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US. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975 Part Four. Vietnam: U.S. Army Senior Officer Debriefing Reports

US. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975 - … · RVNAF — Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces ... Marine Corps logistical units. ... two Field Artillery

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US. ARMEDFORCES INVIETNAM1954-1975Part Four.Vietnam: U.S. ArmySenior OfficerDebriefingReports

U.S. Armed Forcesin Vietnam

Part Four.Vietnam: U.S. Army Senior Officer

Debriefing Reports

Edited byPaul Kesaris

Guide Compiled byRobert Lester

A microfilm project ofUNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC.

44 North Market Street • Frederick, MD 21701

Copyright ® 1983 by University Publications of America, Inc.All rights reserved.ISBN 0-89093-447-9

Table of ContentsReel!

1968 11969 2

Reel II1969 cont 41970 6

Reel III1970 cont 6

Reel IV1970 cont 101971 101972 121973 13

NOTE

Reel III (Frames 0315 and 0527) contains a Senior Debrief ingReport from Iran and Ecuador. These were included so as togive a comparison of the types of Military Assistance Activityoutside of Vietnam.

Acronyms and AbbreviationsARVN — Army of the Republic of VietnamCOMUSMACV — Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,

VietnamCORDS — Civil Operations and Rural Development SupportCTZ — Corps Tactical ZoneDRV — Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)FWMAF — Free World Military Assistance ForcesGVN — Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)LOG — Lines of CommunicationMAAG — Military Assistance Advisory GroupMACV — Military Assistance Command, VietnamMR — Military RegionNVA — North Vietnamese ArmyOPCON — Operation and ControlPSYOP — Psychological Warfare OperationsQNSC — Qui Nhon Support CommandROK — Republic of KoreaRVN — Republic of VietnamRVNAF — Republic of Vietnam Armed ForcesUSASTRATCOM — U.S. Army Strategic Communications CommandVC — Viet Cong (South Vietnamese Communists)VNAF — Vietnamese Air Forces (South Vietnam)

REEL INDEX

Reel I1968

Frame

0001 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 9th Infantry Division, 1 June 1967 - 25 February1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. George G. O'Connor. 25February 1966. 67pp.Contents: Special Problems in Delta Environment—Physical aspects of terrain,Basing troops in the Delta, Operations in densely populated areas; Analysis of 9thDivision operations in the delta—Missions of 9th Infantry Division, Strike operations- MRF, Consolidation operations - 3d Brigade, Improvement of Vietnamese militaryforces; The impact of Skin Diseases on Military Operations in the Delta Region RVN.

0067 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: America! Division, USARV, Republic of Vietnam,September 1967 - June 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D. C. S. W. Koster. 2 June 1968.12pp.Contents: Introduction; Description of the Enemy; Organization; Command, Con-trol, and Tactics; Local Government Counterinsurgency Actions; "Americal" Div-ision Operations.

0079 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Logistics, I Corps Tactical Zone. Plans andOperations, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam; Americal Division; UnitedStates Army Support Command, Da Nang, 1 March 1967 to 18 October 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. George H. Young, Jr. 7 October1968. 15pp.The current logistical concept in ICTZ involves the operation of the wholesalesystem operated by the Navy which is complemented and extended by Army andMarine Corps logistical units. Navy has supply responsibility for wholesale Class Iand III, II and IV common and construction material. Army and Marine Corpsprovide for retail distribution of supplies beyond Navy Support Activity, Da NangStorage Activity (Army), and Navy supply point, Chu Lai and have full responsibilityfor service peculiar Class 11 and IV, Class V, and required services for their respectiveforces. This system is working well and results in little or no duplication among theservices.

0094 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 20th Engineering Brigade, 23 July 1967 - 2November 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Curtis Chapman. 30 October1968. 57pp.Because of the AR 1-26 debriefing subjects (causative factors of the insurgency,local government stability actions, and the US role in support of local government,among others) have been treated by officers eminently qualified to contribute tothose important matters, this report attempts without benefit of the Brigade's staffexperts, to state positive, helpful comments resulting from personal experience inthe operational environment shared with the stalwart soldiers of the 20th EngineerBrigade.

0151 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: US Army Support Command, Saigon, 1 July 1967 -Q M••• JMMK*-» IQOfl9 DUVVI IIDVi 1VDO>

Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. M. McD. Jones, Jr. 9 November1968. 21pp.The mission of the US Army Support Command, Saigon throughout the periodcovered remained as follows: Provide logistical support (less aviation and avionics,repair parts, medical service/supplies, cryptographic service and missile services/supplies) to US Forces in III and IV CTZ, RVN, and provide common user supplymaintenance and service support to Free World Military Assistance Forces(FWMAF) in III and IV CTZ. RVN. The major forces supported at the beginningconsisted of 4 2/3 division equivalents plus an Engineer Brigade, two Field ArtilleryGroups and the MACV advisory structure throughout the III and IV Corps TacticalZones - a total of some 156,000 US and Free World Military Assistance Forces. Thisnumber has grown to some 220,000 and now includes four US Divisions, 2 separatebrigades, an armored cavalry regiment and sufficient Australian, Thai, Philippineand Korean elements to bring the total of units supported to exceed 6 divisionequivalents.

0172 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: II Corps Tactical Zone, 18 November 1967 -15December 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. John W. Barnes. 15 December1968. 96pp.The purpose of this report is to summarize significant occurances within the II CTZduring the period of my tenure as Deputy Senior Advisor, 18 November 1967-15December 1968. The report addresses primarily matters which directly affected theARVN; however, changes in organization of the Advisory Group and related mattersare also covered, but in less detail.

19690266 Senior Officer Debriefing Program: 34th General Support Group, September 1987 -

October 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. James W. Sandrldge, Jr. 27January 1969. 75pp.Contents: Army Aviation Refresher Training School; Postal and Banking Privilegesfor US Civilians; Crash Damage Parts for Analysis: Shortage of Qualified AircraftArmament Personnel; Late Receipt of Aircraft Armament Test Equipment; Retro-grade of Aircraft; Review of Southeast Asia Retrofit/Modification Program; GeneralSupport Avionics Units in Vietnam; Civilianization Program; Theater AircraftReparables Program; Use of SAAM Flights for Retrograde of Aircraft ReparableComponents; Stove pipe; Push Package Concept; 95 Day RO (RequisitioningObjective); AMMC/NICP Due-In/Due-Out Reconciliation; Project Oasis; andAMMC Computer Requirements.

0341 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps, 1 July 1967 -19

Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. John J. Season, ///. 3 August1968. 29pp.

Contents: Causative Factors of the Insurgency—Political, Military, Social andEconomic. "The Insurgent"—Organization, Logistics, Communist Involvement,Intelligence Activity; Local Government Counterinsurgency Actions—Forces, Intel-ligence, Military Civic Action, Political Action; US Role in Support of the LocalGovernment; Lessons Learned.

0370 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Psychological Operations Group, 15 October1967 - 7 October 1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. William J. Beck. 5 October1968. 29pp.Contents: Causative Factors of the Insurgency; "The Insurgent"; Local GovernmentStability Actions and the US Role; PSYOP Concept.

0399 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 34th General Support Group (AM and S), 18October 1968 - 8 January 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Robert G. Shepherd. 8 January1969. 16pp.This report presents a proposed realignment of some responsibilities, a restructur-ing of certain units to streamline and simplify training and performance require-ments, and a discussion of the advantages that would accrue as well as thedisadvantages that may be foreseen.

0415 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Headquarters, 44th Medical Brigade, Period 1August 1968 -1 February 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Spurgeon Neel. 1 February1969. 87pp.Contents: General Military and Medical Situation; Military Civilian Health Assist-ance; Personnel; Operations; Professional Services; Preventive Medicine; MedicalMateriel; Medical Records and Statistics; Medical Statistical Data.

0502 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Infantry Division; I Field Force Vietnam, Period1967-1968.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. W.R. Peers, 7 June 1969.26pp.The missions for all US forces and activities, both military and civilian, were to:defeat and/or eliminate the NVA/VC main forces; improve the effectiveness andcombat capability of ARVN, to include its combat, combat support, and logisticforces and their operating procedures; and assist in pacification toward thedevelopment of a viable society.

0528 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period 19July 1968 to 25 May 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. MelvinZais. 7 June 1969.37pp.

From 19 July 1968 to 25 May 1969, the 101st Airborne Division underwent majortransformations in organization, operational concepts and techniques, deploymentof major elements and support concepts. The Division's area of operation, centeredaround the city of Hue, increased in size from an area 30 kilometers in length alongthe coast and ranging 40 kilometers inland toward the mountains to an area whichnow extends 108 kilometers in length along the coast and 70 kilometers deep to theLaotian border. Operations were conducted against the enemy's lines of communi-cation and base areas in the mountains; initially, however, the Division focusedprimarily on the elimination of enemy forces in the coastal plains and the protectionof population centers, allied lines of communications, key installations and the riceproducing areas. With the virtual elimination of organized VC forces from the coastalplains through the combined efforts of the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st ARVN

Division and Thua Thien Sector forces, the Division began to orient more and moreon VC main force units and NVA in their base areas located in the mountainousjungle area adjacent to the Laotian border. This shift in operations was madepossible by the significant improvement in the operational ability of the Regionaland Popular forces to control the coastal plains and populated areas with onlylimited assistance from the Division.

0565 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Period 4June 1968 to 29 May 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Harold R. Aaron. 12 June 1969.84pp.The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is assigned to CG, USARV, for command(less OPCON), with COMUSMACV retaining OPCON of the organization. Theprimary purpose of 5th SFGA is to advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces(VNSF) in the conduct of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program.This program establishes a paramilitary indigenous force sponsored and supportedby the United States. In this program, as well as in the other Group missions, 5thSFGA has the basic objective of the maximum combat efficiency at the lowestpossible cost in men, money and material.

0649 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Delta Military Assistance Command and SeniorAdvisor, IV CTZ, Period 15 January 1968 to 1 June 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. G.S. Eckhardt. 16 June 1969.85pp.Contents: The Enemy, IV CTZ—Organization, Command and control. Strategy andtactics, Armament, Logistics, Transportation, Communications, Outside support,Intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations, and Psychological aspects;Local Government, IV CTZ—Government organization, Political development,Economic development, New Life development, Community development. Agricul-ture, Logistics, Engineering, Youth affairs, Civic action, Education; RD Cadreprogram; Chieu Hoi program; Psychological warfare and information; Public healthprogram; Phoenix program; Status of Pacification; Government forces—Intelli-gence, ARVN forces, U.S. military forces, Regional forces/popular forces, Nationalpolice, Logistical support.

Reel II1969 con t.

0001 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 108th Artillery Group, Period 4 September 1968 to14 August 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Robert V. Lee, Jr. 31 July 1969.5pp.The 108th Artillery Group is in general support of XXIV Corps. Being mobile andflexible, our units ranged from Hai Van Pass to the DMZ and from the coast to theLaos border. Not having an area of operations of our own, we were in the position ofcooperation with the supported divisions in their civic actions. The group had inputto division and Corps intelligence agencies but was almost completely dependentupon them for intelligence planning, correlation and analysis. Therefore there willbe many areas in the debriefing report in which there will be little that I cancontribute from first hand knowledge and experience.

0006 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 1st Logistical Command, Period 2 August 1968 to23 August 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. J.M. Heiser, Jr. 20 August 1969.376pp.Contents: Introduction; Personnel and Training; Security, Plans and Operations;Services; Supplies; Maintenance; Transportation; Procurement; The Comptroller;Lessons Learned; Inclosures.

0382 Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Battalion 33d Artillery.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Operational rept. for quarterlyperiod ending 31 July 1969. 12 August 1969.18pp.The 33rd Artillery arrived in the Republic of Vietnam on 21 February 1968. Thebattalion has continuously engaged in combat operations since 25 February 1968.

0400 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 20th Engineer Brigade, Period 2 November 1968 to1 November 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. H.R. Parfitt. 1 November 1969.11pp.At the outset of this debriefing report I would kike to make a few general commentsabout the engineer effort in Vietnam in order to put in proper perspective theremainder of my remarks which will mainly deal with problems and solutions theretoas I see them. Overall I would rate the engineer support rendered our combat troopsin Vietnam as superior to that provided in World War II and Korea. In addition,special circumstances in this war have permitted the engineers to do a lot more workthan ever before in nation building. Construction of major road networks; opening ofsecondary roads; a multiplicity of revolutionary development support projects suchas school house construction, minor community, projects of all types, and housingdevelopment work; all have contributed to improving the nation in such a way thatthe average citizen could see and appreciate what was being done by the U.S. troopsto improve his lot. To many people reared in poverty and misery this was asmeaningful or more so than our efforts to prevent communist domination of theircountry.

0411 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Engineer, USARV and CG, Engineer TroopsVietnam, Period 21 July 1968 to 14 October 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. David S. Parker. 14 October1969. 18pp.The main body of this report deals with my views on the broader aspects of thecounterinsurgency effort in Vietnam from an Army engineer point of view. Atinclosure 1 are additional details of engineer activities and problems which are ofless general interest or which are not necessarily related or limited to a counterinsur-gency environment.

0429 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Infantry Division, Period 30 November 1968 to14 November 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army)', Washington, D.C. Donn P. Pepke. 10 November1969. 148pp.Contents: Operations Summary; Concept of Operation; Operations; Civil Affairs;Organization and Training; Air Cavalry; Fire Support; Air Support; Aviation Support;Chemical Support; Signal Support; Engineer Support; Intelligence; PersonnelLogistics; Base Camp Activities; Information; Pattern Analysis; Commando Vault;Techniques of Air Delivered Munitions: "SCORPION" Operations; "ROME PLOW"Operations; Land Clearing in the MANG YANG; Infantry Weapons; Short RangePatrols; Long Range Patrol Activities.

0577 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Deputy Senior Advisor III Corps and III CorpsTactical Zone, Period 1 May 1969 to 30 November 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Carleton Freer, Jr. 4 December1969. 709pp.

This report is submitted in accordance with cited references. It covers the period 1May 1969 to 30 November 1969, during which period I was assigned as DeputySenior Advisor, III Corps and III Corps Tactical Zone. In the appendices that followthe report sets forth in detail the accomplishments, the residual problems, andrecommended actions for each of the functional areas in which the III CorpsAdvisory Group has responsibilities. In addition, supporting reports from the SeniorAdvisors of the three divisions of III Corps are attached as inclosures. The followingparagraphs highlight those areas which I consider to be the most critical to ARVN atthis time—critical to the extent that they bear a high relevance to the ability of ARVNto take over the ground combat role in Vietnam on a time schedule acceptable to theUnited States.

19700686 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Period 21 May

1969 to 20 November 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. LD. Kinnard. 20 November1969. 56pp.

The following observations were made in late November 1969 and pertain to a sixmonth period as Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery from May 21,1969 to November 20,1969. It might be useful at the outset to comment briefly on theenemy and friendly situation in the II Field Force area during that period. As a resultof FWMAF successes, the main force enemy units have moved into outlying areas. Itappears that the enemy's major objectives were to reopen LOC's and to disrupt theFWMAF pacification effort. His tactics were characterized by stand off attacks usingmortars and rockets, sapper reconnaissance and selected attacks, and main forceattacks in strength along the border. The enemy's ability to avoid contact wheneverpossible continued to be his greatest asset. On the other hand, his ability to choosethe time and place for battle was being attrited. Our successes have enabled us toaccelerate Vietnamization of the war. Territorial security forces were beingcommitted to the security of the populated areas and ARVN units were pushing outto interdict enemy movement and to engage him in the outlying areas. FWMAFcontinued combat and combat support activities with a view towards acceleratingpacification, improving the combat effectiveness of RVNAF, and eroding enemycapability in all areas.

Reel III1970 cont.

0001 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 18th Military Police Brigade, Period 30 August1968 through 22 December 1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. W.H. Brandenburg. 22December 1969.6pp.Contents: Combined Police Operations; Brigade PBR Maintenance; Brigade Con-cept; Sentry Dogs.

0007 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Aviation Officer, USARV and CG, 1st AviationBrigade, Period 31 March 1969 through 6 January 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Allen M. Burdett, Jr. 6 January1970.15pp.This report reflects my views on the major problems facing Army Aviation in theoperational environment of Vietnam, problems which are of prime interest for thecontinued development of Army Aviation and which have been isolated during mytenure as Aviation Officer, USARV, and concurrently Commanding General, 1stAviation Brigade during the previously expressed role of the US Army in support ofthe counterinsurgency action in Vietnam, or, for example, to the merits of the Cobraover the Huey gunships which have already been well documented. I will addressthose continuing and future programs which require a prologue for their successfuldevelopment in light of inevitable troop reductions and our present situation inVietnam. In terms of format, each of the following paragraphs addresses a specifictopic.

0022 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: II Corps, Period December 1968 to December1969.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D. C. J.S. Timothy. 2 December 1969.90pp.Contents: Introduction; Intelligence; Operations; Organization and Training;1

Artillery; Personnel; Logistics; Political Warfare.0112 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Delta Military Assistance Command, Period 1

June 1969 through 16 January 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. P. Wetherill. 14 January 1970.63pp.Contents: The Enemy; Enemy Strength Chart; Government Organization; PoliticalDevelopment; Economic and Social Influences; New Life Development Programs;Revolutionary Development Cadre; Chieu Hoi Program; Psychological Warfare/Information; Public Health Program; Phoenix Program; Resettlement and RefugeeSupport; Pacification Program; Government Forces—Intelligence, Counterintelli-gence, ARVN Forces, US Forces, Regional popular forces, Peoples self-defenseforces, and Police; Logistical Support.

0175 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Operations, J3 MACV; MACV; I Field ForceVietnam, Period 23 May 1968 to 23 February 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Charles A. Corcoran. 4 April1970. 28pp.Contents: Command; Intelligence; "Vietnamization"; Disposition of U.S. Forces;ARVN Operations; Forward Mobile Staff; Artillery; Territorial Forces; ROK Opera-tions; Logistics; LOC and Communications; Summary.

0203 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Psychological Operations Group, Period 4October 1968 to 13 March 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Tarn Katagiri. 13 March 1970.19pp.Contents: Causative Factors of the Insurgency; Enemy Propaganda Capabilities;GVN Political Actions; U.S. PSYOP Agencies; Recommendations.

0222 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 1st Infantry Division, Period 10 August 1969 to 21March 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army). Washington, D.C. Albert £. Milloy. March 1970.63pp.Contents: Causative Factors of the Insurgency; "The Insurgent"; Local GovernmentStability Actions; U.S. Role in Support of the Local Government; Inclosures.

0285 Senior Officer Debriefing Report 1 >t Cavalry Division, Period 23 April 1969 through5 May 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army). Washington, D.C. Elvy B. Roberts. 18 April 1970.30pp.This report reflects the operational environment of the 1st Cavalry Division andpersonal experiences. The story of the division's operations for the past year hasbeen characterized by an expansion of the screening role into an operation whichhas driven the enemy main forces steadily back against the Cambodian border.

0315 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Army Section, ARMISH/MAAG, Period April 1968to May 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Theo. C. Mataxis. 23 May 1970.60pp.This report contains an evaluation of objectives, achievements, and the problemspertaining to the imperial Iranian Ground Forces. Insofar as overall advisory mattersare concerned, the report is addressed from the viewpoint of the Army AdvisorySection.

0375 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Period 25May 1969 to 25 May 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. John M. Wright, Jr. 10 July1970. 69pp.Contents: Introduction; Personnel and Administration; Logistics; Civic Action andPSYOP Operations; Combat Operations.

0444 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 18th Engineer Brigade, Period 3 May 1969 to 3 May1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. J.W. Morris. 15 April 1970.50pp.During the 12 months ending 3 May 1970 the application of Engineer effort in the Iand II Corps Tactical Zones has changed significantly, in consonance with thepolicies to Vietnamize the military operations and to pacify and strengthen theeconomy and political structure of South Vietnam. During this period the proportionof total Engineer effort in support of US troop units has remained relatively constant.However, the specific tasks are considerably more related to relocating US unitsfrom forward areas being turned over to ARVN and to supporting US units inpacification and regional development of populated areas. At the same time, themajor Engineer effort once assigned to base construction is now being expended tobuild a primary road system. Thus the 18th Brigade effort devoted to strengtheningand developing the economic and political structure of South Vietnam increasedmany fold this past year to become our present major requirement. The discussionswhich follow will be divided into three major categories: support of regionaldevelopment and nationhood; support of US and Free World Forces; other items ofinterest.

0494 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: US Army Support Command, Qul Nhon, Period 8June 1969 to 1 June 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Albert E. Hunter. 1 June 1970.33pp.During the past year, the QNSC continued to provide for the logistics support ofapproximately 90,000 Free World Forces. At the same time, the initial phase of majorretrograde program was begun. Significant reductions were made in excess stocksat the ON Depot and at DSU's. The TO and E equipment of one infantry brigade andan artillery battalion was received, processed and disposed of in operation KeystoneBluejay. Other units were encouraged to turn in non-mission essential equipment.Throughout the retrograde program, strong command emphasis has been placed

on the objective "RETRO RIGHT" to maintain high standards in the care andhandling of retrograde items. Concurrent with the increased retrograde program,QNSC began a major effort to consolidate logistics support facilities in order todecrease security requirements and make maximum use of a decreasing base oflogistics manpower resources. Consolidation of QN depot areas, reduction of VungRo Bay facilities, elimination of the QN-Pleiku pipeline and pump stations, andreduction of the QN Ammunition Base Depot to an ASP are some of the majoractions accomplished. Plans have been developed for additional restructuring andconsolidation which will be accomplished consistent with the phased withdrawal ofUS forces. A final but most noteworthy accomplishment has been the successachieved by QNSC in the ARVNIZATION Program.

0527 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Defense Attach*, Period Ending 30 July 1968 to 31July 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Harold J. Jacobs. 15 July 1970.13pp.Contents: Contributing Factors to the Incipient Insurgency.

0540 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Capital Military Assistance Command, RVN,Period 5 March 1970 to 24 June 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Herbert E. Wolff. 23 July 1970.33pp.Contents: Narrative of Major Events from the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5 Advisors toCMAT.

0573 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 1st Signal Brigade and ACSC-E, HO, USARV,Period 30 September 1968 to 19 June 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Thomas Matthew Rienzi. 4June 1970. 73pp.The build up of the Vietnamese Armed Forces communications capability is ofparamount importance as an objective in the efforts at Vietnamization. This reportplaces Vietnamization activities first, then nonequipment topics, followed by itemsconcerning equipment and its use, and finally, a section on topics solely concerningthe 1st Signal Brigade. Each item is labeled as to primary source, i.e., USARV or 1stSignal Brigade. The topics and ideas presented here are suitable for use in manyareas. Possible use in the Department of Defense and Army Training Centers andSchools is readily apparent. Along with the US Army's Combat DevelopmentCommand, The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, theElectronics Command and other commands of the Army Materiel Command, theUnited States Army Strategic Communications Command, Defense Communica-tions Agency, and finally, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff forCommunications-Electronics, Department of the Army.

0646 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: I Corps Tactical Zone, Period 12 September 1969to 15 June 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Henry J. Mueller, Jr. 11 June1970. 27pp.Contents: Introduction; Organization; General Assessment; Personnel; Training;Specialized Training; Supply and Maintenance; Logistics; Combat Support Units;Adquacy of Forces; Inclosures.

0673 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: II Corps Tactical Zone, RVN, Period 1 December1969 to 6 July 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Gordon J. Duquemin. 3 July1970. 54pp.

The purpose of this report is to record the experiences and insights gained by theDeputy Senior Advisor (DSA) of II Corps Tactical Zone during the period 1December 1969 through 6 July 1970. This report is made in accordance with AR1-26dated 4 November 1966 and USARV Regulation 1-3 dated 7 June 1968. It is hoped itwill be valuable for use by those charged with development of doctrine, trainingmodernization and improvement, case studies, and evaluations of the effectivenessof Vietnamization and development programs.

Reel IV1970 cont.

0001 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: US Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period 15October 1969 to 27 July 1970.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington. D.C. H.D. Smith. 27 July 1970.52pp.The supply system in Vietnam was considered to be most responsive. Materialreadiness rates in Vietnam across the board were very high. After shifting fromparcel post (and thereby air transportation) to over-the-road movement of Class IXrepair parts from the Army depot to outlying direct support units, as much as fivedays of shipping time were saved. This, in turn, impacted on the volume of suppliesrequired in the system and also on the timeliness of repair of materiel which wasdeadlined. The increased utilization of the rail system between Da Nang and Phu Baireduced the necessity for both over-the-road and sea transportation for low prioritygoods. Economies in the use of drayage transportation have already been effectedby the thruput of Class I and Class IV commodities direct from the Deep Water Portto the ultimate customer. As Local Nationals can be trained in many of the logisticalskills such as truck driving, key punch operation, food handling, warehousing,receiving, shipping, MHE operation, and so forth, Type A military units can beeffectively changed to Type B units and ultimately can be reduced to TDAorganizations that would include a minimum of US Army managerial personnel.Through the medium of Project Buddy, the command has been quite successful inproviding on-trie-job training and classes for the ARVN logistical personnel.Retrograde and disposal operations, while among the more important of thecommand's several missions, will continue to increase in importance as more andmore troops are withdrawn from MR-I.

0053 Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 593d General Support Group.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Operational rept. for quarterlyperiod ending 31 July 1970.13 August 1970.32pp.Contents: Operations and Significant Operations; Incident Summary; After ActionReports; Inclosures.

19710085 Senior Officer Debriefing Report I Field Force Vietnam, Period 15 February 1970

through 9 January 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. A.S. Collins, Jr. 7 January 1971.32pp.Contents: Comments on ARVN, VNAF, and GVN Operations; Comments on USOperations and Forces; Comments on ROK Operations; Pacification; Summary.

0117 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: XXIV Corps Artillery, Period 17 November 1969 to1 September 1970. :Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Robert C. Hixon. 19 January1971. 53pp.The period from 17 November 1969 to 1 September 1970, during which I was incommand of XXIV Corps Artillery, was one of constant change. The US troopredeployments, the steadily increasing skill and responsibility of RVNAF, and therenewed attempts by the enemy to exert battlefield pressure and to destroy thepacification program all combined to make flexibility of action the most importantaspect of artillery operations in XXIV Corps. Although the DMZ area remained ofvital importance, the main enemy activity and the area of greatest continuing threatwas in the western portions of the Corps area, especially western Thua Thien. Inconjunction with RVNAF, XXIV Corps Artillery reacted strongly to this threat andwas instrumental in reducing it to tolerable levels. In each of our operations we usedthe tactics and techniques which, we felt, were best suited to the tasks to beperformed. The optimum solution in one area or one situation often could not beapplied in another. In this report I will summarize the more significant occurrencesduring my period of command, and discuss some lessons learned which, might be ofvalue to others.

0170 Senior Officer Debriefing Report 18th Engineer Brigade, Period 3 May 1970 thru 27April 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. H.C. Schrader. 26 April 1971.16pp.Contents: Command and Control Administration; Logistics; Operations; ARVNAffiliation.

0186 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Period 30 June1970 thru 18 May 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. John G. Hill. 8 May 1971.23pp.The brigade, officially designated as the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division(Mechanized), functioned as an independent brigade, directly subordinate to XXIVCorps, and conducted operations in Quang Tri Province. A troop list is included. Abrief description of the area of operations is included. Operations have beenconducted on all types of terrain from the flat tide lands along the South China Seato the east; throughout the Piedmont in the center and in the mountainous terrain inand around the Khe Sanh Plateau to the Laos-Vietnam Border in the west.

0209 Senior Officer Debriefing Report CG, 1st Signal Brigade, Period 19 June 1970 thru 1May 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Hugh F. Foster, Jr. 1 May 1971.38pp.Contents: Introduction; USASTRATCOM and the Doctrine of "Flexible Response";Soldier Art Program; Equipment; Communications Support in Cambodia; Recoveryof Fixed ICS/DTE Assets; Project "Thrift"; CARA; Training.

0247 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: I Field Force Vietnam, CG, Second RegionalAssistance Command, Period 31 March 1970 thru 15 May 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Charles P. Brown. 18 August1971. 31pp.This report reflects personal assessment of conditions in military Region 2 and isbased upon a service of fourteen months in the region. While failures continue tomar the scene, there also is considerable basis for confidence. While this is apparentwhen one compares the situation now with the situation one year ago, it is obvious ifconsidered in terms of what has been withdrawn. In March 1970, US maneuverforces included the 4th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and TF South(a multi-battalion force operating primarily in Binh Thuan Province). Now only the173d Airborne Brigade plus two separate battalions (1/22d Infantry and the 1/1 Oth

Cavalry) and Company C. 75th Infantry (Rangers) remain. An assessment of justhow much the Vietnamese can be expected to do on their own is discussed fromdifferent angles.

0278 Senior Debriefing Report: US Army Military Forces, Military Region 2, Artillery.Adjutant General's Office (Army). Washington, D.C. William H. Tucker, Jr. 31August 1971.15pp.

Contents: Summary of Observations; Major Tactical Activities; Fire Base Security;Future Planning; Maintenance and Logistics; Personnel; Morale and Welfare; Sub-Zone IV; Club and Messes.

0293 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Delta Regional Assistance Command, Period 15January 1970 thru 14 May 1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Hal D. McCown. 14 May 1971.90pp.Contents: Introduction; Personnel; Training; Operations; Logistics; Situation inMilitary Region 4; Reports.

0383 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: USA Engr Cmd, RVN, 29 June 1970 thru 5 August1971.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Charles C. Noble. 6 August1971. 121pp.

The mission was to advise the Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, onengineer matters; to command the US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam; and toensure optimum utilization of Army engineer resources in Vietnam. Among theprincipal objectives of the Engineer Command have been to get the USARV portionof the lines of communication (LOG) completed to a high standard of quality and assoon as possible; to help the ARVN prepare to take over the engineer task across theboard upon our departure; and to ready US Engineer units for redeployment as soonas they could possibly be released.

19720504 Senior Officer Debriefing Report.

Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. DeWitt C. Armstrong. 2November 1971.11 pp.

Contents: Introduction; RVNAF; ROK Forces; US Troop Discipline; Drug AbuseProgram; Defense of US Forces; Army Organization in Military Regions; CommunityRelations; "The Soldier."

0515 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 23d Artillery Group, Period 30 June 1971 - 26January 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Richard G. Hoffman. 15 May1972. 6pp.The period covered by this report was characterized by a low level of enemy activitywhile US units were being drawn down and inactivated. Enemy activity consistedmainly of sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and terrorism. 23d Artillery Group wasassigned to USARV, but under the operational control of HO, Third RegionalAssistance Command, and under Saigon Support Command for administration andlogistical support except for personnel matters. The group dealt directly with HQ,USARV on personnel matters.

0521 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) - PeriodFebruary 1971 to February 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Thomas M. Tarpley. 13 July1972. 87pp.Contents: Introduction; Intelligence; Combat Operations; Personnel Administra-tion; Logistical Support; Psychological Operations; Redeployment; Inclosures.

0608 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Commander, 1st Signal Brigade, 1 May 1971 -11June 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army). Washington, D.C. Wilburn C. Weaver. 11 June1972. 10pp.The period discussed in this report was characterized by continued, sharpreductions in military strength, a corresponding increase in contract operations forcommunication services, continuing assumption of former 1st Signal Brigadecommunication missions by the ARVN Signal Department, and a major effort toretrograde Communications-Electronics equipment from South Vietnam.

0618 Senior Officer Debriefing Report 1st Cavalry Division, 13 December 1971 - 20 June1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army). Washington, D.C. James F. Hamlet. 25 June 1972.32pp.

This report covers observations and reports lessons learned during the employmentof a separate airmobile brigade in a combat environment. During the period of thisreport, operations ranged from small unit actions to conventional, mid-intensitycombat.

0650 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Deputy Province Senior Advisor, Ba Xuyen, MR 4,4 January 1971 -18 July 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. James J. Turner. 24 June 1972.17pp.Contents: Question and Answer Format; After Tour Report.

0667 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Deputy Commander, United States Army, Viet-nam, 15 June 1970-5 September 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. W.J. McCaffrey. 5 September1972. 11pp.Contents: Operational Environment; Command Relationships; Experiences inCommand; Relations with the Host Nation Forces and Government; Relationshipswith Third-Nation Forces; Organization; Training; Civil Disturbance Operations;Research and Development; Conclusions.

19730678 Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Province Senior Advisor, Phong Dlnh Province,

Period 26 May 1971 -1 December 1972.Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Edward J. Porter. 15 November1972. 15pp.Contents: Completion of Tour Report; CORDS.

U.S. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975

Part One. Indochina Studies

Part Two. Vietnam: Lessons Learned

Part Three. Vietnam: Reports of U.S. Army Operations

Part Four. Vietnam: U.S. Army Senior OfficerDebriefing Reports

UPA