TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

What is Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy is the set of policies that a sovereign State adopts and all

activities it undertakes unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally within the

international arena with the aim to achieve its international goals and interests.

Let’s now examine all the components of this definition separately.

First of all, only sovereign States can have a foreign policy in the

commonly understood meaning. I am sure that you all know what ‘sovereign

State’ means. Sovereignty is the quality of being a State that is fully

independent, self-governing, with unlimited power in its actions and decisions,

free of any foreign intervention. The only sanctions against its acts may be

reprisals by other countries or war.

I have to add that, today, sovereignty is a much more flexible concept than

it was even just a few decades earlier. Today, Sovereign States accept with their

own free will and before the international community not to use some rights

which are inherent in their sovereignty, and they may choose to transfer these to

some international or supranational bodies. However, one should keep in mind

that the source of these transferred sovereignty rights continue to be the States

that have transferred them, and this is not considered as an encroach upon the

sovereignty of these States. There are also cases where the sovereignty of a State

is limited by international agreements. It is not possible for these to have

independent foreign policies. For instance, at the time when they were still part

1

of the USSR, Ukraine and Belorussia used to enjoy the right to vote separately

in the UN. Nevertheless, this meant that in practice, the USSR actually enjoyed

three votes.

International recognition is also important for a State to be able to implement

foreign policy decisions. In fact, if a State is not recognized as such by a notable

number of other States, it is not possible for it to establish necessary

international contacts enabling it to shape and implement policies on the

international arena. In this case, though sovereignty remains a de facto situation

it is not an internationally legitimate one; sovereignty in itself is not enough to

sustain an applicable foreign policy. Otherwise, the establishment of full

sovereignty on a territory often does open the door for recognition, allowing the

implementation of foreign relations. For example, that is exactly what happened

to the Ankara Government after victory was won over Greece at the end of

World War I.

One may point out that, even though Palestine is not a state, and even though it

does not enjoy full sovereignty on its territory, it still prevails on the

international scene. In reality, Palestine is recognized by a number of countries

as a State, and those countries which do not recognize it as such only approach it

in order to help find a solution to the Middle East Issue. Therefore, international

political activities of Palestine are limited to this problem and do not constitute

fruits of real foreign policies as we understand them. The same also applies to

TRNC.

As noted above, the primary aim of foreign policy is to help achieve national

interests. The concept of national interests is a very wide one. One may observe

this concept has also been evolving. In fact, up until the French revolution, the

State was at the service of monarchs; ‘national interests’ were most of the time

2

nothing but the interest of these rulers themselves. When we look back at the

history, we see a big number of wars that had for main aim the establishment of

hegemony of one or some countries over one or many other countries. Today,

States are at the service of nations; this means that they are at the service of

citizens who demand, for example, economic and technological development, a

better life, or more security.

The Main Factors Which Shape Foreign Policy.

a) Geographic factors.

Until recently the geographic situation of a country was the major element

to be taken into consideration when shaping its foreign policy.

Geopolitics, which studies the role of the geographic situation of a

country in preparing and implementing its national policies vis a vis other

foreign countries, has evolved into a distinct science only since the beginning of

the 20th century. However, one may say that there is not just one definition of

this science over which all interested scientists agree. Consequently, there exist

different definitions that are more or less close to each other.

I will mention only two of these:

1. Geopolitics is the science which studies world policies and

policies of States in consideration of geographical factors.

2. Geopolitics is the science seeking the best use of geographical

circumstances for the achievement of determined foreign policy

goals.

Geopolitics is affected by:

- Geographic location. The country’s location on the map, its distance to seas,

to continents, main roads, its climate, natural resources etc. These have in fact

crucial effects on national policies vis a vis other countries. We all know for

instance that those countries which are located far from main maritime lines

3

have continuously sought to reach rich sea coasts throughout history (e.g. Tsarist

Russia as well as the USSR).

- Other invariable geographic conditions. The climate, the size of the country,

rivers, physical formations, and natural resources all have important effects over

the social and economic life of the people living in the territory as well as over

their security. No need to explain the constant effects of these on the policies to

be adopted either in domestic or in foreign policies.

- Dynamic geographical conditions. These are geographic factors which

change continuously, such as demographic conditions. For example, the number

and composition of the population, races, religions, etc., also have the same

effects as the variable conditions cited above.

b.Economic circumstances

c.Political situation prevailing in the country.

d.Policies followed by neighboring and other influential countries.

Those who are convinced in the utmost importance of geopolitics have

pushed it forward as to cause the emergence of various different theories. I do

not want to go deep with these theories because my understanding is that they

have lost their values today as a consequence of technological development.

e) Ideologies or national aspirations . Ideologies or national aspirations also

play an important role in the determination of foreign policy. In the near past,

we have witnessed how capitalism and communism had divided the world in

two or even in three different camps. Those countries that want to export their

ideology choose to follow aggressive policies, while those who want to protect

themselves take defensive measures. Members of each camp coordinate their

activities and policies among themselves.

The main conclusion we can draw from the above is that the foreign

policy of a country has a very strong base which causes it to develop on a more

or less a determined line unless drastic changes occur in the geographical or

political environment.

4

Tools of Foreign Policy

a) Diplomacy.

When we talk of Foreign Policy, we generally understand Diplomacy. In fact

diplomacy is the most efficient and most frequently used means to try to achieve

foreign policy goals.

What is diplomacy? The meaning of the word is a combination of two things:

the management of relations between countries by each country’s

representatives and the set of skills needed to achieve this. It is indeed an art that

country representatives need to master if they want to talk with their foreign

counterparts efficiently enough to convince them to intervene with their national

authorities to act in favor of the policies of their own country. Efficient

diplomacy should not only be be backed by a strong and stable government,

high economic and technological capability, and accurate information, but

should also be handled by skillful diplomats.

During my carrier I have observed big changes in diplomacy. Today, a Diplomat

may not easily lie for the benefit of his country. Today, information circulates

the world so quickly and widely that any such approach would quickly put the

credibility of this gentleman at stake. In democratic countries especially, there

remains little room for secrets. One is not obliged to disclose eveything, yet one

should not lie. In addition to this, half a century ago a diplomat posted in a

foreign country had to have the ability to imagine very well the attitude that his

government might want to adopt vis a vis an emerging situation, while today all

the information he needs can be ready for him in few minutes. He or she can

5

execute all of his/her interventions on the basis of clear and recent instructions

that are received almost as fast as they are needed.

Another important change is that, earlier diplomacy was state-to-state and

mainly bilateral. Today, a wide range of multilateral talks are being held.

Different aspects of relations are being carried out within international

organizations. Bilateral contacts are mainly used to give support to delegates in

multilateral talks. Last but not least, today’s diplomacy is not being carried out

exclusively by diplomats. Statesmen, presidents, chiefs of Governments,

ministers are also working as diplomats, though naturally with more authority

than these might have had.

b) Governmental and non- governmental agencies.

Today, technical ministries have their own foreign contact within their own field

of activities. Armed Forces are often represented in foreign capitals by military

attachés. These play a role that is very important especially in armed conflicts.

Non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross, trade unions,

businessmen’s associations etc. keep their own contacts and activities in foreign

countries, thus contributing towards the achievement of national goals.

c) Press and information.

Mainly in democratic countries, public opinion exercises a tremendous influence

over Governments. Thus, all activities that influence foreign public opinion

stand as a guide to the direction of national interest and help diplomacy

enormously. In this context, the press and the media assume a very important

part.

6

Main factors influencing the Turkish Foreign Policy. Let us now give a look

on the impacts on the Turkish foreign policy of the factors I explained earlier.

Let’s start by geographic ones.

Geostrategic location of Turkey. Balkans, Caucasus, Fertile Crescent of the

Middle East, between countries with raw materials and industrially developed

countries. Energetic resources, oil. Roads to historical emigrations, which give

the feeling of insecurity.

Neighboring countries. Today 11 with those who are separated with seas.

Increased feeling of insecurity. Need to alliances.

Straits: strategic importance unchanged despite of nuclear technology. Create

int. problems for Turkey, and open Turkey to the influences of international

disputes. Difficult to defend.

Dilemmas. To be member of NATO without irritating the USSR, Balkans are

access door for Turkey to Europe, She needs to be present there without creating

problems with Greece and/or Bulgaria, Avoid to be encircled by Greece in

Aegean and Mediterranean while continuing to be ally to Greece in NATO, to

have influence in the Middle East which is full of oil and with a Muslim

majority while staying out of the range of the endless intestinal conflicts, to

weaken the Russian influence in Caucasus without irritating Russia,

Is Turkey an Asian or European country? 97% of its territory in Asia.

Traditions. Democratic institutions developing. Islam. Turkic people in

Caucasus and central Asia. Opposition to Russian policies. Support from the

USA. On the other hand with only 3% of its territory in Europe European

vocation. The only secular State with Muslim population. Cultural rupture with

the past. Double cultural identities which oppose. Especially between elites and

ordinary people. Those who decide the foreign policies are absolutely

westernized which help pushing Turkey towards Europe.

7

Model of Economic development: Capitalism. This also guides Turkey towards

the West.

National security. * Military aspect: Turkish army is highly qualified.

Dependency on foreign countries in arms, equipments, ammunitions. Turkish

defense industry: Relatively new. Although strong enough Turkish Armed

Forces are not up to give support to the Turkish Foreign Policy beyond a certain

limit. * Economic aspect: internal disequilibrium .agricultural character which

is changing. Dependency on importations and growing dept burden. Need to

external economic, financial and technological assistance which limits the

economy as a support to foreign policies. Social, political, religious division,

weakness of solidarity is also against a strong foreign policy.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE WAR OF SALVATION

I. The Armistice of Mondoros (Limni)

The principal international document which declares the end of the

first World War for the Ottoman Empire is the armistice of Mondoros.

Concluded in 30 October 1919, the main provisions of the Mondoros armistice

were:

1. The immediate immobilization of the Ottoman army with the exception of

the units necessary for the internal order and control of frontiers. All the

ottoman war ship at seas under ottoman control would be surrendered.

The Ottoman army had to withdraw from the north west of Iran, Trans-

Caucasus and south Caucasus, Cilicia (Mersin, Adana, etc.)

2. The Allied Powers would have free use of all ottoman facilities. All of

the wireless communication stations, of the railways would be left to

8

Allied control. Among these, facilities for Allies to buy oil and coal were

to be offered as well as sea vehicles.

3. The Ottoman government would cease all contact with the Axis Powers.

All war prisoners and detained Armenians would be turned unilaterally

into to the Allied Forces. All German and Austrian citizens would leave

the Ottoman territory.

4. Allies would occupy all strategic places in case any emerging situation

was perceived to be threatening in terms of their security. They would do

the same in 6 provinces with Armenians in case of disorders in these

provinces.

Following the signature of the armistice,

a) The Allied fleet anchored in Istanbul (13th November). They occupied

Istanbul on March 16th 1920.

b) Great Britain occupied Musul (15 November) and sent units to Izmit,

Eskişehir, and Samsun; on the other hand, Italy occupied Kuþadası,

Antalya, and sent units to Konya. France occupied Adana, Urfa, Maraş,

Antakya, Iskenderun, and sent units to Zonguldak. They pushed Greece

to occupy Izmir (May 15th 1919).

9

II. The Treaty of Sevres

Frontiers

Europe: The Ottoman Empire was to withdraw from all of its European

territories, except Istanbul under the condition that the rights of the Christian

minorities were to be respected.

Gökçe Ada, Bozcaada to Greece

The Dodecanese Islands to Italy

The Region of the Straits was to be demilitarized (from Þile, Izmit, Bay of

Edremit) under the authority of the Commission of Straits, which had its own

flag and budget. Only G.B., France Italy could use the region for military

purposes.

Asia: The frontiers were to pass from the north of Antep, Mardin and

Urfa

Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin were to be left to Russia

Armenia: Trabzon, Rize, Gümüşhane, Erzurum, Van, and Muş (frontiers

to be decided by Wilson)

Kurdistan: Elaziğ, Siirt, Diyarbakır (with territorial autonomy)

Izmir (from Kuþadası Until Alaşehir on the East and until Ayvalık on

North) was left de facto to Greece

Regions of influence

o Italy: Balikesir, Aydın, Muðla, Isparta, Antalya Niğde

o France: Sivas, Mersin. Adana, Maraþ, Malatya, Elaziğ, Diyarbakır,

Syria

o G.B.: Siirt, Iraq

Protection of minorities

Use of languages

o Autonomy of schools,

o Return to the country of origin (voluntary)

10

o Surveillance of the L.N.

Restrictions were brought to Armed Forces

Financial restrictions

o A Finance Committee was to approve the State Budget and

control its realization. Resources other then those allocated to the payments of

State debts were under the control of the Committee.

Capitulations were enlarged.

III. International dynamics

Problems in GB, France and Italy: GB faced independentist movements in India,

Egypt and Ireland and difficulties in meeting her promises of independence to

Arabs of the Middle East. The Prime Minister Lloyd George supported Greece

in her action in Anatolia, while Foreign Minister George Curzon was thinking

this would make peace impossible. Defense Minister Churchill favored an allied

Turkey that would be useful against communist Russia. France had to deal with

the manifestations of catholic and communist-oriented trade unions and strikes.

In Italy, the government had to face fascists who ended up acceding to power

later, in October 1922.

There also were problems among these countries as well. Italy was

taking initiatives without consulting the GB in the Adriatic and Antalya, and

G.B. was offering to Greece Izmir region she had promised to Italy, just the

same way as Izmir had been promised to Greece. The interest of France was to

bind Germany as strictly as possible while GB was making opposition to that.

Similarly, GB occupied Musul and Antep even though they had been promised

to France. At the end, France and Italy’s efforts were mainly to try to obtain

economic concessions in Anatolia; they left GB alone to face Ankara.

11

Another important development that occurred in the public opinion of

these countries was that people were fed up with wars and were not able to

understand well the aims of the continuation of war in Anatolia. The number of

those who were against war was increasing every day and, for example, the

French army was thinking that it would not be possible to recruit enough

soldiers in order to force Turks to surrender in Anatolia.

Wilson’s declaration of fourteen points in January 1918 – which backed

ideologies such as self-determination of peoples and the principle of nations,

also preoccupied these three colonialist countries. In fact, Wilson’s 12 th point

was foreseeing sovereignty and security for Turkish provinces of the Ottoman

Empire as well as to other nations so far under Ottoman rule. He was also

putting forth the necessity of having free transit rights for trade ships through

Turkish Straits.

III . Domestic dynamics in Anatolia

There was an important lack of infrastructure, of roads, and of

communication facilities; for example, travel from Ankara to Eskişehir used to

take 22 hours. Nothing was manufactured in the country.

Mutinies and revolts. Ankara had to seek support of bands close to its.

The Istanbul Government used to incite people to revolt against Ankara through

declarations by the Şeyhülislam.

People had been in war since 1911, and were completely weakened. They did

not want to continue this way. Troops were inclined to escape from their units,

facing trials in Liberation Courts (Istiklal Mahkemeleri).

Lack of National Conscience. Regional conscience dominated. Elites

around Mustafa Kemal did have national conscience; however, none had the

skill nor the possibilities to provoke it in the mind of the masses.

In this panorama two events changed the course of history:

12

1. The occupation of Izmir By Greece. Greek people had lived for

centuries under Turkish rule; and for the first time, a nation with a

different religion was now occupying Turkish lands. Old subject

were becoming rulers in a city that had been the main trading

harbor of Anatolia. The fact that Istanbul and the Sultan did not

react awakened the Turkish Muslim population in the area.

2. The establishment of Armenia. First, the idea of an Armenian

State in Anatolia with access to Black sea was already irritating

enough.

Second, Regional notables had shared among themselves all real estates

belonging to Armenians which had been forced to emigrate, and now they did

not want to restitute them to their real owners. In Antep, people who did not

react before British occupation revolted when the French used military units

composed of Armenians in order to impose their authority in the city.

Third, Kurds were unhappy in seeing that some lands which had been

promised to them in the first place were given to Armenians even though the

number of Kurds in Anatolia was much superior to that of Armenians.

IV. Relations with Europe

Great Britain.

The Ottoman Empire had established diplomatic relations with the GB in the

16th century, after the assignment of an ambassador by GB to Istanbul, an action

which was reciprocated by the Empire in 1793.

In fact from the 18th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire had been in

decline and sought to continue to exist through the support of countries who

influenced the balance of power in Europe, and one of these Powers was the GB.

13

Reasons for GB to maintain a policy favoring the territorial integrity of the

Ottoman Empire was mainly geared to prevent Russia from having access to the

Mediterranean Sea. GB renounced to this policy of protecting the Ottoman

Empire after Ottoman-Russian war 1877-1878, after she realized that Russia

was too strong and that it was impossible for the GB to follow this policy by

herself. Furthermore, she then reversed her policy; since the dismantlement of

the Ottoman Empire had already started, she sought to obtain as big a part as

possible from the partition. A weak Ottoman State surrounded by small

neighboring states like Greece, Armenia, Kurdistan, and Arab sheikhs in the

South all under her influence would have allowed GB to control roads to India

much more easily.

Within this policy, the GB was facing two main difficulties:

1. Competition with France. The two states had come to a common accord

twice (in 1916 Sykes-Picot, and in 1920 San Remo) in order to share their

influence zones in the area. And in Europe, France wanted to weaken Germany

(which had lost the war) completely, and GB did not want to see France become

too strong and influential.

2. GB had promised Arabs the establishment of a big Arab State. Now,

difficulties with the establishment of this big Arab kingdom, as well as the

developments regarding the creation of Armenian and Kurdish States was

creating disappointment among the population of the area, thus weakening

British influence.

3. Another problem for GB was that Muslims in India were taking the

struggle in Anatolia as a struggle in the name of Islam. Ankara’s policy was to

emphasize that the aim of the National Movement was to protect the Sultan and

the Caliphate, and this in order to get the support of religious and traditional

masses of Anatolia. In India, an Indian Committee for the Caliphate was

established. This was disturbing for GB, because a movement that aimed to

bring Islam on the fore line could provoke Muslims of India against British rule.

14

This preoccupation of GB was only appeased when the National Assembly in

Ankara abolished the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

4. The last point of annoy for the GB was the relations of Ankara

Government with the USSR. Even if there was nothing of common between

Turkish nationalist movement and the communist regime ideologically, the two

countries were under western occupation directly or indirectly which led two

Governments to cooperate. When Ankara concluded a treaty with Moscow in 16

March 1921, the GB would sign an agreement of trade with the USSR on the

same day. As long as the Movement became stronger relations with the USSR

lost its importance, for the Ankara government saw that these relation would

constitute in the long rang a hand in cape in promoting in the future relation with

western countries, included the GB to start with.

Allied countries decided on February 10th1920 to occupy Istanbul. If the

visible reason for this was disorders in Cilicia and resistance in Anatolia, its

main aim was to facilitate the application of the Sevres treaty, which was under

preparation. Allied forces occupied Istanbul on March 20th, 1920. Allies were

saying that this occupation was temporary and was only aiming at strengthening

the authority of the Sultan. They raided the Parliament and arrested

parliamentarians. This caused reactions in GB’s public opinion. In reality this

allied move would constitute another event, which, after the occupation of Izmir

by Greece, would enhance the authority of Ankara in Anatolia. This also helped

M. Kemal to prove that the National Assembly could not work in Istanbul and

that a new parliamentary body was necessary in Ankara. M. Kemal reacted

severely and sent a protestation note to GB; he published a declaration against

GB to Muslim countries, and ordered the arrest of some British citizens in

Anatolia. However M. Kemal did not seek to come to a complete dissent with

GB and continued to send unofficial messages to persuade this country for the

principle of the National Pact (Misak-I Milli).

15

By the time some amelioration in the relations between Ankara and GB

started to take place. Reactions by the British public opinion against British

policies towards Turkey were becoming stronger every day. The fact that the

Nationalist Movement was gaining strength and the occurrence of the Gümrü

Treaty in the East helped this development. When Turks won in Inönü in

January 1921, GB understood that a policy that aimed at stopping Turks

indirectly by using the ambitions of Greece without facing Turkish nationalist

forces directly was not successful. She understood that dispersed national forces

had managed to be as organized as a regular army. M. Kemal was responding

positively to British approaches.

Allies decided to organize a conference to bring some amendments to the

Sevres treaty and to invite Ankara to this Conference. An invitation extended

through Istanbul Government was not accepted by Ankara because it was not a

direct invitation. Istanbul wanted Ankara to be represented within the Ottoman

Delegation, which was not acceptable for Ankara either. At the end, Allies

formulated a separate invitation for Ankara. For the first time, Allies were de

facto recognizing the Ankara Government. During the Conference held in

London on February 21st 1921, the Chief of the Istanbul Delegation Tevfik Paşa

left the floor to the chief of the Ankara Delegation Bekir Sami Bey.

The Turkish part demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from

Istanbul, the evacuation of Izmir, and the assurance that the Turkish sovereignty

in the Straits would be accepted; Turkish delegation would not be content with

cosmetic changes, which Allies were proposing on the Sevres treaty.

Even if this Conference was not a success, it helped the Ankara

Government to be accepted as interlocutor and to bring the principle of the

National Pact to the Allies’ public opinion. On the other hand the Conference

made known the difference of views between the Allied Governments as well.

Agreements that Bekir Sami Bey signed with GB, France and Italy did not get

the approval of Ankara. In April 1921 and before the success of the Turkish

16

National Army over Greek forces, the GB proclaimed its impartiality vis a vis

the Turco-Greek war, and France as well as Italy joined GB thereafter. The

Turkish victory at Sakarya led France to conclude an agreement signed on

October 20th 1921 with Ankara. This was followed by the withdrawal of Italy

from the region of Antalya. Now, GB was alone before Ankara.

In February 1922, the Foreign Minister of the Turkish National Assembly

Government, Yusuf Kemal was sent to London and to Paris. Yusuf Kemal was

unsuccessful to make these countries recognize the National Pact. In March,

Allied countries brought a new proposal to Ankara; but Ankara insisted the

Allies to evacuate Anatolia at the same moment with the entry in force of an

armistice., Allies did not accept this. Later, contacts of the Interior Minister

Fethi Bey in London and Paris were also unfruitful, and Ankara concluded that

the only remedy would be obtained by an overall victory over Greece. Later, the

capitulation of Izmir by Turkish forces, and the subsequent move of these to the

North to Çanakkale caused new tensions between Ankara and London (named

‘Chanak’ tension). Scared that Turks would pass to Thrace, GB sent troops to

the Anatolian coast of the Straits of Çanakkale and made it known that she

would not refrain from armed hostilities in case Turks crossed the Straits. But

Ankara had the support of the USSR, while France and Italy did not want to take

the risk of being involved in new armed conflicts; on the other hand, the British

public opinion was against war. Ankara accepted to start negotiations about an

armistice on the condition that Thrace would be evacuated until the Eastern cost

of the Meriç River. Ismet Paşa and the commanders of occupation Forces got

together in Mudanya on October 3rd 1922; Allies agreed to evacuate Eastern

Thrace, and Ankara accepted not to send troops to Çanakkale, Izmit and Istanbul

until the opening of talks for a peace treaty.

17

France.

After the withdrawal of GB from these regions in November 1919, France

occupied the regions of Adana, Mersin, Urfa and Antep in addition to southern

parts of Anatolia she had occupied following the armistice of Mondoros. This

French move created reactions in Anatolia and M. Kemal protested before allied

countries. In December, the High Commissioner of France, Mr. Picot came to

Sivas on unofficial basis, and offered to M. Kemal the return of Urfa, Antep and

Adana in exchange for economic privileges. Facing the resistance of the

population in these cities, France sent a delegation to Ankara again, and a truce

of 20 days has been signed. The importance of this truce was that it brought a

big Power to recognize the newly formed Ankara Government as interlocutor.

Few days later, France sent troupes to Zonguldak, arguing that the truce only

included Southern regions. In fact, France was aiming to get a hold of the

mineral stratum of Eregli, and demanded related privileges in all its agreement

tentatives.

The new French Government under Aristide Briand convinced GB to

organize the London Conference of February 1921. During this Conference,

Bekir Sami Bey came to an agreement with the Prime Minister Briand; however,

this agreement which foresaw not only economic privileges but also some

political concessions with regard to minorities had been rejected by the Great

National Assembly. However M Kemal made known that he was not

completely against this agreement and that the problem was with some clauses

only; he sent Bekir Sami Bey to France and Italy to continue discussions with

France. In fact, French forces were facing strong resistance in the territories

under their occupation on one hand, and the National Government in Ankara

had become strong enough on the other hand. Military expenses in Anatolia

were adding to the financial difficulties brought to France by the world war, and

the relation of France with the GB was worsening. French forces were in direct

18

war in Turkey, while GB controlled the Ottoman Government headed by Damat

Ferit Paşa and was using Greeks for pursuing her goals in Anatolia.

France and Italy understood that their rapprochement to Turkey would

weaken the rising British influence in the Middle East. In June 1921, France sent

Mr. H. Franklin-Bouillon to Ankara and subsequent negotiations with the

presence of M. Kemal in person, ended by an agreement on June 20th 1921.

With this agreement, a Great Power recognized the Ankara government de jure

for the first time. France withdrew from the Southern regions of Anatolia,

leaving some arms and ammunition to Turks. Even if Iskenderun and Antakya

stayed out of the Turkish borders, stipulations of this agreement would influence

positively the future status of the Sancak. This agreement is abrogated with the

Treaty of Lausanne.

Italy.

At the start of the 20th century and within the context of increasing imperialism

in Europe, Italy was aiming at the Mediterranean basin as the heritage of the

ancient Roman Empire. Its main target was the Ottoman Empire. She occupied

Trablusgarb (Libya) and the Dodecanese Islands in 1911, which was recognized

by the Ottoman Empire. During the 1st World War, The G.B. and France, in

order to bring Italy to their side, had signed an agreement in London in 1915,

giving a share to Italy in Anatolia. In 1917 they agreed in Saint Jean de

Maurienne to leave the Izmir region to her.

It was then a big disappointment for Italy to see that Izmir and connected

regions were offered to Greece at the Paris Conference at the end of the War.

She started to occupy South Eastern Anatolian coasts but gave direct and

indirect support to Turkish national resistance. After the occupation of Istanbul,

the Italian High Commissary Conte Sforza had contacted M. Kemal before the

national resistance had started and Italy understood the nature of the national

was of liberation.

19

Thus Italy led Turkish national forces to be organized in areas under her

occupation, did not react when Turkish national forces sought refuge in these

territories before Greek advance, helped Ankara Government to get some arms it

needed; Italian ships were used for the transportation of arms and ammunition to

Turkish forces through Kuşadası, Söke and Antalya ports under her control.

Conte Sforza, who became Foreign Minister of Italy, intervened during the

London conference for the direct invitation of Ankara to the Conference, and the

Turkish delegation went to London on an Italian ship.

In august 1922 the Partito Nazionale Fascista came to power and Italy

started to try to obtain what she failed to obtain during the War. At the Lausanne

Conference, She gave support to GB and France and worked for the

demilitarization of the Straits, for the continuation of capitulations in a different

way, for obtaining control of Ereðli mines. It finally obtained the Dodecanese

Islands.

Germany.

Germany surrendered and accepted unconditionally the Versailles Treaty.

According to this agreement, She would break off all relations with Turkey.

During this period, Turkish-German relations were thus at their lower level.

The USSR.

Bolsheviks had tried at the start to impose their regime in Eastern parts of

Tsarist Russia through cooperation with the leaders of these regions. Out of old

Russia, at the 3rd International in July 1920, it was decided to give support to

those who were struggling against imperialism independently whether they were

communist or not. The Western fold of the USSR’s foreign policy at that time

was to get profit from internal conflicts between Western States. In 1921 this

policy would be based on peaceful coexistence, a policy mainly necessitated by

the worsening of the economic situation. They signed a trade agreement with

20

G.B. in 1921 according which each parties would refrain all action against each

other and would stop adverse propagandas; subsequently, the USSR committed

not to provoke Asian populations in India and in Afghanistan against G.B. Thus

the USSR then abandoned its policy of giving support to national salvation

movements.

As to relations with the USSR, the situation looked as follows

from the Turkish part:

Both were struggling against imperialist countries

There was a need for economic and military assistance

To ensure security at the East for being freer at the West.

To play the USSR against Western countries

From the part of the USSR,

Common enemy,

Turkish victory over Greeks could awaken Muslims under British rule;

Need of security in the South-West

Good relations with Ankara were a good reference in Central Asia

Expectation to convert Turkey to Communism

Stability in the international system was depending on a solution of the

‘Eastern Problem’ and Moscow wanted it be resolved for the benefit of Turkey.

After the October Revolution, a truce had been signed on 5th January 1917

between Moscow and Istanbul; with the Brest-Litovsk Agreement signed

thereafter on 3rd March 1918, Moscow accepted to evacuate the Eastern Ottoman

regions she had occupied. The final status of these regions would be decided by

the peoples living there and by the Ottoman Empire. However, the withdrawal

of Russian forces from the area created a vacuum that would be an opportunity

for Mensheviks (Opponents of Lenin, social democrats) to found an independent

21

State in Georgia. Independent States were also founded in Azerbaycan and

Armenia.

Bolsheviks took contact with the Turkish national movement from the

start. A soviet delegation came to Havza and was received by M. Kemal in

summer 1919. Foreign Minister Cicerin declared in September that the future of

the Empire was in the hands of workers and peasants struggling against

imperialists. The Commander-in-Chief of Bolshevik armed forces paid a visit to

Istanbul and took contact with national Turkish forces in order to let them know

that the USSR would recognize the rights of the Turkish People.

On April 20th, 1920 Ankara decided to send a delegation to Moscow,

merely to get assistance from the USSR. The Turkish Great National Assembly,

in its decision on this respect, let Moscow to know that it was ready to cooperate

with the USSR, accepted Azerbaycan to be member of Bolshevik group of

nations, and requested 5 000 000 gold, necessary war material and food in

exchange. Cicerin, in his reply, accepted to establish direct relations and

cooperation with Ankara, emphasized the rights to self-determination of peoples

living in Anatolia and underlined that the question of Straits should be solved in

a conference with the participation of States with coasts at the Black Sea.

The First Ankara Government was founded on 3rd of May and five days

later Bekir Sami Bey, Foreign Minister, was sent to Moscow. In his instructions,

reference was made to ‘today’s borders’ and not to the National Pact (which

made the status of Batum open), and Turkey was accepting that the Straits issue

concerned all Black Sea countries. Nevertheless, the mission of Bekir Sami Bey

in Moscow would be unsuccessful. The Red Army was already in Armenia, and

the Russians did not want to pressure Armenians for the benefit of Turkey. With

Azerbaycan among Bolshevik groups, and with Greeks advancing into Anatolia,

Moscow was not sure that arms delivered to Turks by France after the Turkish-

French truce would not be used against them. Çiçerin requested Bitlis, Van, and

22

Muş to be given to Armenia. Bekir Sami Bey left Moscow on the 11 th of

September.

On the 19th of June 1920, right before the Greek attack started on 22nd of

June, Armenian bands started to attack Muslims living in border areas. Ankara

did not react for a while, because she did not want to accept combats in two

opposite fronts and was scared of an intervention from the G.B. or the USSR in

the favor of Armenians. In September, the situation was a little different K.

Karabekir passed in action and took Sarıkamış back.

In October, Tevfik Paşa who supported national forces became Prime

minister in Istanbul. Moscow was reported that this new Government in Istanbul

was a maneuver approach to bring the National Movement closer to G.B. and

further away from Bolsheviks as well as from the Islamic World. Bolsheviks

understood that if they wanted Turks to continue their struggle against the

imperialist, USSR should refrain from giving support to Armenian claims. The

TGNA Government learned that G.B. (which was seeking contacts with Ankara

through the new Istanbul Government) would not intervene in favor of

Armenians. Thus the Ankara army undertook a second series of military

operations on the East; Turkish forces occupied Gümrü on the 7th of October. An

agreement was concluded in this city on the 2nd of December, within which

Armenia was renouncing territories given to her by the Sevres Treaty. But 3

days later, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic that came to power with the

support of Moscow made it known that it would not recognize the Gümrü

Agreement.

On the 5th of March 1921, the USSR Ambassador to Ankara presented his

credentials. Ali Fuat Bey would be Ankara’s Ambassador to Moscow in

November. A second Delegation was sent to Moscow on February 1921.

Cicerin demanded the abrogation of the Gumru agreement and the evacuation of

Gümrü, and complained about measures against communists in Anatolia. He

added that they could not conclude an alliance with Ankara, but that they were

23

ready to sign a friendship agreement. The Turkish Delegation was aiming at not

talking about Armenia, at obtaining a de jure recognition from the USSR, and at

obtaining money, arms and ammunitions. Stalin, who received the Delegation

on the 22nd February, reiterated that an alliance was impossible due to the trade

agreement they had signed with G.B., but that they could give any other

assistance Ankara needed. In this development, the facts that Ankara had been

invited to London for talks and that Greek forces had lost the battles in Inönü

played an important role. The Moscow Treaty was signed on the 16 th of March

1921, at the anniversary of the occupation of Istanbul by allied troops.

Stipulations of the Moscow Treaty:

1. Parties will not recognize a peace agreement or

any other commitment imposed to the other Party against Its will. The

word ‘Turkey’ covers territories as expressed in the National Pact adopted

by the Parliament in Istanbul on January 28th, 1920.

2 Batum is left to Georgia under some conditions (freedom of the

People and freedom of transit).

3. Nahcivan will be an autonomous region under the protection of

Azerbaycan

4. Parties recognize the salvation movements of Nations at the East

and their rights to opt their governmental regimes.

5. Parties agree to leave the solution of the issue of the Straits to a

conference which would be held later with the participation of countries with

coasts on the Black Sea

6. All the agreement made earlier between the two countries are now

no more valid. Thus Turkey is free of her debt burden vis a vis Russia (or

USSR)

7. Parties declare invalid all capitulations.

24

8. Parties will not receive governments in exile with the claim to be

the Government of the other Party.

On the 13th of October 1921, Ankara signed a Treaty with Armenia,

Azerbaycan and Georgia in Kars. This Treaty had more or less the same content

with the Moscow Treaty. On the 2nd of January, a Treaty of friendship was

concluded with Ukraine. The importance of theses documents was that all the

obstacles for the aid of the USSR to Turkey were so far removed.

During the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish and the USSR delegations

would coordinate their position on the question of Straits. USSR was insisting

that the Straits should be closed to all military ships both in peace and in war

times and that the right of free passage should be recognized to all trade ships.

Cicerin refused the demilitarized status of the Straits and insisted on The

Turkish control over them He blamed the Turkish Delegation for being weak on

this issue. Inönü asked Cicerin whether the USSR would be ready to help

Turkey in case the Conference failed for this reason and in case hostilities

started again. As he could not receive a positive reply, he said to Cicerin that he

could not afford to block these talks even if he shared common views with the

USSR. Finally, the Conference agreed that the security of the Straits be ensured

by the international commission.

Grece.

The fact that Ottoman Empire was defeated in the World War and had

signed the Mondoros Truce was a unique opportunity for Greece and the Greeks

to realize their Megalo Idea. At the Paris Conference, Venizelos presented

Greek demands on 30th of December 1919: North Epire, Eastern and Western

Thrace (Except Istanbul and Straits), Trabizon (Pontus), East Anatolia, the

Aegean Islands and Cyprus. He made it understood that he could give in from

25

other demands in case of obtaining satisfaction in Anatolia and based this claim

to the article 14 of the Wilson Declaration - arguing that Greeks were in

majority in these territories. The G.B. and France to some extend were in favor

for Greece to obtain a big share in Eastern Anatolia. The USA was not agreeing,

knowing that Muslims were in majority in all cities other then Izmir, and the

partition of Izmir region was not economically acceptable. Italy was also against

these demands, because these were contrary to what she had been promised by

the G.B and France earlier.

On the 24th April Italian delegation left the Conference. After rumors

circulated that Italy would send two military ships to Izmir, pro-Greek Lloyd

George convinced President Wilson to allow Greece to sent troops to Izmir to

avoid an Italian fait accompli. Later, they managed to convince Italy to join the

conference again on the 12th of May.

Greek forces landed in Izmir on the 15th of May 1919 and Greek occupation

in Anatolia started. During the Paris Conference, Damat Ferit Paşa tried to stand

against Greek claims; yet at the end, the Ottoman Delegation was asked to leave

the Conference.

In 1920, allies started to show their impatience for a peace treaty with

Turks. In the meantime new elections in the Ottoman Empire had been held and

the new Parliament had adopted the National Pact. The G.B. and France were

desiring a treaty which would not hurt their interests: Turks would get out of

Europe, an international order would be set up in Istanbul; Greeks would be

granted other privileges in addition to the economic ones and would be asked to

withdraw from Anatolia. However, in face of the strong resistance in Kilikya

and following rumors that thousands of Armenians had been killed, they opted a

policy of force. In March Istanbul was occupied. On the other hand For

Venezilos, to loose in Anatolia would be a political suicide. At the and GB and

France agreed with a Greek military move in Anatolia but they emphasized that

26

they would not participate in that move. GB underlined that She would not give

military help to Greece.

Rallis, who came to power after new elections in Greece decided to follow

the policy of Venezilos to make Turks accept the Sevres treaty by force. King

Constantinos returned to Greece and this gave GB and France a motive to

review their policies. For France, Sevres had to be reviewed and Greek forces

had to be withdrawn from Anatolia. The G.B. wanted to continue the war with

Ankara through the intermediary of Greece.

After the Greek defeat in İnönü on the 9th of January 1921, the London

Conference organized by allies brought an important change in Greek domestic

policy. Karegopulos who was decided to prove Greek determination replaced

Rallis, which was criticized for his moderation.

After the failure of the London Conference Greek forces initiated a new

attack but they were defeated again for a second time in İnönü. Greeks, in spite

of these military failures, made new preparations; in July they tried their chances

for a third time. They obtained some success at the beginning, yet they lost again

in Sakarya. This was the end of the Greek expectation to force Turks to accept

Sevres by arms, and this created important domestic difficulties in Greece.

On March 1922, Allied Governments made a new attempt for peace talks

but their conditions were unacceptable for Ankara. Knowing the Greek army to

be in a difficult situation, Ankara wanted to give it a last coup. Turkish Attacks

continued until Izmir capitulated. The Turkish-Greek war was ended on the 22nd

of October 1922.

Iran.

During the period, relations with Iran were very distanced. Despite USSR’s

important efforts to promote bilateral agreements between Moscow, Ankara,

27

Teheran and Kabul, an agreement between Turkey and Iran could not be

realized. The reasons were:

1. Lack of trust coming from history, created by conflicts between

Sunna and Shia.

2. Pan-Turanist policies of İttihak Terakki

3. Great Britain. Iran did not want to provoke the reaction of G.B. by

establishing of relations with Ankara.

4. The question of Kurdish Tribes. At the end of the 1st World War

Kurdish tribes living on the border areas felt themselves independent and started

to threaten security on the both sides of the border. Hot pursuits, which occurred

after these Kurdish attacks was creating tensions on the security forces of each

side.

5. Territorial claims. During the Paris conference, Iran made territorial

claims at the East of Turkey. These claims were not taken into consideration by

the conference, but they added to the lack of confidence between the two

countries.

Afganistan.

Afghanistan obtained limited independence from the G.B. in 1919. Its leader

Amanullah Han wanted to maintain the independence of Afghanistan and assure

the stability inside the country; he was willing to establish relations with

Ankara.

Even before the establishment of relations a known Afghan who had made

his studies in Istanbul, Tarzi Mahmut Bey, had advised Shah Amanullah Han to

profit from the Ottoman experiences in implementing new institutions in

Afghanistan that would be based on the Western model. Elites from Turkey,

mostly officers had thus been invited to Kabul.

28

On the other hand, Cemal Paşa, one of the leaders of İttihat Terakki had

organized the Afghan army and had informed Ankara about his activities in this

country. In 1920, Ankara sent an Ambassador to Kabul. In March 1921 The

Turkish delegation that was in Moscow signed an agreement with Afghanistan

with the encouragement of the USSR. G.B had suspicions about Turco-Afghan

relations. In fact, in the 2nd article of the agreement, Parties were affirming the

right of Eastern nations to liberation and to full independence. Within other

articles, the two countries committed not to conclude any agreements that would

be contrary to the interest of the other Party, and any attack from an imperialist

country to one of the parties was to be considered by the other party as if it was

made to itself.

Muslims in India.

The occupation of Istanbul by allied countries had brought the existence of

the Caliphate in danger, and created some support among the Muslim population

of India in favor of Turkey; this support manifested under the form of the

Caliphate Movement. A Caliphate Committee was founded.

The aim of the leaders of this movement was to organize manifestations

against British rule and thus to advance on the road to independence. Muslim

leaders informed London about their demands vis a vis the Caliphate and

threatened to organize uprisings in India. This movement had four implications:

1. Contributed to the division between Hindus and Muslims,

2. A Turkish lobby in London was established. British government

made a declaration to appease Indian Muslim leaders. The Government’s policy

towards Islam had been criticized in the Chamber of Commons and in the

newspapers.

29

3. France started to have preoccupation with regard to her colonies

with Muslim majority. This preoccupation reflected on her attitude towards

Ankara.

4. The Committee of Caliphate raised funds, which it sent to M. Kemal

trough the Ottoman Bank.v

THE END of THE WAR. of LIBERATION

The armistice was signed in Mudanya on the 11th of October 1922, and

three week later Allied countries invited Istanbul and Ankara to Lausanne for a

Conference aiming at bringing clear peace in the East.

Istanbul asked Ankara to send a representative and made it clear that if

Ankara failed to send this representative, Istanbul would designate one for

Ankara. On the 1st January 1923 TGNA adopted a resolution and let the world

know that the sole Turkish Government was that of the TGNA: The Government

in Istanbul resigned, The Padishah and leaders of İttihat Terakki left Istanbul.

The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24th July 1923.

The Main stipulations OF THE LAUSANNE Treaty.

Frontiers

o In Thrace, today’s borders. This border would be demilitarized.

On the south

o With Syria, today's border with the exception of Hatay.

Borders with Iraq

o This issue would be decided between Turkey and GB within nine

mouths after the Treaty. In case the to Governments could not come to an

30

agreement over the question, the issue would be submitted to the League of

Nations.

Aegean Islands

o North Aegean Island with the exception of Gökçeada, Bozcaada

and Tavşan Islands were left to Greece. These would be demilitarized.

o The Dodecanese Islands were left to Italy.

Capitulations were abolished.

Minorities

o The Turkish Government committed to protect lives and freedoms

of all people living in Turkey without discrimination.

o Freedom of religion.

o Freedom to use mother tongue.

o Freedom to establish schools and foundations.

o Freedom to learn native tongues

Financial stipulations.

o Debts of the Ottoman Empire would be shared bay all the countries

issued from the dismemberment of the Empire.

Straits: Freedom of passage

o In case Turkey is in war, trade Ships of neutral countries can

transit. They would remain under the control of the Turkish Government;

war ships can pass freely during peacetime but their numbers should not

exceed the number of ships of bigger fleets around the Black Sea. In case

Turkey is in war, only neutral countries’ war ships can enjoy freedom of

passage.

o Some parts of the Straits would be demilitarized. An International

Commission for the Straits would be established. This Commission’s

authority would be on the waters of the Straits and would watch over the

application of the Treaty.

31

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 1923-1930

I. International situation.

This period is dominated by two developments: a) Competition and

struggle between the Germany which had lost the war and the winners, G.B. and

France, due to the Versaille treaty which was very strict and sometimes

inapplicable. b) World economic crises started in 1929.

This situation helped Turkey: a) Great European Powers had their own

problems and could not intervene continuously with the countries in their

periphery. b) Struggle between revisionists and those which were for the status

quo would give strategic dimensions to Turkey. c) Russia was no more a threat.

So that Atatürk could adopt a skilful balance policy.

ll. Domestic Dynamics.

a) Economy. At the economic congress of Izmir in 1923, businessmen

an landlords dominated the talks and they put down the principles which would

lead the Turkish economy during years 20s. Economy would be open to foreign

relations, foreign capital would be encouraged and liberalism would be the main

slogan. The Government granted concessions to foreign companies and

important amount of foreign capital could be brought in the country. Foreign

investments became twice higher than domestic ones. This was normal because

domestic capital was too little. At the same time important efforts were made to

replace Turks to minorities in the economic activities. Bookkeeping would be in

Turkish and Companies owned by Minorities would employ 75 % Moslem

employees.

32

b) On the political field, this period is that of liquidation of the

remaining influence of İttihat ve Terakki. Threads of Islamists and communists

as well as Kurdish revolts are brought to an end. In fact the country needed calm

and stability to take up reforms M.Kemal had decided to implement in the new

Turkey. (Abolition of Khalifat 1924, Civil Law 1926, criminal law 1927,

reform of alphabet 1928, constitutional amendment to delete official religion

1928).

During this period where there was no external thread on the scene,

the main preoccupation for the security of the country was however the Kurdish

question. Kurdish tribes were revolting in border areas between Turkey, Iran and

Syria and were crossing borders to take refuge in one of these neighboring

countries. Turkey concluded agreements with Iran (1926 and 1932), with France

as mandatory in Syria and with the G.B. as mandatory in Iraq promoting

cooperation with these States against Kurdish tribes activities.

Again during this period Turkish foreign policy priority would be

the settlement of remaining problems with G.B. and France. Thus Mosul would

be ceased to G.B., Good relations would be established with Greece, Turkey

would take steps to adhere the League of Nations, would stay distant to

Germany and Italy. Occupation of Dodecanese by Italy and Italy’s threads on

Antalya contributed the coolness pf relations with Germany.

c) Relations with the G.B. G.B refused longtime to transfer her

Embassy from Istanbul to Ankara. She was not ready to admit that a new State

had been found on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. She would open her

Embassy in Ankara once the Mosul question was settled.

Question of Mosul. When Mondoros armistice had been signed the

main part of Mosul was at the hands of Ottomans, but GB occupied the city

thereafter. This city was important for Turks for human factors, for their security

and for oil. For G.B for oil(which She never admitted) and for the situation of

33

city on the road to India. Lord Curzon was saying that Euphrat was the western

border of the GB in the area.

In 1922 GB signed an agreement with King Faysal in order to

enhance her position in Iraq which provoked reactions of Kurds, Shia and

population of Musul but Bagdad ratified this agreement under the pressures of

London. On the north Kurdish tribes were uneasy and revolting and their

subversive activities were tolerated by Ankara.

In Lausanne İsmet Paşa proposed to discuss the issue bilaterally with the

GB, explaining to Lord Curzon that Anatolia was in need of Mosul oil. Lord

Curzon did not admit any relation of Mosul question with oil. Turkey based her

calims on : a) the demographic composition of the city (263 000 Kurds, 146

000Turks and 74 000 others) arguing that Turks and Kurds were from Turan

people, from the same race and wanted to live together with Turks, b) Mosul

was occupied by the GB after the Armistice had been signed, and this

occupation was not legitimate and was also against the Wilson principles; c)

historically the region belonged to Turks since the eleventh century; d)

geographically Mosul was closer to Anatolia then Iraq from the economical

point of view; e) the city was important for Turkey for its strategic situation.

The GB, from her side was arguing that a) In Mosul were living 455 000 Kurds

and only 66 000 Turks; b) Kurds and Turks were not from the same origin; c)

Mosul’s economic ties were mostly with its south and west; e) in case Turkey

get Mosul she would come 60 Km near to Bagdad; f) if the city was occupied

after the armistice, the reason was simply that the British forces there had

learned the signature of armistice late; Question is not a question regarding oil

but the frontiers of Iraq. At the end it was decided that the question would be

resolved through talks between Turkey and GB within one year and in case no

agreement could come out of these talks, the problem would be submitted to the

League of Nations. In Ankara his agreement drew critics over the Government

which was blamed to have given in to open the way to the westernization of

34

Turkey only. M.Kemal stressed that Turkey could not afford the continuation of

armed hostilities.

On May 1924 talks started again with the request of the GB. (Conference

of Haliç) Turkey put forward the same argumentation and let the GB understand

that if Süleymaniye, Kerkuk and Musul were given to Turkey, Turkish

government would take British Government as partner in oil. But GB far from

agreeing, asked Hakkari for Nasturis (Suryani branch) and incited Nasturis to

manifestations and other disorders in areas near Hakkari. As there was not any

possibility of agreement GB brought the question before the League of Nations

according to Lausanne.

In the League of Nation Turkey demanded the organization of a plebiscite

in Mosul, but the GB argued that the problem was not that of the population but

was connected directly with the determination of frontiers of Iraq. She said that

anyway in the area the population was uneducated and self determination could

not be applied. She proposed the formation of a commission to study the

question. A commission composed of one Hungarian, one Swiss and one

Swedish member was founded. At the same time armed conflicts occurred in the

area and the Commission when it took over its mission drew a line separation

from Mosul to Hakkari as border, which is called Brussels Line. In its report to

the L.N. the Commission proposed Brussels Line as frontier between Turkey

and Iraq and Syria, considering that population living in Mosul was not

enthusiastic in been part of Iraq but were not eager nether to join to Turkey. It

seems that Şeyhs and leaders of tribes or Aşirets acted by fear of the GB or

preferred to be with rich GB than with poor Turkey. In this situation the decision

of the Commission was that the territory should not be divided for the economic

interest of its population and the south of the Brussels Line be given to Iraq on

the conditions that a) LN would have mandate for 25 years, b) Civil servants and

officers would be recruited from Kurds. c) in case the population would not be

given autonomy as the preference of the population would be Turkey which is

35

economically in better situation, the city would be given to Turkey d) if the area

is decided to be divided Zap would be frontier between Turkey, Iraq and Syria.

This report was accepted by GB but not by Turkey. Turkey argued that a)

the LN could not take a binding decision; b) Turkey was not member of the LN.

The LN asked advice from the Int. Permanent Court of Justice which said as

parties had agreed before in Lausanne on the authority of the L.N on the matter

this latter could take decisions which would bind them. And The LN decided

that the Brussels Line would be frontiers between Turkey and Iraq and Turkey

lost Mosul. Why?

a) Turkey was not member of the LN while the GB was the

most influential member.

b) GB and France did not want to give this strategically end

economically important area to Turkey

c) There were information’s that Italy and Greece would

attack Turkey, and Turkey could not afford to combat in two fronts at the same

time,

d) Turkey did not sent representatives to the Int.Perm.Court

of justice,

e) Turkey did not receive the mission of a commission leaded

by an Estonian general to make researches oil the area

f) Rumors and claims that Christians were oppressed created

a hostile atmosphere against Turkey

g) Coincided with the revolt of Şeyh Sait

h) Abolition of Caliphate cut off Kurds from Turks

i) Turkey could not afford a new war for Mosul

j) Turkey was not sure of the position of the USSR in case of

conflict with the GB

k) Most important: Ankara wanted to get rid of problems

with The GB and France in order to have free hands to start with reforms

36

Even if Ankara did not recognize this decision she continued talks with the

GB. And on the 5th of June 1926 an agreement was signed between Turkey,

BG and Iraq:

i.) Brussels line was accepted as border with small

change on favor of Turkey.

ii.) Turkey, GB and Iraq would cooperate against

armed bandits on border areas

iii.) Iraq would pay Turkey for 25 years a 10% share from

Mosul oil revenues. On June 1926 GB proposed Turkey to exchange her share

with 500 000 Sterling payment. (Some researchers are of the opinion that

Turkey accepted the payment of this amount and renounced to monthly

payments. Some others are not of this opinion. In fact annual payments always

existed in budget projects of Turkey until 1980 where Iraq’s debt was 2 000 000

Pounds. Taking into account the flourishing economic and trade relations

between Turkey and Iraq, this debt will not take place in Turkish budgets since

then.

Turkey could not obtain minority rights for Turkmens because her

argument was that Turks and Kurds were from the same race, and Turkey scared

that GB asks the same minority rights for Kurds in Turkey

After the settlement of Mosul question there was no move in Turkish

British relations until 1929 when a British fleet came to pay an official visit to

Turkey..

Diplomatic relations are established with Iraq in 1928

d) Relations with France. Two problems dominate the relations of

Turkey with France: Question of the Ottoman debts and question of Hatay

During the Lausanne Conference France insisted on the continuation of

the capitulations and on the Ottoman debts. But the immediate problem was to

determine the frontiers of Syria with Turkey. According 1921 agreement

37

between Turkey and France a commission would take the question up one

month after the signature. The Commission could start to work only in

September 1925 and failed to achieve its goal. In February 1928 a French

delegation came to Ankara where an agreement was initiated but Paris did not

sign it and waited until the Mosul question was settled to sign an agreement on

this issue, until 1930.

Another problem between the two countries, worth to mention is that of French

schools in Turkey. Turkish Government decided foreign schools in Turkey be

subject to Turkish law and follow the programs of Turkish Min. of Education

and teach some of the matters in Turkish . France did not want to accept it. But

before the determination of the Turkish Government France could not insist and

recognized the situation.

Ottoman debts. In fact France was the m ost concerned country with the

depts. Left by the Ottoman Empire. In 1928 Turkish Ambassador in Paris and

representatives of Duyun-u Umumiye made an agreement: Turkey accepted to

pay 62% of the debts made before 1912 and 73% of those made after that date.

Turkey paid the first installment timely but the 1929 economic crises broke out.

The amount Turkey had to pay yearly was 14% of her budget and it was very

difficult for her to pay. Turkish dept payments would be rescheduled in 1933

with some new arrangements in favor of Turkey.

Question of Sancak. 1921 agreement between Ankara and France had

granted the area a special status. But this agreement was never ratified by Paris.

France’s argument was that the agreement concerned Syria and France did not

need to ratify it. Ankara insisted that the stipulations of 1921 agreement

regarding Sancak be incorporated in Lausanne Treaty. At the end, only article 3

of the 1921 agreement, regarding the borders between Turkey and Syria was

taken in Lausanne Treaty and France circulated a latter confirming that

Lausanne Treaty did not bring any prejudice to the 1921 agreement which was

meaning that the special status of Sancak would be respected.

38

In 1923, the League of Nations approved the Mandate of France in

Syria. France divided the territory in four districts: Halep, Damascus, Lebanon

and Laskiye and established an autonomous Sancak attached to Halep. This

created discontent among Arab populations which revolted. France suppressed

the revolt using Armenian units. In 1925 unified the districts of Halep and

Damascus and attached Sancak to Damascus. That time Turks, Alleviates and

Armenians living at Sancak reacted. The problem would be solved later.

In 1926, following of the settlement of Musul problem, Turkey and

France signed an agreement of friendship and good neighborhood.

e) Relations with Italy. Italy which had taken a positive stand vis a vis

Ankara during the war of salvation changed her policy once Missolini came to

power. Mussolini, in his speech at the parliament in 1925 said that Italy could

not contend with Adriatic sea and that Italy’s interest was with Mediterranean.

She forced Yugoslavia to border changes in favor of Italy, occupied Corfu, and

established economic control in Albania. All this created discontent and

preoccupation in Ankara.

On the other hand Italy was seeking to bring about an alliance with

Turkey and Greece to enhance her influence in Mediterranean. This would

balance also the agreement Yugoslavia made with France under the thread of

Italy. In 1927 Mussolini proposed to T. Rüştü who was in Milan for an official

visit an agreement of friendship and neutrality between Italy, Turkey and

Greece. One year later a Treaty was signed. Parties accepted not to participate in

any political or economic arrangement against each others, to stay neutral incase

one of them attacked by third country or countries, they would submit their

conflicts to the Int. Perm. Court of Justice of Den Hague. In fact in 1929 a

conflict occurred on Meis which was brought to the Court.

During this period, despite of Italian thread trade with this country

increased.

39

f) Relations with Germany. Germany was in a very difficult economic

situation after the war. Turkey and Germany were old allies and there were not

any difficulty between them. However Germany did not want to provoke the

G.B. for some time. Later talks started in 1924 and an agreement of friendship

was signed in Ankara on 3rd March 1924. Big number of qualified scientists and

technicians, who had difficulties to find employments in Germany came to

Turkey and their help and advise, proved to be very useful. Number of Turks

was sent also to Germany for education. German militaries that were jobless due

to the demilitarization of Germany came also to work in Turkey.

In 1929 T. Rüstü paid a visit to Germany.

During this period economic relations grew more quickly than

political relations. In 1927 The Company Junkers interested to build an aircraft

plant in Turkey. The company was in difficulty and the Turkish Government

supported the project. Germany’s main aim was to continue her researches on

arms in foreign countries due to the military restrictions in Germany. Aircraft

plant was completed in one year. Lufthansa started its flights Berlin-Istanbul.

A trade agreement was signed in 1927 which would be renewed in 1930.

g) Relations with the USSR. The first important agreement with the

USSR was the Treaty of friendship and neutrality signed in 1925. Turkey was in

a difficult position with Sheikh Sait revolt and the Mosul question had been

solved against Turkish aspirations. As to the USSR, despite Western countries

had started to recognize it, the fact that Germany’s western frontiers were

decided in Locarno in 1925 while her eastern borders were not consisted an

element of insecurity for the USSR. In this context proposition of widening the

1921 Treaty with a new one came from the USSR Ambassador to Ankara.

According to this treaty signed in 1925 and came into force in 1926 Parties

would refrain from all military action against each other and would not take part

in any agreement or action third countries would make against one of them.

40

In 1926 USSR opened her new Embassy in Ankara and initiated talks for

delimitation of borders between the two countries. T.Rüştü met Çiçerin in

Odessa and both Ministers exchanged views on the membership to the LN, and

on Balkans. Çiçerin affirmed that the USSR would not take actions which would

prejudice Turkish interests in Balkans. And Turkey made known that she would

not be member of the LN unless a permanent seat was granted to her (which was

not possible). After that Turkey was invited to the disarmament conference in

1928 according the proposal made by the USSR.

On the other hand the USSR were not happy to see Turkey to sign a

Treaty with Italy, to came to an agreement with Western States on Ottoman

debts, to have let a British fleet to visit Istanbul in October 1929 and with the

mistreatment of communists in Turkey. However a Protocol prorogating 1925

Treaty for two more years was signed in 1929. With this protocol the Two

Parties were committing not to make agreements with neighboring States

without informing the other Party.

USSR opened trade representations in Turkey in 1922. Problem with these

representations was that they were making communist propaganda. On the other

hand, as trade was State monopoly in the USSR Moscow was insisting to obtain

diplomatic privileges and immunities for the members of these representations.

USSR put restrictions on the goods coming from Turkey. Talks started and

ended with a trade agreement in 1927, the USSR obtained the status she

requested for her trade representations which would be in Istanbul, Trabizon,

Mersin, Erzurum, Konya and Eskişehir. The transits of goods would be free of

duty.

b) Relations with Greece. The situation in Greece which lost the

war with Turkey and whose Anatolian adventure which had turn out to be

‘Anatolian disaster’, was confused. 1 000 000 Greeks of Anatolia had left

Anatolia with the withdrawing Greek army for Greece and there were an

41

important problem of immigrants. On the other hand, Greek units which had

taken refuge in Midilli and Sakız islands after the withdrawal revolted. A

Committee of Revolution was set up. Revolutionists were asking the abdication

of the King and dissolution of the parliament. The king abdicated in favor of his

son and the power was transferred to the hands of revolutionists. A process of

trials of those who were responsible of the lost of the war started. Despite of the

departure of the King the country was divided in two camps: supporters of the

king and supporters of Venizelos. Committee of Revolution asked Venizelos

who was in Paris to represent Greece in the peace conference with all the full

powers. He was granted with the authority to decide for Greece without

referring to Athena.

Problems solved at Lausanne Conference.

a) Frontiers. I. Thrace. Turkey asked the organization of plebiscite

in western Thrace he had left at the end of Balkan wars in 1913, but as it was

understood that this would not be acceptable by the Allies that recognized Meriç

line as frontiers with Greece and Bulgaria. Lands 30 km at each cost of the river

would be demilitarized.

ii. Islands.. Turkey claimed the small islands within her

territorial waters, Imroz and Bozcaada who were recognized by the Allies as

belonging to Turkey in 1914, Semadirek as being to close to Straits and

renounced to recognize the transfer of Limni, Midilli, Sakız and Nikaria to

Greece. An advisory military committee studied the question and proposed that

the status of Imroz, Bozcaada, Semadirek and Limni be decided later with the

status of the Straits, and the northern islands be demilitarized. The Conference

decided to give Limni, Semadirek, Midilli, Sakız Sisam and Nikariato Greece

with a demilitarized status. Greek aircrafts would not overfly Anatolian coasts

and Turkish aircraft Greek islands. Imroz and Bozcaada were given to Turkey

on the condition that a local administration was set up on these islands which

were demilitarized as well.

42

b) Humanitarian questions. Exchange of population. Turkish

delegation was instructed from Ankara to obtain an exchange of population

agreement which would be as comprehensive as possible. While Turkish

Delegation was scaring of the reactions of Allied countries before such a

proposal, The League of Nations’ responsible of emigration Mr Nansen took the

floor to explain his views and pointed out to the difficult situation the

immigrants were in and advised that this problem be solved urgently, and in case

of Turkey and Greece, two rural country, to give peasants opportunity to do their

work before the season ends. Against Turkish position Venizelos supported an

exchange of population more restricted and on voluntary basis, which would

take into consideration the difficulties Greeks who had already emigrated from

Anatolia was in. He was for the voluntary character of the exchange and the

exclusion of Istanbul Greeks from this measure. In fact Greece was thinking

that they had to reduce the number of immigrants to Greece, (1) not to provoke a

wider disappointment in Istanbul Greeks who were convinced in the Megola

Idea and (2) not to create a situation were staying without community

Archbishop of Istanbul would be obliged to live Istanbul as well. As to the G.B.,

Lord Curzon was thinking that if Istanbul Greeks with whom Western countries

managed their trade relations leaved Istanbul all Western trade with Turkey

would suffer, even Turkey would economically suffer from this. A

subcommittee touches the question up with that of exchange of all detainees.

At the end two agreements were signed:

- Agreement on the repatriation of civil detainees and war

prisoner. The two Parties agreed on a general amnesty for detainees and war

prisoners, citizen of the other Party, no matter what their charges were.

- Convention regarding the exchange of population between

Turkey and Greece. Greek-Orthodox people of Turkey and Muslim people of

Greece would be exchanged on the compulsory basis with the exception of

Istanbul Greeks and west Thrace Muslims. Exchanged people would be allowed

43

to take with them all their belongings, their properties would be liquidated and

money which would come from these liquidations would be the dept of the

Government vis a vis the other Government. Important is to underline that the

exchange was done according to the criterion of religion.

Problem of Archbishop of Fener. This question was discussed conference

which did not take a decision on the matter and left it to the discretion of the

Turkish Legislation.

Question of reparation. Allies asked Turkey and Greece to renounce to

their claims of reparations. Turkey argued that she did no ham in Greece, thus

Greece could not have any claim for reparations from Turkey. Grecce was in

economic and financial difficulties and could not afford any payment for

reparations. At the end Turkey renounced his claim in exchange of Karaagaç in

the border. This was accepted in the Conference.

Problems remained from Lausanne.

i. problem of etabli. Mixt commission for exchange found by the

agreement of exchange of population started its work on October 1923. Bigger

problem was in the interpretation of the term ‘établi’ in case of Greeks of

Istanbul. According the Agreement would be considered “établi’ those Greek

population of Istanbul settled before 30 October 1918 in the city according to

the law of municipality of 1912. Greece interpreted this as covering all Greeks

coming to Istanbul at that period of time, regardless whether they had or not the

intension of settling themselves down there. In fact Turkey wanted to send to

Greece as in big numbers of Greeks as possible while Greece tried to reduce this

number. In Istanbul 4500 Greek were not recorded in official records as living in

that city and if Turkish interpretation was accepted they would be expatriated to

Greece.

As the problem could not be solved by the Mix Commission The League

of Nation was asked for advise and this later brought the issue to the Court of

44

Justice which decided. Would be considered établi who had set down in Istanbul

before 30 october1918 with the intention to live continuously there. This advise

did not help parties. Greece started to take measures in WEST Thrace, seizing

properties of Turks and settling there Greek immigrants. Turkey responded

seizing properties of Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul.

Question of Patriarchate of Fener. Archbishop Meletios behaved during

the salvation war against Turkish independence and supported a Greek State in

Asia Minor, thus it was impossible for him to continue with his mission in

Istanbul after new state was found. Under the pressure of Greece Meletios

resigned in October 1923.Papa Eftim with the support of the Turkish

Government made pressing on the Patriarchate to obtain the election of

Damianidis, a Karaman orthodox as Patriarch of Fener. But face to reactions in

the Christian public opinion the Turkish Government withdrew its support from

Damianidis and gave its consent to the election of Grigorios. In June 1924 Papa

Eftim romped all his relations with Fener and found the Turkish Orthodox

church. When Grigorios died in November Papa Eftim took up the same

initiatives but that time the Turkish Government did not give him support and

stayed impartial. Despite of this election of new patriarch brought about a new

crisis in Turkish Greek relations. In fact new elected Patriarch Constantinos VI

was of these ‘etabli’ Greeks to be exchanged and the Turkish Government could

not accept him as Patriarch. Greece wanted to submit the question to the

international .Court of Justice. Turkey did not accept this, arguing that

Patriarchate was a Turkish institution and expatriated Contantinos who

submitted a personal memorandum to the League of Nations. The L.N. advised

bilateral solutions. At the end Constantinos resigned. But this conflict had an

important result: Turkey was not recognizing international status to patriarch of

Fener, admitting him as a Turkish institution. She would not authorize

foreigners to intervene with the domestic affairs of Turkey on the pretext of

religion.

45

Treaties of Ankara and Athens. Talks started between Turkey and Greece

on the questions of “établi’ and Patriarch constituted the first steps in the

settlement of disputes on these problems. The main reason of these talks from

the Turkish part was the preoccupation of the Government of Inönü to bring a

solution to the questions remained from Lausanne to have the hands free from

the problem created by the Şeyh Sait revolt and to start with the reforms. In

Athens The Government of Mihalokopulos who was in economic difficulties

and had problems with his Balkan neighbors profited from the situation. At the

end of talks Ankara Treaty was signed in June 1925. With this treaty main

problems coming from the exchange found solutions. Provisions of the treaty

provided Turkey with the possibility of preventing the return of Greeks who left

the country trough illegitimate ways, without a passport, Greece was no more

obliged to evacuate some Greek immigrants from properties of Turks where

they were installed. Ankara assigned an Ambassador to Athens but the

Ambassador never took his office, because General Pangalos who toppled the

Government and took the power started a different line of foreign policy for the

revision of the Lausanne Treaty. He was making plans against Balkans and

Ankara. But the carefull behavior of Italy and her refusing to make a pact with

Greece and the settlement of Mosul issue did not allow Pangalos to initiate a

military action against Turkey. In 1926 he lost the power.

After Pangalos talks started again between the two States and Treaty of

Athens was signed. This Treaty was solving mainly financial problems.

Properties of these Moslems and Turkish Citizens who had left before October

1912 the Greek districts where the exchange of population was applicable would

come to the Greek Government and properties of Greeks and Greek citizens who

had left on the same date Turkish districts subject to the exchange of population

and stood continuously elsewhere would come to the Turkish Government and a

mechanism of clearing between the two Governments would be set up. The

implementation of this treaty was not without problems. It was not easy to

46

determine the value of real estates and the two Governments were acting very

slowly. And difficulties stemming from the interpretation of the word “établi”

continued.

f) Relations with Iran. Rıza Han who became Defense Minister in Iran

in 1921 started the process of change in this country on the model of Turkey.

New Iran regime was aiming at creating a modern country with western norms

and institutions. Turkey and Iran had the same ideology (nation instead of

religion), similarity in their enemies, inside (traditional economic class) and

outside (the G.B.).Thus their relations were developing positively. Turkish

reforms were a support for Rıza Han’s policies in Iran. Proclamation of republic

in Turkey provoked the same desire in Iran, but abolition of Khalifat give the

Iranian public opinion that this was a natural result of the republic and Rıza Han,

despite he was thinking otherwise, declared in 1925 that he was against republic.

The same year Pehlevis replaced Kaçars . Rıza Pehlevi said to the

Turkish Ambassador to Teheran that his choice was republic, but he was

obliged to accept to be shah.

Problems on the frontiers. Ottoman – Iran frontiers delimitated by the

treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin in 1639, and since it came without major changes until

today. But small problems always existed. Iran desired to attend the Lausanne

Conference to bring solution to this problem but the GB did not accept it. Then

Iran sought bilateral solutions. Revolt of Şeyh Sait accelerated demarches in that

direction and in April 1926 a treaty of friendship and security was signed in

Teheran. Parties committed not to attack each others and be neutral if one of

them is attacked by third countries. They agreed also to cooperate against

organizations which were to disturb public order in border areas, not to give

refuge to them in their countries. Aşirets were pointed out directly. But despite

this treaty problems created by Kurdish Aşirets on border areas could not be

solved. In 1928 a second treaty was concluded in Teheran. This treaty was

47

foreseeing solidarity of the two states against British or Soviet interventions. In

fact these interventions were not very probable and the main problem was not

the probability of such interventions but activities of Kurdish Aşirets. Question

of border security turned out to be a crisis during Agrı revolts in 1927-1930

because rebels were taking refuge in small Agrı area in Iran. To combat them

Turkey occupied the area and Iran could not intervene. Solution to border

problems would take many years more.

T U R K I S H F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

BETWEEN 1930 – 1939

In the early 1930s equilibrium started to change both in Europe and in the

Middle East:

a) Jewish immigration into Palestine created discontent in the Middle

East and provoked Arab nationalism.

a) In Europe, Hitler and Missolini formed a camp of revisionists and

started to violate the restrictions imposed in Versaille. Italy occupied Ethiopia,

which was taken as a threat to the British domination of the area. Germany’s

stand vis a vis Turkey and Italian political and military activities in Balkans and

Mediterranean increased the importance of Turkey.

b) The effects of the 1929 economic crisis decreased.

For Turkey most of the reforms were completed, and most of the

problems remained from Lausanne were solved. Facing the revisionist countries’

policies, GB and France sought to strengthen their relations with Turkey.

48

Despite the fact that she could not have realized the goals of the National Pact

Turkey did not take place at the side of revisionists. On the contrary, Italian

policies concerning the Balkans and the Mediterranean area especially pushed

Turkey closer to the countries that were defending the status quo.

Relations with Great Britain

Two events helped build good relations with GB:

a) The atmosphere created in GB by the 1930 Turkish-Greek agreement

and the amelioration of the relations of the two countries.

b) The fact that the USSR was seeking cooperation with GB and France as

well.

Fuelled by increasing economic relations, German influence was

growing in the Balkans; this preoccupied GB as well as Turkey. The part of

Germany in Turkish foreign trade was also increasing quickly, which was also a

concern for Turkey. Despite better conditions offered by Krupp, the construction

of the Karabük steel factory had been given to Brasset, a British company; only

the control of the work was left to Germans.

In June, a trade agreement was signed wit the G.B.. Turkey would give

priority to GB in the maintenance of railroads and irrigation installations. When

Turkey obtained the right to militarize the Straits, she asked Britain again to help

achieve the work necessary to this purpose. GB responded by giving credit to

Turkey. In 1936 King Edward VIII paid an official State Visit to Ankara. In

1937 Turkey was invited to join a conference on the security in the

Mediterranean basin following the sinking of two ships. Turkey participated to

this conference and acted in line with GB while Germany and Italy refused to

participate.

49

In 1935, Italian aggression to Ethiopia and the military buildup

which she undertook in the Dodecanese Islands incited GB and Turkey to build

closer relations. Turkey accepted the sanctions imposed by the League of

Nations against Italy; which became more and more a threat for Turkey, Greece

and Yugoslavia. GB gave guaranties to France, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece

in case they would be attacked by Italy; this was an offer for an alliance that

Turkey joined in January 1936. However, GB suspended the accord once

sanctions on Italy were removed. In fact, Turkey was desirous to make an

alliance with GB; nevertheless, she was careful about this idea at that moment in

order not to worsen her relations with Italy.

GB was following appeasement policy that she would renounce

to in 1939 when Hitler occupied Poland. Turkey was still seeking closer

relations with GB and France on one hand and the USSR on the other while

facing growing threats from the side of the German-Italian axis.

In March 1938 France took the first step for an agreement with

Turkey. Meanwhile, GB was looking for ways to support Turkey in case of war.

In April 1939, Italy attacked Albania; Consequently, GB and France understood

that it would not be possible for them to pull Italy to their side. The same month

unilateral assurances were given to Greece and Romania against a German or

Italian aggression; they intended to give the same assurances to Turkey as well.

They were calculating to include Bulgaria in a Balkan cooperation against

revisionists or to obtain her neutrality.

However, Ankara found British reaction before Italian aggression to

Albania to be too weak. She thought that unilateral assurances would not be

sufficient to stop aggressions and sought her security in an alliance. Thus,

Turkey proposed to the G.B. Turkish-British cooperation in case of extension of

a war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

50

However, Ankara found British reaction before Italian aggression to

Albania to be too weak. She thought that unilateral assurances would not be

sufficient to stop aggressions and sought her security in an alliance. Thus,

Turkey proposed to the G.B. Turkish-British cooperation in case of extension of

a war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

In may 1939, Chamberlain and Refik Saydam made declarations

before their respective parliaments that both countries decided to actively

cooperate and give each other all possible help in case of a war in the

Mediterranean region. After the Sancak problem was solved, a declaration with

the same content was signed with France. Contacts had been made in three

capitals for financial and military aid to Turkey. Turkey informed the URSS

about all these developments; on the other hand, the URSS was not informing

Turkey about any of her activities concerning the Germano-Soviet pact of non

aggression: it came as a surprise for Turkey. Occupation of Poland By Germany

and the URSS increased Turkish concerns. As a result, Ş. Saracoglu paid a visit

to Moscow, however, he returned without any tangible result

On October 19th, 1939 a Turkish-British-French alliance was signed and

was followed by an economic and financial aid agreement. We can thus say that

Turkey achieved her goal of forming an alliance with GB and France, though in

difficult circumstances. On the other had this meant that Turkey and the URSS

would follow different roads from then on.

Relations with France.

The 1926 agreement helped to ameliorate Turkish-French

relations. This also helped the situation in Sancak, which was closely following

all the steps taken by Turkey: all the reforms Turkey had made at home were

realized in Sancak as well.

51

When GB renounced to her mandate in Iraq in 1930, national feelings rose

among Arabs and in Sancak as well. To appease this, France added some

dispositions about the special status of Sancak to the Syrian constitution. In

1936 France, face to the difficulties in Europe, declared that she would give an

end to her mandate in Syria. It was better for France to have an allied

independent Syria then to rule on a territory with hostile population. Financial

difficulties of France as well as the ideology of the new French Prime Minister

Mr. Blum contributed to this decision.

On the 9th of September 1936 France declared that she would

end her mandate in Syria three years later when Syria would become member of

the League of Nations. France was transferring all her rights and commitments

to Syria.

This provoked important reactions in Sancak and in Turkey. T. Rüştü

asked France to make the same declaration for Sancak as well; yet this

proposition was not accepted and was countered by the argument that such a

declaration would mean a partition of Syria. The Sancak problem was referred

to the League of Nations in January 1937. The League of Nations brought up a

report which proposed the following points:

Sancak would be considered as a different entity with autonomy in

domestic affairs yet attached to Syria in terms of Foreign Affairs;

it would also be part of a customs and monetary union with Syria;

its official language would be Turkish;

a French delegation would watch the implementation of Sancak’s

special status;

Sancak would have police forces only;

Turkey and France would respect the territorial integrity of Sancak;

Turkey would be allowed to use the Iskenderun harbor;

52

The Council of the League of Nations adopted this report. In all, the League

of Nations adopted three documents: (1) the Status of Sancak, (2) the

Constitution of Sancak, and (3) the Frontiers of Sancak.

Frontiers as proposed in this report would be the same, though with small

changes, as they were at the moment when Sancak joined Turkey. An

agreement to guaranty the territorial integrity of Sancak and another to

determine Turkish-Syrian borders were signed by Turkey and France. The

Syrian parliament protested France for these arrangements on the 3rd of June.

An election committee sent by the League of Nations to make necessary

arrangements for the elections to be held on April 15th 1938 took advice and

assistance from French mandate officers; this provoked reactions in Sancak due

to the decisions disfavoring Turks. It set up election regulations without

consulting Ankara and sent them to the League of Nations. As a reaction to that,

Turkey abolished the 1930 treaty, and M. Kemal, despite his illness, went to

inspect army units in Adana and Mersin. Some 30,000 troupes were deployed on

the border. Taking the developments in Europe and the increasing importance of

Turkey into consideration, and with the advice of GB, France, amended the

regulations in question according Turkish wishes. France also suspended all the

operations of the election committee.

On the 3rd of July 1938 a military treaty was signed between Turkey and

France in Antakya, foreseeing an arrangement in case of an attack to Sancak.

France and Turkey agreed that they would have the equal number of troupes in

Sancak. On the 4th of July, Turkish troupes were already deployed in Sancak

and on the same day a treaty of friendship was signed between Turkey and

France in Ankara.

At the elections held in August, 22 of the 40 seats of the parliament were

earned by Turks. Sancak adopted all the laws that Turkey had previously

adopted, as well as all the reforms she had realized. Arabs and Armenians

53

started to leave the area. Following the Turkish-British declaration, Turkey did

not want to make a similar declaration with France until the Sancak question

was resolved. This declaration, identical to the Turkish-British declaration, was

made on June 1939, and the French Ambassador in Ankara signed with M.

Kemal the Agreement on ten final points regarding territorial questions between

Turkey, Syria and France. With this agreement, France officially recognized the

annexation of Hatay by Turkey. The Sancak parliament took a decision in the

same direction. Syrian protests supported by Italy gave no results.

Note: There are two main differences between the cases of Hatay and Musul:

the presence of oil and the conjuncture during which these issues were

addressed.

RELATIONS WITH ITALY.

In May 1929, Turkey and Italy signed a protocol about the status

of Meis and of other small islands around it, agreeing to submit this problem to

the International Permanent Court of Justice. However, after a visit made by

Inönü to Rome, Turkey and Italy concluded an agreement on the status of these

islands without referring the problem to the Court. Some 20 small islands and

Karaada were left to Turkey, while Meis and some 12 small islands were given

to Italy.

Nevertheless, from 1933 on Italy started to act in a more aggressive

manner. Mussolini was saying that Italy's historical goals were in Asia and in

Africa, and that the Mediterranean was in any case Italy’s Mare Nostrum.

Mussolini felt the need to declare that these declarations were not aiming at

Turkey.

In 1935 Italy proposed an alliance to Turkey and Greece. Turkey

perceived this offer as a maneuver against the Balkan Pact concluded in 1934

54

and declined it. Turkey was seeking a general alliance in the Balkans that would

include all countries while Italy was for bilateral arrangements. Italy on the

other hand was increasing her military activities in the Dodecanese and attacked

Ethiopia. The League of Nations adopted sanctions against Italy and Turkey

joined these sanctions.

Italy protested against the attitude of Turkey and came up with new

threats. As a result of a Turkish initiative, similar replies were given to the

Italian protest notes by Turkey, GB, France and some Balkan countries to show

that all these countries were concerned by the developments. Turkish-Italian

economic relations suffered from this situation as well. The Italian occupation

of Ethiopia generated new preoccupations.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY.

A first reason of conflict with Hitler's Germany was the Balkan Pact.

Turkey had played an important role in its conclusion. Germany did not like to

see Turkey as active in a region Germany liked to see as her own area of

influence whereas Turkish activity in the area pointed out British and French

influence. Germany was already discontented with the small entente formed by

France.

Germany was taking the Balkan pact as an action against Bulgaria as well.

The second problem with Germany was with the provisions of the Montreux

Convention relative to the right of free transit recognized to Soviet ships.

Despite these, there were no major problems in the Turkish-German

bilateral relations. In 1938, Ribbentrop invited Turkey to the revisionist camp

and proposed a treaty of neutrality. Turkey said she was concluding such treaties

with her neighbor countries only.

55

On the other hand, Germany made efforts to prevent Turkey from joining

the other camp. Von Pape, who was assigned as Ambassador to Ankara, drew

the attention of Berlin the negative impacts of Italian behavior and urged to

make pressure on this country to give assurances to Turkey. Italy was very

important for Germany, and Berlin did not comply with his ambassador's

warnings. Later, when Turkey's relations with GB and France became more

important, Rebbentrop would take some measure against Turkey by stopping

delivery of arms and war materiel. However, it was difficult for Germany to

bring restrictions on bilateral trade relations because she was importing from

Turkey items that she needed for her war industry.

On the 1st of September, Germany attacked Poland and the war

broke out. Turkey led Germany know that she would remain neutral. During this

period, despite political difficulties, Germany was importing 50% of Turkish

exportation goods and had a share of 45% in Turkish importations. This

preoccupied GB as well. Thus, she offered a cleaning agreement and a credit of

10,000,000 Pounds. Germany retaliated with an offer of 150,000,000 DM in

1938.

The Adhesion of Turkey to the League of Nations.

For a long time, Turkey stayed distant vis a vis the League of

Nations. She was not happy with the position the League of Nations had taken in

the settlement of Mosul issue and did not want to go against the attitude of the

URSS either, given that the USSR thought of the League of Nations as a

ramification of imperialist countries. Turkey kept telling GB and France that she

would be member of the organization only if she was provided with a permanent

seat in the Council.

56

At the start of 1930’s, an improvement of the relations with GB

and the experience of Mosul had shown that being outside of the Organization

was more harmful then being inside. This pushed Turkey to change this policy.

The USSR was no more against the membership of Turkey. Turkey informed

the Organization that she would join if she was invited to. Consequently, she

was invited following a motion made by Spain and seconded by Greece.

Relations with the USSR

Until the years 1930s, relations between Turkey and the USSR

were shaped by cooperation under the impacts of the international situation.

However during these years we notice the establishment of some sort of balance

in the relations between the two countries due to the fact that Turkey had solved

her problems with Western States and that Turkish foreign policy was no longer

dependent on the URSS.

In 1930, T. Rüştü visited Moscow. In 1931, a Protocol on the

limitation of naval forces in the Black Sea as well as in neighboring seas was

signed in Ankara. The two parties committed not to increase their naval forces

without informing each other six months in advance. The 1925 Treaty was also

prorogated.

In 1932, Inönü paid a visit to Odessa, Moscow, Leningrad and

Harcow. During this visit,

i. Inonu convinced the URSS not to oppose Turkish membership

to the League of Nations, but Turkey would not take part in any

sanctions that might be imposed on the USSR as long as the

URSS was not the aggressing part in an armed conflict.

ii. The USSR gave financial credit to Turkey. Turkey was given

important contributions by Soviet experts in the preparation of

her five-year economic development program. The credit

57

obtained, one third of which was needed for the implementation

of this program, would be used for building the Kayseri and

Nazilli textile factories.

A meeting between Ataturk and Stalin in September 1934 was

decided upon, yet could not be realized. In 1933, Voroshilof, Defense Minister

of the URSS, paid a visit to Turkey.

Turkey was seeking the amendment of arrangements adopted in Lausanne

vis a vis the Straits. She raised this question during diverse international

environments in 1933 and 1935, and bilaterally with GB and the URSS.

In 1936 she made a note and asked the Lausanne Convention to be

amended. The USSR were not happy with the clauses that were allowing free

passage to all ships and wanted this be restricted to countries with coasts on the

Black Sea only. The USSR were also in favor of the militarizing the Straits but

wanted to be the country that would realize this for Turkey.

When the Montreux Conference was held, The USSR offered alliance to

Turkey. Turkey proposed instead a commitment of the USSR to help Turkey if

attacked form the Mediterranean. USSR did not think it could afford that.

Turkey let GB be informed of these talks and GB warned that an additional

alliance over the Montreux Convention would make the Convention lose its

value. All of these developments cooled down the relations between Turkey and

the USSR. In 1937, T. Rüştü went to Moscow but could obtain no positive

development.

In 1938 Saracoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit

to Moscow. In 1939, talks on the possibility of a pact did not give any result.

However, Turkey stayed out of the war that broke out and this was

comfortable for the URSS because the straits would be closed to ships

belonging to fighting countries.

58

RELATIONS WITH GREECE

By 1928, Turkey had normalized her relations with GB and France, and

had started to be active in maintaining peace and the status quo in the Balkans.

In Greece, Venizelos who had come to power with strong majority votes gave an

end to the long lasting instability in the country, left his irredentist policies and

adopted a peaceful policy defending the status quo as well. The two countries

were aware of the negative effects of military expenses resulting from the lack

of confidence they had with respect to each other. They also understood that

they were in need of each other in the face of threats originating from Italy and

Bulgari.

After 1928, an agreement about the Islands and mutual

neutrality was signed between Ankara and Rome. That same year, Greece

signed a similar agreement with Italy. Italy was desirous to conclude a Balkan

pact with Turkey and Greece. She was trying to help these countries in finding

compromises to overcome their bilateral difficulties. However, Turkey and

Greece did not trust Italy and started to improve their relations with each other.

In 1928, Venizelos stated in a letter to Inonu that Greece had no territorial

claims on Turkey and expressed the expectation that Turkey as well did not hold

any such claims on Greece either. Inonu responded positively. These

developments led the two States to sign in June 1930 a Convention on the final

settlement of problems stemming from the Lausanne Treaty. This convention

made a clear cut definition of the word ‘etabli’. New arrangements were made

with regard to the properties of exchanged populations and some financial

problems were resolved as well. After this, relations improved quickly.

Venizelos came to Ankara the same year and a period of friendship started.

During Venizelos’ visit three documents were signed: - the

Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitrage (a protocol on

the limitations of naval forces), a Trade, Settlement and a Communications

59

Agreement. This last agreement recognized for each party’s citizens the right to

hold property, to trade, to found companies, and to exploit maritime lines within

the other party’s territory. The main goals of the agreement were to:

1. Create a free trade area in Aegean region to promote economies;

2. Bring solutions to the deficit of qualified manpower in Turkey after the

departure of the Greek population, and to

3. Lessen unemployment in Greece.

After this agreement, a great number of Greeks came to Turkey. Despite

this agreement, some Greek ‘etabli’s still emigrated to Greece due to the Turkish

law consacrating some jobs to Turks only.

In 1931, Inönü visited Athens. Good relations between the two countries

continued after the resignation of Venizelos from his post of Prime Minister.

In 1933, Ismet Pasa and Caldaris signed in Ankara the

‘Document of Sincere Agreement between Turkey and Greece’. This document

was obviously addressing to the potential of Bulgarian aggression.With this

agreement, parties assured the defense of common frontiers mutually and agreed

to consult each other on all international issues of common interest. The same

year an agreement of clearing was signed. In 1934, a Turkish-Greek Trade

Office was founded. Venizelos came to power again and was proposed as

candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.

THE BALKAN ENTENTE

The issue of Cooperation for the security between Balkan

countries was raised several times but the first important step was taken in

October 1929 in Athens. During the 27th World Peace Congress, Papanastsiu,

Greek Prime Minister, proposed the foundation of a Balkan Union Institute. The

60

proposal was welcomed by participating Balkan states and it was decided that

yearly meetings among them would be organized.

The 1st Balkan Conference met in Athene in October 1930. (Albany,

Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece) They decided:

1. Yearly ministerial meetings;

2. Elaboration of a Balkan Pact which would ban war, would ask parties to

proceed to peaceful solutions of conflicts

3. Foundation of an organization for Balkan cooperation.

The 2nd Balkan Conference met in October 1931 in Istanbul;

economic and technical relations were taken up. Ankara and Greece undertook

all efforts to prepare a pact, yet Albania and Bulgaria under Italian influence

were staying cool to the idea.

The 3rd Balkan Conference in 1932 in Bucarest took up

minority issues, and Bulgaria left the conference when she understood that

decisions would not be the ones she wished to get. The remaining five countries

decided to found a Balkan Chamber of commerce and Industry, a Balkan Office

of Workers, a Balkan Union of Post and a Customs Union.

In September 1933 Inönü visited Sofia to convince Bulgaria to

come back to the Balkan conferences but failed.

The 4TH Conference in 1933 occurred in Salonique; it was decided to

conclude the Balkan Pact without Bulgaria. The Pact would be signed in 1934. It

was more against a Bulgarian aggression then against an Italian one. With this

document Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania reassured each other

mutually about their borders in Balkans, adopted consultations, agreed not to

61

take any commitment vis a vis a third Balkan country without the permission of

the Signatories.

Turkey and Greece made reservations to the Pact: Turkey

would not participate in any action that might be taken against the USSR and

Greece would not be forced to fight a war against Italy.

The Turkish-Greek rapprochement opened the way to the Balkan Pact;

yet, as Albania and Bulgaria were not included in the pact, this one was not up

to assure enough protection for its members in case of war. Thus Turkey and

Greece increased their common defense efforts and their cooperation in the

military field. In 1936, when Turkey sought the revision of the dispositions of

the Lausanne Treaty regarding the Straits, she had the support of Greece. The

friendship was pushed so far that T. Rüştü Bey declared in a speech on the

Montreux Convention that this convention was abolishing the militarized status

of Limni and Semadirek islands. This declaration would be exploited later by

Greece when violating the militarized status of these islands according to

Montreux.

In 1936 Metaxas came to power in Greece. He was also

convinced to the necessity of Turkish-Greek cooperation on the military filed

because Greece would not be able to defend herself alone.

In 1937 Yugoslavia signed a friendship agreement with Bulgaria

and the Balkan entente decided the abolishment of the militarized status of

borders in Balkans. These developments increased the preoccupations in

Greece. In 1938 Turkey and Greece signed new documents to complete the 1930

friendship agreement and the 1933 Sincerity agreement. Each party committed

not to allow their territory to be used against the other party by hostile activists.

The Rapprochement also covered the cultural field. Minorities in

both countries benefited from these developments. Turkey stopped to give

support to Papa Eftim and refrained to intervene to the elections of the Patriarch,

diminished her pressures on Greek schools, and in Greece similar measures were

62

taken in Western Thrace, expatriating opponents of the Turkish regime, and

adopting the use of the Latin alphabet in Muslim schools. Nevertheless, Greece

took profit from these good relations with Turkey and took advantage in order to

fortify her position in the Aegean. In 1931, she declared that she was expanding

her air space from 3 miles to 10 miles, and in 1936 her territorial waters were

expanded from 3 miles to 6 miles. Turkey failed to react in the good atmosphere

of friendly relations.

RELATIONS WITH IRAN

The 3rd Agrı revolt which had started in 1930 turned into a crisis between

Turkey and Iran. Revoltees were escaping from the forces of order and were

taking refuge in Küçük Agri in Iran. Turkey was forced to occupy this area

militarily in order to put an end to this situation. She proposed a piece of land

without strategic importance in exchange; this was not accepted by Iran. She

insisted on keeping the 1913 protocol on the borders unchanged.

This protocol was never ratified by Turkey. The aim of Iran was to obtain

recognition of this protocol - which contained dispositions in favor of Iran, with

regard to borders with Iraq on Sattul Arap. She wanted to use this against Iraq.

In 1932, T.Rustu paid a visit to Teharan. The problem was

solved through the signature of two documents. Small points upon which no

agreement was reached would be submitted to arbitrage. The arbitrator was Riza

Sah Pehlevi; he decided in favor of Turkey.

In 1937 a Treaty determined Turkish Iranian frontiers as they

are today.

63

THE SADABAD PACT

There were two major reasons for interested States to make a pact

among themselves:

1. Desire to give a final end to border problems. In fact most of these

problems had been solved in 1937 and now they wanted that situation to

continue without further problems.

2. The desire to underline the independence and the sovereignty of these

countries.

In 1931, King Faysal of Iraq and his Prime Minister Nuri Sait Pasa paid a

visit to Turkey. As the border problems were already solved, they took up

problems created by the Kurdish aşirets at border areas. Iraq asked the mediation

of Turkey to normalize Iraqi-Iranian relations. In 1933, Iraq proposed a non-

aggression Treaty between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Turkey wanted the GB and the

URSS to become member to such a Treaty. (Iraq was under control of GB

despite the independence of Iraq; on the other hand the presence of the 1929

agreement with the USSR also played a role).

GB was thinking that the League of Nations was a sufficient means for her

and was against participation to regional pacts and proposed Afganistan to join

this new pact. As GB declined the membership, that of the URSS became no

more necessary, thus in October 1935, Turkey, Iran and Iraq initialed Treaty and

Afganistan joined later on.

However Iraq had some difficulties with the pact, first due to differences

with Iran about the borders on Sattul Arap; second, she did not want to be the

only Arab country in the pact facing the Hatay problem opposing Syria to

Turkey. But after the solution of the border problem between the two countries,

64

the Minister of Foreign Affaires of the four countries signed in June 1937 the

treaty already initialed in 1935.

With this Treaty they committed to the following:

1. not to intervene with each others’ the domestic affairs

2. to proceed to consultations on matters of common interest,

3. to refrain from any action against each others

4.

As the War broke out, the pact was shelved until 1979 when Iran abolished it.

The Montreux Convention

Turkey had accepted restrictions on the Straits within the Lausanne Treaty

because at that time, besides her desire to complete the peace talks as soon as

possible, she was thinking that the collective security system established by the

League of Nations would work and a general disarmament would be realized.

The League of Nations obtained some success with the limitation of naval

weapons, but this did not last long. from 1931 on, an arms race started again.

Talks on the limitation of land weapons were completely unsuccessful.

Germany withdrew from the talks as soon as 1934. The situation was much

different as compared to that in the aftermath of the war.

In fact, Turkey had been taking steps to change the Lausanne stipulations

with regard the Straits since 1933 (Disarmament conference of London). She

continued her actions in the Council of the League of Nations in 1935, at the

Council of the Balkan Entente.

She did find a favorable atmosphere in the League of Nations during the

discussion of sanctions against Italy who had aggressed Ethiopia. On 10 th of

April 1936, with a note to all the signatory states, she argued that the situation in

the Black Sea as well as in the Mediterranean had completely changed since the

65

signature of Lausanne, and that the collective security system was no more

effective The Straits regime now needed to include provisions with regard to the

immediate danger of war, while it was not possible to work with Lausanne’s

stipulations.

In the face of these Turkish demands the URSS, unhappy with Lausanne

as well, was seeking the possibility to amend it in her own favour; Bulgaria was

thinking that negotiations about the Turkish Straits would provide her with the

occasion to raise the issue of its demilitarized status imposed by the Neuilly

Treaty. France did not want to go against the Russian desire of amending the

Lausanne stipulations. GB, who wanted to pull Turkey on her side, did not want

to antagonize this latter either. The only objection came from Italy, which

wanted to take revenge on Turkey for backing the decision of the League about

the sanctions against Italy.

The conference was held on the 22nd June 1936 in Montreux within the

presence of all the signatories of Lausanne except Italy. Turkey wanted to obtain

a limitation of the total tonnage and time of journey of ships belonging to non-

Black Sea countries, in order to have more control over the transits in situations

where Turkey would feel herself under threat, and in order to get rid of the

Commission of the Straits and the demilitarization imposed by Lausanne. GB

was against of the abolishment of the commission. She was thinking to give the

League of Nations the right to cancel if it deemed it appropriate, in case of a

Turkish decision declaring any threat of war. She was also against the

restrictions proposed against those States without shores in the Black Sea. URSS

was favorable to Turkish views but was not agreeable with restrictions on

passage of ships of Black sea countries.

The conference ended on 20th June 1936.

66

The Montreux Regime

1. Trade vessels.

- ( Peace time ) Free passage, day and night, inform about their

name and qualifications, no formality other then sanitary ones, guiding

services voluntary.

- (In danger of war ) passage only day time and through the road

given by Turkey. Guiding services may be compulsory.

- (War time but Turkey is not in war) as peace time

- (If Turkey is in war) passage of ships belonging to those

countries in war with Turkey: on the discretion of Turkey.

- Passage of ships belonging to countries which are not in war

with Turkey: free on the conditions that they will not help Turkey’s

enemies and will pass during day time and following road given by

Turkey.

2. War vessels. (Peacetime)

Black Sea countries:

i) Auxiliary ships, light surface ships, small war ships:

- total number of foreign ships in the Straits no more then 9

- total tonnage of foreign ships in the Straits no more then 15

000 t.

- passage with notice, during day time and without stopping

ii) War ships with weight more then 15 000t.

- alone and accompanied maximum by two torpidoes

- No limitation of duration of journey in the Black Sea

67

Non Black sea Countries:

i) Auxiliary and small vessels: same as for Black Sea countries.

ii) Aircraft-carriers and submarines cannot pass

iii) Total weight permitted: 30 000t. (may be augmented. until

45 000t.)

iv) No one Black sea country can have in the Black Sea more the 1/3 of

the total tonnage of all non-Black Sea country ships

v) (War Time) (Turkey is not in war) All war vessel like peace time

except: those which had left their port of attachment can return

vi) Ships forcing LN’s sanctions can pass

vii) Those which are under an assistance agreement Turkey is

member can pass

viii) (If Turkey is in War or under imminent threat of war)

Passages are at the complete discretion Turkey.

T U R K I S H F O R E I G N P O L I C Y D U R I N G T H E I I . W O R L D WA R

The Three Partite Alliance

Italy occupied Albany on April 1939. Italy who was disappointed at the

end of the 1th World war, not being able to obtain a share in Anatolia, but

became a neighbor to Turkey by obtaining Dodecanese islands was now giving

signals of expansionism in Balkans. Missolini was declaring publicly that the

main interest of Italy was in Asia and Africa. For him the Mediterranean was

‘mare nostrum’. All these created big concerns in Turkey who was mainly a

Mediterranean country with major parts of territories in Asia.

68

Great Britain gave guaranties to Greece and Romania in the case of an

Italian aggression. Turkey didn’t accept a unilateral guaranty from the U.K. and,

instead, proposed an alliance with reciprocal engagements. She was in contact

with the USSR as well, and, in accordance with the 1929 Protocol, brought the

UK proposal to the knowledge of this later which wanted to start immediately to

discuss with Turkey the measures to be taken to prevent an Italian aggression.

The aim of Turkey was to approach U.K. and France while continuing her

friendly relations with the USSR. She was not aware that the USSR was

preparing to sign a non aggression treaty with Germany and did not want Turkey

to cooperate with other European countries against Germany. Turkey, unaware

of all these, was sparing efforts to harmonize her friendship with the UK, France

and the USSR, in vain.

On May 1939Turkey and the UK made a common declaration and on

June, the day Hatay problem had been solved between Turkey and France in

Ankara, Turkey, UK and France signed in Paris a common declaration regarding

to the conclusion of a definitive long term agreement, and until such an

agreement was signed, to cooperate effectively in case an of an aggression in the

Mediterranean region. The agreement was not against any other state. Germany

made efforts to prevent the signature of the declaration unsuccessfully. The

USSR was not happy to see Turkey closer to the UK and France. Italy took it

against her and pretending that the Dodecanese Island were under threat,

concluded a military alliance with Germany.

Conclusion by the USSR a non aggression treaty with Germany in August

1939, at a time when Turkish-British -French negotiations were highly

progressed, was a shock for Turkey. Friendship with all these four countries was

no more compatible. Now Turkey had no other choice than to count on the

guaranties of the UK and France. However when Germany attacked Poland and

the Second World War started the negotiations between Turkey and these four

states were on way.

69

Always in August, the USSR approached Turkey and stating that the non

aggression agreement with Germany aimed at preventing a complot of the UK

with Germany against the USSR proposed a reevaluation of Turkish-USSR

relations according the new changing situation in Europe. In September Turkish

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Saracoğlu visited Moscow. His main aim was to

look for compatibility between Turkey’s friendship with the USSR and western

countries. Intentions of the USSR were different. They wanted to profit from

Moscow talks in seeking to amend the Montreux treaty in their favor and to

learn more about the Three Partite Alliance which was taking shape. On the

other hand Germany asked the USSR to obtain neutrality of Turkey. Saracoğlu’s

26 days negotiations in Moscow ended with failure.

The Three Partite Alliance, officially called Treaty on Mutual Aid Between

Turkey, Great Britain and France, was foreseeing the following:

i) In the face of an aggression by a European country in the

Mediterranean area, which may lead to a war involving GB and France, Turkey

would effectively cooperate with them and lend them all aid in her power;

ii) In case of an aggression by a European country in the

Mediterranean area, which may lead to a war involving Turkey, GB and France

will effectively cooperate with her and lend her all aid in their power;

iii) If France and GB enter in a war in virtue of their guarantees

to Romania and Greece, Turkey would effectively cooperate with them and lend

them all aid in her power.

iv) If GB and France due to an aggression against them enter in a

war with a European country allied countries will proceed immediately to

consultations. In such a case Turkey would at least adopt a benevolent

neutrality towards GB and France.

70

On the other hand, according to a secret protocol, GB and France were

committed to cooperate effectively with Turkey and lend her all aid in their

power if requested by Turkey in case a military action initiated by a European

country reached the Bulgarian or Greek frontiers. Another secret military

agreement was foreseeing arrangements in case Bulgaria participated in a

military action against one of signatories. GB and France committed to give

financial and other material aid to Turkey by a special agreement. Commitments

of Turkey would come into force after GB and France would honor their

commitments in the special agreement.

With a protocol Turkey made the reservation that she would not be forced to

be led to an armed conflict with USSR under the commitments she undertook

with this Treaty. But we may note that USSR which had qualified the Turkish-

British declaration as a peaceful initiative at the start, declared that She was

taking the Three Partite Alliance as an element of war. They condemned Turkey

for serving the interest of GB and France which wanted to extend the war to the

Balkans, for creating a common military camp with these States against

Germany, for spoiling URSS-German relations. Molotov was saying that Turkey

would regret this. Thus Turkey who was seeking alliance with GB and France

faced Italian threats was running into a Soviet threats just in the first months of

the War.

Turkey’s Efforts to stay out of the War.

Turkey, although adhered tone of the adverse camps, with the desire to stay

as neutral as possible, tried to continue her trade relations with both parties.

Both parties were importing chrome ore from Turkey; as the production was not

sufficient to meet all the demand, Turkey was forced to apply limits to her

chrome exportations to each customer country. By so doing She was not

71

allowing one country to obtain the monopoly of Chrome importations from

Turkey. On the other hand each camp was pressuring Turkey not to provide the

other camp with this strategic raw material. She wanted to balance her economic

relations through an agreement with GB, although she had difficulties to convert

her industrial demands from Germany to GB. But in August 1939, as talks on

the prorogation of Turkish-German trade agreement failed due to the German

insistence on minimum chrome ore deliveries, Turkey proceeded to sign some

agreements with GB and France, recognizing for them the right to purchase all

Turkish Chrome ore production for two years. With this agreement GB and

France were giving Turkey credits of a total of 27,000,000 Pounds.

In the mean time, talks continued also with Germany; in the end, a one

year trade agreement which did not include chrome ore delivery was signed in

June 1940.

At that time, Germany and the USSR were thinking that the only way to

prevent Turkey to enter in the war was to keep her fearful from the Soviet

Union and invoke her reservation with regard the USSR in the Tri-Partite

Alliance. Turkey would not enter the war as long as Italy was not in war. They

were thinking that even in this case Turkey would raise her reservation with

regard to the USSR in order to stay out of the War. In fact Turkey was affirming

herself this possibility, to both camps, herself.

Italy declared war to GB and France on June 10th 1940, after the withdrawal

of allied forces from Dunquerque. This was giving force to the Tri-Partite

Treaty.

When Turkey was discussing what to do before this situation, Italy was

warning the Mediterranean and Balkan countries that if they would leave their

neutrality war would be extended these areas. Germany was urging Turkey not

to break off her relations with Germany and Italy. On the other side, GB and

France were saying that Turkey should then enter the war.

72

In fact GB and France gave notes to Turkey to ask her to join them in the

war. But armaments promised by the tripartite Treaty were not yet delivered.

How to be sure that USSR would not attack Turkey in case Turkey would enter

the war at the side of GB and France? There were rumors that USSR was

preparing a campaign with Bulgaria towards the Dardanelles. Turkey, referring

to her reservation with regard to USSR, decided to maintain her neutrality.

Allies continued to pressure Turkey, arguing that her preoccupations about

possible Soviet behavior were not valid.

The collapse of France and its truce with Germany gave Turkey a new

argument: one of the countries that were to aid Turkey had surrendered. The

French press wrote that the Vichy Government might declare war to GB. Thus

GB was alone before her strong enemy and was not able to give the promised

aid to Turkey any more. Turkey made a declaration on 26th June on her

determination not to be party in the war in virtue of her reservation. In fact the

wording of the Tripartite treaty which foresees ‘all aids in her power’ may be

discussed and be interpreted as meaning entry of war as well as ‘aids’ without

entering to war which was not possible for Turkey due to the Soviet Threat. But

in GB people were thinking that in this situation GB would have the right to

consider her own position, had Turkey need GB for the commitments of this

latter.

On the 7th October German forces entered Romania and on the 28th

October Italy attacked Greece. This brought to the agenda the provisions of the

Balkan Entente as well as the provision of the Three Partite Treaty concerning

an aggression in Balkans. Normally the Balkan entente was an assurance for the

frontiers inside the Balkans and not for exterior frontiers, thus this could not

force Turkey to enter to war. Against the assurance given to Greece, there was

Turkish reservation again with regard to USSR. In fact GB did not also ask

Turkey to enter the war, thinking that deployment of Turkish troops in Greece

would jeopardize the security of Turkey.

73

There were also different views in London as to forcing Turkey to enter in

the War. Churchill was affirming that GB wished Turkey to enter in the war as

soon as possible but this would be necessary only if Bulgaria took military

action alone or with the support of Germany. Turkey was contented with letting

Bulgaria know that, Turkey would declare war to Bulgaria according the Balkan

Entente if Bulgaria attacked Greece. But with Italians in Greece Turkey felt

herself completely surrounded. In fact France could no longer fulfill the

requirements of the Three Partite Alliance. G.Britain not only could not give

adequate equipment to Turkey, but also she herself faced the possibility of a

collapse under the strain placed on her.

On July 1940 Germany published a White Book based on the captured

French documents in occupied France related to Allied plan of attacking Soviet

oil centers. The German publication manufactured the lie that Turks were

preparing to undertake an offensive with Allied aid. Turkey categorically denied

the existence of such a plan. But this publication disturbed the Turkish efforts to

prepare the way for a more intimate Russian-British-Turkish relation.

Events would prove the Turkish attitude to be right. GB stayed alone once

France was out of the War, and was unable to give necessary aid to Greece. In

Germany the thought was that if Turkey took action in Greece the Straits would

be attacked to open the way to Syria, but Hitler who focused his attention to the

USSR after his meeting with Molotov, was thinking that an operation on Turkey

would delay German military initiatives on USSR and decided to avoid any

conflict with Turkey.

The extension of the war from Western Europe to Eastern Europe

shook the Germen-Soviet cooperation seriously. Soviet started to think that

Germans were entering in their zone of security and Germans and Italians did

not like the USSR to dominate the Balkans. Conflicts of interest had started.

74

In the mean time, while making efforts to convince Turkey to make

a pact by giving Turkey guarantees, Germany was seeking to include the USSR

among the Axis countries and to this end she was bargaining over Turkey.

During Molotov’s visit to Berlin on the 12th of November, Molotov and

Ribbendrop agreed that in case the USSR, Germany, Japan and Italy could find

common ground, Turkey would join them. Ribbendrop said that Germany

understood the Soviet attitude vis a vis the Montreux Convention, that this

convention should be redrafted between Turkey, USSR, Germany and Italy; and

that Germany was always ready to help USSR to amend the Convention

according to Soviet wishes. They agreed on the free passage of war and trade

ships through the Dardanelles with special privileges to USSR. For that Molotov

was thinking that it would be necessary for Germany to give guarantees to

Bulgaria. In his talks with Hitler, Molotov insisted on the same point. Hitler

said that Bulgaria should be asked whether she would like to have such

guarantees and pointed out that he also needed to consult with Mussolini.

Molotov added that Russia wanted to obtain a guarantee against an attack on the

Black Sea via the Straits not only on paper, but in reality and asked some points

of control on the Aegean islands and on the Straits. It meant that the USSR was

asking for bases in the Aegean and in Dardanelles in return for joining the Axis.

Molotov requested Kars and Ardahan as well. The USSR also wanted that the

South of Batum and Baku would be recognized as Soviet influence zone.

Germany, in order to gain some time until military action on USSR could start,

wished to take the views of Bulgaria and Italy. In October 1940, the USSR gave

Germany a written document about Soviet demands.

Before Molotov left Berlin, Ribbendrop gave him a project of a Treaty

dividing the world into German, Japanese, Italian and Soviet zones of influence,

amending the Montreux convention to recognize unlimited right of passage to

the USSR while closing the Straits to warships of non Black sea countries other

then Germany and Italy. Turkey was not in a zone of influence, which meant

75

that Germany would not allow the USSR to control Turkey through Balkans and

Dardanelles. In its reply to this project, the USSR included among its conditions

a Soviet Bulgarian mutual assistance pact and a Soviet base on the Straits. But

Germany did not want to share the Straits with a third country and the Soviet

claims on Dardanelles reminded Hitler that it was time to bring to an end the

Germano- Soviet cooperation.

. In its reply to this project, the USSR included among its conditions a Soviet

Bulgarian mutual assistance pact and a Soviet base on the Straits. But Germany

did not want to share the Straits with a third country and the Soviet claims on

Dardanelles reminded Hitler that it was time to bring to an end the Germano-

Soviet cooperation.

Turkey heard about the Germano-Soviet bargain over Turkey for the first

time in March 1941 by what Hitler said to the Turkish envoy. The only

difficulty for the USSR to join the Axis was the German refusal to Soviet claims

for bases on the Dardanelles and in Bulgaria.

German pressures on Turkey in 1941-1943

In January 1941, German troops were sent to Romania via Hungary with full

concurrence of Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. The German Foreign

Minister said that they were aimed exclusively at getting a foothold in Greece

and not at the Balkans, nor Turkey.

The USSR suspected that these German troops were aiming at Bulgaria,

Greece and the Straits. The Soviet Union was considering Bulgaria and the

Straits to be within their influence zone and let Germany know that the

appearance of any foreign forces in these areas would be considered by the

USSR as a violation of its security interests. Germany replied that she had no

76

intention to occupy the Straits and that it would respect Turkish territorial

integrity unless Turkey committed a hostile act against Germany.

A Turco-Bulgarian Declaration on February, referred to as the “mutual

confidence and friendship declaration”, stressed the mutual respect of territorial

integrity, good-neighborhood and non aggression between the two countries.

This declaration was interpreted to be a victory of Germany. But the declaration

contained an escape clause to reassure GB.

The entry of the German army into Bulgaria on March 1st, 1941 alarmed

the Turkish Government. Hitler sent a personal letter to Inönü on the 4 th of

March assuring him that German troops would be kept at a distance of 6 km.

from the Turkish border and that Germany had no aggressive intentions against

Turkey. Despite these assurances Turkey blew up the bridges on the Meriç for

good measure.

On March 18th, a meeting took place between Saracoğlu and Eden in

Cyprus. A communiqué issued on March 19th stressed the points of view of the

Parties. In March 24 Turkey demanded complete neutrality of the URSS in case

of an attack to Turkey. USSR replied positively.

On April 4th, 1941, Raşit Ali - a former Prime Minister of Iraq - made a

coup and seized power in Bagdad. He was in touch with the anti-British Arab

Leader, the ex-Grand Müftü of Jerusalem.

Ankara refused to transmit arms from Syria to Raşit Ali via Turkey. On April

6th, Germans and Hungarians attacked Yugoslavia, and Germans and Bulgarians

attacked Greece. Churchill concluded in the House of Common that at present

time Hitler was driving South East to the Balkans and at any moment he might

turn upon Turkey. Yugoslavia was crushed on the 17th of April and Greece

surrendered on the 23rd of April. The German Foreign Minister instructed

German Ambassador in Ankara to endeavor to obtain from Turkey the

permission of secret passage of arms to Iraq through Turkey. In order to attract

77

Turkey in the orbit of the Axis, Hitler seemed considering to offer Syria to

Turkey.

The Turco-German Treaty of non aggression. In May 1941, Germany

envisaged a Treaty of friendship to be presented to Turkey as a German

guarantee against Soviet designs and a secret agreement by which Germany

would have the right to transit for war material and troops. Ribbendrop also

proposed the rectification of Bulgarian frontiers in favor of Turkey. Before the

success Germany obtained in the Balkans, in the Aegean and North Africa, it

could easily be realized that Turkey was in no position to stand against that

country.

The Turkish Government kept the G. Britain informed of her talks with

Germans and resisted German demands of omitting references on validity of the

Treaty of Turkey with G.B. Germans even tried threatening Turkey, saying that

She would be attacked if they did not conclude the Treaty. Thus, on 18th June

1941 Turkey signed a Treaty of non aggression . The Preamble of the Treaty

was stating that the two countries concluded this Treaty subject to the

reservation of their existing engagements. The two countries undertook to

respect each other’s territorial inviolability and integrity, to refrain from any

kind of direct or indirect action against each other. Turkey gave GB assurances

that she would not allow German troupes and military materiel pass through

Turkey.

Italy attempted to make a similar agreement with Turkey without success..

Nazi troops had crossed the Soviet frontiers by the 22nd June 1941.

Moscow discovered that the Montreux convention contained some provisions

extremely beneficial for Soviets. By virtue of the Montreux settlement, Turkey

could guard the Straits, and therefore, Soviet security. Turkey announced her

neutrality. If the Russian war was successful German forces would drive through

Iran in the winter and ten German divisions would pass from Bulgaria to Syria

78

and Iraq trough Anatolia. In case Turkey resisted, the Germans planned that they

would need double that strength.

When German armies advanced towards the Turkish speaking areas

of Russia, the German Ambassador in Ankara hoped to secure Turkish

cooperation by conceding to Turkey the right to organize the liberated Turkish

lands. Von Papen considered offering to Turks two Caspian provinces of Iran in

return for a break with G.B. When Hitler hinted that Turkey might take over

Turkish speaking areas of Russia, Turkish Ambassadors in Berlin did not want

to discuss such a suggestion. However, some documents indicate that German

success in Turkish speaking areas of Russia aroused hopes among Turco-Tatar

leaders, in Turkey and elsewhere.

The fact that Britain and the Soviets had now made common cause against

Germany would affect their relations with Turkey. In fact, on the 10 th of August

the British and Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara presented declarations to the

Turkish government confirming their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and

assuring that they had no aggressive intentions or whatever claims regarding the

Straits. They pointed out that they were prepared scrupulously to observe the

territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic and that they would render Turkey

every help in the event she would be attacked by any European country.

Sea communications between Turkey and Western Europe having

been interrupted, Turkey felt the necessity of resuming commercial relations

with Germany. The guarantee to sell chrome production to Britain had expired

and Germans insisted that Turkey should sell it to them. Turkey was selling

exclusively to GB since the beginning of the war. GB proposed to extend the

chrome arrangement. In the end, Turkey preferred to extend her chrome

agreement with the G.B. for one more year. Nevertheless, despite this Turkey

entered in 1942 into a chrome agreement with Germany with British consent,

and under the condition that Germany sold Turkey some war materials.

79

Four days prior to the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor, The USA declared

that the defense of Turkey was essential for the defense of the USA, and

extended land-lease assistance to Turkey on December 1941. After the USA

declaration of war to the Axis Powers, Turkey maintained her neutrality in the

new conflict.

On July 8 th 1942, the Turkish Prime Minister died; Saracoglu, old friend

of the Allies became Prime Minister. Despite this, relations of Turkey with

Allies were impaired during the summer of 1942 by the strong tone of the

Anglo-American press. The enthusiasm of the Western countries for the heroic

resistance of the Russian population created suspicion about Allied intentions

among Turks, suspicions that Allies would make concessions to the USSR at the

expense of Turkey.

October brought the successful British counter-offensive at El Alamein

and the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The news on Romel’s retreat was a great

relief for Turkey who had never been happy at the proximity of German forces.

British defeat would not coincide with Turkish interests, which demanded

equilibrium of forces in the Mediterranean and not the total predominance of

Germany or Italy. Turkey feared also that a complete Soviet victory would give

Russians a free hand in an impoverished and exhausted Europe.

Churchill set out to develop a strategy that would take full

advantage of the success won in North Africa and at Stalingrad. The plan he set

forth in November 1942 was threefold. In Western Europe, he wanted the

Americans to sent large number of troops to the British Isles, ready to descend

upon Continental Europe at an appropriate moment. He advocated an attack on

Italy in the Central Mediterranean. In the Eastern Mediterranean, he entertained

hopes of bringing Turkey into war in the spring of 1943. Turkey was an Ally

and she would ask a seat at the peace conference. He suggested to offer Turkey a

80

Soviet-American-British guarantee of territorial integrity as well as to equip her

with tanks and guns. URSS agreed with these ideas.

In the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Churchill said that if

Turks were not inclined to enter the war he would tell them that he could not

undertake to refrain Russians in the Straits issue. However, Americans were

reluctant about Turkish participation in the war, thinking that a new front in the

Balkans would entail more men and more war materiel. But in the end, GB and

the USA agreed on doing everything to bring Turkey into the war.

The Turkish President accepted to meet Churchill, and they met in Adana

on 30th January. Churchill made everything to attract Inönü to into the war, yet

there were also strong arguments against encouraging Turkey to take too great a

risk; by prudence no formal request was made for Turkish entry into the war.

The official communiqué referred to the identity of Turkish and British points of

views and that the British Government had viewed Turkish policy with

sympathy and understanding. As a result of the Adana Conference G.Britain

undertook to provide the Turks with additional war material. Britain also did not

seem to object to the German material aid to Turkey since this would only

strengthen the defenses of an Ally.

Churchill and Roosevelt met on 12-16 May in Washington. While

discussing the possibility of landing troops in the South of Italy, they took up to

induce Turkey in war and to attack Rumanian oil fields (which were on the

hands of Germans) from Turkish airfields and to open a second front in the

Balkans. Roosevelt was for landing troops via the British Channel instead of

opening a new front. They met again in Québec on 11-24 August. They decided

that even if it seemed early for a Turkish entry into the war, they would demand

Turkey to open her airfield for Allied use. They decided also to continue to help

Turkey militarily, to demand Turkey to stop her sales of Chrome ore to

Germany and not to let German Ships pass through the Dardanelles. What was

81

interesting for Turkey was that at this conference, the USSR made opposition to

the idea of a new front in the Balkans and insisted to obtain that Turkey enter

into the War. This insistence was aiming also to avoid having an additional front

in the Balkans.

The Italian armistice was announced on the 8th of September, 1943. GB

sent troops to the Dodecanese and to other Islands under Italian occupation.

However, the problem was about how munitions and provisions were to be

supplied to British troops positioned there. The Turkish Government came to the

help of GB without hesitation and supplies were regularly shipped from the

Turkish mainland. Turkey allowed also stores dispatched from Syria by rail to

the Turkish port opposite to Laros. But without the use of the Turkish airports

the British troops would find it difficult to keep their position. This question was

brought up at the Moscow Conference of the Big Three in October-November.

Roosevelt supported efforts to get Turkey into the war. Eden could not persuade

Turks. On November 16th, Germans occupied the Aegean islands and the British

troops and Greek civilians were evacuated from Samos to pass Turkey.

At the Moscow Conference on October 19th, it was agreed that a hopeful

contribution to an early victory would be obtained with Turkey to become

belligerent, preferably by the end of 1943. Eden invited Menemencioglu for a

meeting in Cairo on November and eloquently set forth the reasons in favor of

Turkey’s entry into the war. It was decided that the Turkish Minister of Foreign

Affairs should return to report to his Government.. By the 17th of November,

The Turkish Government and the National Assembly had thoroughly examined

British requests. Germans had already compelled to surrender the British

garrisons on the Islands of Kos and Leros. These British failures at areas too

close diminished the Turkish willingness to enter the war. However, the Turkish

Government announced to the British Ambassador in Ankara the Turkish

decision to enter in war, however making it clear that this would be impossible

82

unless Turkey received adequate defense material and that all planning for

military cooperation in Balkans should be made beforehand.

The question of inducing Turkey to enter into the war was discussed at the

Teheran Conference on 28th November-1st December. Stalin admitted that

Turkey would be a useful Ally, but added that an eastern Mediterranean

campaign would be a waste of time when the direct road to Germany passed by

France. It seems that Stalin wanted to see the Allied forces in the West of

Europe but not in Southern Europe. Churchill insisted on Turkish entry in war.

He thought the Allied interests would be served best if Anglo–Americans as

well as Russians participated in the occupation of the Balkans. But the GB

would give only limited air protection to Turkey and the US was against to new

commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the Turkish entry into the

war would facilitate communication with the USSR through the Dardanelles,

would attract some German forces to Turkey and would diminish military

pressure over the USSR and would make possible for the Allies to realize air

attacks to Rumania and Bulgaria via Turkey.

On the 29th November the chiefs of Staff of the USA, GB and the USSR

met together but they could not reach an agreement about future operations, with

GB proposing an attack to Rhodes, while the USSR argued that this would delay

the attack on France. Thus, Churchill argued again to Roosevelt for operations in

Mediterranean. The next day Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Russia’s

need for ice-free ports west to the Baltic, South of the Turkish Straits, and East

Pacific. Roosevelt and Churchill made no commitment to Stalin. At the end it

was decided that when Churchill and Roosevelt were in Cairo they should make

another effort to persuade Turks. Churchill was authorized to offer Turkey 20

squadrons of fighter planes and to use threats of cutting off all supplies and of

refusing to support Turks against any Russian claim for rights in the Straits.

83

Churchill and Roosevelt invited Inönü to Cairo. The Turkish reply was

that if the President was being asked to come to Cairo for discussions on the

basis of decisions already taken in Teheran, he would not show up. The Allies

gave assurances and Inönü accepted the invitation. Roosevelt and Churchill sent

their private planes and Inönü chose the American one. The representative of the

USSR did not attend the Conference. Before he left Turkey, Inönü had obtained

from the T.G N Assembly the authorization to enter in the war. He let the two

leaders insist. Inönü said they could not afford more time. Then the talks

covered the subject of supplies and the time to train Turkish troops in the use of

modern weapons. Roosevelt was not agreeable with the diversion of large

quantities of arms and as the talks came to a stalemate Churchill arranged

another meeting of his own with Inönü. The two leaders agreed on the use of air

bases. Pending the Turkish decision preparatory work, including radar

installations was to be carried out. Churchill told Inönü that if Turkey was

obdurate, he personally would favor a change in the Straits regime. The

Americans were relieved rather the disappointed because of the failure to bring

Turkey to war immediately. The communiqué issued on the 7th of December

stated the closest unity existed between three leaders.

In Ankara The German Ambassador learned the negotiation as a result of

theft of documents from the British Embassy; he warned the Turkish Foreign

Minister that compliance with The British request would inevitably lead to

German reprisals with the complete destruction of Istanbul and Izmir. After the

Cairo meeting, the Turks replied that they accepted the proposal in principle but

added that by allowing RAF to fly Turkish bases they would be risking reprisals

by air and by land and asked for proper equipment.

The British too understood Turkey’s reluctance to declare war to

Germany until her needs had been sufficiently met. Turkish–British taks were at

deadlock and the British mission left Ankara on the 3rd of February.

84

Turkey, again in isolation, started to follow a more

conciliatory policy towards the USSR. Turkish policies became more favorable

to the Allies as well. On the 20th April, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced

to suspend all chrome ore deliveries to Germany. Ribbentrop reacted with a

sharp message threatening with reprisals. On April 1944, planes appeared over

Istanbul and the Government ordered black out.

TURKISH DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE AXIS POWERS.

While the Soviet armies were positioned on the borders of

Romania, Churchill thought that Turkey’s entry at this stage would have a

potent in future of Southeastern Europe; yet he feared that Turkey would ask for

aircrafts and for joint military operations in Bulgaria and the Aegean. He

preferred for Turkey to break all her relations with Germany as a first step. The

growing power of the USSR made it impossible for Turkey to risk falling into

Allies’ bad grace. Ankara decided to break off her relations with Germany on

the 2nd August 1944.

On January 10th, Stalin raised the question of the Straits in

Yalta. He said that he would not accept Turkey to have a hand on Russia’s

throat. Roosevelt expressed a firm conviction that the USSR would have access

to a warm-water port. In Yalta, it was decided that the three Foreign Ministers

would meet in London to make proposals on the Montreux Convention.

The big Three agreed at Yalta to invite to the post war Peace

Conference only those nations that had either fought the Axis or would declare

war by the 1st March. The Turkish National Assembly unanimously approved in

February 1945 the Government’s decision to comply with the Yalta decision. In

a message to the House of Common, Churchill welcomed Turkey into the ranks

of the United Nations.

85

If we rapidly review the position of Turkey during the war we can say that,

before all, the rapid defeat of France face to Germany put in a difficult situation

Turkey which had been calculating that Germany would vest time and loose

strength before French troops, and French navy would prevent Italian fleet from

acceding to the Mediterranean. As this calculation had been proved wrong, Italy

entered in the war and the war was spread out to the Mediterranean. In such case

Turkey had to enter into the war as well, according to the Three Partite Alliance.

Plus Turkey suddenly found German troops on her borders.

Second development which was interesting for Turkey was the German

aggression to the USSR. So the risk of being invaded by Germany and the

USSR at the same time disappeared.

Third important development for Turkey was the defeat of Germany

before the USSR, creating again Soviet threat over her. Turkey didn’t want to

see one of them to obtain a definite success, scaring that the winner would turn

against her.

What were the impacts of the war on Turkey, in the country?

The war had enormous negative effects on Turkish economy, even if she

was not a belligerent country. Mobilization of more than one million men

deprived of manpower the sector of agriculture the economy was based on.

Industry declined intensely. Turkey made acquaintance with inflation which was

due partly to circumstances, partly to bad administration. Black market

developed. New riches from lower social classes proliferated. Public

investments stopped. In 1942 tax on the wealth (varlık vergisi) was put into

force.

86

T U R K I S H F O R E I G N P O L I C Y A F T E R

W O R L D WA R I I

1. TURKEY IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

A. The International Situation

The first tangible consequence of the World War II was that at the end of the

war, Western Europe – that was at the center of the world system - lost its

privileged position. The war was won not by European countries, but by the

USA and the USSR. These two states were militarily stronger, while they

represented two opposite economical and political systems and two different

ideologies. As a result, other countries in their respective fields of attraction

grouped around them, forming two hostile camps. We name this a two-pole

system.

One pole - the USA – supported capitalism, liberal economy and free

trade, democracy based on individual freedoms and political parties. On the

other hand, the other pole – led by USSR - advocated communism, state

monopoly in the whole economy and trade, and a dictatorship of workers –

which, in practice, turned out to be a dictatorship of a small group of rulers.

These two poles were organized militarily in two politico-military organizations:

NATO and the Warshow Pact. This political, economical and military division

of the World bore what we call the Cold war.

In the economic area, the US organized the new world economy under her

leadership through two main international economic organizations: the IMF and

the World Bank. We call this the Bretton Woods System. In fact, an

87

international conference held in 1944 in Bretton Woods, USA, led to the

decision to found an organization which would help member countries with their

balance of payments by giving them credits through a Stability Fund. Turkey

became member of the IMF in March 1947.

A second international economic organization was also created in Bretton

Woods: the World Bank, which was designed to grant long term investment-

minded credits to member countries which were also members of the IMF.

In both of these organizations, decisions were largely based upon the

quotas or financial contributions of member countries; rich capitalist countries

such as the USA had the biggest quotas, with the consequence that these latter

had an efficient control of the international economy.

Later, a third international economic organization - the GATT - would

join these in 1947 with the aim to liberalize world trade.

The USSR, in response to this western organizations system, and after

replacing the leaders of the communist governments of Eastern Europe by pro-

soviet leaders, founded in 1949 an organization called the COMECON. This

latter aimed at promoting the economic developments of member countries and

at the coordination of their respective economic activities. As the USSR

exploited this organization for its own political goals, it naturally did not yield

the same efficiency as the Bretton Woods system.

B. Relations with the USSR until the early 1950’s

The Soviet economy suffered very much during the War, where 27

million Soviet citizens lost their lives. In 1946, the federation accepted its 4th

five-year economic plan, envisaging a restructuring of the Soviet economy.

88

However, if this plan reached its goals in the industrial area, it failed in

promoting agriculture.

In the domestic policy, The Cyrillic alphabet was imposed to all nations in

the Union, while the Communist Party was reorganized. Stalin took all the

powers into his own hands.

Despite economic difficulties, the Soviet Union felt - for security reasons

- the need to obtain the nuclear weapons to face the USA.

As to foreign policy, the Cominform was founded in 1947 with the

participation of the C.P. of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,

Yugoslavia, France and Italy in order to ensure cooperation between these

countries.

By this time, all Eastern European Communist countries were under the

Soviet influence. In 1949, Communist China joined the Communist camp.

Moscow, with a note to the Turkish Ambassador in March 1945 had

denounced the 1925 Turco-Soviet Treaty arguing that the circumstances had

now changed after the War, and, a few days later, offered that new talks be

started with a new Treaty in view.

Turkey asked the Soviets what conditions a new Treaty would bear. In

June, Molotov proposed to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that amendment

be made to the Montreux Convention. As the Ambassador replied that this

question could not be treated bilaterally, he asked that the Turco-Soviet frontiers

delimited in 1921 be review, claiming Kars and Ardahan. Molotov received

Ambassador Sarper again ten days later and renewed these Soviet propositions.

The Soviets were aiming to obtain amendments on the Montreux Convention; it

seemed that they also wanted to make territorial claims in order to force Turkey

to agree on such amendments in favor of the USSR.

89

The USSR brought these claims up again in the Potsdam Conference

between allied countries to settle the questions related to Poland, the frontiers of

post-war Germany, issues concerning indemnities, etc. Molotov pointed out to

Churchill that, if it was not possible to provide the USSR with an enhanced

position in the Marmara Sea, the Allied should concede them a military base in

Dedeağaç. Churchill let him know that he was backing these claims on the

Straits, but that these requirements should be met while keeping in full respect to

the Turkish territorial integrity. USSR tabled a document requiring the abolition

of the Montreux Convention; this document was proposing that the security of

the Straits should be assured by both Turkey and the USSR, and that the USSR

should be given territorial concessions. At the end of the Conference, Parties

declared that they had agreed on proceeding to the amendment of Montreux, but

that the question would be settled through bilateral talks which each Party would

undertake with Turkey.

There was no clear agreement on other issues. Truman was thinking that

territorial questions were up to Turkey and the USSR. In other words, Turkey

was left to face the USSR on her own. Open-air meetings were held in Istanbul

with the USSR. In the mean time, a Georgian professor wrote an article claiming

Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu; Tortum; Ispir, Bayburt, Gümüşahe, and Giresun for

Georgia.

After Potsdam, First note came to Turkey From the USA on 2nd

November 1945 :1)Straits should always be open to all countries trade ships, 2)

free transit for Black sea countries’ war ships, 3) passage of non-Black sea

countries’ war vessels should always be prohibited with the exception of under a

certain tonnage or under UN authorization 4) League of Nations should be

replaced by the UN, 5) An international Conference should be held to achieve

these amendments.

90

Soviet Note arrived on the 7th August 1946: Montreux regime does not

correspond to the security interests of the Black sea countries. The USSR

propose:

1. Free transit of all trade ships;

2. 2) Free transit far war vessels of Black sea countries;

3. 3) prohibition of transit for war vessels of non-Black sea countries with

pre-agreed exceptions

4. 4)Straits’ regime should be under the authority of Turkey and other Black

sea countries;

5. 5) As the most interested and most able countries Turkey and the USSR

should assume in common the security of the Straits and they would take

necessary measures to avoid that the Straits be used against the interests of the

Black sea countries.

This note awakened the USA and the GB. USA took this note as intended

more to put Turkey under Soviet hegemony rather then to give Straits a new

regime. Both countries replied the USSR on 19 and 21 August refusing the

proposal to give the regime of the Straits solely to the authority of the Black Sea

countries’ and stressed that Turkey was responsible of the security of the Straits.

Turkey encouraged by the USA note, replied on the 22nd of August:

Turkey was agreeable with a Conference to be held to adapt Montreux regime to

new technological changes and was not against of the first three Soviet

proposals but declared 4th and 5th proposals unacceptable.

USSR insisted on their claims with another note on September. Turkey

refusing again Soviet claims informed the USA and the GB about Soviet

insistence. This Soviet demarche made to Turkey was replied by the GB who

were asking the USSR to stop this correspondence started according to the

decisions taken in Potsdam .The USA in her note to the USSR emphasized that

Montreux Convention could only be changed through negotiations of all

signatory countries , included the USA. USA let the USSR know that in case of

91

an attack to the Straits the USA would proceed to activate the UN Security

Counsel procedures. Moscow who disposed the right to veto in the Security

Counsel did not take this last threat serious. We have to note that in adopting

these policies, the aim of the USA was not to protect Turkey against USSR but

to defend their own national interests. In fact as the relations were tending with

the USSR, the USA was taking in every point of the world such policies

challenging the USSR. Turkey sent her reply to the USSR to all signatories of

Lausanne Convention with the exception of Japan, to inform them about the

developments. As her second demarche was refused also, the USSR would not

raise the issue again.

TRUMAN DOCTRİNE

The USA-USSR relations started to deteriorate since the beginning of

1947. Fear from the ‘Red Danger’ In the American public opinion conditioned

the attitude of the people and the Administration vis a vis the USSR. In 12th

March 1947 President Truman, in a speech before the parliament stated that the

world was at the threshold of division between two series of ideological

principles. On this speech he was declaring also the financial help to Greece and

Turkey which is known as Truman Doctrine. We shall come back to this point

again when treating the relations with the USA. Truman Doctrine was followed

by Marshall Aid in 1948 while the USSR was taking all the control in the East –

Europe.

The press in the Soviet Union started a campaign against the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. She protested by a Note the Turkish demarches

to be member of NATO with a note on the 3rd November 1951.Turkey replied

that NATO was a defensive organization and adhered to NATO in February

1952. The USSR would protest the Middle East Command initiative also, as we

shall see later.

It is to be noted that The USSR not only failed to achieve her goals on

Turkey but pushed her also to join the Western Alliance. As to Turkey, it is to be

92

discussed weather Turkey would join Western camp against her powerful

neighbor if the USSR had not come up with territorial claims. On the other hand

it was true that had the USSR obtained the control in Turkey and Greece all the

equilibrium in the Middle East and Mediterranean would change. That is why

the USA backed these two countries. Thus Turkey slid rapidly to the West,

joined NATO , accepted military bases on her territory and became a militarily

strong partner of the West in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Turkey was

taking this as an assurance for her territorial integrity and sovereignty face to

Soviet threats .

C. Relations with the USA until the early 1950’s.

It was important for the vital interests of USA to keep Turkey out of the Soviet

influence zone. That is why They were interested with the question of the Straits

despite they were not a signatory of the Montreux Convention. According a

report of the Foreign Service, The American policy for the Straits was : free

transit for all trade ships of all the countries and war ships of Black Sea

countries in time of peace; prohibition of transit for war ships of non-Black Sea

countries if the Black Sea countries are parties in a war; fortifications on the

Straits could be made by no country except Turkey; freedom for Turkey to take

any measure on the Straits when Turkey is in war or in danger of a war. Before

Potsdam what was important for the USA was to avoid a full Russian control

over the Straits, She was not impressed so much with the territorial claims of the

USSR and suggested that this issue could be solved bilaterally between Turkey

and the USSR. At the Potsdam Conference, Parties decided by a protocol that

they would discuss the possibility to amend Montreux Convention with Turkey

separately. This was giving the USA the right to have a say on the issue for the

first time. But Truman who agreed with Stalin to amend the Montreux

Convention and who was thinking that the Straits should have a status of

93

international waters would change his ideas slowly as the USSR would become

stronger in Balkans, and would start to defend that the Straits should be under

full Turkish sovereignty.

On the 20th August 1945 Turkey demanded from the USA and the GB

that freedom of transit through the Straits and the peace in the aria should be put

under the US guarantee, new arrangements on the Straits should not constitute

obstacle for Turkish sovereignty and asked them to intervene with the USSR to

bring her claims to an end. In fact Turkey was asking for the first time Western

help against the Soviet threat. Amendments the USA was willing to bring to the

Montreux Convention which were made known by the US Embassy in Ankara

in November were not harmful for the Turkish Sovereignty on the Straits.

The USA will change her policy on the straits and start to give more support to

Turkey from the early 1946 when an autonomous Republics of Azerbeycan and

Mahabad ( Kurdish ) were founded in Iran with the initiatives of the USSR.

USA took such moves as being part of the USSR’s plan to advance in Europe

and to challenge the USA anywhere on the earth. Thus USA decided to attract

Turkey in the Western block . American and British press started to treat Soviet

territorial claims over Turkey to stimulate in Turkey anti-Soviet feelings. In

March the biggest vessel of the American fleet, Missuri was to bring to Turkey

the body of Mr. Münir Ertegun , Turkish Ambassador in Washington who had

died there some 16 months earlier. This symbolic visit was giving the USSR the

message that Montreux convention could not be amended without the approval

of the USA. The same day President Truman declared that countries in the aria

were not up to defend themselves against an attack and the USA would help

them if necessary.

On the 7th May 1946 The USA erased Turkish debts due to credits taken

during the War within the context of American Land and Lease law. Exchange

of Notes between the USSR on one hand and Turkey, USA and GB on the other

took place in this atmosphere.

94

In 1947 Truman declared what is called the TRUMAN DOCTRINE

aiming at giving financial aid to Greece and Turkey. In the Congress some

criticized the US Administration for replacing the GB in the Middle East, for

assuming the defenses of Greece and Turkey without any national requirement,

these two countries were not ruled by true democracies etc. Some were against a

help to Turkey because she had enough reserves or because of what Turks had

done to Armenians. At the end the Congress decided to grant $ .300 000 000 to

Greece and 100 000 000 to Turkey. American advisers would be sent to these

two countries to help them to use this aid. Greek and Turkish civil and military

personnel would be sent to the States for training.

This aid was welcomed in Turkey in general. Turkey was feeling alone face the

Soviet threats. She was under economic difficulties. She had enough reserves,

but she was keeping this money as an assurance against the soviet threats.

Turkish army’s armaments were very old. Thus Turkey was in need of this aid.

An American delegation headed by General Oliver came to Turkey to explain

how to use this aid. According to the USA Turkey should demobilize some of its

troupes, modernize her armament and use the sum of USD: 100 000 000 for this

purpose. On 12th July 1947 an agreement was signed. The aim of the aid was, as

it was written in the agreement, to assure the enhancement of Turkish security

forces Turkey needed to safeguard her freedom and independence and to defend

the stability of her economy. Turkey would report to the US Embassy on the use

of the aid and all developments on this respect and would allow American press

to guess freely the use Turkey would make of this aid. The agreement was

foreseeing that Turkey could not use this aid as well as all material and

information she would obtain through this aid for other purposes than stated in

the agreement. This meant that these would be used only in Turkey to defend the

country against an attack. This clause will be raised later by the USA when

Turkey intervened in Cyprus to prevent Turkey to use in Cyprus the armaments

95

and material She obtained through this aid. In fact American aids were always

given under special conditions which end up with not only military but also

political dependence vis a vis the USA.

In 1948 the aids given to Greece and Turkey were taken in the context of

American Foreign Assistance Law and thus gained a permanent status. Between

1947-1949 Turkey received aid of value of USD. 152 500 000.

147 500 000 of it were used for the modernization of Turkish Armed Forces and

USD 5 000 000 for the construction of roads. During 1947-1951 this figure

increased to USD 400 000 000. We may point out that aid received under the

Truman doctrine contributed a lot to the development of the Turkish armed

forces.

Truman Doctrine symbolized the end of USA-USSR cooperation

established during the II. World War. As to its impacts on Turkey, Turkish

Statesmen, taking also into consideration Soviet policies in the Middle East

started to follow completely American oriented policies. Some researchers are

pointing out to the negative effects of this aid. They say for instance that

military surplus material given to Turkey necessitated to purchase spare parts

and to make maintenance expenses which reduced considerably the reserve

money Turkey had spared during the war time. We may not forget that Turkey

was facing a threat which was not new, which was if I may say ‘traditional’ and

she had to take it serious. To defend herself Turkey should break off her

isolation, find friends sharing the same security interests and money to maintain

a strong army with a certain degree of deterrence. If there was no American help

Turkey had to make bigger expenses for her security. They say that due to this

doctrine Turkey became economically and politically dependent of the USA.

Did Turkey have a choice? She had no luxury to follow non alignment policies.

They establish parallelism between Turkish pro-American policies and

recognition by Turkey of Israel which brought cold winds on her relation with

96

Arab countries. I think importance of relations with Israel is something apart

from her relations with the USA and we shall return to this question later.

Turkey did not participate in the Conference of Asian States held in 1949. But

Turkey had already made her choice between Asia and Europe since Atatürk and

this orientation was not something of new.

Did Truman Doctrine have impacts on the Turkish domestic policies? It

is true that the Turkish public opinion found the opportunity to know the

American democracy and the American way of life more closely. But I think it

is not right to link Ismet Inönü’s orientation to democratize the country with

Turkish –American relations. Critics are saying that with the aim to promote

friendly atmosphere with the USA, oppressions over opponents of the official

ideology increased. If we evaluate the developments with today’s concepts you

can say that oppression on the opponents of the capitalist ideology was

enormous. But do not forget that at that time the words communism, Soviet and

Russian had the same meaning in the understanding of the majority in Turkey

and Russians were traditional threat against the territorial integrity an the full

sovereignty of Turkey.

The Truman Doctrine showed clearly that sincere relations between USA and

the USSR would no more continue. Two military camps were established and

this was the beginning of the cold War.

As to Turkey, Turkish policy makers took the Doctrine as a means for

closer relations with the USA and a strong element supporting Turkish

resistance before Soviet claims. Turkey, face also Soviet policies in the

Middle East, started to implement pro-western and especially pro-American

foreign policies. The needs of maintenance and spare parts for the military

equipment we received from the USA was necessitated importations from that

country, with a cost three or four time higher than the cost of the equipment, and

Turkey had no resources for that. These caused a large economic and military

97

dependence on the USA. So, Turkey who gave support to Arab countries during

long years and years became the first country to recognize Israel, ten months

after its establishment.

Truman Doctrine was followed by THE MARCHALL PLAN. Americans

was rightly establishing a parallelism between economic and social collapse the

European countries faced with after the Second War with the rise of the

Communism and the USSR. They thought that the only way to stop this trend

was to help Europe, starting with the GB, France and Germany, to solve its

economic and social problems and to promote European economic and political

cooperation. A Europe with no power of purchase would negatively affects the

US economy as well. In order to increase their exportation, the USA had to help

Europe to product and increase the income of Europeans. Efforts made through

IMF, World Bank and the U. N. were not enough and thinkers in the USA were

saying that if economic difficulties in Europe were not overcome a world chaos

would be unavoidable. The Foreign Secretary G. Marshall, in a speech on the

5th June 1947 made known that the USA was determined to realise a joint

American and European plan of reconstruction and invited all European

countries, included the USSR to join this plan.

Differences of Marshall Plan with the Truman Doctrine was that the

former was economic oriented and did not include any military aid. Marshal

plan was at regional level while Truman doctrine was at national level., dealıng

with individual countries. Thirdly the USA made it known that the USA would

resist against Governments or parties which would obstruct the implementation

of this plan. This was a warning to the communist parties and to the USSR. Plan

was welcomed by the G.B. and France but criticized by Pravda. However

Molotov met his British and French colleagues to discuss the feasibility of the

98

plan, and put forward some conditions which were not acceptable . After the

failure of these talks GB and France invited all the European countries except

Spain to Paris, to elaborate a European plan of Development. USSR and East

European countries did not attend the conference. On the 12 July 1947

representatives from Austria, Denmark Greece, Island, Ireland, Italy,

Luxemburg, Nederland, Norway, Switzerland , Turkey, GB, France founded an

Organization named Conference of European Economic Co-operation to

determine and meet the urgent economic needs of Europe.

In the conference Turkey demanded an economic aid of USD.615 000 000

to unable her to implement again her development plan interrupted by the War.

American experts who examined the Turkish demands refused them, because

the program was aiming at vitalizing the economies of the countries which

suffered from the war while Turkey wanted to develop her own economy

independently of problems coming from the war, Her balance of payments was

better then other 15 European countries’ and she had enough reserves of foreign

currency and golden. In the report of the Foreign Office to the Congress Turkey

was offered in the contest of the Marshall Plan only some material which would

help Turkish economy to keep its level in the short term.

This behavior of the American expert preoccupied Turkey because the

USA who was leaving Turkey alone in the economy could do the same in the

political ground also. Turkey insisted to be included in the plan. The USA, in

order to be able to include her into the plan asked Turkey to make some change

in her five year plan. Aid to be done would be used to increase agricultural

products, to modernize agricultural equipment and to improve roads. On the

industrial field emphasis should be put on the production of chrome ore. It

seems that with these changes the aim was to make of Turkey a food producer of

Europe. Chrome ore was important for the defense industry of the USA. Turkey

accepted and was included in the Plan according the agreement signed between

Turkey and the USA on 4th July 1947.. With this agreement Turkey accepted

99

also in Turkey an American Mission for Economic Co-operation which would

watch the use of the aid in a way conforms to the Agreement.

Within the framework of Marshal Plan, Turkey received between 1948-

1952 total aid of USD.352 000 000. (The military aid Turkey received during

the same period was USD. 687 000 000.) %60 of the aid was used in agriculture.

This helped Turkish agriculture to develop rapidly. As he aid was also for the

development of the roads (but railways are neglected).

E. Relations with the Arab world and Israel during early 50s.

At the end of the 1st World War seven Arab states were

independent: Egypt (1922), Iraq (1932), Syria (1946), Lebanon (1945), Jordan

(1946) , Saudi Arabia (1926) and Yemen (1932). These countries founded on

March 1945 the Arab League. Turkey welcomed this Arab initiative. The

Secretary General of the League made declarations underlining the importance

of the Turco -Arab friendship. In fact Turkey had always looked with

understanding and sympathy to these newly independent states with which she

shared a long history and a common religion. She deployed efforts to develop

her relations with them. A first official visit was realized by the Regent of Iraq,

Abdullah to Ankara on September 1945. Following this visit the Treaty of

friendship and Good Neighborhood between Turkey and Iraq was signed on

March 1946.

This first step of good relations with an Arab country had impact on the relations

of Turkey with other Arab countries. The more problematic was Syria due to the

Hatay question. Syria who declared on July 1944 that She would respect all

international commitments France had taken on Her name, had changed her

policy once France had left the region. Damascus made declarations that Turkish

sovereignty on Sancak was illegal and this question was a common concern of

all Arab countries. These declarations postponed the recognition of Syria by

100

Turkey. A compromise had been found by the mediation of the Iraqi Prime

Minister Nuri Sait Pasha. Turkey accepted not to insist to obtain an official

recognition from Syria of the annexation of Hatay to Turkey and Syria accepted

not to raise this issue officially. After that compromise, Turkey recognized the

independence of Syria and Lebanon. This understanding between Turkey and

Syria would not last long and the question of Hatay would always shadow the

relations of the two countries.

Relations with Lebanon were without problem. Lebanese President visited

Turkey on 20th June 1946. The king of Jordan, King Abdullah visited Turkey on

8th January 1947 and a Treaty of Friendship and good neighborhood was

signed. The foreign policy of Jordan was different from those of other Arab

countries even at that time. King Abdullah was pride of being friend of the G.B.

on the West and Turkey on the East. Other Arab countries were thinking that the

G.B. would not renounce to her interests in the area and were not happy with the

policies of Jordan which, in their eyes was trying to form a new block with

Turkey and the G.B.

Turkey voted with the Arab countries in the U.N. when the question of

Palestine was taken up in 1947. She voted against the partition of Palestine on

30th November 1947 despite the USA and the USSR who voted positively. This

welcomed by the Arab world. and Şükrü El Kuvvetli sent a message of thanks to

Ankara. But this will not last long neither.

Ideas to found a Jew State in Palestine were not new. During the First

World War The declaration of Lord Balfour, British Minister for Foreign

Affaires, was stating on November 1917 that His Majesty’s Government was

seeing fit to the establishment of a national land for Jew people and would

endeavor to realize this goal. Since San Remo Conference in April 1920 it was

101

decided to put Palestine under British control after the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire. In fact when the British rule was established there Jews started to

immigrate to these lands. Local crashes happened between Arabs and Jews. On

3rd June 1922 the British Government felt the need to send a letter to the World

Zionist Organization to let it know that the G.B.’s intention was to establish a

national land for Jews and not to create a Jew Palestine. British Government was

not ready to share the sovereignty in Palestine with Jews. The league of Nation

was sharing also the British position. But Jews organizations had already started

to struggle for a Jew State in Palestine.

After the Second World War the G.B. raised this issue in the U.N. in April

1947. On 15TH May 1947 the General Assembly established a Special Palestine

commission and asks it to prepare a report. This report contained a Majority

Plan proposing an independent Palestine State divided into Arab and Palestine

States with Jerusalem under international control and a Minority Plan foreseeing

a Federal Palestine composed of Arab and Jew federated states. Arabs were

against of the partition of Palestine. But in November USA and the the USSR

gave their support to the partition of Palestine and this was decided by the

General Assembly of the U.N. on the 29th November 1948. At the start Turkey

was also against of the partition of the Palestine and against a Jew State and

advocated an independent Arab Palestine State. In fact She voted with the 12

Arab States against the partition. This attitude of Turkey welcomed by Arab

countries, but it seems that Turkish behavior was due not to her sympathy for

the Arab cause, but, rather than that, to the fear of instability that the creation of

a Jew State might provoke in the area. In fact just after the UN took the decision

of partition crashes broke out between Arabs and Jews. The Arab League took a

series of decisions to prevent the implementation of the decision. Terrorist

actions started to take place from both parts. Few hours before the end of the

British mandate on Palestine Jews National Congress declared the foundation of

the Jew State and the first Jew Government was formed the same day by David

102

Ben Gurion. 11 minutes later USA recognized the new state. The USSR

recognized Israel on 17th May 1948.

Turkey did not welcome this development. The establishment of a Jew

State despite of strong opposition of Arab States was making the peace

impossible in the area. Maybe she was not neither sure of the place this new

State in the region would occupy on the political map. Terrorist Jew

organizations had good relations with the USSR and Jews from the east

European countries under control of the USSR were immigrating in Palestine..

In Jew settlement in Palestine were establishing cooperatives and working

places with a certain communist approach, all giving the preoccupation that a

Soviet satellite was coming up.

Immediately after the proclamation of independence of Israel, armies of

Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq entered in Palestine, but their attack was not

successful. On the 22nd of May 1948 UN Council of Security invited the parties

to refrain from military actions. This decision was followed by another one

inviting Parties to a cease of fire of four week. Armed conflicts which were

appeased after Arabs accepted these decisions started again in October between

Egyptian and Israeli forces. Israel armies occupied big parts of Egyptian

territory. Parties accepted the invitation of the UN Security Counsel for cease of

fire. Israel concluded armistices separately with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and

Jordan.

During the war Security Counsel founded a Palestine Conciliation

Committee composed of French, British and Turkish representatives. France

was chosen as neutral and Turkey pro-Arab while the G.B. was pro-Israel.

Arabs were against of such a committee. Turkey not only gave support to its

foundation but accepted also to be one of three members of it. This could be

103

interpreted as a sign of the change in the Turkish policy vis a vis Israel. During

the works of the committee Turkey instead of taking part of Arabs preferred to

play a neutral role and tried to reconcile the Parties. This Turkish position would

constitute the start of more distanced and cooler relations with the Arab

countries. It is possible that new relationship of Turkey with Western powers

started with the declaration of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan played an

important role in this change of the Turkish policy.

Before Turkey recognized Israel, She concluded with this new state a

postal agreement on 30th June 1948. Face to Arab protest, Turkey explained the

reason for which she concluded this agreement by the existence in Israel of

some 10 000 Turkish citizens.

On the other hand Turkey took a neutral stand at the start of the Arab-

Israeli war and took restrictive measures against Turkish citizens who wanted to

join the war. But later as the war lost its intensity She relaxed this measure.

Radio Ankara announced that Turkish citizens could emigrate any country they

would like to. Big number of Turkish Jews started to immigrate to Israel. On

28th March 1949 Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognized Israel.

Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak was explaining this as a necessity for

Turkey to assume her functions appropriately in the Palestine Reconciliation

Committee. In the reality:

1. Turkey needed to align her policies with these of the Western countries in

order to be admitted to the Western club. In fact she aspired also for the

membership of NATO that was shaping at that time. Turkish Foreign Minister

would soon pay a visit to USA and be received by Truman who was giving his

full support for Israel and may be it was time for Turkey to make a political

gesture before this important visit.

2. Turkey had understood that Israel would not be a satellite of the USSR.

Israel started to have closer relations with the USA

104

3. In Turkey elites were criticizing the Governments pro-Arab policies.

Souvenirs of Arabs’ behaviors at the end of the First World War were yet alive.

F. Relations with Iran

Iran was occupied by Allied countries in 1941 until 1947. During that

period there was no relation with Iran. Turkey approached the G.B. on two

issues related to Iran.

The first issue was with regard Kaşkay Turks who were under heavy

pressure of the G.B. who was considering them as pro – German. Turkey was

shoving for the first time interest with the fate of Turks living out of Turkey.

The second issue was the fear that Iran would be dominated by the

USSR like East European countries and Turkey drew the attention of the British

Government to this danger

Turkey and Iran resumed their relations again in 1948 with exchange of

ambassadors.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DEMOKRAT PARTİ

Accession of Turkey to NATO

NATO was established in 1949 under the auspices of the USA. Why

Turkey was interested with this organization:

1. Turkey was always under the shock created by Soviet demands in

1945. Even if she was entered in good cooperation with the USA,

this was not enough guaranties against threads coming from the

north.

105

Turkish statesmen was thinking that membership of NATO would

be a result of pro-western policies Turkey followed since the

independence.

2. If Turkey stayed out of the NATO, economical and military aids

she was receiving from the USA could diminish by the time.

3. Turkish politicians were of the view that new establishes multi-

party system could only continue if Turkey could take its place

among other democratic countries. Turkey should be part of all

western establishments in order to implement in the country

political and economical liberalism.

As an invitation didn’t come from initiators of the organization Turkey

made known officially his desire to accede it. If this was impossible a

Mediterranean Pact could be established with the participation of Turkey, Italy,

Greece, France and the UK. All these efforts gave no fruit.

In June 1950, When the United Nations decided to sent international

troops in Korea, the Menderes Government decided to participate to that force.

Normally this was a decision the Parliament could take and the decision was an

infringement of the Constitution ad the opposition parties were against. The

Government was taking the war of Korea as a chance to be accepted in NATO,

but a second application was refused again by the NATO Counsel which

proposed instead a Mediterranean pact with the participation of Egypt, which

was far from satisfying the Turkish Government. Turkey found this proposal

unrealistic. It was impossible to see Egypt and UK within the same organization,

Egypt would not like to be the only Arab country in such a grouping and as long

as Arab-Israeli war continued it would be unconceivable to establish a defensive

organization in the Mediterranean. However Turkey didn’t reject the proposal.

In 1952 U.S. National Security Counsel reported that, taking in account

Soviet nuclear stocks and its capability to launch them, The USSR would be at a

106

level to make fatal attacks to the USA in 1954. In order to respond in time to a

Soviet nuclear attack The USA should possess bases in countries near USSR.

They approached Turkey to that end, but Turkey made clear that this can not be

possible unless Turkey became member of NATO.

On the other hand, SSCB could repeat in Europe what they did in Korea,

an in that case the first country to be attacked would be Turkey. Invasion of

Turkey by the USSR would jeopardize the security of Europe.

Yugoslavia which left the Commintern in1948 had become a Soviet

target. NATO’s southern Flank had to be strengthened in order to be able to

defend Yugoslavia and Southern Europe.

All these reasons pushed the USA to propose to NATO the membership

of Turkey and Greece. But to the British eyes, Turkey with its strong army,

could better serve to British interest in the Middle East. With this in mind, in

1951 the UK proposed Turkey an alliance in the Middle East with the UK, USA

and Turkey in it. The USA didn’t like this idea. On the other hand Denmark and

Norway didn’t want to be obliged to go in war for such a far area like the

Southern Europe. They were also looking at NATO as grouping countries with

similar social and cultural values.

Despite of all these oppositions, The North Atlantic Counsel invited

Turkey and Greece for membership to NATO. The UK proposed the

establishment of a new command, Middle East Command, under a British

commander which would be responsible of the defense of the area included

Egypt. Turkish and Greek forces would be part of this Command. But Egypt

didn’t want to cooperate with such a command, and turkey didn’t like to assume

responsibility out of NATO area. So This British initiative died down. The two

countries became member on 18 February 1952.

BİLATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE USA

AND RELATİONS WİTH THE USA

107

With the development of the Turkish- American relations, and especially

military ones, many agreements were signed between the two countries. Nobody

knows how many there were, because a large number of these were ratified by

the Government and not by the Parliament, although this was not compatible

with the Constitution. Some of these were:

The Common Security Agreement (1951): Turkey undertook to support military

initiatives of the USA and, if necessary, to participate in these even before being

a member of the NATO. Advantages given to the goods imported from the USA

in the context of economic aid was extended to military equipment as well.

The Statue of Forces Agreement (1952): Turkey accepted the establishment of

US bases and military installations on her territory and agreed on the statue

given to US military personnel deployed in Turkey. During the following years

many amendments were brought to this agreement. Other technical agreements

were also signed as a part of it. Among these was the Agreement on NATO

Installations which was allowing the US Army, Navy and Air Force to use

Turkish territory.

The Agreement on Nuclear Energy (1955): Turkey would establish a nuclear

center for peaceful and humanitarian aims; USA would lend the necessary

nuclear fuel for it. Turkish armed forces would be reshaped on the American

Model. By the time, some conflicts arose between the two countries. At first,

from 1955 on, foreign aid received by Turkey from the USA and other

developed countries proved to be not enough to meet the expenses necessary for

Turkey to achieve the economic development she was planning for. The USA

and IMF did not want to extend new credits unless measures aiming at economic

stability were taken. At the end, The Turkish Lira devaluated (From 1 $= 2,80

TL, to 1$ = 9 TL) . On the other hand, the attitude of some American

newspapers (criticizing oppressive political measures in Turkey) created

problems. Moreover, the Turkish opposition was not happy with the privileges

recognized to American investing companies in Turkey. Other difficulties were

108

as regards to US policies in the Middle East and we will come to them later.

However, all these difficulties were not of a nature to have drastic impacts on

the general path of the relations.

In 1957, USSR launched the satellite Sputnik successfully. To the US

experts’ eyes, Soviet ballistic missiles were a direct nuclear threat to the USA.

At that time, NATO’s nuclear strategy was ‘massive retaliation’ which means

that any nuclear attack should have immediate nuclear response. President

Eisenhower proposed the installment of the middle range Jupiter missile

launchers in NATO member countries in order to deter The USSR from a first

strike. Only the UK, Greece and Turkey accepted these launchers on their

territories. These missile launchers became fully operative in 1962 only. They

increased the threat on Turkey.

In May 1960, a US spy plane U2 based in Diyarbakır, was shot down in

Russia. This created a limited crisis between USA and USSR and between

Turkey and USSR.

RELATİONS WİTH THE USSR AFTER STALİN

Stalin’ death in 1953 was a turning point in Soviet History. First

Malenkov, and then in 1955 Kruschev took over. Pacific coexistence became

one of the foreign policy principles. In May 1955, the Warsaw Pact was

established.

The USSR made it clear with a note to Ankara in May 1953 that:

1) The USSR was desirous to ameliorate its relations with Turkey;

2) The USSR had no territorial claims over Turkey;

3) The USSR had revised its views on the question of the Turkish Straits.

Turkey and her allies commented this offer as

1. A change in Soviet Policy resulting from Turkey’s membership of NATO;

2. It might have been a maneuver to separate Turkey from her allies or to

sabotage the initiatives of the Mediterranean Command or the Balkan Pact. Only

109

France thought that this demarche was an indication of the Soviet desire for

normalization between East and West.

Turkey’s concerns were different: such a Soviet attitude could end up

reducing aids Turkey was receiving from the West. The Soviets could proceed

to abrogate the Montreux Treaty. These concerns proved unfounded.

In fact, the USSR was not happy with the US basis in Turkey and with the

participation of Turkey in the US encirclement policy. The USSR made this

clear during the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. The USSR severely

criticized Turkish policies during the Crisis of Syria in 1957 an in that of Iraq in

1958. Despite of her discontent of the Turkish policies, the USSR didn’t adopt

negative attitudes vis a vis Turkey.

Attenuation of tension between the two blocks in 1950 reflected to

Turkish- Soviet relations. Once again, the first step came from Kruschev who

reiterated the desire of normalization of relations between the two countries.

Reciprocal declarations followed. The Turkish Minister for health visited

Moscow in 1959. In 1960, a visit to Moscow of the Turkish Prime Minister

Adnan Menderes was on the agenda. This visit would not be realized due to the

military intervention in Turkey in 1961.

.

TURKISH- GREEK RAPPROACHMENT:

During the war The USSR negotiated a security belt with its western allies

to protect its borders and to expand the effects of Communism. So, Balkans was

divided into influence area, and Greece was left to British influence. Soviet

claims over Turkey regarded upon positively by the West at the beginning as

well. From 1946 on, Western countries were restless about the extreme military

strengthening of the USSR and started to take measures against it. This was the

beginning of the Cold War. Turkey needed western economic and military aid to

sustain her economic development which was also a precondition to make a

110

multiparty political system survive. She needed the West to resist the Soviet

threat as well. In Greece the civil war ended with the liquidation of communists

with the help of the USA. She also had to take place in the Western camp.

In 1947 the Paris Treaty was signed and the Dodecanese Islands were

given to Greece. In fact, as Italy had lost the war, the Greek-Orthodox majority

in the Islands addressed the winners in order to annex the Dodecanese Islands to

Greece. The UK was looking to these demands positively to compensate the war

efforts of Greece and to politically strengthen the King and the royal

government in Greece. Turkey pointed out that these islands were important for

her security despite the fact that a Greek majority was living there and was in

favor of their autonomy under condition that they would be given a

demilitarized status. However, yielding tothe pressure from the UK, Turkey

accepted the transfer of these islands to Greece provided that they were

demilitarized and some Aegean islands closer to Turkish shores be given to

Turkey. The Dodecanese islands were put under Greek sovereignty in March

1947, and Turkey kept her silence, since Turkish-Greek friendship under the US

umbrella against the USSR was more imported for her.

Two mouths after the declaration of the Trumann doctrine, a Turkish-

Greek cooperation committee was established in Athens, and a trade agreement

was signed the following year. The role the USA was playing in Turkish-Greek

rapprochement would be seen more clearly in the question of the election of the

new Fener Archbishop.

During the war the USSR Governments did not hesitate to exploit the

Orthodox religion to their benefit. An archbishop was nominated at the Moscow

church in 1947 and tried to establish relations with other Orthodox communities.

Despite the fact that Turkey was taking the Fener Church as a national

institution, Moscow started to support the claims that the Fener Archbishop

should be elected by all Orthodox Churches. This pushed the USA to make

efforts to obtain the election of men they could trust on as archbishops of Fener.

111

In 1948 the archbishop was forced to resign due to her political activities against

Turkey, and when Turkey refused three candidates proposed by Greece, the

name of the Archbishop of the Orthodox church of the North America,

Aristokles Spiru Athinagoras was put forth by the USA. Turkey and Greece

agreed. The biggest resistance came from the Fener church itself because the

candidate was not one of theirs. Greece convinced them at the end. The last

difficulty was the citizenship of Mgr. Athinagoras who was thus given the

Turkish citizenship. Athinagoras was able to establish good relations with the

Turkish Government and would assume his functions some 24 years until his

death in 1972.

During 50s we see a lot of similarities in Turkish and Greek domestic

policies. Both countries ruled by center-right parties backed by the USA. Turkey

wanted to make a multi partite democracy to survive. Greece, following the civil

war proceeded to elections which ended by the victory of the rightist parties.

Both countries needed economic and military aid, only the USA could provide

them. Both countries were dependent on the USA.

In 1952 Greek Prime Minister Venizelos visited Turkey. A Permanent

Turkish Greek Committee was established to strengthen political and economic

relations. Venizelos qualified the Turkish- Greek friendship declaring that in

short time the two countries would make one. The same year Turkey’s Prime

Minister Menderes paid this visit back. This was followed by the visit to Turkey

of the King of Greece. The King visited The Fener archbishop which was seen

positively by the Turkish public opinion. President Celal Bayar in his turn

visited Athens and Western Thrace and opened Celal Bayar Gymnasium in

Gümülçine. Shadows will start to come on these relations with the emergence of

the Cyprus question.

Balkan Pact

After the 2nd World War Balkans were divided in two: Socialist countries

backed by Moscow and Turkey and Greece supported by the USA. When in

112

Communist Yugoslavia Tito tried to follow policies different from those of

Moscow, he was excluded from the Communtern. This created economic and

security problem for Yugoslavia. The USA profited the situation by providing

that country with economic and military aids. But this was not enough.

Yugoslavia would be part of the US encirclement policy. As it was not possible

to admit a communist country to NATO, the only possibility could be to include

this country in western security system by encouraging her to military

cooperation with Turkey and Greece. In fact the three countries were feeling the

Soviet threat on them. All the three needed US economic and military aids. Plus

Yugoslavia was in dispute with Italy over Trieste and needed political

international support. In that context, a pact was signed in Ankara in 1953.

According several clauses of the Pact, the three countries would cooperate

permanently, would proceed to political and military consultations on the

matters of mutual interest. The Chiefs of Staff of the three countries would

cooperate on determining common defense problems. Cooperation would be in

economic and technical matters as well. They committed not to adhere any

agreement against one of them. A secretariat was also established with a

separate agreement in 1953.

It is clear that this arrangement was not a military alliance. But in 1954 a

new Treaty will be signed by the same three countries and the Pact turned out to

be the Balkan Alliance. With this Treaty Parties agreed on resolving their

problems by peaceful means, refusing all use of threat and force. An attack to

one of them would be regarded as directed to all of them. In such a case they

would take in common all necessary measures, included the use of armed forces,

to help the attacked party. Balkan Alliance established a Permanent Counsel, as

well. But face the changing in Soviet policies towards Balkan countries after the

death of Stalin in 1953 (Soviets declared that they were not against national

communism) Yugoslavia inclined to non aligned policies. In the mean time the

question of Trieste was settled as well and the Alliance was no more a military

113

necessity for Yugoslavia. New difficulties between Turkey and Greece with the

emergence of the Cyprus question added to that. The pact and the Alliance died.

EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

After the occupation of Crete by Germany, UK started to pay more

attention to Cyprus, the strategic importance of which was undisputable.

Augmentation of the number of British troupes and British investments for the

defense infrastructure of the island, financial aides from London created a real

economic activity in Cyprus. We can say that this relative improvement in the

economy laid to political activity in the island. In 1941 UK decided to organize

municipal elections and to that end authorized political activities. That year was

founded AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People). Against it KEK (Cyprus

National Party) was found with the support of the Church. In 1943 AKEL get an

important victory in local elections. If Greek Cypriots were divided among

themselves ideologically, Turkish Cypriots were divided on personal basis.

However as either AKEL or the Church manifested frequently their aspirations

for ONASİS (annexation to Greece), Turks unified and founded KIBRIS

ADASI TÜRK AZINLIĞI KURUMU (KATAK) with two opposing leaders Mr.

Fazıl Küçük and Mr. Özkan who was known as close to the CHP in Turkey.

The following year Mr. Küçük left KATAK and found KIBRIS MİLLİ TÜRK

HAREKETİ PARTİSİ (KMTHP) and profited from the support of DP which

was on power in Turkey. At the end, Mr. Küçük became the only leader of the

Turkish- Cypriots.

In 1946 UK started some economic and political reforms and established a

Constituting Assembly where Greek Cypriots insisted on self government which

was not acceptable for Turks. AKEL left the meetings of the Assembly when the

Governor General Tabled a Constitution which did not contain self governance.

Thereafter AKEL directed all its efforts for ENOSİS. In 1949 it submitted to the

114

UN General Assembly a memorandum for self determination in Cyprus. The

Church could not remain indifferent to these efforts and organized a referendum

in the Island where 96/100 of the population voted for ENOSİS. With this the

Church obtained the leadership of the Island, and it became more active in

domestic politics with the election of Makarios III as Archbishop.

Greece was in a difficult position: She could not remain indifferent to

demand of ONASİS and had to continue to have friendly relations with Turkey

and the UK. In 1953 Mr. Eden, Prime Minister of the UK was asking Mr.

Papagos, Prime Minister of Greece, if Greece would demand also the annexation

to Greece of New York where more Greeks were living then in Cyprus. Mr

Eden did not accept the existence of a question as Cyprus question. In fact for

the UK which lost her supremacy in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis,

Cyprus was strategically more important. From that point Greece would left her

efforts to seek solution to the problem by bilateral talks and would try to

internationalize the problem.

Turkey wanted to continue friendly relations with Greece and the UK and

in 1950 Turkish Minister of foreign Affaires declared that there was not such a

problem like problem of Cyprus, and in fact the UK would never leave the

island, but face to pressings from Cyprus he declared that Turkish Cypriots

would be given all necessary help. In 1955 Menderes said to his Greek colleague

that the Cyprus question would be settled within the framework of Turkish-

Greek friendship.

In 1954 Greece raised the Cyprus issue in the UN Assembly General. This

was the first attempt to internationalize the conflict. During the negotiations

Turkey and the UK have put forth the following arguments:

- Cyprus was under the domestic jurisdiction of the UK

- Cyprus was given to the UK by the Lausanne Treaty signed

by Greece as well.

- It was strategically important for the UK

115

- Turkish-Cypriots had not been consulted before such a

proposition had been submitted to the UN

- Cyprus was closer to Turkey or Syria then Greece

- Cyprus had never been under Greek hegemony in the history.

Assembly General did not accept to include the Cyprus question in

its agenda. Thereafter Msgr. Makarios, in order to force the UK to accept the

Greek demands, opted for a guerilla war in the island and he designed for this

Mr Grivas, born in Cyprus, chief of an organization named X (hee) who founded

the National Organization for the Straggle of Cyprus (EOKA). In 1955, face to

the increased violence in the Island, the UK proposed (1) a three lateral

Conference, (2) elaboration of a new constitution for the Island, and (3)

elaboration of a program of economic development. Turkey accepted the British

proposal of Conference. Makarios objected, and asked Greece to participate in

such a conference in case the UK accepted the principle of self determination in

the island. But Greece could not afford conflicts with her allies and participated

in the conference which was held in London. In the Conference Turkish

Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Zorlu disclosed Turkish views on the subject:

1. Cyprus is near by the Turkish costs,

2. There are historical, cultural and economic ties between the island and

turkey,

3. If a State controls at the same time Cyprus and other island at the west

of Turkey will thus encircle Turkey, and creates a security risk for Turkey.

4. Turkey is happy with the status quo, but if a change would deem

necessary, the island had to be given back to its old owner.

Turkey objected the idea to give self government to the island as well.

Greece insisted on self determination.

On the 6th of September the news reached Turkey that a bomb had been

placed at the house of Atatürk in Salonica and Association ‘Chyprus is Turk’

organized a protest meeting in Istanbul. Shortly the meeting turned out to riots,

116

police could or did not intervene, and rioters attacked minority shops and

schools. Results: 35 wounded, 5622 buildings destroyed, $ 300 000 000 of

damages. Those who were responsible of these events of 6-7 September were

never known. What is interesting is that the investigations in Greece showed that

the bombe at the Atatürk’s house was given to an official of Turkish Consulate

in Salonica by a Western Trace Turk.

EOKA increased its actions and Turkish Cypriots established a resistance

organization VOLKAN. Makarios was opposing to the political reformes put

forth by the UK. Greece was obliged to send him to exile, but this let OEKA to

increase its violent acts further. It became the leader of the Greek Cypriote

community. After the Suez crisis and with the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 the

UK lost its domination in the Middle East and geopolitical importance of Cyprus

decreased to her eyes. British Minister for Colonies was declaring that UK could

accept the self determination but among the choices to be presented to Cypriots

should figure the partition of the island as well.

The fact that Greece cold not obtain satisfaction in the UN for her self-

determination thesis, resistance of Turks to that thesis and determination of

Turkey to support Turkish Cypriots swept the way for negotiations between

Turkey and Greece and the UK, Turkey and Greece came to an agreement in

Zurich in February 1959: A Basic Structure Document was adopted with parties

Turkey, Greece, UK, Turkish Cypriot Community and Greek Cypriot

Community. They all signed the document. According to this agreement the UK

transferred the sovereignty to the two Communities who would enjoy the

sovereignty rights together in common. President of the new republic would be

Greek and Vice President Turkish with the right to veto of this latter on security,

foreign policy and defense matters. Partition, enosis and accession to a political

or economic union of which Turkey and Greece were not member were

forbidden. Turkey and Greece would be on equal footing in the Island. Turkey

and Greece recognized the continuity of British sovereignty in British bases in

117

Cyprus. Three documents were signed: Agreement on the foundation of the

Republic of Cyprus, Agreements on Guaranties and Agreement of Alliance

which let Turkey and Greece to deploy troops in Cyprus. These agreements

were ratified by Turkey in March 1959.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING 50s

1. The Baghdad Pact. The G.B. who had the Suez Canal under her control, who

was present in Cyprus, Iraq and the Gulf was against the membership of

Turkey and Greece to NATO and advocating the establishment of a defense

system in the Mediterranean under her leadership with the participation of these

two countries plus some Arab countries. Such a defense system would

counterbalance the American supremacy in the area and would help moderate

the reactions against the British bases as well. The participation of Turkey was

important because Turkey was a Muslim country with strong armed forces and

her presence would alleviate the western character of the Alliance. In October

1951 Turkey disclosed that She was considering this alliance named the

Mediterranean Command, useful and necessary. The second important country

for the G.B/ was Egypt due to the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and to

the influence of this country in the Arab League. On 13th October the G.B.,

USA, France and Turkey invited Egypt to participate to the Command. The GB

made also known that in case Egypt would accept to join the Command GB

would withdraw all her forces except those who would be under the Command.

But Egypt refused the offer declaring that She would not consider such kind of

proposals as long as British forces would continue to stay in her Country, and

denounced the 1936 agreement. Turkey was also severely criticized in the

Egyptian press. In November the USSR gave a Note on the Soviet concerns

118

about the participation of Turkey to western defense plans in the region. Turkey

had understood that she would not obtain any ally from Arab countries but was

continuing to argue that she was the sole country in the Middle East to defend

Western interests in the area.

Face to the difficulty of forming a military alliance the USA and GB

decided to change the project and instead of a Command they decided in July

1952 to convert It to a planning organization under he name of Middle East

Defense Organization. The GB was thinking to contact also Arab countries other

then Egypt. like Jordan and Iraq. The USA was insisting on the participation of

Egypt, but contacts with this country proved unsuccessful.

In 1953 Eisenhower became President of the USA and changed US

policy towards the Middle East. The new US Administration was thinking The

Mediterranean Command or the Middle East Defense Organization were not up

to assure the security of the region under the changing international situation.

The essential thread on Arab countries was coming not from the USSR but from

Israel and it would not be possible to obtain the cooperation of the Arab

countries by insisting on the dangers of the Communism. Arab countries, which

obtained their independence recently would not like to join formations, which

would recall French and British domination in the region. Arabs were seeking

economic development and they would look with sympathy to the Soviet

policies after the death of Stalin. It would not be possible to have the

cooperation of Arab countries before the solution of the problems existing

between Egypt and the GB (like the problem of the Suez Canal) . With these in

mind the USA decided to take the initiative and in May 1953 Dulles, Foreign

Secretary made a visit to all the countries of the region included India and

Pakistan. Turkey argued that it was not possible to assure the defense the Middle

Eat security with Arab countries a new approach was necessary and Pakistan

had to be included to the Middle East defense system.

119

After this visit Dulles put forward the notion of Northern Belt. This

Belt was on the north of the Middle East and was including Turkey, Iran, Iraq,

Pakistan and Syria. According to this policy only these northern Middle east

countries were feeling the Soviet threat and a new security belt to be build on

the south of the USSR should include these countries while other Arab countries

were feeling more the threat of Israel instead of the Soviet threat. For Turkey

who was seeking to fortify her security ties with the West was an occasion. The

USA made first an economical and technical cooperation agreement with

Pakistan in December 1953.In February Turkey and Pakistan disclosed their

intention of concluding a defense treaty. USSR reacted and pointing out that this

was but a NATO maneuver in a region where there was no threat and was

putting the region in danger. Egypt declared this initiative as a threat to all the

counties of the region. Iraq reserved her position while Iran disclosed that she

will not join the treaty. Despite these reactions Turkey and Pakistan concluded

the treaty of friendly cooperation between the two countries in April 1954. It

was not a military alliance.

Few weeks later Prime Minister Menderes was declaring in Washington

that it was a necessity for Arab countries to recognize the existence of Israel. In

fact Middle East countries were divided in two: Those countries cooperating

with the West with Turkey as leader and those following non aligned policies

with Egypt as leader. There was a real competition between Turkey and Egypt.

Solution of the Suez Canal problem awakened new expectations in the West to

take Egypt in western camp but attempts made by Menderes were not

successful/ Then Turkey focused her demarches on Iraq. Iraq had already started

to receive American military aid since 1954. Her position against Turkish

Pakistani treaty was due to the negative reaction of other Arab countries. Suez

agreement comforted Nuri Sait Pasha, Prime Minister, in his pro West policies.

In January 1955 Menderes paid a visit to Bagdad. According the joint

Communiqué issued after the visit was disclosing that a treaty would be signed

120

to assure cooperation of the two countries against attacks from the region and

from out of the region. With the term “attack from the region” was meant Israel

and was aiming at comforting other Arab countries. The countries would

conform to the UN decisions about the rights of the Palestinians and the treaty

would be open to the participation of the countries determined to realize the

peaceful goals of the Treaty. Menderes visited Syria and Lebanon also. Both

countries refused to join. On 24 February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed in

Bagdad the Treaty that was foreseeing the cooperation of the two countries for

their security and defense accordingly to the article 51 of the UN Charter. The

Treaty was open to the participation of other countries interested with the

security of the region. Nothing was put in the Treaty about the recognition of the

UN decisions on Middle East despite the agreement reached earlier on the

matter because Turkey was desirous to see USA and GB who had close relations

with Israel, to join the Treaty. To satisfy Iraq Turkey accepted an exchange of

letter with Iraq to confirm the recognition of the said UN Decisions.

In April 1955 GB joined the Treaty. The GB committed with a new Treaty

with Iraq to contribute in the training and equipping the Iraqi army. In case Iraq

would be attacked GB would come to her aid following the demand of Iraq, if

necessary, with armed forces. Arabs would interpret this Treaty as the

continuation of the British presence in Iraq. After Musaddak , Prime Minisrter of

Iran, who had rebelled against the Shah was toppled by the USA in September

1955 the Shah started to implement pro-Western policies. Thus Iran joined the

Pact in November 1955 as well. This was the fourth adhesion required in the

Treaty to establish a Permanent Counsel at the level of Minister. This Counsel

held its first meeting in Baghdad.

Why the USA did not join the Pact? In fact the USA did not

want to deteriorate her relations with Egypt and the Saudi Arabia . Participation

of the USA would provoke more the USSR. Israel was not happy with the Pact.

She was thinking that The Pact was against her and Turkey would also change

121

her policies vis a vis Israel. The USA did not want to preoccupy more that

country. On the other hand the American Administration was not sure if it

would be able to have the approval of the Senate where a discussion on the US

Middle East policies could create domestic policy problems.

Baghdad Pact contributed in the deterioration of the relations of Turkey

with the Arab countries other than Iraq. On the other hand Egypt and the Arab

League decided to conclude between Arab countries another Treaty covering

political, economic and military fields and excluding Iraq. Turkey reacted

against Syria and warned her Turkey would consider such an Alliance against

her. In the mean time Turkey continued to try to attract other countries to the

Pact. Celal Bayar visited Amman in November and gave Jordan assurances that

Turkey would take part of Jordan in the Palestinian question in case Jordan join

the Pact. But After this visit leaders who were supporting the policies of

President Nasser of Egypt came to power in Amman and Jordan did not join the

Pact. Another question was the policy of the USA who was giving support to the

Baghdad pact while giving economic aid to Egypt with the World Bank in order

to avoid that country to approach to the USSR. This US behavior was a signal to

the Arab countries that to stay out of the pact would not be a handicap for the

good relations with the USA.

2. Crisis of Suez Canal. Egypt established diplomatic relations with

communist China in September 1955 and in July 1956 President Nasser

disclosed that he would pay a visit to Moscow. In August the USA made Egypt

known that she had renounced the aid she promised to finance the Aswan dam.

The GB and the World Bank followed the USA. Egypt reacted and declared that

she was nationalizing the Suez Canal. Three days later USA, GB and France

decided to hold a conference in London with the participation of signatory

countries of 1888 Istanbul Treaty and those countries that used more the Canal.

Egypt establishing similarity between the Canal and the Turkish Straits

122

demanded Turkey to act as mediator, but Turkey was taking the question rather

from political point of view. Turkey accepted to attend the London conference

as one of the signatories of Istanbul Treaty but also taking into consideration

that GB was an Ally and that 1954 GB- Egypt Treaty allowing the GB to use the

Canal in case Turkey would be attacked and nationalization of the Canal was

jeopardizing the use of the Canal by GB.

According the Dulles Plan submitted to the conference, Suez would be

steered by an international body which would include also Egypt, would be used

freely by the signatories of the 1888 Istanbul Treaty. Egypt would get an

equitable income and the Suez Canal Company would be indemnified. The

USSR qualified the plan as colonialist and proposed a conference with wider

participation, which would take up the question in full respect of the sovereignty

rights of Egypt. Turkey who took the part of Western countries in the

Conference supported however that the sovereignty of Egypt should not be

given harm and the Dulles Plan was meeting this requirement. She joined

Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia to obtain that the respect to the sovereignty of Egypt

should find its expression in a separate article. Conference adopted the plan but

Egypt refused to accept it.

A second conference held in London established the Union of the Users of

the Canal and Turkey was among the countries who joined this formation first.

GB and France submitted the problem to the UN. But the Security Counsel

could not bring a solution. Then France and GB decided to profit from the

Israeli attack to Egypt for a military intervention to the Canal. Israel attacked

Egypt on 29 October 1956 and the following day they gave an ultimatum to

Egypt and Israel to stop the war and to withdraw 10 miles far from the both

coasts of the Canal. Israel accepted the Ultimatum, but as Egypt refused to

accept it, GB and France attacked Egypt. This attack created a wide reaction in

the international public opinion. The USA and the USSR condemned GB and

France. Turkey qualified the France and GB attack to Egypt as a violation of the

123

international law, but condemned Egypt as the main responsible. Under the

international pressure GB and France agreed on the 3rd of December to

withdraw from Egypt. This completed the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

After the war broke out in the Middle East the Baghdad Pact

countries” chiefs of States met together in Teheran with the exception of the

UK, condemned Israel, asked the withdrawal of French and British Forces, gave

support to US initiative in UN Security Counsel and stated that the UN 1947

decision on the partition of Palestine which was rejected by Arab countries

could serve a basis to negotiations. They refrained from condemning France and

UK. Turkey withdrew her Minister (title of chief of diplomatic mission, lower

then Ambassador) from Tel Aviv. This later when leaving his post declared that

this was not a measure against Israel with whom Turkey would continue with

her good political and commercial relations. On the other hand this measure,

which was welcomed by Arab countries, was not sufficient to satisfy them

taking into account that Turkey did not condemn the aggressors like even the

USA had done.

3. Crisis of Syria Crisis of Suez Canal approached the USA to

Baghdad Pact and USA representatives attended for the first time in June 1957

in the Military Committee of the Pact. It helped also the USSR to develop her

relations with Arab countries. In August USSR made an economic and technical

cooperation agreement with Syria. Few days later Syria expatriated three US

diplomats with the allegation that they were spying for the USA. In reply USA

declared persona non grada Syrian Ambassador in Washington. This was

followed with large scale liquidations in Syrian army and Colonel Brizi who was

known with his communist inclinations was assigned as Chief of Staff. This

scared not Turkey only but Iraq and Jordan a well. King Faysal , King Huseyin

came to Turkey and there they met with Celal Bayar American representative

124

Henderson to discuss with him the situation in Syria. Egypt immediately

condemned the USA for provoking these countries against their neighbors.

Turkey was looking Syria as a Soviet satellite.

USA declared her intention to sent troupes to the neighboring countries to

Syria but made also Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon known that she would not

intervene in Syria. In that Situation Menderes Government chose to deploy

troupes on Syrian borders. Bulganin warned Menderes that Turkey would create

disasters for herself in case she was thinking that an attack to Syria would lead

to a local war only. Turkey expressed that she did not understand the USSR who

advocating for Syria while this latter did not react. 8 months later Syria

complained from Turkey for creating border incidents, for violating the Syrian

air space and building in forces at the border. Turkey replied that there were

only security measures necessitated by the tensions in the Middle East. USA

made a declaration to support Turkey and the USSR condemned Turkey and the

USA for following aggressive policies in the region. Two Soviet war ships

showed up in Lazkiye and American Forth Fleet visited Izmir. Mediations

offered by the King of Saudi Arabia were rejected by Syria. Egypt accused King

Saud for being an American agent.

Syria submitted the problem to the UN. During the debates started on 22nd

October and which severely opposed Turkey and Syria at the General Assembly

of the UN Indonesian proposal inviting parties to the conflict to seek solution

through negotiations was accepted by Turkey and Syria. In the mean time USSR

moderated her behavior vis a vis Turkey.

In February 1958 Egypt and Syria founded the United Arab Republic. For

Turkey a Syria united to Egypt was preferable then a Syria under Soviet

influence and She recognized the UAR. On the other hand when Iraq and Jordan

decided to form a federation Turkey gave support to that as well.

We have to note that this artificial crisis was due also probably to the

effort of the Turkish Government to divert Turkish public opinion from

125

domestic problems to an international question just before the 1957 elections in

Turkey, which would take place under severe economic conditions.

4. Foundation of CENTO. On 14 July 1958 a military coup in Baghdad

toppled king Faysal and Nuri Said and opened way to important changes in the

regional policies of Iraq. Other Baghdad Pact countries qualified the coup as the

result of suggestions made by Nasser and communists and asked Washington to

intervene conformingly to the Eisenhower doctrine.

F.R.Zorlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign affaires declared that there was not \a

new Iraqi Government and the only legitimate Government was that under King

Husseyin., head of Iraqi Jordan Federation. In fact such a federation had died.

On 2nd August Husseyin declared the end of the Federation. Turkey was

seriously considering intervening in Iraq to restore the old regime, thinking that

new regime would approach Iraq to Egypt and the USSR. USA who was afraid

of a Soviet intervention warned Turkey not to pass to any action against Iraq.

On 28-29July 1958 the Pact countries met together with the exception of

Iraq in London and stated their conviction that the Pact was more necessary then

any time and invited the USA to join. USA declined this invitation again and

chose to strengthen her relations with Pact countries on bilateral basis.

In October the seat of the pact was removed to Ankara. In March Iraq

withdrew from the Pact. On 21 August the name of Baghdad Pact was changed

as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

5. Developments in Lebanon and Jordan ‘n 1958. When President of

Lebanon Mr. Chamoun started demarches to change the Lebanese constitution

to obtain a new mandate, pro Nasser nationalists provoked armed conflicts in the

country. With President Chamoun’s approval the USA sent marines to Lebanon

on July “to help Lebanon Government to preserve its independence and

territorial integrity”. This was the first implementation of the Eisenhower

126

Doctrine. Turkey gave support to this American intervention and offered also

the Incirlik bases to be used for this purpose. USA did not accept this offer

arguing that this was not a NATO operation. More that Turkey proposed to the

USA to give military support by Turkish Air Forces. The use by the USA of

Incirlik base provoked reactions in Egypt and in the USSR.

King Husseyin was preoccupied with the possibility that incidents

in Lebanon would occur in Jordan also and asked USA and UK to sent troupes

in Jordan. British forces landed to Jordan from Cyprus with the support of USA.

Jordan having military support of USA and the UK complained to the UN

against UAR for intervening in domestic affairs of Jordan and broke off her

relation with UAR. Turkey gave her support to USA,UK and Jordan during

these developments.

6. Independence of Algeria Turkey manifested interest for the struggle for

independence in Algeria, but voted with France against the adoption of the

question in the agenda of the General Assembly of the UN in 1955. In 1957 and

1958 She abstained before the project of resolution for self-determination in

Algeria.

Relations with Israel

Turkey after her decision to recognize the State of Israel waited one year

to establish diplomatic relations with her. On 9th Mach 1950 Diplomatic

relations at the level of Legation has been established. Relations between the

two countries started to develop in all the fields. In fact, the two countries were

secular in a region where the religion was predominating. The two countries had

adopted the western stile of economic and political development. Both countries

had good and close relations with the USA. Turkey was convinced on the

influence of Jews lobby in Washington. Israel was also desirous to develop her

127

relations with Turkey. Some Israeli politicians were thinking that Turkey could

help Israel in her conflict with Arabs.

In 1950 Trade agreement and payments agreement were signed between

the two countries. Israel started to buy agricultural products of Turkey. Israel

was re-exporting to Turkey products from East European countries Turkey had

not good relations with. Some Israeli companies started to operate in Turkey. In

1954 balance of payments was for the first time in favor of Israel. During the

first half of 50s cultural relations were developed as well.

Some of the expressions in the decisions taken between Turkey and Iraq

during the contacts leading to the Baghdad Pact uncomforted Israel. Israel was

interpreting them as a signal showing that Turkey was taking part of the Arabs

in Arab-Israel conflict. Iraqi prime minister had said that Pact would never

accept Israel as member. Menderes was once declared in Damascus that Turkey

was ready to help Arab countries in case of an Israeli attack to them. Israel tried

to elude the formation of the Pact. In 1955 Israel gave a not to Ankara and

referring to the positive declarations of Turkish authorities in the past asked

weather a shift had occurred in Turkish policies towards Israel. Turkey replied

that there was no change in her policies. But this affirmation was weakening her

demarches to attract Arab countries to Baghdad Pact. However Israel stressed

that Baghdad pact was against the existence of Israel and was encouraging

hostile Arab feelings against this country. These Israeli attitudes were

discomforting Turkey. In fact since the summer of 1955 Turkey started to revise

her policy. All relations with Israel were limited to law level contacts.

When Egypt was attacked by Israel at the start of the Suez canal Crisis,

Turkey joined a declaration of the Baghdad Pact condemning Israel. Taking into

considerations developments in the Turkish public opinion Turkish Government

appealed Turkish Minister in Tel Aviv to Turkey. With this measure Turkey

128

wanted also to moderate feelings against Turkey in Arab public opinions, but

this did not help. In December 1956 Israel withdrew her Minister from Ankara.

Expansion of pan Arab feelings in Arab countries after Nasser came to

power in Egypt, close relations that country has established with the USSR and

formation of Arab Federations pushed later Israel to approach to non Arab

countries of the region. She was thinking that pan Arab development could only

be stopped by a Pact composed of countries around Arab States. But a pact

without Turkey would not be useful. Ben Grion and Golda Meir came in secrecy

to Ankara in August 1958 and met with Menderes and Zorlu. Turkey was

convinced to join the pact suggested by Israel. Why? Union of Egypt and Syria

had discomforted Turkey. Iraqi coup d’Etat jeopardized the security of southern

borders of Turkey. At last the USA wanted to see Turkey member of the Pact.

Pact was foreseeing the cooperation among member states against pan Arab and

communist developments. After the establishment of that Pact Turkish Israeli

relations gained their initial vivacity.

Relations with Iran

Turkey did not welcome the initiative of Musaddik to nationalize oil in

Iran in early 50s. Furthermore at Musaddik period Iran took a nonaligned

inclination. Communist Tudeh Party gained influence in the Iranian public

opinion. Thus Turkish Iranian relation was in a crisis between 1951-1953

Turkey gave support to UK accepting embargo imposed on Iran. She gave

support to the USA-UK operation against Iran. But following the CIA operation,

which toppled Musaddik, the relations between the two countries were improved

in one night.

Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in November 1955. Bayar had gone to

Teheran to convince the Shah to adhere. He understood that the reason Shah was

129

acting slowly was to get more aid from the USA. Shah was also preoccupied

with the probable reactions of the partisans of Musaddik and leftist groups. Shah

did not want also to irritate the USSR.

Following the coup in Iraq Pact was transformed in CENTO. Scaring that

what happened to King Faysal could happen to him as well Shah wanted

CENTO to become a stronger organization. Then came up the coup in Turkey.

130