Thompson, Perspectivism

Perspectivism: Aquinas and Nietzsehe on Intellectand Will

by WalterJ. Thompson

1.

I propose to examine here the riyal and often radically conflictingviews of Aquinas and Nietzsche on the role played by intellect and willin human activity.1 As the problem occupies so central a position in thethought of each----it is virtually the cornerstone of their respectiveanthropologies---I will not dweIl on justifying my choice of theme. Still,if the topic itself seems unproblematic, perhaps the larger comparativeproject does not. Some may doubt the very possibility of the sort ofencounter of rivals that I propose to facilitate. It might be objected, forexample, that the two riyal accounts are so radically conflicting as to beincommensurable, that the antagonists share no common language inwhich to articulate their problems in a mutually intelligible way, andtherefore, that genuine dialogue between them is impossible. If theiraccounts are indeed incommensurable, then Aquinas and Nietzschecannot be construed as speaking about, as offering riyal accounts of, thesame things. An encounter between such incommensurable views willprove impossible because there will be no commonly acceptable criteriaby which to adjudicate their conflict. Indeed, it will be impossible evento identify the problems at stake in a mutually acceptable way, sincewhat counts as a problem and why will itself vary across the riyal

1 The author wishes to thank Edward A. Goerner, Alasdair MacIntyre, JohnRoos, and Michael M. Waldstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft.Research on this paper was supported by the Earhart Foundation and theDepartment of Government and International Studies at the University ofNotre Dame.

Copyright 1995, Amencan Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4

452 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYviewpoints. If this incommensurability holds, how can the two thinkersbe brought into conversation?

To these objections, I offer two responses. First and most obviously,while common explanatory criteria may be unavailable in this case,there remains a deeper commonality to which we may appeal. For itseems an ineliminable mark of all accounts to intend to explain, to givea compelling account of the phenomena they consider. However diver-gent the riyal ways in which such an intention may be fulfilled, the deepintention to fulfill it remains common. It is this deep intention whichjustifies our grouping together divergent views as rivals, as contendersin a common enterprise. Despite the radical differences in their accountsof intellect and will, both Aquinas and Nietzsche purport to be offeringan explanation of certain fundamental features of human experience.However much their accounts finally diverge, they are united by thisdeep intention.

Second, as this study will attempt to show, it may be that theapparent incommensurability between the two accounts is surmount-able, if we can show that the incommensurability itself is unidirectional.If, that is, one of the two accounts can encompass its riyal, can providean account that both saves the successes and explains the failures of itsrival---successes and failures intelligible to the riyal in its own terms-then the problem of incommensurabilit~will be overcome from theperspective ofthe encompassing account. Such a conclusion, however,requires an argument, which I will now attempt. I will examine theviews of both Aquinas and Nietzsche on the relation of intellect and will,expounding each view in itself and then in confrontation with its riyal.Finally, I will attempt to adjudicate the conclusion ofthat confrontation.Let us begin with the view advanced by Aquinas.

2.

To avoid possible misunderstandings, we would do weIl to begin byexamining Aquinas' order and manner of treatment. Looking to theSumma Theologiae, 3 we notice that detailed analyses of intellect and

2 This framing of the problem owes much to Alasdair MacIntyre, 'TheRelationship of Philosophy to Its Past," in Philosophy in History: Essays on theHistoriography of Philosophy, Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and QuentinSkinner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 31-48.3 I shall confine my analysis to this text, for it provides in compact form the cruxof the Thomistic position. A complete account of Aquinas' teaching would needto consider the full range of his writings on the subject, especially De Malo andthe Quaestiones Disputate De Anima. My own research into these texts suggeststhat they serve in diverse ways to extend, but in no way to fundamentally alter,the analysis offered in the Summa Theologiae. For an analysis of these textswhich supports this view, see Mark D. Jordan, 'The Transcendentality ofGoodness and the Human Will," in Being and Goodness, Scott MacDonald, ed.

PERSPECTIVISM: AQUINAS AND NIETZSCHE 453

will occur in two contexts: first, in the prima pars, in the discussion ofthe creation and distinction ofthings, where Aquinas proceeds along thehierarchy ofbeing that issues from God to arrive at human beings, thereto treat intellect and will as powers which belong to the nature of suchbeings; second, in the prima secundae, in the discussion of those acts bywhich human beings come to the perfection of their nature, whereAquinas treats the role played by each ofthese powers in human action.Aquinas sets his treatment of human psychology, then, within a largeraccount of the nature of human being in particular, and of created beinggenerally. In this treatment, moreover, he employs explanatory princi-pIes which he takes to hold for being generally. Those most commonlyemployed in the account of intellect and will are the Aristotelian con-cepts of potency and act and of the "four causes.'~We will examine theuses of each principle as the occasion arises.

The type of account Aquinas gives-an explanatory account-shouldalso be differentiated from an introspective or phenomenological de-scription. For Aquinas, description can provide materials for the con-struction of an explanatory account, but description is not itselfexplanation. In his account of intellect and will, Aquinas rarely appealsto introspective evidence-Iargely, it would seem, because it has littleto offer in the way of explanation. He does not allow the human soulintuitive or introspective self-knowledge. Instead, he argues that thesoul comes to know its own nature in the same way that it comes to knowthe nature of other beings-by constructing an explanation that canaccount for the phenomena.5 In the case of the soul, the phenomena inquestion are the various actions which it engages. As a potency, the soulmust know itself as it knows all potencies, by reflection on the actsproper to it.6 Let us turn, then, to Aquinas' two treatments of intellectand will: first, in themselves, as powers of the rational soul within thestructure of human being considered statically; and second, in theirrelation within the dynamic structure of human action.

For Aquinas, intellect and will are powers or potencies proper to therational soul, the substantial form ofthe human being. Because the soul

(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 129-50.4 See Alan Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in The CambridgeHistory of Later Medieval Philosophy, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny,and Jan Pinborg, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 642.5 For an elaboration, see George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Unity of HumanActivity," The Modern Schoolman 27 (January 1950): 91-96; and Jordan, "TheTranscendentality of Goodness and the Human Will," 134-35.6 Summa Theologiae 1.87.3 (Hereafter, ST part. question. article. (and, ifnecessary) reply to objection. Citations will be to the Leonine text as found inthe B. A. C. edition: (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961). Forfurther analysis, see Mark D. Jordan, Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy ofPhilosophical Discourses in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre DamePress, 1986), Sec. 4.2: ''The Soul's Knowledge of Itself."

454 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

is a finite created substance, its essence is not its perfeet operation.Rather it is in potentiality to diverse operations, and to each of these indiverse ways. The powers of the soul are the principles of those opera-tions by which the soul is brought to its perfeetion in act.7

The powers, then, are potencies directed to acts. As with all potencies,they are diversified according to the nature ofthe act toward which theyare directed; and acts themselves are diversified according to the natureof their object. Powers, then, are specified by their formal objects or,more precisely, by the formality under which they are related to theirobjects.8 This distinction bears emphasis for, as we shall later see, athing one in reality may be regarded under various formal aspects, andso be the object of various powers.9

Intellect is that power of the soul which is in potency to knowingtruth, or that power by which the soul is related to being under theaspect or notion of the true. Thus the proper object of the intellect isbeing qua intelligible. Will, on the other hand, as a species of appetite,is that power of the soul which is in potency to desiring or inclining togood, or that power by which the soul is related to being under the aspector notion of the good. Thus the proper object of the will is being quaappetible. The powers of intellect and will, then, are differentiatedaccording to the formal aspect under which they are related to theircommon object, being.

The powers of the soul are potencies, Aquinas argues, and a potencymust be moved to act by something already in act. This cause of motiollcan be either a principle, which moves as a moving mover, or an object,which moves as a term or end. Apower, therefore, can be in potency intwo ways: first, with respect to its operation-whether it be exercisedor no-and second, with respect to its object-whether the end of itsexercise be this or that. Both intellect and will are passive with respectto both their operation and object. Each awaits a cause for its exerciseand for its determination.

It belongs to the will, Aquinas argues, to move to exercise. Regardingoperation will can, as agent or efficient cause, move both itself andintellect to exercise. This is so because under the will's proper object,the common notion of the good, are subsumed all the particular goodswhich belong to particular exercises of the powers. IO Will, therefore,insofar as it intends a more universal end-the good in general-movesthe powers directed to more particular ends to their operation. II Itbelongs to the intellect, on the other hand, to move by determination.Intellect can, as end or formal cause, move both itself and will to the

7 ST 1.77.1.8 ST 1.77.3.9 ST 1.80.1.2.lOST 1.82.4.llST 1-2.9.1.


specification of its act, by presenting apower with its object. In thisrespect, under the proper object of intellect-the common notion of beingand truth-are subsumed all particular truths regarding the powersand their proper acts and objects. l2 The relation between will andintellect in general, then, is one of reciprocal causality: will as efficientcause moves both itself and intellect to exercise, intellect as formal causemoves both itself and will to determination. l3 The causality of thepowers is not univocal, but of diverse kinds. Will causes an operation tobe, intellect causes it to be such and so. The formal differentiation of thetwo powers is not a real separation, rather, as Aquinas says, "thesepowers include one another in their acts. l4

Having said this much, certain difficulties with Aquinas' accountseem immediately to arise. In the first place, how do we overcome whatappears to be a vicious circularity in the causality of intellect and will?How do we avoid an infinite regress of causes if the exercise of aparticular act of intellect depends on a prior act of will, which in turndepends for its determination on a prior act of intellect, which itselfdepends for its exercise on a prior act of will, and so on? How do weovercome the problem that both intellect and will are in potency withrespect to both their exercise and their determination? If we supposethat we must begin from an initial inertial state, and if we conceive ofcausality solely in terms of mechanistic efficient causes, then the circu-larity cannot be overcome. Aquinas himself, however, makes neithersupposition. Instead, he argues for the inherent natural dynamism ofthe powers, the natural directedness of the powers toward their properends. l5 The will, Aquinas argues, is by nature inclined to the universalgood, the intellect to the universal true. Pushing the argument further,Aquinas claims that God himself, as first cause of the being and finalend of the operation of all natures, is the first cause of such naturalmovements in things. l6 God is the ultimate source of the naturalinclinations of created beings; and beings are created by God as natu-rally inclined, as naturally ordered to certain operations and ends. Thusintellect naturally knows first common principles in both speculativeand practical matters, while will naturally wills the first principle ofvoluntary movement, the universal good and last end, under which is

l2ST 1-2.9.1.l3ST 1-2.9.1.3.l4ST 1.82.4.1.16 See Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of AlternatePossibilities," in Christian Theism and the Problems ofPhilosophy, Michael D.Beaty, ed. (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990),266.l6Compare ST 1-2.9.6; 1.105.5; and 1.105.5.3. See Jordan "TheTranscendentality of Goodness and the Human Will," 138-40. On the relationof divine and human causality see the seminal work of Bernard Lonergan, "St.Thomas' Theory of Operation." Theological Studies 3 (1942): 390 et passim.

456 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYsubsumed all that pertains to the well-being ofthe agent as a whole.17Such universal motion to the end makes possible every particular act ofwill, for it is the common noti~n under which any particular good iswilled, the efficient cause which moves every particular act of will. Yetwhile in the absence of such universal motion, no particular good couldbe willed, it remains for intellect to determine each particular act of willto this or that particular apprehended good.

The natural teleology of the powers, therefore, overcomes the prob-lem of initial inertia, while the problem of regress is overcome by therecognition that we are dealing not with a temporal series of univocalefficient causes, but with the operation of necessarily concomitantcauses which differ in kind. Intellect moves to determination, will toexercise; intellect acts as formal, will as agent cause. The operation of

e~ch is necessary to any particular act.A second potential difficulty arises in attempting to sort out the

problems of agency that arise in any so-called "faculty psychology."Aquinas hirnself treats this problem in replying to an objection whichargues that, since appetite is naturally devoid of understanding, willcan in no way receive and heed a command of reason. Aquinas respondsthat the powers of the soul operate not for themselves alone but for thewhole human being. Thus any statement which attributes agency to apower can be translated into one which s~eaks of the human being whopossesses such powers as the real agent. 8 Faculties or powers, thoughthey are to be formally differentiated, cannot be really separated. Theyare not themselves supposits--spiritual organs, as it were-but arepotentialities which inhere in integral human agents.

Having examined intellect and will in themselves, as powers of therational soul, let us turn to abrief examination of the role each plays intwo sorts of human activity. I have in mind here Aquinas' distinctionbetween speculative and practical activity, a distinction grounded in hisdifferentiation of two corresponding sorts of intellect. Again, however,this analytic differentiation does not amount to a real separation, forwhile the speculative and practical intellects differ in their materialobject-the speculative concerned with necessary intelligibles and thepractical with contingent operables-still the~ share a common formalobject--being under the aspect of the true.1 They differ again withrespect to their end, for the speculative intellect directs apprehensionto the consideration oftruth alone, and its truth consists in the conform-ity ofthe intellect to its object; the practical intellect, on the other hand,directs apprehension to operation, and so its truth consists in theconformity of intellect with right appetite, which in disposing to the

17ST 1-2.10.1.IsST 1-2.17.5.2. See Donagan, 'Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," 654.19ST 1.79.9.3.


right end disposes to right operation.20 This ordering of apprehensionto a further end, however, remains an accidental and not an essentialdistinction, and so Aquinas admits only one power of intellect.21

These two sorts of intellect are, however, diversely related to the will.Will does not enter into the constitution of speculative reason's object,the necessary true, while it does enter into the constitution of practicalintellect's object, a contingent operable.22 Let us apply our previousconclusions on the relation of will and intellect generally to these twocases. First, will can move both the speculative and the practicalintellect to its operation or exercise.23 While it cannot itself apprehenda thing as such and so, it can move intellect to the act which culminatesin such an apprehension, an apprehension which may or may not thenspecify a further act of will. Thus will can, if indirectly, contribute to itsown determination, by causing the exercise of that act of intellect whichmay subsequently determine it. Second, in speculative matters, willcannot determine intellect's object, for that object is something thatcannot be other, something whose intelligibility cannot be altered bywilling it so. In practical matters, on the other hand, will enters into thevery constitution of intellect's object. The object of practical intellect isa possible thing to be done. Possible things to be done are judged bypractical intellect according to their goodness or appropriateness. Good-ness, however, is the proper object ofthe will, and the good is that whichis desirable. Fully to know a thing as good, then, is to know it asdesirable, and therefore as something toward which the will is inclined.The disposition of the will toward a possible thing to be done serves tomark it as a thing good and to be done or evil and to be avoided.24

To recapitulate, the operation of will is necessary to make use of thepower of intellect, both speculative and practical, in allowing or bringingabout intellect's relation to its object, while it serves to constitute theobject itself only of practical intellect. Such acts of use, as particularacts, must exhibit the reciprocal causality of intellect and will, intellectmoving to determination, will to operation. And these acts of the com-ponent powers must themselves be particular acts, that is, must them-selves exhibit the mutual causality of intellect and will-the act of willspecified by an act of intellect, and the act of intellect moved by an actof will. Thus will's causing the exercise of any particular act of intellect

2ST 1-2.57.5.3.21ST 1.79.11.22ST 1-2.57.5.3.23ST 1-2.17.6. For an explicit reference to will's moving the speculative intellectto exercise, see ST 1-2.16.1.3.24This decisive point is not recognized by commentators who excessivelydichotomize intellective and volitional functions. See, for example, Stump,"Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," 267-68; and ScottMacDonald, "Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas' Basis for Christian Morality," inChristian Theism and the Problems ofPhilosophy, 333.

458 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYis not a moving to exercise generally, but a particular choosing in somehere and now to move the power to operation. Moreover, choosing toexercise either the speculative or the practical intellect is itself a matterofpractice, of something to be done, and therefore depends decisively onwill's disposition toward that exercise, as on practical intellect's appre-hension and judgment. Both speculative and practical activity, then, fallwithin the larger unity of voluntary activity in general, of activity thatproceeds from a deliberate will. For such activity to be good activity,the proper disposition of both intellect and will is required.

3.

Let us turn next to Nietzsche. I will here construct a Nietzscheanresponse to Aquinas' account, setting forth Nietzsche's own riyal accountonly to the extent necessary to construct this response. A fuller elabora-tion of the Nietzschean alternative will follow later in the argument.

To present Nietzsche's interpretation of Aquinas we must first knowwhat it is on Nietzsche's account to interpret, what on Nietzsche's viewit means to forward a view. For according to Nietzsche, views do notsimply wear their meanings on their sleeves, they are not transparentto their deeper significances. So, confronting Aquinas, Nietzsche willask: this Latin psychologist, what does he really want, what is it thatdrives him in such a direction?25 To move toward a response to thisNietzschean question we must first examine Nietzsche's teaching onperspective.

For Nietzsche, all views without exception are perspective views, areinterpretations. Interpretations, moreover, are forwarded by determi-nate character-types, who fashion them in light of valuations relative totheir type. All interpretations both reflect and at the same time concealan interest.26 They are fundamentally masks worn by a will to powerwhich engenders them. To understand a view, therefore, we mustdisclose the interest it conceals, and trace that interest to the charac-ter-type from which it proceeds. It is the Nietzschean genealogist's taskto unearth and evaluate what lies hidden behind and beneath thesurface ciphers of a view, to lay bare the character of that constellationof motives which gives rise to it. The truly decisive question regardingany view, therefore, is not "what is it?" but "from whom is it?"-that is,

25 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals 1.1. Translations ofNietzschewill be taken from the editions of Walter Kaufmann: (New York: RandomHouse/Vintage Books). I will use the traditional English abbreviations ofNietzsche's works: The Gay Science (GB); Beyond Good and Evil (BGE); On theGenealogy of]v!orals (GM); Twilight ofthe Idols (Tl); and The Will to Power (WP).In keeping with Kaufmann's caveats on treating WP as a finished work, I willcite it only to amplify claims extracted from Nietzsche's published works.26BGE 6; 32; 268; WP 481; 493.


what character-type does such a view serve and how, or more precisely,what is the character ofthe will to power manifest in such a view.27 Thusthe content of a view becomes asymptom of astate of forces, a cipher ofa character.28 The interpretation of a view becomes the evaluation ofone type of character (and its masks) by another.

Let us turn then to Aquinas' view, looking to what he does as a clueto what character-type he iso What Aquinas does is to forward a certainkind of account, a philosophie account, which offers an explanation ofintellect and will in the context of a broader account of nature or being.Such an account treats human nature and human psychology on thebasis of principles of explanation taken to hold for being generally,principles at least potentially accessible to those with adequate aptitudein the use of reason. Such a totalizing view, Nietzsehe argues, inforwarding the myth of an "order of things" accessible to the rational,denies the creative and perspectival character of interpretation. Itdenies differences in type, subjecting all alike to the tyranny of the samerational order. On Nietzsche's account, such a view is but a mask thatconceals the working of a will to power of a certain type-a type thatfeels the need to deny what differs from itself through totalizing claims;a type that, feeling itself subject, would reduce all to a similar subjection.Such a type is weak and base, and such a view is but an elaboraterationalization and projection on a cosmic scale of that peculiar mode ofbeing. The action of this type is areaction: too weak to affirm its owndifference, it denies the difference of others.

The Thomistic account which vindicates this type, which fashions anorder within which it might feel at home, is according to Nietzsehe buta scholarly version of the morality of the weak and base-all the morecontemptible perhaps for its perverse ingenuity.29 In forwarding such asupposedly universal account, Aquinas is in fact playing the duplicitousadvocate, taking refuge in the fiction of an "order of things" because helacks both the strength of character to self-consciously assume theauthorship of his own interpretations, and the nobility of spirit to affirmhimself in affirming the perspectival character of his views.30

Aquinas' treatment of human psychology and human action viewshuman acts as those which proceed from a deliberate will, and so thoseover which we are master. On a Nietzschean reading such aseparationof doer and deed denies the efficacy of will to power, again for a reasonwhich serves the interest of the weak. It sets over the expression of atype's force, its character, a neutral substratum which it falsely sup-

27BGE 6; GB 335. For an elaboration, see Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsehe andPhilosophy, Hugh Tomlinson, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press,1983), 76-7.

28 TI 2.2.29BGE 186.30BGE 5.

460 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYposes is free-and because free responsible-to express its inherentcharacter or not, to discharge its force or not. Such a view is theself-deception of impotence which masks the necessity of will to power'scausality with the illusion of free conscious agency. "The subject," saysNietzsche, "(or to use a more popular expression, the soul), makespossible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of everykind, the sublime self-deception that intergrets weakness as freedom,and their being thus-and-thus as a merit." 1 The weak and base, whoare constitutionally incapable of true action-that is, of self-affirma-tion-interpret the necessary expression of their impotence as praise-worthy self-restraint, and likewise condemn the strong for choosing togive vent to the seeming excess which is but the necessary expressionof their type.32 In either case, a fictitious agent is held to be responsiblefor what in truth cannot be other.

Aquinas further treats human powers and operations in terms of anatural teleology in which each power is ordered to some end proper toit, the realization or attainment ofwhich constitutes that power's properperfection. That perfection, moreover, then provides a measure by whichto evaluate the success or failure of any particular operation of thatpower. On a Nietzschean view, such an elaborate teleological schemedenies the universal efficacy of will to power, substituting instead amultitude of superfluous principles.33 It denies the multiplicity of evalu-ative principles which arise from differences in type, differences in thecharacter of will to power manifest in a given type. In short, it deniesthe interested character of evaluation and substitutes a monolithicmeasure of adequacy taken to be binding on all perspectives.

4.

In laying out this Nietzschean critique of Aquinas' position, I wonderif I have not said far too much, if I have not quite naively acted thephilosopher in attempting to apply Nietzsche's principles to the Thomis-tic account. For fundamental to Nietzsche's position would seem to be aself-conscious refusal to play the philosopher's game, to suppose thatwhat we are about here is argument, debate, the reasoned considerationof alternatives. Perhaps the most consistently Nietzschean response tothe Thomistic account would be no response at all. The self-consciousNietzschean would not be interested in joining the issue with his riyal,indeed, would not acknowledge any issue between them. TheNietzschean strong and noble type needs no, and so seeks no, justifica-tion of his own view. Unlike the weak he does not need to vindicate

31BGE 13.32 TI 6.7.33BGE 13; 36.


himself through comparison. Indeed, the very notion of vindication isradically alien to the character of the one who instinctively affirms hisown difference, whose action is a positing of self and not merely a denialof what is other.34 At best such a one would disdain what is other thanhis type when he happens upon it, but he would certainly feel no needto seek it out in order to prove a superiority he affirms from the start.

The authentie Nietzschean, therefore, would be little interested inengaging in the sort of dialectical exchange into which I have cast him.Indeed, it would be the death of his position to do so. That very fewNietzscheans-Nietzsche himself included-find themselves able con-sistently to exercise such restraint is a telling fact that we shall examinelater at greater length. For now, let us simply note the tension, and moveon to an examination of Nietzsche's own positive account of intellect andwill.

5.

We notice at the outset a pervasive duality of aspect in Nietzsche'streatment of intellect and will. He examines each by turns from thestandpoint of cosmology-the view on nature -and from the standpointof psychology-the view from the subject. Inquiring into the relation ofthese two views leads us immediately into irresolvable problems ofcircularity. On the one hand, Nietzsehe will have his cosmologicalaccount ground the psychologieal, will have his teaching on natureground his teaching on perspective; on the other hand, and simultane-ously, his perspectivism requires that his cosmological account be givenan explanation in terms of perspective psychology. To sharpen the issue,the necessity for Nietzsehe to maintain the perspectival character of histeaching on perspective threatens to impale him on the horns of self-ref-erential absurdity.

Later Nietzsehe scholarship has recognized the peril of this dualityof aspect and has attempted to avert it by emphasizing one side of theteaching to the neglect of the other.35 Such a neat resolution, however,

34 TI 2.5.36Jean Granier reeognizes the "antinomy," but allows it to stand. See"Perspeetivism and Interpretation," in The New Nietzsehe, David B. Allison, ed.(New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1977), 197-99. Harold Alderman elevates thepsyehologieal while slighting the eosmologieal side of Nietzsehe's teaehing. SeeNietzsche's Gift (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977), eh. 4. Traey Strongproeeeds similarly, downplaying the eosmologieal in favor of the psyehologieal.See "Text and Pretexts: Refleetions on Perspeetivism in Nietzsehe," PoliticalTheory 13 (May 1985): 175-76. Gilles Deleuze, on the other hand, explains thepsyehologieal in terms of the eosmologieal. See Nietzsehe and Philosophy, eh. 2,espeeially 51-55. Finally, Alexander Nehamas attempts a eompromise whieh inthe name of eonsisteney would dilute both sides ofthe teaehing. See Nietzsehe:Life As Literature (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1985),

462 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYcannot suffice, for each aspect of Nietzsche's teaching not only acciden-tally but essentially implies the other. The consistent Nietzschean,moreover, must abjure any such tidy rational resolution..36 We willreturn to these problems subsequently, when we have a firmer grasp onthe particulars of Nietzsche's account.

Let us first consider the cosmological dimension. For Nietzsche allphenomena whatever are expressions of force, or more precisely, of aconstellation of interacting forces. 37 What a thing is-its essence-isjust this dynamic constellation of force. A thing is its expression; it is itseffect. The world is the larger field of force which encompasses thesecomponent clusters in their dynamic relations, it is the effect of thesummation of effects. On a cosmic scale life is the play ofthese contend-ing forces and such play has the character of a struggle for mastery. Thisplay of life Nietzsche calls will to power. "A living thing seeks above allto discharge its strength," he says.38 And the world of such things isgoverned by "the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcementof claims of power... and every power draws its ultimate consequencesat every moment."39

Nietzsche, then, posits will to power as the pervasive cause of allphenomena:

The question is in the end whether we really recognize thewill as efficient, whether we believe in the causality of thewill: if we do-and at bottom our faith in this is nothing lessthan our faith in causality itself-then we have to make theexperiment of positing the causality of the will hypotheticallyas the only one... [Should one do so] then one would havegained the right to determine all efficient force univocallyas--will to power. The world viewed from inside, the worlddefined and determined according to its "intelligible charac-ter"-it would be "will to power" and nothing else.4o

While thus maintaining the ubiquity of will to power's causality,Nietzsche does not wish to deny, but rather to affirm the radicalplurality of appearances, the heterogeneity of phenomenal manifesta-

eh. 2.36 See BGE 22.37 WP 567. See Deleuze, Nietzsehe and Philosophy, 3.38BGE 13. See too, GS 5.349.39BGE 22. See too, WP 481.40BGE 36. Nietzsehe's use of the language of belief reminds us again of theperspeetival eharaeter of his aeeount. Yet note the tension involved in thetransition from "our faith" to "the world viewed from inside," from the view fromthe subjeet to the view from nature. Can both views be simultaneouslymaintained, as Nietzsehe would have it-and at what eost, with whateonsequenees-or must we finally ehoose to reduee one to the terms of the other?


tions. The monism of will to power is compatible with-indeed isidentical to-the pluralism of its expression. It is will to power thatmanifests itself in any thing's expression, in its force. It is will to powerthat gives rise to, that differentiates, that relates the order of forceswhich are the being of any thing.41 Thus will to power confers on anything its peculiar character and makes it to be of a certain type.

On the cosmic level Nietzsehe envisages two antinomie types offorceand will: an active force driven by a will which is affirmative; and areactive force driven by a will which is negative. In their manifestationin human beings these types appear as the strong and noble as opposedto the weak and base human type. Despite these divergences in types ofmanifestation, behind all manifestations of force lies will to power. AsGilles Deleuze has written, for Nietzsehe, "everywhere and always thewill to power is 'the one that."'42

Let us turn next from the cosmological aspect of Nietzsehe's teachingto the psychologieal, from will to power's working in the world to itsworking in human beings. Wehave seen above that will to power givesrise to, differentiates, and orders expressions of force into types. In thephenomena we call human beings such determinations specify distincttypes of character. What sets one human being apart from another isthe character of force and its directive will that that person manifests-or more precisely, of which that person's expression is the expression.If a human being, like all beings, is a constellation of will-driven force,and if the essence of force is its effect, then a human being is the sumtotal of his effects, of those manifestations of force we call actions oroperations.43 Conversely, what a human being effects in any givensituation will be the necessary conse~enceof the type of his being, ofthe will-driven force manifest in him.

Thus for Nietzsehe all the manifold activities in which human beingsengage are the many masks assumed by a will to power. Their deepsignificance is always to be found in the character of will-driven forcemanifest in them. All activities proceed from, or are expressions of,distinct human types, and such types differ radically. Still, all activitiesproceed toward an end which, while varying materially by type andcircumstance remains formally constant across both type and circum-stance-namely, the advancement of the life of the actor, the increaseof his power.45

Thus while the particular ways in which individuals further theirexistence may vary radically across types, it remains the case that all

41 See Deleuze, Nietzsehe and Philosophy, 50-51; 85-86.42Deleuze, Nietzsehe and Philosophy, 77, citing WP 204.43 GM 1.13.44 TI 6.2.45 GM 3.7. I recognize that I have adopted a terminology foreign to Nietzsche'sown exposition, hut I see no other way to make this necessary point ahout his

464 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYindividuals whatever their type seek a formally common end. Similarly,while the particular means through which a type furthers its existencemay vary immensely, Nietzsche envisages but two formal possibilities,which correspond to his basic distinction in types of force and will.Strong and noble types further their lives through action-through theaffirmation of their difference-while weak and base types further theirlives through reaction-through the denial of what differs. Now, as allparticular human acts are acts of particular human beings, and allparticular human beings are of a type, all human acts must issue froma determinate type. Therefore all human acts will be driven by a will topower which seeks to further a determinate mode of existence. What wesay of any particular human act, then, we must say in reference to theneeds of a determinate type, the demands of a determinate life.46

If it is true that each thing qua living seeks to further its life, andqua type seeks to further its determinate way of life, it is also true thatthe operations by or in which a thing pursues its goal vary according tothe kind of thing it iso Thus all that live share a common end, all of atype share a common character, and all of a kind share commonfunctions or operations. As all particular instances of a kind are of adeterminate type, particular exercises of a function must themselves bein the service of determinate types serving their lives through them.Functions, therefore, or their uses, must also be differentiated by type,according to the character of will-driven force they serve and express.

In exploring human beings, then, we must look to them first as a kindsharing common functions, and next as types possessing distinct char-acters. Among the several functions common to human beings we willconcern ourselves here with intellect and will alone, looking to each initself and to both in relation, first as to their common function andsecond as to their determinate uses.

For Nietzsehe, intellect as a function is not fundamentally a cognitiveor contemplative power, but an interpretive or creative one. In an earliercontext we adverted to Nietzsche's teaching that all views are perspec-tival interpretations. Let us here elaborate. Interpretation is forNietzsehe a matter more of eisegesis than of exegesis: it confers, it doesnot discover meaning. Through intellect a determinate character fash-ions for itself a meaningful world in which its type can feel at home.47Such creation or conferral ofmeaning is perspectival, that is, relative to

position. It remains significant that while he cannot seem to eliminate it,Nietzsehe himself fails-or perhaps refuses-to recognize and articulate thedistinction to which I advert.46 GM Preface.2.47BGE 3; 9; 21; GS Preface.2; 6.301.


a type, and so is driven by that will to power of which the type is themanifestation.

Intellect, then, is an instrument in the hands of will to power, andits products-interpretations-are a means through which will to powerworks its way in human being.48 Perhaps, however, the language ofinstrumentality misleads by reifying and separating the function andits ruling will, whereas for Nietzsehe particular exercises of a functionare not accidentally or extrinsically but essentially or intrinsicallyrelated to will to power. Hecall that on his view the essence of a thing isits effect, the expression of its inherent force, and will to power bothgives rise to and gives order to such an expression. In human beingssuchforce is expressed through the operation ofthose functions peculiarto their kind. Such operations, then, belong neither to faculties noragents, but are simply the expression of that will-driven force which isthe being of the human being.

Let us now turn from intellect as a function common to the kind ofthing we call a human being, to its particular uses in diverse character-types. Nietzsehe differentiates particular uses of intellect according tothe second-order attitude which diverse types assume toward the natureof intellect as a function. Here as always for Nietzsehe, as the type is,so is the act; and as the will is, so is the type. To diverse types of will topower, therefore, correspond diverse types of exercise of what on thesurface appears to be a common function. Operations diverge in charac-ter as radically as the character-types from which they proceed, and forthe same reason. Let us look to these divergences.

It is the mark of the weak and base, Nietzsehe holds, to mask thecreative function of intellect, to deny its interpretive and perspectivalcharacter, and to substitute a totalizing interpretation of its role whichmasquerades as the truth of things. Too weak to self-consciously assumethe awful necessity of truth-creation, the weak and base deny it, takingrefuge in the fiction of a real order of things accessible to and bindingon all. Lacking the nobility of spirit necessary to affirm themselves inaffirming their own interpretations as interpretive, in donning theirmasks self-consciously, they end by denying interpretation altogether,and subjecting all to their unacknowledged creations.

The strong and noble, on the other hand, because their action is anaffirmation of their own difference, self-consciously affirm the creativefunction of intellect. Because they glory in themselves, they glory too intheir self-expression. They own their interpretations as interpretive, asperspectival. They know their knowing to be a free creation proceedingfrom a will to power which makes them to be what they are. Such typesrenounce the petty comfort of subjection to any totalizing view andassume the terrible but liberating responsibility of truth-creation. Un-

48BGE 6.

466 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYlike the weak, they need not hide the interested origins of their views-from themselves at any rate-but don their masks self-consciously, infull recognition oftheir perspectival character. Only in this way is theirexercise of intellect an affirmation of difference, only so does theiroperation conform to their character, to the type of will to powermanifest in them.

Turning now from intellect to will, we first note that willing as anoperation of the kind of being we call human is not for Nietzscheequivalent to will to power. Rather, as with all functions, acts of will aresurface expressions or manifestations of a deeper force-will to power.What we call willing is but a channel through which, or a means bywhich, this more fundamental drive is vented. As expressions of will topower, therefore, particular will-acts receive their meaning from thecharacter of that which they express, from the type of will to power theydisplay.

As an operation, Nietzsche sees willing as "above all somethingcomplicated, something that is a unit only as a word.n49 He offers us thisphenomenological description:

[T]he will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, butit is above all an affect, and specifically the affect of thecommand.... A man who wills commands something withinhimself that renders obedience, or that he believes rendersobedience.50

Coincident in any instance of willing, then, are a manifold of volitionalsensations, a ruling thought, and the simultaneous affects of commandand obedience. These exist in an inseparable complex. Their mutualrelation and not any one taken in isolation constitutes the phenomenonwe call willing. This complex, moreover, is not an act effected by someagent, but a manifold acted within an agent by will to power. It is willto power and not some sovereign subject that wills in our willing.51 Thefiction ofthe sovereign subject is the interpretation of a certain type, theweak and base, who separate agent and act, force and effect, that theymight view as voluntary and so meritorious what is but the necessaryexpression of their innermost character.52 The strong and noble, on theother hand, recognize that behind or beneath their willing is no free andindependent subject, but the necessity ofwill to power. They admit thatthe very force of their character compels them to discharge their inher-ent power, to express their strength.53 The weak, while equally bound

49BGE 19. This section is a miniature treatise on will as function.50BGE 19.51 TI VI.3; GS V.360.52 GM 1.13; TI 6.7.53BGE 21.

PERSPECTIVISM: AQUINAS AND NIETZSCHE 467to this neeessity of eharaeter, mask it by means of the fietion of moralageney, of freedom of will. And they do so in order that they, who are tooweak to enjoy the pleasure of eommanding and subduing others throughan affirmation of self, might feel the viearious pleasure of mastery overself through a denial of strength, and so suppose their impotenee anaehievement.

Regarding the relation of intelleet and will as funetions, Nietzsehesees the operations of intelleet and will as inextrieably intertwined. Inany human aet we will find an inseparable eomplex of thought-direetedwill and will-prompted thought.54 The exereise of neither, it would seem,ean exist in isolation. There ean be no thinking without willing, nowilling without thinking.55 Their differentiation as funetions, moreover,masks a deeper unity, for the operation of both is fundamentally anexpression of will to power. A will to power of a eertain type always liesbehind eaeh instanee of thinking-willing, giving rise to it, giving mean-ing to it, giving value to it.56

Finally, let us eonsider the attitude assumed by the divergent typesof human being toward the relation of intelleet and will to one anotherand to will to power. It is eharaeteristie ofthe weak and base, Nietzsehemaintains, to mask the eausality of will to power through the reifieationof funetions into independent faeulties whose operation is subject to theeontrol of a neutral subject. The strong and noble, on the other hand,self-eonseiously affirm both the inseparability of thinking-willing, andthe dependenee of this eomplex on a will to power of a eertain type. Inshort, eaeh type responds to the relation of the funetions in a wayeongruent with its own mode of being, in a way that furthers its ownlife.

6.

Having set forth the Nietzsehean eounterposition, I will now attemptto eonstruet a Thomistie response. At the outset we should note that aThomistie eritique will differ from a Nietzsehean in this, that while bythe internallogie of his own position the Nietzsehean eannot engage indialeetie--cannot enter into an argument without subjeeting himself tothe terms of his rival, and therefore without renouneing his position onperspeetive-the Thomistie eritique must be dialeetieal in form, must

54 It should be emphasized that our examination is concerned with the functionsof intellect and will alone, and so abstracts from much that Nietzsche himselfincludes in his account of human acts-the role of the passions for example, oras Nietzsche sometimes puts it, of those other than intellect and will. Anycomplete treatment of his position would need to integrate what I haveconsciously excluded.66BGE 19.56 BGE 19; 21; 23; see Deleuze, Nietzsehe and Philosophy, 53.

468 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYjoin the issue on the interlocutor's own ground and attempt to show himon his own terms the impossibility of maintaining his position. Such adialectical critique must, moreover, provide an account that can explainthat impossibility. My own critique will focus on what I take to be thecornerstone of Nietzsche's account, his teaching on perspective. Butfirst, let us address some points of detail.

A Thomist will wonder, first, how Nietzsche can deny the existenceof a subject of activity, of an agent independent of its acts, by assertingthat a thing is but the sum of its effects. How, the Thomist will ask, canwe speak of a sum without presupposing something to which the thingssummed accrue? Nietzsche may protest that it is only grammatical habitthat compels us to speak in this way,57 but the Thomist will respondthat it is a telling fact that we cannot speak otherwise, that our thought,and so our language, will allow us no alternative. And for one who findsan essential connection between our mode of knowing and speaking andour mode of being, the mute dismissal of grammatical habit seemscavalier.

Second, regarding Nietzsche's understanding of will to power's uni-versal efficacy, the Thomist will ask: if will to power is always "the onethat," and if its expression cannot be other, why are Nietzsche's pagesfilled with exhortation, with denunciation, with exultation, with la-ment? Why ~uarrelwith necessity? Why not rather resign oneself to theinevitable?5 Nietzsche's own practices threaten to give the lie to hisaccount.

Third, with respect to Nietzsche's account of the best type of humanlife, the Thomist will wonder just what it is that makes such a life best.The strong and noble type, we recall, is the one who creates meaning,purpose, and direction, who, in Nietzsche's words, "overcomes." Thecontext within which Nietzsche offers such a teaching on the best sortof human life is a genealogical unmasking of common morality and itsclaim to be grounded in the "nature of things." Nietzsche appears to denythe existence of any such natural order and to ground his own rivalaccount in the impossibility of discovering any such norm. Yet here theThomist will wonder whether, despite his intentions, Nietzsche is nothimself forwarding an account of the "nature of things" as norm.

Nietzsche replaces a purposive teleological natural order, conformityto which constitutes human perfection, with an alternative vision of anature without purpose or direction which, he claims, can function as

57BGE 17; GM 1.13; TI 3.5.58 Stanley Rosen has provocatively argued that, given Nietzsche's account of theuniversality of will to power's causality, such exhortations and denunciationsform only the exoteric surface of Nietzsche's teaching. They are rhetoricalsupport for the false but salutary beliefthat human action is free, in the absenceofwhich belief human beings would soon fall into despair. See The Ancients andthe Moderns (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 197200.


no norm. If purpose or value is to exist, he argues, it must be created byman or, more precisely, by a certain type of man. Such a type is "the onewho overcomes," the one who freely and self-consciously posits from hisown way of being meaning, value, and purpose. It is significant thatNietzsehe forwards his account of such a type within the context of abroader account of nature, that he does feel the need to debunk thetraditional account and to provide a riyal account in which his ideal typeseems more at home. In this sense, Nietzsehe does not wish his idealhuman type to be a mere rebel against the order of things. What, then,is the true extent of the freedom of "the one who overcomes"?

He is not, it would seem, utterly or indiscriminately free. Indeed, heis in a certain sense bound by at least the formal criterion that, whateverelse he may be, he must be one who overcomes, one who createsmeaning, purpose, and value. This criterion, then, "the one who over-comes" is not free to create. Though Nietzsehe refuses to specify thedeterminate forms that overcoming may assume, he does bind his idealtype to this formal requirement. The freedom of such a type is notabsolute, but conditioned. His is an ordered freedom, a freedom to-inthis case, to overcome. In fact, his freedom is a form of enslavement-enslavement to the necessity of life as will to power.59

Given this fact, the question immediately arises: why is freedomunderstood in such a way normative? What distinguishes this from allother norms which Nietzsehe has with such vehemence debunked? Inresponse, Nietzsehe seems to argue that he who overcomes is true tolife, that life is will to power, and that the character of will to power isovercoming. But again we must ask, why then is life as will to powernormative? Isn't Nietzsehe here doing precisely that for which hedenounces all previous philosophers, namely, forwarding a teaching onthe "nature of things," conformity to which constitutes the best type ofhuman life? Despite his vigorous protests to the contrary, isn't hearguing that nature or the order of things is such-and-so, thereforehuman activity should be such-and-so, that is, in conformity with the"nature of things?',oo If Nietzsehe is in fact offering such an account, thenit remains difficult for a Thomist to see how he can continue to exempthimself from the requirement of justifying his account as an account. Ifhe can no longer claim to be engaged in an enterprise radically differentfrom that of past philosophers, can he maintain the privilege of placinghis account above dialectical scrutiny?

For our fourth point, let us examine the relation of Nietzsehe asauthor to the account he authors. Let us compare what Nietzsehe isdoing in giving an account with the content of the account he gives.

59Thus the centrality in Nietzsche's thinking of the affirmation of the eternalreturn of the same as the pinnacle of freedom.60 See Rosen, The Ancients and the Moderns, 195,219-20.

470 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYNietzsehe, we will argue, betrays more of the tacit Thomist in himselfthan he would care to admit. Given his teaching on perspective and therelation of perspectives to determinate types of will to power, why is itthat Nietzsehe feels the need to communicate his discovery to us, toinvite us to consider his view? Why does he forward his account inopposition to riyal accounts? Now, he may respond that his doing so isbut a form of self-affirmation, but it remains striking that his affirma-tions take this form. Given what Nietzsehe has said of the strong andnoble type, the last thing we would expect from him would be thedeliberate and detailed exposition of the opposition of the strong andnoble and the weak and base human types. Indeed, the very mark ofthestrong and noble type as Nietzsehe understands him is a terrible yetcarefree indifference to all forms of self-justification.61 His self is its ownjustification; he need enter no comparison to be vindicated. The need tovindicate oneself through comparison is precisely the province of theweak and base, whose impotence compels them to give an account.

It remains difficult to see how Nietzsehe can escape this difficulty.His own activity as author contradicts the teaching he authors; his deedsgive the lie to his words. Nietzsehe attempts to vindicate his view in theface of its rivals, while forwarding a view that maintains both theimpossibility of meaningful vindication and the superiority of that viewwhich recognizes the impossibility and renounces the quest for vindica-tion. It may be objected that Nietzsehe is here offering no vindicationbut an interpretation, one affected in full knowledge of its perspectivalcharacter. Such a retort, however, misses the fundamental point. It isnot what is offered, but the fact of the offering that is decisive. Nietzsehecan take refuge behind the play of words, but he cannot hide the fact ofhis speaking. Such speaking betrays a deep need to justify, to give anaccount of one's views. And this in turn manifests a still more funda-mental desire, the desire to be right, to hold not just any view but a trueone.62 Nietzsche's own deeds in this case bear witness to Aristotle'sobservation that all human beings by nature desire to know. And is itperhaps a corollary of this desire that all human beings wish the objectof their desire to receive its due, that truth be known for what it is andnot otherwise? How else can we explain the natural human inclinationto argue, to offer accounts which intend to be true and to resist thosethat appear to be false? Does not this reaction-and it appears to beNietzsche's-give the lie to Nietzsche's own account? Does it not imply

61 TI 2.5.62 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry: Encyclopedia,Genealogy and Tradition (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1990),45-46.


that we do pursue truth precisely as common, that the notion of theuniversality of truth is inherent in our desire for it?

Now, to maintain that truth is common is by no means to imply thatit is equally apparent to all. From the view that truth is common "initself' does not follow that it is common "to or for us." To speak inThomistic terms, though the order of being-the mind's grasp of whichconstitutes truth-itself is common to all, the apprehension ofthat orderneed not be. Indeed, given the palpable diversity among potentialknowers with respect to intelligence, interest, character, and leisure, wehave every reason to believe that it will not be. Here the views ofAquinasand Nietzsche diverge radically, for while Aquinas differentiates speak-ing of things "in themselves" from things "to or for us," differentiates the"order of being" from the "order of apprehension," and relates them asmeasure to potentially measured, Nietzsche seems to eliminate thedistinction altogether. There is no difference, he will argue, betweenappearance and reality, between things for us and things in themselves.The notion of a "real world" underlying the world of appearance is afiction-and no innocent one at that, for it is fabricated by base, reactivetypes too weak to assume the responsibility of perspectival truth-crea-tion.

To put the issue between them succinctly, I would argue that Aquinasis in fact the perspectivist, while Nietzsche, despite his protests, succumbs precisely to a form oftotalism. It is Aquinas who maintains that,while the order of being is given prior to and as the condition ofunderstanding, coming to know it is a process whose success or failuredepends decisively on the disposition of the inquirer, on his perspective.Nietzsche, on the other hand, maintains that there is no common realityintended by inquiry, that all knowing, whatever the perspective of theknower, is truth-creation.

For Aquinas, one can choose in particular situations whether or notto attempt to come to know. Through a particular act of will one canchoose to inquire, to exercise his intellective capacities, whether inthings to be done, or in things to be known alone. On a Thomistic accountcoming to know is a complex process into which figure the dispositionsnot only of will and intellect---our focus here-but of the passions, thesenses, the body-in short, ofthe whole human being. Knowing is in thissense a process in which a concrete human agent comes into relation tosome particular intelligible object. Knowing is perspectival in the sensethat all potential knowers are particular agents disposed in particularways to particular objects, while all occasions for knowing are them-selves particular situations with determinate features which may facili-tate or hinder the process. Yet while all knowing is from--embedded inand conditioned by-a determinate perspective, still it is to-directedtoward-a reality whose existence is given prior to its being known. Thereal "in itself' becomes the real "to or for us" in and through an act ofknowing which effects a relation between a concrete human agent andsome knowable object. In attempting to give an account of this relation,

472 AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYany but realist presuppositions would seem to lead us into irremediabledifficulties, for any denial that it is the real itself that is disclosed to usin this relation must marshai as evidence some contrary insight, whichmust itself claim to be founded on an adequate grasp of the real.

Nietzsche's counterposition takes the form of the quite radical andtotalizing claim that all knowing is not merely mediated or conditionedby the perspective ofthe knower, but that the knower himself constructsan intelligible world out of the resources of, and in harmony with, theneeds of his own character. Such an account of knowing holds for allperspectives. Types differ only in the attitude they assume toward it,the strong affirming and the weak denying it. If this is Nietzsche'sposition, it remains difficult to see how he can forward it and avoidself-refutation. And it remains difficult to see why Nietzsche would bespeaking at all if not to forward it. If giving an account is not whatNietzsche wishes to be up to, then maintaining silence would seem tobe the most appropriate response. Nietzsche, however, seems emphati-cally incapable of silence, and given the fact of his speaking, we haveevery right to assume that he wishes to submit himself to the require-ments of conversation, chief among which is the demand that in speak-ing one actually be saying something, be making a claim, and thereforebe excluding from one's claim all that one might have said but did not.Now Nietzsche's claim is a universal one: that all knowing is consciousor unconscious truth-creation. As universal, it must apply also-per-haps especially-to itself. And when applied to itself, it explodes the veryclaim it purports to make.

At this point, if the Nietzschean takes refuge in the excuse that heis not engaging in argument, that he is not playing the philosopher'sgame, and so need not subject himself to the conditions of argument, theconversation must end. For time being short, and" the way of inquirylong, the Thomist cannot squander his energies. And arguing with onewho rejects the possibility of argument is futile. The Nietzschean mayfind the Thomist's seriousness in this regard amusing, but the Thomistis enough a Platonist to recognize that the opposite of seriousness is notplay but frivolity. And for the Thomist, to press the issue beyond thispoint would be frivolous.

7.

To conclude, let us return to what is fundamental in the disagree-ment between Aquinas and Nietzsche. At issue are radically divergentviews of the proper way to philosophize, and to approach the history ofphilosophizing. Nietzsche's genealogical method proceeds not throughargument but through interpretation and evaluation. It determines themeaning of a view by revealing its origin in a will to power of a certaintype. It then evaluates that view and that will from without, from theperspective of the interpreter. It cannot enter into debate with a rival,cannot criticize an opponent's view from within and show it to be


internally incoherent, but must attack from the outside. Genealogy,then, consists in external total critique, in the confrontation of antinomieperspectives. Aquinas' method, on the other hand, is dialectical, itattempts to join an issue from within, on an interlocutor's own ground,and to show in terms intelligible to that interlocutor the impossibilityof maintaining his position.

I have attempted to show that Nietzsche's own account cannotexplain the fact of his giving it. Paradoxically, it is Aquinas who is ableto explain what Nietzsehe is doing, and furthermore, to explain whyNietzsche's own account is unable to do so. To the extent that Aquinasprovides an explanation for Nietzsche's failures, his account has vindi-cated itself at the bar of its rival. To say this, however, in no way impliesthat the argument between them is closed, for at least two reasons. Firstand most obviously, our analysis here was limited to only one aspect ofthe thought of each. Many important issues remain to be joined. Second,and more importantly, the encounter of rivals itself has proved to be afruitful tool of interpretation. The confrontation with an alien viewbrings to light aspects of a teaching that would otherwise remainhidden-in this case, the latent perspectivism in Aquinas' teaching.Dialogic encounter, then, aids us in getting to the bottom of a teachingand, through it, to the real problems that teaching addresses. For thesereasons, the analysis offered here can be but a first step in a continuingproject.

University ofNotre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

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Thompson, Perspectivism