World Political Science ReviewVolume 3, Issue 3 2007 Article 2

Understanding China’s Energy SecurityChristian Constantin _

University of British Columbia, cconstan@interchange.ubc.caOriginally published as Constantin Christian 2006. “Comprendre la s´ecurit´e ´energ´etique enChine.” Politique et Soci´et´es. 25(2-3): 15-45. Reprinted with permission from Politique etSocieties.Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press.

1. IntroductionOn June 30th 2004∗, following a year of intense discussions, a study group madeup of actors from the energy sector and headed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao setan energy policy stressing the importance of energy conservation, newtechnologies, and the protection of the environment. One would have expectedthat, in light of the rising prices of black gold, Beijing’s decision to revise itsdependence vis-à-vis hydrocarbons be met with acclaim and considered as a stepin the right direction. Yet, the Western press lashed out with critical articles on theimpact of the Chinese demand on crude price and the risks Chinese consumptionentail for the security of East Asia1.This discrepancy between the decisions taken in Beijing and the perceptionof China abroad may be explained by the reliance of some analysts of energygeopolitics or Chinese energy policy on dangerously short-sighted theoreticalconceptions on energy security and decision-making processes. First of all, thesetheoretical approaches often give oil supply a privileged position to the detrimentof other energy sources or demand-control measures. Second, these analyseseither attribute an overall unity to the Chinese regime, or see bureaucraticbargaining as the only mechanism of political innovation. These approaches donot do justice and cannot convincingly describe the evolution of debates onenergy policy within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the coming topower of the Hu Jintao administration.This paper seeks to offer a different perspective of China’s energy policyand of the role played by security issues in its definition. Hence, it will impartparticular attention to conceptions and ideas held by the actors involved in theenergy policy decision-making process. It will demonstrate that the differentmeasures that make up Chinese energy policy are the result of a debate amongproponents of three frames 2 – a strategic vision, a market approach, and aconception of “scientific development”– simultaneously exhibited within China’senergy policy community. Each one of these frames sheds light in a uniquefashion on the objective conditions confronting Chinese decision-makers by∗ A preliminary version of this text was presented at the CEPES’ symposium titled: TheChallenges of Governance in China, September 17 2004.The author would like to thank the Center of International Relations at the University of British-

Columbia and the SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) for theirfinancial support, as well as the Center for Strategic Studies (Zhanlüe yanjiusuo) of QinghuaUniversity for their warm welcome and their logistical support.1 For example, Lam (2004) and Tanner (2004).2 I will come back to this concept in greater details later in the text.1Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007identifying some of them as problematic while leaving others in the shadows, and,at the same time, they offer solutions articulated in their own terms. If theseframes provide the substance of problem definition and solutions, it is alsoimportant to note that certain structural factors, namely economic culture, politicalinstitutions, and administrative procedures impose a selection among frames orlimit the possibility of them being converted into viable policies.2. Approaches to China’s Policymaking2.1 The Rationalist ApproachChina’s central state is often viewed as a rational and unitary actor. Thisperception is common because of theoretical reasons peculiar to the discipline ofinternational relations, but also because the workings of the central Chinese stateremain largely unknown. The conception of a monolithic central regime is alsoconveyed by the literature concerned by center-region relations or by theopposition between the regime and China’s civil society3.This theoretical perspective stems from a long tradition of research whichpostulates a rational process of public administration. This process begins with theidentification of problems to solve and objectives to achieve, then proceeds to theidentification of available solutions and the evaluation of their consequences andleads, finally, to the adoption of the appropriate solution in light of a costsbenefitsassessment4. Although it is well known that very few actual public policyprocesses come close to this ideal, it nevertheless remains widespread when itcomes to studying China. Its main advantage lies in its ability to provide plausiblehypotheses on the objectives and solutions that avail themselves to Chineseleaders in a situation where the nature of the regime limits researchers’ access tothe decision-making process 5 . It goes without saying that this model seemsparticularly well adapted to approximate the decisions of a regime with a highdegree of autonomy from social pressures and in which political leaders enjoyconsiderable power over their subordinates.A majority of analyses dealing with the international consequences ofChina’s energy policy adopts this model. To authors of these analyses, thegrowing dependence of this country on oil imports, forces Chinese leaders toadopt a series of diplomatic and administrative measures to limit the negativeeffects of this dependency. Thus, the Chinese strategy of investing in foreign oilresources (Zouchuqu or Going Out), the development of diplomatic and3 For a few examples, see Shambaugh (2000), Roy (1998) and White, and Xiaoyuan (1996).4 This classic model was originally elaborated from the Weberian concept of ideal bureaucracyand Taylor’s model of scientific administration (Gerth 1973; Taylor 2003).5 Graham Allison mentioned this theoretical advantage of rationalistic models in the study of

Soviet foreign policy (Allison 1999).2World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2commercial ties with a variety of oil producing countries, the acceleration of theexploitation of national energy resources as well as the creation of a strategic oilreserve, to name a few, can be seen as part of a larger strategy of resource control.The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would thus have adopted a shortage-equalsthreat-to-security reasoning and applied a mercantilist approach that relies onbilateral diplomatic contacts with oil producing countries to beef up its energysecurity (Yergin, Eklof and Edwards 1998; Herberg 2003).Conclusions about the international order that researchers derive from theserecent developments sometimes diverge though. Some see it as a new source ofrivalry between China and other oil importing countries (Lewis 2002; Kane andSerewicz 2001; Salameh 1995-1996). Kent Calder, an eminent specialist ofenergy in Asia, considers that “At the root of Asia’s energy security problem isChina -a rising, frustrated, revisionist power in which ideological communism isyielding to nationalism- and its new status as an oil importer” (Calder, 1996: 56).For others, however, China’s increased participation in international energymarkets can facilitate regional and international cooperation. Indeed, China andthe United States share a common interest in ensuring the stability of oil supply.China and its neighbors could also team up to develop hydrocarbon resources inCentral Asia and Russia. Furthermore, the cooperation between China and thecountries of the OECD is reinforced by the mere fact that there are programs tyingBeijing to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Harrison 2002; Yoshihara andSokolsky 2002; Anonymous 1999; Christoffersen 1992; Ögütçü 1998).The application of the rationalist model of decision-making to the China’senergy security policy suffers from the well-known ailments of this model. First,this model suggests that Chinese leaders enjoy complete knowledge of alternativesolutions and a capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of each option’sconsequences. This particular premise was abandoned some time ago in mostresearch on administrative decision-making processes (March 1978).Furthermore, these studies presuppose a unity of view within the Chinese state or,at least, leaders with sufficient power to impose their views over the whole stateapparatus. However, these two premises seem difficult to maintain, even in thecontext of China’s political regime (Jianrong, 1999). One last problem occurswhen this model is used to study Chinese energy security policies: the objectivespursued by China are mostly seen in terms of access to oil resources. Thistendency introduces an important bias: problems related to the energy sector butnot directly related to oil are systematically dealt with in a residual manner.3. Fragmented AuthoritarianismThe limits of the rationalist model have led to the development of new,more realistic, models of public administration. On the one hand, researcherscould no longer ignore the fact that public policies represent less the result of a3Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

decisive choice among clear alternatives than the consequences of an incrementalprocess of transformation in preexisting policies in a context of incertitude withregard to their likely consequences6. On the other hand, the discrepancy betweenthe optimal policies identified by the rationalist model and the policiesimplemented was explained in two ways: it was either the impact of socioeconomicinterest groups exerting pressure on their political representatives, or itis seen as the fruit of internal conflicts among bureaucratic agencies in search ofmore resources or locked in standard operating procedures restraining theircapacity to innovate (Niskanen 1994).In China, this theoretical current paved the way to the “fragmentedauthoritarianism” model developed at the end of the 1980s by Lieberthal andOksenberg. These authors explain the decisions taken by the Chinese governmentin terms of power and struggle among bureaucratic units of the Chinese state(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). In a similar fashion, other authors explain thesedecisions as a result of conflicts among leaders and their network of clientsspanning the state apparatus and the provinces (Shirk, 1993).This type of approach appears particularly appropriate to describe energypolitics in China since the context in which decision-making takes place ischaracterized by a decentralized administrative structure, unclear hierarchyamong the different administrative units involved, close and under-regulatedrelationships between state enterprises and administrative structures, as well asthe fact that coordination among actors in energy politics is held only at the end oftheir respective decision-making process, in other words, each actor has alreadyprepared detailed projects and is set on implementing them before they meet. Thisstrong decentralization is responsible for the involvement of numerous actors withvarious and often conflicting interests in the decision-making process. Newpolicies are often the result of a long bargaining process between participatingagencies. Thus, more often than not, adopted policies lack in cohesion, since fromone political measure to another, bureaucratic participants tend to be different.Finally, these policies are never definitive; bargaining can begin anew in anulterior phase in the implementation process (Lampton 1992; Junhua 2003).Numerous authors, Chinese as well as Westerners, have noticed that one ofthe major problems facing China in its quest for energy security can be tracedback to a lack in coherence between measures (Fengying 2003; International6 For Lindblom, incrementalism in public policies is characterized by: (1) decision-makingthrough small or incremental moves on particular problems rather than through a comprehensivereform program, (2) it takes the form of an indefinite sequence of political moves, 3) it isexploratory, as the goals of policy-making continue to change as new experience with policiesthrows new light on what is possible and desirable, and (4) it is moving away from known socialills rather than moving toward a known and relatively stable goal Braybrooke and Lindblom(1963).4World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2Energy Agency, 2000: 8). Philip Andrews-Speed is probably the mostrepresentative author of this school of thought. According to him, the lack of clearauthority in an already decentralized sector, the direct involvement of state owned

oil enterprises (SOOE) in policy formulation coupled with the weakness of thelegislative branch and the absence of strong regulation hinder the emergence of anintegrated and coherent energy policy. Furthermore, the competition amongbureaucratic agencies seems also to be condoned by Chinese leaders expectingthat representatives from different ministries will defend the interests of their ownorganization (Andrews-Speed, 2004: 32,53).These bureaucratic disputes have hindered the liberalization of the energysector and led to the adoption of a “strategic” approach to energy security. Thisstrategic approach is aimed at limiting the Chinese dependence on internationalmarkets by promoting self-sufficiency, the use of national resources, state-ownedenterprises investments in overseas hydrocarbon assets and tight control overexports and imports of energy products. According to Andrews-Speed, thisapproach to energy security is counterproductive as it may engender problemssuch as domestic price instability and the waste of financial resources ininvestments with dubious returns. Furthermore, it could lead China to getinvolved in bilateral agreements entailing potentially explosive political andmilitary compensations (Andrews-Speed, Xuanli and Dannreuther 2002).The bureaucratic competition model brings increased realism to the study ofdecision-making processes, but carries certain weaknesses as well (Lieberthal,1992). First, if the model can accurately explain gradual changes taking place inestablished policies, it has more trouble to deal with quick shifts in orientationsthat can also take place in public policy (Scot Tanner, 1999: 27; Schulman, 1975).Indeed, confronted with sudden shifts in policies, the authors who rely on thismodel must often invoke the actions of Chinese political leaders, who acting asdeus ex machina save the state from the bureaucratic drama. Second, more oftenthan not, this model takes the problems of the rationalist model of decisionmakingto a lower level of analysis. Indeed, instead of picturing states as unitaryand rational actors with predefined interests and objectives, this model depictsbureaucratic or faction actors who pursue their objectives rationally by weighingin the pros and cons of such or such measure. Another problem emerges when werealize that this grid of analysis can only take into account those who enjoyresources —material or bureaucratic— which are readily exchanged. It is thusunable to capture the important role played by think tanks and university researchcenters in the identification of problems and the elaboration of solutions (Li 2002;Naughton 2002). Finally, except ex post facto this model teaches us little aboutthe substance of policies because a multitude of political measures can be in linewith the objective interests of the actors involved. To state after the fact that apolicy is favorable to the interests of the strongest coalition of actors is arbitrary if5Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007we don’t take into account the ideas held by political actors prior to the decisionand which give a political meaning to their interests.4. Ideational ApproachBy taking as granted that public policies are nothing more than mirrors ofactors’ interests – of the state or of socio-economic groups, traditional approachestend to reject any independent role that ideas may have in the Chinese

administrative process (Yu 2004; Reardon 2002; Halpern 1989). However, manyrecent researches attribute a greater role to ideas in the elaboration of policies inother nations7. The political debate does not limit itself to a struggle aroundunambiguous material conditions, but rather deals with strategic representationsof what is legitimate, of what ought to be done. By manipulating theserepresentations, political actors can create conditions propitious to the formationof coalitions that transcend cleavages due to conflicting material interests. It isthrough this process of strategic representation that actors come to shape theirperceived interests with regard to a given political issue. The social constructionof problems and of the available solutions provide the raw material that allows theconcrete expression of socio-economic or bureaucratic interests, what actorsdesire or are actually able to desire. An analysis which puts the emphasis onpolitical ideas may reduce the researcher’s “disposition effect” by refocusing theanalysis on actors’ intentions8.I will follow a two-pronged analytical strategy in order to better highlightthe role of ideas in the elaboration of energy security measures. First, it seemsimportant to put energy security questions back in the broader context of China’senergy policy. Indeed, one of the most common problems of current studies ofthis particular issue is caused by the adoption of a narrow version of energysecurity and which restrict analyses to measures related to oil supply. As I willdemonstrate, the debate on energy security in China is located within a muchlarger debate that deals with the future structure of the country’s energy needs andof the national energy production.7 For recent reviews of this literature, see Béland (2005), and Lieberman (2002).8 These “disposition effects” are on display in Erika Strecker-Downs’ analysis of the debatessurrounding energy security in China. Indeed, this author takes as granted that the notion of energysecurity is grounded in stable oil supplies and thus limits her analysis to the presentation ofbureaucratic discussions related to the implementation of diverse measures aimed at enhancing oilsecurity. She thus brackets out the internal debates in China about the larger issue of definingenergy security and the priorities that this definition entails (Strecker-Downs, 2004). On theimportance of taking into account actors’ intentions to avoid these “disposition effects”, see:Dobbin (1994) and Boudon (1986).6World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2Second, I intend to analyze the elaboration of China’s energy policy as theresult of political games revolving around three frames: a strategic vision, amarket approach and a conception based on “scientific development”. A frame isa “perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can bemade sense of and acted on” (Rein and Schön 1993). It provides a way to select,organize, and interpret a complex reality and provides the references needed forknowledge, analysis, persuasion and action. The use of frames allows participantsin the decision-making process to identify problems and priorities, to specify theirinterests and objectives, to back their empirical and normative judgments on asolid theoretical basis, and hence lends them moral or scientific credibility in

political debates (Bleich, 2003).The importance of frames is not limited to their role in interpreting theworld. They also endow political entrepreneurs with tools for persuasion, whichare crucial in decision-making processes, and this, even in a closed politicalsystem like that of China9. By calling on the shared values of the polity or onscientific or moral superiority, frames provide the necessary arguments for thepromotion of a policy or the rejection of an antagonist point of view. Byreframing wider questions on the basis of their own conception of what should bedone, participants to the political game can also call upon broader cultural orhistorical referents to buttress their own point of view, and build “causalitystories” to attribute responsibility for a political problem to another actor or to agiven structural condition (Schmidt 2002; Blyth 2002; Campbell 1998; Stone1989).Three types of energy security representations are available for states tochoose from: a strategic conception, a market approach and vision inspired byenvironmental considerations 10 . The first two representations entail thepreservation of the development model based on hydrocarbons adoptedworldwide, but differ on the role the state and the market should play to ensurethe security of supplies. The third one suggest the possibility of moving to a newmode of energy production and consumption which would help to reduce bothenvironmental risks and concerns over supplies and the security of energyinfrastructures.Each one of these frames is present in China. The 1990s were primarilycharacterized by a debate between the strategic conception of energy security andthe neoliberal grid of analysis. However, the coming of a new leadership team in2003 and the development of a new rhetoric of “scientific development” (kexue9 Nina P. Halpern (1992) uses the concept of “competitive persuasion” as the cornerstone of heranalysis of Chinese bureaucratic processes.10 In a similar fashion, Måns Nilsson (2005) identifies three basic frames in Swedish energypolicy: « energy as infrastructure », « energy as market » and « energy as risk ».7Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007fazhan) have introduced a new environmental dimension to the debate on energypolicy.In order to identify frames and their influence over policy, I will follow amodel of policy formulation based on three relatively independent “streams”: the“problem stream”, the “policy stream” and the “political stream” (Kingdon 1995).The direct impact of frames is more likely to be visible in the discursiveenterprises which take place at the level of problems definition and policyformulation. In conclusion, I will focus on political opportunities, which puts intoplay political institutions and cultural variables such as the national mood, todemonstrate how the mechanisms of reframing, combining, and rhetoricalconstruction, explain the emergence of a window of opportunity which allowsinnovation in policies pertaining to Chinese energy security.5. Frames5.1 The Strategic Point of View

Originally intimately related to the military performance of nations at war,energy security was first viewed in terms of access to oil resources, then as the oilweapon wielded by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) in the 1970s. According to this approach, energy security is achievedwhen: (1) adequate supply is sufficient to support a healthy national economy; (2)allies also have access to these supplies; (3) the concerned nation and its allieshave the means to protect their vital energy supplies if threatened (Ahearne 1985).For consumers, price and availability are the two most important aspects ofenergy security; but for governments it is rather a question of supplydiversification, which allows the reduction of vulnerability, and fueldiversification which seeks to lower dependence on oil (Ebel 2003). It would thusbe dangerous to let the energy mix of a country be dictated by the market alone,since consumers and firms would presumably turn to the cheapest fuel and thusincrease the level of vulnerability and dependency of the country (Belgrave,Ebinger and Okino 1987).This conception guides an important number of Chinese analyses dealingwith the geopolitics of oil, the necessary strategic measures to ensure China’saccess to oil resources —investments abroad, the construction of pipelines, thecreation of military and merchants fleets to protect supplies, etc.— and the risksof too much dependence on the Middle East, a very unstable region controlled bythe United States11.11 For a few examples, see Jianhua (2003), Yuncheng, Zhugui, Chunqiang, Yujun, Junhong andWei (2003), Yishan (2002) , and Zhongqiang (2001).8World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2From this point of view, the most important problem in the China’s energysector can be traced back to the country’s transition in 1993 from the status ofexporter to that of net importer. From that day on, its dependence on oil importsgrew dramatically (see figure 1). From 1993 to 2003, the national oil productionremained stagnant –it grew by an average of 1.7% during these years– whereasthe major, but quickly maturing, oil fields of Daqing and Shengli12 were slowlydeclining and exploration, offshore as well as in the Tarim Basin, remaineddisappointing. Meanwhile, oil consumption has grown an average of 7% per yearduring the same period. This increase follows, of course, the economic growth ofthe country, but is also the result of recent reforms in the transportation sector andthe conversion of China to the automobile civilization –the production of thatindustry increased by about 50% per year since the turn of the millenniumboosted by a 256% increase in car loans since their debut, in 1998, and the end of200313.Figure 1: China’s oil production, consumption and importations, in millionof barrels per day, 1980-2003.12 These fields are responsible for more than 50% of China’s national production.13 These loans made up only 20% of the car market in 2003, compared to 70% in more advancedeconomies (Mc Gregor 2003).Importations0

1234561980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002Consommation Production9Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007Even though Chinese consumers have not yet encountered problems in oilsupply from the international markets, the growth of the dependence vis-à-visimports has been portrayed as a major crisis by promoters of the strategic frame.Many rhetorical tropes were used to underline the acuity of this crisis. First, somecalled on national values and harked back to the self-sufficiency ideal exaltedduring the Maoist era in order to campaign in favor of the development ofdomestic energy resources. At the same time, to discourage increased reliance oninternational markets, analogies of the painful experiences of the Sino-Soviet rift,which eventually led to the end of the Russian oil supply, and of the embargoimposed by Western nations on China during the Cold War were summoned andsupplemented by the evocation of the two international oil crises and of theblockade imposed by the United States on Imperial Japan. Finally, the question ofenergy dependence has also been linked to maintaining social stability due to theimportance of fossil fuels production and transformation in China’s employment.The significance of this issue is even more obvious when we take into accountthat the traditional regional base of the Chinese oil industry has suffered the mostfrom economic reforms over the past twenty-five years and does not benefit fromincreased energy imports.These arguments were sufficiently convincing to provide the main thrust tothe elaboration of China’s energy policy throughout the last decade. In 1993, LiPeng set the twin objectives of guaranteeing a stable oil supply to China andmaking sure that it does not become vulnerable to an external embargo in thefuture as the top priorities (Chang 2001). In a similar fashion, the 10th Five-YearPlan, presented in 2001, puts the preservation of supply security at the top of itsenergy strategy. In order to reach that goal, the plan puts the emphasis oninnovation in production technologies and expects the accelerated development ofnational energy resources, on the pursuit of the Zouchuqu policy whichencourages investments in foreign assets, on the creation of a strategic reserve, onthe diversification of supply sources, and on the development of alternativefuels14.5.2 The Market ApproachThe second school of thought on energy security was developed in parallelto the comeback of neo-classical economic ideas in a context of global oil glut.Here, security is essentially seen in terms of economic costs related to suddenchanges in supply or energy prices (Bohi and Toman 1996). According to this14 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui [National Development and

Reform Commission], 2001, Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan dishige wunian jihua. Nengyuanfazhan zhongdian zhuanding guihua [Tenth Five-Year Plan of Social and Economic Development.Special Section on the Energy Development Program.], [www.ndrc.gov.cn].10World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2approach, government interference should be limited to cases of market failure15.One of the most important observations of this approach deals with the“fungibility” of oil, a characteristic that renders useless any policy based on thediversification of sources, since, in the global oil market, all consumers areaffected by price variations due to a disruption of supply even if it is localized(Hogan 1985). Accordingly, the path to security goes through enhancedintegration of national and international markets, the development of hedgingtools such as the oil futures market, and the establishment of an internationaljuridical framework which would guarantee investments and multilateralcooperation. Ideally, state intervention would be limited to the diffusion ofinformation in a multilateral context, the support of innovation, and, for some, themanagement of a strategic oil reserve which would be used in case of momentarysupply disruption (Andrews-Speed and Vinogradov 2000; May 1998; Fesharaki1999). These precepts apply to the whole energy sector as well since deregulationis often seen as a cure to all the ailments that afflict a sector which tends to benaturally dominated by monopolies.The liberal conception of energy security is much less frequent in Chinesedebates. Nevertheless, many authors and specialists point out that internationalmarkets can answer to the international and Chinese demand and that China needsonly to improve its international cooperation to reduce the impact of suddenchanges in oil prices and to counter the influence of the OPEC (Zekun 2004; Lei2003). Others adopt the pro-deregulation arguments and advocate improvedcompetition in China’s energy markets as well as innovation as means to fosterthe development of new resources16. Finally, some proponents of the creation of astrategic reserve in China believe that this measure can only make sense in awider, regional or international, context of cooperation (Lei 2003).According to this frame, oil dependency is not necessarily the mostimportant problem facing China since international markets are now sufficientlydeveloped to absorb short-term shocks and since global resources are seen assufficient to accommodate demand over the medium term (Xing, Xiaolin, Jialinand Li 2003). The most important problem in oil security is rather related to thestate’s control over prices and the monopoly of state firms in refining anddistribution. The fact that crude oil prices are fixed monthly by the state in light ofinternational markets has, for example, allowed distributors to hoard oil during15 It is interesting to note that, according to this vision, the costs generated by the deployment oftroops to ensure the stability of oil production regions, the environment externalities, and the issueof oil-induced commercial deficits are not taken into consideration in the calculation of theadequate price of energy (Bohi 1993).16 For a review of these arguments, see Yanrui (2003).

11Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007the weeks of rising prices prior to the American invasion of Iraq, a behaviorwhich in turn led to localized shortages (Jun 2003; Teo, 2003).From this point of view on energy security, the most pressing problem israther to be found in the incomplete reform of the power sector. This situation isresponsible for a pendulum movement between surpluses and deficits ofproduction. The last manifestation of this phenomenon began in the summer of2003. That year’s exceptional growth in electricity demand —up 15.3% over theprevious year, a dry and hot summer coupled with a failure in planning led tobrownouts and blackouts in half of China’s provinces. This crisis was due for themost part to a freeze in the construction of new plants imposed in 1999 as aresponse to power surpluses caused by low demand during the Asian crisis of1997-1998. Yet, although this moratorium ended in 2002, its long-term effectswere deeply felt in the mid-2000s as delays of three to four years, even more fornuclear plants, are necessary in order to put a new plant online.To this serious bureaucratic blunder, we can add droughts responsible forempty hydroelectric reservoirs, quick growth of energy-intensive industries likethose of aluminum, steel and cement, problems related to the half-bakedliberalization of coal prices, and a population increasingly able to afford modernhousehold appliances. These phenomena converged in 2003-2004 and led to theworst electric supply crisis since the beginning of the reforms17. However, theadministrative measures undertaken to slow demand growth and to encourage theconstruction of new power plants risk to reverse shortages and create a newsituation power glut in 2006 or 2007.The discursive ammunition available to promoters of the market point ofview on energy security is also much diversified. First, they can rely on theabundant Western theoretical corpus expounding the virtues of deregulation as thebest way to ensure an efficient energy supply, a theoretical corpus which draws itsauthority from the different technical and scientific canons of economic sciencesand on the recommendations of international economic organizations. Second, theinternational experience is also used as an analogy to stress the potential gainsthat China could secure by increasing competition in its energy sector. Thecausality discourse produced within this framework further indicates that thesources of the instability in China’s energy supply are to be found in the actionsof state monopolies and in the control of prices which both introduce irrationalityin the market.17 Ore prices are determined by the market whereas electricity prices are still controlled by thestate. Coal prices have escalated during the last few years in response to the closing down of manydangerous and polluting mines, the competition from the steel sector, and the closure of oil-flaredplants. Because of that, many thermal plants have been operating at sub-regime rather thansustaining important losses (Anonymous 2003e; Anonymous 2003a).12World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2

Of course, in the background of this discourse lays the privileged solutionfor all these problems: to leave more freedom to market mechanisms whileensuring minimal regulation to prevent the rise of monopolies. The action of thestate should thus be limited to a few roles like improving internationalcooperation, either within the framework of global or regional institutions, orfacilitating foreign investments in China’s energy industry. Another importanttask would be the development of institutions which would help regulating themarket or would allow China to improve its action in international markets, likethe development of an oil futures market and the creation of a strategic oil reserve(Daojiong 2004; Zhun 2003; Zhonglang 2003; Anonymous 2002). A report by theState Council Development Research Center (SC-DRC, Guowuyuan fazhanyanjiu zhongxin) made public in 2002, thus emphasized a set of measuresinfluenced by the market frame: (1) the development of a better administrativeand juridical system in the oil sector, (2) accelerated exploitation anddevelopment of national resources, (3) development of natural gas resources, (4)cooperation with international oil producing states, (5) the creation of a strategicreserve, and (6) increased oil consumption efficiency (Runsheng, Yan andShenyuan 2000).5.3 The Environmental GridA third conception of energy security stems from the identification of twoimportant elements missing from traditional definitions (Stares 2000): the risksdue to polluting emissions and those entailed by centralized systems of energyproduction and distribution vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Often environmentalissues are seen as going against the grain of energy security. Increased attention tothe former is seen as leading to important sacrifices in terms of security. Forinstance, the use of coal as a substitute to oil can limit dependence on imports butis also linked to serious environmental degradation (Yergin 1991: 779; Stanislaw2004). The third current on energy security thus tries to highlight how new energysources can both serve environmental security purposes and ensure supplies(Flavin and Dunn 1999)18. In order to do that, it is not only necessary to see oilsecurity within a larger picture encompassing all types of energy, but also to adopta concept of security that applies to all stages of the energy cycle: extraction,transport, transformation/consumption and elimination of wastes produced by thiscycle. Since they can be produced in situ and do not involve a dangerous andvulnerable industrial structure and because they are less polluting, renewableenergies would contribute more to national security than nuclear energy or fossil18 It may be argued that this new approach is trying to “flatten” the “Maslow Pyramid” of energysecurity so that supply needs, viewed as the priority, are not be satisfied at the expense of theenvironmental needs, seen traditionally as secondary. See Frei (2004).13Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007fuels which necessitate the transportation of dangerous products over longdistances and often from unstable regions, their transformation in polluting andhard to protect infrastructures, their distribution on highly vulnerable domesticnetworks while at the same time being responsible for the production ofenvironment-damaging wastes (Stoett and Pretti 2003).

This perspective on energy security is embodied in China’s concept of“conservation society” (jieyuexing shehui) which has been diffused in the countryafter the rise to power of the leadership team led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.They first introduced the concept of “scientific development” which seeks tointegrate economic development, reduction of social inequities, and the protectionof the environment. This concept has since been elevated to the status of officialdoctrine by the national propaganda apparatus and has been relayed at all level ofthe state apparatus (Fewsmith 2004). The concept of “conservation society” isincluded in this broader doctrine and constitutes its application to the sectors ofenergy and natural resources. It first appeared in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2006), but was only recently exposed in greater details by Ma Kai, the head of theNational Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It has since been usedby Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on many occasions before being the object of indepthmedia coverage in the spring of 2004. It aims at putting an end to thebottlenecks hindering development and to support the transformation of thecurrent conception of economic development toward a more sustainable conceptof development (kechixu fazhan) (Kai 2003; Tiemao 2004). In other words, thisnew development philosophy is geared at the conservation of resources —energyhaving a priority status within the larger body of natural resources— and is to berealized through technological innovation, through the reduction in energyconsumption generated by the transformation of China’s industrial structure andthe reduction in energy intensity (the amount of energy per unit of GDP), andthrough popular education and state intervention.If the advocates of this approach recognize the problems in supply andinefficient regulations, they maintain that it is essential to link these difficulties tothe environmental issue and to the important social and economic costs it entails.According to a World Bank study published in 1997, pollution costs China 8% ofits GDP, close to 20 billion dollars in health care, in addition to around 200,000premature deaths every year (Johnson 1997). China’s energy choices weighheavily in the country’s future environment balance. In the first place, China isdependent for almost two thirds of its energy on coal, available in large quantitieson its territory (Energy Information Agency 2004). Second, energy consumptionin the transportation sector, which generally accounts for the largest share offossil fuels consumption and polluting emissions, makes up a mere 15% of the14World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2overall Chinese energy consumption and is thus bound to increase19. Finally,China is already the world’s second most important source of greenhouse gaseswith 13.5% of global emissions, yet these emissions represent little more than10% of per capita emissions in the United States.Proponents of this new approach shore up their discourse on the failure oftraditional frames to include considerations about the environmental impacts ofcurrent modes of production and energy consumption. They thus suggest a newlanguage to evaluate the environmental impact of economic decisions: to calculatea measure of “Green GDP” which subtracts environmental costs from thetraditional GDP equation. Promoters of this frame stress that China’s international

status will be affected if it proves unable to control transnational emissions.Finally, the specter of social instability as a result of urban pollution is also usedto emphasize the urgency to revise thinking about energy policy.The “Short and Long Term Strategy of Energy Development, 2004-2020”made public on June 30th 2004 as the result of a large consultation headed byPrime Minister Wen Jiabao offers a variety of solutions which concretelyarticulate the environment frame: (1) to make reduction in energy consumptionthe core of the energy policy, (2) to adjust and optimize the energy structure, (3)to encourage the rationalization and the regional coordination of energy projects,(4) to make use of both national and international resources, (5) to base energydevelopment on technological innovation, (6) to improve environment protection,(7) to strengthen energy security by diversifying the sources of supply, (8) toimprove market mechanisms by speeding up reforms in the energy sector(Anonymous 2004b). To execute this plan, NDRC calls for an improvement in thediffusion of resource conservation techniques, for more technological innovation,for stronger regulations and norms, for a transformation in the structure ofproduction, and for the creation of a “circular economy” (xunhuan jingji) (Kai2004) 20.The emphasis is thus put firstly on measures aimed at improving thecountry’s energy efficiency, either by betting on the gradual modification of thecountry’s economic structure —from the polluting and energy-intensivemanufacturing industry to the service industry— or by improving the energysaving measures through the elevation of standards, the replacement of obsoleteequipment and the use of more efficient technologies (Anonymous 2003d;Anonymous 2003c). Secondly, the modification of the energy productionstructure will also attribute a greater role to “cleaner energy”: hydroelectricity,19 The IEA estimates that this share will reach 23% by 2030. International Energy Agency (2002).20 The term “Circular Economy” is the official translation used in English-language Chinese media,yet the Chinese term would be closer to the idea of a “close circuit economy” or “full circuiteconomy”. The expression “recycling economy” is also used, but may lead to some confusion.15Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007renewable energy, natural gas, but also nuclear power. Thirdly, in order toguarantee the concrete implementation of these measures, the proponents of thisapproach suggest the adoption of a new mode of calculating GDP as mentionedabove.6. Political ChoiceThe selection of one frame over another is, of course, not carried out only atthe level of ideas; ideas can stand at the margin for a long time before beingattached to a problem and then have a political echo. Institutional and culturalvariables, as well as the persuasive power of idea advocates, can play animportant role, if not a more important role, than the idea itself in itstransformation into concrete policy. To paraphrase Risse-Kappen, “ideas do notfloat freely”(Risse-Kappen 1995). To have a political impact, a frame must be

supported, reformulated, softened, or adapted to the flavor of the day by politicalentrepreneurs, individuals or organizations who are ready to invest time andpolitical capital to promote their pet policies21. Then, a favorable political windowmust open to enable these entrepreneurs to link objective conditions viewed asproblematic and available solutions to the political context of the moment(national mood, leaders’ priorities, the interplay of socio-economic groups, etc.)(Kingdon 1995:19). I suggest first to identify the main political entrepreneurs ofthe Chinese energy sector, then to describe the necessary conditions for theopening of a window of opportunity.The Western literature on Chinese energy policy identifies a certain numberof key actors in this process. In general, a typology of actors includes importantSOEs in the energy field (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC), the NDRC, the differentministries involved in energy issues (Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce,Ministry of Finance, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, the major financial Chineseholdings (China International Trust and Investment Corporation, CITIC), theenergy services firms, and the military(Strecker-Downs 2004; Cole 2003).Notwithstanding the fact, underlined above, that the “manipulators of symbols”are excluded, this list seems problematic for two reasons. First, it does not allow21 For Rein and Schön (1993), "Frames are never self-interpreting", the interpretation of frameshas to be executed by advocates who set up the frame, explain its implications on public actionand develop the argumentation that must sustain that action. Recognizing that these political ideasare carried by specific actors does not constitute a return to “fragmented authoritarianism” though.First, all political actors are not political entrepreneurs. Second, these actors' interests are not onlyshaped by their material bases or their bureaucratic position, but are also formulated in terms ofthe frames diffused by political entrepreneurs. Finally, the consensus that provides the substanceof concrete political measures is built through frame reinterpretation or frame synthesis rather thanthrough a process of bargaining around material or bureaucratic resources. See (Hall 1997: 194).16World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2us to distinguish at which point in the political process, stakeholders exert theirinfluence. Yet, it seems crucial to distinguish political actors whose actionsinfluence policies through the definition of problems and solutions, and those whohave a role downstream from this process. Second, Chinese leaders tend to beexcluded from these typologies as they are seen as last moment brokers in thedecision-making process. Yet, it is clear that the role of Chinese leaders does notstop at settling bureaucratic quarrels, but is much more pro-active.Indeed, Chinese leaders play an important role, not only in the shaping ofpolitical windows and in the identification of problems, but also in the process offormulating solutions. This hands-on approach seems to be relatively differentfrom that of their Western counterparts22. Their influence over policy formulationis not, in general, felt in the elaboration of concrete policy measures, but rather inthe promotion of general theories which set the main directions which will laterinfluence the development of concrete policies23. The need to formulate these new

theories can probably be explained by tradition – the theoretical work of Mao,Deng, and later Jiang Zemin have all been enshrined in the Chinese Constitution;but it may also be explained by the expectation that new leaders will create theirown theoretical legacy to put some distance between them and the previousgeneration of leaders (Fewsmith 2004; Tanner 2004: 212). Thus, the notion of“conservation society” is often associated to the concepts of “scientificdevelopment”, “circular economy”, and “sustainable development”. Thesedifferent terms have all been used to criticize the style of short-term, wasteful andpolluting extensive development which came to symbolize the rapidly growingChinese economy during the 1990s (Quanquan and Juhua 2004).The state apparatus’ think tanks also play a central role in the identificationof problems as much as in the elaboration of solutions. Two organizations seemparticularly important in this regard. First, the SC-DRC which provides the PrimeMinister’s office with studies and evaluations. Ever since its creation in 1981, thiscenter has articulated the preferences of the Prime Minister’s office byemphasizing economic reforms and liberalization under Zhu Rongji, then byfocusing on environmental and social measures since the nomination of WenJiabao. However, this center also has its own measures of predilection. Thus, duein part to the hierarchic affiliation of its energy section to its industrial economicsdivision, the improvement of energy efficiency and conservation have always22 In general, the latter are viewed as too preoccupied by the political game and the evolution ofpublic opinion to take part directly in the theoretical elaboration of solutions.23 In this sense, Chinese leaders can play the role of « path-shapers ». See Cox (2001).17Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007been part of the measures recommended by the center24. The DRC has thus playeda major role in the translation of the “scientific development” frame.The second source of interpretation of energy problems and formulation ofsolutions is the Energy Research Institute (ERI, Nengyuan yanjiusuo) of theNDRC. The NDRC plays a double role since it formulates the final version ofpolicies and is in charge of implementing them, but it is also engaged in framepromotion through its Energy Research Center. In contradistinction to the DRC,the ERI has pushed forward, in a regular manner, a strategic vision of China’senergy problems by emphasizing the development of national resources, pricecontrol and the Zouchuqu policy 25 . The bureaucratic culture of NDRC canprobably be partly held accountable for this tendency since, as the direct heir tothe State Planning Commission, this institution is imbued with an interventionisttradition and still maintains intimate ties with state firms.Other research centers also have a role in framing energy issues. Thus,researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and fromuniversities can directly voice their concerns to the different political leaders andput forward recommendations ranging from the promotion of hydrogen as areplacement fuel to the deregulation of the power sector26. Research centers oninternational relations or strategic and military questions were also among the firstto attract attention to the strategic risk that dependence on imports can create.Thus, if, like many have noted, the military hierarchy does not have a direct role

to play in the decision-making on energy policy27, research centers affiliated withthe military play a central role in the formulation of policy programs.It appears that major state-owned firms in the energy field are rarely presentat the stages of problem identification or in the elaboration of politicalalternatives. Their role seems rather located downstream in the process: they reactto actual policies, by supporting some and opposing others, without necessarilyfollowing a coherent political frame28. Thus, the wavering that has characterizedthe creation of the strategic oil reserve has more to do with the sharing ofrespective financial burden between the state and its firms than with the lack of24 Interview at DRC, Beijing, May 2004. See also DRC, 2003, “Guojia nengyuan zhanlüe de jibengouxiang” [A Few Basic Concepts on the National Energy Strategy], Renmin wang, November 16.25 Interview at the ERI, Beijing, May 2004. The ERI has nonetheless adopted certain aspects of thesustainable development program since one of its main suggestions is the reduction of thecountry’s dependency on coal in favor of cleaner energy sources.26 Interviews at CASS, Beijing, March 2005.27 Strecker-Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate”, p. 26-27.28 This finding is consistent with Heclo’s (1974: 298) observation that interests groups are ingeneral reacting to policies adopted by the state and will sometime veto measures that are goingagainst there perceived interests rather than being pro-active at the policy-formulation level.18World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2consensus in the identification of problems and the elaboration of solutions(Anonymous 2003b).6.1 Windows of Opportunity and Entrepreneurs’ SuccessAccording to Kingdon, certain crucial moments create windows ofopportunity conducive to political innovation, for instance, when a problembecomes so overwhelming that it can no longer be ignored and forces the searchfor an appropriate solution or when transformations in the political environmentencourage political entrepreneurs to act (Kingdon 1995). The turn of the centuryappears to offer such a favorable conjuncture for innovation in China’s energypolicy.First, the coming to power of a new team with an apparent strong will toreorient the economic development path of China makes the political conjuncturemore favorable to the revision of the country’s energy policy.Second, traditional conceptions of energy security were plagued by manyproblems which seemed insurmountable without a radical change of frame. First,the shortcomings of the diplomatic approach, privileged under the leadership ofJiang Zemin, were illustrated by the dead end reached in Sino-Russian energycooperation (Xuzheng 2003), by the reluctance of SOOEs to pay for nationalenergy security, by the growing problem of pollution, and by the difficulties ofthe power sector. These shortcomings have all worn down the persuasion powerof the strategic approach followed during most of the 1990s. Second, the fiasco ofCalifornia’s power sector deregulation, the rapid rise of crude rates on

international markets, and the lack of success in the liberalization of the coalsector in China have greatly shaken the credibility of the market option.Not only is there a political window opened by the perceived failure oftraditional frames but, thirdly, solutions to these problems are readily available.Indeed, the “scientific development” frame offers solutions to more than one woeof the Chinese energy sector. Energy conservation and the development ofalternative energies can kill three birds with one stone by reducing pollutingemissions, developing national resources, and reducing energy consumption. Therhetorical force this frame enjoys is supplemented by the support of politicalentrepreneurs with direct access to the country’s leaders, as well as by the entiretheoretical arsenal developed in the rest of the world around the concept ofsustainable development29.Fourth, this frame receives support from major bureaucratic and socioeconomicactors. The State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) isstrongly in favor of this conception and of the development of a Green GDP29 It is interesting to note that Greenpeace figures among the most enthusiastic supporters of thenew Chinese approach vis-à-vis energy (Anonymous 2004a).19Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007measure, and can also rely on the support of foreign partners in favor ofsustainable development. The environment technologies industry, a rapidlygrowing sector in China, is also strongly behind a transition to a new approachregarding energy issues.All these conditions seem to have aligned to open a window for in-depthreforms of China’s energy policy. Nevertheless, as of today, the Chinesegovernment has not been able to fundamentally reorient the energy policy of thecountry. In spite of innovations like the adoption of the Law on the Promotion ofRenewable Energies, the implementation of new measures aimed at energyconservation and the constitution of a strategic reserve, the principal characteristicof the policy in that sector remains status quo rather than change. If all theseconditions converged to be conducive to a major change, how can we explain thisinertia? I would like to suggest two hypotheses as a way of concluding.7. Conclusion: Culture and InstitutionsOne possible line of explanation has to do with the economic culture or theeconomic identity of the country. If Kingdon stressed the importance of the“national mood” as a key factor of the “political stream”, he implied that it israther fickle and could vary depending on the government in power. However, itis possible to think that certain, more perennial, elements of national identity or ofthe economic tradition also have an impact on the persuasive power of theseframes (Crane 1996; Dobbin 1994: 2; Hall 1989): those that are very detachedfrom commonly shared references risk meeting difficulties.In that sense, we can understand the attractiveness of the strategic approachfor Chinese elites: the Chinese cognitive background gives a primordial place toself-sufficiency. Without even mentioning the millennium worth of autarchictradition, the birth of the Chinese energy industry was triggered by the withdrawalof Soviet engineers and the end of Soviet exports of crude oil on which the PRC

was dependent for 50% of its needs. This bad experience has, since the discoveryof the giant oil field of Daqing which became a Maoist model of self-sufficiency(zili gengsheng), led many Chinese to see foreign investments in the sector andthe dependence on international supplies as potentially dangerous. At the sametime, many also harbor doubts about new technologies and see them as lessreliable or technologically inaccessible for China (Strecker-Downs 2000). Theimportance of this heritage is manifest in the efforts that advocates ofenvironmental solutions take to reframe in terms of security the benefits of theirpreferred measures.Beyond self-sufficiency which has become a constitutive element ofChina’s economic identity, it is possible to treat the Chinese Communist Party asa culture. As such, socialization in the CCP would encourage resorting to certainrepertoires of actions and to reject others (Campbell 1997: 22; Geertz 1964).20World Political Science Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 2http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art2Indeed, the structures of recruitment of the CCP which emphasize ideologicaluniformity can strongly play against political innovation (Yasheng, 1996: 101-119). Thus, energy measures that could raise energy efficiency —a gas tax forexample— can also be construed as destabilizing might find scant support withinthe Party even if some leaders would be in favor of them.The structure of administrative and political institutions can also explain inpart this lack of process. First, even though institutions determine politicalentrepreneurs’ access to decision-makers, in the case at hand, access does notseem to have been a critical factor. It rather seems that the bureaucratic culture ofthe NDRC —its rules, routines and standard operating procedures— led to theformulation of measures inspired by past practices: popular campaigns inciting toenergy conservation and the exploitation of national resources by public firms, forexample. Only measures breaking new bureaucratic grounds have had a certainsuccess as in the case of the Law on the Promotion of Renewable Energies andthe creation of a strategic oil reserve. Finally, the administrative capacity of thestate could also have limited the echo of the “scientific development” frame onconcrete policies. Indeed, the need to develop a battery of new statistical toolsseems to have forced a reconsideration of the Green GDP program.Maybe this inability to innovate, can simply be explained by the game ofsocio-economic interest groups? The big state firms and provincial governmentscould simply have been opposed to the more innovative measures. In the actualstate of the research, it is impossible to reject this hypothesis; yet an explanationbased only on interests seems insufficient to explain why certain measures havebeen adopted whereas others were blocked. Why would the major SOOEs havebeen able to check the most radical energy conservation measures when powerfulpublic power utilities have not been able to protect themselves from a law thatforces them to buy electricity produced from renewable sources at a higher pricethan traditional fuels?This paper aimed at offering a different point of view on the decisionmakingprocess in China’s energy policy. I believe that an approach looking forthe independent role of ideas can yield superior results to one which takes for

granted the equivalence between material interests and ideas. An approach builtaround political ideas organized in frames allows for a better understanding of thesubstance of policies and gives a meaning to political games actors play byunearthing the mechanisms of the social construction of their interests. I havechosen to join two theoretical literatures which seem complementary but haverarely been explicitly used together. The first approach was developed around theconcept of political framing and the second is the model of public administrationput forward by John Kingdon. These two analytical currents seems especiallycomplementary because the impact of frames is most clearly felt at the level ofproblems definition and policy formulation, two relatively independent “streams”21Constantin: Understanding China's Energy SecurityPublished by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007in Kingdon’s work, while the third “stream” is more amenable to an analysissensitive to structural factors (culture, socio-economic interests, institutions)which limit the possibilities of converting frames into concrete policies.ReferencesAhearne, John F. 1985. “Challenge for Energy Security Policy to the Year 2000(or Santayana Was Right)”, in Improving U.S. Energy Security, Richard J.Gonzalez, Raymond W. Smilor and Joel Darmstadter (eds.), Cambridge(MA), Ballinger Pub. Co., p. 9.Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit.Andrews-Speed Philip and Sergei Vinogradov, 2000. “China’s Involvement inCentral Asian Petroleum. Convergent or Divergent Interests?”, AsianSurvey, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 391.Andrews-Speed, Philip Liao Xuanli and Roland Dannreuther, 2002. The StrategicImplications of China’s Energy Needs, Adelphi Paper No. 346, New York,International Institute for Strategic Studies.Andrews-Speed, Phillip 2004. Energy Policy and Regulation in the PRC, TheHague, Kluwer Law International, p. 32, 53.Anonymous, 1999. “The Main Study”, in China and Long-Range Asia EnergySecurity: An Analysis of the Political, Economic and Technological FactorsShaping Asian Energy Markets, Houston (TX), Rice University, James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy;Anonymous, 2002. “China’s 21st Century Oil Strategy Outlined”, People’s Daily,November 15.Anonymous, 2003a. “China Faces Energy Shortage”, Xinhua, December 8 inAlexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 15.Anonymous, 2003b. “China Steps up Efforts in Oil Reserves Building”, People’sDaily, January 21, in Asia-Pacific Resources Database.Anonymous, 2003c. “China Strives to Cut Oil Consumption via Energy-EfficientAutomobiles”, People’s Daily, November 18.Anonymous, 2003d. “China to Face Challenges in Energy in Next 20 Years”,People’s Daily, December 31, in Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections,Vol. 9, No. 1, January 15 2004.Anonymous, 2003e. “China’s Economy Feels Pinch of Power Shortage”, BeijingXinhua, December 10, FBIS : CPP200312100000170.

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