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ISLAMSKO NASUPROT KONVENCIONALNOM

BANKARSTVU: UPOREDNA ANALIZA

ARANŽMANA FINANSIRANJA

Rezime

U radu istražujemo koncept islamskog bankarstva kroz poređenje osnovnih odlika ključnih finansijskih aranžmana karakterističnih za konvencionalno i islamsko bankarstvo. U svom paradigmatskom konceptu islamsko bankarstvo isključuje aranžmane zasnovane na fiksno definisanom prinosu finansijera i prednost daje vlasničkim modalitetima finansiranja, zasnovanim na partnerskom odnosu između finansijera i preduzetnika. Međutim, predloženi koncepti se u praktičnoj primeni sreću sa ozbiljnim teškoćama (previsoki troškovi agenture), trpe značajne modifikacije, zbog čega se u važnim aspektima udaljavaju od teorijskog ideala i u svojim ekstremima islamsku bankarsku praksu približavaju konvencionalnom bankarstvu.

Ključne reči: Islamsko bankarstvo, teorija ugovora, kreditni ugovor, troškovi agenture, finansijska struktura

JEL: G21, G24, K2

UDK 336.71:28

Rad primljen: 19.04.2013.

Odobren za štampu: 27.05.2013.

dr Srđan MarinkovićUniverzitet u Nišu, Ekonomski fakultet

srdjan.marinkovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

Rad je deo istraživačkog projekta pod šifrom 179015 (Izazovi i perspektive strukturnih promena u Srbiji: Strateški pravci ekonomskog razvoja i usklađivanje sa zahtevima EU), finansiranog od strane Ministarstva prosvete i nauke Republike Srbije.

originalni naučni

rad

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ISLAMIC VERSUS CONVENTIONAL

BANKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL

ARRANGEMENTS

Summary

The paper explores the concept of Islamic banking by making comparison between the basic features of some key conventional and Islamic financial arrangements. Paradigm version of Islamic banking forbids arrangements based on a predetermined rate of return on financial investments, instead it proposes equity based modes of finance which promote partnership between financier and an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the theoretically suggested concepts in current practice are faced with serious difficulties (prohibitively high agency costs), and are being consequently modified. Islamic banking diverges in several important ways from the ideal version, and at the end of the spectrum closely coincides with conventional banking.

Key words: Islamic banking, Contractual theory, loan agreement, agency costs, financial structure

JEL: G21, G24, K2

UDC 336.71:28

Paper received: 19.04.2013

Approved for publishing: 27.05.2013

dr Srđan MarinkovićUniversity of Niš, Faculty of Economicssrdjan.marinkovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

This work is a part of the research project coded 179015 (Challenges and perspectives of the structural changes in Serbia: Strategic directions of economic development and harmonisation with the EU requirements), financed by the Ministry of Education and Sciences of the Republic of Serbia.

original scientific paper

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Uvod

Islamsko bankarstvo predstavlja relativno novu pojavu na svetskoj finansijskoj sceni. Prvi pokušaji da se formira finansijska organizacija koja će svoje poslovanje voditi potpuno u skladu sa principima Islama datiraju kada je u Egiptu 1972. godine, formirana Nasser Social Bank, mada je ova banka ostala privržena socijalnim ciljevima, i do danas nije prerasla u pravu komercijalnu organizaciju. Nekoliko godina kasnije, u cilju koordinacije i podsticaja razvoja ovog koncepta, formirana je i multilateralna organizacija, Islamska banka za razvoj (Islamic Development Bank). Po raspoloživim podacima (Khan and Bhatti, 2008), trenutno oko 300 banaka svoje poslovanje vodi u skladu sa islamskim principima. Islamske banke su prisutne u 75 država sveta, uključujući SAD i Evropu. Uprkos dinamičnom razvoju u poslednjim decenijama ovaj sistem i dalje ima vrlo skromne kapacitete u poređenju sa konvencionalnim bankarstvom. Ukupna aktiva islamskih banaka procenjuje se na svega pet stotina milijardi američkih dolara. Islamsko bankarstvo je uspelo da stekne dominaciju u odnosu na konvencionalno bankarstvo jedino u državama koje su zabranom finansijskih aranžmana u sukobu sa Šerijatskim pravom svoj finansijski sistem u potpunosti islamizovale (Pakistan, Iran i Sudan). U ostalim državama u kojima je Islam zvanična religija islamske banke posluju u konkurenciji sa konvencionalnim bankama.

Koncept islamskog bankarstva zasnovan je na nekoliko principa, čije je izvorište Šerijatsko pravo. Ključni princip islamskog bankarstva je zabrana kamate („riba“) kao prinosa čija je visina unapred utvrđena. To ne znači da finansijer nema prava na prinos od uloženih sredstava, već da se visina prinosa mora dovesti u vezu sa ekonomskim rezultatom finansiranog projekta. Islam takođe zabranjuje poslovne aktivnosti u kojima su akteri preterano izloženi neizvesnosti („gharar“), ili špekulišu („maysir“) (Siddiqui, 2008, p. 681).

Zagovornici ovakvog sistema njegove ključne prednosti vide u podeli rizika između finansijera i preduzetnika, većoj posvećenosti finansijera uspehu projekta, i po tom osnovu većoj alokativnoj efikasnosti. Pretpostavljene prednosti ovog koncepta takođe bi podsticajno

delovale na štednju, investicije i potpunije ostvarenje ideala društvene pravde.

U radu ćemo istražiti da li prethodna konstatacija ostaje isključivo aksiomatska tvrdnja, odnosno u kojoj meri su očekivanja zagovornika ovog koncepta u konfliktu sa finansijskom teorijom, ali i u sudaru sa ekonomskom realnošću. Rad ima sledeću strukturu. Nakon uvoda, najpre dajemo osnovnu tipologiju ključnih islamskih finansijskih aranžmana, da bi nakon toga pristupili analizi pravnih i ekonomskih obeležja kako islamskih tako i konvencionalnih finansijskih aranžmana. U četvrtom odeljku bliže ćemo analizirati izazove sa kojima se paradigmatski koncept islamskog bankarstva sreće u praksi. Rad završavamo zaključkom.

Finansijski aranžmani u islamskom bankarstvu

Teoretičari islamskog bankarstva (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Siddiqui, 2008) u velikoj meri su saglasni da se šarolika ponuda islamskih banaka može bez preteranog pojednostavljenja redukovati na pet osnovnih oblika. Ne bi trebalo previše da iznenadi što sve ove oblike možemo u obično nešto izmenjenoj formi naći i u ponudi koja karakteriše konvencionalno bankarstvo. Zbog toga ćemo kod navođenja, pored engleskog transkripta originalnih naziva, koristiti i nazive za konvencionalne aranžmane koji su najbliži konkretnim islamskim aranžmanima.

U islamskom bankarstvu srećemo finansijske aranžmane čija je namena različita. Jedan broj aranžmana namenjen je potrošačkom finansiranju, većina finansiranju trgovine, dok su specijalni aranžmani posvećeni investicionom finansiranju. Kod aranžmana koji podrazumevaju ugovoren povraćaj sredstava, pa su po tome veoma slični klasičnom kreditnom finansiranju, po pravilu se u zajam ne daje novac već materijalno dobro. Pravna osnova ovakvih aranžmana je ugovor o prodaji na odloženo plaćanje ili ugovor o iznajmljivanju.

Troškovi plus profit (Murabaha) predstavlja kupovinu od finansijera na odloženo plaćanje. Za račun korisnika, banka nabavlja dobro i predaje mu ga na upotrebu obavezujući ga da nabavnu cenu uvećanu za „naknadu“ isplaćuje

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Introduction

Islamic banking is a relatively new phenomenon on the world financial scene. The earliest attempts to form a financial organisation which shall conduct its business totally concordant with the principles of Islam are dating back to 1972, when the Nasser Social Bank was established in Egypt, although this bank remained devoted to the social objectives, and to this day had not grown into a proper commercial organisation. Several years later, for purpose of coordination and instigation of the development of this concept, a multilateral organisation was formed as well, the Islamic Development Bank. According to the available data (Khan and Bhatti, 2008), at present there are some 300 banks operating in accordance with the Islamic principles. Islamic banks are present in 75 countries of the world, including the USA and Europe. In spite of the dynamic development, over the last decades, this system still remains rather modest in its capacities in comparison with conventional banking. The total assets of the Islamic banks are estimated at only five hundred billion US dollars. Islamic banking succeeded in gaining predominance over conventional banking only in countries where the prohibition of financial arrangements, opposed to the Shariah jurisprudence, have in totality and in full adjusted their financial system to the Islamic laws (Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan). In the other countries where Islam is the official religion, Islamic banks are operating in competition with the conventional banks.

The concept of Islamic banking is based on several principles finding their source in the Shariah law. The key principle of Islamic banking is the prohibition of interest to be charged (‘riba’) as the fixed or floating payment on investment. This does not mean that the financier is not allowed to collect return on funds invested, but that the amount of return must be linked with the economic result of the given financial project. Islam also prohibits business activities where the parties involved are over exposed to uncertain outcome (‘gharar’), or are speculating (‘maysir’) (Siddiqui, 2008, p. 681).

The supporters of such a system recognise its key advantages in the sharing of risk between the financier and the entrepreneur, in a high

connectivity between the financier and the success of the given project, and on that basis on higher allocation efficiency. The assumed advantages of this concept would also have a boosting effect on savings, investments and a more comprehensive achievement of the social justice ideal.

In this paper we shall investigate whether the previous assumptions have remained solely within the axiomatic realm i.e. to what extent expectations of the supporters of this concept are conflicting with the financial theory but also clashing with the economic reality. The paper has the following structure. After the introduction what follows is a basis offered of the typology of the key Islamic financial arrangements, to be followed by the analyses of legal and economic characteristics of both the Islamic and the conventional financial arrangements. In the fourth part we shall analyze in more detail the challenges facing paradigmatic concept of Islamic banking in practice. The paper ends with conclusion.

Financial arrangements in islamic banking

Theoreticians of Islamic banking (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Siddiqui, 2008) to a great extent agree that the diversified offer of Islamic banks can be, without any excessive simplification, reduced to five of its basic forms. It should not come as any great surprise that all of these forms are to be encountered, albeit in a slightly changed form, also in the offers which are characteristic for the conventional banking. Hence for purpose of presenting them, in addition to the English transcript of the original names, we shall also use the names of the conventional arrangements which are the closest to the particular Islamic arrangements.

In the Islamic banking we encounter financial arrangements with different purposes. A certain number of arrangements are used for consumer financing, mostly for trade financing, while some other special arrangements are rather devoted to the investment financing. In case of arrangements specific for the contracted repayment of funds borrowed, hence very similar to the classic credit financing, the rule is that money is not given as a lending fund but rather in the form of material goods. Legal basis

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u više otplatnih rata. Visina „naknade“ (engl. mark-up) određuje se na osnovu poznatih referentnih kamatnih stopa (LIBOR, prinos na američke državne zapise i slično), ali i na osnovu kreditnog rejtinga klijenta, obima transakcije i tipa dobra (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). U nekim islamskim državama (npr. u Turskoj) formalni prenos vlasništva nad dobrom obavlja se tek nakon potpune otplate, što aranžman približava kolateralizovanom zajmu, umanjuje rizik i neizvesnost finansijera, pa ga samim tim i udaljava od ideala. Interesantno da je ovaj aranžman najšire korišćen u praksi islamskih banaka, a istovremeno najudaljeniji od temeljnih principa Islama.

Aranžmani iznajmljivanja (Ijara, Ijara wa-Iqtina) su koncepti koji odgovaraju aranžmanima poslovnog i finansijskog lizinga u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima. U prvom modalitetu, davalac lizinga zadržava vlasništvo nad predmetom lizinga i zadužen je za njegovo osiguranje i održavanje. U drugom slučaju, koji je sličan finansijskom lizingu, korisnik lizinga preuzima obavezu da po isteku lizinga otkupi predmet lizinga od davaoca. Ovi aranžmani u osnovi sadrže fiksnu naknadu finansijeru, zbog čega se i u među islamskim teoretičarima spori njihova utemeljenost na Šerijatskom pravu.

Ugovor o koncesiji (Istinsa) je model koji je prilagođen dugoročnom finansiranju nabavke kapitalnih dobara (npr. proizvodnog kapaciteta). Kod ovog aranžmana, koji u praktičnoj primeni može biti jako sličan lizingu, finansijer kupuje dobro i predaje ga na upotrebu preduzetniku, koji se obavezuje da plaća naknadu sličnu kao kod lizinga, ili ustupa vlasništvo nad dobrom preduzetniku obavezujući ga da nabavku otplati u ratama, po principu sličnom aranžmanima troškovi plus profit. Razlika između ovog i prethodnih aranžmana je pre svega u tome što ovde naknada finansijeru može uključivati brojne elemente, i biti određena kompleksnijim formulama.

Svi pomenuti aranžmani imaju kao zajedničko obeležje nastanak finansijske obaveze. Aranžmani koji su najviše u duhu proklamovanih islamskih principa finansiranja su aranžmani koji podrazumevaju partnerski odnos između aktera koji obezbeđuje finansijska sredstva i nosioca preduzetničke

aktivnosti. Ovu grupu, koju teoretičari islamskog bankarstva nazivaju aranžmanima podele profita i gubitka (engl. Profit and Loss Sharing arangements, PLS) čine dva aranžmana: mudarabah i musharakah.

Agentski aranžman (Mudarabah). Najbliži temeljnim islamskim principima je aranžman podele profita i gubitka poznat kao mudarabah (Hassan, 1999, p. 63). Ovaj aranžman odgovara konvencionalnom konceptu društva sa ograničenom odgovornošću u kome jedna strana obezbeđuje sav potreban kapital, dok je druga strana zadužena za upravljanje poslovnim poduhvatom. Ovaj aranžman banke jednako primenjuju kod pribavljanja i plasiranja sredstava. Banka pribavlja sredstva od deponenta na bazi nenamenske mudarabe (engl. unrestricted Mudarabah), što znači da je banka slobodna da po svojoj proceni izvrši ulaganje sredstava položenih u depozit. Deponentu se ne garantuje povraćaj sume niti bilo kakav prinos na ulaganja. Prinos koji pripada deponentu će zavisiti od profita koji banka ostvari u datoj godini, a koji će se deliti po utvrđenom ključu između deponenta i banke. Kod plasmana sredstava banka primenjuje namensku mudarabu (engl. restricted Mudarabah), odnosno sredstva plasira u konkretan preduzetnički projekat, pa će se prinos od tog projekta deliti takođe po utvrđenom ključu između banke i preduzetnika.

Ukoliko je iznos sredstava pribavljen na ovaj način jednak iznosu plasiranom na isti način, neto pozicija banke će biti isključivo posrednička. Banku možemo posmatrati kao investicionog agenta deponenata čija je osnovna svrha postojanja da generiše vrednost za direktne investitore kroz specijalizaciju u oblasti investicione analize (Diamond, 1984). U ovoj svojoj ulozi banka takođe opravdava svoje postojanje, jer omogućuje direktnim investitorima da transformišu rizični u nerizični finansijski tok diversifikacijom ulaganja (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).

Banka koja plasira sredstava na bazi mudarabah principa takođe ulazi u agentski aranžman u kome klasičan odnos finansijera i preduzetnika evoluira u odnos investitora i agenta, jer aktera koji upravlja projektom a ne ulaže sopstvena sredstva ne možemo smatrati preduzetnikom u pravom smislu reči, već

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for such arrangements is the sales agreement on deferred payment, or a leasing contract.

Costs Plus Profit (Murabahah) is a purchase from the financer on deferred payment. For the account of the beneficiary, the bank is procuring goods and handing it over to the beneficiary for his use imposing that he will be repaying it at the purchase price plus the “mark-up” price in several repayment instalments. The amount of this fee, or rather the English term a ‘mark-up’ price, is determined on the basis of the recognized reference interest rates (LIBOR, the return on the US treasury bills, and similar), but also on the basis of the credit rating of the client, the volume of transaction and the type of goods (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). In some Islamic countries (for example, in Turkey) the formal transfer of ownership over the asset is being done only after repayment in full is completed, which makes this type of arrangement rather similar to the collateralised loan, lowering the risk and uncertainty for the financier, hence removing it even further from the original ideal. It is interesting to note that this arrangement is most broadly applied in the practice of Islamic banks, yet being the most distant from the fundamental principles of Islam.

Renting Arrangements (ljara, ljara wa-Iqtina) are the concepts corresponding to the business and financial leasing in the conventional financial systems. In the former modality, the person granting the leasing of goods retains ownership over the object of leasing and remains in charge of its insurance and maintenance. In the latter case, which is similar to the financial leasing, the leasing beneficiary takes over the liability to purchase the subject of leasing once the leasing term expires, from the person granting the leasing option. Such arrangements basically contain the fixed fee for the financier, resulting that even amongst the circles of Islamic theoreticians their foundation on the Sharia law is contested.

Concession Agreement (Istinsa) is the model adjusted to long-term financing for purchase of capital goods (for example, those of production character). In case of such an arrangement, which in its practical implementation may be very similar to the leasing contract, the financier is buying the goods and is handing it over for use to the entrepreneur, who undertakes to

pay a fee similar as in the case of leasing, or cedes the ownership of the relevant goods to the entrepreneur making him liable to repay it in instalments, along the principle similar to that in the arrangements costs plus profit. The difference between this one and the previous arrangements is primarily in the fact that the fee in this case due to the financier may comprise numerous elements, and may be determined through more complex formulae.

All of the above stated arrangements have one thing in common, and that is the creation of a financial liability. The arrangements that are mostly in the spirit of proclaimed Islamic financing principles are those which involve partnership relations between the party supplying financial resources and the party engaged in entrepreneurship. This group, which is named by the theoreticians of Islamic banking as the Profit and Loss Sharing arrangements – PLS, is composed of two arrangements: mudarabah and musharakah.

Agency Arrangement (Mudarabah) is the closest to the fundamental Islamic principles as this arrangement implies sharing of both profit and loss, also known in the Islamic world as the mudarabah (Hassan, 1999, p. 63). This arrangement corresponds to the conventional concept of a joint venture with limited liability where one party supplies all of the necessary capital, while the other party remains in charge of managing the business venture. This arrangement is applied by banks equally on supply and placement of funds. The bank procures funds from the depositors on the basis of an unrestricted Mudarabah, which means that the bank is free, according to its own assessment, to decide on investment of funds deposited. Depositors are not guaranteed return of the sum deposited and neither any return on investment. Return on funds deposited will depend on the profit that the bank will make in the given year, and which is to be divided according to a determined key between the depositor and the bank. In placement of funds the bank is applying the restricted Mudarabah, i.e. it is investing funds in concrete entrepreneurial ventures, where the return from such a venture will be allocated according to the key agreed upon between the bank and the entrepreneur.

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agentom. Agentu pripada deo ostvarenog poslovnog rezultata (profita ili bruto prihoda)1 koji se utvrđuje u pregovorima sa investitorom kod zaključenja ugovora, i ne može se menjati sve do okončanja projekta. U slučaju neuspeha posla čitav finansijski gubitak snosi finansijer, osim ukoliko je agent („mudarib“) neadekvano koristio sredstva, kada će biti u obavezi da finansijeru nadoknadi štetu, i to obično iz kolaterala koji je prethodno ugovoren u korist finansijera. Ovaj element suštinski modifikuje aranžman. Najpre, samo ugovaranje kolaterala zahteva od agenta da raspolaže izvesnim sredstvima, posveti ih projektu, ali ne i angažuje kako bi ostvario prava na prinos srazmeran ulaganjima. Sa druge strane, takav kolateral ne pojednostavljuje odnos između ugovornih strana, jer se može aktivirati tek nakon kompleksnog postupka dokazivanja postojanja eventualne „zle namere i grube nepažnje“.

Zajedničko ulaganje (Musharakah) se razlikuje od prethodnog oblika po tome što kapital potreban za pokretanje projekta obezbeđuju obe strane u aranžmanu. Na taj način se preduzetnik pojavljuje i u ulozi sufinansijera projekta. Priroda aranžmana ne isključuje da se u konkretnom slučaju pojave i više od dva finansijera.

Prinos od projekta se deli po ključu koji je unapred dogovoren između učesnika, a koji se može razlikovati od ključa koji se primenjuje u slučaju srazmernog snošenja gubitka. U prvom slučaju ostvareni profit će se deliti prema strukturi finansiranja koja se dalje koriguje izdvajanjem izvesnog dela naknade preduzetniku za upravljanje projektom. Kod alokacije gubitaka uvek se primenjuje ključ određen prema srazmeri u finansiranju projekta. Ova obeležja aranžman kategorišu u modele vlasničkog finansiranja.

Dobročini zajam (Qard Hassan). U islamskom bankarstvu poznati su i aranžmani pozajmljivanja bez ugovorene naknade. U praksi ovakvi aranžmani nisu česti i svakako ne predstavljaju značajan deo aktivnosti banaka. Takođe, izvesna naknada troškova administriranja je praksa, ali ona ne bi trebalo da zavisi od visine ili roka dospeća zajma. U

proseku, banka će na ovakvim aranžmanima generisati gubitke. Ovakvi aranžmani rezervisani su za socijalno ugroženu populaciju.

Analiza finansijskih aranžmana

Pravna priroda kreditnog ugovoraU pogledu pravnih obeležja, bogata praksa

finansijskih ugovora ne omogućuje tako nedvosmislenu kategorizaciju ugovora o dugu i ugovora o vlasničkom ulaganju. Ako se kao ključna odrednica ugovora o dugu postavi obaveza dužnika da predata sredstva vrati, onda je takav aranžman veoma sličan povlašćenim akcijama sa ograničenim rokom trajanja. Iako retko korišćen, ovakav finansijski instrument je prisutan u savremenim poslovnim finansijama i tretiran kao oblik vlasničkog ulaganja.

Kako ograničen rok dospeća srećemo kod vlasničkih oblika ulaganja, tako isto srećemo i dužnička ulaganja na neograničen rok. U ekonomskoj istoriji poznati su brojni primeri duga sa neograničenim trajanjem. Prve hartije od vrednosti (ital. prestiti) predstavljale su dug grada-države Venecije na koji se obavezala da plaća kamatu godišnje u iznosu od pet procenata, sve do konačnog otkupa duga. Istoričari beleže da izdavalac nije propustio da isplati kamatu vlasnicima u čitavom periodu od 1262. do 1379. godine (Michie, 2008, p. 17). I novija ekonomska istorija beleži primere takozvanih perpetualnih obveznica, koje se još nazivaju rente ili konzole.

Ugovaranje prinosa kao jedna od mogućih odrednica takođe ne pruža uslove za jasnu kategorizaciju. Interesantan je primer Đenovljanskih hartija od vrednosti (ital. luoghi), koje je ovaj grad počeo izdavati u 16. veku. Ove hartije od vrednosti nisu imale fiksan dohodak. Dohodak je zavisio od naplate specifičnih poreskih prihoda, založenih za isplatu ovih hartija. I u savremenim finansijskim sistemima funkcionišu vlasničke hartije od vrednosti sa unapred definisanim prinosom. Na primer, povlašćene akcije redovno imaju prinos koji je određen ugovorom o emisiji. Prinos na ovakve hartije od vrednosti je u slučaju kumulativnih povlašćenih akcija i definisan u velikoj meri

1 Na primer, u Indoneziji su bruto poslovni prihodi osnova za primenu ključa, pri čemu je ugovaranje kolaterala redovna praksa (Timberg, 2003).

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If the amount of funds mobilised in such a way is equal to the amount of funds invested in the venture, net position of the bank will be exclusively the intermediary one. The role of the bank may be deemed in this case to be that of an investment agent on behalf of the depositor, having the main purpose of such an intervention to generate the value for direct investors through specialisation in the field of investment analysis (Diamond, 1984). In this role, the bank is also justifying its very existence as it allows for direct investors to transform their risk into risk-free cash flow through diversified investment (Diamonds and Dybvig, 1983).

The bank, which is placing funds based on the Mudarabah principle, is also venturing into an agency arrangement in which the classic relationship between the financier and the entrepreneur is evolving into a relationship between an investor and the agent, because we can not deem the party managing the venture while not investing its own funds to be an entrepreneur in the true sense of the word, but may deem it to be solely an agent. The agent is entitled to one part of the achieved business result (profit or gross earnings)1 which is determined in negotiations with the investor when contracting the agreement, and may not be changed until the completion of the venture. In case of failure of the business venture, the entire financial loss is borne by the financier, except in case when the agent (‘Mudarib’) had inadequately used the funds, when he will be held liable to compensate the financier for the loss, and this usually from the collateral which was previously contracted in favour of the financer. Primarily, contracting of collateral requires the agent to dispose with certain funds, to allocate them to the venture, but not engage them in order to gain the right to the return proportionate to his investment. On the other hand, such a collateral does not simplify the relationship between the contracting parties as it can be activated only after a rather complex procedure of proving in evidence the presence of an eventual “malicious intent and gross negligence”.

Joint Venture (Musharakah) is different from the previous one by having the required capital

for setting the business venture in motion supplied by both of the contracting parties. In this manner the entrepreneur appears also in the role of a co-financier of the venture. The nature of this arrangement does not exclude in any concrete case for more than two financiers to appear.

Returns on the venture are allocated according to the key agreed in advance by the contracting parties, which may differ from the keys applied in the case of a proportionate covering of the losses. In the former case, profits gained are allocated according to the financing structure which is additionally corrected by the allocation of a certain part of compensation for the entrepreneur managing the venture. In case of allocation of losses what is always applied is the key proportionate to the venture financing. These features of the arrangement are categorised into the models of equity financing.

Good Loan (Qard Hassan). In the Islamic banking there are also arrangements in lending funds without any contracted fees. In practice such arrangements are not very frequent and certainly are not any significant part of banking activities. In addition, certain compensation to cover the fees of administration had become a practice, but it should not depend on the amount of or the maturity due for repayment of the loan. On an average, the bank in such arrangements will suffer losses. These arrangements are also reserved for the socially endangered population strata.

Finanical arrangement analysis

Legal nature of loan agreementRegarding the legal terms of financial

agreements, an abundant practice does not allow for any unambiguous categorisation of either debt contracts or equity investment agreements. If the crucial determinant for the debt contract is to be set as a liability of the obligor to repay the borrowed funds, then such an arrangement is very similar to the participating preference shares with limited duration. Although very seldom to be used, such a financial instrument is present in the

1 For example, in Indonesia, gross business earnings serve as basis for the implementation of the keys, where the contracting of collateral is a regular practice (Timberg, 2003).

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nezavisno od rezultata, jer će akcionar pravo na prinos zadržati (i preneti na naredne godine) i u slučaju da društvo u datoj godini ne ostvari dobit. Bogata praksa savremenih finansijskih tržišta poznaje i instrumente duga čiji prinos zavisi od ostvarenog poslovnog rezultata dužnika (tzv. dohodovne obveznice).

Izgleda da pregledom prakse nismo uspeli da potvrdimo da su dospeće i način utvrđivanja prinosa ona obeležja koja izdvajaju kreditne (dužničke) od vlasničkih oblika finansiranja. Šta je onda to što definiše kreditni ugovor?

Pravni institut „ugovora o kreditu“ u našem pravu određen je odredbama Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, ali dalje preciziran Zakonom o zaštiti korisnika finansijskih usluga. Po Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima (Čl. 1065): „Ugovorom o kreditu banka se obavezuje da korisniku kredita stavi na raspolaganje određeni iznos novčanih sredstava, na određeno ili neodređeno vreme, za neku namenu ili bez utvrđene namene, a korisnik se obavezuje da banci plati ugovorenu kamatu i dobijeni iznos novca vrati u vreme i na način kako je utvrđeno ugovorom“.

Ugovor o kreditu se razvio iz ugovora o zajmu, ali se danas u komparativnom pravu smatra posebnim tipom ugovora. Ugovor o kreditu ima nekoliko obeležja koja ga čine različitim od ugovora o zajmu. Najpre, kod ugovora o zajmu, zajmodavac može biti bilo koje lice, dok je kod ugovora o kreditu zajmodavac uvek organizacija sa kreditnom licencom. Dalje, kredit se uvek daje u novcu, što je jasno iz prethodne definicije. Zajam može ali ne mora biti dat u novcu, već može biti izražen i u drugim vrednostima. Konačno, ugovor o kreditu je uvek teretni pravni posao, dok zajam može biti i dobročin (Bejatović, 2008, p. 86). Po našim propisima, slično komparativnom pravu, kreditni ugovor proizvodi pravno dejstvo samo ukoliko postoji u pisanom obliku, te stoga predstavlja formalni pravni posao, pa se i po tome razlikuje od ugovora o zajmu.

Zakon o zaštiti korisnika finansijskih usluga definiše kao obavezni element ugovora o kreditu (Čl. 19, tačka 6) „visinu nominalne kamatne stope uz određenje da li je fiksna ili promenljiva, a, ako je promenljiva - elemente na osnovu kojih se određuje“. Pri čemu, Zakon

o obligacionim odnosima, u članu 47. reguliše da je ugovor ništav „kada je predmet obaveze nemoguć, nedopušten, neodređen ili neodrediv [dodat italik], i dalje (Član 50) definiše da je „predmet obaveze odrediv ako ugovor sadrži podatke pomoću kojih se može odrediti ili su strane ostavile trećem licu da ga odredi“.

Iz navedenih izvoda iz teksta relevantnih zakona zaključujemo da su dva bitna elementa koja određuju ekonomsku poziciju ugovornih strana kod ugovora o kreditu „obaveza korisnika da banci plati ugovorenu kamatu i dobijeni iznos novca vrati“, kao i da visina kamate, pa samim tim i ukupne obaveze, mora biti određena ili odrediva. Po našim zakonima, prinos kreditora ne može da zavisi od stanja u kome se nalazi dužnik, ali to ne znači da teret ugovorene obaveze ne može biti i umanjen ukoliko se o tome saglase ugovorne strane. Naime, Zakonom o zaštiti korisnika finansijskih usluga, u odeljku o docnji (Čl. 32, stav 2) predviđeno je da „ukoliko u toku trajanja ugovornog odnosa nastupe okolnosti koje korisnika dovode u teško imovinsko stanje, odnosno druge bitne okolnosti na koje korisnik ne može uticati - banka, ... [može] na zahtev korisnika, proglasiti zastoj u otplati (moratorijum) za određeni period, u kome banka... ne obračunava zateznu kamata na dospelo a neizmireno potraživanje“. Takođe, ovaj Zakon postavljen je na načelima (Čl. 5): 1) prava na ravnopravan odnos sa davaocem finansijske usluge, 2) prava na zaštitu od diskriminacije, 3) prava na informisanje, 4) prava na određenost ili odredivost ugovorne obaveze i 5) prava na zaštitu prava i interesa.

Dakle, u savremenim zakonodavstvima, kreditni ugovor je regulisan sa intencijom da obezbedi pravnu i ekonomsku ravnopravnost ugovornih strana, efikasnu primenu ugovora kroz čvrste i jasne ugovorne obaveze obe strane, koje se dalje saglasnošću njihovih volja mogu prilagođavati izmenjenim okolnostima kako bi se postigao sklad interesa ugovornih strana. Kao osnovna pravna odlika kreditnog ugovora nameće se postojanje finansijske obaveze, koja mora biti unapred određena ili odrediva na bazi elemenata na koje ne može uticati jednostrana volja nijedne od ugovornih strana.

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contemporary business finances and is treated as a form of equity investment. As the limited maturity is encountered in equity forms of investment, so is also encountered the debt investment with unlimited duration. In the economic history there are many examples of debt with unlimited duration. The earliest securities (Italian prestiti) were the debt certificates or bonds of the city-state of Venice that were yielding a return of an annual interest rate of five percent, throughout the duration and until the final repurchase of debt. Historians are recording that the issuer did not fail to pay interest due dividend to the holders of these certificates throughout the entire period from 1262 and up to 1379 (Michie, 2008, p. 17). Even the more recent economic history records cases of the so-called perpetual bonds, also known as rents or consoles.

Contracting of return, as one of the possible determinants, also fails to offer sufficient grounds for a clear categorisation. There is an interesting example of the Genoa securities (Italian luoghi) which were issued by this city during the 16th century. These securities did not yield any fixed return. Return depended on the collection of specific tax revenues, pledged in favour of payment on these securities. In the modern-day financial systems fixed-yield securities are also functioning. For example, preference shares are having a regular fixed return as set out in the issuing agreement. Yield on such securities, in case of cumulative preference shares, is defined broadly irrespective of results as the shareholder has the right to retain the yield (and carry it on to the next year), even in case the company in that given year should fail to make profit. Abundant practice of contemporary financial markets also recognises debt instruments where the yield depends on the achieved business result of the obligor (the so-called income bonds).

It appears that by examining the practice we did not succeed in establishing that maturity and the manner of fixing the return are the features that are distinguishing credit (debt) from equity forms of financing. What is it, then, that defines a loan agreement?

Legal institute “credit agreement” in our jurisdiction is determined under the provisions of the Law on Contracts, but also specified in

more detail in the Law on Protection of Users of Financial Services. Under the Law on Contracts (Article 1065) it reads as follows: “Under the loan agreement terms the bank undertakes to make available to the credit beneficiary a certain amount of monetary funds, for a determined or undetermined period of time, for a certain particular purpose or without specified purpose, and the beneficiary undertakes to repay to the bank the contracted interest and the received amount of money, in the time and manner prescribed in the agreement”.

Credit agreement has evolved from the loan agreement, yet today it is deemed to be, in the comparative law, a special type of agreement. Credit agreement has several features which are making it different from the loan agreement. Firstly, in case of loan agreement, creditor may be any person so willing to oblige, while in case of credit agreement creditor is always an organisation licensed for crediting operations. In addition, credit is always granted in money which is clear from the previous definition. Loan, however, may be but does not necessary have to be in money, and may be expressed in other values. Finally, credit agreement is always a charging legal deal, while a loan may be a benevolent affair (Bejatovic, p. 86). Our legal framework, similar to the comparative law, prescribed that the credit agreement produces legal effect only if it is drawn in a form of a written document, and hence it is a formal legal document, which differs in this manner from a loan agreement.

Law on protection of users of financial services defines as a mandatory element in a credit agreement (Article 19, item 6) “the amount of the nominal interest rate and stipulation on the interest rate being a fixed or a floating one, and in case it is a floating interest rate – the elements on the basis of which it shall be determined”. In this case the Law on Contracts, in its Article 47, regulates that the agreement will be nil and void “what the liability objective is impossible, impermissible, unspecified or unspecifiable [italics added], and further on (Article 50) specifies that “the subject of liability is specifiable if the agreement contains data on the basis of which it can be determined, or the contracting parties have assigned a third person to determine it”.

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Ekonomske odlike kreditnog i vlasničkog ulaganja

U oblasti ekonomske interpretacije pomenutih ugovora problem postaje dodatno komplikovan. Islamska kritika konvencionalnog kreditnog ugovora, kao finansijskog aranžmana kome se osporava ravnopravnost u položaju ugovornih strana, implicitno favoriziju vlasničke oblike ulaganja, kao aranžmane kod kojih je nagrada koja pripada svakom ekonomskom faktoru (kapitalu i nagrada za menadžerski angažman) dovedena u vezu sa njegovim doprinosom ostvarenom rezultatu. Pored same etički motivisane argumentacije, favorizovanje vlasničkih modela finansiranja dodatno je podržano argumentom da podela rizika među investitorima podstiče posvećenost svih strana i povećava efikasnost investiranja. Odgovor na ovaj argument daćemo osvrtom na temeljne doprinose savremene teorije poslovnih finansija, koja u značajnom delu opusa objašnjava prednosti i nedostatke ova dva konkurentna mehanizma finansiranja.

Kreditni ugovor je tip ugovora u kome zajmoprimac dobija izvesnu sumu novca od zajmodavca, uz obećanje da će zajmodavcu u budućnosti isplatiti unapred definisan novčani tok. Pored toga, zajmoprimac često prihvata da suzi poslovnu autonomiju usklađujući svoje ponašanje prema nizu klauzula uključenih u kreditni ugovor. Ukoliko zajmoprimac prekrši neku od ugovornih klauzula, ili uđe u otkaz plaćanja, zajmodavac ima pravo na deo imovine firme (kolateral) ili mogućnost da pokrene postupak stečaja nad firmom. Dakle, esencijalna ekonomska odlika kreditnog ugovora je da neuspeh zajmoprimca u ispunjenju obaveza iz ugovora pokreće transfer izvesnih prava kontrole sa njega na zajmodavca (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 762). Može se reći da, u ekonomskom smislu, u momentu kada dužnik u potpunosti iscrpi sopstveni kapital, položaj poverilaca postaje identičan položaju vlasnika, zbog čega ugovorom definisan transfer prava položaj ugovornih strana samo dovodi u sklad sa izmenjenom realnošću. Na taj način, ponašanje dužnika suprotno onome definisanom u kreditnom ugovoru, uređuje proces prenosa upravljačkih prava sa jednih na druge aktere na poslovnoj imovini. Upravljačka prava se na ovaj način alociraju u

skladu sa kriterijumom objektivno dokazane kompetencije. Zaštitom svojih prava, poverioci omogućuju da poslovnom imovinom u društvu uvek upravljaju najkompetentniji, odnosno da se na nivou privrede produktivni resursi uz najmanje gubitaka privode optimalnoj upotrebi. Naravno, ovakav stav ne može se uzeti bez rezerve. Brojna istraživanja ukazuju da troškovi stečaja mogu biti značajna determinanta efikasnosti ekonomskog sistema (Altman, 1984).

Savremena literatura iz oblasti poslovnih finansija glavnu prednost kreditnog ugovora vidi u ublažavanju sukoba interesa između investitora i lica koja za njihov račun upravljaju projektom, kao što je sprečavanje menadžera da investiraju u projekte sa negativnom neto sadašnjom vrednošću, ili prinudna prodaja poslovne imovine kada se ona efikasnije može upotrebiti izvan firme. Istom intuicijom rukovodimo se kada utvrđujemo loše strane kreditnog ugovora. Na isti način zajmodavac može sprečiti da se pokrenu dobri projekti ukoliko je kreditnim ugovorom predviđeno da se zajmoprimac dodatno ne zadužuje, ili prinuditi zajmoprimca na likvidaciju kada to nije rešenje sa efikasnim ishodom.

Sud o prednosti jednog ili drugog mehanizma finansiranja teorija daje imajući u vidu kombinaciju očekivanih efekata kontrole i očekivane efikasnosti u primeni kontrole. Spoljni investitori lakše mogu sebi obezbediti zaštitu preko kreditnog nego preko vlasničkog ulaganja, zbog toga što su prava poverilaca jasnija pa je kršenje tih prava lakše dokazati na sudu. To je jedan argument. Za drugi argument mora se istražiti uticaj veličine investitora na efikasnost kontrole, koji osvetljava dilemu relativne moći poverilaca i akcionara. Shleifer i Vishny (1997, p. 763) ističu da dug i akcijski kapital treba porediti imajući u vidu kombinaciju pravne zaštite i lakoće koncentracije vlasništva koju svaki od ova alternativna ugovora može obezbediti.

Najpre, da li ugovor o dugu stimuliše koncentraciju vlasništva? Do sada pretežna forma kreditiranja u svetu je bila bankarsko kreditiranje. Banke su po pravilu krupni investitori, koje sebi mogu pribaviti brojna prava na kontrolu firme kako pre tako i nakon otkaza duga. Blokada računa može se obaviti i bez sudske odluke. Kontrola firme može se

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The above stated citations from the text of the relevant laws lead to the conclusion that there are two significant elements that are determining the economic position of the contracting parties in case of a credit agreement, “obligation of the credit beneficiary to pay to the bank the contracted interest and repay the amount of money received”, and also that the amount of the interest, hence the aggregate liabilities, must be fixed or fixable. Under our jurisdiction, the return in favour of creditor can not depend on the credit rating of the obligor, but that this does imply that the burden of contracted liability can not be also reduced in case both of the contracting parties should so agree. Namely, the Law on protection of users of financial services, in its sector on default (Article 32, para 2) stipulates that “in case during the time contractual relation is in force and effect, events should arise bringing the beneficiary in distress regarding his material status, i.e. some other significant circumstances should occur that are beyond the beneficiary’s control – the bank… [may] at the request of the beneficiary, proclaim a moratorium on repayment for a certain period of time, during which the bank… will not charge the default interest on the defaulted arrears”. In addition, the same Law stipulates that this is based on the following principles (Article 5): 1) the right to an equitable relationship with the creditor of financial service; 2) the right to protection from discrimination; 3) the right to receive information; 4) the right to a fixed or fixable contractual liability; and 5) the right to protection of rights and interests.

Therefore, in contemporary jurisdictions, credit agreement is regulated with intent to secure the legal and economic equality of the contracting parties, an efficient implementation of the agreement through strict and clear contractual obligations binding for both contracting parties, which may be in further agreement between their expressed wills adjusted to the changed circumstances in order to achieve an equilibrium between the interests of the contracting parties. What is imposed as the basic legal feature of the credit agreement is the presence of financial liability which must be pre-determined, i.e. fixed or fixable, on the basis of the elements which can not be a prerogative

for the influence of a single-sided will of either contracting party.

Economic features of the credit and equity investment

In the field of economic interpretation of the above mentioned agreements, the problem tends to become even more complicated. The Islamic criticism of conventional credit agreement, as a financial agreement where the equality of contracting parties is being denied, argues that they are implicitly favouring equity forms of investments, as arrangements where the rewards due to every economic factor (capital, and managerial arrangement fee) is brought in connection with its yield based on the result. In addition to the ethically motivated arguments themselves, favouring of equity models of financing additionally is supported by the argument that the division of risk between investors instigates dedication of all the parties and boosts efficiency of investment. In response to this argument, we shall give a survey of the fundamental contributions of the modern theory of business finances, which in its significant part of the opus elucidates on the advantages and disadvantages of these two competitive financing mechanisms.

Credit agreement is a type of agreement where the credit beneficiary receives a certain amount of money from the creditor on the pledge to repay to the creditor in future the fixed in advance cash flow. In addition, borrower often accepts to narrow down business autonomy by adjusting his conduct in accordance with a number of clauses contracted under the credit agreement. In case the credit beneficiary is to breach some of the contract clauses, or come into default, creditor is entitled to one part of the firm’s assets (collateral), or has the option to file procedure for receivership of the company. Therefore, the essential economic characteristic of the credit agreement is that the failure of the credit beneficiary in servicing his contractual liabilities will set in motion the transfer of certain rights of control from himself on to the creditor (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 762). It can be argued that, in an economic sense, at the moment when the obligor has fully exhausted his own capital, the position of the creditor becomes identical to the position of the proprietor, as the

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dodatno ojačati direktnim vlasničkim statusom poverilaca kao i implicitnom pretnjom dominantnog kreditora. Suprotno akcijskom kapitalu, kreditni ugovor na neobičan način može biti čvršći kada nije koncentrisan, pa će efektivna pravna zaštita koju uživaju poverioci verovatno biti viša od zaštite koju sebi mogu obezbediti manjinski akcionari. Ključno obeležje prava poverilaca je u tome što koordinirana, usaglašena akcija više poverilaca nije neophodna da bi se preduzele akcije protiv delikventnih dužnika. Pravna obaveza firme je obaveza prema svakom poveriocu pojedinačno, koji može tužiti dužnika nezavisno od ostalih poverilaca. Naravno, kada se takva akcija preduzme, ostali poverioci i sud će preduzeti akciju da obezbede da prvi poverilac ne zapleni nesrazmerno veliki deo za sebe. U stvari, ova mogućnost da jedan od kreditora unilateralno pokrene plenidbu imovine u ambijentu u kome dužnik ima više poverilaca predstavlja teoretsko opravdanje regulacije stečaja.

Kada dug nije koncentrisan, na primer kod sindiciranog kreditiranja i investiranja u javne oblike duga, poverilac gubi dominantnu poziciju. U slučaju otkaza duga prema velikom broju poverilaca, pregovori između poverilaca mogu biti izuzetno otežani, pa dužnik može biti gurnut u stečaj. Mnogo je lakše restrukturirati dug prema jednoj banci. Problemi sa restrukturiranjem, kao i pozicija manjinskih poverilaca, može objasniti zašto su mulitilateralni oblici duga izuzetno retki oblik finansiranja, koji se upotrebljava u nekolicini najrazvijenih država, pa i tamo daleko ređe od bankarskog kredita.

Suprotno poveriocima, inidividualnim akcionarima nije obećana nikakva isplata u zamenu za ulaganje u firmu, mada po slobodnoj odluci upravnog odbora često dobijaju isplate dividendi. Takođe, individualni akcionari nemaju prava na konkretnu poslovnu imovinu firme, niti pravo na kolateral (izuzetak predstavljaju otvoreni investicioni fondovi, gde akcionari fonda mogu pro rata likvidirati aktivu fonda i dezinvestirati). Ne manje važno je i obeležje da akcionari ne mogu računati da će sigurno, određenog dana, dobiti novac nazad (likvidacija firme je neizvesna). Činjenica da je pozicija poverioca u finansiranom projektu oročena predstavlja vrlo važnu odliku. Manjinski akcionari često nisu u stanju da dezinvestiraju i

kada se grubo krše njihovi interesi.Pored relativno slabe pravne zaštite, glavno

pravo koje akcionar dobija je pravo glasa kod izbora odbora direktora. Zato što je usklađena akcija velike grupe akcionara neophodna za preuzimanje kontrole preko glasačkog mehanizma, prava glasa imaju ograničenu vrednosti osim ako nisu koncentrisana. Mnogi mali akcionari čak nemaju ni motiv da se adekvatno informišu o tome kako treba glasati. Stupiti u kontakt i ubediti veliku grupu manjinskih akcionara preko mehanizma zastupanja njihovih interesa je teško i skupo, naročito kada se tome protivi menadžment. Međutim, kada su glasovi koncentrisani postaju izuzetno vredni, jer strana koja kontroliše glasove može doneti gotovo sve odluke u korporaciji. Koncentrisana akcijska pozicija je u tom smislu snažnija od koncentrisane poverilačke pozicije. Vrednost svake akcije pojedinačno potiče od vrednosti koju ova akcija može imati za one koji pokušavaju da preuzmu kontrolu nad firmom, a zaštita manjinskih akcionara osigurava da oni koji kontrolišu firmu moraju podeliti neke od koristi sa manjinom.

Kako akcionari poseduju pravo glasa i izvestan stepen pravne zaštite (posebno u slučaju manjinskih akcionara) raspolažu i mogućnošću da izvuku izvesne isplate od menadžera u obliku dividende. Na izvestan način, dividenda je za akcije isto što i kamata za dug, isplata koja se zahteva od menadžera podržana pravom finansijera da kontroliše, osim što su u slučaju akcija ova prava kontrole u obliku prava glasa (Shleifer i Vishny, 1997. p. 765).

Nesavršena informisanost i islamski finansijski aranžmani

Pregledom osnovnih stavova savremene teorije poslovnih finansija uočavamo da kreditni ugovor ima značajne prednosti u odnosu na vlasnička ulaganja spoljnih investitora, jer spoljni investitor lakše uočava povredu interesa i lakše reaguje u cilju prevencije i to naročito u slučaju kada ne raspolaže koncentrisanom pozicijom. Međutim, islamski finansijski aranžmani zasnovani na vlasničkom obliku ulaganja uglavnom podrazumevaju visok stepen koncentracije vlasničke pozicije, pa brojne primedbe u vezi neefikasnosti zaštite interesa manjinskih akcionara ovde nisu od

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contractually defined transfer of rights in the status of the contracting parties is only bringing them in harmony with the changed reality. In this manner, the conduct of the obligor opposed to the one defined in the credit agreement, determines the process of transfer of the management rights from ones on to the other actors over the business assets. Management rights in this way are being allocated in accordance with the criterion of an objectively substantiated competence. In protection of their rights, creditors are allowing for the business assets in the society to be always managed by those most competent, i.e. at the level of the real economy for the productive resources, with the least of losses, to be brought about to their optimum use. Such an attitude, of course, can not be accepted without some reserves. Numerous research studies show that the costs of bankruptcy may be a significant determinant for the efficiency of an economic system (Altman, 1984).

Modern literature in the field of business finances sees the main advantage of the credit agreement in the mitigation of conflict of interest between an investor and the persons who are in his name managing the project, such as prevention of managers to invest in projects with a negative net present value, or a forcible sale of business assets when they can be more efficiently deployed outside of the company. We are led by the same intuition when determining the downsides of a credit agreement. In the same way a creditor may prevent initiation of certain good projects in case credit agreement prescribes that the credit beneficiary must not venture into additional borrowing, or force the beneficiary to accept liquidation when this is not the best solution with any efficient outcome in sight.

Judgment on the advantages of the former or the latter financing mechanism is pronounced by the theory in the form of combination of the expected effects of control and expected efficiency in the application of control. Exterior investors may more easily secure for themselves protection through the credit, rather than through the equity investment, because the rights of creditors are more clearly defined, so that the breach of these rights is easier to prove in the court of law. This is one of the arguments. In support of the other argument what must be investigated is the impact of the size of investor

on efficacy of control, which will reveal the dilemma of the relative power of creditors and the shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 763) argue that the debt and the equity capital should be compared when bearing in mind the combination of the legal protection and the easy ways that concentration of ownership can be made, which both of these alternative agreements can provide for.

Firstly, does the debt agreement stimulate concentration of ownership? Until now the prevailing form of crediting in the world was banking crediting. Banks have been, as a rule, major investors that can gain for themselves many rights for control over companies, both prior and after a loan call-in (cancellation). Blocking of account may be imposed and does not require any court order. Control over company may also be additionally strengthened through a direct ownership status of the creditor, but also through an implicit threat by the predominant creditor. Contrary to the case of equity capital, credit agreement in an unusual manner may become even stronger when it is not concentrated, so that the effective legal protection enjoyed by the creditors will be even higher than the protection that can be won for themselves by the minority shareholders. The key feature of the creditor rights is in the fact that the coordinated, harmonised action by several creditors is not necessary in order to produce action against delinquent obligors. Legal obligation of the company is the obligation towards each one of the creditors individually, who is free to bring a law suit against the obligor irrespective of the other creditors. When such an action is undertaken, other creditors and the court of law shall certainly undertake action to insure that the first creditor does not acquire a disproportionate share for himself. In actual fact, such an option for one creditor to instigate unilaterally seizure of assets in a climate where the obligor has several creditors is a theoretical justification for regulating bankruptcy procedure.

When debt is not concentrated, for example in case of syndicated loans and investment into public forms of indebtedness, creditor loses a dominant position. In case of a debt call-in or cancellation towards a large number of creditors, negotiations between creditors may be extremely difficult, so the obligor may be

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posebnog značaja. Naravno, kada ocenjujemo uticaj ova dva aranžmana na efikasnost finansiranih firmi moramo imati u vidu da bolja zaštita interesa spoljnih investitora ne mora uvek značiti i bolje usmeravanje aktivnosti finansirane firme.

Videli smo da savremena teorija poslovnih finansija prednost različitih finansijskih ugovora izvodi na osnovu potencijala koji dati ugovori imaju u ublažavanju sukoba interesa agenta i principala. Kod finansijskih ugovora principal je akter koji obezbeđuje finansijska sredstva, dok je lice koje de facto upravlja projektom u poziciji agenta.

Agentski odnos se pojavljuje u svakom ugovoru po kome neko lice, ili lica (principali), angažuju drugo lice (agenta) da izvrši izvesnu uslugu za njihov račun, kojim se prenosi izvesno ovlašćenje u odlučivanju. Agentski odnosi u krajnjoj liniji proističu iz asimetričnosti, tj. fundamentalnoj nejednakosti u informisanosti partnera koji ulaze u ugovorni aranžman. Agentske odnose, usled asimetrične informisanosti, prate problemi nesavršene kontrole i oportunističkog ponašanja agenta. Principal može ograničiti mogućnost otklona od svog autentičnog interesa uspostavljanjem odgovarajućih pobuda za agenta ili prihvatanjem troškova praćenja agentovog ponašanja. Pored toga, u nekim situacijama rešenje će se naći u ekstra nagradi za agenta (troškovi obavezivanja) kao vidu garancije da agent neće preduzeti akcije štetne po interes principala, ili kao garancija da će principalu šteta biti nadoknađena ukoliko do toga dođe. Ponekad, ni praćenje niti obavezivanje nije dovoljno da obezbedi da agent postupa u cilju maksimizacije bogatstva principala. Eventualni gubici koji nastaju u tom slučaju čine treću kategoriju agentskih troškova, rezidualne troškove. Dakle, principal ne može bez troškova obezbediti da agent uvek donosi odluke optimalne sa stanovišta samog principala. Autori ovog koncepta, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308) koji se danas označava kao ugovorna teorija firme, agentske troškove definišu kao zbir (1) rashoda principala nastalih u kontroli agenta, (2) rashoda nastalih obavezivanjem agenta, i (3) rezidualnih gubitaka. Agentski troškovi nastaju u svim situacijama koje podrazumevaju kooperativne napore, čak i kada ne postoji eksplicitno uređen

odnos principala i agenta, zbog čega čak i situacije zajedničkog upravljanja projektom nisu zaštićene od pomenutog problema (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).

Dakle, savremene ekonomske teorije polaze od pretpostavke da je ljudska priroda obeležena ograničenom racionalnošču, u smislu da smo po namerama racionalni, ali smo u realizacije svojih namera ograničeni. Takođe, podložni smo oportunizmu, u smislu da smo motivisani ličnim interesom i u tom procesu delujemo mudro. Neminovna nekompletnost ugovora je posledica prvog obeležja, a rizik koji nosi ugovaranje, posledica drugog. Iz teorije ugovora poznat je koncept savršenog ugovora. Uloga savršenog ugovora je da stipulira sva moguća stanja i odredi distribuciju koristi i šteta u svim mogućim stanjima. Savršeni ugovor je teorijski ideal u kome se obaveza svake ugovorne strane, u svim eventualijama, može u potpunosti predvideti i uneti u ugovor. Na taj način bi bilo moguće očuvati sva prava ugovornih strana. Ukoliko bi ovakav ugovor bio moguć, onda bi i kreiranje takvog ugovora generisalo ex ante kompleks troškova nastalih u pregovorima, izradi ugovora i obezbeđenju integriteta ugovora. Teorijski bi u ex ante kompleks troškova trebalo uključiti i troškove raznih instituta kojima se štiti integritet ugovora, npr. sufinansiranje projekata ili uspostavljanje kolaterala. Kao teorijski koncept, savršeni ugovor se ne može primeniti u ambijentu kada ugovorne strane ne mogu sagledati sva moguća stanja pa samim tim ni ugovorom precizirati. U ambijentu u kome akteri ne raspolažu sa potpunim informacijama, pomenuti konkurentni aranžmani se ključno razlikuju po tome u kojoj meri je njihovo sprovođenje osetljivo na problem informisanosti. Na primer, nivo informacija potreban obema ugovornim stranama u vlasničkim modalitetima finansiranja je neuporedivo veći, jer učešće u profitu zavisi od ostvarenog profita. Učešće finansijera je ovde jako osetljivo na bilo kakve manipulacije visinom ostvarenog profita. Zbog toga ne čudi da Tariqullah Khan (1995, p. 40) zaključuje da „primena principa podele profita i gubitka zahteva idealan moral korisnika sredstava. U realnosti, ako ovaj uslov nije ispunjen, princip podele profita i gubitka ne može se primeniti efikasno“.

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pushed into a bankruptcy. It is much easier to restructure debt owed to one single bank. The problems with restructuring and the position of minority creditors, may be the explanation why the multilateral forms of debt are extremely rare forms of financing, which is being applied only in a few most developed countries, and even there much less frequently than the banking credits.

Contrary to the creditors, individual shareholders are not promised any return for investment into the company although according to a free decision made by the board of directors they often receive payment of dividends. In addition, individual shareholders have no right to concrete business assets of the company, and neither the right to collateral (with the exception of the open-ended investment funds where the shareholders of the fund may pro rata liquidate assets of the fund and disinvest). Not less important is the feature providing for the shareholders that there is no certainty for them to be sure that on a certain fixed day, they shall receive their money back (liquidation of the company is uncertain). The fact that the position of the creditor in a financial project is time limited is a very important characteristic to be borne in mind. Minority shareholders are often unable to disinvest even when their interests are grossly breached.

In addition to a rather poor legal protection, the main right gained by the shareholder is the voting right in the selection of the board of directors. In view of the fact that a coordinated action by a large group of shareholders is necessary in order to take control over the voting mechanism, the voting rights have a limited value except if they are concentrated. Many small shareholders do not even have a motivation to be adequately informed of the way they should vote. To come in contact and convince a large group of minority shareholders through the mechanism of the proxy of their best interest, is very hard and rather costly, especially when this is opposed by the management. However, when the votes are concentrated they become extremely valuable, as the side controlling the votes can become able to pass almost all of the decisions in the corporation. Concentrated action, in this regard, is more powerful than the concentration of the creditors’ position. The value of every share

equally derives from the value which such a share may have for those who are trying to take control over the company, while the protection of the minority shareholders insures that those who are controlling the company will be forced to share some of the benefits with the minority.

As the shareholders are having the right of vote and a certain degree of legal protection (especially in the case of minority shareholders), they also have the option to attract some of the payments from the management in the form of dividend. In a certain manner, dividend on shares is the same as the interest charged on a debt granted, payment requested from the management supported by the right of the financier to control, except that in the case of shares such control rights are having the form of the voting rights (Shleeifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 765).

Imperfect disclosure and the Islamic financial arrangements

In reviewing the basic stands of contemporary theory of business finances we note that the credit agreement has a significant advantage over the equity investments of exterior investors, as the exterior investor can more easily identify breaches of the interest and can more easily react for purpose of prevention, and this especially in the case when he does not dispose with a concentrated position. However, the Islamic financial arrangements based on the equity form of investment mainly prescribe a high degree of concentration of the equity position, so that numerous objections regarding the inefficiency of protection of interests of the minority shareholders are not of any special importance in this case. When assessing the impact of these two arrangements, however, on the efficiency of the financial firms, we must bear in mind that better protection of exterior investors does not necessarily imply better streamlining of activities of the financed company.

We have already noted that the modern theory of business finances is assessing advantages of different financial agreements from the potential which the agreements have in mitigation of the conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. In case of financial agreements, principal is the actor who provides financial assets, while the person who is de facto managing the project holds the position of the agent.

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U ambijentu asimetrične informisanosti učesnika na tržištu problemi nastaju već u fazi kada je potrebno doneti odluku o tome da li će se neki realni projekat finansirati ili ne. Problem koji nastaje pre samog sklapanja ugovora (ex ante) izučavan je pod nazivom problem nepovoljnog izbora (engl. adverse selection). Naime, ako finansijer nije u stanju da pouzdano proceni bonitet projekta, visinu naknade za finansiranje odrediće ne na osnovu boniteta konkretnog projekta, već na osnovu procenjenog boniteta čitavog skupa projekata. Tako određena visina naknade biće destimulativna za projekte natprosečnog boniteta, ali će i dalje biti primamljiva potprosečno bonitetnim projektima. Kao posledica opisane interakcije, finansijer će završiti sa potprosečno bonitetnim projektima. Teorijski dobro elaborirano rešenje ovog problema je takozvani višeslojni ugovor (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Naime, finansijer će ponuditi ugovore sa različitim uslovima, koji bi po pretpostavci trebalo da odgovaraju agentima različitog boniteta. Na osnovu opredeljenja agenta, finansijer stiče uvid (dobija signal) u stav samog agenta o sopstvenim karakteristikama. Na primer, ako je ponuđen kreditni ugovor koji kombinuje višu kamatnu stopu i manje vredan kolateral, zajedno sa ugovorom koji kombinuje nižu kamatnu stopu i vredniji kolateral, opredeljenje zajmotražioca za prvi tip

ugovora ukazivaće da on sâm sebe procenjuje kao natprosečno rizičnog. Slična je situacija i sa stepenom samofinansiranja projekta koji se može na identičan način kombinovati sa visinom kamatne stope. Kao što smo videli, teorija ugovora prepoznaje da izvesni troškovi nastaju i kod instituta kojima se štiti integritet ugovora (kolateral, samofinansiranje, druge restriktivne klauzule), ali po definiciji povoljan uticaj na pobude ugovornih strana preteže u odnosu na troškove.

Kada se ugovor sklopi tako da se utvrdi visina naknade finansijeru, bilo visinom kamatne stope ili ključem za podelu profita, preduzetnik može pokazivati sklonost da pribegne poslovnim operacijama koje će uvećati rizik projekta, u smislu da projekat sada ima veću verovatnoću da ostvari natprosečan profit, ali i gubitak. Ovaj efekat poznat je kao devijantan odnos prema riziku (engl. moral hazard). Klasičan kreditni ugovor zaštićen je od ovakve naknadne izmene u relativnom učešću obe strane ugovoranjem kolaterala, samofinansiranjem ili brojnim drugim zaštitnim klauzulama, koje su tu da umanje afinitet preduzetnika prema riziku ili poslovnu autonomiju. Ukoliko ovakvi mehanizmi nisu raspoloživi finansijer mora povećati svoj angažman na direktnom praćenju i kontroli poslovnih aktivnosti.

Informacioni problemi u realizaciji

Tabela 1: Uporedna analiza aranžmana poslovnog finansiranja

Tip aranžmana Naknada finansijeru

Finansijska struktura

Dodatne garancije

Period finansiranja

Distribucija vrednosti

Konvencionalni kreditni ugovor

Utvrđena kao procenat izvršenih ulaganja

Obavezno učešće agenta (zajmotražioca)

Kolateral, lična jemstva

Unapred utvrđen, kraći od životnog veka projekta

Datumom dospeća ugovora, povraćaj duga, rezidual agentu

Troškovi plus /lizing (Mudarabah /Ijara)

Utvrđen kao procenat izvršenih ulaganja

Bez učešća agenta (preduzetnika)

Kolateral, lična jemstva

Unapred utvrđen, kraći od životnog veka projekta

Datumom dospeća ugovora, povraćaj duga, rezidual agentu

Agentski aranžman(Murabaha)

Utvrđen kao procenat ostvarenog rezultata, saglasno izvršenim ulaganjima

Bez učešća agenta (preduzetnika)

Kolateral, lična jemstva

Neoročen, do likvidacije firme

Rezidualna vrednost firme finansijeru, ili puna naplata uloga iz kolaterala, agentu ništa

Zajedničko ulaganje(Musharakah)

Utvrđen kao procenat ostvarenog rezultata, saglasno izvršenim ulaganjima

Obavezno učešće preduzetnika

Bez dodatnih garancija

Neoročen, do likvidacije firme

Rezidual srazmerno strukturi finansiranja

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The agency relationship appears in every agreement where a person or persons that the principals are engaging is an additional person - agent tasked to perform a certain service for their account, thus transferring certain authority in the decision making. The agency relations, in the final instance, derive from an asymmetry, i.e. from a fundamental inequality in the information available to the partners venturing into the contractual arrangement. Agency relations, because of asymmetry of information, are accompanied by problems of an imperfect control and opportunistic conduct by the agent. The principal may limit the options for departure from his authentic interests by establishing corresponding motivations for the agent, or by accepting monitoring costs for the surveillance of the agent’s behaviour. In addition, in some situations the solution may be found in an extra fee for the agent (binding costs) as a form of a guarantee that the agent will not undertake any action detrimental for the interests of the principal, or as a guarantee that the principal will be compensated for damages caused if that should be the case. At times, neither monitoring nor binding would be sufficient to insure that the agent will proceed in the manner maximizing wealth of the principal. All eventual losses incurred in such a case represent the third category of the agency costs, residual costs. Thus the principal can not insure, without costs, that the agent will always make decisions which are optimal from the point of view of the principal himself. The authors of this concept (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308), which is designated today as the company contractual theory, define agency costs as the sum of the following: “(1) expenditures of the principal incurred in control over the agent; (2) expenditures incurred in binding the agent; and (3) residual losses. Agent expenditures occur in all situations which comprise cooperative efforts, even when there is no explicitly regulated relationship between the principal and the agent, where even the cases of a joint project management are not protected from this problem (Alehian and Demsetz, 1972).

Hence, the modern economic theories start from the assumption that the human nature is marked by limited rationality, in the sense that in our intentions we are rational, but in the

realisation of our intentions we are limited. In addition, we are susceptible to opportunism, in the sense that we are motivated by private interests and in this process are acting prudently. The inevitable imperfect nature of the agreement is the consequence of the former feature, and the risk embodied in contracting, is the consequent of the latter. In the contract theory there is well known concept of the perfect contract. The role of a perfect contract is to stipulate all the possible conditions and to determine distribution of costs and benefits in all possible situations. Perfect contract is a theoretical ideal in which obligations of both contracting parties and in all eventualities, may be fully predicted and entered into the contract. In this manner it would be possible to preserve all the rights of the contracting parties. If such a contract would be possible, then the creation of such a contract would generate ex ante complex of costs incurred in the negotiations, drafting of the contract and securing integrity of the contract. Theoretically speaking, it would be necessary to add to the ex ante complex of costs also the costs of various institutes used to protect integrity of the contract, for example, co-financing of the project or setting up of a collateral. As a theoretical concept, perfect contract can not be applied in a climate when the contracting parties can not assess all the possible circumstances, and hence can not specifically provide for them in the contract. In an environment where the actors involved do not have all the information available, the above mentioned competitive arrangements are crucially different in the sense to what extent their implementation is sensitive to the problem of information accessibility. For example, the level of information necessary for both contracting parties in the equity modalities of financing is infinitely higher, as the sharing of profit depends on the profit made. The share due to the financier is very sensitive here to any manipulation with the size of the profit made. Hence it does not come as a surprise that Tariqullah Khan (1995, p. 40) concludes that “the implementation of the profit and loss sharing principle requires an ideal morality from the funds beneficiary. In reality, if this requirement is not to be met, the profit and loss sharing principle can not be applied efficiently”.

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finansijskog aranžmana postoje i kod njegovog ugovornog ili prinudnog okončanja (ex post). Naime, u slučaju okončanja ugovora potrebno je izvršiti verifikaciju stanja da bi se pristupilo konačnoj distribuciji vrednosti projekta (engl. costly state verification). I u ovom aspektu kreditni ugovor je superioran finansijski aranžman, jer ga prati najniži nivo troškova revizije stanja (engl. auditing costs) (Spencer, 2000, p. 10). Kod kreditnog ugovora distribucija se obavlja na bazi jednostavnog pravila. Nominalna vrednost potraživanja uvećana za dospele kamate prioritetno se naplaćuje iz konačne vrednosti projekta, dok rezidual pripada preduzetniku. Da bi zaštitio svoj interes, finansijer treba da prati isključivo jedan parametar, tj. da reaguje prinudnim okončanjem projekta ukoliko uoči da se likvidaciona vrednost projekta kritično približila iznosu duga. Kod vlasničkih oblika ulaganja, bilo kakva, pa i najmanja, promena u kvalitetu poslovanja uticaće na vrednost pozicije finansijera.

Posmatrajući obeležja različitih finansijskih aranžmana (tabela 1) uočavamo da se islamski aranžmani zasnovani na dugu u suštini ne razlikuju u odnosu na konvencionalni kreditni aranžman. Precizno definisana finansijska obaveza, sa rokom kraćim od životnog veka firme ili rokom efikasne upotrebe finansirane poslovne imovine, kao i kolateral, čine distribuciju vrednosti između agenta i principala, kako u toku tako i po okončanju aranžmana, prilično pojednostavljenim zadatkom, bez većih mogućnosti da agent oportunističkim ponašanjem nekažnjeno povredi interes principala.

Međutim, problemi koji nastaju zbog nesavršene informisanosti ugovornih strana redovan su pratilac islamskih aranžmana koji se zasnivaju na podeli profita i gubitka. Ovim problemima se eksplicitno bavio Nienhaus (1983). Autor je analizirao slučaj paralelne egzistencije islamskih i konvencionalnih aranžmana, i zaključio da u takvom ambijentu ključ za raspodelu profita predstavlja tržišno determinisanu varijablu na koju utiče i visina kamatne stope. Ova pravilnost je i empirijski dokazana. Ekonometrijskim istraživanjima (Haron and Wan Azmi, 2008) utvrđeno je da tražnja za islamskim investicionim

depozitima opada uporedo sa rastom konvencionalne depozitne kamatne stope. Nienhaus je eksplicitnim modelom dokazao da će u konkurentnom ambijentu agent imati motiv da precenjuje očekivanu profitabilnost projekta, kako bi u pregovorima sa finansijerom obezbedio za sebe povoljniji ključ raspodele, dok bi za islamsku banku korisna strategija bila da potcenjuje očekivanu profitabilnost projekata. Uz pretpostavku o asimetričnoj informisanosti, u pregovorima oko visine svog učešća banke će insistirati na visokom učešću što će dovesti do problema pogrešnog izbora (engl. adverse selection), odnosno samo oni preduzetnici koji očekuju nisku profitabilnost konkurisaće za sredstva kod islamskih banaka, što će ugroziti profitabilnost islamskih banaka.

Priroda poslovnog rezultata kao finansijske osnove za raspodelu čini ove aranžmane posebno osetljivim i na oportunističko ponašanje agenta tokom važenje ugovora i po okončanju. Troškovi koje u sistem unosi asimetrična informisanost ne mogu se izbeći niti u jednom tipu aranžmana, ali su zbog prirode varijable koja je ključna za funkcionisanje aranžmana podele profita i gubitka ovde srazmerno viši. Kod dužničkih oblika finansiranja poverilac nije zainteresovan za profitabilnost projekta sve dok ona garantuje urednu otplatu zajma. Kod PLS aranžmana, uobičajeni instrumenti za redukovanje agentskog konflikta nisu prisutni. Samofinansiranje projekta je jedan od načina kojim se rešavaju problemi koji nastaju u primeni kreditnog ugovora. Spremnost agenta da uloži sopstveni novac ili da založi deo svog bogatstva za obeštećenje finansijera u slučaju neuspeha, dokaz je njegove vere u uspeh projekta, ali i garancija njegove posvećenosti uspehu. U agentskom aranžmanu nedostatak samofinansiranja često se nadoknađuje ugovaranjem kolaterala, ali je upotreba kolaterala ovde skopčana sa problemima u primeni, jer je uslovljena identifikacijom specifičnog postupanja agenta. Razlike između dužničkih modaliteta finansiranja i islamskog zajedničkog ulaganja postoje i kada razmatramo potencijal samofinansiranja da reši konflikt između ugovornih strana. Kod konvencionalnog kreditnog aranžmana zajmoprimac po osnovu svog finansijskog uloga (sufinansiranje) stiče podređen status

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In an environment of asymmetric information for the participants on the market, the problems arise already in the phase when it is necessary to decide whether to finance some real project or not. The problem which emerges prior to the contracting itself (ex ante) was studied under the name of adverse selection. Namely, if a financier is not able to make a reliable assessment of the project solvency, the amount of the financing fee will be fixed not on the basis of the solvency of the concrete project, but on the basis of an estimated solvency of an entire set of projects. So determined amount of the fee will not be attractive for that projects that have higher-than-average solvency, but will still be attractive for the below average solvency projects. As a result of the described interaction, financier will end up with the below average solvency project. A solution to this problem, well elaborated in theory, is the so-called multi-layered contract (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Namely, a financier will offer contracts under different terms, which are assumed to correspond to the agents of different solvency. On the basis of the agent’s decision, financier will gain an insight (receive a signal) in the attitude that the agent himself has towards his own standing. For example, if a credit agreement which combines a higher interest

rate and a less valued collateral is offered, together with the agreement which combines a lower interest rate and a higher value of collateral, the choice of the credit applicant of the former type of agreement will show that he is judging himself to be an above average risky one. Similar situation prevails with the degree of self-financing of the project which may be combined, in an identical manner, with the amount of the interest rate. As we have already seen, contract theory recognises that certain costs are incurred even in the institutes which are protecting contract integrity (collateral, self-financing, other restrictive clauses), but per definition a favourable impact on the motivation of contracting parties in outweighing the costs.

When an agreement is concluded by fixing the amount of financier’s fee, either concordant with the interest rate or the profit sharing key, entrepreneur may show a tendency towards taking recourse in business operations that will increase the project risk, in the sense that the project will now have a higher probability to make an above average profit, but also loss. This effect is known as a risk deviation attitude, or as a moral hazard. Classic credit agreement is protected from such an additional amendment to a relative share of both parties by contracting collateral, self-financing, and a number of

Table 1 Comparative analysis of business financing arrangementsType of arrangement

Financier fee Financial structure

Additional guarantees

Financing period Value distribution

Conventional credit agreement

Fixed as a percentage of investment made

Mandatory agent participation (credit applicant)

Collateral, personal pledges

Fixed in advance, shorter than the life span of the project

Agreement maturity date, debt repayment, residual due to agent

Costs plus/leasing (Mudarabah/Ijara

Fixed as a percentage of investment made

Without agent (entrepreneur) participation

Collateral,personal pledges

Fixed in advance, shorter than the life span of the project

Agreement maturity date, debt repayment, residual due to agent

Agent arrangement (Murabahah)

Fixed as a percentage of result achieved, concordant with investments made

Without agent (entrepreneur) participation

Collateral, personal pledges

Without time limits, until the liquidation of company

Residual company value due to financier, or full repayment of investment from collateral, nothing for the agent

Joint venture(Musharakah)

Fixed as a percentage of result achieved, concordant with investments made

Mandatory entrepreneur participation

Without additional guarantees

Without time limits, until the company liquidation

Residual proportionate to the financing structure

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u odnosu na zajmodavca. Interes zajmodavca ostaće zaštićen sve dok postoji ma koliko učešće zajmoprimca. Dakle, sve dok zajmodavac brine da učešće zajmoprimca ne iščezne, degradacija vrednosti firme bilo zbog nekompetencija, bilo zbog delikvencije, neće ići na teret onog dela vrednosti firme koji pripada zajmodavcu. Ovo nije slučaj sa statusom investitora kod islamskog aranžmana zajedničkog ulaganja, koji imaju potpuno ravnopravan status. Zbog toga ponašanje preduzetnika kojim bi sebi pribavio lične materijalne koristi na teret smanjenja vrednosti zajednički uloženih sredstava postaje verovatnije, pa prevencija takvog ponašanja zahteva daleko intenzivnije napore investitora.

Efekat koji se od šema podele profita i gubitka može očekivati kada je u pitanju njegov uticaj na nivo štednje i investicija ključno zavisi od toga da li će veća zainteresovanost finansijera za profitabilnost (su) finansiranog projekta nadjačati eventualne nepovoljne efekte koji se mogu očekivati od zaoštrenog problema neujednačene informisanosti ugovornih strana. Izvesni islamski teoretičari (Bashair and Darrat, 1996, p. 37) navode da će u situaciji kada je interes finansijera usklađeniji sa interesom preduzetnika, finansijer biti spremniji da svoje ekspertske resurse posveti uspehu projekta, za razliku od finansijskih aranžmana zasnovanih na dugu, kod kojih je pažnja kreditora sužena na bonitet dužnika, pre svega stepen njegove zaduženosti (ili vrednost zaloge)2. Ovakav argument počiva na pretpostavci koja je upravo suprotna onoj od koje slične analize kreću u savremenim poslovnim finansijama. Redovno pretpostavljamo da je preduzetnik potpunije informisana strana, svakako negirajući sposobnost banke da posveti svoje resurse upravljanju velikim brojem realnih investicionih projekata. Potreba za značajnijim uključenjem osoblja banke u vođenju realnih investicionih projekata nastaje u slučaju otkaza u servisiranju zajma. Kada dođe do grupisanja ovakvih slučaja briga o zajmovima u restrukturiranju obično se izmešta iz redovnih bankarskih operacija, formiraju se posebne organizacione jedinice (engl. work-out units) ili se potraživanja po diskontovanoj vrednosti prenose na posebne

organizacije, čime banke implicitno priznaju da ne raspolažu ekspertskim resursima koje mogu u značajnijem obimu posvetiti upravljanju realnim projektima.

Dakle, ključna pitanja kojima testiramo validnost iznetog argumenta je da li pojačana potreba banke da se uključi u upravljanje realnim projektima može i zaista imati povoljan uticaj na kvalitet upravljanja, kao i da li to uvećava sklonost ka riziku kod druge ugovorne strane. Ipak, ova pitanju su više empirijske nego teorijske prirode. Izvesna iskustva (Zaher and Hassan, 2001) sa početnom primenom aranžmana podele profita i gubitka u Pakistanu potvrdila su da su slučajevi delikvencije od strane preduzetnika daleko od sporadičnih, što je konačno dovelo do kompromitacije ovakvog koncepta. Rezultati ne iznenađuju ukoliko se uvaži činjenica da je poreska evazija u ovoj državi dostigla neslućene razmere.

Izvori sredstava islamskih banakaJedan od osnovnih argumenata koji

teoretičari islamskog bankarstva navode u korist ovog koncepta je usklađenost finansijskih izvora sa plasmanima banke. Naime, ako izvori sredstava islamske banke nisu fiksirani u nominalnom iznosu, jednako kao i plasmani, onda islamske banke izbegavaju osnovni rizik kojim su izloženi njihovi konvencionalni konkurenti. Problem očuvanja likvidnosti i solventnosti trebalo bi da bude daleko manje akutan nego kod konvencionalnih banaka, kod kojih je glavnina finansijskih obaveza kratkog roka i nominalno određena.

U pogledu izvora sredstava, islamske banke trpe značajna ograničenja u odnosu na konvencionalne banke. Instrumenti za pribavljanje sredstava sa finansijskog tržišta nisu raspoloživi, pa se izvori svode na različito definisane depozitne aranžmane. Islamsko bankarstvo slično konvencionalnom bankarstvu praktikuje depozite po viđenju, često uz vrlo savremenu tehnologiju (ATM i slični pristupni proizvodi). Razlika između ova dva sistema pojavljuje se u prirodi investicionih depozita (engl. profit/loss participation accounts). Objašnjavajući aranžmane podele

2 Napominjemo da je u modelu kreditnog rizika profitabilnost dužnika samo jedan od elemenata u kompleksnoj formuli za proračun kreditnog rizika (Merton, 1974).

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other protection clauses, which are there to lower the risk appetite of the entrepreneur, or business autonomy. If such mechanisms are not available, financier will be forced to enhance his engagement in direct monitoring and control of business activities.

Information problems in the realisation of financial arrangement are present also in its contractual or forcible termination (ex post). Namely, in case of contract termination it is necessary to make a verification of the state of facts in order to proceed with the final distribution of the project value, or costly state verification. In this aspect as well credit agreement is a superior financial arrangement as it is accompanied with the lowest auditing costs (Spencer, 2000, p. 10). In the case of credit agreement, distribution is taking place on the basis of a simple rule. Nominal value of receivables increased for interest due has the priority in collection from the final project value, while the residue belongs to the entrepreneur. In order to protect his interest, financier should monitor exclusively one parameter, i.e. he should react with forcible project termination if it is identified that the liquidation project value is critically getting closer to the amount of debt. In case of equity investment, any and even the smallest change in the quality of business conducted will impact the value of the financier’s position.

When observing the features of different financial arrangements (Table 1) we notice that the Islamic arrangements based on debt are essentially different from the conventional credit arrangements. Precisely defined financial liability with maturity shorter than the life span of the company, or term for efficient use of business assets financed, as well as a collateral, present the core of value distribution between the agent and the principal, both for the duration and upon completion of the arrangement, and it may appear rather a simplistic task, without any broader option for the agent to engage in an opportunistic behaviour and undermine without sanction interests of the principal.

The problems arising because of the imperfect information for the contracting parties, however, are a regular feature to be found in the Islamic arrangements based on profit and loss sharing. These problems were an explicit focus of study by Nienhaus (1983). The author

analysed the case of parallel existence of Islamic and conventional arrangements, and concluded that in such an environment profit distribution ratio is a market determined variable which is also impacted by the amount of the interest rate. This regularity is also empirically substantiated. Econometric research (Haron and Wan Azmi, 2008) determined that the demand for Islamic investment deposits is falling parallel with the growth of the conventional interest rate on deposits. Nienhaus proved, on an explicit model, that in a competitive environment the agent will be motivated to overrate the expected project profitability, so that he may secure for himself in the negotiations with the financier a more favourable key of distribution, while for an Islamic bank the useful strategy would be to underrate the expected project profitability. On the assumption that there is asymmetry of informationy, in the negotiations on the amount of their participation, the banks will insist on a high share which shall bring about the problem of adverse selection, i.e. only those entrepreneurs who are expecting low profitability will compete for funds from the Islamic banks, which shall in turn undermine profitability of the Islamic banks.

The nature of business result, as financial basis for distribution, makes these arrangements especially sensitive also to an opportunistic conduct by the agent for the duration of the agreement and upon its completion. Costs which will be introduced in the system by asymmetric information accessibility can not be avoided in either type of arrangement, but because of the nature of the variable wich is crucial for functioning of the profit and loss sharing arrangement, they are proportionately higher in this case. In the debt financing forms the creditor is not interested in profitability of the project for as long as it guarantees regular loan repayment. In the case of a PLS (profit-and-loss sharing) arrangement, the usual instruments for reducing agents conflicts are not present. Project self-financing is one of the ways to resolve problems which arise in the implementation of the credit agreement. Readiness of the agent to invest his own money or to pledge one part of his wealth for indemnifying the financier in case of failure is the proof of his belief in the project success,

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profita i gubitka (mudarabah) pomenuli smo da je intencija islamskog koncepta da položaj koji banka ima prema preduzetniku bude preslikan u položaj koji deponent ima prema banci. Kako u ovim aranžmanima banka ne može ugovarati prinos nezavisno od rezultata finansiranog projekta, tako ni deponentima koji kod banke polažu investicione depozite banka ne garantuje stopu prinosa, pa samim tim ni očuvanje vrednosti uloženih sredstava. Ovakva rešenja konvencionalno bankarstvo ne poznaje, ali se nešto slično sreće u praksi osiguravajućih kompanija. Takozvano „osiguranje uz profit“ predstavlja modalitet životnih osiguranja u kome osiguranik polaže pravo na srazmeran deo godišnjeg profita osiguravača, ali ovaj neizvesni deo prinosa je samo dodatak na garantovanu sumu koja već u sebi uključuje izvesnu fiksnu stopu kapitalizacije.

Ideja o ulaganjima sa neizvesnom stopom prinosa, namenjenim prevashodno individualnim ulagačima, nije nepoznata u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima. Na primer, ovakav modalitet ulaganja doživeo je veliku popularnost sa pojavom otvorenih investicionih fondova. Ipak, sličnost između islamskih investicionih depozita i investicionih jedinica otvorenih investicionih fondova iscrpljuje se obeležjem da kod oba oblika prinos zavisi od rezultata ulaganja. Razlike su međutim brojne i značajne. Otvoreni investicioni fondovi su izuzetno transparentne šeme, preko kojih se sredstva investiraju unapred jasno definisanim

i tipiziranim strategijama. Investicione jedinice su izuzetno likvidna ulaganja koja sam fond unovčava otkupljujući jedinice od ulagača na dnevnoj osnovi. Likvidnost investicionih jedinica je direktno izvedena iz likvidnosti aktive fonda. Da bi ovi fondovi mogli otkupljivati svoje investicione jedinice sva svoja ulaganja moraju koncentrisati ka finansijskim instrumentima kojima se trguje na uređenim tržištima. Aktiva (islamskih) banaka je po sebi netransparentna i nelikvidna. Po ovom obeležju položaj deponenata više odgovara položaju investitora u netransparentnim šemama, kao što su vrlo rizični privatni (hedž) fondovi.

U konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima uporedo postoje i manje transparentne šeme za kolektivno ulaganja individualnih investitora, doduše, daleko su manje i atraktivne od otvorenih fondova. Ulagači takozvanih zatvorenih investicionih fondova, zastupljeni su u organima uprave, mogu izmeniti investicionu politiku, pa čak i investicionog menadžera. Ulaganja mogu unovčiti prodajom investicionih jedinica na sekundarnom tržištu. Dakle, islamskim deponentima je preko investicionih depozita ponuđena izuzetno netransparentna šema ulaganja, pri čemu izostaju svi instrumenti kojima se inače ublažava problem informisanosti kod šema poznatih u konvencionalnom bankarstvu. U narednoj tabeli (2) sumiraćemo obeležja konvencionalnih šema ulaganja i islamskog modaliteta podele profita i gubitka, kako bi se uporedila njihova atraktivnost.

Tabela 2: Uporedna analiza investicionih alternativa

Otvoreni fondovi Zatvoreni fondovi Privatni (hedž) fondovi

Islamski investicioni depoziti

Upravlja Agent na osnovu mandata investitora

Agent, ali i ulagači preko organa upravljanja

Agent na osnovu mandata investitora

Agent na osnovu mandata investitora

Struktura izvora Homogena Složena (u diskreciji agenta)

Složena (uz učešće investitora)

Složena (u diskreciji agenta)

Likvidnost imovine ulagača

Garantovana (interno)

Negarantovana (moguća eksterno)

Garantovana uz ograničenja

Negarantovana

Strategija ulaganja Tipizirana i rigidna

Tipizirana ali manje rigidna

U diskreciji agenta U diskreciji agenta

Likvidnost ulaganja Primarna (uslov) Poželjna (u diskreciji uprave)

Poželjna (u diskreciji uprave)

Izuzetno nelikvidna

Transparentnost Primarna Relaksirana Ograničena Ograničena

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but also a guarantee of his devotion to the project success. In the agency arrangement the absence of self-financing is often compensated by contracting collateral, but the use of collateral is here linked with some problems in the implementation as it is conditioned by identification of a specific conduct by the agent. The differences between the debt financing modalities and the Islamic joint venture are present also when we consider self-financing potential as the means for resolving the conflict between the contracting parties. In a conventional credit arrangement the borrower, based on his financial deposit (self-financing), acquires a subordinate status in respect to the creditor. The interest of the creditor will remain protected for as long as it lasts, no matter what the share of the borrower might be. Hence, for as long as the creditor cares for the share of the borrower not to disappear, any downgrading of the company value due to incompetence, or due to delinquency, will not be charged on that part of the company value which belongs to the creditor. This is not the case with the status of investors in Islamic joint venture arrangement, which have a fully equitable status. Hence the conduct of an entrepreneur, aimed at acquiring for himself material gain at the expense of a reduced value of jointly invested funds, becomes more probable, and the prevention of such conduct requires much more intensive efforts to be made by the investor.

The effect which may be expected from the profit and loss sharing scheme, when speaking of its impact on the level of savings and investments, crucially depends on whether a higher interest by the financier for profitability (co-financing of project) will prevail over eventual adverse effects that may be expected from an intensified problem of asymmetry of information for the contracting parties. Certain Islamic theoreticians (Bashair and Darrat, 1996, p. 37) state that in a situation when the interest of the financier is harmonised with the interest of the entrepreneur, financier will be more inclined to devote his expert resources to the project success, as opposed to the debt based financial arrangements where creditor’s attention is

focused on the obligor’s solvency, most of all on the degree of his indebtedness (or the value of collateral).2 Such an arrangement is based on the assumption that is actually opposite to the one which is being taken as a starting point in similar analyses in the modern business finances. We are assuming on regular basis that the entrepreneur if more substantially informed party, certainly denying the ability of the bank to devote its resources to the management of a large number of real investment projects. The need for significant engagement of the bank employees in managing real investment projects arises in case of cancellation in the regular loan servicing. When a group of such cases occurs, the care for restructuring loans is usually relocated from the regular banking operations into specially formed business units, known as the work-out units, or the receivables at a discounted value are being transferred on to the special organisations, as the banks implicitly acknowledge that they do not have available expert resources that may be significantly devoted to the real projects management.

Hence, the crucial questions that serve for testing validity of the above stated argument is whether an intensified need of the bank to engage in the real projects management can and really have a favourable impact on the management quality, but also whether this boosts a risk appetite of the other contracting party. Nevertheless, these questions are rather of an empirical than of a theoretical nature. Some experiences (Zaher and Hassan, 2001) gained from the initial implementation of the profit and loss sharing arrangements in Pakistan, have confirmed that cases of delinquency by the entrepreneurs are far from sporadic, which has finally caused this concept to be compromised. Results do not come as a surprise in view of the fact that tax evasion in this country has truly reached enormous proportions.

Islamic banks funding sourcesOne of the basic arguments set forth by the

theoreticians of Islamic banking in favour of this concept is the harmonisation of financial sources with the bank placements. Namely, if

2 Let us note that in the credit risk model profitability of the obligor is only one of the elements in a complex formula for calculation of the credit risk (Merton, 1974).

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Zaključujemo da je položaj ulagača u aranžmanima podele profita i gubitka najmanje povoljan od svih poznatih šema ulaganja koje stoje na raspolaganju individualnim investitorima u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima. Po nekim aspektima ona je nepovoljnija i od podregulisane investicione šeme privatnih investicionih (hedž) fondova, iako je pravo na pristup fondu jedna od retkih oblasti u kojima je poslovanje privatnih fondova regulisano, i to obično ograničenjem na bogatiju u po pretpostavci bolje informisanu klijentelu.

Islamsko bankarstvo u praktičnoj primeni

Možemo slobodno reći da konvencionalno i islamsko bankarstvo rastu iz istih korena. Savremene obrise konvencionalno bankarstvo je dobilo u neprekidnoj evoluciji, u pokušaju da se reše problemi, koje paradigmatski koncept islamskog bankarstva jednostavno ignoriše. Na taj način, koncept savremenog islamskog bankarstva predstavlja ništa drugo do povratak na sam početak.

Ignorantski odnos islamskog ideala prema savremenim izazovima se možda najjasnije očitava u problemima sa kojima se islamsko bankarstvo sreće kod same primene. Zaher i Hassan (2001) navode nekoliko oblasti u kojima se islamsko bankarstvo u primeni najizrazitije udaljava od paradigmatskog koncepta. Najpre, najveći deo aktivnosti islamske banke obave zaobilazeći aranžmane podele profita i gubitka3. Drugo, čak i kada se primenjuju, ovakvi aranžmani se znatno modifikuju. Na primer, kod investicionih depozita često se praktikuju eksplicitne (zakonima i propisima) ili implicitne garancije vrednosti depozita4. Na taj način se relativizira naglašavana veza između prinosa na angažovana sredstva i troškova pribavljenih sredstava. Kod plasmana sredstava na bazi aranžmana podele profita i gubitka, umesto potpuno neizvesnog prinosa na ulaganja pribegava se složenim šemama utvrđivanja

ključa za raspodelu u momentu ugovaranja uz uvažavanje svih onih elemenata koji su inače ključni u konvencionalnim aranžmanima (karakteristike zajmotražilaca, privredna grana i drugo).

Posebno je značajna praksa ugovoranja zaloge. Ugovaranjem zaloge aranžmani podele profita i gubitka približavaju se konvencionalnim finansijskim instrumentima, jer se time rizik realno prenosi sa finansijera na preduzetnika. Suprotno intenciji paradigmatske verzije islamskog bankarstva, praksa ugovaranja zaloge je prilično prisutna, i u velikoj meri je ostavljena na slobodan izbor banci. Ovo je posebno slučaj kod aranžmana koji se ne zasnivaju na principu podele profita i gubitka, ali se sreće i kod agentskog aranžmana. Ako se finansiranje vrši preko agentskog aranžmana, što znači da preduzetnik ex ante ne unosi sopstveni kapital radi finansiranja projekta, ali se finansijer obezbeđuje ugovoranjem zaloge, agentski aranžman se transferiše u specifičan aranžman sufinansiranja projekta. Kolateral, kao specifičan deo imovine preduzetnika, postaje uslovno ulaganje preduzetnika, koje će se aktivirati u slučaju neuspeha projekta, što dalje u specifičnim slučajevima finansijeru garantuje naplatu uložene sume transformišući po intenciji vlasničko ulaganje u dužnički tip ulaganja.

Sami teoretičari islamskog bankarstva zaključuju da se konkretnim rešenjima islamsko bankarstvo udaljava od teorijskog modela, tako da se na kraju spektra islamsko bankarstvo može potpuno poklopiti sa konvencionalnim bankarstvom, sa terminologijom kao jedinom razlikom.

Jedno od značajnijih pitanja, koje je takođe istraživano, je u kojoj meri se udaljavanje islamskih banaka od idela može pripisati razlozima koji determinišu ponudu, a u kojoj meri razlozima koji determinišu tražnju za proizvodima islamskih banaka. Modalitet troškovi plus profit (mark-up) kao kao sinonim za dužnički oblik finansiranja, apsolutno dominira nad vlasničkim modelima finansiranja

3 O ovome svedoče nalazi brojnih empirijskih studija, npr. za Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2008, p. 688), Indoneziju (Timberg, 2003), dok analize šireg obuhvata potvrđuju da jedva jedna petina svih plasmana islamskih banaka u islamskim državama biva plasirano preko aranžmana koji isključuju fiksne prinose finansijeru (Sunderarajan and Errico, 2002).

4 U Turskoj investicioni depoziti uživaju tretman vlasničkih ulaganja kod primene politike obaveznih rezervi likvidnosti, pa su po tom osnovu izuzeti, iako su potpuno pokriveni osiguranjem, ukoliko je deponent fizičko lice (Okumuş, 2005, p. 56.).

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the funding sources of Islamic banks are not fixed in the nominal amount, equally as the placements, then the Islamic banks are avoiding the basic risk to which their more conventional competitors are exposed. The problem of preserving liquidity and solvency should be by far less acute then in the case of conventional banks, where the main financial liability is a short-term one and nominally designated.

Regarding the funding sources, Islamic banks are suffering substantial limitations in respect to the conventional banks. The instruments for mobilazing funds on the financial market are not available, so the sources are being reduced only to some differently defined depositing arrangements. Islamic banking, not unlike the conventional banking, is practicing receiving demand deposits, often with the application of state-of-the-art technology (ATM and similar accessible products). The difference between these two systems appears in the nature of profit and loss participation accounts. When explaining the profit and loss sharing arrangements (Mudarabah), we have mentioned that the intention of the Islamic concept is for the position which the bank has towards the entrepreneur to be reflected in full on the position which the depositor has towards the bank. As in the case of such arrangements the bank can not contract the return irrespectively of the financed project results, neither can the depositors making their investment deposits with the bank be guaranteed the rate of return, or the preservation of the value of invested funds. Such arrangements are not known in conventional banking, but something similar is encountered in actual practice of the insurance companies. The so-called “profit-related insurance” is a modality of the life insurance where the person insured is granted the right to a proportionate part of the annual profit of the insurer, but this uncertain part of return is only an addition to a guaranteed sum which already contains in it a certain fixed capitalisation rate.

The idea of investing with an uncertain rate of return, especially designed for individual investors, is not known in conventional financial systems. For example, such a modality of investment has gained a great popular

acclaim with the emergence of the open-ended investment funds. Nevertheless, similarity between Islamic investment deposits and the investment units of the open-ended investment funds ends with the feature designating that in both of these forms, return or yield depends on the investment results. The differences, however, are many and significant ones. The open-ended investment funds are extremely transparent schemes, through which funds are invested through well in advance and clearly defined and typical strategies. Investment units are extremely liquid investments which the fund itself is liquidating by purchasing units from investors on daily basis. Liquidity of investment units directly derives from liquidity of the fund’s assets. In order to enable these funds to repurchase their investment units, they must concentrate their investments into financial instruments which are traded in regulated markets. Assets of (Islamic) banks are per se non-transparent and not liquid. According to these features, the position of the depositor is rather more corresponding to the position of an investor in non-transparent schemes, such as the highly risk exposed private hedge funds.

In the conventional financial systems, there is a parallel running of less transparent collective investment schemes for individual investors, albeit far less attractive than those of the open-ended funds. Investors into the so-called close-ended investment funds, represented on the management boards, have the power to change investment policies, and even replace the investment manager. Their investments may be cashed-in through the sale of investment units on the secondary market. Hence, the Islamic depositors, through the investment deposits, are offered an extremely non-transparent investment scheme, where there is an absence of all the instruments that are otherwise used to mitigate the problem of information accessibility in the schemes encountered in the conventional banking. In the forthcoming Table (2) we shall sum up the characteristics of the conventional investment schemes and that of the Islamic profit and loss sharing modality, in order to make comparison between their attractions for business clients.

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u islamskom bankarstvu. Ovakva situacija se dugo objašnjavala isključivo sklonostima banaka da favorizuju prvi oblik, jer je on inače više u duhu komercijalnog bankarstva, a i iskustvo banaka je daleko veće u ovim oblicima finansiranja. Međutim, i na strani tražnje očigledno postoje razlozi za smanjen interes za drugim oblikom finansiranja. Istraživanja sklonosti korisnika usluga5, pokazala su da korisnici usluga islamskih finansijskih organizacija ne ocenjuju interesantnim upravo one aranžmane koji su najbliže usklađeni sa islamskim principima (npr. musharakah). O nekim mogućim razlozima koji mogu objasniti smanjen interes klijentele za ovim aranžmanima govorićemo u nastavku.

Rigidnost finansijske strukture projekata kontinuirane egzistencije

Aranžmani podele profita i gubitka, u svom izvornom obliku, imaju dva obeležja koja zajednički stvaraju izuzetnu rigidnost i nameću firmama neopravdana finansijska ograničenja. Najpre, mudarabah kao i musharakah ne dopuštaju reinvestiranje profita u preduzeću. Drugo, u svom tradicionalnom obliku ovi ugovori nemaju fiksno dospeće (engl. perpetual). Ovi aranžmani će proizvoditi pravno dejstvo sve do prestanka zajedničkog poduhvata. Struktura finansiranja zajedničkog poduhvata, pa samim tim i ključ za raspodelu profita i gubitka ostaju nepromenjeni sve do prestanka firme. Etička opravdanost nepromenljivog ključa za raspodelu zaslužuje posebnu raspravu, mada ćemo se mi ovde baviti isključivo posledicama koje pomenuta obeležja imaju na efikasnost.

Preduzetnik neće moći da nakon potpisivanja ugovora poveća svoje učešće u firmi, iako bi on to eventualno želeo i bio u stanju bilo zbog toga što je u međuvremenu stekao dodatna sredstva, bilo zbog toga što su njegovi afiniteti prema riziku uvećani (po pretpostavci zbog toga što su unapređeni njegove menadžerske sposobnosti). Zbog ove nefleksibilnosti, PLS aranžmani neće odgovarati zrelim firmama, dok nove firme neće biti primamljive finansijerima jer menadžerske sposobnosti preduzetnika još uvek nisu proverene i dokazane. Ukoliko se

ovakav aranžman uspostavi, preduzetnik će sve vreme biti nagrađivan srazmerno njegovim početnim kvalifikacijama.

Kao rešenje za ovaj problem, imajući u vidu prioritet koji reinvestiranje dobiti ima u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima, neki autori (Tariqullah Khan, 1995) predlažu osavremenjivanje PLS aranžmana. Po predlogu, nakon što preduzetnik „stane na svoje noge“, banka bi postepeno napuštala aranžman prepuštajući kompletno vlasništvo preduzetniku. Na taj način bi banka povratila angažovana sredstva, koja bi se dalje mogla koristiti radi finansiranja novih projekata. Vlasnički udeo od sufinansijera preduzetnik bi mogao otkupiti svojim delom ostvarenog profita, dakle u nejednakim tranšama, sve do konačnog otkupa. Međutim, da li bi u interesu banke bilo da dezinvestira, tj. napusti svoje najbolje projekte. Ukoliko bi to prihvatila, banka bi de facto dala bez naknade opciju preduzetniku da poveća stepen vlasničke kontrole nad zajedničkim poduhvatom kada njegove privatne informacije ukazuju da poduhvat očekuje natprosečna profitabilnost. Dakle, ako krene dobro preduzetnik dobija firmu nazad, ako krene loše firma ostaje u delimičnom vlasništvu partnera.

U klasičnom kreditnom sistemu isplata kredita je čin kojim dužnik vraća u svoj posed poslovnu imovinu firme. Sve do tada u proces upravljanja firmom uključen je i kreditor. Restriktivne klauzule u kreditnim ugovorima omogućuju da se kreditor aktivnije uključi u upravljanje finansiranim projektom, upravo u trenutku kada preduzetnik dokazuje da nije u stanju da samostalno upravlja projektom, što se jednostavno dokazuje padom vrednosti poslovne imovine i smanjenjem učešća preduzetnika u finansiranju projekta. Potpuni prelazak firme u svojinu kreditora uređen je stečajnim postupkom. Na taj način kreditor nije isključen iz upravljanja projektom, već se uključuje u „pravi momenat“.

Na osnovu analiziranih obeležja možemo uočiti da su islamski aranžmani namenjeni za dugoročno finansiranje, a zasnovani na modelu vlasničkog ulaganja, izuzetno nefleksibilni, i to

5 Ovo potvrđuju istraživanja ponašanja korisnika bankarskih usluga izvršena u Bahreinu (Metawa and Almossawi, 1998, p. 310) i Turskoj (Okumuş, 2005, p. 73).

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We may conclude that the position of investor in the profit and loss sharing arrangements is the least favourable from amongst all of the other known investment schemes which are available to the individual investors in the conventional financial systems. In some aspects, it is even less favourable than the sub-regulated investment scheme of the private investment (hedge) funds, although the right of access to the fund is one of the few areas in which business of private funds is regulated, and this usually by restricting it to a more opulent and purportedly better informed clientele.

Islamic banking implemented in practice

We may feel free to state that both the conventional and Islamic banking have grown out from the same roots. Modern forms of conventional banking have matured through an uninterrupted evolution, in the attempts to resolve some problems, which the paradigmatic concept of Islamic banking is simply ignoring. In this manner, the concept of modern Islamic banking is nothing else but a return to the early beginnings.

An attitude of denial that the Islamic ideal has

towards contemporary challenges is best reflected in the problems which are facing Islamic banking when implemented in practice. Zaher and Hassan (2001) are mentioning several fields in which the Islamic banking, when applied in practice, is most emphatically distancing itself from the paradigmatic concept. Firstly, the major part of activities that the Islamic banks are conducting is applying forms that are circumventing the profit and loss sharing arrangements.3 Secondly, even when applied, such arrangements are being significantly modified. For example, in case of investment deposits what is often done in practice are the explicit (in laws and regulations prescribed) or implicit guarantees for the deposits value.4 In this manner the emphasised link between the return on funds engages and costs for provision of funds is expressed in rather relative terms. In case of placement of funds on the basis of the profit and loss sharing arrangement, instead of a fully uncertain return on investment, what is applied are complex schemes for determining the key or ratio of distribution at the moment of contracting, with due respect for all those elements which are otherwise crucial also in conventional arrangements (borrower’s credit rating characteristics, economic branch where the enterprise operates, etc.).

3 This is testified by many empirical studies, for example in the case of Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2008, p. 688), Indonesia (Timberg, 2003), while analyses of a broader scope confirm that barely one fifth of all the placements by Islamic banks in the Islamic countries is being places through the arrangements which exclude fixed returns for the financier (Sunderarajan and Errico, 2002).

4 In Turkey, investment deposits are enjoying the treatment of equity investments in application of the required reserves policy for liquidity, and on that basis they are exempt although they are fully covered by insurance, if the depositor is a physical person (Okumus, 2005, p. 56).

Table 2 Comparative analysis of investment alternatives

Open-ended funds Close-ended funds Private (hedge)

fundsIslamic investment deposits

Managed by Agent mandated by the investor

Agent but also investors through the management boards

Agent mandated by the investor

Agents mandated by the investor

Structure of sources Homogeneous Complex (at the agent’s discretion)

Complex (with participation of investor)

Complex (at the agent’s discretion)

Investor assets liquidity

Guaranteed (internally)

Non-guaranteed (possible externally)

Guaranteed with limitations

Non-guaranteed

Investment strategy Typical and rigid Typical but less rigid At the agent’s discretion

At the agent’sdiscretion

Investment liquidity

Primary (condition)

Desirable (at the discretion of the management)

Desirable (at the discretion of the management

Extremely non-liquid

Transparency Primary Relaxed Limited Limited

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ne samo u pogledu izbora strukture finansiranja. Distribucija nagrade na osnovu ostvarenog rezultata, podrazumeva da do nje dolazi u momentu kada je finansijska osnova za raspodelu (poslovni rezultat) utvrđena, i to po ključu koji je unapred utvrđen i nepromenljiv čitav životni vek projekta. Ukoliko bi zbog potreba finansiranja razvoja firme, u međuvremeno dolazilo do izmena u finansijskoj strukturi, moralo bi doći i do prilagođavanja ključa, što bi uvek iznova povlačilo složene pregovore o relativnom učešću (menadžerskog) rada i kapitala. U konvencionalnim finansijama ovaj problem ne postoji, jer je sistem raspodele jednostavniji: učešće poverilaca u raspodeli poslovnog rezultata i imovine firme je određeno nominalno, a čitav rezidual pripada preduzetniku.

Ovi modeli ostaju potpuno neprilagođeni potrebama razvojnog finansiranja dinamičnih firmi. Ne samo što u međuvremenu ne može doći do dodatnog finansiranja iz eksternih izvora, već izvorni oblik ovih aranžmana isključuje bilo kakvo reinvestiranje ostvarenog profita. Kako podela profita, zbog učešća menadžerskog rada, nije srazmerna strukturi finansiranja, eventualno reinvestiranje profita bi dovelo do smanjenja učešća u finansijskoj strukturi aktera koji isključivo obezbeđuje kapital. Problem reinvestiranja profita ne postoji u konvencionalnom modalitetu zajedničkih ulaganja, jer je struktura raspodele profita i pokrića gubitka saglasna strukturi kapitala. Takođe, potrebe za dodatnim finansiranjem mogu biti zadovoljene konvencionalnim kreditiranjem, koje ima drugačiji tretman od vlasničkih ulaganja, a nagrada zajmodavcu ima tretman finansijskog rashoda koji se isključuje iz ostvarenog rezultata i ne utiče na ključ raspodele.

Dezinvestiranje finansijera i ekonomske posledice

Predlog dogradnje PLS aranžmana, o kome smo upravo diskutovali, podrazumeva ugovorom uređeno, postepeno dezinvestiranje finansijera, što dokazuje da je fleksibilnost finansijske strukture potreba prepoznata i u islamskim sistemima. U tradicionalnim PLS aranžmanima izmena finansijske strukture je moguća jedino likvidacijom projekta, odnosno finansirane firme. Firma bi se onda prodavala u celini ili ako to nije ekonomski isplativo, vršila podela njene poslovne

imovine. U oba slučaja, likvidacija firme može stvarati posebno velike troškove kada alternativna upotreba poslovne imovine nije raspoloživa (Williamson, 1988). Poslovna imovina ili firma mogu biti osnova novog projekta čije pokretanje je moguće iznova finansirati.

U konvencionalnim, zapadnim finansijskim aranžmanima problem je rešen prenosom prava na preduzetnika da raspolaže rezidualnom vrednošću projekta od momenta pune isplate duga (vidi u tabeli 1). Zbog toga je nastavak projekta kada neko od finansijera gubi interes za svojim učešćem, eventualno dodatno ulaganje u projekat, kao i finansiranje već kreiranih projekata, daleko lakše izvesti. Konvencionalni finansijski aranžmani omogućuju vrlo različite kombinacije duga i vlasničkog kapitala u finansiranju realnih projekata, i to različite u brojnim aspektima, npr. može se kombinovati dug sa različitim stepenom prioriteta. Upravo model finansiranja zasnovan na kombinacijama vlasničkog ulaganja sa konvencionalnim dužničkim aranžmanima omogućuje firmama potpunu slobodu u izboru finansijske strukture. Na taj način, finansijska struktura postaje aktivna determinanta u kreiranju razvoja firme.

U islamskim aranžmanim koji se zasnivaju na dugu, npr. u finansijskom lizing aranžmanu, ovaj problem je rešen slično rešenju koje je u primeni u konvencionalnom kreditnom finansiranju: nakon otplate punog iznosa davaocu lizinga korisnik lizinga ulazi u posed predmeta lizinga. Međutim, ovi problemi su daleko izraženiji kod PLS aranžmana. Kahn Fahim (1995) objašnjavajući podelu rizika u agentskom i aranžmanu zajedničkog ulaganja navodi da „finansijer u celini absorbuje gubitke sve do okončanja projekta i otplate uložene sume“. [dodat italik]. Italikom istaknut deo konstatacije ukazuje da autor pravi pogrešnu analogiju PLS aranžmana sa aranžmanima o dugu. Naime, ukoliko finansirani projekat pripada tzv. kontinuiranim ekonomskim projektima (engl. going concern), a ne jednokratnom preduzetničkom poduhvatu (engl. single venture) ostaje problematično kako će se odrediti momenat okončanja projekta. U oba PLS modaliteta finansijer kontinuiranih ekonomskih projekata sredstva „može povratiti“ jedino likvidacijom firme. Nije jasno ko može pokrenuti likvidaciju firme, i šta sve može biti osnov za pokretanje likvidacije. Kod agentskog

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Especially significant is the practice of collateral contracting. By collateral contracting the profit and loss sharing arrangements are coming closer to the conventional financial instruments, as in this manner the risk is really transferred from the financier on to the entrepreneur. Contrary to the intentions of the paradigmatic version of Islamic banking, the practice of collateral contracting is rather broadly present, and to a great extent is made available for the bank to make its free choice in this regard. This is especially the case in arrangements which are not based on the profit and loss sharing principle, but is also encountered in the agency arrangements. If the financing is carried out through the agency arrangement, which means that the entrepreneur ex ante is not investing his own capital for project financing, but the financier is securing himself by contracting collateral, the agency arrangement is transferred into a specific arrangement of the project co-financing. Collateral, as a specific part of the entrepreneur’s assets, becomes conditionally speaking entrepreneur’s investment, which is to be activated in case of failure of the project, which in turn guarantees the financier, in specific cases, that he will be able to collect the invested sum by transforming, per intent, equity investment into debt investment type.

Theoreticians of Islamic banking themselves are finding that in some concrete solutions Islamic banking is departing from the theoretical model, so that at the end of the spectrum Islamic banking may be found fully compatible with the conventional banking, with the terminology remaining the only difference present.

One of the important questions, which were also researched, was to what an extent is the distancing of the Islamic banking from its ideal to be ascribed to the reasons which are determining the supply of, and to what extent to the reasons which are determining the demand for products of Islamic banks. The modality of the cost plus profit, or the mark-up, as the synonym for the debt financing

form, is absolutely dominating over the equity models of financing in the Islamic banking. Such a situation was for a long time being explained exclusively by the inclination of banks to favour the former form, as it is more in line with commercial banking, but also the experience of banks is by far higher in these forms of financing. However, on the side of demand it is obvious that there are reasons for a diminished interest in other forms of financing. Research into preferences of the users of services5 has shown that the users of services of Islamic financial organisations have not found interesting actually those arrangements which are most closely harmonised with the Islamic principles (for example, Musharakah). Some of the possible reasons that may explain a reduced interest of clients for these arrangements will be discussed further in this paper.

Rigid financial structure of projects with continuous existence

Profit and loss sharing arrangements, in their original form, have two features which are together creating an extreme rigidity and imposing on the firms unjustified financial constraints. Firstly, Mudarabah just like Musharakah are not allowing reinvestment of profit into the company. Secondly, in their traditional form, these contracts do not have a fixed maturity, they are perpetual. These arrangements will continue to produce legal effect for as long as the joint venture is not terminated. Structure of the joint venture financing, and thus the key for distribution of profit and loss, remains unchanged through the duration of the company’s life span. The ethical justification of this unchangeable key for distribution deserves special discussion, although we shall deal here exclusively with the consequences that the above mentioned features have on the efficacy.

Entrepreneur will not be able, after signing the contract, to increase his share in the firm, although he would be eventually willing to do so and would be able either because he had in

5 This is confirmed by the research into the conduct of the users of banking services made in Bahrein (Metawa and Almossawi, 1998, p, 310), and in Turkey (Okumus, 2005, p. 73).

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aranžmana do likvidacije može doći i kada se ustanovi da je agent pogrešno vodio projekat. U tom slučaju se prilikom likvidacije može aktivirati kolateral, što ovaj modalitet finansiranja čini jako sličnim modalitetu finansiranja privatnih (hedž) fondova, sa svim nedostacima i rizicima. Naime, zbog potrebe zaštite informacija o strategijama ulaganja, hedž fondove karakteriše izuzetno netransparentno poslovanje, visoka diskrecija menadžera i agresivno koncipirana struktura nagrada menadžera vezana za rezultate. Konflikt interesa između principala (finansijera) i menadžera ublažava se specifičnim opcijama ugrađenim u finansijske aranžmane. Na primer, finansijerima se garantuje pravo na povlačenje dela ili celine uloženih sredstava, što oni koriste na prvi znak loših performansi. Rizik prinudne likvidacije, pojačava averziju menadžera prema riziku, koji tada čine otklon od projekata koji, iako dugoročno mogu biti efikasni, u kratkom roku bivaju praćeni lošim rezultatima (Shleifer, 2000, p. 106).

PLS modeli finansiranja imaju dva ključna nedostatka. Najpre, interesi firme grubo su opstruirani ukoliko je dodatno finansiranje neophodno za dinamične razvojne planove. Na ovaj način finansirane firme neće moći da rastu, jer će ih u tome ograničavati nefleksibilni finansijski aranžman. Dakle, figurativno rečeno „dečak je prinuđen da raste ostajući u istom odelu čitavo detinjstvo“. Drugo, na nivou privrede široka primena ovakvog aranžmana suzila bi razvojnu podršku na projekte na koje su sredstva inicijalno alocirana. Nove firme mogle bi se finansirati jedino iz novih izvora banaka. Koliko je ovakav koncept anahron govori sledeći primer iz ekonomske istorije. Naime, prvi primeri finansiranja zajedničkih poslovnih poduhvata u zapadnom svetu zabeleženi su u slučaju Britanske kompanije za istočnu Indiju. Svaki poduhvat se finansirao iz posebnog kapitala. Ovakav model finansiranja zahtevao je likvidaciju firme, odnosno fizičku podelu imovine uvek kada je bilo potrebno da se rezultat zajedničkog poduhvata podeli među suvlasnicima, a to se dešavalo po okončanju svakog putovanja. Pomenuta kompanija je nastavila da se finansira izdavanjem privremenih akcija, koje su se odnosile na posebne poduhvate sve do 1613. godine (Lavelle, 2004, p. 30). Tek je otkriće transferibilnosti akcijskog kapitala, prvi

put primenjeno kod Holandske kompanije za istočnu Indiju, dovelo do naglog ekonomskog rasta i učinilo srednjevekovni Amsterdam finansijskom prestonicom zapadne civilizacije (Michie, 2008, p. 25).

Rezerve koje smo izneli u ovom odeljku odnose se gotovo isključivo na PLS aranžmane. Kod ostalih finansijskih aranžmana ne bi se moglo reći da dolaze u sukob sa praksom, jer su daleko češći kod islamskih banaka. Međutim, primedbe bi se ovde mogle koncentrisati oko sumnjive utemeljenosti na izvornim principima Islama.

Zaključak

Dva u islamu najžešće osporavana principa konvencionalnog bankarstva su a) pravo na povraćaj date sume (bez obzira na ishod projekta) i b) pravo zajmodavca na naknadu koja nije utvrđena u skladu sa rezultatima finansiranog projekta. Međutim, u islamskim finansijskim aranžmanima zasnovanim na dugu ova dva obeležja nisu isključena, već su samo prikrivena. Aranžman troškovi plus profit uključuje oba sporna elementa: podrazumeva bezuslovni povraćaj uloženih sredstava i fiksni prinos finansijera. Činjenica da se u zajam ne daje novac, već se za novac kupuje dobro koje se dalje daje u zajam, ne predstavlja suštinsku razliku. Argument da se banka u komercijalnom aranžmanu izlaže rizicima, kojim se pravda fiksna naknada banci, prilično je labav. Rizik eventualnog oštećenja dobra pre predaje korisniku može se izbeći komercijalnim uslovima, dok se neodgovarajući kvalitet nabavke po pravilu izbegava direktnim uključenjem korisnika u proces nabavke. Rizici vezani za dobro u procesu upotrebe dalje se isključuju ugovaranjem kolaterala.

Sa druge strane, aranžmani koji se zasnivaju na principu podele profita i gubitka ostaju osetljivi na niz problema, kao što su problem nepovoljnog izbora, devijantnog odnosa preduzetnika prema riziku i druge pojavne manifestacije troškova agenture, i to u daleko većoj meri od klasičnog kreditnog aranžmana. U praksi, izvesni elementi konvencionalnog kreditnog aranžmana ugrađuju se u islamske finansijske aranžmane, kako bi se ovi problemi ublažili, ali to istovremeno udaljava ove aranžmane od teorijskog ideala.

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the meantime acquired additional resources, or because his risk appetite had increased (at the assumption that his managerial skills have been enhanced). Because of this rigidity, the PLS arrangements will not be suitable for more mature companies, while the newly established firms will not be attractive to the financiers as the managerial skills of entrepreneurs have not as yet been tested or proven. If such an arrangement is to be set in place, entrepreneur will be rewarded all the time in proportion with his initial qualifications.

As a solution to this problem, bearing in mind the priority which reinvestment of profit has in the conventional financial systems, some authors (Tariqullah Khan, 1995) suggest an upgrading of the PLS arrangements. They propose that after an entrepreneur had “found his stable feet” the bank would be gradually leaving the arrangement, leaving complete ownership in the hands of the entrepreneur. In this way the bank would return its engaged funds, which it would be able to use further on for financing some new projects. Equity share from the co-financier the entrepreneur would be able to purchase with his part of the profit made, therefore in unequal tranches, until the final buy-out. However, would it be in the best interest of the bank to disinvest, i.e. to abandon its best projects? In case it would accept such an arrangement, the bank would hand over de facto the option to the entrepreneur to increase the degree of his ownership control over the joint venture, when his private information are indicating that the venture is expected to reach an above average profitability. Therefore, if things would go smoothly, entrepreneur is getting the firm back, if things are going badly the firm remains in a partial ownership of the partners.

In the classic crediting system, credit repayment is an act where the obligor is returning into his possession business assets of the firm. Until then, in the process of the firm management creditor was also involved. Restrictive clauses in the credit agreements are allowing the creditor to engage more actively in the management of the project financed, actually at the time when the entrepreneur is showing that he is not able to independently manage the project, which is simply reflected in the fall of value of his business assets and the fall of share of the entrepreneur

in the financing of the project. The full transfer of the firm into the ownership of the creditor is regulated under the bankruptcy or a receivership procedure. In this manner, creditor is not excluded from the project management, but is joining the firm “at the right moment”.

On the basis of the analysed features we can note that the Islamic arrangements designed for long-term financing, and based on the model of equity investment, are extremely rigid, not only regarding the choice of the financing structure. Distribution of profit on the basis of result achieved implies that it shall take place at the moment when the financial basis for distribution (business result) has been determined, distribution to be made according to the key determined in advance and unchangeable for the entire life span of the project. If in case of necessity to finance company development, in the meantime there should be some changes in the financing structure, what would have to be adjusted is the key itself, which would always and from the beginning involve complex negotiations on the relative share of the (managerial) work and capital. In the conventional finances this problem does not exist, as the system of distribution is much simpler: the share of the creditor in the distribution of the business result and the company assets is fixed nominally, and the entire residual amount belongs to the entrepreneur.

These models remain completely unadjusted to the needs required for development financing of dynamic companies. Not only is it impossible in the meantime for additional financing to come from external sources, but also the original form of these arrangements is excluding any re-investment of the profit made. As the division of profit, because of the participation of the managerial work, is not proportional to the financing structure, any eventual reinvestment of profit would bring about a reduced share in the financing structure of the actor who is exclusively providing capital. The problem of profit reinvestment in conventional banking modality of the joint ventures is non existent, as the structure of profit distribution and covering of losses is concordant with the capital structure. In addition, the need for additional financing can be satisfied by conventional crediting, which has a different treatment from the equity

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investments, and the reward for the creditor has the treatment of the financial expenditure which is excluded from the result achieved, and does not impact the key for division.

Disinvestment of financier and economic consequences

The proposal for upgrading of the PLS arrangement, that we have discussed hereinabove, designates contractually regulated and gradual disinvestment by the financier, which proves that flexibility of financial structure is a necessity well recognised also in the Islamic systems. In the traditional PLS arrangements the change of financial structure is possible only in case of liquidation of the project, i.e. liquidation of the financed company. The company would then be sold in its entirety, or if this should not be economically feasible, division of its business assets would be made. In both cases, liquidation of the company can incur very high costs when an alternative use of the business assets is not available (Williamson, 1988). Business assets of the company can serve as basis for the new project and its initiation can be financed from the beginning.

In the conventional western financial arrangements the problem is solved through the transfer of right on to the entrepreneur to dispose with the residual value of the project from the moment of full debt repayment (see Table 1). Hence the continuation of the project, when one of the financiers is losing interest in his participation, would be in an additional investment into the project, but also financing of the already created projects, which would be much easier to perform. Conventional financial arrangements allow very diverse combinations of debt and equity capital investments in the financing of real projects, and this differs in numerous aspects, for example, it is possible to combine debt with various degrees of priority or preference. Actually the model of financing based on combinations between equity investments and conventional debt arrangements allows companies to have full freedom in selection of the financing structure. In this way the financial structure becomes an active determinant in the creating of the company development.

In the Islamic arrangements based on

debt, for example in the financial leasing arrangement, this problem is solved in the manner similar to the solution which is applied on conventional credit financing: after repayment of the full amount due to the leasing agent, leasing beneficiary becomes the proprietor of the subject of leasing. However, these problems are far more emphatic in the PLS arrangements. Khan Fahim (1995), when explaining the sharing of risk in the agent arrangement and the joint venture arrangement states that “the financier fully absorbs losses until the completion of the project and repayment of the sum invested” [italics added]. Italics underline the part of statement which points out that the author is making an erroneous analogy between the PLS arrangement and the debt arrangement. Namely, if the project financing belongs to the so-called continuous economic projects, or rather the going concerns, and not to the single entrepreneurial venture, what remains problematic is the way to determine the moment for project termination. In both the PLS modalities financier of going concerns “can return” funds only through the liquidation of the company. It is not clear who will instigate company liquidation, and what may serve as grounds for instigating liquidation. In the agency arrangement, liquidation may occur also when it is established that agent had wrongly managed the project. In such a case, what is activated during liquidation is the collateral which is rendering this financing modality very similar to the modality of financing private (hedge) funds, with all the shortcoming and risks involved therein. Namely, because of the need to protect information on strategic investments, hedge funds are characteristic for an extremely non-transparent business operation, high discretion of its managers and aggressively conceived structure of managerial rewards and bonuses linked with results achieved. Conflict of interest between the principal (financier) and manager is mitigated with specific options embodied in financial arrangements. For example, financiers are guaranteed the right to withdraw a part or entirety of funds invested, which they avail themselves of at the first sign of poor performance. The risk of forcible liquidation in increasing the risk aversion of managers,

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Perspectives and implications“ International Journal of Bank Marketing 16 (1998.) 299–313.

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which are then distancing themselves from the projects, which although feasibly efficient on long-term basis, over short-term are suffering poor results (Shleifer, 2000, p. 106).

The PLS financing models have two crucial shortcomings. Firstly, the company interests are grossly obstructed if additional financing is necessary for dynamic development plans. Companies financed in this manner will not be able to grow, as they will be prevented by a rigid financial arrangement. Therefore, figuratively speaking, what this means is that “the boy is forced to grow while clothed in the same suit during his entire childhood”. Secondly, on the level of economy, the broad application of such an arrangement would narrow down development support for projects where the funds were initially allocated. New companies could be financed only from the new bank sources. Just how much such a concept is an anachronism is best illustrated by the following example found in the history of economics. Namely, the earliest examples of financing joint business ventures in the Western world were recorded in the case of the East Indies British Company. Each venture was financed from a special capital. Such a financing model required liquidation of the company, i.e. a physical division of assets always when it was necessary for the result of the joint venture to be divided between the co-owners, and this was happening at the end of every voyage. The said company continued to finance itself through the issue of interim stock certificates, which referred to special ventures up to 1613 (Lavelle, 2004, p. 30). It is only with the discovery of the transferability of the equity capital, applied for the first time in case of the Dutch Company of the East Indies, that a sharp economic growth occurred and made the mediaeval city of Amsterdam to be financial capital of the Western civilisation (Michie, 2008, p. 25).

The reserves that we have expressed in this section pertain almost exclusively to the PLS arrangements. In case of other financial arrangements it can not be said that they are conflicting with the practice, although by far more frequent are those in the case of Islamic

banks. However, the remarks could be focused here on their dubious grounding on the original principles of Islam.

Conclusion

The two most often disputed principles of conventional banking in Islam are the following: a) the right to return of the given amount (regardless of the project outcome); and b) the right of the creditor to receive a fee which is not predetermined in accordance with the financial results of the project. However, in the Islamic financial arrangements based on debt these two features are not excluded, but are only concealed. The profit and loss sharing arrangement includes both of the disputable elements: it comprises an unconditional return of funds invested, and a fixed yield for the financier. The fact that the loan is not granted in the form of money, but money is given for purchase of the good which is given on loan, does not make a substantial difference. The argument that the bank in commercial arrangement is exposed to risks, which serves as justification for prescribing fixed fee for the bank, is rather a feeble one. The risk of a possible damage caused to the goods before it is handed over to the beneficiary may be avoided by commercial terms, while an inadequate quality of goods supplied as a rule is avoided by direct involvement of the beneficiary in the process of supply. The risks connected with the goods in the process of its use are further excluded by contracting collateral.

On the other hand, the arrangements based on the profit and loss sharing principle remain sensitive to a number of problems, such as the problem of an adverse selection, a deviant attitude of the entrepreneur towards risk, and other manifestations featuring in the agency costs, and this much higher than in the case of a classic credit arrangement. In practice, certain elements of conventional credit arrangement are embodied in the Islamic financial arrangements, in order to mitigate these problems, but this also renders these arrangements more distant from their theoretical ideal.