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Union Campaign Activities and Voter Preferences* J. MALCOLM WALKER San Jose State University, San Jose, CA 95192 JOHN J. LAWLER University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820 The impact of campaign activity on voting preferences in union representation elections is investigated using a panel study approach. The context of this study is afour-year, mutticampus, university system, in which two faculty unions competed vigorously for representation rights for several years. We propose a multivariate model of individual voting intentions which, we argue, depend on the pre- campaign expected consequences of collective bargaining, recent changes in institu- tional conditions, various normative and value constraints, and union campaign activity. Both self-reports of exposure to campaign activity and exogenous measures of campus-specific organizing efforts are used in the analysis. The use of exogenous indicators of campaign activity, which we argue is more appropri- ate, suggests that campaign activity exerts no appreciable effect on the manner in which individuals vote in such elections. Policy implications of these findings are discussed. I. Introduction An extensive body of research focusing on the causes of union growth (and decline) has evolved over the past 15 years (Fiorito and Greet, 1982). The bulk of this work has dealt with the structural and contextual determinants of aggregate rates of unionization, changes in unionization rates, and individual union membership. Given the declining level of unionization in the U.S. and decreasing union win rates in representation elections, it is not surprising that much of the re- cent research in this area has concerned either election outcomes or individual voting behavior (Heneman and Sandver, 1983). The role of union and employer tactics in influencing voting behavior and election outcomes has been of particular interest, since they are subject to regula- tion by the NLRB (or relevant state or federal administrative agency) and are argued by many to be of critical importance (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Yet, research dealing with the impact of campaign activity, especially efforts designed *The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version. JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH Volume VII, Number I Winter 1986

Union campaign activities and voter preferences

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Page 1: Union campaign activities and voter preferences

Union Campaign Activities and Voter Preferences*

J. M A L C O L M W A L K E R San Jose State University, San Jose, CA 95192

J O H N J. L A W L E R University o f Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820

The impact o f campaign activity on voting preferences in union representation elections is investigated using a panel study approach. The context o f this study is a four-year, mutticampus, university system, in which two faculty unions competed vigorously for representation rights for several years. We propose a multivariate model o f individual voting intentions which, we argue, depend on the pre- campaign expected consequences o f collective bargaining, recent changes in institu- tional conditions, various normative and value constraints, and union campaign activity. Both self-reports o f exposure to campaign activity and exogenous measures of campus-specific organizing efforts are used in the analysis. The use o f exogenous indicators o f campaign activity, which we argue is more appropri- ate, suggests that campaign activity exerts no appreciable effect on the manner in which individuals vote in such elections. Policy implications o f these findings are discussed.

I. Introduction

An extensive body of research focusing on the causes of union growth (and decline) has evolved over the past 15 years (Fiorito and Greet, 1982). The bulk of this work has dealt with the structural and contextual determinants of aggregate rates of unionization, changes in unionization rates, and individual union membership. Given the declining level of unionization in the U.S. and decreasing union win rates in representation elections, it is not surprising that much of the re- cent research in this area has concerned either election outcomes or individual voting behavior (Heneman and Sandver, 1983).

The role of union and employer tactics in influencing voting behavior and election outcomes has been of particular interest, since they are subject to regula- tion by the NLRB (or relevant state or federal administrative agency) and are argued by many to be of critical importance (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Yet, research dealing with the impact of campaign activity, especially efforts designed

*The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version.

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH Volume VII, Number I Winter 1986

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to persuade members of an election unit to vote in a particular way, is inconclu- sive. This partially explains the NLRB's shifting and inconsistent position with respect to factual misrepresentation in campaign statements and literature. Based on a study by Getman, Goldberg, and Brett (1976), which suggested that certain campaign activities are not especially effective, the Board significantly relaxed its standards relating to misrepresentation (Hollywood Ceramics [51 LRRM 1600, 1962]) in the ShoppingKart case (94 LRRM 1705). The Getman et al. study, how- ever, is not without its critics, and the NLRB shortly returned to its earlier stance (GeneralKnit of California [99 LRRM 1687]), only to reverse itself again in 1982 (Midland National Life Insurance [110 LRRM 1489]). Clearly, additional research on this topic is necessary.

The essence of the controversy surrounding the regulation of campaign ac- tivity, especially persuasive communications, is the manner in which individuals voting in representation elections assimilate and use information to which they may be exposed. If they closely attend to such information and rationally evalu- ate it, as is implicitly assumed in the Board's "laboratory conditions" doctrine (Getman et al., 1976), then factual misrepresentation in persuasive communica- tions would interfere with the objective of assuring that employees make a free and informed choice regarding unionization. If, on the other hand, the decision process deviates significantly from the conventional rational choice model, then employees may be unaffected by campaign activities and close policing of the content of campaign messages would be unwarranted.

The present study investigates the impact of union campaign activities that are designed to persuade employees to vote for a specific union. We analyze indi- vidual voting behavior using a model that draws heavily from theories of micro- behavioral processes developed by political scientists to explain voter behavior in governmental elections. A panel study design is used, which allows greater confi- dence in inferences drawn regarding causal relationships. The general context is that of the "new unionism" among public, professional, and quasi-professional employees. The specific context is a faculty representation election in the Califor- nia State University (CSU) system. The impact of union campaign activities is a major focus. Evidence as to campaign effects is scant (Heneman and Sandver, 1983); no studies have examined campaign effects on individual choice in the "new unionism" context, where campaigns are conducted under conditions that differ from those in traditional sectors.

II. Campaign Activity: Prior Research

Descriptive case studies of the behaviors of union organizers, including the use of such tactics as meetings, campaign literature, and personal contacts with workers,

qn his research on election outcomes in state employment Martin (1985) focuses on the bargaining unit as his level of analysis. Martin's work is theoretically consistent with that reported here and in Walker and Lawler (1979).

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 21

have suggested positive effects on election outcomes (Karsh, 1982; Strauss, 1953). Assertedly, such tactics heighten and channel discontent, mobilize group opposi- tion to an employer, maintain solidarity, and persuade employees that group action through the union under collective bargaining will improve conditions. Craft and Extejt (1983), however, have suggested that work place-focused tactics no longer work as well in the face of sophisticated employer opposition and that strategies involving pressure on an employer from beyond the immediate work place may be more successful. Recent aggregate level empirical studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between resources allocated to union organ- izing and aggregate levels of union effectiveness in elections (Block, 1980; Elliot and Hawkins, 1982; Voos, 1983).

The most important empirical study of the impact of union and employer campaign activities on individual voting behavior is that by Getman et al. (1976). They found some union campaign activities to be marginally significant in influ- encing voting behaviors. This finding was inconsistent with an earlier, more limited study in which no relationship was found between perceived effectiveness of a union's campaign activities and voting behavior (Brotslaw, 1967). Getman et al. also found that employer campaign activities had no significant effects on employees' voting behavior. This finding is contradicted by Dickens' (1983) re- analysis of their data. Aggregate level studies also suggest that employer resis- tance, legal maneuvering by employers causing election delays, and the use of consultants reduce the probability of union election victory (Cooke, 1983; Lawler, 1984; Seeber and Cooke, 1983).

The work of Getman et al. has been criticized on conceptual and method- ologicai grounds (Dickens, 1983; Eames, 1976; Flanagan, 1976). Since they exam- ined campaigning only in the period immediately preceding an election, the time horizon may have been too short to reveal campaign effects. Much of the data based on employees' intended vote in their first interview wave were gathered after campaigns were underway. Criteria used to select the sample studied (in- cluding the high potential for employer coercion) and the absence of a control group suggest selection and regression biases in the results. Lack of rigor in the specification and estimation of Getman et al.'s model is implied by the simple theoretical framework used; failure to control for other factors that might have influenced voting and their reliance on simple correlational analysis precluded isolating the direct effects of campaign activities. The authors presented results that, for the best part, support only null hypotheses and do not offer an alterna- tive model that might explain voting behavior.

A further issue of potential importance is that of the campaign exposure measures used. Both the Brotslaw (1967) and Getman et al. (1976) studies relied on respondent self-reports of exposure, which may bias estimated campaign ef- fects because of the endogenous nature of campaign exposure measures. Selective exposure to campaign influences, conditioned by an individual's pre-existing sentiments about collective bargaining and a particular union, may induce the

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erroneous conclusion that campaign activities causally affect voting behavior. Controlling for pre-campaign sentiments provides only a partial solution to this problem. An exogenous measure of campaign activity is necessary.

III. The Issue o f Election Context

Almost all individual-level studies of the outcome of initial elections have been conducted among blue collar, service, and lower-level white collar employees in the private sector. Typically, voters face a dichotomous choice between one union and no agent. The time covered is short, since the focus is on the campaign period. This focus is consistent with the interpretation of union organizing as involving a contemporaneous membership drive and election campaign: the immediate pur- pose of both is an election victory. This interpretation is consistent with the customary view of unionization of the work place. Individual employees who are dissatisfied and feel powerless coalesce and then seek - - with the help of organ- izers - - to persuade a majority of their fellow employees to join them in a union and to provide a majority vote in an election (Brett, 1980).

The nature of representation elections is often quite different in public, pro- fessional, and quasi-professional employment. A union's membership base may have been established long before the issue of winning an election arises, so that membership formation and election campaign are distinct events. Two or more unions with alternative programs may be present. The union(s) may have long carried out formal or informal employee representation activities, so that an insti- tutional power structure exists that may be retained through "no agent" votes in an election. Employees have had the opportunity to form perceptions of the union(s), including what the union(s) may be expected to achieve should collec- tive bargaining come, well before an election campaign gets underway. A short- term election campaign, involving competition between established groups, takes place in the context of long-term, institutionalized relationships. The dynamics of campaigns and the effects of campaign activities may be quite different from those found in traditional union sectors.

IV. Research Context and Data

Efforts to obtain bargaining rights for CSU faculty were already under way by the early 1970s (Walker, 1974). Two unions engaged in representational activities at campus, systemwide, and state political levels for several years before competing in an election in December 1981: (1) the California Faculty Association (CFA), a coalition of NEA, AAUP, and the California State Employees Association affili- ates; and (2) the United Professors of California (UPC), an AFT affiliate. Both unions had a substantial membership base, and they presented distinctive ideolo- gies and programs of action. As argued elsewhere, CFA could be characterized as a protective union and UPC as an aggressive union (Walker and Lawler, 1979). This distinction is based on whether a union seeks changes in intraorganizational

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J. M A L C O L M W A L KER and J O H N J. L A W L E R 23

political relationships through the redistribution of power (aggressive) or pri- marily in the terms of economic exchange relationships (protective).

Although the systemwide administration opposed bargaining, a substantial majority of faculty members voted in favor of bargaining in the election held in December 1981. CFA prevailed in a run-off election. Our individual survey data were collected in two waves: mail questionnaires were sent to the same sample of full-time faculty members in the spring of 1976 and in November 1981, immedi- ately prior to the initial election. Respondents were asked about their attitudes toward and perceptions of their work situations and the competing unions. About 25 percent of the sample (n = 2000) responded to the first questionnaire and provided their names for the second. The demographic characteristics of the sample generally paralleled known population characteristics. There was attri- tion in the sample between the first and second questionnaire waves; about 30 per- cent of the 1976 respondents were no longer employed in the CSU in 1981. The pattern of support for the three ballot options, however, did not differ signifi- cantly between the sample of respondents studied here and the CSU faculty as a whole. The proportion of respondents favoring each of the alternatives closely matched the actual vote distribution in the election. This study is based on 271 cases with usable data.

After the election, interviews were conducted on CSU campuses with key persons from each union, the campus senate, and the administration. These inter- views provided information about a variety of conditions on campus and about each union's campaign activities in the period before the election. It was possible to complete interviews on 17 of the 19 campuses in the system.

V. Theory and Hypotheses

Our dependent variable is the individual's intended vote as reported in the 1981 survey. The contextual characteristics suggest enough similarities with elections in the American polity to warrant drawing on the theory of individual voting choice developed in political science and related empirical studies. For the pur- pose of modeling, we start from the assumption that faculty members (1) are issue-oriented voters capable of conceptualizing intraorganizational political and economic issues with a substantial degree of sophistication, and (2)choose among union and no agent alternatives in an intendedly rational manner. 2 The focus, then, is on cognitions underlying electoral decision making.

These cognitions include interest by faculty members as professionals in the political economy of their organizations. Significant differences must exist, and be perceived to exist, among alternatives so that voting will be seen to make a dif-

2Of course, in multi-alternative elections an individual may not vote for his or her preferred choice for strategic reasons: if the preferred alternative is apt to lose, the individual may vote for the most attrac- tive or least onerous alternative from the set of likely winners. Because of the complexity of modeling such a choice process, rational optimization is assumed.

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ference. Both conditions have been demonstrated empirically in the CSU.3 Given these conditions, individuals are motivated to search for information about (1) organizational political and economic issues and conditions (related to both organizational and personal welfare), and (2) the policies and programs o f the administration and of each union, including what they can be expected to accom- plish in the future (particularly under collective bargaining). An individual formulates a cognitive map in which such information is matched with personal preferences and the degree of fit is established between the individual's out look and the perceived policy and program of each contending party. This cognitive map forms the basis for the electoral decision: the individual will vote for that alternative with subjective expected utility that is greater than that presented by each of the other alternatives.

Political elections in a democracy and representation elections of the type analyzed here occur in settings that can be characterized by some degree o f overall stability in " p a r t y " support. But electoral choices are also in part responses to immediate circumstances that surround a specific election. I f most electors form well-structured cognitions before the campaign period, short-run factors may have little effect on election outcomes. Short-run influences include campaign activities intended to alter the individual's voting preferences as well as changes in objective conditions that might affect the evaluation of alternatives. Other fac- tors examined in this study are normative and personal value constraints as well as the individual's personal circumstances (the theoretical rationale for these vari- ables is discussed below).

Our model (Figure 1) posits that pre-campaign cognitions, campaign activi- ties, and other short-run influences (which occur after pre-campaign cognitions have been measured) condition current perceptions of the value of ballot alterna- tives. Current perceptions, along with personal circumstances and normat ive / personal value constraints, determine voting behavior. Current perceptions (i.e., at the time of the election) are not used in the study since these may be a conse- quence, as well as a cause, of behavior or intended behavior. The use of lagged perceptions and short-run influences avoids the endogeneity problem and allows us to test some interesting hypotheses that derive f rom research on voter behavior in political elections (i.e., the model is estimated in reduced form).

Pre-Campaign Expectations Regarding Bargaining. The 1976 survey data are used to identify pre-campaign cognitions. We assume that individuals make voting decisions based on the expected consequences of collective bargaining

~"Rational choice models do not of necessity require that individuals be highly informed and accurate concerning parties'. . , positions. However, they do require that voters perceive differences between the parties, and be able to locate these positions relative to their own and further that these social cognitions be shared by the electorate, irrespective of their own preferences" (Himmelweit et al., 1981, p. 107). In an earlier article based on the 1976 survey data, we established that the views of CSU faculty were well structured in this respect, forming in particular two belief dusters system associated with the rival unions (Walker and Lawler, 1979).

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J. M A L C O L M W A L K E R and J O H N J. L A W L E R 25

under the competing unions, as well as the consequences of continued no- bargaining status.' Respondents were asked about their expectations regarding bargaining under both CFA and UPC relative to continued no-bargaining status. Several issues were presented, including increases in salary and fringe benefits, job security, quality of personnel decisions, potential for faculty-administration conflicts, resource allocations, and university governance. Since responses to these items are highly intercorrelated, factor analysis was used to construct an index of overall expectations for each union.' These composite indices are scaled

Figure i

Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Voting Behavior

Short-Run Changes in

Organizational Conditions

Pre-Campaign Cognitions

Campaign Tactics

~ [ Cognitions at I ~ ] Time of Election

(Post-Campaign)

t ' v o , e i n Election

=1

Personal Value and Normative

Constraints

Personal Circumstances

'Others have formulated decision models that incorporate current dissatisfaction and expected change under bargaining ("union instrumentality") as well as the potential for change without bar- gaining (Brett, 1980; Brett and Hammer, 1982; Kochan, 1980). "In forming his or her perception of the likelihood of a party implementing particular policy once in power, a voter surely draws on both past political experiences and his or her knowledge of the parties' current statements. So we do not need a separate 'past political experiences' variable" (Himmelweit et ai., 1981).

'The first principal factor was used as the overall expectations scale. Separate factor analyses of the UPC and CFA items resulted in only two factors with eigen values in excess of 1.0 in each analysis. While the first factor in each case appeared to be a general factor after rotation, [oadings on the sec- ond factor were limited to governance issues. Inclusion of the second factor in the logit analysis (not considered here) does not influence the results reported below.

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so that a more positive value indicates more favorable expectations regarding the consequences of collective bargaining with the union, relative to continued no- bargaining status. The questions were formulated so as to imply an evaluation of the outcome as well as an expectation. Therefore, the composite indices are analogous to subjective expected value expressions in rational choice models. We expect the following relationships to hold:

Hla: The more positive pre-existing CFA expectations, the more probable a vote for CFA relative to UPC and to no agent.

Hlb: The more positive pre-existing UPC expectations, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA and to no agent.

Campaign Influences. "The bottom line is that votes have to be sought, and the most concentrated work to win them takes place through the campaign" (Jacobson, 1983, p. 49). Election campaigns may make a difference, but how much and under what conditions? Political campaigns provide stimuli to which individuals react and information about issues and party positions. Campaigns also increase the salience of issues and present issues in ways that are favorable to the party (Nie et al., 1979). Effects on voter choice depend on the amount and types of campaign activities, the exposure of the elector to those activities, and how the elector processes information derived from that exposure.

Individuals whose pre-campaign cognitions are coherently structured and firmly held are unlikely to change their voting choice as a result of campaign activities. They tend to expose themselves to campaign information; but given their predisposition in favor of one party, they are motivated to engage in selec- tive exposure to information sources and to give positive attention only to infor- mation that supports existing orientations (selective perception) (McCombs, 1972). Party campaign activities reinforce existing predispositions and activate propensities to vote for the party.

Some of those individuals whose pre-campaign cognitions are not coherently structured and firmly held are "interested independents." These individuals pay attention to political affairs, but they make choice decisions only when an elec- tion is imminent, at which point the election issue becomes salient. Such indi- viduals then search for and attend to party-specific information. They use such information to form cognitions, which, by crystallizing perceptions of alternative parties, provide the basis for forming voting decisions (Bybee et al., 1981; Chaffe and Choe, 1980; Nie et al., 1979; Wayne, 1984). Similar effects may be found among "weak partisans," especially when information is frequently reported through multiple sources, so that awareness is increased and the biasing effect of predispositions is weakened (Miller and MacKuen, 1979). Such individuals are uninterested in political affairs and do not form consistent cognitions, but they may vote anyway. The "uninterested" are highly prone to make short run changes in voting choice on the basis of minimal campaign specific information, provided any information reaches their attention, even if exposure is inadvertent

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 27

(Dreyer, 1971-1972). This would be more likely when campaign activities are in- tense and information is ubiquitous.

The preceding effects have been demonstrated in studies of a variety of cam- paign influence channels using voters' self-reports. A few studies of elections in particular communities have demonstrated direct positive effects on voters' evaluations of alternatives and on voting choice of a variety of party campaign activities: (1) quality of local party organization; (2) precinct work by party activists; (3) mailed campaign literature; (4) number of telephone contacts; and (5) face-to-face personal contacts by party leaders and campaign workers (Crotty, 1971; Jacobson, 1983; Sorauf, 1980). Such activities have increased a party's share of the vote by 5 to 10 percent and are especially significant when races are close and mass media effects are weak.

We would expect to find a mix of partisans, informed independents, and un- interested individuals in a representation election of the type studied here. Rein- forcement, crystallization, and vote change effects should be present. Given such a mix, campaign effects should also be likely because the initial election was "criti- cal," the election was competitive, and campaign information was easy to access.

Our intention was to assess the effects of campaign activities conducted by the administration as well as by the unions. There was very little variation across campuses in the administration response, and formal faculty opposition to bar- gaining was very limited. Therefore, we must treat opposition to bargaining as a constant effect and investigate only the unions' campaign activity. The following hypotheses are suggested:

H2a: The greater the intensity of CFA campaign activity, the more probable a vote for CFA relative to UPC and to no agent.

H2b: The greater the intensity of UPC campaign activity, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA and to no agent.

Our measures for campaign activity influences are of two types. Self-reports o f campaign exposure relate to attendance at union-sponsored pro-bargaining meetings or parties (attended/did not attend) and frequency of reading CFA and UPC campaign literature. These items are similar to those used by Getman et al. (1976), so that findings here can be compared with theirs'. 6 To deal with the en- dogeneity problem associated with self-reports of campaign exposure, we devel- oped measures of a range of actual campaign activities conducted on each of the 17 campuses during the semester of the election. Thus, we are able to assess the impact of the intensity of campaign activity on voter behavior without the con- founding effects of selective exposure and perceptual distortion that accompany self-reports of campaign exposure. This information was obtained in on-campus interviews. The campus- and union-specific measures are used in the analysis and

~We do not have a campaign familiarity index of the type used by Getman et al.

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are compared to the results obtained using self-reports o f campaign exposure. Summary statistics for campaign activity measures are reported in Table 1.

Other Short-Term Influences. Campaign activities are not the only possible short- term influences on voting behavior. A representat ion campaign takes place within the context o f ongoing organizational events. As in the polity (Nieet al., 1979), changes may occur in intraorganizat ional political and economic condi- tions. These changes can be observed and assessed by employees independently of management and union interpretations. Such assessments may influence voting choice by enhancing the importance of issues, weakening part isan identifications, and increasing the salience o f the election. Thus, changes on campus, especially those that individuals experience as a worsening of conditions, may affect voting choice. Such may be the case with respect to both the state of the campus and per- sonal working conditions.

Table 1

Campaign Activity Measures

CFA UPC (SD) X (SD)

A) SELF-REPORTS OF CAMPAIGN EXPOSURE (Respondent Averages; n = 271) 1) Attended pro-bargaining meetings

(1 = Yes; 0 = No) .21 (.41) .31 (,46) 2) Frequency of exposure to campaign literature

(5 = Very often; 1 = Little or none) 3.70 (1.17) 3.74 (1.16)

B) EXOGENOUS MEASURES (Campus Averages; n = 17) 1) Personal contacts

(% of faculty reached) 58% (22) 71% (17) 2) Telephone contacts

(070 of faculty reached) 5807o (30) 7207o (20) 3) Fliers

(number issued) 11.2 (7.7) 15.7 (6.8) 4) Parties

(number held) 4.02 (3.5) 7.3 (8.8) 5) Newspaper advertisements

(number placed) .35 (.60) .41 (.79) 6) Newsletter

(number issued) 4.7 (9.2) 4.6 (3.7) 7) Pro-bargaining meetings

(number held) 1.47 (1.6) 1.88 (1.7)

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 29

Pressures on campus resources, programs, and faculty opportunities should increase the expected value of collective bargaining to faculty members and perhaps the propensity to support the more aggressive union. Those contacted for personal interviews were asked a series of questions about student enrollment trends (the key determinant of campus budgets in the CSU), budgetary cutbacks, termination of academic programs, faculty layoffs, and tightening of promotion and tenure opportunities since 1976. Responses were summed to give an index of severity of changes in campus conditions, with higher values indicating greater deterioration of conditions. We hypothesize:

H3a: The less favorable the changes in campus conditions, the more probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

H3b: The less favorable the changes in campus conditions, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA.

Employees are perhaps more likely to have direct experience with and to be sensitive to changes in conditions in their immediate work site. In the 1981 survey, we asked faculty members about changes over the preceding five years in their own departments: in course enrollments, number of fulltime equivalent teaching positions, budget allocations, number of courses taught, and rate of faculty advancement. Items were anchored in terms of improving versus worsening con- ditions and were summed to construct a scale of changing departmental condi- tions. As these questions are largely objective in nature, the endogeneity problem is not seen to be serious here. The index is scaled so that higher values indicate deteriorating conditions. Since deteriorating conditions would increase the ex- pected value of collective bargaining to faculty members, we hypothesize:

H4a: The less favorable the changes in departmental conditions, the more probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

H4b: The less favorable the changes in departmental conditions, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA.

These hypotheses take into account the possibility that employees blame management for worsening conditions, reduce their confidence in management, and perceive their vote as a means of retaliation (Heneman and Sandver, 1983). Similar effects may occur in response to deleterious changes in the distribution of power on campus and the capacity of the governance system to resolve problems. The worse these changes, the greater the appeal of the more aggressive union (UPC).

The CSU campuses, as with other organizations where the "new unionism" is found, were characterized by institutional power structures in the pre-election era. CFA and UPC carried on representational functions, and faculties were in- volved in shared governance processes through senates and decentralization of decision making to departments. In the period before the election, campuses

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varied as to (1) shifts in the distribution of power (degree of centralization of decision making and administration influence vis-a-vis faculty); (2) degree of presidential responsiveness to faculty concerns; and (3) the level of collaboration between administration and senate. We combined our campus interviewees' assessment of these dimensions to derive a single index of power distribution and level of conflict for each campus: from extensive power sharing-high collabora- tion (1), through moderate power sharing and collaboration (2), to power highly skewed to the administration and high conflict (3). Categorization of campuses is consistent with generally recognized power and conflict relations on the campuses and with information derived from our interviews as to conflict behaviors on campuses (such as major issues disputed and overt faculty challenges to the cam- pus administration). We hypothesize:

HSa: The greater the power of the administration and the degree of conflict, the more probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

HSb: The greater the power of the administration and the degree of conflict, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA.

Normative and Personal Value Constraints. Political voting decisions have a social basis, and they may be shaped by social influences that reflect shared experiences and norms derived from that experience. These may run counter to partisan inclinations (Wayne, 1984). Despite evaluation of ballot alternatives and exposure to campaign activities, an individual may vote in a way that is consistent with normative pressures. Such influences may come through peer pressure or role ascription. Both are captured by academic field. In particular, faculties in professional or technical fields (business, engineering, agriculture, health sciences) are generally less inclined to support bargaining or, if in favor, are more inclined to support a more "moderate" union. We hypothesize:

H6a: If the individual is in a professional or technical field, the less probable a vote for CFA, or for UPC, relative to no agent.

H6b: If the individual is in a professional or technical field, the more probable a vote for CFA relative to UPC.

Involvement in organizational governance activities, through membership in campus senate or important campus committees, is also apt to affect an indi- vidual's role perceptions. Given the long-term presence of unions with substantial membership and of widespread support for collective bargaining among the fac- ulty, then close familiarity with governance processes in a university system char- acterized by complexity of structure and decision-making processes is likely to (1) accentuate perceptions of the inadequacies of existing governance mechan- isms and (2) build up hopes that collective bargaining will enhance the de facto role of "shared governance" mechanisms. Such enhancement should be seen as more likely under CFA (with its substantial AAUP component) than under UPC. We expect:

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 31

H7a: If the individual is active in the governance system, the more probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

H7b: If the individual is active in the governance system, the more probable a vote for CFA relative to UPC.

Political ideology may shape some faculty members' attitudes about bargain- ing (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). Those with leftist or liberal leanings are more sup- portive than conservatives. The latter may find general political postures of faculty unions unacceptable, especially AFL-CIO affiliates. They may also view unions as inconsistent with economic efficiency. Commitment to bargaining among left- ists may be sufficiently strong to induce a favorable vote irrespective of the par- ticular programs or campaign posture of an"aggressive" union. We hypothesize:

HSa: The less politically conservative the individual, the more probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

HSb: The less politically conservative the individual, the more probable a vote for UPC relative to CFA.

Political ideology is measured by a five-point Likert scale. Respondents were asked to characterize their personal political ideologies as very conservative, conserva- tive, moderate, liberal, or left. This item is taken from the 1981 survey.

Personal Circumstances. Political voting choice is influenced by personal cir- cumstance at the time of the election (Nie et al., 1979). A key factor may be how central the political economy of the organization is to a faculty member's life. Flanagan (1976) has suggested that individual vote may be influenced by alternative employment opportunities. This item addresses the exit-voice option argument that Freeman (1976) has applied to support for unions: individuals who expect improved conditions under bargaining but who would have difficulty obtaining comparable employment elsewhere are most likely to support unions. We include a measure of perceived alternative employment opportunities for the individual based on a 1981 question anchored in terms of very good to very poor external opportunities. We hypothesize:

H9" The more favorable perceived external employment opportu- nities, the less probable a vote for CFA, and for UPC, relative to no agent.

Vl. Model Specification

Since the respondents in our study had to choose from among three ballot alterna- tives (CFA, UPC, or no union), we must use a polychotomous choice model to test the hypotheses. We employ multinomial logit, an approach widely used in analyzing such choice problems (Amemiya, 1981). The attractiveness of each of the three ballot alternatives to an individual voter is assumed to be a linear func- tion of the set of observed independent variables and a random error term:

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32 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH

A(c) = ~ [B (c, i)] [X(i)] +e(c) (1)

A(u ) = ~ [B(u, i)1 [X(i)] + e(u) (2)

A(n) = E [B(n, i)] IX(i)] + e(n), (3)

where A(j) = attractiveness of alternativej (c = FCA; u = UPC; n = no agent); B(j, i) = coefficient for variable i in equation j , X( i ) = independent variable i; and e(j) = random error term for equation j .

For an individual to choose a given alternative, the attractiveness of that alternative must exceed the attractiveness of all competing alternatives. If, for example, an individual were to choose to vote for the C F A , then it must be true that A(c) > A(u ) and A(c) > A(n ) , which is equal to

[B(c,i) - B(u,i)] [X(i)] > e(u) - e(c) (4) t

and

[B(c,i) - B(n,i)] IX(i)] > e(n) - e(c). (5) l

The right-hand side of each inequality is a random variable; given assumptions regarding the joint distribution of these random variables, along with observa- tions on the respondents' voting intentions, it is possible to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the probability function for intended voting behavior. The probability function may be transformed algebraically to develop an expression for the natural logarithm of the ratio of the probabilities (log-odds) of any pair of alternatives. Given the three alternatives available to respondents, these such log-odds functions are relevant:

entPr(c)/Pr(n)] = X [B(c,i) - B(n,i)] [X(i)I (6)

en[Pr(u)/Pr(n)] = ~ [B(u,i) - B(n,i) l [X(i)] (7)

entPr(c)/Pr(u)l = ~ [B(c,i) - B(u,i)] [X(i)I, (8)

= natural logarithm; Pr( j ) = probability of voting for alternative where enO " j . " Parameter estimates for equations 6 through 8 are the differences in the in- dicated coefficients of the attractiveness functions. Consequently, our hypotheses have been formulated in terms of the impact of the independent variables on the log-odds ratios for pairs of choice alternatives.

VII. F i n d i n g s

Maximum likelihood estimates for the model (equations 6-8) were obtained separately for self-reported campaign exposure (Table 2) and the exogenous cam- paign activity measures (Table 3). The overall fit is statistically significant in both cases, using the change in the likelihood ratio (relative to inclusion of only the constant terms in the equation) as the criterion. Results with respect to specific hypotheses are considered in turn.

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 33

Pre-Campaign Expectations Regarding Bargaining. Both CFA and UPC expectations effects are of the expected signs (Hla and Hlb) in all three equations, although two of the six coefficients are not statistically significant (UPC expecta- tions in equation 6 and CFA expectations in equation 7). We did not specifically

Table 2

Multinominal Logit Results for Self-Reports of Campaign Exposure* (n = 271)

E q u a t i o n s

Independen t (6) (7) (8)

Variables en[Pr(c) / Pr(n)l en[Pr(u) / Pr(n)l en[Pr(c) / Pr(u) l

C o n s t a n t 1.21 (3.50) ° 1.01 (2.7) ° .18 (.73)

CFA Expec ta t ions ( lagged) .78 (2.30) b .14 (.39) .63 (1.88) ~

U P C Expec ta t ions ( lagged) - .13 ( - .42) 1.21 (2.97)" - 1.34 (3.38) °

A l t e rna t ive E m p l o y m e n t

Oppor tun i t i e s (High = poor ; Low = good) .51 (1.98) b .58 (1.81) ~ - . 0 4 ( - . 1 5 )

Field (0 = p r o f e s s i o n a l / technical ; 1 = o ther ) .23 (1.09) .24 (.68) - . 0 1 ( - . 0 4 )

Invo lvemen t in Gove rnance (1 = yes; 0 = no) - . 0 9 ( - . 3 7 ) - . 2 0 ( - . 0 6 ) - . 0 7 (.29)

Pol i t ica l I deo logy (High = left ; Low = conserva t ive) .32 (1.12) 1.12 (2.95) ° - . 8 0 ( - 2 . 6 ) "

D e p a r t m e n t a l C o n d i t i o n s

(High = de te r io ra t ing ; Low = improv ing ) - .09 ( - .30) - .05 ( - . 14) - .04 ( - . 15)

C a m p u s C o n d i t i o n s (High = de te r io ra t ing ; Low = improv ing ) .21 (.82) .56 (1.53) - .35 ( - 1.24)

Power C o n c e n t r a t i o n and Conf l i c t .15 ( .60) .12 (.37) .03 (1.05)

Exposure to C F A L i t e ra tu re .70 (1.76) ° - 2.57 ( - 1.46) 3.27 (1.88) °

Exposure to U P C L i t e r a tu r e - .21 (.57) 3.04 (1.77) c - 3.25 ( - 1.92) c

At t ended C F A Mee t ing .42 (1.40) - 1.12 ( - 2 . 3 2 ) b 1.55 (3.56) °

A t t ended U P C Mee t ing 1.57 (.34) 2.17 (3.89)" - 1.95 ( - 4 . 3 7 ) "

- 2 x Log o f L i k e l i h o o d R a t i o = 307"

*t-statistics in parenthesis "Significant at .01 level SSignificant at .05 level cSignificant a t . 10 level

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Table 3

Multinominal Logit Results for Exposure Campaign Activity Measures* ( n = 271)

Equations

Independent (6) (7) (8) Variables en[Pr(c) / Pr(n)] en[Pr(u) / Pr(n)] en[Pr(c) / Pr(u)l

Constant 1.18 (4.48)* .80 (2.84)* .39 (2.00) b

CFA Expectations (lagged) .85 (2.76). - .39 ( - 1.21) 1.24 (4.56)"

UPC Expectations (lagged) - 1.03 ( - .36) 1.62 (5.18)" - 1.72 (5.99)*

Alternative Employment Opportunities (High = poor; Low = good) .44 (1.74)" .38 (1.27) .05 (.24)

Field (0 = professional/ technical; 1 = other) .30 (1.68)" .22 (.93) .07 (.33)

Involvement in Governance (I = yes; 0 = no) .01 (.02) .28 (.96) - . 2 7 ( -1 .27 )

Political Ideology (High = left; Low --- conservative) .27 (.97) 1.44 (4,42). - 1.14 ( - 5.29)*

Departmental Conditions (High = deteriorating; Low --- improving) - . 0 2 ( - .07) .08 (.24) - 1.08 ( - .47)

Campus Conditions (High = deteriorating; Low = improving) .03 (.09) .43 (1.02) - .39 ( - 1.21)

Power Concentration and Conflict .34 (1.09) .69 (1.84)" - .36 ( - 1.23)

Direct Communication CFA - 1.23 (.46) .23 (.77) - .35 ( - 1.63)" UPC - .65 ( - .02) .26 (.74) - . 2 7 ( - 1.01)

Indirect Communication CFA - .83 ( - .32) - .78 ( - .23) - .04 ( - .02) uPc -.44 0.26) -.15 (-.38) -.28 ( - 1.~)

Written Communications CFA .20 (.54) - .27 ( - .64) .47 (1.59) UPC .35 (.83) .80 (1.70)" - . 4 5 ( - 1.34)

- 2 x Log of Likelihood Ratio = 212"

*t-statistics in parenthesis *Significant at .01 level bSignificant at .05 level "Significant at . 10 level

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J. MALCOLM WALKER and JOHN J. LAWLER 35

formulate hypotheses with respect to those two coefficients, since arguments could be developed to support either positive or negative effects. Thus, we con- clude that attitudes regarding a ballot alternative formed prior to the formal cam- paign are strong predictors of ultimate voting behavior. This corresponds to find- ings reported by Getman et al. with respect to the positive relationship between pre-campaign sentiments and voting behavior, except that our results indicate that the stability of this relationship may extend over several years.

Campaign Influences. Results obtained using self-reports of campaign ex- posure (Table 2) generally support the hypotheses (H2a and H2b). Overall, the addition of the self-report items significantly improves the fit of the model ( - 2 x log-likelihood -- 111.6 with 8 d.f.; Pr < .01). UPC exposure significantly affects the probability of voting for UPC relative to no agent (equation 7) and CFA (equation 8) in the hypothesized direction. The same holds for the impact of CFA exposure on the probability of voting for CFA relative to UPC (equation 8). An exception is with respect to the impact of CFA exposure on the probability of voting for CFA relative to no agent (equation 6); although the signs of the CFA exposure variables are as hypothesized, they are relatively weak and only one is statistically significant. Finally, we note a general absence of cross-effects in equations 6 and 7 with respect to CFA and UPC exposure (i.e., UPC exposure does not influence the CFA versus no union choice), the exception being with respect to CFA meet- ing attendance on the UPC versus no union choice. This would suggest that inter- union competition is not especially detrimental to overall support for bargaining, as opponents of "dual unionism" sometimes argue.

The results reported in Table 2 tend to support the findings of Getman et al. with respect to the impact of union campaign activities on voting behavior. The test here, although limited in terms of the population studied, is more rigorous in terms of the model used. The relationship of campaign exposure to voting behavior suggested by the Getman et al. study is observed in a multi-union contest even after several control variables are included.

Yet, the endogenous nature of the self-reports of campaign exposure makes this test relatively weak. Consequently, we have re-estimated the parameters of the model using the exogenous campaign activity measures. As indicated in Table 1, there is considerable variance across campuses and between the faculty unions with respect to each of the activity measures, so that the absence of any relation- ships cannot be attributed to a restriction in the range of these measures (a poten- tial problem, given the limitation of the study to a single university system).

Including all fourteen variables in the model simultaneously would have created multicollinearity problems and substantially reduced degrees of freedom in the analysis. Consequently, the seven activities measured for each faculty union were divided into three distinct categories: (1) direct contact (proportion of faculty contacted personally and by phone by each union); (2) indirect contact (frequency of parties and pro-bargaining meetings held by each union); and (3) written communication (frequency of distribution of leaflets and newsletters,

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and of use of campus newspaper advertisements by each union). A composite activity scale for each category was constructed by summing the standardized values of each measure associated with the category. The six resulting scales were included in the model in place of the self-report items (Table 3).

The overall impact of the exogenous measures on voting behavior is negligible, with the change in the likelihood ratio being insignificant ( - 2x log-likelihood = 14.10 with 12 d.f.; Pr > . 10). Only two of the coefficients differ significantly from zero: CFA direct communication in equation 8 and UPC written communication in equation 7. These effects are weak, however, and the former is opposite to the expected sign. The implications of the conflicting findings of the separate analyses reported in Table 2 and Table 3 are discussed below.

Other Short-Term Influences. With one exception, the variables measuring departmental conditions, campus conditions, and power/conflict relations on campus are not significantly related to voting preferences (the power/conflict variable is significant, but only at the .10 level, in equation 7, Table 3). Thus, we reject H3, H4, and H5.

Normative and Personal Value Constraints. Although the signs associated with the variable indicating the respondent's field tend to agree with the relation- ships posited in H6a and H6b, only one coefficient is found to be significant and of the correct sign (equation 6, Table 3); however, the relationship is weak and sig- nificant only at the .10 level. Hence, we conclude that support for H6a is weak at best, and H6b is clearly rejected. None of the coefficients associated with gover- nance involvement is significant, and the signs of these coefficients often conflict with the hypothesized signs. Thus, H7a and H7b are rejected.

An individual's self-characterization of his or her political ideology appears to affect voting intentions in ways that are consistent with theoretical expecta- tions. HSb is clearly supported (equation 8). The signs of the political ideology coefficients in equations 6 and 7 are also as hypothesized (HSa), although the ef- fect is not significant in the CFA equation. Thus, we conclude that general politi- cal sentiments may affect voting choice in representation elections independently of an individual's evaluation of the ballot alternatives.

Personal Circumstances. Individuals with relatively poor external employ- ment opportunities appear to be more likely to vote in favor of collective bargain- ing, as predicted by H9. The coefficient is positive in both equations 6 and 7, though somewhat weaker in the second specification (Table 3) where it is not sig- nificant in equation 7. Thus, we must be tentative in accepting this hypothesis, although the observed relationships provided some support for the exit/voice argument. This variable clearly has no impact on the choice between the compet- ing unions (equation 8) and none had been hypothesized.

VIII. Conclusions

We have proposed and empirically evaluated a model of individual voting choice in a union representation election in a multi-establishment organization. Unlike

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previous studies, we specified a multivariate model that includes measures of the expected impact of bargaining under competing unions, campaign influences, other short-term factors, normative and value constraints, and personal circum- stances. The model includes some variables that were omitted from previous studies (Heneman and Sandver, 1983). The use of a panel study approach, in which lagged values of perceptual measures (cognitions) are used, allows for greater confidence in causal inferences drawn from the results.

In assessing campaign effects, following Getman et al. (1976), we first con- sidered the impact of self-reports of exposure to union campaign activities on the voting intentions of faculty members in a multicampus system. Using these kinds of measures, our findings are essentially consistent with those of Getman et al. regarding union campaign effects. Since voting intentions are apt to condition an individual's exposure to campaign activities, an endogeneity problem is associ- ated with the use of self-reports. We therefore constructed exogenous measures of campaign activity specific to each campus and each union and reestimated the model substituting exogeneous measures for self-reports. We found no appre- ciable impact of campaign activity on voting intentions with respect to either the bargaining-no bargaining choice or the choice between rival unions. Given the conceptual and methodological problems associated with self-reported campaign exposure, our analysis suggests that union influence efforts in campaigns exert no meaningful effects on voting preferences in representation elections. Such a con- clusion might be modified had it been possible to use exogenous measures that could capture the qualitative content of campaign activities. It is possible that the content and style of written and personal contacts might not effectively match the characteristics of electors. If so, some campaign activities might be counterpro- ductive. Such mixed effects may underlie our reported findings. 7

Of the variables included in our model, lagged expectations regarding bargain- ing outcomes exert the strongest effect, suggesting early formation of cognitions and considerable consistency in bargaining preferences over a long period. Voting preferences are shaped early and are relatively insensitive to intervening forces.

The particular context in which this model was developed and tested is higher education. The more general context is that of the "new unionism." We have sug- gested that a longitudinal cognitive model derived from the theory of political electoral behavior may have some general utility for exploring individual voting choice in much of the "new unionism" sector. This perspective warrants further testing. It would be most useful to be able to extend and test a model of this type into the collective bargaining period and through a decertification election. At

'We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. One way to assess qualitative con- tent would be to identify changes in attitudes of electors following each campaign activity. This is sometimes done in studies of political campaigns. Such an effort was beyond the resources available for the present research.

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that point, it would be possible to test for the relative impact of vote in the initial election, the experience with a union bargaining agent, and the inter-election short-term changes in political and economic conditions, as in some longitudinal studies of political electoral behavior.

Most fundamentally, it would be desirable to emulate the work of political scientists in accumulating a body of studies of individual electoral choice in specific contexts, using carefully developed theoretical frameworks and causal models appropriate to contexts studied. Only in this way can one expect to move to general models of individual electoral choice in representation elections of the kind currently being proposed for political electoral choice (Markus and Con- verse, 1979).

Even though our findings contradict the Getman et al. finding of some mar- ginal union campaign effects, our research tends to support the principal findings and policy implications of their work; that is, that costly monitoring of campaign statements and organizing efforts by agencies charged with administering bar- gaining legislation is probably unnecessary. Of course, additional work is needed to determine if our results apply to management actions in this setting. This is not to say that certain coercive or manipulative actions by unions (or employers) should not be closely scrutinized. Rather, what are generally viewed as propagan- dizing efforts apparently are not important influences in campaigns, and misrep- resentations of fact that meet tests, such as those set forth in the Hollywood Ceramics case, probably should not be the basis for nullification of election results in this context.

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