttraditional state-to-state diplomacy to take intoaccount the rise of non-state players; the debate overpreemptive or preventive warfare to counter threatsfrom terrorists and terrorist-supporting states; thedevelopment of a long-term international strategy forthe post-Cold War world; the future of arms control;and the case for a missile defense system.

“Think tanks remain a principal source ofinformation and expertise for policy makers andjournalists,” Andrew Rich, a political scienceprofessor who has studied think tanks, concluded in areport five years ago. “Their studies and reports areregularly relied upon to guide and/or bolster membersof Congress in their legislative efforts and journalistsin their reporting.”

In a survey of congressional staff members andjournalists covering the Senate and House ofRepresentatives, Rich found that more than 90%viewed think tanks as “somewhat or very influential”in contemporary American politics. Rich reportedthat Brookings was judged to be the “most credible”of the 30 think tanks listed in his survey.

Brookings is often referred to as “a universitywithout students.” Many of our 75 senior scholarshave advanced degrees, and quite a few come fromuniversity faculties. Their research and writing issubject to scholarly review.

Some of the Brookings Fellows are what we call“scholar practitioners.” This description applies toresearchers who periodically accept positions ingovernment where they can test their academicconclusions in real-world circumstances, and toformer officials who come to Brookings after aperiod of public service and use their governmentexperience to add a practical viewpoint to ouracademic research.

For example, more than a dozen Brookings “scholarpractitioners” have served in the State Department oron the National Security Council, including JamesSteinberg, the Vice President and Director of theForeign Policy Studies program at Brookings (formerDeputy National Security Adviser at the White Houseand Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the StateDepartment); Helmut Sonnenfeldt (National SecurityCouncil senior staff member in the Nixonadministration and former director of the StateDepartment Office of Research on the Soviet Unionand Eastern Europe); and Martin Indyk, Director ofour Saban Center for Middle East Policy (formerAssistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairsand twice U.S. ambassador to Israel). Brookings alsohas expertise from all the other branches ofgovernment, such as former Congressman BillFrenzel (Republican-Minnesota), one of our residentexperts on taxes, free trade, and budget policy.

The National Institute for Research Advancement inTokyo compiled a list of 3,500 think tanksworldwide, half of them in the United States. Not allof these policy research organizations maintain astrictly academic atmosphere, or are required to be“independent and non-partisan” in their analysis, as ismandated by the Brookings mission statement. Somethink tanks are more overtly political. A numberfocus on a single issue or a small number of relatedissues. Some have an ideological agenda or a clearlyidentifiable partisan approach, and lobby policymakers to implement their agenda.

But, whether identified with the left or right — orcentrist, like Brookings — all think tanks arededicated to disseminating their research andrecommendations to the policy-makers, and to thenews media, influential opinion leaders, interestedorganizations, and members of the public.Underlying all these activities lies the goal ofBrookings and all other think tanks — to provide thepolicy community with analysis and conclusions touse as the basis for developing new policies, and formodifying or retiring existing policies.

Dissemination of policy analysis andrecommendations from Brookings takes a number offorms. The conclusions of many research projectsare presented in books and reports. However, a few

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years ago, when it was realized that policy-makersand their staffs don’t always have time to read booksand lengthy reports, Brookings also began publishingits findings additionally in shorter, more accessiblepapers called Policy Briefs. Other think tanks havefollowed suit.

Scholars at Brookings often communicate theirconclusions more directly to policy-makers throughCongressional testimony, private consultations, andmeetings with Congressional and executive branchstaff members, and to interested non-governmentalaudiences through forums, roundtable discussions,and other public events.

Policy-makers are often influenced by public opinion,and public opinion is often influenced by coverage inthe news media. Additionally, much of what policy-makers, their advisers, and the public know aboutpolicy issues they learn through the news media.Therefore, it’s not surprising that many scholars atBrookings and other think tanks devote a good dealof effort to presenting their ideas and findingsthrough the news media. This takes the form ofinterviews on television and radio and in print,opinion articles for the op-ed pages of newspapers,press briefings, public speeches, and articles forscholarly journals. More than a year ago, Brookingsbuilt its own TV and radio studio to facilitate mediainterviews.

Brookings and other think tanks also publish “mediaguides” to help reporters locate and interviewscholars with specific expertise on the policy issue ajournalist is writing about.

The budget to fund all this research, analysis,dissemination, and outreach — and the necessarystaff — runs approximately $40 million a year atBrookings. The money comes from an endowmentwhich was originally established by founder RobertBrookings; from grants and donations byfoundations, corporations, and individuals; and from

such revenue sources as the Brookings InstitutionPress, which publishes more than 50 books a year,and the Center for Public Policy Education, whichruns executive education seminars for governmentand corporate managers.

Elaborate rules are in place to guarantee thatfinancial providers have no influence over the designand outcome of Brookings research.

One of our most challenging tasks is to identify earlyon the new and important issues our nation and theworld will confront in the future. Then, in theBrookings tradition, we focus our scholarship onbringing those issues to the attention of the policy-makers and the public, providing solid research andanalysis, informing the debate, and offeringconstructive ideas and recommendations.

As the historian James Allen Smith wrote in hishistory of Brookings on its 75th anniversary, “...whenfew scholars have been available and prepared totackle an emerging policy issue, Brookings has oftenworked to redirect scholarly attention and fashionnew networks of expertise, whether on governmentfinance and regulation, the economies of Asiannations, or the command and control of nuclearweapons. Indeed, the best single test of theinstitution’s long-term success and influence residesnot in its immediate impact on particular policydecisions...but on its ability to shape expert networksin ways that continue to anticipate the nation’sproblems even before the contours of policy debateare delineated.”

Busy government policy-makers have noted the valueadded in Brookings’ ability to combine the analysisof long-term trends with the recommendation ofshort-term policies. Though many issues we tackletoday could hardly have been imagined by RobertBrookings in 1916, that non-partisan, policy-orientedmethod of inquiry has remained constant since ourfounding day. _

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From the beginnings of the U.S. Department ofDefense (DOD), think tanks have workedclosely with both the civilian and military

leadership on a wide range of issues, from newtechnologies to military planning and operations, tohelp better protect American interests from ever-evolving threats.

Like the DOD civilian leadership, the uniformedmilitary services require high-quality, objectiveresearch on geopolitical trends and the implicationsof different foreign policy options. Among otherthings, such research is necessary for realisticscenarios to guide planning and program evaluations,and to develop an understanding of probableconstraints on operational flexibility.

To their credit, the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have used andnurtured a large array of sources for that research,ranging from small institutes, such as the Center forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) and theLexington Institute, funded primarily with corporateor individual donations, to larger policy researchorganizations such as the Institute for DefenseAnalyses under contract to the DOD. The oldest andlargest of these research organizations is RAND,which was established with private capital as a non-profit corporation in 1948. About half ofRAND’s current work deals with national defense

while the rests deals with a wide range of domesticpolicy issues.

RAND operates three DOD-sponsored, federallyfunded research and development centers (FFRDCs).FFRDCs are research programs operated by privatenon-profit (non-commercial) organizations underlong-term contracts. They develop and maintainessential expertise and capabilities important to theirsponsors and operate in the public interest, free fromreal or perceived conflicts of interest.

RAND’s creation enabled the Air Force to retain andextend the considerable civilian scientificcontributions during World War II. As part of alarger program of research on air power at RAND,the Air Force seeded the development of a path-breaking analytical effort aimed at understanding the Soviet Union. Some of RAND’s researchaddressed the development of Soviet strategy,doctrine, and military systems. The Air Force alsorequested analyses of the Soviet economy, foreignpolicy, science and technology programs, amongmany other topics.

RAND’s pioneering work was so new that it requiredthe translation of large amounts of fundamentalSoviet writings and the creation or refinement ofnumerous analytical methods that became standardthroughout the research community, including the

RAND: HOW THINK TANKS INTERACT WITH THE MILITARYBy Michael D. Rich

Executive Vice President, RAND

Think tanks that work with defense and intelligence agencies once focused exclusively onregional and functional topics, but these organizations are now also being called upon tohelp the military address the new challenge of terrorism and homeland security, saysRAND Executive Vice President Michael D. Rich. RAND researchers, who have beenstudying terrorism for more than 30 years, are now helping decision-makers develop acomprehensive analytical approach to defending against terrorist attacks and, at the sametime, they are doing an increasing amount of research on other issues for governmentsaround the world.

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interviewing of emigres whose distrust ofgovernment officials made them otherwiseinaccessible.

Soon the Air Force, and then the Office of theSecretary of Defense, turned to RAND for researchon China, Eastern Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, theMiddle East, Latin America, and Western Europe.Although smaller in scale than the analyses of theSoviet Union, these studies also provided the AirForce — and through RAND’s widely-disseminatedpublished reports, the rest of the U.S. government and the public — with an independent body ofresearch on a broad range of topics. These includedeconomic strength, military capabilities,insurgencies, hegemonic intentions, and leadershipsuccession possibilities in many nations and regionsaround the world.

Over time, RAND developed complementary lines ofresearch for the Army, as well as for other federalclients such as the intelligence community. And theDOD steadily increased the number and diversity ofits external sources of research, also using others inthe growing world of “think tanks” such as theCouncil on Foreign Relations, the AmericanEnterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution.

RAND’s federally funded research and developmentcenters have a special role in helping to meet theresearch and analysis needs of their DOD sponsors.The FFRDCs are: Project AIR FORCE; the Army’sArroyo Center; and the National Defense ResearchInstitute (NDRI), which primarily serves the Officeof the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and thedefense agencies. Each of these centers conducts abroad, integrated program of research that addressesemerging security needs and their implications forthe sponsoring organizations; the development ofnew strategies, doctrines, tactics, and concepts ofoperations; the application of new technologies; andissues related to logistics, manpower, training,personnel, health care, and systems acquisition.

For each FFRDC, RAND commits to developing andmaintaining a set of specified “core capabilities.”This is all done with close familiarity with the

structure, doctrine, operations, and personalities ofthe sponsoring organizations. Indeed, one of thestrengths of FFRDCs, whether operated by RAND orother non-profit entities, is their stability and long-term, strategic, and close-in relationship with theirmilitary or OSD sponsors.

The research agenda-setting process is an iterativeone that begins with the development of a long-termresearch plan that is revised annually. Continuousdiscussions between RAND research leaders andgeneral officers or civilians of comparable rankenable RAND to develop an annual research programof individual studies, which is then approved by ahigh-level advisory board. In the case of Project AIRFORCE and the Arroyo Center, the advisory boardsare chaired by the services’ vice chiefs of staff; in thecase of NDRI, the chair is the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, andlogistics. Individual studies are typicallycommissioned by one or more senior officers orofficials, who help shape the scope, phasing, andtimetable of the research — providing comments,suggestions, and critiques along the way.

As an example, one such study was a multi-yearProject AIR FORCE study on Chinese defensemodernization and its implications for the Air Force.Although it was developed against the backdrop ofextensive interactions between RAND and the seniorAir Force leadership, the specific contours of thestudy were worked out with then-Commander of thePacific Air Forces, General Michael Ryan, and AirForce Headquarters’ Deputy Chief of Staff for Airand Space Operations, Lieutenant General JohnJumper (now Air Force Chief of Staff). Bothofficers, as well as their successors, were activeparticipants during the course of the analyses. Theresearch team reached out to numerous othersincluding experienced members of the ForeignService and specialists in academia.

Once the study objectives were agreed upon, RANDassembled a disparate team of researchers under theleadership of Zalmay Khalilzad, a former seniorofficial in both the Departments of State and Defensewho was then at RAND. Khalilzad is now a member

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of the National Security Council staff and alsoPresidential Envoy to Afghanistan. In addition toChina specialists, there were other regionalspecialists, as well as experts in defense strategy, airpower, intelligence, and economics.

The team was augmented by several Air Forceofficers serving at RAND as federal executivefellows. During the course of the research, the studyteam reviewed work in progress with an advisorygroup composed of a wide variety of current andformer senior federal officials in both Democraticand Republican administrations, including formernational security adviser Brent Scowcroft and threeformer secretaries of defense: Harold Brown, FrankCarlucci, and William Perry.

This project produced numerous interim briefings tosenior Air Force officers and other DOD officials,and written products, as well as a final report andderivative issue paper that were published andcirculated widely. In a manner that characterizesmuch of the research of FFRDCs, the projectinvolved close and continuing interaction with the AirForce at all levels. Most important, the work was ofpractical value to the Air Force senior leadership andwas widely read and used elsewhere in the U.S.government and in the region.

Every RAND product undergoes a rigorous qualityassurance process and this report was no exception.In addition to internal peer reviews, the manuscriptwas reviewed before publication by I. Lewis Libby, aformer principal deputy secretary of defense andState Department official, and David Shambaugh,professor of political science and internationalrelations and director of the China Policy Program atThe George Washington University.

This study is one of several done by RAND’sFFRDCs during the past few years that haveexamined issues at the heart of U.S.-China relations.Other FFRDC studies at RAND during the sameperiod examined critical problems involving suchnations as North Korea, Indonesia, India,Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Colombia. Eachof these studies drew on the same RAND strengths as

the study on China: a multi-disciplinary team ofresearchers, extensive contacts overseas, and closeworking relationships with the military sponsor.

The work in and on individual countries has enabledRAND to carry out detailed analyses of securityissues on a regional level in East Asia, South Asia,the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. In fact RANDis doing an increasing amount of work forgovernments around the world. The pattern ofdetailed country studies and broader regionalanalyses has been especially effective in work onEurope. RAND has a substantial presence in Europe,with three offices and research programs in bothdefense and non-defense fields. A series of analysesof conventional arms control using advanced combatmodels, and of the related question of limits on airpower, had substantial influence on the U.S. positionand ultimately on the resulting Conventional Forcesin Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moreover, much of the earlythinking about the rationale for alternative pathstoward NATO expansion was done at RAND andother think tanks.

Think tanks are now called upon to contribute to anew challenge: the emergence of terrorism as aworldwide threat and of homeland security as anational priority of the highest order. RANDresearchers have been studying terrorism for morethan 30 years, and are today helping the United Statesgovernment develop a comprehensive analyticalapproach to defend against terrorist attacks. Biggerbombs, better guns, and new weapons systems aloneare not enough to defeat terrorists, who operate farfrom traditional battlefields. We also need a betterunderstanding of who terrorists are, how theyoperate, what motivates them, and what can be done to stop them from expanding their ranks. And we need a better understanding of our nation’svulnerabilities and how to reduce thosevulnerabilities. RAND’s research and analysis isplaying an important role in helping to improvegovernment policy and decision-making in these vital areas.

Since the attacks on America on September 11, 2001,the RAND FFRDCs — like those of the other

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FFRDCs operated by other institutions, such as theCenter for Naval Analyses, that regularly assist theDOD — have been called upon by their sponsors tomodify their research agendas. The legacy of pastwork and resulting capabilities, coupled with theflexibility of the institutional arrangements and closeworking relationships between sponsors andresearchers, operators, and analysts, have equippedthe FFRDCs for these new dimensions in the nexusof foreign policy and defense planning.

The “old” issues haven’t gone away, of course. Theyhave simply been joined and complicated by the morerecent ones. RAND’s experts on a broad range ofnational security issues have been helping America’sarmed forces defend the nation for more than 50years, dealing both with threats that are now part ofhistory and with threats that will be on tomorrow’sfront pages. _

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2002

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The United States Institute of Peace is a uniqueentity in the increasingly crowded Washingtonforeign policy “think tank” community.

Perhaps the most obvious aspect of our uniqueness isthat we are a creation of the U.S. Congress. We are anindependent federal entity. However, its most salientaspect is that we take a hands-on, pro-active approachto fulfilling our mission of promoting the peacefulresolution of international conflicts. Some of ourstaff-members, in fact, like to refer to us as a “think-and-do tank.” I’ll come back to that idea, after a briefexplanation of the origins and mission of the Institute.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s — the aftermath ofthe Vietnam War — there was a lively debate in theUnited States about the value of establishing anational “peace academy” to train professionals in theskills of peacemaking, as a complement to theeducational mission of the nation’s three government-run military academies. The result of that debate wasthat the U.S. Congress decided in 1984 to establish“an independent non-profit, national institute to servethe people and the government through the widestpossible range of education and training, basic andapplied research opportunities, and peace informationservices on the means to promote international peaceand the resolution of conflicts among the nations andpeoples of the world without recourse to violence.”

Thus was born the United States Institute of Peace.Funded annually by Congress and overseen by apresidentially-appointed, bipartisan, Senate-confirmed board of directors, the Institute focuses its

efforts on education, training, policy development,and practical programs of conflict management, all inthe pursuit of international peace — in the MiddleEast, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in sub-SaharanAfrica — indeed in any part of the world whereviolent conflict threatens or rages.

While we approach our mission in some of the waysthat a traditional, non-governmental think tank would— through research, studies, grant-making, publicevents, and publishing — we also have practicalprograms that are more applied than the work of atraditional think tank. As I said at the outset, we liketo describe ourselves as a think-and-do tank. So,what is the “do” part of the equation?

It is, in large part, training and education. We arevery active in training the peacemakers of today andeducating those of tomorrow. In the training realm,for example, the Institute of Peace, through acooperative arrangement with the U.S. StateDepartment, trains American police officers whohave volunteered to go overseas to serve as on-the-ground, specially-trained peacekeepers in post-conflict areas such as the Balkans and East Timor.There are hundreds of such civilian police nowserving overseas, and many of them have passedthrough our Training Program before shipping out.

The Training Program operates not just inWashington, but worldwide. Its trainees includediplomats, government officials, civic leaders, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives,

THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE: A HANDS-ON APPROACH TO RESOLVING CONFLICT

By Richard H. SolomonPresident, United States Institute of Peace

The approach of the United States Institute of Peace is “to go a step further” than atraditional think tank, and “climb into the trenches with those trying to bring peace to theirparts of the world and work directly with them,” says USIP President Richard H. Solomon.In this endeavor, he says, the Institute — which was created by the U.S. Congress — bringswith it “a growing wealth of knowledge and expertise in the techniques of managingconflict and building peace.”

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and military personnel from the United States anddozens of other countries. They are trained to handleall phases of conflict, from preventive action to post-conflict stabilization and reconciliation.

A recent example of the program’s work is a two-week, interactive trust- and team-building course forabout 30 young NGO leaders from Serbia andKosovo. The program had four components: a day-long course consisting of various outdoor challengesrequiring collaborative planning and teamwork; asecond day of negotiation and mediation discussionsand exercises; an intensive, three-day, computer-driven simulation involving negotiation and policy-making; and a day of dialogue with Washingtonpolicy-makers. During the simulation, theparticipants were challenged to address, in a highly-pressured environment, the problems of a fictitiouscountry wrestling with the post-conflict challenges ofethnic tensions, high unemployment, environmentaldegradation, and an HIV/AIDS epidemic. In thethree days, they “made policy” through a computersimulation that enabled them to track the effects oftheir policy decisions on the country’s economy andsociety over a 10-year period.Our Education Program works to prepare Americanyouth for the difficult work of making peace inconflict-ridden countries and stimulates emerginggenerations of leaders to pursue careers ininternational conflict management. It does this byproducing teaching guides and conducting workshopsand seminars for American teachers at the highschool and college levels who want to incorporateconflict-resolution studies into their curricula.

The program also works with educators in zones ofconflict abroad, convening workshops and seminarson conflict analysis and management and the role thateducators can play promoting reconciliation andtolerance in those areas. Since September 11, 2001,these efforts have been focused mainly in countriesand regions with large Muslim populations.

The Education Program also works directly withAmerican high school students by sponsoring anannual National Peace Essay Contest. All U.S. highschool students are eligible — and encouraged — toparticipate by submitting an essay on a given peace-related subject. This year’s topic is the justification

for war, i.e., is it possible to have a “just” war?Thousands of students throughout the countryparticipate in the contest. Each state chooses a localwinner who gets college scholarship money and a tripto the Institute in Washington, where three nationalwinners are chosen and given additional scholarshipsupport.

Our Rule of Law Program also takes a hands-on andpro-active approach to its mission. People tend tothink of democracy as consisting of two elements:elections and freedom of speech, expression andthought. But a fully-functioning democracy consistsof many more components, one of the most importantbeing adherence to the rule of law. Research stronglysuggests that societies that uphold the rule of law areless likely to be aggressors and more likely tocontribute to international peace.

Rule of Law Program staff frequently travel tocountries in transition from totalitarianism todemocracy to offer guidance on implementingcommonly-accepted rule of law principles.At the request of the Israeli and Palestinian ministersof justice, for example, Rule of Law Program staffhave organized a special initiative on Palestinian-Israeli legal dialogue. The goal is to build professionalrelationships between the two legal communities andenable them to jointly explore a range of commonproblems — a process they had not been able to startwithout outside facilitation and which no otherinternational party had undertaken. Throughroundtable discussions and working groups in Israeland the Palestinian territories, members of the twolegal communities and foreign experts discusspractical legal issues affecting the daily interaction oftheir two systems, consider relevant examples of legalrelations between neighboring countries around theworld, and develop proposed solutions to commonproblems. More than 120 members of the two legalcommunities have participated to date. Agendatopics range from traffic accidents between Israelisand Palestinians to intellectual property rights andrepresentation in each other’s courts.

In addition to our issues-oriented programs, we haveprograms that focus — again in a hands-on, pro-active fashion — on particular regions that are facingviolent conflict or recovering from a period of

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violence. One of those programs addresses theBalkans — an area that is well into the recoveryphase after years of ethnic violence. Another focuseson a region that is larger, less easily defined, andwhere the conflicts are historical, current andpotential — the diverse Muslim World.

The Institute’s Balkans Program is deeply involved inhelping the states, communities, and ethnic groups ofthe former Yugoslavia emerge from the wreckage of adecade of violent and deadly conflict and rebuildtheir societies. Its director, Daniel Serwer, has beenextremely active in the region and has convenednumerous workshops for Balkans community leadersand government officials in the Balkans to help themplan for the peaceful co-existence of various ethnicand religious communities that have traditionallybeen enemies.

Our newest program, and a vitally important one, isthe Special Initiative on the Muslim World. One factmade painfully clear by the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 is that Americans and otherWesterners are woefully ignorant of the customs,cultures and beliefs that prevail in a large andimportant segment of the world’s population — the more than 1 billion Muslims who populate abroad swath of geography stretching from WestAfrica to East Asia.

Under the direction of former U.S. Ambassador toAzerbaijan Richard Kauzlarich, the Muslim Worldinitiative explores ways of promoting understandingand tolerance between the Western and Islamic

worlds, focusing initially on the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, then on Iraq and developments in South andSoutheast Asia. It also supports related Instituteactivities under the Rule of Law, Religion, andPeacemaking, Education, and Training programs.

While a great deal of attention has been paid to therole of religion in fomenting violent conflict, thereare few think tanks that address its role in the makingof peace. The Institute of Peace’s Religion andPeacemaking Initiative works to enhance the capacityof faith-based communities to be forces for peace.The Initiative organizes interfaith dialogues andworkshops in the Balkans, the Middle East, and theUnited States.

These are but some of our programs. We have othersthat focus on the effects of new telecommunicationstechnologies, such as the Internet and satellitetechnology, on modern diplomacy, and on the moretraditional think-tank functions, such as policy-oriented research and publishing. But the operationalprograms I’ve described here are the ones that makeus truly unique in a growing world of foreign policythink tanks. The usual modus operandi in that worldis to devise new policy options and offer them toofficials and practitioners to apply at the negotiatingtable or in the field. Our approach is to go a stepfurther — to climb into the trenches with those tryingto bring peace to their parts of the world and workdirectly with them, bringing with us a growing wealthof knowledge and expertise in the techniques ofmanaging conflict and building peace. _

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There are moments in the evolution of U.S.foreign policy where think tanks have had adecisive impact in reshaping conventional

wisdom and setting a new course on a key strategicissue. The debate over NATO enlargement in theearly 1990s was one of those moments. U.S. thinktanks played a key role in developing and buildingsupport for the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO as partof a broader strategy of overcoming the continent’sCold War divide and building a Europe whole andfree and at peace.

It was a dramatic period. The collapse ofcommunism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989,and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself twoyears later, had also left in its wake a vacuum interms of Western policy in the region. Thedemocratic revolutions of 1989 in Central andEastern Europe had taken the West largely bysurprise. As welcome as they were, they nonethelessoverturned many of the underlying assumptions thathad previously guided Western thinking and policy.

Events on the ground were moving faster than theability of many policy-makers to rethink.Governments and bureaucracies were at times behindthe curve of history — and they knew it — victims,in a sense, of our own success. Having succeeded intoppling communism without a shot fired inconfrontation between East and West, the West wasunprepared politically and intellectually to comeforth with a new vision of what kind of post-Cold

War Europe and trans-Atlantic relationship wasneeded for the future. What was NATO’s purpose tobe in a world absent communism and a Soviet threat?

These questions produced one of the most passionateand divisive foreign policy debates of the 1990s inthis country. The issue was not only whether or not toenlarge NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. Thatwas in many ways just the tip of the iceberg. Policy-makers were also battling over nothing less than whatkind of Europe and U.S.-European relationship theUnited States should build for a new era. The resultwas some of the most far-reaching changes in U.S.and NATO strategy in decades. I was fortunate tohave a bird’s eye view of this debate — first as aRAND analyst, subsequently as a deputy assistantsecretary of state in the European Bureau, and later asa Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Why did think tanks play such a key role in thisdebate? There were several reasons. First, in theearly 1990s there was a keen demand for fresh andout-of-the-box thinking on both sides of the Atlanticand governments were often not well equipped toprovide it. Coping with revolutionary change orcoming up with a new intellectual paradigm are notthe natural strengths of bureaucracies. This is notbecause people working inside the system are lessgifted. But they must operate by consensus, are attimes risk averse, and are simply overloaded withshort-term operational issues and requirements. It ismuch easier to think big or out of the box when one

HAVING AN IMPACT: THINK TANKS AND THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

By Ronald D. AsmusSenior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

U.S. think tanks played a pivotal role in the debate to expand the NATO Alliance in the early1990s, according to Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German MarshallFund of the United States and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.He says several factors were involved: there was a demand for fresh thinking on the subjectfrom both sides of the Atlantic, elements of the U.S. government were initially divided on thesubject, and think tank staff brought unique strengths and assets to the table.

_ C A S E S T U D I E S

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is on the outside and at a think tank where the incentivestructure is very different. Former Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger’s remark that one should accrueone’s intellectual capital before entering governmentbecause one only depletes it while working in thebureaucracy is, unfortunately, often the case.

Second, in the early 1990s the initial efforts of the U.S.government to grapple with these issues had left itseriously divided. Many actors in the U.S. governmentat the time turned to outsiders for additional input andanalysis. In some cases this was simply further tostrengthen their own cases. In others it reflectedefforts to find new ways to bridge existing differencesacross the inter-agency process. The net result wasthat senior U.S. officials pro-actively increasinglyreached out to think tanks and brought them intonormally closed interagency deliberations.

Third, some think tanks were able to capitalize onthese opportunities because they brought someunique strengths and assets to the table. In the early1990s RAND had one of the strongest teams ofEuropean security experts outside of the U.S.government. In addition to a close workingrelationship with different parts of the U.S.government, it also had excellent contacts in Westernand Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russia.Along with the National Defense University and TheAtlantic Council, it had been among the first thinktanks on the ground in the new democracies ofCentral and Eastern Europe. Indeed, both theGerman as well as Central and East Europeangovernments had turned to these institutes to provideanalytical support in developing new polices. Thisgave them access to and insights into the thinking inWashington and in both halves of Europe that fewoutsiders enjoyed.

But access alone was not enough. In an age wherethe work and analysis of some think tanks areincreasingly partisan and political, it is important tounderscore that institutions like RAND weresuccessful precisely because they went that extra mileto remain analytical and objective. They were able toprovide busy and overworked senior policy-makerswhat they often needed most — a framework and away of thinking through a problem as well as a set ofoptions complete with their pros and cons. In

Washington, alternative policy views are a dime adozen. But those pieces of research that help providea new analytic framework are few and far between.

For example, the most successful analytical workRAND produced during the NATO enlargementdebate was not the op-eds or other advocacy piecesindividuals wrote. Rather, it was a series ofanalytical briefings that explored alternativerationales for enlarging the Alliance, the practicalissues of how it could be done, the costs thereof, andthe implications for Russia and other countries notinvited. As an institution, RAND never took anofficial stance pro or con on NATO enlargement. Itsaw its role first and foremost as assisting policy-makers in understanding the issues, options, andtradeoffs — and letting them make better-informeddecisions of their own.

This did not mean that individual analysts did nothave strong views. They often did. I was among theearliest and most outspoken advocates ofenlargement. But many of my RAND colleagueswere on the other side of the issue. Indeed, at timeswe ended up testifying on opposite sides beforeCongress. Internal RAND seminars or Boardmeetings at the time were as contentious andwitnessed debates as passionate as any inter-agencymeeting. But it was RAND’s ability to frame theissues and to elucidate the trade-offs that earned it themost praise from policy-makers. Perhaps the greatestcompliment I received came from a senior DODofficial strongly opposed to NATO enlargement whopraised a briefing my colleagues and I had done asthe best piece of analysis he had seen that helped himunderstand the linkages and trade-offs of the issues— even though the two of us came to completelydifferent conclusions as to what U.S. policy at thetime should be.

As a result, a number of think tanks became, for aperiod of time, an informal but nonetheless real partof an extended inter-agency process and debatewithin the U.S. government on NATO’s future. Theirbriefings and memos became an integral part of theintellectual and policy debate. Think tank analystsworked closely with, and were often invited in tobrief, senior officials. They were often asked to crossthe Atlantic and test-market ideas and policy options

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with West European allies or Central Europeanpartners in order to provide feedback before finaldecisions in Washington were made.

By the mid 1990s the role of think tanks in the NATOenlargement debate was changing. The debateswithin the U.S. government were increasinglyresolved but the broader public debate over NATOenlargement was just starting. As the enlargementissue become the focal point of an increasinglypassionate debate, other think tanks stepped in tohelp provide a forum for broader public discussion.The Council on Foreign Relations, the BrookingsInstitution, and the “New Atlantic Initiative” of theAmerican Enterprise Institute all stepped forward tocreate study groups and other outlets for publicdiscourse and debate. Rarely has an issue been thesubject of more attention and public policy debate asNATO enlargement was in the mid- and late 1990s.

The role of think tanks changed to reflect these newrealities. They remained crucial in terms of the broaderdebate and public understanding and support for newpolicies. But they were no longer playing a quasi-insider’s role or acting as a key driver in that process.Nonetheless, many key officials from the early andmid-1990s — such as Secretary of State WarrenChristopher, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott,and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations RichardHolbrooke — have all testified to the important rolethat outside think tanks played in helping themdevelop their own thinking on these issues.

Looking back today, what can one learn from thisperiod and the crucial role that think tanks played inhelping to develop U.S. and NATO policy? To whatdegree was the impact of think tanks the result of aunique phase of history where senior policy-makerswere seeking outside support to come to terms withrevolutionary change, coupled with entrepreneurialskills of several think tanks? Or does this experienceteach us something more enduring about policy-making in the modern age?

The simple fact is that in today’s globalizing world,the pace of diplomacy is accelerating while theinternal ability of governments to think long-term

and conceptually continues to decrease. This trend isfurther exacerbated by the long-term under-fundingof the State Department. In practical terms, this hasmeant that whatever resources exist on paper forlonger-term strategic planning are often de factopressed into service to simply manage the day-to-dayoperational workload. Often there is little if any timeleft over for other tasks.

As a political appointee coming to government fromthe think tank world, I was surprised to discover howthe need to manage day-to-day operational needsoften crowded out efforts to devote more energy tolonger-term intellectual thinking. Moreover, policyand planning staffs or cells are less and less able toplay the role initially envisaged for them. The dayswhen a veteran diplomat like George Kennan couldspend weeks on a paper that would then besystematically discussed and perhaps set U.S. policyare few and far between.

This suggests that the demand from withingovernment for creative thinking from the outside islikely to continue and may even increase. To be sure,the early 1990s in Europe were an extraordinaryphase where revolutionary changes called so manyprevious assumptions into question. But in the futurethere will be other issues or parts of the world wheremajor changes on the ground are likely to renderexisting policies obsolete. As long as governmentssuffer from a limited internal capacity to do long-term strategic planning, they will continue to reachout to the think tank world for research and ideasthey can tap into and exploit.

Whether future think tanks will be able to step in tofill that need is a separate question. On the one hand,many think tanks have gotten smarter. And themarket is increasingly competitive. As competitionamong think tanks over influencing official policygrows, it has bred a new generation of entrepreneurialanalysts who assiduously cultivate their governmentcontacts to obtain unique access. But getting in thedoor is only half the battle. At the end of the day thekey to success is the quality of one’s work, the abilityto address the needs of senior policy-makers, and thepackaging of practical policy recommendations. _

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Since before former President Ronald Reagan’sMarch 1983 speech creating the StrategicDefense Initiative (SDI) program, missile

defense has been among the top issues of concern toThe Heritage Foundation. The Foundation-sponsoredHigh Frontier study, which advocated the deploymentof an effective ballistic missile defense system, waspublished in 1982. Since then the HeritageFoundation, as a Washington-based, non-partisanpublic policy research organization or “think tank,”has been working to educate policy-makers about theneed to deploy such a system.

Today, the United States has withdrawn from the1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, whichbarred the deployment of an effective missile defensesystem, and the Bush administration is pursuing amissile defense program to field an effective systemas soon as possible. These welcome developmentsdid not come about by accident. Numerous groupsand individuals, both inside the U.S. government andout, played important parts in changing U.S. policyregarding missile defense.

The Heritage Foundation’s educational effortemployed a variety of means to influence the policyprocess in Washington regarding missile defense.The primary means was to publish succinct paperscalled Backgrounders and Executive Memoranda onnarrow topics related to missile defense wheneverCongress or the executive branch faced importantpolicy decisions. The papers were designed to meet

the needs of the busy policy-maker who needed to getup to speed quickly on the issue. Other means ofinfluence included providing public and privatebriefings for members of Congress and their staffs,submitting testimony for congressional hearings,giving briefings to the media, and sponsoring avariety of lectures and seminars on the topic ofballistic missile defense.

Two examples best demonstrate where The HeritageFoundation has influenced the debate in the U.S.government over the question of missile defense inrecent years. The first example pertains to the ABMTreaty, while the second relates to an option fordeploying missile defense systems on ships at sea.

BLOCKING THE CLINTONADMINISTRATION’S POLICY FORPRESERVING THE ABM TREATY

Analysts at The Heritage Foundation had believed for a long time that the ABM Treaty posed aninsurmountable obstacle to the deployment of aneffective missile defense system. By early 1995, thesesame analysts concluded that the best option was toseek the removal of the treaty, as opposed to seekingincremental changes in it. The Clinton administration,being at best skeptical about the wisdom of fieldingmissile defenses, sought to preserve the accord. Oneof the reasons Heritage analysts in 1995 opted forseeking to overturn the treaty stemmed from theClinton administration’s failure, by that time, to

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION: INFLUENCING THE DEBATE ON MISSILE DEFENSE

By Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy

The Heritage Foundation

The Heritage Foundation has employed a variety of means over the past two decades toinfluence the policy process in Washington on the issue of missile defense, says BakerSpring, the Foundation’s F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy. Heexamines developments regarding the demise of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty andpursuit of a sea-based missile defense deployment system to show how the Foundation wasable to influence policy decision-making.

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resolve the issue of which states would succeed theformer Soviet Union as parties.

Both opponents and proponents of the ABM Treatyrecognized that the resolution of the succession issuewould be necessary to the preservation of the treatyas a legally binding accord. The Clinton administrationhad assumed that it could resolve the issue absent theU.S. Constitution’s requirement for Senate advice andconsent in the making of treaties. It was prepared toargue that the resolution of the succession questionrequired no substantive change to the treaty. HeritageFoundation analysts disagreed. Starting in 1996, theyworked to convince important senators that replacingthe Soviet Union as the opposite party to the ABMTreaty would necessitate substantive changes in thetreaty, and therefore any agreement resolving thesuccession question required Senate consent.1 Senateconsent to the ratification of treaties requires a two-thirds majority under the U.S. Constitution.

As then-chairman of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolinacame to play a key role in this issue. Senator Helms andhis committee staff agreed with the findings of Heritageanalysts. In 1997, Senator Helms acted. Duringconsideration of another treaty regarding conventionalmilitary forces in Europe, he successfully attached acondition that required President Clinton to certifythat he would submit any agreement resolving ABMTreaty succession to the Senate. President Clintonmade the required certification on May 15, 1997.

From that point forward, the Clinton administration’seffort to preserve the ABM Treaty stalled. While anagreement designating Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,and Ukraine as ABM Treaty successors was signedon September 26, 1997, the Clinton administrationwas unable to gain Senate approval and it neverentered into force. If the Clinton administration hadbeen successful in its policy of preserving the ABMTreaty, it is unlikely that President Bush, as apractical matter, would have been able to order theU.S. withdrawal from the treaty in June, 2002. Thisis because such a recent agreement, as a legallybinding commitment to the four successor states tocontinue U.S. observance of the ABM Treaty, wouldhave proven too disruptive to undo.

PURSUING THE SEA-BASED OPTION FORMISSILE DEFENSE

In addition to its interest in the arms control aspectsof the missile defense issue, The Heritage Foundationhas sought to educate policy-makers about thetechnological options for fielding an effective missiledefense system. Its interest in the technologicaloptions led Heritage to form its Commission onMissile Defense in 1995. The Commission, chairedby the former director of the SDI programAmbassador Henry Cooper, consisted of some of thenation’s ablest minds on the technological options formissile defense. The Heritage Foundation publishedthe first of what would be several editions of theCommission’s report later the same year.2

The Commission recommended the deployment ofmissile defense interceptors on the U.S. Navy’sexisting Aegis-class cruisers as the best near-termoption for missile defense. Specifically, itrecommended upgrading the technology that wasalready being pursued through what was then calledthe Navy Upper Tier program. The Commissiondetermined that this option could deploy 650interceptors on 22 ships in five to six years forbetween $2 billion and $3 billion. The proposal alsoenvisioned the interceptors having access to targetinginformation provided by what was then called the“Brilliant Eyes” sensor satellite constellation.

Congress proved to be a receptive audience for theCommission on Missile Defense. The Fiscal Year1996 Defense Authorization Act, an earlier version ofwhich President Clinton had vetoed, increasedfunding for the Upper Tier program from a Clintonadministration request of a little more than $30million to over $200 million. President Clinton’saction to veto an earlier version of this DefenseAuthorization Act was prompted in part by hisopposition to ballistic missile defense.

While the Clinton administration was forced toaccept higher funding figures for the Navy UpperTier development program, it refused to manage theprogram in a way consistent with the recommendationsof The Heritage Foundation’s Commission on MissileDefense. It did so because it viewed the Heritageapproach as incompatible with its policy of

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preserving the ABM Treaty. Specifically, the Clintonadministration did not want to allow the system tohave access to satellite and other sensor data thatwould give it the ability to counter long-rangeballistic missiles. The Clinton administration provedwilling to fund the program, but only if thetechnology was “dumbed down.”

Congress, nevertheless, kept pressing the Clintonadministration on the potential of a sea-based optionfor ballistic missile defense. The National DefenseAuthorization Act for fiscal 1998 included arequirement for the Clinton administration to reportto Congress on whether the Navy’s Upper Tier systemcould be upgraded to provide a limited defenseagainst long-range ballistic missiles. The Pentagon’sBallistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)produced the report and a summary of its findingswas released on June 1, 1999. The BMDO’s reportreferenced a later edition of the report by TheHeritage Foundation’s Commission on MissileDefense.3 More importantly, the BMDO reportconfirmed the Heritage findings that an upgradedversion of what was by then called the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) system would be capable ofintercepting long-range missiles.

While the Clinton administration continued to dragits feet regarding development of the NTW system,progress was made. Today, the Bush administrationcalls the NTW program the Sea-Based Mid-courseprogram. Twice this year a prototype of theinterceptor has destroyed target ballistic missiles inflight tests. The first flight test occurred in January2002, while the second took place in June. Thesuccessful intercept tests have served to bolster therecommendation first made in 1995 by The Heritage

Foundation’s Commission on Missile Defensefavoring the option of basing missile defenseinterceptors at sea.

CONCLUSION

The Heritage Foundation’s role in shaping publicpolicy, as with other think tanks in the United States,is to educate members of Congress and other policy-makers regarding specific issues. The Foundation isneither a lobby nor a political entity. Its influence isderived from the quality of its proposals for solvingpublic policy problems.

In the area of national security, the problem wasaddressing the vulnerability of both the United Statesand its allies to the increasing threat posed by theproliferation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missiletechnology. The Heritage Foundation’s proposedsolutions to these problems were to withdraw fromthe ABM Treaty and deploy an effective globalmissile defense system, starting with sea-basedinterceptors. U.S. policy-makers have accepted thefirst proposal and are moving in the direction ofaccepting the second. These actions are the directresult of the strength of the proposals themselves andthe educational effort by their originators. _

1. Baker Spring, “The Senate Should Block the White House’s End Run onABM Treaty,” Heritage Backgrounder No. 1106, March 11, 1996.

2. The Heritage Foundation’s Commission on Missile Defense, DefendingAmerica: A Near- and Long-Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1995).

3. The Heritage Foundation’s Commission on Missile Defense, DefendingAmerica: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat (Washington, D.C.:The Heritage Foundation, 1999).

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When invited earlier this year to conduct aseminar with Honduran national opinionleaders on “how to establish a strategic

think tank,” I considered a series of issues about howto guide a country through this process. Whileexperts on think tanks have examined a wide range ofissues, including the history of these institutions andwhy they were founded, few, if any, have outlinedpractical guidelines for those interested inestablishing such an institution. Furthermore, thewhole concept of a “think tank” in the Hondurancontext needed to be examined. As a former staffmember and current adjunct fellow of the AmericasProgram at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies in Washington, I am familiar with the innerworkings of a U.S.-style think tank operating as anindependent, non-profit organization that producesresearch and analysis with the goal of shaping publicpolicy. However this was not necessarily a relevantmodel for Honduras, given the financial limitationsand lack of tradition for such institutions in thatcountry. The approach that I ultimately selectedaddressed the following four key questions:

• Where would the leadership for such anestablishment come from and who would itsconstituents be?

• What are the characteristics of think tanks, theirrole and function, and why do they emerge?

• What is the general context of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) in Latin America in whichthese kinds of institutions exist, and specifically,are there any institutions in Honduras now thathave characteristics similar to those of a think tank?

• What kinds of resources are available for publicpolicy institutions?

Finally, the heart of the workshop, which wassponsored by the U.S. Embassy in Honduras, focusedon a “visioning” exercise to identify policy issues and gaps in the Honduran context that could providean impetus for the creation of a public policy research effort.

The purpose of organizing a workshop on think tanksin Honduras was two-fold: first, there was aperceived need for a national institution thatproduced high-quality research on national andinternational issues, particularly ones related toforeign policy. No single institution stood out as anautonomous leader in this area. Second, there was noinstitution that could provide a ready pool ofrecognized experts on national and internationalissues upon which national opinion leaders, thegovernment, Congress, the foreign diplomatic corps,and others could draw for policy analysis, data,speakers, and other products and services that a thinktank typically provides. What followed out of these

A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON ESTABLISHING A THINK TANK:THE CASE OF HONDURAS

By Amy Coughenour BetancourtAdjunct Fellow of the Americas Program

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Think tanks can be created from watershed events in a nation’s history or spawned by urgentnational issues that drive the search for better policy solutions, and, in many cases, they are“the brainchild” of an individual or a small group of visionaries, says Amy CoughenourBetancourt, Adjunct Fellow of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. In Honduras, she says, the notion was to plant the seed with a broadrange of national opinion leaders taking part in a workshop and to allow natural leadershipto emerge.

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identified needs was an interesting “brainstorming”session about what role public policy institutionsserve in political life, how and why they develop,how national policy issues are identified andprioritized, and, ultimately, how to identify theleadership to implement the establishment of such aninstitution in a developing country.

LEADERSHIP AND CONSTITUENTS

Identifying the players in a national discussion aboutestablishing a new national think tank — oralternatively, strengthening existing public policyorganizations — is a challenging task because it canpredetermine the views and issues brought to thefore. In the case of Honduras, the diplomaticacademy of the Honduran Ministry of ForeignRelations took the lead in identifying key institutionsand participants to include in the planning session.Groups represented included government officials,defense college officials, the media, NGOs,international consulting firms, business and tradegroups, the legal research center of the university, andthe Congressional Research Center. Other potentiallyimportant players who were not at the workshop, butwho could be valuable in such an effort, includestronger representation from the National Universityand other academic institutions, congressionalmembers or staff, a broader range of civil societyorganizations, state government officials, mayors orother local government representatives, andindividuals with particular expertise or scholarship inpublic policy.

Not only do these groups have a stake in publicpolicy research, but they also could potentiallyprovide some of the required intellectual leadership,financial support, or organizational components forfuture endeavors.

The dilemma is that, ideally, a broad range ofviewpoints should be included in a national dialogueon the establishment of an institution intended tohave national impact, but historically, think tanks areoften formed by persons or groups with a particularagenda, set of goals, or policy imperative. They arerarely formed by a disparate group of institutions orindividuals with varying missions and functionscoming together by consensus.

Think tanks are often formed out of watershed eventsin a nation’s history or urgent national policy issuesthat drive the search for better policy solutions, andthey are often the brainchild of one person’s vision ora small group of visionaries. For example, theCouncil on Foreign Relations, one of the oldestpublic policy institutions in the United States, wasoriginally founded in 1921 by businessmen, bankers,and lawyers determined to keep the United Statesengaged in the world. This followed in the wake ofWorld War I when many U.S. policy voices werepromoting a more insular view of American policy.And in the early 1980s, several conservative thinktanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, were formedout of an ideological break with the legacy of then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.1

In Honduras, however, the idea was to plant the seedwith a range of groups and allow natural leadershipto emerge.

ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THINK TANKS

Once the players were at the table in Tegucigalpa, thefirst goal was to develop a common understanding of“think tanks,” or public policy research centers, andto examine typical functions, roles, and activities ofsuch organizations. Questions about the mission,focus, autonomy, size, budget, ideology, and othercharacteristics were posed and discussed using asampling of U.S. think tanks as a backdrop for smallgroup analysis and discussion, and later drawingupon a sampling of Latin American institutions. TheU.S. institutions included CSIS, the Center forInternational Policy, the Brookings Institution, theHeritage Foundation, and the Council on ForeignRelations. Latin American institutions includedgroups like El Colegio de Mexico, SalvadoranFoundation for Economic and Social Development(FUSADES), Center for the Study of the State andSociety (CEDES) in Argentina, Institute for Libertyand Democracy (ILD) in Peru, and the Getulio VargasFoundation in Brazil.

Within the context of the role and function of thinktanks, the group also discussed the reasons that thinktanks emerge — an important element inunderstanding the political, social, cultural, andeconomic catalysts for creating such institutions.Comparative studies on think tanks by leading

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experts in the field facilitated discussion by providingsome practical input on the proliferation of publicpolicy research institutions worldwide. The studiesalso provided valuable insights for understandinghow a country’s political structures and policyinteractions translate into unique public policyresearch institutions.2

THE “THIRD SECTOR” AND THINK TANKSIN LATIN AMERICA

One of the critical steps in the workshop was to viewthe emergence of public policy research centerswithin the context of the explosion of NGOs andother civil society groups in Latin America over thelast several decades. As many scholars haveobserved, these burgeoning “third sector” groups —which are neither a part of the public sector (thestate) nor the private, for-profit sector (the market) —have emerged from the increasingly blurring nexus ofgovernment, markets, and civil society. A growingbody of literature on civil society, democracy, andchanging power structures has begun to clarify thevarying types of civil society organizations, theirrelationship to both the state and the markets, and theincreasing power they wield in major societal debatesin Latin America as in other parts of the world.3

A subset of NGOs are institutions devoted to policydebate, public policy research and impact, and, insome cases, advocacy for affecting social change. InLatin America, these institutions — for example,Center of Research for Development (CIDAC) andthe Center for Economic Research and Teaching(CIDE) in Mexico, the Center for Public Studies(CEP) in Chile, and the Institute of Peruvian Studies(IEP) in Peru — not only exist, they have beenproliferating rapidly over several decades, and insome cases, are thriving. Yet, with a few notableexceptions, they are little understood in terms of thescarce research dedicated to them. While not as largeand well known as those in the United States andother countries, many Latin American public policyinstitutes have been successful in attracting topintellectual and research talent and in playingimportant roles in shaping national policy debates.4

THE HONDURAN CONTEXT

The workshop participants then turned to the historyand current state of public policy institutions insideHonduras. How Honduran institutions werecategorized in terms of whether or not they areengaged in independent, non-partisan public policyresearch activities was driven partly by theircomparison to the U.S. think tank model. Most didnot fit the U.S. model, but upon closer inspection,Honduras had an interesting history of think tank-likefunctions being performed by a number ofinstitutions. Mapping these institutions, how theyemerged, their funding sources, and the types ofactivities they undertook was key to determining anyfuture steps toward strengthening public policyinstitutions and activities.5

Most of these organizations have produced national-level research on particular issues, and have heldpolicy fora and other events. However, none of theseinstitutions — for various reasons, including lack ofautonomy, limited funding, a business sector focus,and a failure to have policy impact — would likely beconsidered a “classical” think tank. Yet, each hadvaluable expertise to contribute on a wide variety ofrelevant policy questions, and many had creativelybuilt research and policy activities into their portfolioswhen funding was available for such pursuits.

RESOURCES AND FUNDING

The question of funding is the determining factor inany discussion of institution-building. A broad rangeof funding mechanisms was discussed at thisworkshop, including foreign development funds,foundations, private sector contributions, state funds,tuition from graduate education, membership,contract research, sale of publications and services,and conference fees. Particularly evident in LatinAmerican institutions is the need to diversify funding sources and avoid over-dependence on anyone source. When the single source — in manycases, foreign aid funding — dries up or a donor’spriorities change, institutions are left with little or nofunding, and are therefore severely weakened, oftencausing them to close their doors or severely cut their budgets.

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FINDINGS

The heart of the workshop was the participants’“visioning” process to identify specific policy issuesimportant to Hondurans, uncover policy gaps, andpoint to opportunities to shape policy and impact anagenda for change. They thought through therequisite policy issues and the relevant players, aswell as the role that a think tank could play in theHonduran context.

Although the participants expressed very positivefeelings about the outcomes of the workshop, itremains to be seen how Honduras will ultimately farein strengthening the quality and impact of its publicpolicy research. Consensus was achieved regardingthe key priority policy issues for Honduras as well aswhere opportunities exist to influence these policies.6

The group also agreed to form a steering committeeto meet and develop a concept paper, fundingstrategy, and an action plan.

To date, two meetings have taken place under theleadership of the Foreign Ministry’s diplomaticacademy. But plans to create a “center fordocumentation and research” within the academy —however useful for the professionalization of theHonduran Foreign Service — will not ultimatelyserve the need for an autonomous, non-partisan,credible, policy-focused institution to strengthen

public policy debate in the country. The impetus foran independent think tank in Honduras — or inalmost any country — that is not directly tied tobusiness, government, the military, or other specialinterests, will ultimately be determined by theperceived urgency for reform, strong value placed onindependent thinking in public policy debate, and agroup of leaders and benefactors with a vision forshaping the future of the country through solid policy solutions. _

1. Smith, James. 1991. Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the NewPolicy Elite. New York: Free Press.

2. See Stone, Diane, Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, eds. 1998. ThinkTanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach. Manchester and NewYork: Manchester University Press.

3. See Meyer, Carrie. 1999. The Economics and Politics of NGOs in LatinAmerica. Westport: Praeger.

4. For an excellent survey of Latin American public policy centers, seeLevy, Daniel, 1996. Building the Third Sector: Latin America’s PrivateResearch Centers and Nonprofit Development. Pittsburgh: University ofPittsburgh Press.

5. Several group members shared their knowledge of these institutions,which included the Foundation for Investment and Development ofExports (FIDE); the National Defense College; Institute for JuridicalResearch at the National Autonomous University; Honduran Council forPrivate Enterprise (COHEP); and Citizens’ Forum (Foro Ciudadano), toname a few. Thanks to John Sanbrailo, Executive Director of the PanAmerican Development Foundation, for his insights on Honduran publicpolicy institutions.

6. Security and corruption were the top two policy issues, followed bypoverty alleviation, sustainable development, education, and theeconomy.

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“Think tanks provide a steady stream of experts toserve in incoming administrations and oncongressional staffs,” a function that is “critical inthe American political system,” says StateDepartment Director of Policy and PlanningRichard Haass. In addition, he says, “think tanksprovide departing officials with institutional settingsin which they can share insights gleaned fromgovernment service” and “remain engaged inpressing foreign policy debates.”

Following is a list of some prominent Americanswho have served both in government and in thinktanks:

James Baker: Honorary Chairman of the James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy at RiceUniversity in Texas

Formerly: Secretary of State for the first BushAdministration (1989-1992), Secretary of theTreasury and Chairman of the President’s EconomicPolicy Council (1985-1988).

C. Fred Bergsten: Director of the Institute forInternational Economics

Formerly: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace (1981), Assistant Secretary of the Treasury forInternational Affairs (1977-1981), Senior Fellow atThe Brookings Institution (1972-1976), SeniorDirector for International Economic Affairs at theNational Security Council (1969-1971), the Councilon Foreign Relations (1967-1968).

John Bolton: Under Secretary of State for ArmsControl and International SecurityFormerly : Vice President of the American EnterpriseInstitute, and Assistant Secretary of State forInternational Organization Affairs (1989-1993).

Zbigniew Brzezinski: Counselor for the Center forStrategic and International Studies

Formerly : President Carter’s National SecurityAdviser (1977-1981).

Paula Dobriansky: Undersecretary of State forGlobal Affairs

Formerly : Senior Vice President and Director of theCouncil on Foreign Relations Washington office,Associate Director of Policy and Programs at the U.S.Information Agency, Director of European and SovietAffairs at the National Security Council.

Lee Feinstein: Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policyand International Law at the Council on ForeignRelations

Formerly : Principal Deputy Director of the StateDepartment Policy Planning Staff in the ClintonAdministration.

Leslie Gelb: President of the Council on ForeignRelations

Formerly : Senior Associate of the CarnegieEndowment (1980-1981), Assistant Secretary of Statefor Political-Military Affairs (1977-1979), SeniorFellow at Brookings (1969-1973), Director of Policyand Planning at the State Department (1967-1969).

Morton H. Halperin: Senior Fellow and Director ofU.S. Foreign Policy and of the Center for Democracyand Free Markets at the Council on Foreign Relations

Formerly : Director of the State Department’s PolicyPlanning Staff (1998-2001), Senior Vice President ofthe Century Foundation/Twentieth Century Fund(1997-1998), Special Assistant to the President andSenior Director for Democracy at the NationalSecurity Council (1994-1996), Senior Associate atthe Carnegie Endowment (1992-1994), Senior Fellowat Brookings (1969-1973), Deputy AssistantSecretary of Defense for International SecurityAffairs (1967-1969).

_ F A C T S H E E T S

THE REVOLVING DOOR

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Richard Holbrooke: Counselor at the Council onForeign Relations

Formerly : Assistant Secretary of State for Europe(1994-1996), President Clinton’s Special Envoy toBosnia and Kosovo, President Carter’s AssistantSecretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs(1977-1981), Managing Editor of the CarnegieEndowment’s quarterly journal “Foreign Policy”(1972-1976).

Kim Holmes: Assistant Secretary of State-designatefor International Organization AffairsFormerly : Vice President of The HeritageFoundation, Senior Fellow at the Fletcher School’sInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Martin Indyk: Director of the BrookingsInstitution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Formerly : Assistant Secretary of State for Near EastAffairs (1997-2000).

James Kelly: Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs

Formerly : President of the Pacific Forum of theCenter for Strategic and International Studies inHonolulu, President Reagan’s Special Assistant forNational Security Affairs and Senior Director forAsian Affairs at the National Security Council (1986-1989), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternational Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific).

Zalmay Khalilzad: President Bush’s Special Envoyon Afghanistan and Special Assistant for SouthwestAsia, Near East and North Africa for the NationalSecurity Council

Formerly : Director of the Strategy, Doctrine andForce Structure program for RAND’s Project AirForce (1993-1999); Assistant Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy and Planning (1991-1992), SeniorPolitical Scientist at RAND (1991-1992), SpecialAdvisor to the Under Secretary of State for PoliticalAffairs on the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet war inAfghanistan (1985-1989).

Henry Kissinger: Secretary of State (1973-1977)and Assistant to the President for National SecurityAffairs in the Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969-1975), Study Director for the Council on ForeignRelations’ Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policyprogram (1955-1956).

Lawerence Korb: Senior Fellow and Director ofNational Security Studies at the Council on ForeignRelations

Formerly : Assistant Secretary of Defense (1981-1985).

Jessica Matthews: President of the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace

Formerly : Senior Fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations and Director of the CFR’s Washingtonprogram (1993-1997), Deputy Under Secretary ofState for Global Affairs (1993), founding VicePresident and Director of Research at the WorldResources Institute (1982-1993), and Director of theOffice of Global Issues for the National SecurityCouncil (1977-1979).

Richard Perle: Resident Fellow at the AmericanEnterprise Institute, Chairman of the DefenseDepartment’s Defense Policy Board

Formerly : Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternational Security Policy (1981-1987).

Peter Rodman: Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternational Security Affairs

Formerly : Director of National Security Programs atthe Nixon Center (1995-2001), Special Assistant tothe President for National Security Affairs andNational Security Council Counselor (1987-1990),Director of the State Department’s Policy PlanningStaff (1984-1986).

George Shultz: Thomas W. and Susan B. FordDistinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution

Formerly : Secretary of State in the ReaganAdministration (1982-1989), Chairman of PresidentReagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (1981-1982), Secretary of the Treasury (1972-1974), NixonAdministration’s Secretary of Labor (1969-1970).

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Richard Solomon: President of the U.S. Institute ofPeace

Formerly : Assistant Secretary of State for East Asianand Pacific Affairs (1989-1992); Director of Policyand Planning at the State Department (1986-1989);senior staffer on the National Security Council(1971-1976).

Helmut Sonnenfeldt: Director of the AtlanticCouncil of the United States and guest scholar atBrookings

Formerly : Counselor at the State Department (1974-1977), Nixon Administration’s National SecurityCouncil senior staffer (1969-1974).

Gene Sperling: Senior Fellow for Economic Policyand Director of the Center on Universal Education atthe Council on Foreign Relations

Formerly : President Clinton’s National EconomicAdviser and head of the National Economic Council(1996-2000)

James Steinberg: Vice President and Director ofForeign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

Formerly : Clinton Administration Deputy NationalSecurity Adviser (1996-2000), Director of Policy andPlanning at the State Department (1994-1996), asenior analyst at RAND (1989-1993).

Strobe Talbott: President of The BrookingsInstitution

Formerly : Deputy Secretary of State in the ClintonAdministration (1994-2001), Special Assistant to thePresident and Senior Director for Near East andSouth Asian Affairs on the National Security Council(1993-1995). _

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The approximately 1,500 think tanks in the UnitedStates “engage in a range of policy-relatedactivities, and comprise a diverse set of institutionsthat have varied organizational forms,” says JamesG. McGann of the Foreign Policy ResearchInstitute.

The following fact sheet profiles nine U.S. thinktanks, selected to show a representative range ofviews, with budgets ranging from $3 million tonearly $30 million, and staff sizes that range from35 to about 200.

American Enterprise Institute(http://www.aei.org)

Mission: The American Enterprise Institute forPublic Policy Research, founded in 1943, is dedicatedto preserving and strengthening the foundations offreedom — limited government, private enterprise,vital cultural and political institutions, and a strongforeign policy and national defense — throughscholarly research, open debate, and publications.AEI is strictly nonpartisan and takes no institutionalpositions on pending legislation or other policyquestions.

Structure : A 24 member Board of Trustees,composed of leading business and financialexecutives, governs the Institute, and its researchagenda and appointments are reviewed by a Councilof Academic Advisers, a group of distinguishedoutside scholars. President Christopher C. DeMuthguides the Institute’s daily operations. The Institutehas about 50 resident scholars and fellows, andmaintains a network of more than 100 adjunctscholars at American universities and policyinstitutes.

Funding: AEI is an independent, non-profitorganization supported primarily by grants andcontributions from foundations, corporations, andindividuals. It’s budget in 2000 was $17 million.

The Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace(http://www.ceip.org)

Mission : The Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace (CEIP), founded in 1910, is a private, non-profit organization dedicated to advancingcooperation between nations and promoting activeinternational engagement by the United States.Through research, publishing, convening, and, onoccasion, creating new institutions and internationalnetworks, the Endowment’s associates shape freshpolicy approaches.

Structure: The Board of Trustees, composed of 23leaders of American business and public life, governsthe Endowment and directs its research initiatives.President Jessica T. Matthews oversees theEndowment’s daily operations. The WashingtonOffice supports a staff of 100, and nearly 40 Russianscholars work at the CEIP office in Moscow.

Funding : The Endowment has an annual budget of$18.3 million. Most of its funding comes fromcontributions, rental income, and publications,including “Foreign Policy,” one of the world’s leadingmagazines of international politics and economics.

The CATO Institute(http://www.cato.org)

Mission : The Cato Institute, founded in 1977 as anon-profit public policy research foundation, seeks tobroaden the parameters of public policy debate toallow consideration of the traditional Americanprinciples of limited government, individual liberty,free markets, and peace. Toward that goal, theInstitute strives to achieve greater involvement of thepublic in questions of policy and the proper role ofgovernment.

Structure : A Board of Directors, composed of 15business professionals, governs the Institute, whichhas approximately 90 full-time employees, 60 adjunctscholars, and 16 fellows, plus interns. President

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THINK TANKS IN BRIEF

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and founder Edward H. Crane oversees the Institute’sdaily operations.

Funding : In order to maintain its independence, theCato Institute, which is a $15 million a yearoperation, accepts no government funding orendowments. Contributors include individuals,corporations and foundations. Other revenue isgenerated from the sale of publications andconference fees.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies(http://cns.miis.edu/)

Mission : The Center for Nonproliferation Studies(CNS), established in 1989 by its current director, Dr.William Potter, strives to combat the spread ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training thenext generation of non-proliferation specialists anddisseminating timely information and analysis. CNSat the Monterey Institute of International Studies isthe largest non-governmental organization in theUnited States devoted exclusively to research andtraining on non-proliferation issues.

Structure : CNS has a full-time staff of more than 65specialists and over 65 graduate student researchassistants located in offices in Monterey, California;Washington, D.C.; and Almaty, Kazakhstan. AnInternational Advisory Board — including U.S. andRussian legislators, former ambassadors, UnitedNations officials, non-proliferation experts, andcorporate executives — meets twice a year to reviewCNS programs and activities. In addition, the Centerhas convened the Monterey Nonproliferation StrategyGroup, an international panel of experts who meetperiodically to develop policy recommendations.

Funding : CNS, with an annual budget of $6.5million, is a non-profit educational institutionsupported by donations from individuals, foundationsand corporations. Three times a year, it publishes thejournal “The Nonproliferation Review.”

Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)

Mission : For four decades, the Center for Strategicand International Studies (CSIS) has been dedicated

to providing world leaders with strategic insights on— and policy solutions to — current and emergingglobal issues. CSIS helps to develop national andinternational public policy by generating strategicinsights, convening strategic networks, craftingpolicy solutions, and developing today’s andtomorrow’s leaders.

Structure : CSIS is led by President and ChiefExecutive Officer John J. Hamre, a former deputysecretary of defense, and is guided by a Board ofTrustees chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn andconsisting of prominent individuals from both thepublic and private sectors. CSIS employs 190researchers and support staff.

Funding: Contributions from corporations,foundations, and individuals constitute 85 percent ofthe revenues needed to meet CSIS’s budget, which in2001 was $17.5 million. The remaining funds comefrom endowment income, government contracts, andpublication sales.

The Council on Foreign Relations(http://www.cfr.org)

Mission : Founded in 1921, the Council on ForeignRelations is a non-partisan membership organization,research center, and publisher. It is dedicated toincreasing America’s understanding of the world andcontributing ideas to U.S. foreign policy. TheCouncil accomplishes this mainly by promotingconstructive debates and discussion, clarifying worldissues, and by publishing Foreign Affairs, the leadingjournal on global issues.

Structure : The Council is governed by a 31-memberBoard of Directors. Leslie H. Gelb is the ChiefExecutive officer and president. It has a staff ofapproximately 200, including about 75 fellows. Itsmembership (approximately 4,000, chosen by anomination process) is divided almost equally amongNew York, Washington, D.C., and the rest of thecountry.

Funding : The Council is an independent, tax exemptorganization financed by member dues and gifts,foundation and individual grants, corporatecontributions, and revenues from its own endowment.The total budget for its current fiscal year is $29.6million.

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The Heritage Foundation(http://www.heritage.org)

Mission : Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundationis a research and educational institute whose missionis to formulate and promote conservative publicpolicies based on the principles of free enterprise,limited government, individual freedom, traditionalAmerican values, and a strong national defense. TheFoundation produces research and generates solutionsconsistent with its beliefs that are marketed to theCongress, the Executive Branch, the news media andothers.

Structure : A 19-member Board of Trustees governsthe work of 185 Heritage employees, including some75 experts in a wide range of domestic and foreignpolicy issues. President Edwin J. Feulner overseesthe Foundation’s daily operations.

Funding : The Heritage Foundation, which has anannual budget of $28.4 million, is supported bycontributions from its members, includingcorporations and more than 200,000 individualsacross the United States.

Hudson Institute(http://www.hudson.org/)

Mission : The Hudson Institute, founded in 1961,produces independent, high-quality research andstrives to compete boldly in the debate of policyideas. Hudson works to counsel and guide policychange, applying its ideas whenever possiblealongside other leaders in communities, business,non-profit organizations and governments alike. Itsmission is to be America’s premier source of appliedresearch on enduring policy challenges.

Structure : In 1984, Hudson broadened its scope bysecuring a diverse, influential research staff. TheInstitute, which has a staff of 75, maintains its

headquarters in Indianapolis, Indiana, while alsooperating an office in Washington, D.C. and satelliteoffices across the United States. Institute PresidentHerbert I. London and two vice-presidents, one inIndianapolis and one in Washington, D.C., presideover the Institute, and its work is guided by a Boardof Trustees.

Funding : Hudson Institute, with an annual budget of$7 million, is a non-profit organization supportedprimarily by contributions from individuals,foundations and corporations.

New America Foundation(http://www.newamerica.net/)

Mission : The purpose of the New AmericaFoundation, founded in January 1999, is to elevatenew voices and ideas to the fore of the nation’s publicdiscourse. Relying on a venture capital approach, theFoundation invests in outstanding individuals andpolicy ideas that transcend the conventional politicalspectrum. New America sponsors a wide range ofresearch, published writing, conferences, and eventson the most important issues of the day.

Structure : The New America Foundation, which hasa staff of 35, is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit public policy institute that was conceivedthrough the collaborative work of a diverse andintergenerational group of public intellectuals, civicleaders, and business executive. New America’sBoard of Directors is chaired by James Fallows, andTed Halstead is the organization’s founding Presidentand CEO.

Funding : The New America Foundation, with anannual budget of $3 million, is supported primarilyby grants and contributions from foundations,corporations, and individuals, and by the sale of itspublications. _

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Abelson, Donald E. AMERICAN THINK-TANKSAND THEIR ROLE IN US FOREIGN POLICY. NewYork: St. Martin’s, 1996. 208p.

Abelson, Donald E. DO THINK TANKS MATTER?:ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICYINSTITUTES. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’sUniversity, 2002. 272p.

Allen, Mike. GLOBAL PEACE GETS A PUSH FROMNEW KROC INSTITUTE (San Diego BusinessJournal, vol. 22, no. 27, July 2, 2001, pp. 3-4)

Brown, Eugene; Snow, Donald M. PUZZLE PALACESAND FOGGY BOTTOM: U.S. FOREIGN ANDDEFENSE POLICY-MAKING IN THE 1990S. NewYork: St. Martin’s, 1994. 281p.

C-SPAN. WASHINGTON JOURNAL: SPECIAL ONTHINK TANKS. Washington: C-SPAN, August 12-15,2002.

Center for Defense Information. AMERICA’SDEFENSE MONITOR. Washington: Center forDefense Information, Weekly Television Program.

Congressional Quarterly. PUBLIC INTERESTPROFILES, 2001-2002. Washington: CongressionalQuarterly, 2000. 912p.

D’Agostino, Joseph A. CATO INSTITUTE (HumanEvents, vol. 58, no. 19, May 20, 2002, p. 14)

Deane, Claudia; Morin, Richard. THE IDEAS INDUSTRY(The Washington Post, Weekly Newspaper Column)

Delgado, Richard; Stefancic, Jean; Tushnet, Mark. NOMERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKSAND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA’SSOCIAL AGENDA. Philadelphia: Temple University,1996. 208p.

Garnett, Mark; Stone, Diane. THINK TANKS OF THEWORLD: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON IDEAS,POLICY AND GOVERNANCE. New York: St.Martin’s, 1998. 240p.

Higgott, Richard; Stone, Diane. THE LIMITS OFINFLUENCE: FOREIGN POLICY THINK TANKS INBRITAIN AND THE USA (Review of InternationalStudies, vol. 20, no. 1, January 1994, pp. 15-34)

Kitfield, James. CSIS EMBRACES OLD MISSIONWITH NEW FACES (National Journal, vol. 32, no. 37,September 9, 2000, pp. 2807-2808)

McGann, James G.; Weaver, R. Kent, eds. THINKTANKS AND CIVIL SOCIETIES: CATALYSTS FORIDEAS AND ACTION. New Brunswick, NJ:Transaction, 2002. 617p.

Newsom, David D. THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OFFOREIGN POLICY. Bloomington: Indiana University,1996. 287p.

Public Broadcasting Service. THINK TANK.Alexandria, VA: Public Broadcasting Service, WeeklyTelevision Program.

Ricci, David M. THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN POLITICS: THE NEW WASHINGTONAND THE RISE OF THINK TANKS. New Haven, CT:Yale University, 1994. 310p.

Rich, Andrew; Weaver, R. Kent. THINK TANKS INTHE U.S. MEDIA (The Harvard International Journalof Press/Politics, vol. 5, no. 4, Fall 2000, pp. 81-103)

Robin, Ron. THE MAKING OF THE COLD WARENEMY: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THEMILITARY-INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University, 2001. 256p.

Smith, James A. THE IDEA BROKERS: THINKTANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICYELITE. New York: Free Press, 1993. 356p. _

The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign PolicyBIBLIOGRAPHY

Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

_ A G U I D E T O A D D I T I O N A L R E A D I N G

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American Enterprise Institutehttp://www.aei.org/

Aspen Institutehttp://www.aspeninst.org/

Atlantic Council of the United States http://www.acus.org/

Brookings Institution: Foreign Policy Studies http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/fp/fp_hp.htm

Carnegie Endowment for International Peacehttp://www.ceip.org/

Cato Institute: Foreign Policyhttp://www.cato.org/foreignpolicy/index.html

Center for Strategic and International Studieshttp://www.csis.org/

Council on Foreign Relationshttp://www.cfr.org/

Foreign Policy Research Institutehttp://www.fpri.org/

Heritage Foundationhttp://www.heritage.org/

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace,Stanford University http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/

Hudson Institute http://www.hudson.org/

Institute for Defense Analyses http://www.ida.org/

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysishttp://www.ifpa.org/

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacyhttp://www.imtd.org/

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Universityhttp://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kennedy.shtml

National Defense Universityhttp://www.ndu.edu/

New America Foundationhttp://www.newamerica.net/

RAND: Foreign and Security Policyhttp://www.rand.org/interpol_area/forsec/

Stimson Center http://www.stimson.org/

U.S. Institute of Peacehttp://www.usip.org/

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholarshttp://wwics.si.edu/

Lehman Social Sciences Library, Columba Universityhttp://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/lehman/guides/ttanks.html

University of North Carolinahttp://www.ibiblio.org/ucis/Nonprofit.html _

The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign PolicyA SELECTION OF INTERNET SITES

There are approximately 1,500 think tanks in the United States. The list below, far from inclusive, is intended to give a representative sampling or cross section of think tanks that deal with U.S. foreign policy issues. For a more comprehensive view, use the last two Internet references or URL’s, which provide many more links to think tanks. Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

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NOVEMBER 2002

IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICYIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

THE ROLE OF THINK TANKSTHE ROLE OF THINK TANKS