U-Boat Monthly Report - Dec 1942

8/9/2019 U-Boat Monthly Report - Dec 1942

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CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Ma r 53-5M13 Ma r 61

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-,"A. ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES. - - - . . . . . - - - . , . : . . - . - - . - - - - - . . - - - . - - - . . . . . - - -90

After reaching a high level in November,1IO I - - -+ - -+ - - - - I - - - I - - - l - - -+ - - - l - - - - - - l 80shipping losses were sharply reduced in December

to the lowest level for any month since last 101------1----1---1---1---+-----1--+---1-11-170January.Chart I shows the tonnage lost as the re

sult of submarine action since the beginning of 5llI1941 as well as the tonnage loss of tankers and

cargo-passenger vessels. I t includes ships thatmay have been used for transporting troops regardless of whether or not the ships were classified as commissioned auxiliaries. - 2D

The shipping losses due primarily to sub' I - - - - I - - - ' - - - - - + - ~ - - / - - J ~ " -JI'I-t--+'----!-'--->,+,L"":----l1Omarine action but including a small amount of \' "

tonnage lost through a ir attack are shown in th efollowing table. Marine casualties and losses 1941due to enemy mines or surface craft are excluded.The figures for November s i n k i n g ~ hav'e been re- Sinkings ~ A ~ ~ i e d and N e u t ~ a ~ M e ~ -vised upwards from those shown in this Summary c ~ a n t V e s s e ~ s by E n e m y S u b m a ~ i n e s last month as more complete information becameavailable; doubt less the December to tal will also prove to be somewhat higher when finalfigures are avai lab j.e . These totals are based on reports received up to January 12, 1943.

SUMMARY OF SINK ING$Merchant Vessels SunkBy Enemy Action (ExcludinQ Sfnkings by Surface Craft and Mines)

December NovemberShips Tonnage Ships Tonnage

North Atlantic7West of 500 7 36,709 27 164,503North Atlantic-East of 50 0 32 191,334 50 289,647South Atlantic . . . . 7 38,497 12 72,553East Coast of Africa-Mozambique. 5 21,522 21 115,963North African Coast . . 4 31,440 18 172,232Other Areas . 1 6,3 23 2 15,332Overdue, Presumed, Lost 10 48,688 9 28,770

Total . . . . . . . . . . . 374,513325,063

49,45013 9 859,000

Cargo and Passenger Vessels. 12 9 784,794Tankers. . . 10 74,206Total . . . '. . . . . . 13 9 859,000,

\~ ' f O ,8C$'.... 3 3D::i

CHART I


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NORTH ATLANTIC - WEST OF scoW. Only seven ships were lost in the North Atlanticwest.of scoW during December, due largely to reduced attacks in the Trinidad-Martinique-Caribbean area. In th e preceding month, 24 ships were sunk ~ the westernNorth At1anticsouthof latitude 20 0N, while in the same region only five ships werlost in December. The extent to which th e enemy has abandoned the Western Atlanticat least temporarily, as a theater of submarine war is indicated by th e fact thatwhile only seven ships, with t o t a ~ gross tonnage of 36,709 tons, were lost in December, the losses for the area for the entire year are estimated at 619 ships, tota ling 3,289,787 t o n s ~ NORTH ATLANTIC - EAST OF scoW. Excluding losses in th e North African Coast - Gibralter area, sinkings east of. scoW in th e North Atlantic declined sharply. Thirtytwo ships with a tonnage of 191,334 tons were lost , as compared with fifty ships inthe preceding month and forty-three during OctOber. The enemy continued his policyoJ at tacking convoys with U-boat packs, twenty out of :twenty-three ~ h i p s sunk Northof latitude 30 0 N being in convoys although two of these were stragglers. One convolost four ships, while another that was sUbject to a particularly persistent attacklost eleven ships, with a possibility that other ships in this la t ter convoy thathave not as yet been reported sunk may have been lost .NORTH AFRICAN COAST - GIBRALTAR. Although a substantial amount of shipping has gonto Africa to supply and reinforce the United States Fifth Army, only four ships areknown to have been lost during December in the North African Coast - Gibraltar areaFurthermore, three of these were relatively small vessels. The losses in this areaamounted to only 31,440 gross tons, as compared with 172,252 gross tons in NovembeSOUTH ATLANTIC. Sinkings in th e South Atlantic decreased for the second successivemonth, amounting to only seven ships, aggregating 38,497 tons. In November, twelveships were lost in this area, and in October - - during which a surprise attack wasmade in the Capetown area - - twenty ships were sunk.OVERDUE AND PRESUMED LOST. Ten ships due in port in December, with a tonnage of48,688 tons, are so long overdue as to be presumed 10st. While th e number is nearlthe same as in the preceding month; the'tonnage is considerably larger. As most ofthe overdue ships are of good size, i t is probable that they were lost as the resuof enemy action.LOSSES DURING 1942. Losses of merchant vessels and transports suffered by the Unied Nations and Neutrals, due to a l l causes, are believed to have been about 8,100,0

. gross tons, and to have equaled about 44% of the total losses in the three and aquarter years of war since September, 1939.2


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Construction of new merchant ships in the United States aggregated approximately8,200,000 d e a d w ~ i g h t tons, but the loss of 8,100,000 gross tons is approximately th eequivalent of 12,150,000 deadweight tons of new ship construction, since roughly 1.5deadweight tons is the equivalent of 1.0 gross ton. I t is probable, therefore, thatthe allied and neutral nations suffered a net loss in shipping during 1942 as i t isunlikely that ship construction outside the United States equaled 4,006,000 tons.I t is also of interest to note the particularly heavy to l l that has been taken oftankers; only sixty-two were constructed in the United States, while the indicatedloss of tankers by all ied and neutral nations was two hundred and sixty-eight vessels. I t is evident, furthermore, that with th e huge military need for petroleum,the lo'ss of the Far Eastern oil fields and the comparative inaccessibility" of NearEast oil supply, the need for tankers is greater than ever before.B. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BY A I ~ C R A F T I THE

EAS TERN SEA FRO NT I ER AN 0 GULF SEA FRO NT IER.During December no'depth bombs were dropped in combat by Army aircraft in these

areas. Navy planes and blimps participated in four attacks off possible U-boat contacts. As in November, the lack of allti-submarine activity was due to a lack ofsubmarines. The record low density Of,l.7 in November was further reduced in December to 0.7, and this figure is based on estimates which include.- some merely "possible" contacts. There is no positive evidence that there were any enemy submarinesin these frontiers during this month.

A summary of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft engaged in anti-submarineoperations in ESF and GSF is presented in the following table. Adetailed r e p o ~ t ofoperations for the 25th and 26th A/S Wings is included at t h end of this Summary.

Recon Escort Special Training Total Hrs.Army Bomb. and Observ. 3940 457 2235 7235"Army CAP, CP . . 9762 15393

Total Army. 13702 6233 457 2235Navy Planes. 4551 5493 617 * 10661Blimps . . * * * * 2272

Total Navy., . * * * * 12933I *Total Army and Navy . . * * * 35'560

* Complete data not available.3


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C. ATTACKS ON ENEMY SUBMARINES - DECEMBERPreliminary reports indicate that the decrease in the number of /attacks on me

chant vessels during the month of December was accompanied by a considerable drQP ithe number of attacks on U-boats.

In the U. S. Strategic Area (an irregular area, extending roughly half wayacross the North and South Atlantic) there were fourteen attacks, as compared withforty-six in November, on which the evidence obtained to date indicates that a U-boat was present. Of these fourteen attacks, six were made by aircraft and eight bsurface craft.

Four of the aircraft attacks are believed to have caused damage. Two of theseattacks took place off Natal, Brazil, a region in which the U-boats were operatingin some number during December. Another was east of Trinidad, while the fourth occurred south of Iceland in the North Atlantic convoy lanes. Three of the attacksby surface craft also appear to have produced ' d ~ m a g e , bringing to seven the tota lnumber of attacks on U-boats in the U. S Strategic Area believed to have resuitedin damage.

The only information now available concerning attacks in the Eastern ~ t l a n t i cconsists of brief reports from the Coastal Command, stating that their planes madeforty-one attacks in the period between the f irs t and the twentieth of December.assessment of these attacks was included so i t is not possible to determine the tonumber causing damage to enemy submarines.

The number of. successful attacks on U-boats during December appears to be quilow, but in view of the fact that th e weather was bad during the month and that anunusually large proportion of the U-boats were operating in the mid-ocean regionsthe North Atlantic convoy area, out-of range ()f aircraft operating from establishbases, the low number of known successful attacks is not surprising.D. GERMAN STRATEGY IN DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES.

The November issue of this Summary showed the. enemy strategy in th e dispositioof submarines by plotting the positions of vessels sunk by submarines during sixmonth periods s.ince the beginning of the war. The accompanying Charts numbered IIto ,IX show th e s inkings by months from June to December 1942, inclus i ve, as indiative of the changes in enemy strategy that have occurred in recent months.

The months of heaviest enemy sinkings off the Atlantic Coast of the UnitedStates ended in May and coincided with the organization of adequate air and surfacdefense. The f i r s t air aw:t .. surface escorted ship movements began in April, 1942,and the f.ormal convoy systeJ'twas inaugurated on May 14. The chart for June shows


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pattern of sinkings moving of Mexico and th e Caribbean areas.Adequate defense of shipping was provided thereafter in the Gulf by the Navy and byunits of the I Bomber Command, which began operations in this area as the Gulf TaskForce. By August the/ Gulf was practically free of sinkings, which were then concen-t rated around Cuba and in the Trinidad area (chart V). By September, the enemy hadgiven up attacking around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico (chartVI). Enemy attackscontinued in the Trinidad area from June to November, but a ir and surface protectionof shipping has been gradually increased and the low number of sinkings in this areain December indicates that i t is becoming effective.

In general, the disposition of enemy submarines as shown by the record of sink-,ings from July to December, 1942, reveals a steady departure of submarines from thecoasts of the Americas.

As outlined in this report a month ago, this movement was believed to be due tothe increasing hazards to submarines in 'these areas resulting from better defensesand to the growing strategic importance of intercepting transatlantic traffic .

The chart of sinkings during December, as well as the estimated distribution ofU ~ b o a t s , as of January 8, shown in chart II, justify th e tentative conclusion thatth e enemy followed the capability outlined in last month's Summary "to interceptNorth Atlantic and African Convoys by mld-ocean screens and pack attacks." In fact,Admiral Doenitz has been quoted in the press as saying in a Christmas Eve broadcast

CHART I I JANUAR,{Est imated o f Enemy Submarines _. '7 8 , 19lJ.3

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8

o 0

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JII

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0

CHART II I June CHART IV July

CHART VII October CHART VII I November

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0 0

o 0

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CHART VI Sept embe rCHART V AugustI

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o 0 8"

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CH ART IX

fh e accompanying cha-rtsshow by months the LOC4-t i on o f s ink ings o f aLLied and neut-ral me-rchantvessels , i nc l ud ing shipsused as t - roopt - ranspo -r ts .1-rom them, the m o n t h ~ t o -month changes in enemyst - ra tegy in aLte-r ing thed ispos i t ion o f ~ i sub' laa-rines a-re ev iden t . Lo-ca t i ons , as shown on th echa-r ts, a-re app-roximateonLy.

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' ~ ~ T' that U-boats are forming a defensive ring rather than operating offensively. Whethor not the enemy intends to follow out the capability, also mentioned a month ago,of attacking high speed convoys off ~ h coast of North Africa, is not ye t e t i d e n t ~

.The mid-ocean screen tactics were comparatively unsuccessful in December, however, andfri'endl:y, shi;ppi"ng losses have continued at a low level in the f i r s t twoweeks of J a n u a r ~ . In the absence of complete information, i t is difficul t to weighthe factors w h ~ c h may have been involved in the failure of enemy submarines in December. Important submarine bases in France were sUbjected to heavy bombardmentduring November and December (see section IV). However, the effect on the operation"of German submarines in December cannot be precisely evaluated. I t is estimatedthat the number of enemy s U b ~ a r i n e s operating at sea in December was no less than inN o v e m b ~ r , but the extent and duration of U-boat trips may have been restricted bythe bombing of enemy bases. Final appraisal of the effect on submarine operationsof the continued bombing of bases must be necessarily suspended unti l more completedata can be obtained.

On the basis of information received from Naval sources, i t is believed thatthe volume of transatlantic merchant shipping was not reduced in December or thestrength of surface escort increased.

Factors bearing on the reduction of losses can probably be found in the factthat the enemy chose to employ the strategy of defensive mid-ocean screens. Thesescreens were generally spread over an area :f:rom 560 north latitude to slightly soutof the equator. With th e exception of t h sinkings off th e bulge of Brazil (whichmight be vtewed as defensive screen operations) there was no successful offensiveseries of attacks in a relatively undefended coastal area as lias been customary inprevious months. The enemy's reliance on defensive screens over such a large areagave a wide margin of possible error in intercepting convoys and during D e c e m ~ e r thenemy was, in fact , unwise or unlucky in the disposition of submarines. Finally,bad weather conditions were enco"untered in the North Atlantic. Although there isdisagreement among Naval experts as to the effect of bad weather ~ submarine warfare - some contending that the submarine's offensive. o p e r a t ~ o n s are more adverselaffected than the defensive act ivi t ies of the convoy and others making the oppositecontention - i t would seem that in mid-ocean screen operations submarines are moreaffected by a d ~ e r s e weather conditions. Mid-ocean areas are generally outside therange of aircraft protection so that regardless of weather, th e batt le is betweensubmarine and surface escort. In good weather, submarines should be able visuallyto detect a convoy thirty-five to fifty miles away. This great advantage to thesubmarine is lost in bad weather and, in their effort to intercept convoys in mid

ocean over a wide area of possible convoy routes, the loss of this advantage is aserious restrict ion on, submarine success.8


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Although a month (is too brief a period on which to base conclusions as to probable success and probable continuance of German mid-ocean screen strategy, the comparative failure of this strategy in December can be attributed tentatively to thegeneral difficul ty of interception in areas offering wide opportunities for the,avoidance of sUbmarines, to the faulty disposition of enemy submarines in DecemberaRd the impairment of enemy operations by adverse weather conditions.

The strategic necessity for enemy interference with the support of Allied offensives in Russia and Africa obviously remains. A continued failure to interferesuccessfully during winter months in mid-ocean operations would make i t probablethat the enemy would exercise either or both of his capabilities of concentrating

'attacks nearer the transatlantic shipping points of origin or points of destination.In addition, sporaqic attacks in coastal areas, both for the purpose of sinkingunescorted shipping and for the purpose of inducing us to hold a ir and surfaceforces for the defense of t h ~ s e areas, is an enemy capability which cannot be disregarded.

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, ~ , _ . I [ &I I

INTERESTING AIRCRAFT ATTACKS ON U-BOATSA. AT TACK IN BAY 0FB I seAY BY 1st ANT I S BMA RI NE SQUADRON.

An enemy submarine was attacked on January 11th in the Bay Qf Biscay by thecrew of a B-24, piloted by 1st Lieutenant Walter Thorne of Marietta, Ohio, of the1st Antisubmarine Squadron, now on detached service.

Although complete details of the attack are not available at present, preliminary dispatches indicate that the submarine was sighted on the surface. As th eplane approached for a bomb run, the U-boat started to crash dive. However, beforei t disappeared from view, 1st Lieutenant Brent F. Walker, of Jefferson City, Mo.,attacked with machine gun fire. I t is presumed that the B-24 was armed with theBritish 250- lb. Torpex depth bombs. The approach on the f irs t run apparently wasfrDm the stern, since the f irs t three depth bombs are reported to have explodedf i f ty, thir ty and sixteen feet from th e submarine's stern, while others straddledthe conning tower. Private R. R. \Villiamson, of Austin, Texas, reported seeing apart of the IT-boat in the explosion geyser and fired another burst of "machine gunf ire into i t . On a second run, Lieutenant Thorne saw an oil patch, 200 yards wide,which spread from a geyser-like center.

1st Lieutenant Irving T. Colburn, of Chicago, was Bombardier, and other crewmembers included Co-pilot James Anderson, of Austin, Texas; Staff Sergeant George,Fowler, of Spartanburg, S.C.; Staff Sergeant Hollander of Indiana; and TechnicalSergeants Engles of Hazleton, Pa., L. T. Figg of Crew, Va., and J. Bristow ofEvansville, Ind.B. SIX SIGHTINGS IN ONE DAY.

After six months of anti-submarine patrol without sighting a U-Boat, tbe crewof a Navy PBY made' six sight ings in one da'y and sank one enemy submarine.

The aircraft was on an escort mission about 500 miles south of Iceland whenthe sightings were made. However, only one attack could be delivered as the subshad submerged too long in a l l other cases.

The plane was flying through clouds at 2200 feet when th e sixth sighting wasmade at six miles distance. The bow of the submarine was throwing up spray andthere was a definite wake. Approach was made, taking advantage of cloud cover, andthe run started from two miles away. At 1200 yards the sub opened fire with i tsbridge AA gun. The plane banked sharply, replied with i ts waist gun, turned backagain and, from about 100 feet , dropped one MK 29 depth bomb set for 25 feet. Thebomb exploded just aft of the s t i l l visible conning tower.10


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_124 f.:l17l fJ\ fl ; / ~ ' ' ' ' iImmediately after, a man and some wob\aen',debris were seen in the water.

The conning tower had disappeared in t h e b ~ r s t ; h f the exploding depth bomb. Severalm i n u t ~ s later two more men and objects resembling escape lungs were observed. Airbubbles, large quantities of oil and more debris appeared. All three men drowned.

/I t was intended to drop a full stick in this attack but, because of faulty

m ~ c h a n i s m , a ll but one bomb failed to release.c BAI TIN G TACT I CS

. On December 17 in 0636 S, 33LJ.O W, a PBY-S(A) made what may have been a "kill"on an enemy submarine. Timely employment of baiting tactics figured significantlyin the success of the attack.

The aircraft was flying at 2,000 feet, with unlimited visibili ty and scatteredclouds with base at 1,800 feet. At 1335Q. awake was sighted about 10 miles ahead,slightly to port and on a parallel course. The plane nosed down and increased power,but arrived over the swirl too late to deliver an attack. A smoke float was ~ r o p p e d and th e plane climbed to 3,500 feet, flying through the tops of th e clouds.

After circ1ing- in a wide arc for 30 minutes 'a small black object and a wakewere sighted in approximately the same position. The pilot throttled back and doveinto the nearest cloud, heading for th e submarine. He emerged at 2,500 feet to seethe s t i l l surfacing U-boat about 2 miles dead ahead. Approach was made withoutpower and two Mark 29 and one Mark 17 depth bombs were dropped from less than 50feet while the submarine's decks were st ' i l l awash. Explosions were estimated asbeing well within lethal range, apparently just beneath the sub.

Results of ' the attack are indicated in the accompanying sequence of photographs.Photo NO.1 - A few seconds before bombs were dropped. Sub with decks awash

and s t i l l coming up. Altitude of plane was forty feet.Photo NO.2 - 210 seconds after drop. Picture shows sub rising. Large air

bubble patch, which appeared about 2 minutes after attack, isfading somewhat but there is s t i l l evidence of escape of air.About 30 feet of bow emerged at a LJ.5 degree angle, extending 15to 20 feet in the air and settling back as the conning towerappeared. Residue of th e TNT charge is seen behind the damagedU-boat.

Photo NO.3 - 235 seconds after drop. Despite time interval of about 25 seconds since Photo NO.2, conning tower is in 'almost th e same po

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Photo No . 1 -- Run on Sur fac ing U-Boa t .

Photo No . 2 -- Bow Ris ing A f t e r At tack .

Photo No . 3 -- F in i s?12


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sition relative to residue and a ir bUbbles, indicating almostcomplete loss of forward motion. A considerable escape of a ir isindicated just behind the conning tower and at the stern. Forward gun and b o are also visible. Sub is sett l ing, stern low.

About one minute later th e U-boat settled slowly beneath the surface, s t i l lwithout forward motion and s t i l l emitting patches of air bubbles.

I t is the pilot ' s opinion that the sub thought i t had not been sighted by th eplane ,on the f irs t run. Even if the plane was seen after this run, was started, i tis possible that the submarine did not realize i t had been seen by th e plane.

By not dropping his bombs on an indistinct target and by withdrawing and using'cloud cover, th e pilot was offered a more favorable opportunity to deliver a suc-'cessful attack.D. PASS THE AMMUNiTION.

While on anti-submarine patrol in the Trinidad a r e ~ a U. S', plane had the u n usual experience of flying over a completely surfaced enemy U-boat with ,the rightwing clearing the periscope by less than eight feet. The aircraft was flying throughscattered thunder showers at 5000 feet when an object was sighted at a distance of5 miles. Using cloud cover and flying out of the sun, the plane approached oncourse 700 , apparently unobserved. A run was made on the fully surfaced U-boatwhich was on course 3500 and which had several men on deck and conning tower. Bombswere released at approximately 50 feet, but, by error, mousetrap bombs were released instead of depth bombs. No explosions were noted.

A slight vertical turn'was made to the lef t and another run was made with theplane on course 0550 andthe U-boat on course 35 00 One man was s t i l l visible in the conning tower and the decks were just.begin-ning to be awash as the plane flewover. Again the 9-epth bombs ~ a i l e d to drop, though both pickle and manual releasewere used. The plane circled and made'a third run on the same course as the submarine 10 to IS ' seconds after the conning tower had disappeared. Again the .depthbombs failed to release.

Neither the mousetrap bombs nor .30 and .50 calibre machine gunfi re , which,''las 'directed at t h e s u b m ~ t H E ( h had any visible effect . The plane ~ e m a i n e d in thearea for 3 hours and 45 ~ * ~ f e ~ , using t h e e x c e ) j l ~ ' n ( qloud cover, but saw no furthert race of the enemy craft F ~ i ~ ~ ~ n c e . of a n Y ; f l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; J ~ ; J ! . :fuf i OJ ~ - ; ' t .._. ..-.. ' ~ , , " ~ . ' , : . , - - ~ . - .. J l __ ; i

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I n i t i a l Splash o f Depih Bombs. Subsiding Splash of Depth Bombs.

Detonat ions o f Depth Bosbs.


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The U-boat was seen by every man aboard the plane and a ll agree that i t was a7Lt-0 ton German submarine. There were 8-10 men on the conning tower and 3 or Lt-

, around the bow and stern gun. They appeared to be engaged in work of some kindbut they made no attempt to man the guns. The attack was evidently a complete surprise, as during the f i rs t run all enemy personnel seemed almost stunned. No onemade a move, they just stared at 'the plane.

The color of the submarine was a fairly dark brownish green overlaid in blendedpatches of a l ighter shade. The crew thought this was excellent camouflage ;forthose waters. I t was definitely stated by the crew of the plane that no anti-aircraft gun was mounted in the basket aft of the conning tower. A black swastika wasseen o the side.

Failure of the depth bombs to release was caused -by failure to turn on ,the individual wing torpedo release switches.E. ATTACK OFF MARTINIQUE.

On November 17, about 75 miles east of Martinique, an RAF' Hudson was patrol-,ling at 5000 feet over scattered clouds 'with base at Lt-ooo-feet. Between the clduds,a fully surfaced submarine was sighted at a distance of 8 miles. The pilot immediately dived to attack and, from an altitude of 50 feet, d r o p p ~ d four 250 poundtorpex f i l led Brit ish depth bombs set at 25 feet and spaced for 36 feet. 'According"to the estimate of the crew, one bomb entered the water slightly astern and tostarboard of, the sUbmarine, one directly astern, and one slightly to port and within 10 feet of the hull. Ninety seconds la ter th e U-boat submerged at an estimatedspeed of less than 5 k n o t s ~ However, no evidence of damage was observed.

I t is evident from the accompanying photographs made during this attack thatthe impacts occurred considerably further astern than estimated by the crew and theexplosions were probably outside lethal range. Only one impact and burst are shown,which suggests that the actual spacing was clo$er together than the s pacing set.

The fact that the U-boat remained on the surface 90 seconds after explosionof the bomb and then sUbmerged slowly indicates some damage or difficulty.

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. . NEW TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. FLAT NOSE DEPTH BOMBS.The development of the flat nose depth bomb was described briefly in the Novem

ber, 1 9 ~ 2 , issue of this Summary. The full report of th e tests is now available.They were c ~ n d u c t e d by th e Aircraft Armament Unit of the U. S. Naval Air Station atNorfolk, Virginia, assisted by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Groupand resulted i the adoption of the new type of nose.

The tests of round nose and f lat nose depth bombs were exhaustive. Nearly ~ o Mark 17 and Mark 29 depth bombs were dropped from airplanes flying at varying speedand altitudes. The Atlantic Fleet Camera Party, in conjunction wlth surface vesselsfurnished by th e Fifth Naval District, took s t i l l and motion pictures of the drops.Pictures taken from a tug towing th e target, as well as pictures made from a secondvessel 1000 feet abeam of the target and from, a plane circling over the target, recorded the height of the airplane, the point of impact, the point of explosion, andthe time interval between impact and explosion. From these, by means of triangulation, i t was possible to compute the exact underwater trajectory of the bomb, bothas to range and deflection. In addition, valuable information was obtained concerning ricochets and broaches at various airplane speeds and alti tudes.

As a result of the tests, the following conclusions were reached by the Aircraft Armament Unit:(a) That the underwater travel of the service (round nose) Mark 17 depth bombusing a 25 ft . depth spring in the Mark 2 hydrostatic fuse, measured in yardsfrom point of impact, ave'raged approximately one-fifth the ground speed inknots but, when equipped with the f la t nose, th e underwater travel averagedonly one-fifteenth the ground speed in knots.

(b) That the underwater travel of the service (round nose) Mark 29 depth bombusing a 25 f t . depth spring in the Mark 2 hydrostatic "fuse, measured in yardsfrom the point of impact, averaged approximately one-seventh the ground speedin knots,but, when equipped with the f la t nose, the underwater travel averagedonly one-twelfth the ground speed in knots.(c) That both th e service type Mark 17 and Mark 29 will ricochet or broachat ground speeds in excess of 1 3 0 - 1 ~ 0 knots, even when dropped from an ,altitudas high as 270 feet.(d) That when equipped with f lat noses, the ricochets and broaches are reducedbut will occur at speeds in excess of 1 8 0 ~ 1 9 0 knots, even when dropped from analti tude as high as 250 feet.

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,,',,' -

~ ~ 2 ~ d 48 to 3 0 FT.

J J 1 i ~ ~ ~ ' CLEAN NTRYRICOCHETS EXCLUDED .

~ 2 1 ~ ::d sci t.o ZGOFT.J , . w N t . / ~ ' ~ ~ , , " I k ~ o CLEAN ENTRYo BR.OACH BROACH 6. JUMPRICOCHETS. EXCLUDED

.Sf) 14 16'4D MyU," . ,'16HT . .IOHT e\U T ."?MDU 'PER810N OF

UtNNI"'611 MIt:QD6PrH BoMlJ SlAVIC. TI"NA4t:11'DEPTH8 0M .Dn'P611.,tJN 0"c r l . A T N ~ f'ouNDNo8IJ

CHART XThe accompanying tharts spow the range and dispersion of the service Mark 17

and the Mark 17 equipped with the modified f la t nose. The bunching of the explo-sions of the flat nose bombs stands out in sharp contrast to the dispersion of theround nose bombs, both as to range and deflection to the right and l ~ f t . Further-more, i t should be noted that a large proportion of the round nose bombs broached,or broached and jumped, while no broaches occurred with the f lat nose bombs.

As th e result of tests made in July, 1 9 ~ 2 , i t had been learned that th e serv-ice type depth charge would invariably ricochet at altitudes of les$ than 100 feetand ground speeds in excess of 130 knots. A majority of the drops in this test ,therefore, were dropped at airspeeds and altitudes that would not result in rico-chets. Richochets are not shown on either of the ,accompanying charts, but the re-duction in tendency to richochet on the lower speed ranges by using the f la t noseseems clear from the following table:

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NARK 17 FLATHARK 17ROUND NOSE NOSEKnot Forward Travel Knot Forward TravelSpeed Altitude of Ricochet Speed Altitude of Ricochet11.tl 91 114155 175 111162 153 84162 142 No R i c o c h ~ t s in this180 141 105 speed range ..181 160 117182 177 135185 256 153. 196 162 111 195 196 159232 205 244 318205 309 90213 48 279No tests in 213 247 234this speed range. 223 212 198232 76 .

If the arparent results of these tests are borne out in actual use against submarines, the development of the f la t nose depth bomb should increase the number of'ki l ls to a very material extent. These more accurate bombs, combined with the morepowerful Torpex explosive, look like very bad news to U-boat crews.B. RA0 lOA LTIM ET ERS.

While i t is elementary that an error in computing ~ l t i t u d e has a pronounced effect on the accurac,y ~ bombing, the supreme importance of accurate knowledge ofaltitude in low level bombing is not always kept in mind. A small error in judgingalt i tude in high.level bombing will make but l i t t le difference in the accuracy ofaim bu t at low levels, at 136 m.p.h., an error of as l i t t le as 20 feet from a pre-sumed altitude o 100 feet will cause a range error of as much as 50 feet , often thedifference between a ki l l and a miss. At about 2 0 m.p.h. the error in impact willbe about 75 feet. Similarly, from the 50 foot level, an error of only te n feet ina l ~ i t u d e will produce range errors of 35 feet and ~ 5 f e e t , respect ively t at the as-sumed speeds Of.136 and 204 m.p.h. From the accompanying chart the error in impactrelated to ' error in judging altitude may be computed.

The common form of altimeter, which depends ot} air pressure, is a reliable in-strument provided i t is correctly set for th e true barometic pressure, but - asevery' flyer knows - an airplane on patrol frequently passes through areas of varyingpressure and, .unless th is is realized and ,the altimeter readj usted, an incorrectreading will be obtained. This fal l ibi l i ty has caused inaccurate bombing and hasbeen a frequent cause of plane crashes in bad weather.18


21/34

... tt.~ ..~ ~ 5, , N ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ 4SS~ ~ . ~ 3~ ~ 2. ~ i ~ ~ J,

ALTITUDE OFA/QPLANE IN FEETCHART XI

A new radio altimeter has been developed which not only is more accurate butoperates entirely independently of barometric pressures as i t util izes radar principles. These altimeters are of two types: one is known as the AYA and the otheras the AYB or AYD. T h AYA is useful up to an altitude of 20,000 feet, is accurateto within 50 feet at low altitudes and weighs about 951bs. I t is relatively simple to operate, requiring only about two hours of t r a i n i n ~ and may be used on allplanes.

A new and improved model, th e AYB or AYD, is useful up to qao feet, is accurate to within 10 feet and may be used right down to sea or land level. The weightis only 25 lbs; i t is simple to operate and suitable for any plane. An addedfeature of th e AXB or AYD is a control, tied into flight control equipment, to prevent the plane\ going below any specified alt i tude.

It is planned that a l l aircraft engaged in anti-submarine warfare will beequipped with these low alti tude radio altimeters, and i t is expected that they

I

19


22/34

only improve bombing accuracy but w i u i ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ w ~ ~ ) ~ t j ' Y flyingin bad weather.c. TORPEX-FILLED DEPTH BOMBS.

Delivery of Torpex f i l led Mark 17 depth bombs for use against submarines hasbegun although the in i t ia l output is being sent to the areas of greatest U-boat act ivi ty. While production will not be in quantity prior to April 1, 1943, i t is expected that the Torpex depth bomb will soon become the standard attack weapon.

Torpex has long been used by the British and experience has proved i t superiorto T.N.T. I t is slightly heavier but nearly 50% more powerful than r.N.T. Unfortunately an increase in explosive power does not mean a directly proportionate increase in lethal range and, in fact, the whole question of lethal range, irrespect ive of the explosive used, is subject to controversy. Naval authorities estimate,however, that the Torpex-filled Mark 17 depth bomb, which weighs 33 Ibs. more thanthe Mark 17 f i l led with T.N.T., has a lethal range of 24 feet. ' This compares withan estimated 17 to 19 foot lethal range on the Mark 17 f i l led with T.N.T.o. NIGHT ILLUMINATION OF TARGETS.

Night illumination of targets in anti-submarine warfare remains a difficul tproblem. The Navy is experimenting with the development of ,searchlights but, toprovide adequate illumination sufficiently far ahead of the airplane, searchlightshave to be large and involve considerable weight. An additional disadvantage of thesearchlight is that i t spots the airplane and makes i t an excellent target for AAfire from the submarine.

The Army Air Forces has experimented with rocket-mqtor flares, which have beentested .by the Sea Search Group at Langley Field. Ini t ia l tests indicated satisfactory results with star sheli flares igniting 1.1 miles ahead of th e plane andproviding excellent illumination of the target. Deyelopment and procurement dif ....ficult ies have been encountered, but efforts are being made to expedite this projecsince i t appears to be an adequate solution of the night illumination problem.

20


23/34

IV

ARMY AIR FORCES ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES

On October 21, 1942, the f i rs t raid was made on German U-boat bases by United\ 'States Army Air 'Forces planes, when B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-2LJ. Liberators car

ried out a heavy attack on the submarine base at Lorient. The results included twosubmarines believed to be sunk or damaged, the des'truc t ion of mechanics 'work shops,many bomb hits on the U-boat pens, nearby buildings and docks, and between two hurr

, (dred and three hundred people killed. On November 9, United States pilots flew twohundred and fifty miles through the heavy opposition of German fighters and st i ffanti-aircraft barrages to blast the sub.m.arinebase at St. Nazaire. This heavilydefended port at the mouth of the Loire River had been pounded thirty-eight timesbefore by -the Royal Air Force. The American planes reported many hits on "the docks,causing severe damage. Buildings, work shops and railroad depots'were also hit andthe port was reported. to have been put out of action for several days.

Since these f i rs t two 'attacks, nine more a ir raids have been carried out byUnited States forces against German submarine bases on the West Coast of France. Theimportance of these bases in U-boat operations cannot be overemphasized. They act asthe home ports of almost all the submarines operating in the Atlantic and U-boats return to them f ~ supplies, repairs and for the necessary rest of submarine crews.

The impression seems to be widespread that these bases are practically invulnerable. Discouraging stories about tremendous submarine p'ens protected by concreteroofs twelve feet thick have been emphasized. The Germans are naturally anxious tocreate this impression. I t is probably true that the pens themselves are extremelywell protected. However, the base facil i t ies must of necessity be so large and sointricate that they'cannot all be covered by concrete. Every base is surrounded byinnumerable machine shops, warehouses, railroads, living quarters, and other units,a ll directly tied i n ~ t o the U-boat organization and all more or less vulnerable toair 'at tack.

While i t is very difficul t at this t,ime to evaluate the results of the ,raidson the U ~ b o a t bases, the reports of severe damage to enemy installations, numerousbomb bursts on targets and vast fires indicate successes of some importance. Thepossible effect of these raids on the German U-boat offensive cannot be overlookedin any study of enemy submarine activit ies.

The accompanying photographs show two vIews of. the October 21st attack onLorient.

21


24/34

LORIENT. Bombs away, during a dayZight a t t ack , (10/21/42) by for t re s sa i rc ra f t oj llSAAF on the - r J ) a ~ t , r s h e Zter a t Lor ien t .2


25/34

LORIENT. A. Late'r stage dU'r ing the a t t a c k $ho'Ws a s t i c k o f bombs bU'rs t ingac'ross the ent 'rance. channe L to the U-boat s'he l te ' rs , (a'r'ro'W). 23


26/34

vRESCUE AND SAFETY

A. RESCUE AT SEA.!The following account i l lustrates the importance and necessity of knowing a ll

the safety procedures and checking to make certain that all prescribed equipment isaboard the plane before taking off.

On a recent mission a B-25 aircraft from this Command sighted a lifeboat with31 survivors from a vessel which had foundered in heavy seas about 60 miles off theAtlantic Coast. The pilot immediately called the NCS arid.forwarded a form Sail,reporting the location of the sighting. The crew then discovered that there was noemergency kit aboard, although a pre-flight check to determine the status of safetyequipment is prescribed by AAFAC standing orders. This omission was reported to NCand the pilot was instructed to send out homing signals on his regular patrol frequency. The signals were sent out and very shortly thereafter a Naval PBY arrivedon the scene.

The Wing Controller called another B-25 , which was on patrol approximatelytwenty-five miles South of the' estimated 'position of the l ife boat. This secondplane was directed to the scene and the f i rs t plane was t,old to send MO's on thehoming frequency. The radio operator of the f i rs t p ~ a n e was unable to adjust histransmitter to the homing frequency and as a result th e effort to home the secondplane failed. Arriving by dead reckoning at the estimated position withotit seeingt,he l ifeboat or ei ther of the other two planes, the pilot immediately started a squaresearch, ~ n d ' as he was turning on to the third -leg heard MO's, which were being sentout by the PEY. By using his radio compass, he homed on this signal and spottedthe two planes and the lifeboat.

Arriving on the scene, this second B-25 dropped an emergency, kit , flares andan S.O.S. machine. Although a parachute was available in the plane for the purposei t was not used,and the equipment broke up on striking the water.

A Coast Guard plane, which also reached the location, dropped emergency kitsand emergency rations, and then departed to direct a nearby vessel to the scene.The {survivors retrieved and opened'these emergency kits and, by using the flashlight, were picked up that same night by this vessel.

It is interesting to note that th e f i rs t B-25 reported i ts posi tion as39 50 ' N, 71 0 la' W; th e F.C.C. submitted a preliminary fix based on the MO's atq.oo 00' N, 71 0 30 ' Wand a later fix at 39 0 50 ' N, 71 0 50 ' W; the second B-25 re2ij


27/34

ported the position by dead reckoning as 39 0 43 ' N, 71 0 15' W. The proxlmlty of a llthe$e positions attests to the accuracy of the navigation and the value of the F.C.C.fixes.

B. ONE MAN LIFE RAFTS.

A future addition to the safety devices already in use in this Command will beone man l ife rafts which attach to parachutes. I t is intended that these will beworn by crews of planes which have poor water landing characteristics. The accbm-:panying photographs i l lustrate the raft folded in the 'chute harness, and alsoopened with i ts equipment.

I t is reported that squadrons have, on occasion, experienced difficulty in theoperation of check valves incorporated in the CO 2 bottle attached to l i fe rafts,particularly from the formation of ice in the valve. The valve is said to clogwith ice because of insufficient diameter. Fortunately most difficult ies of thistype have been encountered during inspection tests by maintenance personnel.

If the manufacturer's instructions are followed, no difficulty should be- ex-perienced. The cylinders are designed to operate in a horizontal position, with the

New one-man l i f e r a f t s .25


28/34

valve end down. If placed in this posit ion and the valve opened quicklyl i t t le ice should form. However, in actual use, even though the valve end shouldno t be down, the taft would ordinarily be about 90% inflated before complete icingtook place. This wQuldgive sufficient buoyancy to the raft and, as the water warmup the cylinder, complete inflation w ~ u l d occur. Even though the gas should be re-leased slowly, there is l i t t le liklihood of failure of the CO2 to inflate th e raf t .

I t is well to remember that the CO2 valve should be opened quickly and turnedas far as possible. Failure to follow these inst,ructions is quite certain to re-sult in the formation of ice, due to the fact that the slow expansion at the smallvalve opening absorbs the heat available at this point, freezing any CO2 or watervapor which may be present. Squadrons should be able to eliminate trouble due toice formation at the valve by following the instructions summarized above.C. EMERGENCY KITS.

A communication from Wright Field has stated that the new Emergency Kits re-quested by this Command will be delivered to the units between January 10 and February 14. These kits are buoyant cylindrical shaped metal containers. approximately48" by 15", fittedwithfel"t;, padding and a canvas cover. A sofoot length of rope, withbalsa wood blocks, a ll painted yellow, is fastened to the container. The kits willbe carried by a l l Ant isubmarine"Comma'nd ~ q u a d r o n s and will c,on tain th e followingitems:

24 pts. Drinking Water 1 Sponge6 ( ~ pkgs.) K Ration 1 Fishing Ki t 4 Heat Pads 1 Knife (Scout Type)2 First Aid Kits 1 Package of Bait4 (cans) Fluorescein Dye Check 1 Water Storage Bag4 Smoke Candles 2 Blankets \2 Whistles 2 Can Openers2 Bailing Cups 6 Yellow KnIt Helmets1 Mirror (Polished Reflecting) 1 Very Pistol and Six' Cartridges1 Pocket Compass (Waterproof) 1 Large Tube (Grease) Sulphathiazole2 Waterproof Match Cases and 1 Paulin, Blue One Side, ReflectingMatches. Orange-Yellow on the Other Side

26


29/34

VIOPERATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM.

In accordance with, the training directive contained in AAFAC Circular N o 50-1,dated December 7, 1 9 ~ 2 , the 18th A/S Squadron (M) at Langley Field, Va., h a beenrelieved of i ts operational mission and has been designated an operational trainingsquadron (OTS).

The major purpose of the OTS is to furnish trained combat crews to squadron commanders and thus relieve them of th e responsibility of in i t ia l training of combatcrews.' I t is true that squadron commanders will s t i l l have the responsibili ty forthe maintenance of .combat crew proficiency and for accomplishing the training necessitated by new developments in A/Stactics and technique, but they will be free fromthe slow and arduous work of in i t ia l training .

. This is especially important when i t is realized that this CoIfunand is the onlycomponent of the Army Air Forces within the continental limits of the U. S. with amajor operational mission. Experience has demonstrated that training for the main- \tenance of combat crew proficiency' is in i tself a big problem, which becomes evenmore diff icult when i t must be carried out in conjunction with a primary operationalmission.

Standardization of training is an equally important reason for establishing anoperational tra.ining squadron. At the beginning of th e war, squadrons of the IBomber Command were .placed on A/S patrol with l i t t le instruction in the tact ics andtechnique of this sort of mission. Prior to this time, the I Bomber Command hadconcentrated upon training for the normal missions of bombardment aviation.

The use of the airplane in hunting and destroying submarines is s t i l l in anearly stage of development. New methods and new weapons, several of which are described in this Summary, are being developed and tested-constantly. Suggestions forchanges in tact ics and technique are welcomed at Command Headquarters, are studiedwith the aid of statisticians and scientists o the A/S Warfare Unit of the NationalDefense Research Committee and tested through actual use. To make full use of thesenew developments and to insure that al l units are familiar with their use, standardized'training -through OTS is essential .

The enemy has made effective use of submarine forces through shifting themrapidly from one area to another and to meet these tact ics th e Command must t a ~ e full advantage of the mobility inherent to the airplane by shifting squadrons or even individual personnel from time to time to new areas of submarine activity.

27


30/34

.,_ _ .\. . Uo do this efficiently, a ll training should be stJ-ndardized in order that new a:r -r ivals in a theater of. operations can ~ i i n t o ~ e w outfi ts immediately without further"training. The p r e i i m i n a t y t ' ~ a i n i n g ' i n OTS'and the uniformity of AAFAC Standing Operating Prpcedure ~ h o u l d achieve this result ' .

The, f i rs t class. for transition'and:


31/34

. , ~ 'I 'IiVI J

FORCED LAND I NG OFB-31l AT SEAAt 0915 on D ~ c e m b e r 10" 19LJ.2, Firs t Lieutenant J ~ s s i e McFerrin a.nd hI S crew,

in aB-3q.from'the8thAntisubmarine' Squadron,.f lyinga convoy mission, were forced/down a t sea about 3 miles off Key Largo, Florida. ' Lieutenant McFerrin was able toland the.planesnccessfully, t h u ~ s a v i J 1 g h i ~ : ( ) w ~ l i fe and the l ives of two of themembers of the crew. Unfortunately, the Radar operator, Pvt. Clarence'taug,hlin,and Jhe bbmbardier, Pvt'.W1l1iam R . M c c O r m i ~ k , ~ e ~ t down ~ i t h t he$h ip .,_ " .' ~ , , ' . " " . - ' ' .. '}. '-.' "'; ,

At 'the' time of . the , with ceiling 220o.feet a.nd visibi l i ty U ' n l i ~ i t e d ' . Lieutena.ntMcFerrin was circl ing the convoy when.ct possible target was sighted lq . miles away .Making a steep right t ~ l l r n , he leveled o ff and f.leWfor a few ,seconds when sUddenlythe l e f t engine'quit . Almost immediately the 'r ight engine cut out. Ue instantlyput the nose of ~ h plane down, turned the fuel selector valves for' right and l e f trear ~ a i n tanks, \ e ~ g a g e d the auxll i taryfuel 'pumps , and set props forward to lowpitch, m e 8 : n w h i ; L e u s , l n g t R ~ h a n d m i ~ ~ t ' Q w a r n ~ h e i ~ r e w t o p r . ~ J ? a l ! e . f o r a . < : f ~ . h . : l a n d ~ ,ingpn, the. wate.r. D u . r ~ n g these qpera,tiq'Psthe.plane , 1 q s t a ~ p r o x i m ~ t e l Y ,30G,feet.! ' ,. . ". . , . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . .', .... " , , , ' f

UpoIlreCeivln,gtihe'pilot 's warnirtg the'bombardier, tooknp his : ' s tat lon: lntherear 'of }he .spi-p .. "The depth bombs were relea$ed.by ... the . c o : p ' i l p , t . ' r : S e ~ o I L 4 i L i ~ l J t e n : a q t , , ' : '. ; - -, -.' : . , .. . '. .' /' -:-, .. ' .. ' .,; .'.... . :: .' ,J ~ : r d . a n M. ' P e n ~ ( ) y e r , . 'who t-hen closeci 'the homb bay doors and ende.iivored-:. ioa,sslst the

/ ' , ' , . " _, . . . "'" ; : : ~ : _ ~ : ' . e_ " _ pilot, in landJILg.

; . ",". - ",' .,." .: (

,About - 5 0 f e ~ ' t a b o v e t h e watetbothmotors started andCt'.he:


32/34

( t , t ~ \ .l.\ ( 4 ~ : ( : ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ l . ... ,j;' . 'ti" .,;,) . ..., ' 1 ~ \.\Ii'. ~ ; : \ " ' ; ' ~ ~ ~ - ~ ' ~ - ' -the qomb bay doors. The co-pilot opened _ " ~ - : - - a t c h ~ and he and the pi lot f loa

ed out easi ly by using their l i fe vests which they had inflated prior to landing.T h radar operator and bombardier were not seen after the landing and were pro

ably knocked unconscious andburiedunde.r . the.considerableam6unt ofequipmeilf whicshif ted. Only t he sk i J l of the pilot, in affecting a good landing prevented the losof , theen t i recrew.

The cause of the; crash' i s believed'fo have been an a ir lock' in. the fuel l i n e ~ The c ~ b i n tanks have s i n c e , b e ~ n . r e m o ~ e d \ f r o m B - 3 ~ r s ' . a n d two h e a ~ y p l Y w o o ~ b U l k h e a d Shave been instal led fore and aft of the positions formerly occupied by them. The rmov,alof the cabin tanks will elimir iateoneof the chiefcause.s of accidents due toai r locks in the fn,el dine and the new bulkheads' wil l afford> a greater and more sub';s t ~ J l t i a l b r a c i n g area for members .of thecrew wnosecrash posit ion is inthe rear othepJiane .

VI tLTHE.MEANJ"G,{)FTONNAGE

I

In measuring the size o r w e i ~ h t ( ) f s l t i P S , many, d i f f e t e ~ t trres o f " t d ~ n a g : " arquoted' whichoft'en.cahse c o n f u ' s i o ~ p a r t ' i c u r ~ r l y in studying ship losses and cohstrtit ion.


33/34

' '. -_ i. . N ._ .

~ ~ ""':

25TH 'WING O P ~ R A T I O N S BOMBARDMENT RECON

3 ARON 112:204 ARON 162:235 ARON 251:356 ARON 165: 10

11 ARON 238:4012 ARO,N 244:28

II 3 ARON 127:2014 ARON 1Q7:1216 ARON 16: 1,1I.19 ARON . . . .- 124: 0646'BS 439: 49TOTAL BOMBARDMENT 1969:14

CIVIL AIR PATROL,COASTAL PATROL: RECON

1 ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. 13:65 2 R ~ H O B O T H , D E L A W A R E ~ 382:50 4, PARKSLEY, -'VIRGINIA. '292: 35* 6 ST.SIMqN'S ISLE,.GA. 296:19 8 ST. J AMES IS LE , S. C 322:43.16 MANTEO, N. C 477:40, ,.17 SUFFOLK" L. I . .. 303 :20.18 FALMOUTH, MASS. 191:44.19, PORTLAND, MAINE. 520:00.20 BAR HARBOR, MAINE 261: 10*21 BEAUFORT, N. C 376: 00TOTAL CAP, CPo 3438:16TOTAL 25TH WING 5 4 0 ~ : 3 0

18TH ARO N AAFAC OPEUTIONS TRAINING

TABLE - DECEMBER, J 9 ~ 2 ESCORT .SPECIAL158:23 39:42153:46 94:80

5:45 62:407:.01 72:03 '

28:1532:07

42:22 130:33< 12:4;.1 . 20:35

440:20 420:03

ESCORT SPECIAL837:50179:10

43:0590: 0,9

170:45

217: 40 .167:10

48:1079: 10

1833:092273:29 420:03

~ N I T ...

TRAINING182:50

26:,0.5. -109:45

10.8::30148:00

29:5068':45

160:00.(56:.2529:05

96:651016:10

TRAINING

1016: 10

TOTAL493:15426:44429: 45342:4.4414:00306:25,196:05267:12

72:36326:06. 570,:003845:67

. TOTAL851:45662 :00335:40386:28493:28477:40303;20409:.24687:10309: 20465:10

5271:259117:22

260:30

31


34/34

26TH WING OPERATIOMS TABLE .:; DECEMBER, 19q2BOMBARDMENT RECON

. 7 ARON 200:438 'ARON . ... . 382:00

10 ARON '. '.' . 284:,2515 ARON 1 0 7 : 0 9 ~

I17 ARON 286:0576BS , 287:30

',TOTAL B O M B A ~ D M E N T 1547:52

OBSERVATION RECON124, aBSN. .' I 178:06128 OBSN. 244:60'~ O T A L OBSERVATION " .422: 55TOTAL BOMBARDMENTAND' ,OBSERVATION '1970:47

CIVIL A+R PATROL,COASTAL PATROL RliiCO.N* '3 LANTANA, FLA. 1089:55* 5.DAYTONA, FLA. . . . . . 1010:20* 7 ~ I A M I , FLA 637:00* 9 G R A ~ D 1SLE, LA. 202:20*10 BEA.UMONT, TEXAS 614:10*11 PASCAGOULA, MISS. 434:50

.*12 BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS. 598:25_13 TAMPA, FLA.. 791:40*1 4 .PANAMA CITY, FLA 487:55*15 CORPUS CHR;I:STI, TEXAS 457:25TOTAL CAP, CP 6324:00

,TOTAL 26TH WING 8294:47,

ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL16:28

20:404:35

104: 50 '

23:54

12:49

92:5581:25

215:4538:1049:1595:45

334:0463:2520:5162:4335:2

' 488:0146:33 36:43 573:15 2304:'2

ESCORT' SPECIAL TRAINI}qG ' ,TOTAL4:15

11:50380:45

.4:00563:0260:4

16:05 384:46 823:4

162:38 36:43 958:00 3128:0

ESCORT SPECIAL .TRAINING .TOTAL227:05236:05653:43308:45507:35369:15201:50.286:00385:40.621:20

1317:01.1246:2

I1290:4511:0

1121;48 0 ~ : 0800:1

1077:4873 :,3

1078:43797:15 10121:13959:53 36:43 '958: 00 13248:4

Documents

U-Boat Monthly Report - Dec 1942