24
This article was downloaded by: [University of Colorado - Health Science Library] On: 10 October 2014, At: 15:49 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Irish Political Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fips20 Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century Christopher Farrington Published online: 19 Oct 2007. To cite this article: Christopher Farrington (2001) Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century, Irish Political Studies, 16:1, 49-71, DOI: 10.1080/07907180108406632 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907180108406632 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

This article was downloaded by: [University of Colorado - Health Science Library]On: 10 October 2014, At: 15:49Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Irish Political StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fips20

Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentiethcenturyChristopher FarringtonPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Christopher Farrington (2001) Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century, Irish PoliticalStudies, 16:1, 49-71, DOI: 10.1080/07907180108406632

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907180108406632

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representationsor warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN THE LATETWENTIETH CENTURY

Christopher Farrington

Abstract: This article critiques the dominant analysis of Ulster Unionism by arguingthat a dichotomy is too simplistic to appreciate the multiple and often divergent strandsof a complex ideology. It argues that a more satisfactory approach is to be found in thehistorical understanding of Ulster Unionism and sets out the most dominant ideologicalstrands that can be ascertained today. It puts forth complementary and overlappingdichotomies as a solution to the problem identified. It argues that an ideological dividecan be ascertained between those whose politics is primarily religious in nature and thosefor whom it is secular. However, an appreciation is also made of the other functionswhich these two roles perform. Secondly, it sees the main political division withinUnionism as a tactical struggle between the pragmatists of the pro-Agreement partiesand the dogmatists of the anti-Agreement ones. Finally, it buttresses the argument infavour of more effective categorical analysis by describing the embryonic growth of classpolitics within Unionism to show that dichotomies are ineffectual.

In the political aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, academic commentatorshave fascinated themselves with explaining how and why a political accommodationwas reached between Unionism and Nationalism. Many argue that ideological andTactical changes within Nationalism and Republicanism were the driving force. Unionistreaction and division seem to imply two things. Firstly, that Unionism is still in themindset so aptly expressed by the slogan of the anti-Anglo-Irish Agreement campaign:'Ulster says No.' The second assumption is that there has been little ideological changewithin Unionism and that their motivations for concluding the Good Friday Agreementare simply a realistic appraisal that political circumstances have been mounting againstthem. Both these assumptions are incorrect. The last decade has seen the articulation ofnew ideas that have gradually permeated into formal Unionist discourse, exemplified byDavid Trimble's leadership style and motivations. This article will analyse the internaldynamics of Unionist politics surrounding the Good Friday Agreement and will proposea re-examination of the analysis of contemporary political divisions within Unionism.By doing so, it suggests a different approach to that which has hitherto been utilised toanalyse Unionism.

Historically, Unionism has been seen as layered and complex, involving manydifferent complementary actors and groups. Graham Walker and Richard Englishdescribe the movement as a whole in the Home Rule period as "riddled with tensionsof a political, cultural, class, regional and denominational nature" (English and Walker,

Irish Political Studies - Vol. 16, 2001©2001, PSAI Press

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 3: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

50 Irish Political Studies 2001

1996, p ix). This need not be seen as a negative characteristic as Alvin Jacksonhas described the same movement as "a luxuriant intellectual and cultural growth"(Jackson, 1999, p 215). However, the same appreciation of these tensions and divisionshas not been manifested in the analysis of contemporary Unionism. Preoccupied withanalysing Unionist culture, identity and politics together these analyses have beensatisfied with, at best, a dichotomy (Todd, 1987) and, at worst a barren search foran essence of Unionism which is non-existent.' I propose a fusion of ideas and theintroduction of new categories of analysis to reach a more satisfactory classification andanalysis of Ulster Unionism at the end of the twentieth, and beginning of the twenty-first, century. Therefore, in the next section I examine the role of the Protestant religionin Unionist politics and Unionist political philosophy. In the second section tacticaldivisions are outlined and this discussion is contrasted with the first section to highlightthe deficiencies with previous models and to suggest a layered approach. In the finalsection I outline class divisions within Unionism and show how these are difficult toreconcile with previous interpretations.

THE RELIGIOUS - SECULAR SPECTRUM

Protestantism is seen as central to Unionism. A prominent sociologist, who hasbeen influential in analysing Unionism, has argued that the Protestant religion is thedefining characteristic of the Unionist community (Bruce, 1986, 1992, and 1994).Journalists have propagated the idea through the titles of their books (McKay, 2000)thus reaffirming the centrality of religion. Buttressing these perceptions has been ascholarly analysis of unionist culture: "in constructing their identity, unionists drew onan exclusively Protestant ethos and a history rich in myth and tradition" (Mclntosh,1999, pi). Furthermore, the predominant classification of the Northern Ireland conflictas ethnic or ethnonationalist has reinforced these analyses. This has been to thedetriment of a full appreciation of unionist ideology which has important secularelements. The last decade has seen secularism as a growth-idea within Unionism anda full reappraisal of the relationship between secularism and Protestantism is nowneeded.

Initially two analyses of the role and importance of Protestantism within Unionismare worthy of consideration. They are essentially complementary, although neither isparticularly accurate. Norman Porter's identification of a "Protestant Unionist" ethos,or "cultural Unionism" as he describes it, correctly places Protestantism in its properplace as a strand of a complex ideology (Porter, 1996, pp. 72-126). However, muchof the basis of his discussion about this strand is based on the erroneous presumptionthat Protestantism defines the external relationship with the British State; other facets ofunionism, as shall be demonstrated later, explain this. Steve Bruce, on the other hand,places Protestantism within an internal unionist framework but arguably overplays itssignificance (Bruce, 1986, 1994). Bruce argues that "Ulster Protestants form an ethnicgroup and . . . the Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict" (1994, p 142) and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 4: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 5J_

that "the key point is the centrality of evangelicalism for the Ulster Loyalist's sense ofethnic identity. It defines the group to which he belongs, it figures large in the historyof that group, it legitimates the group's advantages . . . and it radically distinguishesthe group from its traditional enemy" (1994, p 25). However, Protestantism is not andnever has been the sole defining characteristic of Unionism and even the dichotomouspattern suggested by Jennifer Todd shows that Protestantism is minimally important fora significant section of the Unionist populace.

Protestant Unionism, therefore, is a strain within Unionism but it manifests itself inavenues of culture and identity rather than in formal political discourse. It facilitatesinternal definition, as Bruce argues, and provides a means of identification for somepoliticians with their constituency but does not provide a political ideology forUnionism. As such, religious organisations and personalities play a larger politicalrole in Unionism than is ostensibly the case in Irish Nationalism. Each party hasparticular mechanisms to reflect this: the Orange Order sends 106 delegates to the UlsterUnionist Council (UUC) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has maintained areligious leadership. Indeed, commentators have suggested that Paisley's evangelicalismpermeates the DUP on such a fundamental level that the party could be described as a"politico-religious organisation" (Smyth, 1986).

However, there has been a gradual secularisation of the DUP since Smyth's articleand the extent to which other party members support Paisley's religious imagery isprobably defined by how far it reflects the aims and objectives of the party. A distinctionshould be drawn between the personal faith of leading members of the DUP and theirpolitical ideology. Paisley's religious rhetoric pushes an image of the staunch UlsterProtestant who is trustworthy and honest. Moreover, his leadership implies that thisis reflected throughout the party. The speech made by Paisley on 15 July 1999, whend'Hondt was unsuccessfully triggered, demonstrates this:

On this crucial day, when the voice of united Unionism should have been heard, the main Unionist

party is not here because Mr. Trimble is attempting to hold on to office. This is what this is about

- office seekers who arc prepared to sell their souls for office . . . Those Unionists who did not

run away have, today, been able to derail this whole process, and to bury it in a Sadducee's grave,

from which there can be no resurrection. (Northern Ireland Assembly Parliamentary debates, 15 July

1999, www.ni-asscmbly.gov.uk/rccord/990715.htm)

These sentiments are linked to DUP's self-portrayal as "Your Best Guarantee," whichwas their slogan for the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. These words occurredfourteen times in an eight-page manifesto and indicate the emphasis placed on this idea.

Equally important, however, is Paisley's overt identification with Protestantism. Heis one of the few politicians who still unambiguously equates 'Ulster people' with theProtestant community. In the other strands of Unionism these terms have been replacedby the more neutral and universal 'pro-Union people' or 'the greater number of people inD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 5: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

52 Irish Political Studies 2001

Northern Ireland' and which imply much less exclusivity. It is worth briefly contrastingthe initial response of Paisley and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to the Patten Report.Whereas the UUC Executive saw the Report as an attack on policing and the Britishstate in Northern Ireland2 Paisley saw it as an attack on the Protestant people and endson the uncompromising assertion that "Patten's programme is that Protestants have to beethnically cleansed"3. Paisley's appeal is explained by his identification with the group herepresents rather than identification with his ideas.

This brief explanation illuminates the role of Protestantism within Unionism because,for many, Protestantism is an identifying feature of what it means to be Unionist. Itdefines a community and culture; even for those who do not espouse or are even awareof the religious beliefs associated with Protestantism. This is a point which is broughtout with crystal clarity by the series of Island Pamphlets which transcribe the discussionsof the Shankill, Ballymacarrett and Waterside Think Tanks. Each represents a particularworking class Unionist community; the Shankill is located in West Belfast, Ballymacarrettin East Belfast and the Waterside in Londonderry. In each case the theme running throughthe discourse is the identification with a Protestant community and culture but that thisdoes not necessarily translate into a definition of Britishness. The internal dimensionsof Protestantism are evident in that besieged of all besieged unionist communities, theWaterside, which has seen, in their eyes, a steady decline of their population and a steadyattack on their culture, both of which are defined as Protestant. For example, the ThinkTank states "one important ingredient of Protestant alienation arises from the widespreadbelief that Protestant culture is denigrated by Nationalists" (Waterside Think Tank, 1999,ppl2 - 13). Such a view is replicated through the discussions of the other Think Tanksand the following contribution of one of the members of the Ballymacarrett Think Tank isfairly typical of the views expressed in the pamphlets:

I think for years Nationalists and Republicans have been hijacking and misappropriating aspects

of culture which were shared with Protestants or maybe even originally belonged to Protestants.

Anything to do with folk dancing, which Protestants would have participated in at one time - and

probably had a large Ulster-Scots aspect to it - was always claimed as being Irish, and taken away

from us. And they have even hijacked Labour culture to a certain extent. I mean, according to

Republicans a Protestant can't be a Socialist or have Labour views because to them Protestantism is

just reactionary and backward, so they've tried to claim for themselves the whole trade union and

labour movement. And I think you're left with a very narrow definition of culture coming down to

the Orange Order and the bands, which did belong to the Prods and which Nationalists had no wish to

take on board, partly because they can use these as weapons to beat you with, by saying your culture

is very much a one-item thing. And they've backed Protestants into a comer where they now have

to fight for every last bit of culture they've got left, and that probably suits the Republican agenda

too, because some people try to defend our culture in ways that make Protestants look bigoted and

narrow-minded (Ballymacarrett Think Tank, 1999, pp l2-13) .

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 6: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 53

There are therefore several reasons for treating the traditional categorisation ofUlster Loyalism with some scepticism when Todd has defined it as thus: "UlsterLoyalism is dominance, but it is dominance legitimated and garbed in imaginativelyrich and coherent ideas" (Todd, 1987,3). There is little evidence to suggest that this isthe case if the denning element serves an internal purpose. Moreover, while Morrowhas argued that religion facilitates the identification of an 'other' (Morrow, 1997, p59),the electoral rise of the conciliatory loyalist parties contradict the idea that this particularunionist constituency sees treachery in compromise or is preoccupied with dominatingthe Nationalist community.

In the search for an adequate categorisation for Unionism or elements of Unionism,the 'Protestant' element has been called 'cultural Unionism,' (Porter, 1996) the 'Ulster-Loyalist tradition' (Todd, 1987) and the 'sovereign people' (Aughey, 1997) and thefollowing strain has been termed 'liberal Unionism,' (Porter, 1996) the 'Ulster-Britishtradition' (Todd, 1987) and the 'constitutional people' (Aughey, 1997). I feel, however,it is best described as the secular element to Unionism because I want to draw adistinction between ideology and other aspects of Unionist politics which will beexplained later. Secular Unionism is the formal political ideology that is used informing the arguments for defending the Union and the Unionist political position. It isunfortunate that studies of contemporary Unionism fail to see the historical tradition ofa secular Unionism which has employed secular arguments in defence of the idea of theUnion since the emergence of the Home Rule issue. The Stormont years stifled muchof this Unionist political thought because there was no immediate need to employ sucha rationale for the Union and secular ideas have only really re-emerged to prominencesince the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) and the Campaign for Equal Citizenship (CEC).Moreover, they have to compete with the entrenched populism of Paisley with whatare little more than philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, there are layers of secularismapparent even within the DUP.

The fullest expression of such Unionism has come from academics and in particularArthur Aughey and John Wilson Foster. Foster's project is based on the followingargument: "History notwithstanding, it [Unionism] must cease claiming the Union forProtestantism and triumphalism, and claim it for reason and realism" (Foster, 1995,p70). Aughey goes slightly further and states, "The identity of unionism has little to dowith the idea of the nation and everything to do with the idea of the state . . . unionismmust be understood in terms of citizenship" (Aughey, 1989, pp 18 - 19).

Intimately bound up in these ideas is that the United Kingdom is a pluralist state ableto accommodate many diverse identities and that this is preferable to the exclusivenessof nationalism of any sort but particularly Irish Nationalism.

While it cannot be contended that this strain represents the total character or identityof Unionism, it does display a much greater understanding of the merits of maintainingthe Union and, moreover, of the nature of Britishness, the Union and of identity withinthe unionist populace.41 stated earlier that Protestantism facilitated internal definitionD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 7: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

54 Irish Political Studies 2001

but did not define the relationship with Britain. This secular strand defines the latterrelationship, a factor which is reflected by and understood by many of the Unionistpoliticians. The approach outlined above by Aughey and Foster is not limited solely toacademics. For example, John Taylor, the deputy leader of the UUP, has said:

The issue is what kind of unionism the people want . . . Do they want the unionist case articulated in

Dublin, America or London or do they want the sort of unionism where their representative walks in

front of a parade which has people carrying a banner supporting the Harryville protest (Newsletter,

17/4/1997).

It should be noted that Taylor is not beyond playing on Protestant Unionism, as hedid in July 1999 when he publicly made an issue of donning his Orange collarette andmarching on the Twelfth but, again, this merely demonstrates how various branches ofUnionism can exist together. The second example is much more intriguing as it takenfrom a source that, while important within the UUP, is not well-known publicly andperhaps shows that the ideas of secular Unionism go much deeper than a handful ofacademics and political leaders.

The view we represent - Ulster Unionism - suits that modern world. Nationalism is in retreat; its

time is gone. Nationalism preaches isolation and disengagement. Whether it is the Irish nationalism

of Sinn Fein or the Ulster nationalism of the DUP, the message is the same - "Ourselves alone."

By contrast Ulster Unionism, our unionism, real unionism is moving forward. It is at home in the

world of ever closer communications and better information.

This is a world in which you win your case by putting your case.

This is a world in which your viewpoint is given esteem because you esteem the viewpoint of the

other person.

This is the world of engagement, the world of pluralism. It is the world we live in.

(Speech by Lord Rogan of Lower Iveagh to the Annual Conference of the UUP 9/10/99,

www.uup.org)

One further example provides an interesting twist to much of the traditional analysisof Unionism which has held that working class communities are in the Ulster-Loyalistvein, to use Todd's classification, (1987, p3) or who are over-represented in theProtestant Unionist category described earlier. This has always appeared to have beena type of paradox as the working classes have been considered to be more secular thantheir 'representatives,' the DUP. Yet, the past five years have seen the emergence of thetwo loyalist paramilitary parties who appeal to a working class constituency. Moreover,they appeal to this constituency from a secular Unionist perspective. The followingpassage is part of the mission statement from the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)website and the ideas which it offers are evident throughout the speeches and interviewswhich their leadership have given throughout their brief existence.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 8: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 55

The Progressive Unionist Party have pleasure in presenting to you their antecedents, credentials and

their policies which we believe will achieve peace, prosperity and reconciliation in this part of the

United Kingdom. We are a working class Party dedicated to bettering the lot of the ordinary person.

We are staunchly pro-Union, anti-sectarian and wholly dedicated to a pluralist society.

We arc in the process of re-defining Unionism and re-instating that political concept as an honourable,

legitimate, viable and caring proposition, (www.pup.org)

However, this secular defence of the Union stretches to other issues that havegained importance in Northern Irish politics over the past decade, for example, theissue of contentious parades is dealt with in the UUP manifesto in universalist secularlanguage.

The Ulster Unionist Party will continue to advocate civil and religious liberty for all. We uphold

the rights of the Loyal Orders to proceed lawfully on the public highway and in freedom of access

to places of worship for all . . . The Ulster Unionist Party holds that in the wake of the Stormont

Agreement there must be a greater degree of tolerance and that it is unacceptable for any group to

indicate that it is unable to even stand the sight of people of another religion (UUP Manifesto - 1998

Northern Ireland Assembly Election).

This appeal to principles of human rights is one which is not limited to those in theUUP or PUP and the secular tendencies were brought to the fore during the debatesover the Good Friday Agreement where the majority of 'No' Unionists couched theirarguments in secular terms. Aughey may have a point when he states of this group that"intense textual criticism to discover satanic intent in the particular might prevent onediscovering advantages in the larger scheme of this" (Fortnight, No 371, June 1998, p11) but his use of religious language is inappropriate to describe the majority of 'No'Unionists. This is clearly shown by clause six of 'The Declaration and Pledge of theUnited Unionists:'

We demand, as British citizens, equality of treatment, the protection of our lives, persons and

property, and the return of democratic and accountable government, free from the domination of

violent political terrorism, and in which all citizens have equal rights (United Unionists' Declaration

"It s Right to Say No").

The UUP MP for West Tyrone, William Thompson, criticised the Good FridayAgreement for similar reasons: "If they [the unionist people] vote yes, they will be votingto be second-class citizens within the United Kingdom".5 Indeed, the attacks on the GoodFriday Agreement have primarily focused on the 'political' aspects (for example, prisonerreleases, decommissioning) rather than the 'constitutional' aspects (for example, power-sharing). For example, all parties within Unionism have debated decommissioning interms of appeals to democratic norms. McCartney, for example, has stated that:D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 9: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

56 Irish Political Studies 2001

the proposal to place Sinn Fein into government in these circumstances [i.e. without decommissioning]

is so outrageous and does such violence to the principles of democracy as to make it only possible if

the people have been brainwashed into oblivion (R. L. McCartney, speech on 'Democracy Motion'

in Northern Ireland Assembly 15/12/1998, www.ukup.org).

Similarly, Peter Robinson listed his objections to the Good Friday Agreementand included allowing the IRA into government, the minority veto, the all-Irelandbody with executive powers, prisoner releases and decommissioning of the RUC butnot paramilitaries. This was all under the banner of a defence of democracy; "manyalternatives would be satisfactory to the Unionist community. Democracy would bea nice alternative".6 To complete the spectrum David Trimble should also be quotedas he has linked decommissioning and democracy on nearly every occasion he hasspoken on either. A typical remark is, "our policy is and will remain 'no guns, nogovernment.' We have always been democrats and we will always be democrats"(9/10/1999, www.uup.org).

It seems very hard, therefore, to sustain an approach that wishes to classify partiesand communities into discrete ideological groups. The secular strand of Unionismcoexists with and is frequently superimposed on top of the Protestant strand; for instanceDavid Trimble's 'peace-making' has allowed his 'Protestant Unionist' past of the 'Siegeof Drumcree' to be forgotten.7 It would have seemed highly improbable if anyone wouldhave envisaged describing Trimble as one of the prominent spokespersons of secularUnionism in 1996. However, reality dictates that a mixture of the two strains is themost appropriate for success and maintaining a support base. The DUP manages itthrough the leadership of an evangelical with more secular deputies; the UUP managesit through the institutional role of the Orange Order with secular - religious leadershipcombinations. Consolidating 'middle Ulster' of all religious persuasions for the Unionwill have to entail an ascendancy of the secular ideal but this does not precludea progressive Unionism. Trimble has managed to combine elements of both thesestrains with a third, the pragmatic Unionism, whereas those opposing the Good FridayAgreement, no matter what their ideological description, have adopted what can beclassified as a dogmatic Unionist approach.

TACTICS: DOGMATISM VS. PRAGMATISM

This ideological spectrum makes it difficult to easily distinguish the divisionsbetween Unionist political parties. Previously it was relatively straightforward todemarcate these divisions because the constitutional solutions proposed by the politicalparties correlated approximately with a perceived ideological position. Thus the UUP'sideology closely resembled the dominant integrationist thinking within the party duringthe years in which Molyneaux was leader and the DUP's preferred devolutionistsolution mirrored their ideology. However, changes in the political landscape havemade this analysis somewhat redundant. Devolution to Scotland and Wales has createdD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 10: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 57

a fusion of the integrationist and devolutionist ideas. The idea of Northern Ireland andEngland being ruled by the same parliament when Scotland and Wales had self-rulewould have been an unacceptable political anomaly even without Northern Ireland'speculiar circumstances. Devolution, therefore, seems the obvious method of governingNorthern Ireland for Unionist politicians and this has simplified the debate withinUnionism immeasurably. The end goal is now known and the questions that remainare: what form it will take and how it will be achieved? The former question has notbeen a matter of ferocious debate within Unionism because, while there are many formsthat it can take (McGany and O'Leary, 1995, p 94), most Unionists acknowledge thatthe final form will be the result of some kind of negotiation with Nationalism of onesort or another.8 The primary division between the political parties, therefore, is howdevolution will be obtained i.e. what tactics will be used. I will argue that, independentof their ideological positions, two main approaches have been adopted: a pragmatic anda dogmatic approach.

The pragmatic approach is marked by a realism about what is obtainable from aprocess of negotiation and what it is expedient to compromise on to obtain those goals.The Ulster Unionist approach to the peace process as a whole is marked by a pragmaticview. Take, for example, this statement by Jim Nicholson, the UUP Member of theEuropean Parliament:

On every occasion they [Unionist politicians faced with a deal] failed to pay the price a future

generation of politicians had to return to the table and the price that had to be paid was much greater

(Newsletter, 13/04/1998).

This is a sentiment that has been echoed by several other leading UUP figures in thedebate surrounding the Good Friday Agreement. Moreover, the following example fromthe 'Morning View,' the editorial of the Belfast Newsletter, shows that the pragmaticapproach involved a weighing of the benefits and losses which pragmatic Unionistscould accept, on balance:

issues like the release of terrorist prisoners . . . the decommissioning of illegal weaponry and the

future of policing in the Province are leading some unionists to take more of a negative view of the

settlement rather than those proposals which point to some constitutional changes and amendments

(Newsletter 13/04/1998).

This analysis is supported by an examination of the UUP strategy during thenegotiating process. From an interview in 'On the Record' before the Referendum onthe Good Friday Agreement, John Taylor cited the most important change between thedraft and finished Agreement as the removal of the indices of North-South institutionswhile Peter Robinson, in the same interview, cited changes on decommissioning andterrorist releases.9 Thomas Hennessey's account of the negotiations illustrates thatD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 11: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

5 8 Irish Political Studies 2001

the UUP was preoccupied with Strand 2 and the importance of non-executive North-South bodies. This forced a pragmatic approach to Strand 1 and the other issues suchas the equality agenda, prisoners and decommissioning. (Hennessey, 2000). Trimblecommented:

When we talkof accepting the Agreement we think primarily of the structures. And we accept them.

We have got the structures as good as they could be. They are safe. The Union is secure. Dublin

cannot dictate to us. The British Isles dimension has been established (Speech by David Trimble to

Northern Ireland Forum 17/04/1998 www.uup.org).

The UUP attach great importance to this last aspect. In 1996, for example, JeffreyDonaldson stated that the 'totality of relations' had to be British-Irish (Newsletter5/6/1996). Moreover, the UUP paper entitled 'Understanding the Agreement' statesthat:

For the UUP the East-West relationship within the British Isles, between the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, is far more important than the North-

South relationship... the Irish Republic is returning to a Britannic framework. This reality confirms

that UUP view that the British Isles, not the island of Ireland, is the natural economic and social unit.

(Understanding the Agreement, www.uup.org)

However, two aspects underpin UUP strategy: the idea of consent and of balancingthe 'democratic deficit' or creating accountability in Northern Ireland. Both are seenas cornerstones to the Unionist position and thus securing the Union. The conceptof consent is straightforward and can be seen as non-negotiable from an UlsterUnionist view. The problem for Unionists was how to get universal recognitionfor it, especially from republicans. Thus when Trimble stated that "our fundamentalconcerns are peace and democracy, in the language of the peace process they arecalled consent and decommissioning,"10 he was setting ambitious targets in terms ofconcrete delivery on both. Nevertheless, short-term pragmatism on decommissioninghas led to recognition of consent while decommissioning remained on the agenda.There is perhaps another reason why universal recognition of consent in the contextof a settlement is such a big prize, an indication of which is given by John Taylorwhen he was referring to the new secular unionism of Aughey and Foster which wasoutlined earlier:

it [new Unionism] will increasingly appeal to people of both religious communities because there

are many more Catholics in Northern Ireland who want to remain in the UK but up to now have been

voting on a tribal basis simply because they felt that the SDLP defended the rights . . . of the Catholic

minority (Newsletter, 20/04/1998).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 12: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 59

Consent is therefore seen as the mechanism of maintaining the Union indefinitelyand worth compromise.

The idea of ending the 'democratic deficit' is linked with this. Sir Reg Empey,among others, has stated: "the sooner the people of Northern Ireland are empoweredto have control over their own affairs the stronger the Union will be" (Newsletter,28/04/1998). Each of these ideas demonstrates an understanding that the Unionis dependent on public opinion other than the traditional unionist constituency.Pragmatism is about securing the Union by creating a situation where nationalists canfulfil an active role in the state and feel part of the society but where, in the long run,those who profess support for the Union in opinion polls can enter the Unionist fold."It is an approach which is not the exclusive domain of the UUP.

The politicians of the smaller 'loyalist' parties, the Ulster Democratic Party(UDP) and PUP, advance arguments similar to those employed by the UUP. GaryMcMichael, leader of the UDP, has stated, for example, "We only have to look atthe facts to see that the Union is stronger because it is firmly in the hands of thepeople of Northern Ireland" {Newsletter, 22/04/1998). Obviously these parties donot have the same difficulties with issues such as decommissioning or release ofterrorist prisoners. However, the approach is the same; entering into negotiationsto secure your primary goals necessarily requires pragmatism. Nevertheless, DavidErvine has added his own twist to the necessity of pragmatism that includes a Britishdimension:

I would say that one of the most significant views that has to be considered of Northern Ireland is the

Treasury view, which is the economics of Northern Ireland . . . I think that there is within the elite a

sense that the loyalty of Northern Ireland and all the rest is great, but we're moving into a pragmatic

world and pragmatic times and it's hard to afford (Quoted in Cochranc, 1997, p 118).

Therefore, it would appear that not only are Unionist goals within Northern Irelandserved well by a pragmatic approach, a point that is particularly salient if Paul Dixon'sthesis about the growing isolation of Northern Ireland and the asymmetry of relationsbetween Unionism and Nationalism to their mother countries holds true (Dixon, 1995).Pragmatism by Unionists could therefore lead to beneficial rewards if it leads to adecreasing cost to the Treasury of maintaining Northern Ireland.

In contrast to these approaches stand those of the anti-Agreement Unionists; theDUP, the Northern Ireland Unionist Party (NIUP), the United Kingdom UnionistParty (UKUP) and those members of the UUP who are opposed to the Good FridayAgreement. These are best described as dogmatic. The dogmatic approach is marked bya refusal to compromise on any issue because each is seen as a matter of principle. Thedogmatists would not necessarily disagree with the importance of issues such as consentor accountability, but they reject the compromises that have been used to try and obtainthem.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 13: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

60 Irish Political Studies 2001

The clearest demonstration of the differing approaches is shown by the attacks onTrimble by the DUP. At various stages the Good Friday Agreement has been called "Mr.Trimble's pan-nationalist accord" {Newsletter, 14/04/1998) or "The Trimble/AdamsAgreement" {Newsletter, 15/04/1998). If Trimble embodies pragmatic Unionism thenthese attacks are not merely a traditional cry of sell-out because the two most importantaspects that the Ulster Unionists claimed they secured, consent and accountability, arenot for the most part disputed. This is perhaps best illustrated by an example. In aninterview on 'On The Record' John Humphries asked Peter Robinson "Why will you bevoting No?" He replied:

Well there's a number of reasons, chief among them is the fact that it puts terrorists into the

government of Northern Ireland, it ensures that we have an assembly which is rigged and

undemocratic. But perhaps the key reason is that it sets up an All-Ireland body with executive

powers, the capacity to develop and expand. And on the side of all that, you have the fact that

terrorist prisoners are to be released, all of them within two years. The facility is put there to

destroy the RUC and on the back of that there is no requirement at all for decommissioning of illegal

weapons to take place. Now any one of those reasons would have been sufficient for me to say No to

this agreement. Put them all together and it has to be a resounding No from anybody in the Unionist

Community who really loves their country (In On The Record 17/05/1998 www.bbc.co.uk/otr).

This exposition of the 'No' argument is fairly representative and the referendumliterature broadly reiterates this position. For example, the United Unionist leafletentitled "It's Right to Say No" lists five main propositions:

It's right to say no:• to a united Ireland and the erosion of British sovereignty• to all Ireland bodies with executive powers over Northern Ireland• to terrorists in government with control of your future• to the mass release of terrorist criminals• to terrorists retaining weapons while the RUC are demoralised and disarmed

(United Unionists 'It's right to say No' referendum propaganda)

Some of these claims are clearly hyperbole but others vividly highlight the differingapproaches. The issue of terrorist releases is the clearest example and anti-AgreementUnionists have made much of the issue. However, take John Taylor's counter argumentto Peter Robinson on the same programme from which Robinson was quoted above:

I've been shot ten times by the IRA . . I was nearly dead. I don't take any delight in seeing these

kind of people getting out of prison. But I have to accept the truth, the reality of it, that they are

all going to be out, bar eighty, within the next two years in any case (On the Record 17/05/1998,

www.bbc.co.uk/otr).Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 14: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 61_

The pragmatism of Taylor stands in stark contrast to the dogmatism of Robinson.On the issue of all-Ireland bodies or 'embryonic all-Ireland government,' as anti-

Agreement Unionists frequently refer it to, the contrast is also indicative of theapproach. Trimble stated on the 1 February 1998 that "points of co-operation onmatters of mutual interest have never been a problem. What is a problem is the creationof all-Ireland political institutions".12 This problem appears to have been resolved toUUP satisfaction:

The NSMC [North-South Ministerial Council] in the new Agreement will provide an opportunity

for consultation on co-operation in areas such as plant health and canals. This is normal practice

elsewhere in the democratic world; for example the Nordic Council. . . Neither the Nordic Council

or the NSMC involve any transfer of sovereignty; both recognise the territorial integrity of the

separate nations involved (Understanding the Agreement, www.uup.org).

Therefore, while the UUP is prepared to countenance North-South bodies, the anti-Agreement Unionists are not because of a dogmatic interpretation of their significance.

A further example of the pragmatism of the pro-Agreement Unionists in contrastto the anti-Agreement camp comes from David Trimble's speech to the UUP AnnualConference in 1999:

Remember John Taylor was quite right to remind people recently that we will not achieve

progress without agreement with nationalists and includes republicans. Those who talk of so-called

alternatives do not address the fact that Sinn Fein will be represented in those bodies and they will

have to deal with them whether in a new council set-up or an alternative assembly (Speech by David

Trimble to UUP Annual Conference 09/10/1999 at Killyhelvin Hotel, Enniskillcn).

This, I think, represents a pragmatic view of the political realities in NorthernIreland. However, the implications of this interpretation are not shared by 'No'Unionists. Robert McCartney, for instance, has stated:

Compromise blindfolded, like justice, holds the scales equally between the fireman and the arsonist.

Their views must be given equal weight by millennium man. The new learning of this politically

correct renaissance requires the democrat to lie down with the terrorist (Irish Times article by Robert

McCartney, www.ukup.org).

The inclusion of McCartney in the anti-Agreement camp creates difficulties forthose who wish to take ideological positions as the basis for political analysis ofUnionism. Dogmatism could be linked to a Protestant Unionist ideology as outlinedearlier if it was solely limited to the DUP. The link would be tenuous given the secularleanings within certain elements of the party but it could be made. The same cannotbe said of McCartney. He has consistently defended his reputation as non-sectarian

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 15: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

62 Irish Political Studies 2001

and liberal13 and can be seen as the instigator of the re-emergence of secular Unionismthrough the CEC, which Aughey has described in this way:

Under the CEC banner, McCartney was able to present an intelligent and intelligible vision around

which working class and middle class people of either denomination could gather. The articulate

quality of the message and its aggressive spirit were just as important as the message itself (Aughey,

1989, pi 60). '

McCartney has taken this 'articulate quality' and 'aggressive spirit' into the arena ofanti- Agreement politics. His overall assessment of the Agreement is standard dogmaticcriticism, albeit with a conspiratorial twist:

The Agreement's real purpose is to further the government's policy of disengagement from Northern

Ireland and to protect the lives and property of its "first class' British citizens on the mainland.

It represents the terms of a conflict resolution treaty between Sinn Fein/IRA and Britain (UKUP

Conference Speech, 06/02/1999, www.ukup.org).

The argument that the peace process is basically a policy of appeasement is one thathas been taken up by other prominent members of the UKUP, most notably their formerchairperson Conor Cruise O'Brien. (O'Brien, 1998) Their criticism is an extension ofthe ideological arguments surrounding decommissioning which I discussed earlier. Assuch they fit into the dogmatic category because I have shown that such concerns areshared by the UUP but have been shelved in order to achieve other goals.14 Moreover, asa member of the 'United Unionist' coalition for the referendum, McCartney and othermembers of the UKUP endorsed the objections listed earlier and have reiterated thesethemes in other speeches and articles.15

McCartney therefore creates problems for a dichotomous classification. However,he also provides the solution to understanding Unionist politics. McCartney is bestdescribed as a secular dogmatic unionist, thus indicating a complex layered ideologicalprofile which can be replicated to cast an illuminating light on other leading Unionistfigures. Thus Trimble is best described as a secular pragmatist, Paisley as a Protestantdogmatist. This idea not only solves the problem of creating groups that aretoo large tobe of any detailed analytical usefulness but also of shifting positions within the politicalparties and by particular politicians. So, for example, Robinson can be described asa Protestant Unionist at some points in his career or as secular Unionist at others butsimultaneously as a dogmatist. Trimble's career could be described in a similar way.

If we take such an approach, there is no reason to rest with only two binaries.The next section suggests one possible way of multiplying binaries to include otheraspects of Unionist's ideological profile. However, for our purposes here, it wouldbe useful to demonstrate some of these profiles graphically, although there should besome precautionary notes. First, the representation of the religious-secular spectrum

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 16: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 63

Figure 1:

RobertMcCartney

Anti-AgreementUUP

DogmaticUnionism

DUP

SecularUnionism

Pro-AgreementUUP

The BusinessCommunity

PUP

PragmaticUnionism

Orange Order

For exampleDennis Watson orGeorge Seawright Religious

Unionism

The Protestantchurches, e.g.Archbishop Eames

is somewhat artificial when discussing political parties because the DUP, UUP orPUP cannot be classified as wholly secular or religious. They are therefore markedonly marginally above or below the x-axis. A second complication arises when weremember that each party, especially the UUP, is far from monolithic and it would notbe unreasonable to plot individuals on the graph and find many away from the positionsoccupied by their party. However, such an illustration would be unnecessarily clutteredand confusing but it is worth pointing out that figures such as Rev Martin Smyth orRev Robert Coulter (from the UUP) could justifiably be placed below the x-axis buton opposite sides of the y-axis. Moreover, the fluidity of Unionist identity and politicsmakes such classifications dependent on political context and so it is plausible thatparties and personalities can move from their plotted position. I have also includedsome non-political (to a greater or lesser degree) personalities, organisations and groupsto demonstrate how areas, such as religious pragmatists or extreme religious dogmatists,can have some political expression.

If we were to compare Figure 1 with Jennifer Todd's dichotomy, we would see thatthe latter is unable to detect the difference in position between the DUP and the PUP orthe DUP and Dennis Watson as they all come from the same Ulster Loyalist tradition.It is incapable of adequately accounting for the UUP split or why Robert McCartneyD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 17: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

64 Irish Political Studies 2001

and the DUP are on the same side of the y-axis. Moreover, on this representationthe DUP and the UUP are not the logical poles of two traditions and this allows abetter understanding of the actual political divisions between the two parties. Toddadmits that each of her two traditions "crosses class lines and endemic to each is classtension and class conflict" (Todd, 1987, p 2) but does not take account for this in herclassification. By taking the above approach we can factor Unionist class politics intoour ideological profiles.

CLASS: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF A LOST IDEA

The years since the AIAhave seen enormous changes in Unionism and this study has setout to explain some of the most recent transformations. This final section will examinethe growth of 'class politics' within the Unionist electoral bloc, which may, ultimately,be the most important change. The role of social class within Unionism has historicallybeen submerged. Throughout the Home Rule period there existed essentially a cross-class alliance and those who made class an issue found themselves marginalised. Thesituation was made worse as socialism became equated with Connolly's syndicalismand William Walker retired from politics. There was little improvement during theStormont period. The class alliance was kept fairly cohesive by the electoral system andby the predominance of 'populist' policies within the government. The constitutionalquestion was an effective control method if these were seen to be failing. (Bew, Gibbonand Patterson, 1995) Working class politics over the 'Troubles' did not fare any better.Forays into the world of electoral politics tended to be an unmitigated disaster aswas the response to any constitutional proposal that working class groups proposedsuch as Beyond the Religious Divide or Common Sense. (Bruce, 1994) However, theperformance and profile of the UDP and the PUP since the 1996 Forum Elections makea re-evaluation necessary.

The UUP vote is fairly uniform across the whole province, with the obviousexceptions of nationalist strongholds such as Belfast West or Foyle. However, they areweakest in Belfast and the 1998 Assembly result is perhaps indicative of a decline inthese constituencies. There has been an increase in their vote in Belfast East but thisarea has only recently been an area of Westminster competition for the party because ofthe effects of the Unionist electoral pact and this, at least in part, explains the increase.The DUP pattern does not show the same uniformity as the UUP. It is clear thatpersonalities play a much bigger role in DUP politics than in the UUP because the mainpoliticians of the party provide a disproportionate share of their vote. Unsurprisingly •then, Antrim North, the Rev. Dr. Ian Paisley's Westminster seat, constitutes thelargest proportion of the DUP vote. However, for the purposes of this section themost important results are those of Belfast East and North and their vote in Foyle,representing working-class Protestant Londonderry. The results of Down North andBelfast South, in comparison, would indicate that support for the DUP was lowest inmiddle class areas.D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 18: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 65

Both the UKUP and the UDP have localised electoral support based heavily onpersonalities. Nearly half the UDP vote is for their leader, Gary McMichael, in LaganValley and he was not even elected. McCartney provides nearly a quarter of the UKUPvote. McCartney did top the poll in 1998 in Down North but he was the only UKUPcandidate elected in the constituency. Moreover, the UUP vote had increased to 12,147whereas the UKUP vote actually decreased to 8,361. The split within the UKUP hascomplicated matters and the future of the UKUP and the NIUP is far from secure.

The results for the PUP, however, are the most interesting for the study of Unionism.The 1996 results are perhaps distorting because the party contested every constituencyto try and gain two seats from the regional list to the Forum. They do, however, showexactly what the 1998 results demonstrate more clearly: the PUP vote is concentratedin the Unionist working-class constituencies of Belfast. This, again, may appearunsurprising but a deeper analysis suggests a growth that cannot be dismissed lightly.Critics of the PUP are prone to superficial analysis. Patrick Roche, for example, toldme:

ff, for example, you take the last of the Assembly elections . . . what did the Unionist electorate do

with the parties representing these Loyalists . . . Well, they wiped out one of them [UDP] and the

PUP only got in here [Stormont] by the skin of their teeth and to get in they had . . . less that 30,000

votes between them.'6

This analysis fails to appreciate several important facts. The PUP vote was 20,634which was almost double their 1997 Westminster performance and although downon their Forum vote, Ervine outpolled McCartney in the 1999 European Election.Furthermore, 13,428 of these votes in 1998 were concentrated in the four Belfastconstituencies; they topped the Unionist poll in Belfast West and both their MLAswere elected comfortably. Ervine was even elected before Sir Reg Empey in BelfastEast. Overall they captured 17% of the Unionist vote in Belfast. This is hardlyevidence of an insignificant political party.

It would be wrong, however, to paint too rosy a picture. The PUP may be asignificant force but their appeal at present relies heavily on a number of prominentpersonalities. Their three most impressive electoral performances were by their threeBelfast councillors: David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson and Hugh Smyth. Moreover,Smyth's support base is perhaps provided as much by his long record of communityservice and representation as his membership of the PUP. The electoral representationof Court Electoral Area on Belfast City Council (BCC) is perhaps the most accuratepicture of the electoral politics of Unionist working class Belfast. Court includesthe Unionist working-class areas of Crumlin, Glencairn, Highfield, Shankill andWoodvale. On BCC it is represented by Fred Cobain (UUP), Frank McCoubrey(UDP), Chris McGimpsey (UUP), Eric Smyth (DUP) and Hugh Smyth (PUP).A comparison with the largely middle class Victoria ward shows the distinctiveD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 19: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

66 Irish Political Studies 2001

class appeal of the PUP. In a district which includes the middle-class areasof Belmont, Knock and Stormont their representation is Ian Adamson (UUP),David Alderdice (Alliance Party - APNI), Wallace Browne (DUP), Alan Crowe(Independent Unionist), Danny Dow (APNI), Robin Newton (DUP) and Jim Rodgers(UUP).

The trends and figures I have discussed above all indicate the emergence ofa growing party. They do not, however, either confirm or deny that the PUP is apossible dominant force within Unionist politics. Nevertheless, their existence hasbeen of vital importance over the course of the peace process. Stephen King haspersuasively argued:

The elections to the Northern Ireland Forum had the effect not of delegitimising the PUP and the

UDP but rather to give them a democratic platform of sorts which, in turn, has enabled Trimble,

suitably confirmed as the main spokesman of unionism, to sell the idea of a unionist front sans

Paisley to his own grass roots (Fortnight, Feb 1998, No 368, p 28).

This is their most significant contribution to date; they have provided a buttressto Trimble's secular pragmatism. Indeed, their presence at the talks allowed theGood Friday Agreement to be negotiated as, without them, the talks would havelacked the 'sufficient consensus' of the Unionist community.

The ideology of the PUP is quite distinctive. I have already intimated that theyare secular Unionists but they have an ideological base to their 'pragmatism.' Atheme common in PUP rhetoric and literature is of the 'abnormality of Northern Irishpolitics' and this is illustrated by the following quotation:

The tragedy of the abnormality of our politics is that the abnormal almost becomes normal and

we get used to the perpetual divisions that continue our abnormality. I think what we need to

do is that, as a divided society the major issue for us is a convergence of the two traditions that

have to be pushed if you like to the fore, copper fastening democratic institutions, eventually

diminishing the degrees of influence of paramilitary organisations by the creation of allegiance

to the democratic institutions that we between us create and function (On-line interview with

David Ervinc 29/07/99 http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/cnglish/uk%5FpoIitics/newsid%5F407000/

407267.stm).

In conjunction with this is a problem identified by Billy Hutchinson:

Previous to the outbreak of violence there was little opportunity or inclination for anyone from

a background such as mine . . . young, working-class and Unionist . . . to become involved in

Politics. There was certainly no meaningful role for me in the Unionist Party, even if I had

wanted to be part of it, and even less opportunity for my political views if I had become part of it

(Speech by Billy Hutchinson at St. Columb's Park House www.pup.org).Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 20: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 67

This analysis indicates that Steve Bruce would be wrong to assert now, as he did in1992, that:

there is no gap in the market of unionist politics for a working-class party. To the extent that it

was socialist, it would be insufficiently unionist. To the extent that it was unionist, it would not be

offering anything new to Ulster Protestants (Bruce, 1992, 266).

Working class disaffection with their traditional representatives has created thepolitical space for such a party. Moreover, the PUP not only represents the working classby originating from that social strata but also advocate a broadly left of centre politicalprogramme. David Ervine has stated that "the SDLP would have to move a littlemore left-wing to align with us." (On-line interview with Ervine) This is significantbecause the existence of the SDLP on a social-democratic manifesto has traditionallybeen seen as the primary reason for Unionism's inability during 'The Troubles' toembrace a socialist political party. Moreover, the PUP's manifesto calls for "selectiveintervention to retain and expand the indigenous economic base of Northern Irelandbased companies;" "target setting for inward investment by the IDB;" "creation in themedium term of a community based social economy with jobs of added communityvalue." They unashamedly state that "the Progressive Unionist Party repudiates thevalues and ethos of the New Right which now permeate the social services and whichhave led to a contract culture" (www.pup.org). However, the political significance ofthe PUP's non-constitutional ideology is hard to judge as their main impact has beenin the constitutional arena, where they have buttressed David Trimble's ideological andpolitical positions.

CONCLUSION: LAYERING UNIONISM

I have argued that to understand Unionism it is necessary to appreciate the layeredcomplexity and fluidity of the ideology and the movement associated with it. Theclassification of Unionist politicians by both ideology and tactics is merely a reflectionof the importance of such an approach. Moreover, it is an extension of the principleswhich historians have been applying to aspects of Unionism in the Home Rule era. Inrelation to Unionist political identity Ian McBride, for example, has argued that:

A survey of Unionist propaganda during the Home Rule crises uncovers levels of loyalty to Ulster,

Ireland and the British Empire. These references to national identity have often been interpreted

as signs of ideological confusion, but they might also be read as an expression of the multi-layered

allegiances created by the interaction of cultures within the British Isles (McBride, 1996, 10).

Unionists have advanced similar sentiments in reference to economic theories,regionalism and religious arguments used in the same period. It seems ridiculous tosuggest that Unionism should not be analysed in the same way at the end of theD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 21: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

68 Irish Political Studies 2001

twentieth century as it was at the start, when many of the divisions that historianshave analysed are no longer hidden below the surface of the UUP monolith. Indeedthe symmetry of arguments used by Unionists during the two periods should.lendthemselves to a more widespread adoption of this approach.

The closest that commentators have reached is the valuable but ultimatelyunsatisfactory dichotomy of Jennifer Todd. Her model has a number of flaws whichhave been exposed in this article. First, it fails to appreciate the crosscutting currentswithin Unionism. I have argued that none of the elements of Unionism can standalone. Protestantism is the glue that binds the Unionist community together and forsome politicians and organisations it is the medium through which they appeal totheir constituency. Both the main political parties show the importance of recognisingthis where it has a significant role. Todd's model does not consider the role ofProtestant Unionism within the UUP. This is surprising because the Orange Order isincluded among the adherents of 'Ulster-Loyalism' and yet it is the UUP which hasthe institutional link. The fact that secularism has been a growth industry in Unionistpolitics in the last decade further detracts from the model. This is vividly illustrated bythe nature of the burgeoning Unionist polemics such as Aughey's Under Siege (1989),Wilson Foster's The Idea of Union (1994) or Porter's Rethinking Unionism (1996)but it is also not insignificant that all of the newly created Unionist parties (UKUP,NIUP, PUP or UDP) all advance a secular Unionist agenda. However, I have alsodemonstrated that secularism exists in the DUP, making it yet another cross-currentwithin Unionism. The important point is that these two strains exist together and,moreover, are not mutually exclusive. One may predominate but it is highly unlikelythat one will exist without the other. Todd's analysis implies that this is not the case.

Second, Todd's model does not pay adequate attention to the divisions within hergroupings. There is evidence of widespread and bitter hostility among certain sectionsof the Unionist working-class towards their political representatives since the 1970s,both included under the title 'Ulster Loyalist' in Todd's classification. The electoralfragmentation of this section of society, which I have outlined, means that including it ina category with other elements of Unionism, to which some are opposed ideologicallyand personally, is erroneous. A similar situation pertains within the 'Ulster British'tradition. The most recent votes of the UUC over forming an executive withoutdecommissioning in November 1999 and Martin Smyth's leadership challenge in March2000 have shown a level of division for which Todd's model cannot legislate. In thislatter respect the fluidity of Unionist politics has overtaken her analysis but this merelyreinforces the need for a more flexible and nuanced approach.

While Unionist ideological and theoretical energies have been channelled intothe articulation of secular arguments, Unionist political energies have been forcedelsewhere. The fruitless but relatively amicable debate over integration or devolutionhas been replaced by a vicious confrontation over the merits of the Good FridayAgreement. This has meant a blurring of ideological differences, which makes aD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 22: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 69

re-evaluation of Todd's model necessary. McCartney is therefore the key figure inhighlighting and understanding the necessity of a layered interpretation. He is perhapsthe one Unionist who can be credited with starting the secular trend within Unionismand yet he is one of the most readily identifiable opponents of the Good FridayAgreement. I feel the only way to accommodate the nature of these divisions is theapproach I have outlined by layering the way we think about Unionism.

The divisions within Unionism over the Good Friday Agreement are primarilytactical, but the bitterness which has characterised the debate is more attributable tothe traditional Unionist sense of siege and anxiety over their political future. This hasarguably been the dominant feature of Northern Irish politics in the Twentieth Century,fashioning partition, the nature of the Northern Ireland state from 1921 to 1972 andthe difficulties of the various constitutional initiatives from 1972 to the present day.If this trend is to be broken then much will depend on the strength of the pragmaticstrain. This is the strain which has the ability and sureness of arguments to engagewith Irish Nationalism and emerge stronger from the process. However, its position isfar from secure because the Good Friday Agreement has divided Unionism and left thepragmatists with little room for manoeuvre.

NOTES1 See the discussion by Colin Coulter, 1994.2 UUC Executive statement, Patten Report Deeply Flawed, 13/9/99, www.uup.org3 Ian Paisley on 9/9/99, www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/ip9999.htm4 However, Colley's Britons: Forging the Nation 1707- 1837, should be consulted in referenceto the role of Protestantism in the construction of the idea of Britishness.5 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Vol 310, col 936, 22/04/1998.' House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 310, columns 932 - 935.7 Henry McDonald's Trimble (London; 2000) shows a consistent secularism throughoutTrimble's political career despite the events of July 1996.8 An anti-agreement Unionist, stated that, in Trimble's position, he would have negotiatedwith the SDLP but not SF while the IRA held onto their weapons, (interview with the author17/01/2000).9 On the Record interview 17/05/1998 www.bbc.co.uk/otr10 Speech by David Trimble at the UUC Annual General Meeting 23/03/1996www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dt23396.htm" This idea is similar to Norman Porter's "alternative vision for Northern Ireland" which hedescribes as 'civic Unionism.' (Porter, pp 169-213). However, as my description of this strandof thinking suggests, this is not a principled position and so it is not possible to term this anideological view within the UUP. The extent of the political recognition of nationalists wasmerely a by-product of a different programme.12 On the Record 01/02/1998 www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext/DAVIDTRIMBLE. 1.2.98.html13 Although David Trimble once said "Bob is very proud of his reputation. But it puts me inD

ownl

oade

d by

[U

nive

rsity

of

Col

orad

o -

Hea

lth S

cien

ce L

ibra

ry]

at 1

5:49

10

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 23: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

70 Irish Political Studies 2001

mind of Dolly Parton - out of all proportion and with no visible means of support."! (Speech atUUP Conference 09/10/1999)14 Some academic opinion is in concurrence with McCartney and Cruise O'Brien, for example,Joe Skelly, 1999.13 For example in a speech at the Assembly on 18/01/1999 he repeated the same points made byPeter Robinson in On the Record, www.ukup.org16 Interview with author 17/01/2000. It should probably be pointed out that the UKUP, of whichMr. Roche was a member at that time, only got 36541 votes and three of their five MLAs wereelected on the final count in their respective constituencies.

REFERENCES

Aughey, Arthur, 1989, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement.London: Hurst and Company.

Aughey, Arthur, 1997, "The Character of Ulster Unionism", pp 16-33 in Peter Shirlowand Mark McGovern (eds.), Who are 'the People'?: Unionism, Protestantism andLoyalism in Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press.

Ballymacarrett Think Tank, 1999, Beyond King Billy?. Newtownabbey: IslandPublications.

Bew, Paul, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, 1995, Northern Ireland 1921 - 1996:Political Forces and Social Classes. London: Serif.

Bruce, Steve, 1986, God Save Ulster! The religion and politics of Paisleyism. Oxford:Clarendon Press.

Bruce, Steve, 1992, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruce, S., 1994, The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Cochrane, Feargal, 1997, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since theAnglo-Irish Agreement. Cork: Cork University Press.

Colley, Linda, 1992, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707 - 1837. London.Coulter, Colin, 1994, "The Character of Unionism," Irish Political Studies, 9, 1994, pp

1-24.Cruise O'Brien, Conor, 1998, Memoir: My Life and Themes. London: Profile Books.Dixon, Paul, 1995, "Internationalisation and Unionist isolation: a response to Feargal

Cochrane," Political Studies Vol XLIII, 1995, pp 497 - 505.English, Richard and Graham Walker (eds.), 1996, Unionism in Modern Ireland: New

Perspectives on Politics and Culture. Basingstoke: Macmillan.Foster, John Wilson (ed.), 1995, The Idea of the Union: Statements and Critiques in

Support of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Vancouver: BelcouverPress.

Hennessey, Thomas, 2000, The Northern Ireland Peace Process. Dublin: Gill andMacmillanDow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Page 24: Ulster unionist political divisions in the late twentieth century

Farrington/ULSTER UNIONIST POLITICAL DIVISIONS 71_

Jackson, Alvin, 1999, Ireland 1798 - 1998: Politics and War. Oxford: Blackwell.McBride, Ian, 1996, "Ulster and the British Problem," in Richard English and Graham

Walker (eds.), 1996, Unionism in Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics andCulture. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

McDonald, Henry, 2000, Trimble. London: Bloomsbury.McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary, 1995, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken

Images. Oxford: Blackwell.McIntosh, Gillian, 1999, The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Twentieth Century

Ireland. Cork: Cork University Press.McKay, Susan, 2000, Northern Protestants: An unsettled people. Belfast: Blackstaff

Press.Morrow, Duncan, 1997, "Suffering for righteousness' sake? Fundamentalist Protestantism

and Ulster politics," pp 5 5 - 7 1 in Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (eds.), Whoare 'the People'?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland.London: Pluto Press.

Porter, Norman, 1996, Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland.Belfast: Blackstaff Press.

Skelly, Joseph Morrison , "Appeasement in our time: Conor Cruise O'Brien and thePeace Process in Northern Ireland," Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol 10,1999, pp 221-236.

Smyth, Clifford, 1986, "The DUP as a politico-religious organisation," Irish PoliticalStudies, Vol 1, 1986, pp 3 3 - 4 3 .

Todd, J., 1987, "Two traditions in Unionist political culture," Irish Political Studies, Vol2, 1987, pp 1-26.

Waterside Think Tank, 1999, Are we not part of this city too? Newtownabbey: IslandPublications.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

olor

ado

- H

ealth

Sci

ence

Lib

rary

] at

15:

49 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014