14
Title The Competitive Relationship between German Automobile Companies ―Daimler-Benz, Adam Opel, Volkswagen―(1) Author(s) NISHIMUTA, Yuji Citation The Kyoto University Economic Review (1999), 67(1-2): 11- 23 Issue Date 1999-03 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/44288 Right Type Departmental Bulletin Paper Textversion publisher Kyoto University

Title The Competitive Relationship between German … · TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies-Daimler-Benz,AdamOpel,Volkswagen-(1) by Yuji NISHIMUTA ・ TheGermanAutomobileMarketin

  • Upload
    dothuy

  • View
    213

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Title The Competitive Relationship between German AutomobileCompanies ―Daimler-Benz, Adam Opel, Volkswagen―(1)

Author(s) NISHIMUTA, Yuji

Citation The Kyoto University Economic Review (1999), 67(1-2): 11-23

Issue Date 1999-03

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/44288

Right

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Textversion publisher

Kyoto University

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies

-Daimler-Benz ,AdamOpel,Volkswagen-(1)

byYujiNISHIMUTA ・

TheGermanAutomobileMarketinthe1920sandtheProcessof

Daimler-Benz'sEstablishment

ThesixcompaniesthatmakeuptheGermanautomobilemanufacturingindustry

havetheirowncharacteristics.Listingthecompaniesinorderofproductionvolume ,theyare:VolkswagenAG, Wolfsburg;Daimler-BenzAG, Stuttgart-Unterturkheim;

AdamOpelAG , Russelsheim;BayerischeMotorenWerke(BMW)AG , Munich;Fordュ

WerkeAG, Cologne;Dr.Ing.h.c.F.PorscheAG, Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen. Whathisュ

toricalcourseofdevelopmentsleadtotheGermanautomobilecompaniesintheirpreュ

sentforms?Whatcompetitiverelationshipswerethesecompaniesformedfrom?When

consideringthesequestions ,wemustpayparticularattentiontotheperiodfrom1920's

to1930's.Aswesawinthepreviouspapers , thiswasaperiodwhentheGermanautoュ

mobileindustryitselfmadedecisivechanges.AfterWorldWarI, theAmericanautoュ

mobileindustryadvancedintotheglobalmarketwithoverwhelmingproductionpower ,leadbyFord , whichestablishedasystemformassproduction , andGM.Stronglyimュ

pacted , thefirstwaveof“ motor iza t ion " alsohittheGermanautomobilemarket.

Lookingattheresults , theresponseoftheGermanautomobilecompaniesthatsurvived

canbelargelydividedintotwocontrastingdirections. Thegroupofcompaniesthat

chosethedirectionofsmallcars , leadbyAdamOpel , foundedthemassautomobile

marketinGermany , introducinganAmerican 帽style productionmethod. Goinginthe

other , indeedopposite , direction , werecompaniessuchasDaimler-Benz , withaluxury

carorientation.Wheredidthesedifferencescomefrom?Thatis , whatdevelopments

didtheycomeaboutbywayof?Thisisoneproblem.Ofcourseinthatcase , theestabュ

lishment(1937)andexpansionofVolkswagenwerk , whichwillultimatelybecomeGerュ

many'smostfull-fledgedmassautomobilemaker , comesintoourmind.Anexaminaュ

tionofthiswillbethegeneralsubjectforthesecondpartofthispaper.

IfweturnourattentionheretoDaimler-Benz , wefindacompanywithasecure

positionintheGermandomesticandglobalmarketsasatopluxurypassengercar

makerandalsoasamajortruckmaker.Inaddition , inrecentyearsDaimler-Benzhas

acquiredandmergedsuccessivelywithhigh-techAEG (electronics) , Dornierand

MessaschmidtBerkoBlome(MBB)(airline) , andMTU(largeengines). Bydoingso ,thecompanymainlyexistsasanewcomprehensivemakersotospeak. How , whyand

ホ Professor. GraduateSchoolofEconomics.KyotoUniversity.

12 Yuji NISHIMUTA

bywhatmeanswasthistypeoforiginalmanagementstrategyformed?PriortoJune

1926, Daimler-Benz existed as Daimler Motoren GesellschafrtJ), Stuttgart・

Unterturkheim , andBenz&Cie, RheinischeAutomobil-undMotorenfabrikMannheim

AG2)eachindependentlyproducingautomobiles. Daimler-Benzwasformedthrough

theirmerger , andpursuedafixedcoursetoestablishitsownmanagementstrategy.

Lookingatsalesandthenumberofgeneralemployees , whichshowthechangeinthe

company'sscale , andtherelationbetweentheseandprofit , whichshowsthechangein

salesconditions , wegetthefollowinggeneraloutlineofthecompany'sexpansiondurュ

ingthisperiod.Thatis ,Daimler-Benzaftergoingthroughregularperiodsoflackluster

growthandmanagementdifficultiesinthe1920s(highestsaleswere130.8millionRM

in1928), thecompanyachievedlarge-scaleexpansionduringtheNaziregimeinthe

1930s(salesin1938hit462.0millionRM). Notstoppingthere , duringthewaryears

0939 ・1945) Daimler-Benzgrewintoahugecompany0944saleswere953.9millionRM

andthenumberofemployeeswasnearly100,000). Whatcharacteristicsdidthiscourse

ofexpansionhave?

Whileexaminingthesevariousissuestheauthorparticularlyreliedupondocuュ

mentsandhistoricalmaterialscontainedintheDaimler-Benzcorporatearchives

(Daimler-BenzA.G. Archiv , Stuttgart-Unterturkheim).Detailedminutes(Protokoll)

fromtheboardofdirectors(Vorstand)andsupervisorymeetings(Aufsichtsrat)were

veryusefulespeciallyforunderstandingthedecision-makingprocessformanagement

strategy.TheauthorwouldliketoexpresshisdeepthanksheretoReinerKarnowski

andothersattheDaimler-Benzarchivesfortheirhelpwiththegatheringofmaterials.

Inthispaper ,let'sfirstexamineindepthhowDaimler-Benzcametobeformed

duringthecircumstancesoftheearly1920safterWorldWar1.

I TheGermanAutomobileIndustryintheEarly1920sandtheFormationofthe

Daimler-BenzCooperativeProfitGroup ,Interessengemeinschaft

Rightnowlet'slookattheyear1924.Duetothestabilityofthemark , Germancapitalismwasonceagainincludedwithinnormalrelationsintheglobalmarket.Howュ

ever , theimport/exporttrendintheautomobilemarketshowedarapiddeclineinexュ

portsandacontrastingsuddenincreaseinimports.Atthispointtherewasanobvious

gapintheinternationalcompetitivestrengthoftheAmericanautomobileindustry ,whichwasadvancingglobally , havingalreadyestablishedamass-productionsystem ,andtheGermanautomobileindustry , whichwaslyinginwait.

InthesecircumstancesthecompaniescomprisingtheGermanautomobileinュ

dustryhadtorespondquickly. ItgoeswithoutsayingthatoneofthesewasAdam

Opel , whichleadtheothersinproductionreform , restructuringtheproductionprocess

towardso-calledFliessfertigung. However , thiswasnottheonlyresponsebytheGerュ

manautomobilecompanies.ThechangeinthenumberofGermanautomobilemakers

1)ForinformationonDaimlerbeforetheformationofDaimler-Benz , pleasereferto:M.Kruk&G.Lingnau , 100

Jα hre Dα imler-Benz Dαs Untemehmen , Mainz1986, S.3-20, 27-64,89-106.

2)ForinformationonDaimlerbeforetheformationofDaimler-Benz , pleasereferto:Ebenda , S.3・20 , 21-26, 64-88.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 13

fromthistimeonshowsthatononehand , weaker , smallercompanieswereweededout ,

whileontheotherhand , severalstrongercompaniestookthecourseofmergers.

Therearethreemovementsthataroseduringthisperiodthatshouldbereュ

markedon.ThefirstisduetoJacobShapiro , thechairmanofBerlin'sonecarbody

company ,ScheberaBodyWorks(A.G.ScheberaKarosserieWerkeA.G.).Intheperiod

from1923to1927, heorchestratedtheextremelyenergeticintegratedactivitiesofthe

Germanautomobileindustry3). First , Shapiroin1923appearedattheBenzshareュ

holder'smeetingwith10%ofhisacquiredstockandwaselectedtothesupervisory

committee , Aufsichtrat.Inaddition , heachievedaclosecooperativerelationshipbeュ

tweenBenzandScheberaBodyWorkbyconcludingacontractbetweenthetwocompaュ

nies4). Inthesameyear , headvancedintoHansaAutomobilwerkeA.G.5) andin1924

didthesamewithNAG6). Againin1924, alongwithcontrolling90%ofthestockin

Cyklon7 に he broughtNSU8)andGothaerWaggon9)underhiscontrol.Heacquiredin

1925twohorsecarriagemakersandNuremberg'spresscompany10). Additionally , by1926hecontrolledthemajorityofstockinNSUandacquired60%ofthesharesinBenz.

ThevariouscompaniesunderShapiro'scontrolwerestillinaseparateparallelstate ,buthisactionscontinuedafterthat.Accordingtohisplan , in1927thecompanieswere

consolidatedintoan80millionRMcompany , andfinally , hebroughtinDresdnerBank

andDanatBank(Darmstadter-undNationalBank).WiththeexceptionofAdamOpel ,

Horch , StoeverandAudi , whichwerefamily-owendcompaniesatthattime , Shapiro

pushedforwardwithhisgrandplantouniteallGermanautomobilecompaniesintoone

largeconsolidatedcompany.Let'sinformallycallJacobShapiro'sactivities!!) , whichshouldbecomparedwithWilliamDurant's12)activitiesatthetimeofestablishingGenュ

eralMotorsinU.S. , the“Shapir o project".

AnimportantfactisthatthemovementtounifytheGermanautomobilein-

3)H.Maurer , DasZuzamenschluBprobleminderDeutscheenAutomobilindustriemitbesonderBerucksichtigungder

Auto-UnionA.G. , Diss.Zurich1936, S.52-53.

4)EbendaandKruk&Lingnau , a.a.0. , S.87.

5)HansaAutomobilwerkeAG(1905-)In1929mergedwithHansaLloyd

WerkeAGandsoonbecameamemberoftheBorgwardGroup , Goliath-WerkeBorgward&Co.GmbH.Thecomュ

pany , locatedinBremen, continueduntil1961.W.Oswald , DeutscheAutos1920-19457.Auflage.Stuttgart1985,S.142ff.

6)Nationale-Automobil-Gesellschaft.Establishedin1901astheautomotivedivisionofAEGelectriccompany.The

companyabsorbedProtos-Werkein1926andPrestto-WerkeandDux-Werkein1927.In1930, thecompanymerged

withBusingandBusinglaterbecameNAG.LocatedinBerlin.W.Oswald , a.a.O. , S.271-281.

7)CyklonMaschinenfabrik(Berlin).Mergedin1926withGothaerWaggonfabrikandin1928becameBMW'sautoュ

motivedivisionalongwithDixi-Werke.W.Oswald , a.a.O. , S.80, 437.8)NechersulmerFahrzeugwerkeAG.Automobilemanufacturersince1906.AftercomingundertheShapiroumbrella ,

thecompanywasundertheumbrellaofItalianautomobilemakerFiatfrom1928to1932.Thecompanycontinued

asanimportantconcernafterWorldWarIIaswell, introducingtheworld'sfirstcarwitharotaryenginein1963.

Atpresent , thecompanyexistsundertheVWumbrellaasAutoUnion= NSU=Audi.W.Oswald.a.a.O. , S.282ュ

283.

9)In1928DixiandCyklonformBMW'sautomobiledivision.

10)H.Maurer , a'a'0. , S.52.

11)ForinformationonWilliamDurant'sactivities , refertoA.P.Sloan , J R., MyYearswithG巴neral Motors , 1963.(JapanesetranslationbyYujiTanaka , etc.[AlongwithGM] , 1967, page7)It'sworthnotingthatmanyofthe

companiesbroughtundertheShapiroumbrellalaterplayedmajorroles.

12)Ebenda , S.53.

14 Yuji NISHIMUTA

dustrywasnotonlythe“ Shapiro project." Anothermovementwaspursuedbythe

DarmstadterundNationalBank , commonlycalledDanatBank!3). TheheadofDanat

Bank , JacobGoldschmidt , alreadyhadputHansa-Lloyd , Busing , NAG , Durrkopp , and

AdlerWerke14)underhiscontrolandinadditionbecamethemainbusinessbankfor

AdamOpeI15). Theseactionsindicateanotherplanforthemerger16).

Inthemidstofallthis , therewasathirdmovementleadbyDeutscheBank17).

Dr.EmilGeorgvonStauss , thebankdirector , fromearlyonwastheonepersonwho

recognizedthe“ immedia te needforthecreationofatrustintheGermanautomobileinュ

dustry."18) HeclearlytargetedalargetrustlikethatofGeneralMotorsinU.S. , withtheminimumrequirementofincludingDaimlerandBenzinasouthGermanygroupand

alsoincludingBMWandAdamOpel!9). Staussdidnottakehiseyesoffhiscompetitors

movements , especiallyShapiro. Accordingly , hetookquickactionsinthisregard.

E.G.vonStaussin1920hadalreadyreceivedaseatonthesupervisorycommitュ

teeofDaimler. Meanwhile , Dr.CarlJahr , headoftheRheinicheKreditBank , saton

theBenzsupervisorycommittee.Therearevariousbusinessrelationshipsconcerning

DeutscheBank-Daimler , andDeutscheBank-Benz. Namely , Daimler'sprinciplebusiュ

nessbank , WiirtenbergischeVereinsBank , wasaddedastheStuttgartbranchof

DeutscheBankin1924.Ontheotherhand , theDeutscheBankin1922becameacontrolュ

lingshareholderintheRheinischeKreditBank , themainbusinessbankforBenz , andso

on.Atthispoint , vonStausscooperatedwithJahroftheRheinischeKreditBank , proュducingaplanfortheestablishmentofInteressengemeinschaft , acooperativeprofit

groupforDaimlerandBenz.InFebruary1924, Jahrsubmittedonedraft20)tothemanュ

agementofbothDaimlerandBenzinwhichheexplainedthenecessityandadvantages

ofcooperationbetweenthetwocompanies.Themainpointsofthismemowerereducュ

ingthenumberofcarmodelsandunificationofresearchanddevelopment , manufacュturing , purchasingandsalesfunctions. Inadditiontheresultsofcentralizationand

13)ForDanatBank , refertoK.Grosweiler , GroBbankenIndustriemonopoleStaat-OkonomieundPolitikdes

staalsmonopolistischenKapitalismusinDeutschelaud1914-1932, Berlin1971(JapanesetranslationbyKawanabe ,Kumagaya , andMatsumoto , [LargeBanks , IndustryMonopolies , Nations] 1979, frompage359)andW.

Hagemann , DasVerhaltnisderDeutscheenGroBbankenzurIndustrie , Berlin1931,S.13ff.

14)H.Maurer , DasZusammenschluBdprobleminderDeutscheenAutomobilindustriemitbesondereBerucksichtigung

derAutoUnionA.G. , Diss.Zurich, 1936, S.53;W.Hagemann , a.a.0. ,S.143;andKruk&Lingnau , a.a.0. ,S.107.15)W.Hagemann , a.a.0. , S.142.

16)Kruk& Lingnau , a.a.0. , S.108.

17)ForGermanbanksduringthisperiod.referto:Institutefurbankhistorische Forschung e.V. , Deutsche

Bankengeschichte , Bd.3, Frankfurta.M.1983.S.79-86, W.Hagemann , a.a.0..S.13ff. , K.Grossweiler.a.a.O.

(Japanesetranslationfrompage403).

Here , I'dliketoaddafewwordsaboutDanatBank , DresdenBankandDeutscheBank.AfterWorldWarI.

itiscommonknowledgethatbasedonAmericanintervention , withregardtothecompensationproblem.thesoュ

called“ Dawes plan"broughtlargeamountsofAmericancreditflowingintoGermany , whichplayedalargerole

intherevivalofGermancapitalism.ItiswellknownthatconcernedpartiesontheAmericanside, werethecoreof

Americanfinancecapitalism.whichcenteredonJ.P.Morgan.

Long-termandshort-termAmericancredit.primarily“ Dawes bonds"issuedinNewYork , flowedintothe

Germanfinancialmarkets.Relyingonthis , therevivalofGermancapitalismmovedforwardwithactionstoraュ

tionalizeGermanindustry.etc.TheGermanbanksmediatedtheinfluxofAmericancreditinvariousforms.Howュ

ever , thevariousmajorGermanbankstakingintheAmericancreditdidnotallhavethesamepointofviewonthe

matter.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 15

specializationwouldbetheredistributionofproductiontoeachfactory. Hedidnot

proposeadirectmergerbutinsistedtheformofaconciselyorganizedcooperative

profitgroup , Interessengemeinschaft.Intheend , Jahr'sdraftwasusedasthebasisofnegotiations , andaquickthree

monthslater ,bothcompaniesonMay1,1924concludedthecontractforthecooperative

group , Interessengemeinschaftsvertrag.Aweeklater , onMay8thecontractwasapュ

provedatbothcompaniesshareholders'meetings.

Theentirecontractforthecooperativeprofitgroup2I)ismadeupof18items.

Themostimportantpointsarelistedbelow.

1. DaimlerandBenzwillformoneintegratedeconomicbodybasedoneachmainュ

tainingitslegalindependence.

2. Theparticipationratiointheprofitgroupwillcorrespondtoeachcompanies

presentratioofnominalcommonstocktocapitalstock , Daimler600, Benz346.

3. Onejointworkingcommittee , Arbeitsausschuss , willbecreatedtoensure

stickingtothegroup'sideologyandbringabouttheclosestpossiblecooperaュ

tionbetweenthetwocompanies.

4. Thispointcoverstheauthorityofbothcompanies'boardsofdirectors.

5. TheprofitgroupiseffectivefromMay1, 1924untilDecember31, 2000.11. AboutthetrademarksMercedes , Daimler , BenzanddieSternmarke.

12. Establishmentofnewcompanieswillbedonewiththebestmethodaccording

DeutscheBankandDiscountGezellshaftfeltthatwhilerelyingonAmericancredit , itshouldbedonewithin

limitsthatmaintainedindependence.Ontheotherhand , DresdenandDanatBank , particularlyDanatBank ,undertheleadershipofJacobGoldschmidt , tookinlargeratherextremeamounts・ one couldsay , unlimitedamountsュ

ofAmericancredit.ThisleadtheGermanbanksandmanufacturingindustriestoaimtogoinadirectionthat

wouldstrengthentheirownpointofview.However , preciselythroughthatfact , bothbanksbecamepilots , soto

speak , oftheattackofAmericanfinancecapitalists' , particularlytheMorganfamily , influenceontheGerman

manufacturingindustry.Thesedetailsmustbeleftforanotherpaper.butMorganin1926hadalreadyplaced

TeissenunderhiscommandatthetimeoftheestablishmentoftheGermansteeltrust , amalgamatedsteelworks.

Inaddition , heputAEGElectricunderthemanagementofAmerica'sGE(acquiring25%ofAEGstock).Inthis

way , hesteadilyformedabasewithinGermany'smajorindustries.Later.hewouldaiminthesamewayforthe

automobileindustry.whosegreatcompetitivestrengthAmericatookpridein.

DeutscheBankwastheprimaryopponentofthistypeofmovement.Comparedwithothermajorbanks , parュ

ticularlyDiscountGesellshaft.whichfocusedonruleheavyindustry , DeutscheBankfromthepast 犯cured a

strongpositioninrisingindustrialfieldsinGermany , firstelectronics , chemistry ,etc.AfterWorldWar1,underthe

leadershipofE.G.vonStauB , directorsince1915, thebank'sinclinationtowardrisingindustriesstrengthened , andthebank'saimwastoexpanditssphereofinfluencetoincludenotonlytheelectric(Siemans)andchemical(IG

Falben)fieldsasuptonow , butalsothefilm(Ufa) , airline(Lufthansa)andautomobile(Daimler-Benz)indusュ

tnes.

WhenweexaminethecourseoftheGermanautomobileindustry.asfollows , wemustidentifyherethetrends

andrelationshipsthatexistbehindit.

W.Hageman , a.a.a. , S. 143, K.Gossweiler , a.a.a. , Japanesetranslationfrompage359, Institutefur

banhistorishceForschunge.v. , a.a.0. , S.79-86.

18)Kruk& Lingnau , a.a.a., S.107.

19)Ebenda.

20)Ebenda , S.108.

21) Interessengemeinschaftsvertrag , Stuttgart , Mannheim , den1.Mai1924(Daimler-BenzA.G. , HistorischesArchiv ,

DBAG1-4).

16 Yuji NISHIMUTA

toI.G.'spurposeandgoals.

15. Theamalgamatedcompanywillworktosolvetaxissues.

18. Evenifoneitemwithinthecontractbecomesinvalid , theremainderwillconュ

tinuetobeeffectiveasbefore.

Inaccordancewithitem3, theIGjointworkingcommittee , IGArbeitsausschuss ,wasformedwithoutdelay.Inaddition , ajointboardofdirectorsandsupervisorycomュ

mitteewerecreatedinaccordancewithitem5.Theimportantpointshereare , firstly ,themake-upofthejointsupervisorycommittee.ThreebankerseachfromtheDaimler

andBenzsideswereseatedonthecommittee;however , ofthesixmembers , fivewere

undertheDeutscheBank'ssphereofinfluence22). Secondly , theheadofthecooperative

profitgroup(chairmanofthegroup'sjointworkingcommittee)wasE.G.vonStauss ,thedirectoroftheDeutscheBank23). Inotherwords , wecansaythatduringthecourse

offormation , theDeutscheBank'sinfluencegrewremarkablystronger. Nevertheless ,JacobShapiro , asbeforeamajorshareholder , gainedseatsonboththejointsuperviュ

sorycommitteeandthejointworkingcommittee24). Moreover , thisindicatesthecoopュ

erativeprofitgroupalreadyhadastrongslanttowardmerger25).

ITNewPolicyFormationintheDaimler-BenzCooperativeProfitGroup

Whenthecontractfortheprofitgroupwasconcluded , preparationofspecific

policiestoachieveitspurposewasleftuptoameetingofthejointboardofdirectors ,SitzungdesGesamt-Vorstandes , whichwasmadeupofmembersfromtheboardofdiュ

rectorsofbothDaimlerandBenz.Thefirstjointmeetingwasheldsoonaftertheconュ

tractwasconcluded , onMay5, 1924.Let'strytoreproducethefirstjointboardofdiュ

rectorsmeetingaccordingtotheminutes , Protokoll26) , fromthisseriesofmeetings ,

whicharekeptintheDaimler-Benzarchives.

AttendingwereMessrs.Berge , Porsche , Sekler , GrossandSchippertfromDaimュ

lerandMessrs. Nallinger , Brecht , Nibel , Strasser , DemannandHilgerfromBenz.

First , Berge , Daimler'sheadofcommercialaffairs , Kommerzienrat , spokeof

theirdesireforthemutualcooperationofallthemembersofbothcompaniesboardsof

directorsinachievingthepurposesetoutinthecontract.Rightafterthis , Berge , orthe

Daimlerside , proposedbasicpolicytoachievethatend2 7), thecontentofwhichcanbe

largelydividedintofourmainareas:1)externalservice2)internalstandardizedmanュ

agement3)designand4)production.Thereisadetailedproposalforeacharea.

Themainpointsforexternalservice , Aussendienst , areasfollows.Inprinciュ

pIe, thesalesorganizationshouldremoveindependentagencies , andonlyconductsales

22)Kruk& Lingnau , a.a.0. , S.109.

23)Protokol1derSitzungNr.1desInteressengemeinschaftsausschussesvom8.Mai1924zuHeidelburg. , S.1.(Daimler-

BenzA.G.HistorischesArchiv , PD100).

24)Kruk& Lingnau , a.a.0. , S.320.

25) Interessengemeinschaftsvertrag , 15.

26)Protokol1derSitzungdesVorstandesderFirmenDaimlerundBenzvom5.Mai1924.(Daimler-BenzA.G. ,HistorischesArchiv , PD20).

27)Ebenda , S.1.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 17

throughthecompany'sownornon-independentdealerships.Bydoingsosalesprofit

willbekeptwithintheconcern.Asarule ,ifDaimlerandBenzbothhavedealershipscoュ

existinginonelocation , theyshouldbecombinedintoone28). Inaddition , it'snecessary

tofurtherexpandtherangeofrepairshops.Amongthesethreepoints , theunification

ofbothcompaniessalesorganizationsisthemostimportant.

Withregardtointernalstandardizedmanagement , Innenverwaltung , themain

objectiveswere , first , tocreatecommonproducttrademarksandintegratedadvertiseュ

ments , Propaganda , formotorracingandnewspaper , aswellastoconsolidatepatent

andlawoffices.Inaddition , toreducecostsbyintroducingajointmaterialspurchasュ

ingcontract29).

Theareasofdesign , Konstruktion , andproduction , Fabrikation ,'werethemost

importantsectionsofthisproposal.Themainpointsareasfollows.

First , anintegrateddesignoffice , EinheitlichesKonstruktionsburo , shouldbe

formed30). Second , thecarmodelsproducedwillbeconsolidatedanddistributedinorュ

derforeveryplanttoonlyproduceonecarmodel.Thefollowingideawaspresentedas

adetailedplanforthis.

Mannheimplant3 1) ー 2-liter passengercars

Vnterturkheimplant32) ーー 4・ and 6・liter passengercars

Marienfeldeplant33)---4-5tontrucks

Gaggnauplant34) ー 2-3 tontrucks

VImplant35) ーー 1 ・ 11 /2 tontrucks

Sindelfingenplant36)-centralizedbodyproductionandsupplyforallmodels37)

Inaddition , aspecialcommitteeconcernedwithproductiontechnology , willbe

createdtofacilitatecontinuousmodernization , suchasinstallationofmachines38). In

particular , everyplant'sproductioncapabilityshouldbeincreasedonechassisper

workerforthetimebeing , throughthemethodsof[ChangeAccordingtotheAmerican

ModelofManagementandProduction] (“ Durch VmestelIungder Betriebeund

ArbeitsweisenachamerikanischeenMuster")39).

Thatconcludesthisproposal , whichwe'llcallthe“ Berge proposal"fornow.

Ifyoucomparetheconciselyoutlined“ Berge proposal"witheachcompany's

28)Ebenda.

29)Ebenda , S.2.

30)NiederschriftuberdieBesprechungderVorstandeder1.G.FirmenDaimlerundBenzvom5.Mai1924CDaimler-

BenzA.G..HistorischesArchiv , PD20)S.1.

31)Benzpassengercarplant.

32)Daimlerpassengercarplant.

33)Daimlertruckplant.Berlinsuburb.

34)Benztruckplant.

35)Magirustruckplant , mergerwasplanned.

36)DaimlerplantbuilttoproduceairplaneenginesduringW W1.

37)Niederschrift , a.a.a..S.1-2.

38)Ebenda , S.2.

39)Ebenda.

18 Yuji NISHIMUTA

productionmethods , etc. , priortothecooperativeprofitgroup , itsmeaningisclear.

LetusexaminetheproductionoutputofDaimlerandBenzfrom1908to1925for

carsandtrucks.Lookingatthetotalproductionvaluesin1912justpriortoWorldWar

I, Daimlerproduced2,183unitsandBenz3,666. TotalGermanautomobileproduction

forthatyearwas22,773 units , soonecanseethatbothDaimlerandBenzwerealready

importantcompanies , eachmakingup10-15%oftotalproduction.In1912-13Daimler

had4,050employeesandBenzemployed6,450. However , theproblemswereinproducュ

tioncontentandcharacter.Wemustexaminethenumberofcarmodelsproducedby

DaimlerandBenzduringthisperiodandthenumberofcarsproducedbymodel.

Atthistime , DaimlerhadonlytheStuttgart-Unterturkheimplantproducing

passengercars. Accordingly , Daimlerproduced6-10modelsofpassengercarsatthis

plantperyear.Forexample , lookingat1924, totalproductionwas1,333carsmadeup

ofsixdifferentmodels(andfourlimitedproductionmodels) , withproductionofeach

modelrangingfromonehundredplusseveraltenstoseveralhundreds.Thissituation

wasnotuniquetoDaimler'spassengercarfacility , butalmostthesameinallDaimler

andBenzplants40). Thus , the“ Berge proposal"wassuggestingnothinglessthanamaュ

jorchange41)inthecompanies'productionsystem , fromoneplantproducingseveral

differentmodels(6-10)ofcarseachyear , toeachplantproducingbasicallyonemodel.

Inlinewiththis , onemustnotetheexpression“Change AccordingtotheAmerican

ModelofManagementandProduction"thatappearsinthe“ Berge proposal". This

pointalsoappearsinthefollowingmannerintheboardofdirectors'report , Berichtdes

Vorstandes , inthe1924fiscalyearDaimlersalesreport42) , Geschaftsbericht:[Applicaュ

tionofanAmerican-styleproductionsystemrequiresanenormousamountofinvestュ

ment.Thiswouldassumehugedomesticandforeignsales"'Abroadrangeoftrialsare

alreadybeingconductedattheUnterturkheimandSindelfingenplants.Wearebringュ

ingoutexpandedproductionatbothoftheseplantsandtheMarienfeldeplant43)].

Onecouldsaythatthisisanextremelyunexpectedfactconsideringthegenerally

acceptedideaofDaimler-BenzAG.ThisisbecauseconventionallyDaimler-Benzhasa

so-called“ luxur y carorientation"and“ hand-made individualpro

40)RefertoChart2-10.

41)Althoughachangetothiskindofproductionsystemwasamatterofcourse , itmeantabigchangeintheprocesses

andlabororganizationineachplant.Pleaserefertothepreviouschapterforageneralexaminationofthis.Furュ

thermore , asubsequentpaperwillcontainpartofadetailedexaminationofDaimer-Benz.

42)DaimlerMotorenGesellschaft.Berlin-Stut tgart , Berichtuberdas35.Geschaftsjahr0.11924bis31.12.1924).

43)Ebenda , S.5.

44)KoichiroShibata , KatsjiKyojo , “Global CompaniesSeries-Automobile"(NihonKeizaiNewspaper , 1986)page

181, etc.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 19

modelofcar. Moreover , evengiventhatweshouldhaveitproduceonlyonemodel , it

isquestionableCZweifelhaft)astowhetherthe2-litercarissuitableinthatcase45) プ

Afterdiscussions , itwasdecidedatthefirstjointboardofdirectorsmeetingto

quicklymoveaheadwiththedetailsusingthe“ Berge proposal"asthefoundation.On

May15and16, twosessionswereheld , oneconcernedwiththesalessystem andthe

otherwithproductionanddesign , andattendedbybothpartiesrelateddirectors.From

thattimetoJuneof1926, ninemeetingsoftheDaimlerandBenzjointboardofdirecュ

torscommitteewereheld48) , resultinginthedeterminationofadetailednewpolicy.

Next , we'lltakealookattheimportantpointsofthechangesthatfollowed.

Thefirstchangetobedecidedandimplementedwasthesalessystem. Inother

words , atthesalessystemsessionfollowingthefirstjointboardofdirectorsmeeting ,

theparticipantsdecidedontotalintegrationofDaimlerandBenz'ssalesorganizations ,resultingintheestablishmentofalimited automobile company , Mercedes-Benz

AutomobilG.m.b.H.49). Integrationofthesalesorganizationwasimplementedfirst ,inanticipationoftheintegrationofproductionandothersystems. Previouslyfierce

competitors , bothcompanieshaduptofoursalesorganizationsinmajorcities50). This

typeofco-existencewasbroughttoanend. Atthistime(1924) , 23branchesand14

commonagencies , Vertretcmgen5I), werecreatedintheformofMercedes-Benz , excluュ

sivelyforDaimlerandBenz.Intheoriginalplan , thepolicywastoasmuchaspossible

shutouttheexistenceofotherindependentagents;however , thatwasnotimplemented

and , accordingly , twosalessystemsremained52).

Comparedwiththesalessystem , implementationofthenewproductionsystem

andpolicywasmuchlikedoingpenance.OnNovember9, 1924atthesecondjointboard

ofdirectorsmeeting , therewasalreadyoppositiontoDaimlerandBenzopinions.One

wasregardingthecentralizationofthedesignarea , withtheBenzsideinsistingonthe

decentralizationofauthorityateachfactory53). TheGaggenauandMannheimplants

opposedfourpointswithregardtothenew2-litercar:1)design ,2)price ,3)production

45)ProtokollderSitzungdesVorstandesFirmenDaimlerundBenzvom5.Mai1924.S.3(abbreviatedasProtokollュ

5.5.1924.samebelow).

46)ProtkolluberdieSitzungam16.Mai1924, Gegenstand:NeuordnungdesVerkaufsgeschasftsmitRucksichtaufden

I.G.Vertrag(Archiv.PD20).

47)BerichtuberdieSitzungam16.Mai1924.NeueTypenfurdiezukunftigeFabrikationinMannheim(Archiv.PD

20).

48)NiederschriftuberdieVorstandssitzunginGaggenauam19.November1924.

ProtokolluberVorstandssitzungam27.1.1925inUnterturkheim.

ProtokollderVorstandssitzungNr.80derDaimlerMotorenGesellschaftam13.Januar1926inUnterturkheim.

ProtokollderSitzungdesgesamtenVorstandesam20.1.1926inMannheim

ProtokollderSitzungdesGesamt-Vorstandesvom26.2.26inMannheim

ProtokolluberDirektions-Sitzungvom2.Marz1926.

ProtokollderSitzungdesGesamtvorstandesam20.Marz1926inStuttgart

ProtokolluberSitzungdesGesamtVorstandesam10.Juni1926inUnterturkheim(Daimler-BenzA.G. ,HistorischesArchiv , PD20).

49)Protokoll-15.5.1924.

50)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.0. , S.110.

50Ebenda.

52)Ebenda.

53)Protokoll-19.11.1924.

20 Yuji NISHIMUTA

numbersand4)class54). Inresponse ,Daimlerresisted ,sayingthatthemeaningbehind

thecreationofthecooperativeprofitgroupwouldbelost.Finally ,theBenzsideeased

objectingopinionsbysaying , “dissolution isnotourgoal.56)" However , differencesof

opinionweredeep-rooted , particularlyonthesubjectofthenumberofcarmodelsfor

production.Thefollowingshowstheprogressionofthechangeincarmodels.Atthe

next(3rd)jointmeetingonJanuary27, 1925, atlastBenzdecidedtoswitchfromproュ

ductionofthe2-1itercartothe2.6 ・liter 57)andproductionofthe2-literwasbrought

intoDaimler'sproductionplan58). Then , atthe4thmeeting(January20, 1926), thecompaniesdecidedtoloada3-literengineintothe2.6-literchassisandhaveBenz's

Mannheimplantproducethe3・liter cars59). Meanwhile , itwasdecidedthatDaimler's

Unterturkheimplantwouldproducethenew2-litercars.However , thedesignworkfor

thesewasnotcompletedforalongtime.Speakingabitaheadhere , theworkwasfiュ

nallycompletedafterthemergercontractwasconcluded60). Inanycase , thecarmodel

productionplan , Typenprogramm , wassettledatlast , puttinganendtoallthetrouュ

bles.

Otherthanthis , thenoteworthypointsfromtheformationofnewpoliciesatthe

ninejointmeetingsare , firstofall , thatC.Jahrplayedadecisiveroleasadelegateof

thesupervisorycommitteeinthecriticalsceneofironingoutthedifferencesinboth

companiesopinions61). Secondly , W.KisseP2) , whowaspressedforwardasacentral

managerafterthemerger , firstappearedasdirector(Benzside)duringthisseriesof

meetings(after2ndand4Ihmeetings)63). Atthe9thmeetingキ(June10, 1926)amoveto ・

wardacompletemergerbecameaformaltopicofdiscussionforthefirsttime64). The

perceptionisthatthecourseofcreatingthesenewpoliciesstrengthenedtheinclination

towardacompletemerger.

illTheFormationofDaimler-BenzA.G.

Itiswritteninthecompanyhistorythat[thefewmonthspriortothemerger

broughtaboutafinalspurtconcerningauthorityinthefuturemajorautomobilepro ・

ducerJ65). Theperiodfrom1924-1926whentheDaimler-Benzcooperativeprofitgroup

wasformedandthecompaniesweredeterminingnewpolicyasanintegratedeconomic

groupwasthemostsevereforbothDaimlerandBenz'ssalesoutlook66). Thecapital

54)Ebenda.

55)Ebenda.

56)Ebenda.

57)Ebenda.

58)Protokoll-27.1.1925.

59)Protokoll-20.1.1926.

60)Protokoll-29.6.1926.

61)Protokoll-13.1.1926. ・20. 1.1926. ・26. 2.1926. ・29. 3.1926 , ・10. 6.1926.

62)Kruk&Lingnau.a.a.a. , S.117.

63)FollowingProtokoll-19.11.1924.-20.1.1926.

64)Protokoll-10.6.1926.

65)M.Kruk&G.Lingnau.100JahreDaimler 司Benz DasUnternehmen.Mainz1986.S.113.

66)Ebenda , S.110f.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 21

demandforrationalizationinvestmentrequiredborrowinglargeamountsofmoney.In

Daimler'sbalancesheetandthepost-mergerDaimler-Benzbalancesheet , Bilanz , in

1913andfrom1924 ・1927 , Onecanseethatthelargeloanamountsincreasedintheyears

1924-1926, andatthetimeofmergerhadalreadyreached40millionRM.

Envelopedinthedemandforcapital , therewereseveralinfluentialmovements67) .

Thefirstwas ,asamatterofcourse ,DeutscheBank ,andalongwithit ,StaussandJahr ,whocertainlyheldthebesthandasdecisiveinfluencesofthecooperativeprofitgroup

era. However , otherinfluencesstillhadn'tlosttheirdesire , particularlyDanatBank ,theheadofwhich , J. Goldschmidt , hadacloserelationshipwithPaulvonGontart68) ,amemberofDaimler'ssupervisorycommitteeatthattime69). Goldschmidtworked

hardonthemergerwithBusingandNAGandtheinclusionoftheGaggnauplant

(Benz)andMarienfeldeplant(Daimler)70). Forhim , theextremedeclineinDaimler's

marketpricecameattheperfecttime.Thecauseofthedropwasalossofonemillion

RMresultingfromparticipationinanUnterturkheimautomobileelectricpartsmaker ,RumeAG.Becauseofthatloss , itwasobligatoryforthechairmanoftheboardofdiュ

rectors , E. Berge , totakeresponsibilityandresign71).

Additionally ,therewereseveralforeignbanks ,particularlyAmericanandSwiss72) ,thatwereworkingtogaininfluencewithregardtothelargeamountofcreditrequired

bythecooperativeprofitgroup. Moreover , therewasaproject13)tocreateoneautoュ

mobilebankforsalesfinancinginspiredbyAmerica.Thistoo , onecansay , wasproュ

motedwithstrategicbackground.

LastlytherewasShapiro.Hebynomeanssurrenderedhisstrongpositionin

Benzwithoutastruggle.Then ,DresdnerBankcametohaveasupporter74). Thedirecュ

tor , W.Clayman , from1925receivedaseatonthecooperativeprofitgroup'ssuperviュ

sorycommitteeasamemberofBenz75).

However , intheendnoneofthemcouldshowtheirstrength.DeutscheBankby

itselfextensivelymaintainedtotheendthecooperativeprofitgroup'shighlevelcredit

contracts76). Withtheirassistance , Kisselevenarrangedspecialinstallmentfinancing

athisownexpense77).

Wellthen , whatbecameofShapiro?Weakeninghisinfluencewasfromthestart

thecommongoalofStauss ,Jahrandlater , Kissel.Daimler'sdirector , Berge , veryconュ

ce

67)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.a. , S.114.

68)RefertoCharts5and8.

69)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.a., S.114.

70)Ebenda.

71)EbendaandProtokollderSitzungNR.9desInteressengemeinschaftsausschussesDaimler-Benzvom25.Juni1925

zuStuttgart(Daimler-BenzA.G. , HistorischesArchiv , PD100).

72)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.a. , S.114.

73)Ebenda.

74)Ebenda.

75)RefertoChart8.

76)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.a. , S.114.

77)Ebenda.

78)Ebenda.

22 Yuji NISHIMUTA

Thecrucialfirststeptowardsseizingthepowerof“ the dislikedmajorBenz

shareholder"wastooccurin1925.Shapirowasunabletogetthesupervisoryboardto

pushthroughhisrequesttobeincludedwhenBenz'sSchutzaktie , converteditssettleュ

mentofaccounts79). Ifhehadsucceeded , hewouldhaveincreasedhisratioofshares

andacquiredadeeperlevelofparticipation.

Thepathtoamergerwasopenedaroundthemiddleof1925.OttoWolf , abusiュ

nessmaninthesteelindustry ,since1922heldaseatontheBenzsupervisorycommittee.

In1925hewasamemberofthecooperativeprofitgroup'ssupervisorycommitteeand

proposedaplanforthecompanies'merger80). Uponreceivingit , theprofitgroup's

workingcommittee , ofwhichStausswaschairman , gatheredonJune25. There , Jahrwasgiventheauthoritytocarryoutallthenecessarymeasuresformerger81). This

wasagainstthewillofDanatBank , whichbackedvonGontart. Atthismeeting ,Stauss , too , onceagainreceivedspecialcapabilities. Thesmallcompetitionwith

ShapirowasanobstacletoimplementingthemergerasoriginallyplannedonOctober

1, 1925.Finally , herequestedthattwoBenzsharesshouldbeequivalenttothreeDaimュ

lershares82). This , however , didnotevenreceiveagreementfromDresdnerBank , withwhichhewaslinked.Thus , theone-to-oneexchangeratiodecidedonfromthestartreュ

mainedinplace83).

OnJune28and29, 1926, themergerofbothcompanieswasconcludedateach

company'sshareholdersmeeting. Themergercontract , Verschmerzungsvertrag84),wassimplytothepoint , madeupofonlysevenitems.DaimlerMotorenGesellscharft

tookontheroleof“ receiving partner."Thatis , onJanuary1, 1926, withretroactiveefュ

fect , allBenzassetsweretransferredtoDaimlerwithoutliquidating.Daimlersecured

BenzshareswithDaimlersharesataone-to-oneratiowithnocompensation85).

Thecompanieshaddecidedthatthenameofthesuccessorcompanyshouldnot

begreatlydifferentandthatthenameBenzshouldalsoappearwithinit86). Thegoods

producedbythemergedmanagementshouldhaveoneuniformbrand , whilebothpartュ

nersgeneralnamesandtrademarksshouldremainidenticalinthefuture. Finally ,Daimlerwouldtaketheresponsibilityforlistingtheshares on theMannheim

stockmarket87).

ThenewcompanywasregisteredasDaimler-BenzA.G.Withthis , the1924plan

wasaccomplishedandthetwoworlds0

79)ProtokollderSitzungNR.9desInteressengemeinschaftsausschussesDaimler-Benzvom25.Juni1925zuStuttgart.

80)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.O..S.114.

81)derSitzungNR.9desInteressengemeinschaftsaussesDaimler-Benzvom25.Juni1925zuStuttgart.

82)Ebenda.

83)Ebenda.

84)OffentlicheUrkundeuberVerschmelzngvertragzwischenderFirmaBenz& Cie..RheinischeAutomobilund

MotorenfabrikAktiengesellschaftinMannheimundderFirmaDaimlerMotorenGesellschaftA.G.inBerlin, am

28.Juni1926.(Daimler-BenzA.G. , HistorischesArchiv , DBAG1-4).

85)Kruk&Lingnau.a.a.O..S.114.

86)Ebenda.

87)Ebenda.

TheCompetitiveRelationshipbetweenGermanAutomobileCompanies 23

TheDeutscheBankreacheditsownobjective.Nevertheless , forE.G.vonStauss

itwasmerelythefirststeptowardtherealizationofhisconceptofastilllargerautoュ

mobiletrust.

Daimler-BenzA.G.'sfirstsupervisorycommitteewasmadeupof21members

andtwolaborrepresentativesdispatchedbythemanagementcouncil.E.G.vonStauss ,thedirectorofDeutscheBank , occupiedthepositionofchairmanofthesupervisory

committee. Forthishestronglyclashedwithhisopponent , PaulvonGontart89);

Gontartwantedtounconditionallykeepthatpost.InadditiontoStauss , theconcerned

partiesatDeutscheBankalsogaveseatstoF.Bausback90¥ CarlJahr , C.Michalolfsky9D

andR.Brosien92). Naturally , Shapiro , asamajorshareholder , wasamemberofthe

supervisorycommittee.OtherrelatedbankpartieswereW.Kleeman(DresdnerBank)

andA.Rosian(DanatBank).

Twonewmemberswereaddedtothegroupthatsatonthesupervisorycommitュ

teeofthecooperativeprofitgroup , oneofwhichwasJ.Brecht , aformerBenzdirector.

TheotherwasaBayerischeMotorenWerke(BMW)director , J.Pope.Pope'sparticiュ

pationcarriedextremelyimportantmeaning:Asbackgroundtothis , Stauss , chairmanofthesupervisorycommittee , hadpursuedhisplantoaddBMWtotheDaimlerand

Benzgroup , andtherewasanexchangeofsharesfirstwithDaimlerandlaterwith

Daimler-Benz93).

ThenewDaimler-Benz'sregisteredlocationwasBerlin.However , theheadqua ト

tersremainedinStuttgart-Unterturkheim , whichwasthelocationofDaimler'smain

plantand , accordingly , becamethenervecenterofthenewcompanyandthelocation

formanagementcontrol.

Thus , DaimlerandBenz, whichhadpreviouslyformedtwo small , separate

worldsnowstartedbusinessasoneintegratedunit.Facingtheworldforthefirsttime ,thedualnameMercedes-Benzbeganitsunstoppablecareer.

88)Benz&Cie., RheinischeGasmotorenfabrikinMannheimwasfoundedOct ., 1.1883.Thenamewaschangedon

Aug. , 26.1911toBenz& Cie..RheinischeAutomobilundMotorenfabrikMannheimAG.DaimlerMotoren

GeseIIschaftwasfoundedonNov. , 11, 1890.Theinventionoftheautomobileasweknowittoday(poweredbyinュ

ternalcombustionengine)isattributedtoKarlBenzwhoreceivedapatentonJan. , 29, 1886(Benz-Patentュ

Motorwagen , patentsDRP37453)andGottIeibDaimlerandWilheimMaybach.Aug. , 28.1886.Accordingto

H.C.G.vonSeherr-Thoss.a.a.O. , S.5, themergerofDaimlerandBenzintoDaimler-BenzA.G.was.therefore.the

unionofthecompaniesestablishedbybothcreatorsoftheautomobile.

89)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.O. , S.116.

90)DirectorofUfamoviecompany.partoftheDeutscheBankfamily;in1928becamebranchmanagerofDeutsche

BankFrankfurta.M.

91)DeutscheBankdirector.

92)HadacloserelationshipwithStauss.Kruk& Lingnau , a.a.O. , S.116.

93)Kruk&Lingnau , a.a.O. , S.116.