Threat Convergence in Pakistan: Countering Terrorist Aspirations and Improving Nuclear Security

Threat Convergence in Pakistan

Countering Terrorist Aspirations and Improving Nuclear Security

Ryan Costello

THREAT CONVERGENCE | THE FUND FOR PEACE

Copyright © 2011

The Fund for Peace.

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The Fund for Peace 1720 I Street NW 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 T: +1 202 223 7940 F: +1 202 223 7947 www.fundforpeace.org The Fund for Peace Publication CR-11-01-TC (11-04A) Circulation: PUBLIC

Executive Summary 5 Map of Pakistan 6 Nonproliferation Overview 7 Terrorism Profile 9 Pakistan’s Nuclear Security 12 Pakistan-United States Cooperation 17 Conclusion 22 About The Fund for Peace 23

List of Acronyms CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence

NCA: National Command Authority

NWFP: North-West Frontier Province

PAL: Permissive Action Links

PPP: Pakistan People’s Party

PRP: Personnel Reliability Program

SPD: Director of the Strategic Plans Division

TTP: Tehrik-i-Taliban, a.k.a. Pakistani Taliban

Contents

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Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the

context of state instability and fragility, the legacy of

the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the

government and Islamist militants. The possibility that

terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials,

either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with

internal assistance, should not be underestimated.

Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal estimated

to contain more than 100 nuclear weapons. This

nuclear stockpile is likely to continue to expand as

Pakistan develops new nuclear-capable missiles and

increases its capacity to produce weapons-grade

material. An expansion will require supplementary

security to guard the additional nuclear material,

facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more

vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that

Pakistan’s nuclear security could break down.

There are several terrorist groups operating within

Pakistan that have challenged and weakened the

Pakistani state. For example, as part of an upsurge of

violence within Pakistan, suicide bombings have

increased from two in 2002 to eighty-nine in 2009. In

addition, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have utilized

the mountainous, semi-autonomous Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as a safe

haven in order to launch local, regional, and

international attacks. Al-Qaeda has also expressed its

desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, demonstrated by the

reported meeting between two Pakistani nuclear

scientists and Osama bin-Laden prior to the September

11th attacks. The scientists allegedly provided bin-

Laden with a “rough sketch” of how to construct a

nuclear weapon.

Given the numerous terrorist groups threatening the

Pakistani state and its nuclear materials, Pakistan

remains one of the world’s greatest nuclear security

vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nuclear

facilities is high, and there is a strong potential for

collaboration between terrorist groups and rogue

elements within the Pakistani security services. The

threat of insider collaboration with terrorist groups is

enhanced by the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network and

allegations that elements of the Pakistani government

support Islamist militants. Over the long-term, there is

a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could

collapse or weaken to the point that nuclear safeguards

would be unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear

weapons. However, the threats of external attack and

internal collaboration are partially addressed by

current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely,

particularly if the United States and the international

community remain engaged in the region.

Nevertheless, nuclear Pakistan is a state confronting

multiple internal and external threats to its security

from rogue and terrorist entities and, as such, remains

at significant risk for exploitation and proliferation.

P akistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a significant

proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating

within the country and in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan.


Executive Summary

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pol_2002.jpg


Pakistan

alleged ties between the government and Islamist

extremists raise international fears regarding Pakistan’s

nuclear security. These fears are justifiable. The

possibility that a terrorist group could acquire nuclear

materials, either through an assault or with assistance

from rogue elements within Pakistan’s security

apparatus, is real.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been a source of

tension between the United States and Pakistan for a

long time. Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign

policy has oscillated between engagement and

isolation. Throughout the 1980s, the United States and

Pakistan cooperated to support the Afghan mujahideen

and oust the Soviets from Afghanistan despite

Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Once

the Soviets were gone, however, the United States

withdrew from the region and sanctioned Pakistan

after the army refused to end its nuclear weapons

program.1 According to former Pakistani Ambassador

Riaz M. Khan, the United States left Pakistan “high and

dry” after the 1980s.2 Pakistan felt betrayed by its

former American ally which now sought to prevent

Pakistan from having a weapon deemed critical to

Pakistani national security. Further sanctions were

imposed on Pakistan (and India) by the international

community following its nuclear tests in 1998.

American sanctions on Pakistan were lifted after the

September 11th attacks when the invasion of

Afghanistan necessitated cooperation with Pakistan.

However, many Pakistanis have not forgotten about

U.S. efforts to derail the nation’s nuclear weapons

program and distrust America’s interest in Pakistan’s

nuclear security.

Today, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to be

greater than 100 nuclear warheads. Pakistan’s guiding

principle for its nuclear strategy is “minimum credible

deterrence.” As a result, the arsenal is used to deter

external aggression, particularly from India, and act as

a force-multiplier for its conventional forces.3

Pakistan appears to be rapidly increasing the size of its

nuclear arsenal through the development of new

nuclear-capable missiles and the expansion of its

capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.4

Pakistan is currently building two new plutonium

production reactors and an additional chemical

separation facility. These efforts will help upgrade the

arsenal from its first-generation design based on highly

enriched uranium (HEU) to a new plutonium-based

design.5 This nuclear expansion could have a negative

impact on Pakistan’s nuclear security. An expansion

will require supplementary security to guard the

additional nuclear material, facilities, and waste. As a

result, there will be more vulnerabilities in the system

and a greater chance that Pakistan’s nuclear security

could break down.6

T errorist groups operating within Pakistan and neighboring countries

could potentially target Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials. The

Pakistani state’s fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and


Non-proliferation Overview

Endnotes

1. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United

States and the Failure of Nation-Building in

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin

Books, 2009), 287.

2. Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, “Pakistan’s

Afghanistan Policy,” East-West Center,

Washington, DC, (Talk), June 17, 2010.

3. Karen DeYoung, “New Estimates put Pakistan’s

Nuclear Arsenal at More than 100,” Washington

Post, January 31, 2011, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004136.html.

See also: Paul K. Kerr & Mary Beth Nikitin,

“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation &

Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service,

February 23, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

nuke/RL34248.pdf

4. This is potentially a response to recent Indian

nuclear advances, including the U.S.-India nuclear

pact.

5. Robert Norris & Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear

Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009,”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/

October 2009, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/

content/f828323447768858/fulltext.pdf, 82-83.

6. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Nuclear Security in

Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear

Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, July 1, 2009,

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/

publication/19191/

nuclear_security_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%

2Fproject%2F62%2Fusrussia_initiative_to_prevent_

nuclear_terrorism.

Non-proliferation Overview


challenged and weakened the Pakistani state.7

Pakistan has experienced a steady rise in terror attacks

since 2001. In 2007, the U.S. Director of National

Intelligence asserted that there were more deaths

resulting from Islamist militancy in Pakistan that year

than during the previous six years combined.8 In 2009

there were eighty-nine suicide bombings and over

3,000 terrorist-related deaths, which was another

record year for terrorist attacks and civilian casualties.9

By comparison, there were only two suicide bombings

in Pakistan in 2002.10

The following terrorist groups are a serious threat and

could potentially target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

and materials. Understanding the threat these groups

pose is essential to ensuring the security of those

weapons and materials.

Al-Qaeda

Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks and the

subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, al-

Qaeda and many of its Afghan Taliban allies fled their

former safe haven and reconstituted themselves across

the border in the mountainous, semi-autonomous

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of

Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have used FATA,

in addition to sections of Baluchistan and the North-

West Frontier Province (NWFP) in West Pakistan, as a

safe haven in order to launch local, regional, and

international attacks.11 Some analysts believe that

Osama bin-Laden and other top al-Qaeda leaders are

hiding within Pakistan’s tribal areas.12

A great deal of the rising tide of violence in Pakistan

can be attributed to al-Qaeda and its efforts to unite its

affiliate groups against the Pakistani government.

Many experts believe that al-Qaeda has trained or is

training most of Pakistan’s extremist groups in terror

tactics. For example, they are believed to have

introduced suicide bombings to the Tehrik-i-Taliban

(TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, one of al-Qaeda’s affiliate

groups (for more on the TTP see below).13 Al-Qaeda

has rallied support against the Pakistani government

by “serving as a mediator and coalition builder for

militant groups,” providing technical expertise to assist

in terrorist attacks, and casting their efforts as part of a

religious struggle.14 This may demonstrate that al-

Qaeda relies on more legitimate local militants in order

to achieve its regional goals.15

Al-Qaeda’s stated regional objectives include toppling

the Pakistani state, undermining American efforts in

Afghanistan, and driving a wedge between the United

States and Pakistan.16 These regional objectives are

part of al Qaeda’s global fight to eliminate American

and Western influence in the Islamic world and replace

the governments of Muslim countries with religiously

fundamentalist regimes.17 Al-Qaeda has also indicated

a desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden

has described the task of obtaining a nuclear weapon as

a “religious duty,” and several al-Qaeda operatives

have attempted to purchase a weapon or gain nuclear

T here are several terrorist groups operating within Pakistan’s borders that

have demonstrated increasing cooperation. Thus, distinctions between

the groups are not clearly defined. This growing nexus of terror has


Terrorism Profile

expertise. Before the September 11th attacks, two

Pakistani nuclear scientists allegedly met with bin

Laden and senior al-Qaeda members and provided

them with a “rough sketch” of how to make a nuclear

weapon.18 Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of the

Pakistani scientists, believed that Pakistan’s nuclear

weapons belonged to the worldwide Muslim

community, or ummah.19

The threat of al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates obtaining a

nuclear weapon or nuclear materials should not be

underestimated. Many reports have indicated that

terrorists could fashion a crude nuclear device with the

right materials, though, it seems that this has not yet

happened. Nuclear materials could be seized from

poorly secured nuclear facilities, intercepted during

transport, or obtained from the black market. The

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has

indicated that there have been eighteen confirmed

cases of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU)

or plutonium to date.20 It is likely that there are many

more unconfirmed cases of loss or theft which have

resulted in nuclear smuggling, which is extraordinarily

difficult to prevent given the weakness of state borders

and the difficulty of detecting small quantities of

radioactive material.21

Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) or Pakistani

Taliban

The formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), also

known as the Pakistani Taliban, under the leadership

of Baitullah Mehsud in late 2007 has also been

instrumental to the recent upsurge of violence in

Pakistan.22 The TTP formed as an umbrella

organization, incorporating thirteen former militant

groups from the tribal areas of Western Pakistan that

had lent support to the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Members of the TTP, which are expected to number

between 30,000 and 35,000, come from all of FATA’s

seven agencies as well as several frontier provinces in

the NWFP.23 The TTP has sought to unite pro-Taliban

groups within the country, assist the Afghan Taliban in

its insurgency campaign against American and allied

forces across the border in Afghanistan, and establish

an Islamic state in Pakistan based on the model of the

Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.24 According

to U.S. ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism

Daniel Benjamin, the TTP cooperates with al-Qaeda

and acts as a force multiplier for the terrorist network.25

The group has been accused of the December 2007

assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

in addition to many other terrorist attacks across the

country.26

Recent attacks have demonstrated that the TTP targets

the United States and seeks to export terrorism beyond

Pakistan’s borders. On December 30, 2009, a Jordanian

born double agent working for the Pakistani Taliban,

who professed to have knowledge of the whereabouts

of senior al-Qaeda members, set off a suicide bomb

outside Forward Operating Base Chapman near Khost,

Afghanistan, killing the base chief, six other CIA

employees, and two Blackwater private security

contractors.27 Additionally, the TTP trained and

assisted Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad in his

failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square

on May 1, 2010.28 On September 1, 2010, the United

States formally declared the TTP a terrorist

organization and charged their current leader,

Hakimullah Mehsud, with conspiracy to murder

American citizens.29

Other Extremist Groups

Aside from al-Qaeda and the TTP, disparate extremist

groups have stepped up attacks against the state,

possibly as a result of the groups’ increasing drive for

cooperation. According to Pakistani journalist Imtiaz

Gul, terrorist groups that were formerly confined to

FATA “are now joining forces with groups around the

country -- and the result is a networked terrorism outfit

with an ever-growing capacity to produce pain and

mayhem.”30 Extremist groups such as Jaish-e-

Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba,31 which have

supposedly been supported by Islamabad as pawns to

undermine India and liberate Kashmir, forged links

with the TTP and al-Qaeda after they were banned by

the former Pakistani president General Pervez

Musharraf. As a result, extremists have been able to

conduct attacks outside of the tribal areas, which have

become the recent focus of Pakistani military

operations and U.S. drone strikes.32

Terrorism Profile


Furthermore, individual Islamist extremists or

alienated members of Pakistan’s security services could

potentially launch devastating attacks throughout the

country. This was demonstrated by the January 2011

assassination of the secular governor of Punjab, Salman

Taseer, by a member of his own police guard. Mumtaz

Qadri gunned down Taseer over his stance on

Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy law. The governor had

supported amending the law so that it couldn’t be used

to persecute religious minorities, and had urged

leniency for a Christian mother sentenced to death for

blasphemy. Although Qadri confessed to the crime, he

has received disturbing levels of support from

sympathetic segments of the Pakistani population.33

Terrorism Profile


Endnotes

7. Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror,”

Foreign Policy, June 10, 2010, http://

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/10/

pakistans_new_networks_of_terror?page=0,0.

8. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,”

Congressional Research Service, February 6,

2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/

RL33498.pdf, 7.

9. Gul.

10. Kronstadt, 7.

11. Don Rassler, “Al Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC

Sentinel, June 2009, Vol. 2, Issue 6, http://

www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-

Vol2Iss6.pdf, 1.

12. Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, “al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al

-Qaida, al-Qa’ida),” Council on Foreign Relations,

Backgrounder, December 30, 2009, http://

www.cfr.org/publication/9126/

alqaeda_aka_alqaida_alqaida.html?co=C005001.

13. Ibid.

14. Rassler, 1.

15. Ibid, 3.

16. Ibid, 4.

17. Bajoria & Bruno.

18. Bunn, 13-14.

19. Ibid, 14.

20. Ibid, 16-17.

21. Ibid, V, 5.

22. Baitullah Mehsud was killed on August 5, 2009 by

a U.S. Predator drone strike. See: Jane Mayer,

“The Predator War,” The New Yorker, October 26,

2009, http://www.newyorker.com/

reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?

printable=true.

23. Bajoria, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists.”

24. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the

political entity formed by the Afghan Taliban in

the mid-1990s, lasting until the U.S.-led invasion

of Afghanistan in 2001. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S.

Relations,” 10.

25. Spencer S. Hsu & Greg Miller, “U.S. Government

Charges Pakistani Leader Hakimullah Mehsud in

CIA Attack,” Washington Post, September 1,

2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2010/09/01/

AR2010090107160.html?hpid=sec-nation.

26. Mayer.

27. Hsu & Miller.

28. Benjamin Weiser, “Call to Taliban After Failed

Bomb Attempt in Times Sq.,” The New York

Times, September 29, 2010, http://

www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/

nyregion/30shahzad.html?ref=faisalshahzad.

29. Hsu & Miller.

30. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.”

31. Lashkar-e-Taiba is the group that is believed to

have orchestrated the Mumbai terrorist attacks in

November 2008. See Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S.

Relations,” 26-27.

32. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.”

33. Karin Brulliard, “As Progressive Pakistani Politician

is Mourned, his Suspected Killer is Lauded,” The

Washington Post, January 5, 2011, http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2011/01/05/AR2011010500341.html

existence of ties between elements of the government

security apparatus and Islamist extremists. These

threats are partially mitigated by a robust nuclear

security system that has improved over time.

However, no nuclear security system is foolproof,

despite the claims of Pakistani officials to the

contrary.34

Command and Control

Pakistan has taken many steps to boost nuclear

security, including the creation of a three tiered

command and control structure. The National

Command Authority (NCA) oversees all organizations

involved in nuclear research, weapons development,

strategy, deployment and employment.35 The NCA is

headed by the Prime Minister and includes the chair of

the joint chiefs of staff, the Director of the Strategic

Plans Division (SPD), Commanders of the various

branches of the Armed Services, and Ministers of

Defense, Interior, and Finance. A full consensus is

required for any nuclear strike.36 The SPD is tasked

with the daily management of Pakistan’s nuclear assets

and oversees approximately 10,000 personnel involved

in securing the arsenal and strategic infrastructure.37

The SPD also formulates nuclear doctrine and strategy;

the chain of command; and plans for the storage,

transport, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.38

The Army, Air Force, and Navy of Pakistan each have

their own strategic forces command, which comprises

the third tier of command and control.39

External Security Measures

Pakistan appears to have robust security measures in

place to moderate the threats posed by external assault.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are believed to be scattered

and disassembled. Reports indicate that the weapons

are stored at up to six locations and are likely buried in

deep underground facilities in order to prevent their

destruction or seizure during an attack on the facility.40

Analysts believe that the weapons are stored in

component form in separate buildings or facilities, thus

necessitating multiple operations to seize control of a

complete nuclear weapon.41 The SPD’s official position

is that the weapons will be ready when needed but will

not be on “hair trigger alert.” It should be noted that if

the weapons are stored in component form, this

measure might make the theft of a fissile nuclear core

easier if its location within the facility is known and can

be accessed.42 This indicates that Pakistan’s nuclear

security is principally designed to safeguard against an

attack by states, such as India, and not by extremist or

rogue forces interested in obtaining nuclear

components rather than a full-scale, strategic nuclear

device.

Pakistan implements security measures that are

integrated into the nuclear weapons themselves.

Pakistan claims to have developed its own Permissive

Action Links (PALs) technology and has integrated the

PALs into its nuclear security system. Assuming this is

the case, anyone seeking to utilize a nuclear weapon

would need to have authorizing codes, which are

T he threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials is extensive given

its proximity to well organized Islamist extremists, the relative fragility

of the state, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and the possible


Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

controlled by the NCA. Additionally, Pakistan

operates a standard two-man or three-man rule so that

multiple individuals are needed to activate the

weapons.43 If terrorists seek to acquire the fissile core

for use in a dirty bomb, however, the PALs will be

unable to prevent them from doing so.44

The physical security measures in place also present

considerable challenges to potential external assaults.

It is believed that the SPD and its 10,000 member

security force exclusively guard Pakistan’s weapons

sites.45 Shaun Gregory, a scholar focused on Pakistani

security, indicates that Pakistan “operates a layered

concept of concentric tiers of armed forces personnel to

guard nuclear weapons facilities,” in addition to

utilizing “barriers and intrusion detection systems.”46

Perimeter security measures such as strengthened

fencing and heightened surveillance are also utilized.

Counter-intelligence teams operate within nuclear

facilities in order to identify both external and internal

threats.47 It appears as if external attacks by extremist

forces would not be able to overcome the physical

safeguards in place without internal assistance.

Another tool that Pakistani forces utilize to safeguard

their nuclear weapons is the secrecy of the program

itself. The location of nuclear weapons sites and other

critical aspects of the program are kept secret, and

transport of nuclear components and materials is

generally conducted clandestinely and avoids highly

visible security measures.48 This approach offers both

strengths and weaknesses for countering external

attacks from extremist forces. The secrecy of the

location of nuclear components limits the ability of

extremists because they will not know where to look

for the weapons without insider assistance. Ideally, not

only will outsiders not know precisely which facilities

house nuclear components, but they also will not know

where to look within those facilities for the components

in question.49 However, this emphasis on secrecy

rather than overt security could create vulnerabilities

during transportation. If a terrorist group obtained

intelligence on the timing and route of transported

nuclear components they could be susceptible to

theft.50

Although Pakistan’s external security measures

significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists would

be able to obtain nuclear weapons or materials, they are

far from invincible. Many of Pakistan’s suspected

nuclear weapons facilities are located near or within

areas contested by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As a

result, this increases the likelihood that terrorists

would be able to launch an attack on the facilities.

According to Gregory, three terrorist attacks have been

launched against Pakistan’s suspected nuclear facilities

in recent years.51 The facility at Sargodha, which

allegedly stores nuclear missiles, was attacked on

November 1, 2007. On December 10, 2007, there was a

suicide bombing at Kamra, a suspected nuclear airbase.

Finally, on August 20, 2008, Pakistani Taliban suicide

bombers attacked several entrances to the Wah

cantonment, considered to be one of Pakistan’s main

nuclear weapons manufacturing sites.52 These attacks

are alarming, and suggest that a better organized attack

aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons or materials could

potentially succeed. However, it bears emphasizing

that these attacks were all suicide bombings targeted

against the Pakistani military which occurred outside

of the respective facilities. Terrorists were not

necessarily targeting nuclear materials and they did not

breach the facilities during these attacks.53

The Obama administration is apparently confident that

Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are secure from external

assault. However, the administration harbors deep

concerns regarding the potential insider threat to

Pakistan’s nuclear materials.54

Internal Security Concerns: Support

for Extremist Groups?

Concerns regarding Pakistani nuclear security are

heightened by accusations from journalists and

scholars55 that the Pakistani government has supported

and continues to support Islamist extremist groups.

According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid,

following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and

America’s loss of interest in the region, Pakistan

supported the Taliban’s rise to power. This strategy

was based on the notion that a friendly government in

Afghanistan could check Indian influence and provide



strategic depth in any future conflict with India. Such a

strategy fundamentally ignored the destabilizing

influence that strengthening Islamist groups would

have on Pakistan and the region.56 According to

Rashid, Pakistan also supported the creation of Islamist

extremist groups in Kashmir as they sought to

undermine India’s control of the disputed territory.57

Rashid asserts that although al-Qaeda became allied

with the Taliban and began to use the region as a safe

haven, Pakistan turned a blind eye to al-Qaeda’s

operations due to the group’s support for the Taliban

and Kashmiri militants.58 Following the September 11th

attacks, Rashid argues that Pakistan has engaged in a

“duplicitous game” in which the government has

tolerated the presence of and supported certain

terrorist groups it deems valuable as counters against

India, such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in

addition to many Kashmir oriented groups, while

making efforts to hunt down al-Qaeda militants on

behalf of the United States.59 Although several high

profile arrests of al-Qaeda leaders have been made by

Pakistan, including Abu Zubaydah in March 2002 and

Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the so called “Mastermind

of 9/11,” in March 2003,60 Rashid asserts that many al-

Qaeda operatives eluded capture and were able to

coalesce in FATA without interference.61 As several

terrorist groups continue to use Pakistan as a safe

haven, accusations regarding active Pakistani support

for these groups have persisted.

The notion that Pakistan supports extremist groups is

highly disputed by Pakistani officials. Following

Harvard scholar Matt Waldman’s recent assertions that

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supports and

partially controls the Afghan insurgency, a Pakistani

military spokesman denounced Waldman’s report as

an untruthful, malicious account.62 Former Pakistani

ambassador Riaz M. Khan rejected the notion that

Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban in order to

provide “strategic depth” in any future conflict with

India. Rather, Ambassador Khan insisted that it was

the strategy of Pakistan to promote a stable and strong

neighbor in Afghanistan.63 Furthermore, an alternative

explanation exists for the prevalence of terrorist safe

havens within Pakistan. Rather than evidence of active

Pakistani support for terrorist groups, the safe havens

could be indicative of the semi-autonomous nature of

Pakistan’s tribal areas and the inability of the central

government to reclaim them.

U.S. officials have confronted Pakistan over alleged ISI

links to militant networks. U.S. concerns have

extended to the highest level of government, as former

President George W. Bush reportedly confronted the

Pakistani Prime Minister and asked who was in control

of the ISI, claiming that members of the ISI were

leaking sensitive intelligence to terrorist groups.64

Currently, the Obama administration has been

frustrated by what they deem as Pakistan’s

unwillingness to confront the Haqqani network and the

Afghan Taliban, which continue to use Pakistan as a

base to plan and launch attacks across the border in

Afghanistan.65 State Department cables leaked in

November 2010 reveal that the former U.S. ambassador

to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, remained deeply skeptical

that Pakistan would abandon its ties to certain militant

groups. Ms. Patterson wrote that “[t]here is no chance

that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in

any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning

support for these groups, which it sees as an important

part of its national security apparatus against India.”66

Although Pakistan’s relationship with Islamist

militants is unclear and disputed, allegations of ties

raise concerns regarding the security of Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons. If the ISI or its members actively

support Islamist militants or are sympathetic to their

cause, the chances are stronger that a rogue member

would attempt to divulge critical intelligence regarding

the nation’s nuclear security or otherwise assist the

networks in obtaining nuclear materials.

Internal Security Concerns:

The AQ Khan Network

The legacy of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation

network is also a serious cause for concern. In order

for Pakistan to obtain nuclear weapons technology, Dr.

Khan set up a black market network to purchase and

manufacture the equipment. Technology was bought

secretly in Europe and copied in factories run by Khan

around the globe. Khan then used this network to

supply other nations seeking to obtain nuclear



weapons, apparently believing that the more nations

with nuclear weapons programs, the less pressure that

there would be on Pakistan’s proliferation efforts.67

It was later found that the network sold nuclear

weapons-related technology, uranium enrichment

materials, and possibly blueprints for the construction

of advanced nuclear weapons to countries including

North Korea, Iran, and Libya.68 Khan was blamed for

Pakistan’s proliferation activities, which he initially

accepted while insisting that the Pakistani government

and army were not involved.”69 The United States

accepted this version of events, and Khan was placed

on house arrest. However, many experts believe that it

is highly unlikely that the head of Pakistan’s most

prominent nuclear research lab, Dr. Khan, could have

acted on his own without the knowledge and support

of the Pakistani army.70 Although Khan has been

closely monitored and restricted from talking to U.S. or

international officials, he has recently backed away

from his prior confession, indicating that it was forced

upon him so as to protect other officials from blame. In

2008, Khan stated that a shipment of centrifuges to

North Korea in 2000 was supervised by Pakistani

security officials with the consent of President

Musharraf.71

Experts have indicated that several Pakistanis involved

in the proliferation network remain at large and as a

result there is reason to believe that the network could

be revived.72 Additionally, some believe that the

Pakistani army cooperated with A.Q. Khan in order to

assist global proliferation efforts. If either scenario is

true, it could mean that Pakistan, or elements within

the country, could revive the network and seek to sell

nuclear secrets or materials, potentially to a terrorist

network. These fears are further enhanced by the

meeting between two Pakistani nuclear scientists and

senior al-Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden,

before the September 11th attacks.

Internal Security Measures

Pakistan has acted to improve its nuclear security

measures in response to international pressure.

Individuals involved in the nuclear program must

undergo a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which

examines a person’s background for evidence of

Islamist sympathies, improper group affiliations, and

other potential personality problems such as drug use

and sexual deviancy.73 An 8,000 member workforce

from four intelligence agencies, including the SPD and

the ISI, is involved in the vetting process. Security

clearance renewal is required every two years or when

a worker is transferred to a different post and random

checks are performed when needed.74 The SPD has

instituted a monitoring system to follow the

movements of all personnel involved in nuclear

security.75 Officers are drawn primarily from Punjab

province, which is believed to have fewer extremist

sympathies and ties. As described previously, a two or

three man rule is in effect to limit the risk of a lone

rogue agent colluding with external actors.76

Furthermore, General Kayani, the former head of the

ISI, took measures to weed out members of the

organization with known Islamist sympathies.77

These measures reduce the likelihood of insider-

outsider collusion. However, no personnel security

system guarantees complete protection. Should an

insider be able to assist in the proliferation of nuclear

materials, technology, expertise, or weapons, they

would greatly increase the chances that terrorist groups

could acquire a radiological dispersion device, or dirty

bomb. Despite relatively robust security measures,

there is a chance that sleeper agents could slip past

security measures unprotected, provided that they

displayed no overt sympathies or links to terrorist

groups.78 Finally, serious concerns remain regarding

Pakistan’s nuclear expertise. A.Q. Khan and Sultan

Bashiruddin Mahmood’s separate attempts to assist

global proliferation efforts underscore this problem.

As Pakistan’s nuclear program expands it is necessary

to monitor and carefully manage those possessing

nuclear knowledge. Efforts to retrain and assist those

who are leaving Pakistan’s nuclear program may be

needed.79

Summary of Pakistan’s Nuclear

Security

The existence of well organized Islamist extremist

groups within Pakistan’s borders, the relative fragility



of the state, allegations of governmental support to

terrorist groups, and lingering doubts concerning the

legacy of the A.Q. Khan network raise red flags

concerning Pakistan’s nuclear security. Fortunately,

Pakistan has a robust system in place to mitigate many

threats to its nuclear security. However, no system is

perfect. Given the enormous threats to the country’s

nuclear arsenal, Pakistan remains one of the world’s

greatest nuclear security vulnerabilities. The threat of

terrorist attack on nuclear facilities, and potentially of

insider collaboration with terrorist groups, is high.

Over the long-term, there is a somewhat distant threat

that the Pakistani state could collapse or weaken

significantly so that nuclear safeguards would be

unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

However, the threats of external attack and internal

collaboration are partially addressed by current

safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely, particularly

if the United States and the international community

remain engaged in the region.



Endnotes

34. Nick Schifrin, “Pakistan Calls Nuke Security Program ‘Foolproof,’” ABC News, January 26, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=4195055.

35. Kerr & Nikitin, 8-9. 36. Ibid, 9. 37. Kenneth N. Luongo & Naeem Salik, “Building

Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo.

38. Kerr & Nikitin, 9. 39. Luongo & Salik. 40. Vikram Jagadish, “Pakistan’s Ultimate Nightmare

Scenario: Preventing Islamic Extremists from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons,” Texas Review of Law & Politics, Spring, 2009.

41. Bunn, 29. 42. Kerr & Nikitin, 10. 43. Jagadish, 3. 44. Ibid, 3. 45. Ibid, 4. 46. Gregory, 2. 47. Jagadish, 4. 48. Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing

the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.” 49. Jagadish, 2. 50. Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing

the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.” 51. Gregory, 2-3. 52. Ibid, 3. 53. Robert Mackey, “Have Pakistani Nuclear Facilities

Already Been Attacked?” The New York Times, The Lede, August 11, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/have-pakistani-nuclear-facilities-already-been-attacked/.

54. Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, “Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/asia/01wikileaks-pakistan.html?_r=1&emc=eta1

55. See Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” and Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan Rejects Report Saying Nation’s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2010/06/14/

AR2010061405056.html. 56. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 25. 57. Ibid, 40-41. 58. Ibid, 48. 59. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink,” The New

York Review of Books, June 11, 2009, Volume LVI, Number 10, (12-16), 14.

60. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 50. 61. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 223. 62. Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan Rejects Report Saying

Nation’s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2010061405056.html.

63. Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, “Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy.”

64. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 16-17. 65. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Strained U.S.-Pakistan

Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/23210/strained_uspakistan_alliance.html.

66. Perlez et al. 67. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 287-288. 68. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 62. 69. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 288. 70. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 63. 71. “Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were

Shipped,” Associated Press, New York Times, July 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/world/asia/05pstan.html.

72. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 63. 73. Gregory, 2. 74. Jagadish, 4. 75. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan:

Separating Myth from Reality,” July/August 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/khan.

76. Gregory, 2. 77. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.” 78. Jagadish, 5. 79. Feroz Hassan Khan.

sharing of best practices, disrupting terrorist networks,

and promoting strong Pakistani democracy and good

governance. Protection against a threat as catastrophic

as nuclear terrorism cannot be limited to a single

dimension. As Matthew Bunn argues, “reducing the

risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan must include both steps

to further improve nuclear security measures and steps

to reduce extremists’ ability to challenge the Pakistani

state, to recruit nuclear insiders, and to mount large

outsider attacks.”80 Efforts to address these issues are

ongoing and should be reexamined to ensure that they

are effective.

Pakistan’s nuclear security is an important, yet

sensitive, issue in U.S. foreign policy. Pakistan takes

great pride in its nuclear arsenal and the United States

has attempted to deter Pakistan from obtaining nuclear

weapons, to rollback Pakistan’s nuclear capability, and

has sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear arsenal. Many

Pakistanis view American skepticism regarding

Pakistan’s nuclear security as evidence of further

interventionism in Pakistani affairs. Thus, the United

States must carefully balance efforts to address the

threat with sensitivity to Pakistan’s desires for secrecy

and national control of the program. Assistance efforts

should avoid pressing Pakistan to divulge too much

critical information. A false step on this issue could

jeopardize the overarching U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Consultations

Consultations between the United States and Pakistan

have reportedly involved the sharing of best practices,

technical measures to prevent theft or accidental launch

of nuclear weapons, personnel reliability and the

physical security of nuclear facilities.81 Pakistan has

also accepted high-level training on nuclear security

from the United States.82 For the most part, these

consultations are shrouded in secrecy. According to a

Pakistani official, Pakistan reserves the right to “pick

and choose” which aspects of nuclear security the

consultations will address, and only “non-intrusive

measures have been accepted.”83 American diplomatic

cables leaked in November 2010 have revealed that the

United States has tried and failed to get Pakistan to

remove highly enriched uranium from a nuclear

research reactor since 2007. The uranium stockpile is

believed to be large enough to build several dirty

bombs or, in the hands of a skilled nuclear physicist,

potentially a nuclear bomb. U.S. officials feared that

the uranium could be seized by a terrorist group,

whereas Pakistan feared a potential media backlash if

they agreed to American requests to secure the

uranium.84

Despite Pakistan’s aversion to cooperate on every

issue, these consultations may have helped Pakistan

improve its nuclear security measures in recent years.

In light of recent improvements, the United States has

denied the charge that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are

not secure. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard

Armitage asserted that “we have spent considerable

time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and

working with them on the security of their nuclear

P akistan’s nuclear security could potentially be strengthened by increased

cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. Beneficial

cooperation between the two countries might include consultations and


Pakistan-United States Cooperation

weapons. I think most observers would say that they

are fairly secure.”85 While Pakistan does have robust

measures that have likely been enhanced with input

from the United States, nuclear security is an ongoing

process that requires constant improvement.

Consultations between the two should continue and

should aim to reduce vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s

nuclear arsenal.

In order to cooperate on this issue, the United States

and Pakistan need to build confidence in one another

and lower the levels of persistent mutual suspicion and

mistrust. Thus, there is a strong need for clear

communication regarding the threat that nuclear

terrorism poses to both countries.86 Pakistan has

traditionally focused more on external threats to its

nuclear arsenal than on internal threats. This includes

India, but also the United States. The United States

needs to reassure Pakistan that it is respectful of

Pakistan’s sovereignty and is not seeking to seize

control of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistani fears that the

United States is once again interfering with Pakistan’s

nuclear arsenal could jeopardize any potential working

relationship. Furthermore, there is a tendency for some

Pakistanis to underestimate the threat posed by

Islamist extremist groups, writing them off as “men in

caves.”87 It must be clear to Pakistan that terrorist

groups do pose a threat to the Pakistani state and that

its nuclear arsenal has to be robustly defended against

internal threats.

Once Pakistani fears regarding American intentions are

allayed and Pakistan understands the common threat,

close cooperation on the identification of vulnerabilities

is necessary. For example, the two countries could

cooperate on securing Pakistan’s nuclear expertise.

Consultations should consider long-term trends that

could create new vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear

security system, such as rising levels of extremism

within the country and Pakistan’s expanding nuclear

arsenal. Rising levels of extremism could mean that

there is a greater likelihood of insider collaboration

with external threats. Pakistan’s nuclear expansion

will result in more facilities, weapons and materials to

protect.88 Furthermore, Pakistan and the United States

ought to consider developing contingencies for

communication in the event of a crisis in order to

promote predictability and ease tension if an

emergency arises.89

Finally, joint public outreach efforts to the Pakistani

public could increase transparency and support for

U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. It is important for the

Pakistani public to see that joint cooperation on nuclear

security is normal and that the United States does not

have ulterior motives. Joint cooperation is currently

kept secret, leading many to doubt American

intentions.90 Some Islamic extremists have played

upon Pakistani fears, suggesting that the United States

seeks to scoop up Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Sultan

Bashiruddin Mahmood, the nuclear scientist who met

with Osama bin Laden, suggested that Pakistan should

support extremists to guard against a potential

American seizure of the weapons.91

Counter-Terrorism

Efforts to strengthen Pakistani nuclear security cannot

simply cover Pakistani safeguards. They also have to

counter the growing terrorist threat within Pakistan.

Ongoing counterterrorist operations within Pakistan

consist of two separate initiatives. The first is CIA

operated drone strikes within FATA to eliminate

known insurgent leaders. The second initiative is

comprised of counterinsurgency operations conducted

by the Pakistani army to eliminate terrorist safe havens.

The “Drone War” over Western Pakistan is

controversial and is shrouded in secrecy. Drones are

unmanned, remotely flown aircraft that utilize video

surveillance and launch missiles onto targets from

miles above. The U.S. government runs two drone

programs, one controlled by the military in

acknowledged war zones and one controlled by the

CIA that seeks out terrorists around the world. The

program in Pakistan is run by the CIA and is operating

not in a war zone, but in an allied country. The CIA’s

efforts are classified, and thus there is no official

information on where the drones operate, how they

select their targets, who oversees the program, and

how many civilians are killed.92 However, Peter

Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of the New America

Foundation indicate that drone strikes in Pakistan have



been limited to FATA, primarily focusing on the

terrorist safe havens in North and South Waziristan.93

This is likely due to restrictions placed on the United

States by Pakistan and to the fact that FATA possesses

virtually no infrastructure, is highly rural, and has been

the principal safe haven for terrorist networks in the

region. As a result, civilian casualties and attention to

the program are minimized.

In Pakistan, drone strikes have been conducted by the

United States since 2004. They have relied on a human

intelligence network established during the Bush

administration to inform the CIA of the whereabouts of

al-Qaeda militants and other terrorist groups in the

region.94 The pace of drone strikes has been rapidly

accelerated by the Obama administration. According

to Bergen and Tiedemann, there were only forty-five

drone attacks in Pakistan during the entire Bush

administration. In 2009, the Obama administration

launched 51 drone attacks.95 This total was more than

doubled in 2010, with as many as 118 drone strikes.96

It appears as if the drone program has severely

disrupted the operations of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

The drone program has killed many terrorist leaders -

more than half of the CIA’s “high value” targets were

killed by the drone program in 2009.97 An atmosphere

of fear and distrust has allegedly been created among

the extremist groups operating in FATA due to the

constant threat of drone strikes. Militants have taken

to sleeping outside among the trees rather than risk

being killed inside a building. As the drone program

depends on a human intelligence network, al-Qaeda

and its affiliates have regularly executed suspected

spies.98

However, several factors complicate the supposed

success of the drone program. First, terrorist groups

have continued their operations despite the threat of

drones in FATA. The sharp rise in drone attacks

undertaken by the Obama administration has not

resulted in a sharp reduction of terrorist attacks within

Pakistan. Militant leaders are killed, but replaced. Al-

Qaeda and its affiliates are still able to use Pakistan as a

base to recruit and train future terrorists from around

the globe, including from Western countries.99 After a

years-long sustained drone campaign, many of the

militants originally limited to FATA may have fled the

region to undertake operations in more urbanized

settings, potentially further destabilizing Pakistan.

Furthermore, Pakistanis overwhelmingly view the

drone strikes negatively as violations of sovereignty

and attacks against civilians. A Gallup poll from

August 2009 found that only nine percent of Pakistanis

approved of the attacks.100 The number of civilian and

terrorist deaths in these strikes is extraordinarily

difficult to determine. Peter Bergen and Katherine

Tiedemann estimated that 114 drone attacks from 2004

through early 2010 killed between 830 and 1,210

people. Of those killed, between 550 and 850 were

reported to be militants, or approximately two-thirds of

the total.101 Given that considerable civilian casualties

accompany the program, whether or not the drone

program kills or creates more terrorists is a matter of

debate that should be openly discussed. However,

Bergen and Tiedemann argue that civilian deaths

declined in 2010 due to better intelligence, more

accurate targeting, smaller missiles, and enhanced

cooperation with Pakistan.102 Reducing the number of

civilian deaths is an important trend that should be

continued so as to reduce blowback against the United

States and Pakistan.

The second major ongoing counterterrorist initiative

within the country is the Pakistani army’s

counterinsurgency operations against domestically

based militants. According to many American

observers, Pakistan has been slow to address the rising

threat of militancy emanating from within its borders.

These observers argue that despite Pakistan’s

longstanding promises to reign in terrorist groups,

Pakistan has continued to serve as the base of

operations for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The United

States has sought to convince Pakistan of the need to

reorient the military from its traditional focus on a

conventional war with India to a counterinsurgency

war against domestic terror groups.103 Since 2001,

Pakistan has conducted several operations to reign in

militants and assert control over the semi-autonomous

tribal regions. Many of these efforts have proven

largely unsuccessful, although Pakistan’s 2009

operations in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan

may have shown some improvement.104



Measuring the Swat Valley and South Waziristan

operations in purely military terms could yield the

conclusion that they were moderately successful. The

operations succeeded in temporarily ousting

insurgents from the targeted areas, but at a steep cost.

They resulted in a huge wave of internally displaced

persons. Efforts to stabilize and revitalize Swat and

South Waziristan have stalled. Many civilians are still

displaced by the fighting and guerrilla groups have

challenged the Pakistani army. Safe havens persist,

such as in North Waziristan, and violence continues to

grip the country.105

The Role of Democracy, Development

& Good Governance

Over the long-term, the stability of the Pakistani state

and its nuclear materials depends on Pakistan’s ability

to undercut support for extremist groups by promoting

democracy, good governance, and development. An

economically sound, democratic Pakistan would limit

the appeal of terrorism by providing avenues for

economic advancement and political participation

through the state. A sole focus on military efforts

against terrorist groups will result in casualties and

increase the political appeal of extremists if not

accompanied by measures to benefit the people of

Pakistan.

Pakistan has been directly controlled by the military for

more than half of its existence. Former General Pervez

Musharraf assumed control of the country in a

bloodless coup in 1999 and ruled until 2008, when the

late Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)

gained power in elections that rejected Musharraf’s

policies.106 Unfortunately, the new civilian government

that took power in 2008 under President Asif Ali

Zardari (Benazir Bhutto’s widower) has been weak and

divided. Internal strife and a bad economy have

limited his government’s appeal and contributed to the

feeling that Zardari is out of touch with the people. As

a result of Zardari’s unpopularity and diminished

power, the army still retains significant power,

autonomy and influence in Pakistan’s foreign and

national security policy.107

Economic development is needed, but the outlook in

January 2011 is grim despite U.S. aid efforts. Pakistan

has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid at

approximately $10.4 billion since 2001, $6 billion for

development and humanitarian assistance and $4.4

billion for security related assistance.108 Additionally,

Pakistan is reimbursed for many counterterrorism

related expenses. The United States expanded its

assistance with the Enhanced Partnership with

Pakistan Act of 2009, which provides Pakistan with

$1.5 billion per year for five years in nonmilitary aid

while making military aid to the country conditions-

based.109 Although the bill resulted in a huge

expansion of aid for economic development, concerns

remain as to how effective it will be and how much will

get to the Pakistani people.110 High inflation and

unemployment, food shortages and an energy crisis

have gripped Pakistan in the past few years. Recent

recovery has been modest at best, and Pakistan’s

growth outlook is troubled. Investors fear operating in

an atmosphere as chaotic as Pakistan.111 Expanding

access to American markets for Pakistani exports is a

goal that could assist the country’s economic

development, but the United States has stalled in

efforts to do so.112

During July and August of 2010, Pakistan was

devastated by torrential rains that caused widespread

flooding. Thousands died, as many as 20 million

Pakistanis were displaced, and countless villages were

destroyed.113 The flooding is likely to create a food

shortage and devastate the economy, thus straining an

already cash-strapped Pakistani government.

Pakistan’s precarious security situation could also

deteriorate. Flooding has disproportionately impacted

poorer, rural areas that were already prone to

militancy.114 The NWFP and Swat Valley, recent

havens for terrorist groups, were flooded, potentially

creating an opening for militant groups to retrench and

gain support among the people by providing their own

relief.115 Amid the deepening chaos, the Pakistani

central government must remain vigilant regarding its

nuclear security so that its nuclear weapons and

materials remain secure. Given America’s strong

interest in a stable Pakistan, relief efforts should

continue to be a top priority of the United States.



Endnotes

80. Bunn, 31. 81. Kerr & Nikitin, 13. 82. Khan. 83. Kerr & Nikitin, 14. 84. Perlez, et al. 85. Kerr & Nikitin, 14. 86. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Building a Strategic U.S.-

Pakistan Nuclear Relationship,” CTC Sentinel, April 2010, Vol. 3, Issue 4, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss4.pdf, 1-2.

87. Ibid, 2. 88. Ibid, 2. 89. Ibid, 2. 90. Ibid, 3. 91. Ibid, 3. 92. Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker,

October 26, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?printable=true.

93. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” The New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf, 3.

94. Matt Irvine, “On Drone Strikes,” Abu Muqawama, Center for A New American Security, April 16, 2010, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/drone-strikes.html.

95. Bergen & Tiedemann, New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones, (summary of Bergen & Tiedemann’s findings – updated frequently)

96. Ibid. 97. Mayer. 98. Bergen & Tiedemann, “Year of the Drone,” 5.

99. Ibid, 4. 100. Ibid, 1. 101. Ibid, 3. 102. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The

Hidden War,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_hidden_war?page=0,5.

103. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 18. 104. C. Christine Fair & Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War

Within,” Survival. December 2009-January 2010. http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/51-6-13_Fair_and_Jones.pdf, 161.

105. Terrence Smith & Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, “Pakistan: In the Cauldron” Center for Strategic & International Studies, South Asia Monitor, Number 139, March 3, 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/sam_139.pdf.

106. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments,” Congressional Research Service, June 1, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41307.pdf, 52.

107. Ibid, 54. 108. Kronstadt, “Key Current Issues & Developments,”

57. 109. As discussed above. 110. Ibid, 57-58. 111. Ibid, 51. 112. Ibid, 53. 113. Ahmed Rashid, “Last Chance for Pakistan,” New

York Review of Books, August 16, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/16/last-chance-pakistan/.

114. The country’s northern provinces, including the NWFP and Swat Valley, Sindh province in the South, and Balochistan, home to a separatist insurgency, have been among the hardest hit territories. Rashid, “Last Chance for Pakistan.”

115. Ibid.



P akistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of

state fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties

between rogue elements of Pakistan’s security services and Islamist

militants. Al-Qaeda, which seeks to conduct a nuclear

attack, has challenged the Pakistani state along with

numerous homegrown militant groups. Efforts to

bolster Pakistan’s nuclear security should address

safeguards, counterterrorism, and the promotion of

democracy and development. As long as Pakistan

remains unstable and the home of the world’s most

dangerous extremist groups, it will continue to be one

of the world’s most significant nuclear security threats.

Given the stakes, reducing the nuclear threat in

Pakistan must be a top international priority.


Conclusion


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Threat Convergence in Pakistan: Countering Terrorist Aspirations and Improving Nuclear Security