U.S ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND FORT SILL

ANNUAL COMMAND HISTORY

(RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2004 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2004

BY

COMMAND HISTORIAN'S OFFICE

JUNE 2005

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

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COMMANDER'S INTRODUCTION

The Annual Command History for 2004 captures key mission support activities,

training and leader development initiatives, and combat development accomplishments for the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill.

As soldiers and civilians at Fort Sill worked around the clock to ensure local safety and security, the Field Artillery and Fort Sill continued to transform to meet future requirements. In support of the U.S. Army's Transformation, the Field Artillery led the way in futures development and integration. Advances in the development of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Lightweight 155-mm Towed Howitzer promised responsive fire support across the full spectrum of operational environments. In addition to emerging weapons systems, including the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon and NLOS Launch System, field artillery munitions, such as the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) and the Excalibur Unitary, assured unparalleled mobility and precision lethal fires in the near future. To enhance the Field Artillery's precision capabilities even more, the Field Artillery School conducted the Precision Effects Study and started working to introduce the course-correcting fuse. Meanwhile, the School launched the Counterstrike Task Force initiative to improve the force's ability to respond quickly and effectively to enemy indirect fire.

As in past years, Fort Sill's core mission remained training soldiers and leaders for Field Artillery units of the operational forces in 2004. While the Field Artillery Training Center improved realism in Initial Entry Training to prepare soldiers better for the Contemporary Operational Environment, the Field Artillery School provided Field Artillery leaders with world-class training and instruction and introduced non-lethal instruction for officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. The School's program of instruction furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and soldiers better for their next or first assignment. To permit Redlegs throughout the world to retrieve information from the Field Artillery School rapidly and efficiently, the Field Artillery School leveraged advanced technology by offering distributive learning and stood up the Fires Knowledge Network.

In support of the Army's initiatives on jointness, the Field Artillery School took steps to create the joint fires observer, worked to introduce the Joint Training Center for Fires and Effects Integration, developed the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System, reintroduced live ordnance close air support training, and conducted its first Joint Fires and Effects Course.

Around the world, Redleg soldiers are the pride of the Nation's forces. At home, Field Artillery units continue to train to unprecedented levels of high-quality performance -- preparing for whatever challenges wait them. Now more than ever, the Caissons are indeed rolling along.

DAVID P. VALCOURT Major General, USA Commanding

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PREFACE

The 2004 Annual Command History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and

Fort Sill emphasizes the training mission and follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Command Historian's Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Center made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, equipment requirements, and mission support.

Because the Center and Field Artillery School were involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Command Historian's Office under the direction of the Commanding General selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History.

Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian's work. After they are collected from the various Center and School organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Command Historian's Office. All documents are available for use by Center and School staffs, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request.

Because new documents are often found after research and writing are completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Command Historian's Office.

In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Command Historian's Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult. BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Command Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i COMMANDER'S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND MISSION SUPPORT

Mission 8 Organization 8 New Deputy Commanding General for Training 8 Reorganizing the Field Artillery School 9 Strategic Communications School 13 Joint Combined Integration Directorate 14 Counterstrike Task Force and Counterstrike Task Force Initiative 14 Mission Support 15 Installation Management Agency 15 The Mission Budget 18 Program Objective Memorandum 20 Force Protection 21 Power Projection 22

CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOMENT: TRAINING AND

EDUCATION

Introduction 24 Fires Knowledge Network 24 Distributive Learning 26 Integrating Effects Based Operations into the Program of Instruction 26 Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 27 Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System 27 Call for Fire Trainer 28 Engagement Skills Trainer 29 Fire Support and Combined Arms Tactical Trainer 29 Warrior Ethos and Improved Realism in Initial Entry Training 29 Noncommissioned Officer Education System Redesign 32 Officer Education System 35 Field Artillery Officer Basic Course 35 Field Artillery Captains Career Course 39 Field Artillery Captains Career Course-Distance Learning 40

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New Equipment Training 40 Multiple-Launch Rocket System Training 40 Cannon New Equipment Training 41 Other New Equipment Training 41 Joint Training 42 Joint Training Center for Fires and Effects Integration 42 Joint Fires and Effects Course 43 Live Ordnance Close Air Support Training 44 Non-Lethal Training 45

CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:FORCE DESIGN

DOCTRINE, AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS Introduction 47 Joint Issues 47 The Universal Observer/Joint Fires Observer 47 Information Operations and Electronic Warfare 48 Joint Terminal Attack Controller (Ground) Memorandum of Agreement 48 Air Warfare Center Detachment Support to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Sill 49 Co-locating Battlefield Coordination Detachments with Air Operations and Training/Experimentation Combined Air Operation Centers 49 Force Design and Combat Developments 49 Transformation of the Army 49 Equipment 53 The Initial Armored Vehicle/Stryker Vehicle 53 The Precision Effects Study and the Course Correcting Fuse 58 Capabilities Needs Assessment 59 XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile 60 Precision Guidance Kit, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunitions Program, and Insensitive Munitions Program 64 Modular Charge Artillery System 64 Non-Line of Sight Cannon 66 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 70 Multiple-Launch Rocket System 75 Non-Line of Sight Launch System 80 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 83

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Army Tactical Missile System and Brilliant Antiarmor Submuntion 88 Firefinder Radars 91 Profiler 92 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System 93 The Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and Knight 94 Fire Support Sensor System 96 The Dismounted Optic System 96 Joint Effects Targeting System 97 The Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 97 Lightweight Countermortar Radar 99 Command, Control, and Communications Systems 99 Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory 102 Networked Fires II Command and Control Experiment 102 Command and Control of Networked Fires and Integrating Experiment 04 108 Unit of Action Developmental Experiment #3: Urban Operations 114 Omni Fusion Experiments 118 FY05 Omni Fusion Experimentation, Build 0, Fort Leavenworth, Ks 119 Extensible C41 Simulation and FireSim Integration for the Army Constructive Training Federation 122 Combat Training Center Replication 122 Joint Fires and Effects Course 122 Field Artillery School Battle Simulation Center 123 Air Assault Expeditionary Force Spiral B 123 Army Tactical Missile System Penetrator Demonstration Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 124 Joint Fires Initiative Block 2, Limited Objective Experiment 124 Sea Viking 125 LIST OF ACRONYMS 127 APPENDEX ONE Student Production for FY2004 137 APPENDEX TWO Key USAFAS Personnel 138 APPENDIX THREE Key USAFACFS Personnel 139 APPENDIX FOUR Field Artillery School Commandants 140 APPENDIX FIVE Chiefs of Field Artillery 142

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APPENDIX SIX Assistant Commandants/Deputy Commanding General for Training 144 APPENDIX SEVEN USAFACFS Mission Organization Chart 146 APPENDIX EIGHT List of Documents 147 INDEX 158

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CHAPTER ONE

MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND MISSION SUPPORT

MISSION Influenced by the new field artillery technology introduced after the Spanish-

American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and inadequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in September 1911. War Department, General Orders No. 72, dated 3 June 1911, directed the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers. Later on 5 June 1911, War Department, General Orders No. 73 made the school an integral part of the department's educational system to train officers and soldiers.1

In 2004 the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill's (USAFACFS) training mission composed of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center (USAFATC) continued the tradition started in 1911. During the year, the Center trained the field artillery forces of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, developed Field Artillery leaders, designed and developed fire support, supported unit training and readiness, mobilized and deployed operating forces, and maintained installation infrastructure and services.2 ORGANIZATION

New Deputy Commanding General for Training

In September 2004 Colonel (P) Mark A. Graham assumed duty as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS). He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery on 22 December 1977 after graduating from Murray State University, Murray, Kentucky. Following graduation from the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery, 8th Infantry Division, Baumholder, Germany. During this assignment, Colonel Graham served as a FIST (Fire Support Team) chief, fire direction officer, battery executive officer, and battalion special weapons officer. Colonel Graham attended the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course in 1981 and remained at Fort Sill to command C Battery, Staff and Faculty Battalion, USAFAS and subsequently served as battalion executive officer. He moved to III Corps Artillery where he commanded A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Brigade and then served as the battalion S-3 (operations officer). Moving to Washington D.C., Colonel Graham served at the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) from July 1986 to July 1989 as a Field Artillery Branch Assignment Officer and Strength Manager. He then moved to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and graduated in June 1990.

12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 7. 2Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004, Doc I-1; USAFACFS FY05 Command Training Guidance, undated, Doc I-1a.

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Upon graduation from the Command and General Staff College, Colonel Graham moved to Augsburg, Germany, to serve as the G-1 (Administration), VII Corps Artillery, where he deployed to participate in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991. Upon returning from the Gulf War, Colonel Graham moved back to Baumholder to serve as the S-3, 2nd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery and then as the S-3 in the 1st Armored Division Artillery. Colonel Graham returned to Fort Sill in July 1993 as Chief of the Field Artillery Proponency Office and then as Commander, 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade from June 1994 to June 1996. The next move took Colonel Graham back to PERSCOM where he served as the Chief of Field Artillery Branch from 1996 to 1997. He remained in Washington D.C. to attend the National War College in 1997-1998. He was selected as the first active duty officer to command an Army National Guard brigade in peacetime. Colonel Graham commanded the 40th Infantry Division Artillery, California Army National Guard from August 1998 to July 2000. Colonel Graham moved to Korea where he served as Commander, 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) in Osan from July 2000 to April 2002. Following his tour with the BCD, he moved to Seoul, Korea, to serve as the executive officer to the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea from May 2002 to June 2003. From July 2003 to September 2004, Colonel Graham served as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill. Colonel Graham's awards included the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (6th award), the Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (5th award), the Army Achievement Medal, and others.3 Reorganizing the Field Artillery School

During 2002-2004, limited resources and the creation of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) on Fort Sill prompted restructuring the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) and the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) to streamline training and support functions.4 Late in November 2002, the Commanding General of Fort Sill, Major General Michael D. Maples, approved a draft concept plan that outlined three major recommendations for reorganizing the School.5 First, Fort Sill had two separate tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) for the School at the end of 2002. As it was standing up IMA in 2002 that had responsibilities for garrison and base operations, Fort Sill had to create a garrison TDA for IMA and had to shift the commanding general and his staff from the garrison TDA to the mission TDA (Field Artillery School) in 2002. This transfer gave the Field Artillery School a TDA for the mission headquarters that was composed of the commander's staff and some garrison functions and one for the Field Artillery School. Rather than maintaining two mission TDAs for the School, Fort Sill proposed combining them to

3Biography, Colonel (P) Mark A. Graham, undated, Doc I-2. 4Col Stephen D. Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 42-45, Doc I-3; "Field Artillery School," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, p. 30, Doc I-4. 52003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 11.

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form one mission TDA and designating the function as the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, School, and Fort Sill. This action would also dissolve Training Command and merge the staffs from the mission headquarters and the school to form one mission staff.6

Second, Fort Sill's draft concept plan of November 2002 proposed changing the USAFAS School Brigade's official designation to the 30th Field Artillery Regiment. Early in the 1990s, the School created the 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment, the 3-30th Field Artillery Regiment, and the 30th Field Artillery Regiment as provisional units as a part of the Army's regimental program. On the official TDA the 1-30th Field Artillery, however, remained the Staff and Faculty Battalion, while the 3-30th Field Artillery continued as the Officer Student Battalion. The 30th Field Artillery Regiment stayed on the TDA as the School Brigade. On 26 June 1995 orders from the Department of the Army and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) redesignated the Officer Student Battalion as the 3-30th Field Artillery Regiment and the Staff and Faculty Battalion as the 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment. However, the School never received orders to redesignate the School Brigade as the 30th Field Artillery Regiment on the official TDA.7 The third major proposal focused on creating a senior leadership position out of existing resources. Fort Sill wanted to establish a Deputy Assistant Commandant (DAC) for the School to monitor changes, policies, and activities in the School in order to keep them in step with the Transformation of the Army. In addition, the DAC would assume the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Commandant of the School during his absence.8

Although General Maples approved the concept plan in June 2003 with the above features to reorganize the School and submitted it to TRADOC in July 2003, TRADOC did not approve it. During 2003, TRADOC was developing a school model for command-wide application; and Fort Sill's concept plan of June 2003 differed from the draft model. This situation caused Fort Sill's concept plan of June 2003 to reorganize the School to sit without any action being taken at TRADOC, left the School in a limbo concerning its future organization, and prompted the Chief of Staff of Fort Sill to withdraw the plan from consideration for official approval for implementation.9

Equally important, this situation caused the School to retain the reorganizations that General Maples had approved earlier in 2002 and that were part of the concept plan of June 2003. As of late 2001 and early 2002, the Gunnery Department and Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD) executed training and managed training. This structure confused students and cadre because each department had officer and enlisted courses and because some courses were taught jointly by each department. To end this confusion, General Maples approved merging FSCAOD and the Gunnery Department under the 30th Field Artillery Regiment and its battalions to execute training in 2002. This complemented another reorganization action of 2002 that involved the Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate (WIDD). That year, the School abolished WIDD that focused on training development, doctrine development, and quality assurance and that had been created by merging the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) and the

6Ibid. 7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 12. 9Ibid.

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Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) in 1995. In the place of WIDD, the General reestablished DOTD in 2002 to oversee training and doctrine development and formed the Quality Assurance Office (QAO) in 2002 to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of training. Besides separating training and doctrine development from quality assurance to end the conflict of interest, the reorganization also moved training management from the training departments into DOTD.10

As Fort Sill revised its School concept plan of June 2003 for resubmission to TRADOC and the Army in 2004, it implemented another aspect of concept plan of June 2003. To streamline overhead in 2004, Fort Sill combined the School's staff and the commanding general's staff that had remained with the general after base operation functions had been transferred to IMA. Although this action gave Fort Sill an IMA garrison staff TDA and eliminated the two mission staffs with their separate TDAs, the new structure left the commanding general without the necessary staff to provide G-1 (Administration), a G-3 (Operations), and a G-4 (Logistics) support. In view of this, Fort Sill created a staff (G-1, G-3, and G-4) for the commanding general as part of its revised concept plan of 2004.11

To fill a critical gap the revised concept plan of 2004 added a G-6 (Chief Information Officer) to the commanding general's staff. Created in 2004 as a provisional organization until official recognition came, the CIO had the responsibility of managing the information systems of the Field Artillery Center and School, developing the strategic planning of Field Artillery information systems, and determining the current and future information technology requirements to execute the Center's and School's missions and the commanding general's priorities.12 Executing the final concept plan of June 2003 and the revised version of that same plan in 2004 that had been forwarded to the Department of the Army for approval provided the School with the ability to participate more extensively in joint operations and to keep pace with Army Transformation and simultaneously streamlined operations The series of reorganizations created a Commandant, an Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commanding General for Training, a DAC that was later re-designated the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), a DOTD to develop training and doctrine, a QAO to evaluate training, and the 30th Field Artillery Regiment that included the Gunnery Department and FSCAOD to execute training. Along with the Noncommissioned Officer Academy and U.S. Army

10Ibid.; Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," pp. 42-45; "Field Artillery School," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, p. 30; Briefing, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 14 Jul 04, Doc I-5; Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004, p. 1, Doc I-6. 11Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004, p. 7; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jim W. Reid, Directorate of Resource Management, 13 Jan 04, I-7. 12SIGACT, DRM, 15 Jan 04, Doc I-7a; SIGACT, DRM, 23 Mar 04, Doc I-8; SIGACT, DRM, 4 May 04, Doc I-9; SIGACT, DRM, 22 Jun 04, Doc I-10; SIGACTS, DRM, 10 Aug 04, Doc I-11; SIGACTS, DRM, 12 Oct 04, Doc I-12; Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004, p. 3; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Reid, 13 Jan 05; Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," pp. 42-45; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 12-13; Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004, p. 1, 3

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Field Artillery Training Center, they served as the major training organizations on Fort Sill.13 On the training and doctrine development and evaluation level, the 2004 School organization closely resembled the structures outlined by TRADOC School Models 1983 and 1989. Both models provided for a commandant, an assistant commandant, TRADOC system managers, a proponency office, a directorate of evaluation, a directorate of training and doctrine, and training departments. Unlike TRADOC School Model 1983 that did not limit the number of training departments, TRADOC School Model 1989 restricted its service schools to four training departments and ensured that training developments and evaluation were separate organizations to minimize any conflict of interest.14 Through 1992 the Field Artillery School adhered to these models. It kept the number of its training departments within the approved number and used DOES to evaluate training and DOTD to develop training and doctrine, but funding constraints led to significant modifications. That year, the School formed the Directorate of Training and Evaluation (DOTE) by merging DOES and DOTD to streamline operations and reduce overhead and shifted training and doctrine development with the exception of new systems training development to the training departments -- the Target Acquisition Department, the Gunnery Department, and FSCAOD. While new systems training development logically went to the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) because it worked with the acquisition of new systems and equipment, DOTE retained the evaluation mission. Because instructors in the training departments were spending long hours on the teaching platform and lacked time to develop training and doctrine, the School abolished DOTE and transferred training and doctrine development with the exception of new systems training development to the Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate in 1995. Creating WIDD combined training and doctrine development and training evaluation into one department and created an awkward relationship because a single director had the responsibility for developing and evaluating training to create a conflict of interest.15 Under TRADOC's direction the School subsequently created the Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in 2001 and gave it responsibility for training development, doctrine development, and combat developments and removed the conflict of interest created by the organization of WIDD. Even though this reorganization was intended to ensure that combat developers and training and doctrine developers would work closely to coordinate the development of training and doctrine, this arrangement failed. Because the director of FDIC focused his attention on combat developments as his top priority, training and doctrine developments did not receive much consideration. Recognizing this systematic

13Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," pp. 42-45; Interview, Dastrup with COL James M. McDonald, Chief of Staff, USAFACFS, 22 Nov 04, Doc I-12a. 14Briefing, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 14 Jul 04; Information Paper with atchs, subj: School Model 89, 27 Apr 89, Doc I-13; Msg, Cdr TRADOC to Cdr, AD Artillery Center, et al, subj: School Model 89 Approval and Requirement to Implement, 27 Apr 89, Doc I-14. 15Briefing, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 14 Jul 04; Information Paper with atchs, subj: School Model 89, 27 Apr 89; Msg, Cdr TRADOC to Cdr, AD Artillery Center, et al, subj: School Model 89 Approval and Requirement to Implement, 27 Apr 89.

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deficiency, the School abolished WIDD in 2002, recreated DOTD to develop training and doctrine, established QAO to evaluate training, left combat development and new systems training development in FDIC, and set in motion the other reorganizations contained in the concept plan of 2003.16

Strategic Communications Office. As part of the revised concept plan of 2004, Fort Sill created the Strategic Communications Office (STRATCOM) as subordinate to Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) and later made the office an independent function. The Directorate of Strategic Communications had the mission of telling Field Artillery's story, advising the Commanding General and other installation offices on strategies to communicate branch initiatives, issues, and messages to the appropriate audiences, instilling pride and esprit de corps in the Field Artillery, ensuring a single voice spoke on behalf of critical issues, enhancing relationships with state and local community leaders, and developing strategic communication products to support the mission of the Field Artillery School and Fort Sill.17

During the last months of 2004 and the first months of 2005, STRATCOM launched an aggressive campaign to promote the Field Artillery. It completed the first of three "Pride in the Field Artillery" poster campaigns, completed the first Internet video presentation, projected four more Internet video presentations over the coming twelve to fifteen months, and planned to produce a "Hooah" video with the help from the Directorate of Information Management for showing to Officer Basic Course, Captain's Career Course, and Reserve Officer Training Corps students to urge them to join the Field Artillery or to remain in the branch. STRATCOM also had plans to create another "Hooah" video for the Internet to serve as a recruiting tool for civilians who were interested in joining the military and laid the groundwork for creating a new position for a congressional liaison officer. Basically, the campaign pointed out that the Field Artillery was the Joint Fires and Effects Integrator for the Army, that there was solid progress with modularity effort, and that Field Artillery was on track.18

STRATCOM had another crucial role that was not as tangible as producing Internet videos and posters. The office had the responsibility of engaging key congressional, state, and local leaders, the media, industry, and the general public to get Fort Sill's and the Field Artillery's message out and at the top of their agendas. For example, Mr. Jean Reed's (a professional staff member of the Military Research and Development Committee in Congress) visit to Fort Sill in October 2004 came as a direct result of STRATCOM's plan

16Email with atch, subj: School Reorganization, 18 Feb 05, Doc I-15; Briefing, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 14 Jul 04; Information Paper with atchs, subj: School Model 89, 27 Apr 89; Msg, Cdr TRADOC to Cdr, AD Artillery Center, et al, subj: School Model 89 Approval and Requirement to Implement, 27 Apr 89. 17Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," pp. 42-45; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Reid, 13 Jan 05; Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004, p. 3; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Shirley Dismuke, Act Dir, STRATCOM, 2 Mar 05, Doc I-15a; Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05, Doc I-.16 18Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Dismuke, 2 Mar 05; Email, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05, Doc I-17

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approved by the Commanding General of Fort Sill, Major General David P. Valcourt, to engage congressional leaders and their staffs.19

Joint and Combined Integration Directorate. A key innovation that was not part of the final concept plan of 2003 but was a part of a TRADOC initiative involved establishing the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) in 2003. Fort Sill created JACI out of the Deputy Assistant Commandant that had been formed in 2003 to put "teeth" into Fort Sill's role as the Army's Joint Fires and Effects Integrator and to provide an additional colonel-level leadership to manage transformation, to work joint issues, and to help the installation become more involved in joint issues in support of the contemporary operational environment.20 Counterstrike Task Force and Counterstrike Task Force Initiative. In response to the wide range of indirect fire and unconventional threats to U.S. forces serving in the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to work with in-theater commanders and the Army staff to find solutions to defeat the insurgents and to protect U.S. soldiers and Marines from enemy indirect fires, particularly rockets and mortars which were the primary source of injuries with improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct action being other major sources of injury. This effort, known as Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortars (C-RAM), combined seven tenets into a holistic solution to defeat enemy indirect fires.21 The tenets included shape, sense, warn, intercept, protect, respond, and integrate. Because of the Field Artillery's role in combined arms warfare, the Field Artillery School had the responsibility for the shape, warn, sense, and respond tenets and established the Counterstrike Task Force (CSTF) in August 2004 to meet that responsibility.22 During 2004, the Counterstrike Task Force developed a strategy to find near-term solutions (ninety days) to increase U.S. Force's ability to acquire incoming rounds and provide an early warning to allow soldiers to seek protection. The task force created digital linkages between existing and emerging technologies that provided greater capabilities for sensors and responders and helped furnish the commander with a more accurate common operating picture. The task force also developed a web portal which was a secure location to collect lessons learned from the field and suggestions for countering the enemy's indirect fire

19Email, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05, Doc I-18; Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05; Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05. 20Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," pp. 42-45, Doc I-3; Interview, Dastrup with Col James M. McDonald, Chief of Staff of Fort Sill, 22 Nov 04, Doc I-12a; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 12-13. 21Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 05, Doc I-19. 22LTC Michael D. Borg, "New Fort Sill Counterstrike Task Force Needs You," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, p. 17, Doc I-20; Email with atch, subj: Counterstrike Task Force Input to Annual Command History, 11 May 05, Doc I-20a; MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc I-21; Memorandum for Director, Counterstrike Task Force, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 21 Mar 05, Doc I-21a; Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 08.

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strikes. The portal permitted experts to develop counterstrike solutions to current and emerging threats in collaboration with soldiers and leaders in the field and served as a means to disseminate information rapidly and efficiently.23 CFTF also sent liaison officers to Iraq to work with the commander of the Effects Coordination Cell which was part of the Multi-National Corps Irag, was stood up by III Corps Artillery, and was later turned over to the XVIII Airborne Corps that was the organization in the Central Command (CENTCOM) with lead for counterstrike in the Global War on Terrorism. To facilitate the Effects Coordination Cell's resolution of enemy indirect fire challenges, the liaison officers coordinated with stateside military, TRADOC Futures Center, industry, and academia to find and field new solutions.24 CSTF's initial efforts produced a wide array of developmental capabilities. The task force looked at ways of providing early warning of incoming rounds, improving overhead protection at base camps, intercepting rounds, improving radar acquisitions of indirect fire, and improving counterfire response times.25

MISSION SUPPORT

Installation Management Agency

During the recent past, constrained budgets forced the Army's major commands to make critical decisions about funding priorities. They had only so much money and had to choose between funding base operations and mission requirements. Generally, they reprogrammed as much money as possible from base operation accounts for training, deployments, and other exigencies. This practice left garrison commanders who cared for the installation's infrastructure with insufficient funds and led to a backlog of maintenance and repair and poorly maintained facilities.26

Prompted by the challenges of funding base operations, the sustainment costs, the deteriorating infrastructure, and the drive to implement better business practices, the Army took action. On 30 October 2001 the Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White, officially approved a program, initially called Centralized Installation Management (CIM) but later renamed Transformation in Installation Management (TIM). As planned, TIM aimed to

23Notes, BG Mark A. Graham, DCG, undated, Doc II-21b; Borg, "New Fort Sill Counterstrike Task Force Needs You," p. 17; "CounterStrike Task Force: How to Protect Troops from GWOT Insurgents," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, p. 44, Doc I-22; Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05, Doc I-23; Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 08; Memorandum for Cdr, US Army Field Artillery Center, School, and Fort Sill, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 22 Apr 05, Doc I-23a; Valcourt, Bray, and Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5; MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 1-4, Doc I-24. 24Borg, "New Fort Sill Counterstrike Task Force Needs You," p. 17; Email with atch, subj: Counterstrike Task Force Input to Annual Command History, 11 May 05. 25Valcourt, Bray, and Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5; MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 1-4; Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 05.

262002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 11.

16

consolidate Army installation management through regional alignment that would distribute funding from the Department of the Army to seven geographic regions to the garrison and would eliminate the major commands from running base operations as they had done in the past. Upon becoming operational as the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency (IMA) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, TIM would permit mission commanders to focus on their mission activities and garrison commanders to oversee base operations. Ultimately, the regional alignment would create a corporate structure with a sole focus on efficient and effective management of installations and would ensure standard and equitable delivery of services from installation to installation.27

After several years of work, Fort Sill officially stood up its new garrison element reporting to the IMA in FY 2004 (1 October 2003). With that accomplished Fort Sill split the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) into a mission DRM and IMA DRM with separate directors. Other actions included creating an IMA TDA (garrison) and TRADOC TDA (mission). The IMA TDA included the Garrison Commander and staff, the Directorate of Information Management (DOIM), the Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM), the Directorate of Public Safety (DPS), the Directorate of Logistics (DOL), the Directorate of Public Works (DPW), the Directorate of Community Activities/Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DCA/DMWR), the Adjutant General (AG), the Judge Advocate General (JAG), the Safety Office, the Chaplain, the Public Affairs Office (PAO), the Equal Opportunity Office (EEO), the Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office (IRAC), and the Directorate of Contracting (DOC). Some agencies, such as PAO and the Staff Judge Advocate, had IMA and TRADOC TDAs.28

Although IMA received funding from TRADOC through most of 2003, this arrangement ended with the creation of two separate budgets for Fort Sill for FY 2004. Beginning on 1 October 2003, base operation funds and sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) funds flowed from IMA to the garrison while mission funding ran from TRADOC to Fort Sill. For the first time the mission and garrison budgets were separate; and the Commanding General of Fort Sill could not shift money from the garrison and base operations to meet mission requirements.29

Challenges immediately confronted Fort Sill's garrison in FY 2004. According to budget guidance from the IMA in Arlington, Virginia, in October 2003, Fort Sill's garrison had $56 million to cover a myriad of functions, such as non-tactical maintenance, force protection, environmental protection, education services, and other base operation functions, and had to execute "must fund" base support functions. Later in December 2003, funding constraints caused the garrison's budget to be reduced to $41 million. As had occurred with Fort Sill's base operation budget in the past, the IMA FY 2004 budget did not cover all base operation requirements. Therefore, Fort Sill's garrison outlined a "cannot do" list and sent to higher headquarters as directed. Even with the reduction, Fort Sill's garrison had to fund civilian payroll, mission essential contracts, A-76 contracting out study costs, utilities, and

27Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 13.

282003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 14-15; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05, Doc I-25. 292003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 15; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05.

17

other critical functions. Equally important, the garrison had to ensure Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) success by making certain that inadequate funding would not degrade mobilizations and demobilizations in FY 2004.30

Acknowledging that the Army was shifting funding to support GWOT which left other areas short of funding, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army urged installation IMA garrisons to review their spending on base operations. In December 2003 he told them to take all possible and prudent actions to manage execution rates. If they failed to do this, the Army would exhaust all FY 2004 base operation funds before the end of the fiscal year. He then recommended that they had to be good stewards of the Army's resources.31

As funding became tighter, Fort Sill's garrison received additional guidance. Although IMA gave Fort Sill's garrison and other garrisons some additional money in March 2004 that did not offset the earlier cut, Headquarters IMA announced that month that GWOT obligations required all IMA garrisons to defer March 2004 obligations until April 2004.32 IMA directed its garrisons to "slow down on Base Operations and SRM commitments/obligations. . . . We must take necessary actions now to not only get to the end of March, but also to make it through the remainder of the year within these financial controls."33 Fort Sill's garrison had to balance all accounts to the available annual funding. This meant reduce spending to stay within budget.34

More specific guidance followed. In an email on 12 May 2004, Headquarters IMA outlined guidance from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The Vice Chief of Staff was adamant that IMA had to pursue efficiencies and savings more aggressively. Spending had to be reduced. For example, Fort Sill's garrison had to implement a hiring freeze, release all temporary employees, and stop student summer employment, among other actions, until the installation received further guidance.35

The Fort Sill Garrison Commander explained the dilemma posed by the IMA budget in stark terms. In an undated memorandum, he wrote, "In summary, base support and sustainment accounts for FY04 remain broken, as we have identified repeatedly in FY03. . . . Without your support, I cannot provide adequate protection, maintain a good QOL [quality of

302003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 15; Email with atch, subj: Installations as Flagships, 5 Dec 03, Doc I-26; Briefing, subj: FY04 OMA Allocation Options, 4 Dec 03, Doc I-27; Email, subj: NETCALL #18 -- IMA FY04 Funding Letter, 5 Jan 04, Doc I-28; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY2004 IMA Operations and Maintenance Army Funding Letter, undated, Doc I-29; Email, subj: FY04 IMA Budget Update, 5 Dec 03; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05. 31Email, subj: NETCALL #18, IMA FY04 Funding Letter, 5 January 04; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05. 32Email, subj: FY04 Budget Cash Flow Problem, 18 Mar 04, Doc I-30; Email, subj: IMA Cash Flow Problem, 17 Mar 04, Doc I-31. 33Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison OMA FY 04 Budget Execution Guidance, 16 Mar 04, Doc I-32. 34Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison OMA FY 04 Budget Execution Guidance, 16 Mar 04; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05. 35Email, subj: IMA Mid-Year Review Briefing to VCSA, 4 May 04, Doc I-33; Email, subj: IMA Directors NETCALL #27 -- FY04 MYR, 12 May 04, Doc I-34.

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life], or provide satisfactory support to our training and mobilization missions."36 On 28 May 2004 the Fort Sill Garrison Commander repeated the warning. In an

email to Headquarters IMA, he wrote, "My current assessment is that we do not have enough money in the Garrison to cover civilian payroll for the rest of the year. . . . But even if we can make more funds available to cover payroll, I am concerned that we will not have enough money to pay for other requirements."37

With the knowledge that base operations and SRM accounts would not receive any additional funding, the Garrison Commander pushed ahead to provide base operations and to support the mission.38 In a briefing to the Commanding General of Fort Sill, the Garrison Commander outlined priorities that had been established by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in April 2004. To stay within the FY 2004 budget Fort Sill's garrison implemented a civilian hiring freeze, curtailed temporary duty, deferred supply purchases, lived with supplies that were already in stock, limited sustainment expenditures to repairs that were essential to the preservation of life, limb, or property for the remaining months of the fiscal year, and reduced contract services. These and other measures saved approximately $16 million. Despite the cuts, the Garrison Commander reassured the Commanding General that the garrison would continue to support the training missions. However, austere garrison operations would continue until additional funding could be obtained from Headquarters IMA.39

Although the Army acknowledged the funding constraints, reprogrammed some money from SRM to base operations in May 2004, and relaxed some of its previous strictures on spending, such as summer hires, funding restrictions persisted through the rest of the fiscal year. Fort Sill's garrison implemented decrements to meet the funding limits, found money to cover civilian payroll, base utilities, and other critical mission support activities, and deferred some FY 2004 obligations to FY 2005.40 The Mission Budget

In 2004 Fort Sill executed the budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 and simultaneously

36Memorandum for HQ IMA, subj: FY04 Initial Funding Distribution for IMA, undated, Doc I-27, 2003 USAFACFS ACH. 37Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison Budget, 28 May 04, Doc I-35. 38Email, subj: Mid-Year Review Results-Guidance Forthcoming, 9 May 04, Doc I-36. 39DPTM SIGACTS, 19 Jul 04, Doc I-37; DPTM SIGACTS, 4 Jun 04, Doc I-38; DPTM SIGACTS, 11 Jun 04, Doc I-39; Briefing, subj: Mid-Year Review, 26 May 04, Doc I-40; Briefing, subj: Garrison Midyear Budget Review, 8 Jun 04, Doc I-41; Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison Budget, 28 May 04. 40Email, subj: Reduction in BOS annual funding program, 13 May 04, Doc I-42; Email, subj: IMA Directors NETCALL #30 -- FY04 Budget Update to NETCALL #27: Actions Required for Remainder of FY04, 27 May 04, Doc I-43; Email, subj: FY04 Budget Brief to IMA RM, 21 May 04, Doc I-44; Email, subj: SPBAC with GC 26 May 1300-1500 Regimental Room 305, McNair Hall, 25 May 04, Doc I-45; Email, subj: FY04 Execution Guidance -- Follow-up to NETCALL #30, 8 Jun 04, Doc I-46; Email, subj: FY04 OMA Execution Update with ABO - 27 August, 27 Aug 04, Doc I-47; Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05.

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prepared a budget for FY 2005. Because of increased rigor added to training based upon lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom and efforts to support Army Transformation, implementing the budget for FY 2004 proved to be challenging. As in the past years, Fort Sill responded with appropriate action to address resource requirements to meet the changing missions. On 18 February 2004 the Commanding General of Fort Sill, Major General David P. Valcourt, wrote the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) about the installation's funding challenges. Although additional funding from TRADOC resolved many funding issues, Fort Sill required money for the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000, the modular sleeping bag system, and body armor, among other needs for initial entry training. The installation also required additional funding to hire contract instructors for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy to handle the increase in the student load, to purchase essential training equipment, to upgrade programs of instruction and lesson plans, and to support Transformation.41

Beginning in February 2004 and continuing for the next several months, the installation developed a monthly obligation plan for pay and travel, among other obligations, updated its unfinanced requirements, prioritized them, and send the plan and unfinanced requirements to TRADOC in keeping with the Commanding General's desire to keep higher headquarters appraised of Fort Sill's needs. Based upon Fort Sill's efforts, TRADOC provided money for "must fund" unfinanced requirements, such as modular sleeping bags.42 Later in May 2004 and June 2004, Fort Sill revised its unfinanced requirements and submitted them to TRADOC. Fortunately, some, such two Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Computer classrooms, received funding from TRADOC through year-end funds. By the end of the fiscal year in September 2004, TRADOC had funded ninety-nine percent of Fort Sill's core operational maintenance Army (OMA) requirements and one hundred percent of Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements to lighten the financial burden.43

In the meantime, Fort Sill received funding guidance from TRADOC for FY 2005. In April 2004 the Commanding General of TRADOC, General Kevin P. Byrnes, reaffirmed that TRADOC's "most critical and primary mission remains to train and educate Soldiers and develop leaders for the dangerous realities of the current operating environment."44 In

41Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY04 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 18 Feb 04, Doc I-48; Memorandum for Cdr, US Army Field Artillery Center, School, and Fort Sill, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 22 Apr 05, Doc I-23a. 42Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY04 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 18 Deb 04; Briefing, subj: FY04 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance Brief, 9 Feb 04, Doc I-49; SIGACTS DRM, 9 Feb 04, Doc I-50; SIGACTS DRM, 23 Mar 04, Doc I-51; SIGACTS DRM, 8 Jun 04, Doc I-52; SIGACTS DRM, 6 Jul 04, Doc I-53. 43Email with atch, subj: FY04 Mission TBG UFRs, 31 Jan 04, Doc I-54; SIGACTS DRM, 9 Feb 04; SIGACTS DRM, 23 Mar 04; SIGACTS DRM, 6 Jul 04; SIGACTS DRM, 24 Aug 04, Doc I-55; SIGACTS DRM, 7 Sep 04, Doc I-56; SIGACTS DRM, 21 Sep 04, Doc I-57; SIGACTS DRM, 12 Oct 04, Doc I-58. 44Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY 05 TRADOC Commanding Training Guidance, 30 Apr 04, Doc I-59.

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keeping with that guidance from General Byrnes, TRADOC directed the installation to execute missions to standard in accordance with TRADOC priorities, to identify unresourced missions and their specific impacts on the Army, to begin FY 2005 under a continuing resolution authority, and to plan for a challenging execution environment.45 Specifically, Fort Sill had to support GWOT, had to resource initial military training fully, had to execute initial military training to standard, had to fund training and leader development, and had to participate in the transition from the Current Force to the Future Force. The installation also had to identify mission unfinanced requirements for FY 2005 and installation mission agency unfinanced requirements that supported mission training for FY 2005.46

Although this early planning for FY 2005 indicated constrained funding of $62.2 million for Fort Sill's mission and a small decrease from FY 2004 of $68.9 million, good news surfaced. In a funding guidance letter on 4 November 2004, TRADOC indicated that money for the fiscal year would not be as tight as initially anticipated in the summer of 2004. In fact, Fort Sill would receive $89.8 million because the Department of the Army funded $380 million of TRADOC's shortfall identified in the Operational Needs Statement. Although the new funding level was a significant increase from the initial $62.2 million, Fort Sill still had unfinanced requirements that needed funding. Besides acknowledging the unfinanced requirements and the funding shortfall, the Commanding General of Fort Sill, Major General David P. Valcourt, reaffirmed the installation's commitment to TRADOC's priorities and meeting its mission.47 Program Objective Memorandum

Early in the 1970s, the Army introduced the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to express program requirements and to propose changes within fiscal guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Annually, including 2003 and 2004, Fort Sill prepared a POM for submission to higher headquarters. On 24 December 2003 the Chief of Staff of Fort Sill, Colonel Mark A. Graham, submitted Fort Sill's Fiscal Year (FY) 06-11 POM to the U.S.

45Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY 05 TRADOC Command Training Guidance, 30 Apr 04; Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04, Doc I-60; Email, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 23 Feb 05, Doc I-61. 46Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery, Fort Sill, FY05 TGB Brief, 22 Jul 04, Doc I-62; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY 05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 14 May 04, Doc I-63; TRADOC FY05 TBG Narrative Guidance, May 04, Doc I-64. 47Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 Appropriated TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated, Doc I-65; Email with atch, subj: FY05 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance 23 Feb 05, Doc I-66; Briefing, subj: FY05 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance UFR Brief, 18 Jan 05, Doc I-67; Briefing, subj: FY05 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 24 Nov 04, Doc I-68; TRADOC FY05 ATBG Narrative Guidance, Nov 04, Doc I-69; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated, Doc I-70; Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 4 Jun 04, Doc I-71; Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04, Doc I-72; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery, Fort Sill, 22 Jul 04, Doc I-73; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) Funding Letter, 17 Sep 04, Doc I-74; SIGACTS DRM, 9 Nov 04, Doc I-75; SIGACTS DRM, 30 Nov 04, Doc I-76.

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Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Besides updating and validating the FY 05-09 mini-POM submission and incorporating new initiatives, the FY 06-11 POM identified critical issues in training, training support, future developments, and joint operations, among other issues, that required additional funding. For example, critical training issues included Bradley Fire Support Vehicle operational tempo, Paladin operational tempo, and Basic Officer Leader Course Phase II.48 In November 2004 TRADOC requested input to its FY 07-11 POM and outlined a strategy to be followed. After explaining that the Department of the Army considered the FY 06-11 POM to be appropriately balanced and reflective of its priorities and modular transformation effort, TRADOC noted that the FY 07-11 POM would identify fixes to the FY 06-11 POM to meet the Army's needs. Under this guidance Fort Sill's POM had to reflect the installation's commitment to its core competencies and priorities in training, outline a balanced program that would support the TRADOC commander's priorities, preserve and protect POM FY 06-11 resources, update POM FY 06-11 requirements that supported Army senior leadership initiatives, such as the modularity effort, and identify new or expanded mission requirements that were directed by Department of the Army or TRADOC. Other new programs or initiatives would be deferred to the FY 08-11 POM.49 Shortly after receiving this tasking, Fort Sill completed its FY07-11 POM and sent it to TRADOC in December 2004. As the Commanding General of Fort Sill, Major General David P. Valcourt, affirmed, Fort Sill's POM reflected its commitment to initial military training, mobilization, and deployment and noted that the lack of Installation Management Agency (IMA) funding had a direct impact on the installation's ability to train soldiers. For example, Fort Sill required additional funding to support initial military training, Basic Officer Leader Course Phase II training, and its Advanced Individual Training field training exercise designed for all field artillery military occupational specialties. Fort Sill also needed more funding to support transitioning to the Future Force and to conduct joint training. More IMA funding was required for range support and initial military training dormitory renovation, among others.50 Force Protection

In 2004 force protection remained a high priority for Fort Sill in light of the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. After finalizing plans in December 2002 for a variety of fences and reinforced gates to encircle the main post or cantonment, the installation began work with the Tulsa Corps of

48Department of the Army, History Summary, FY 1970, p. 84; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY06-11 POM, 24 Dec 03, Doc I-77. 49Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY 07-11 TRADOC Program Review for Operation and Maintenance Army and Other Procurement, Army Data Call, 2 Nov 04, Doc I-78; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY07-11 TRADOC Program Review for Operation and Maintenance, Army, and other Procurement, Army, Data Call, 10 Nov 04, Doc I-79. 50Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY07-11 POM Review Data Call, 6 Dec 04, Doc I-80; Briefing, subj: FY07-11 Program Review, 2 Dec 04, Doc I-81; Email, subj: FY07-11 Program Review Data Call, 23 Feb 05, Doc I-82; Email with atch, subj: FY07-11 Program Review Data Call, 23 Feb 05, Doc I-83.

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Engineers by overseeing construction. Upon completing the crash fence on the northeast corner of the Polo Field in May 2003, the installation started construction on the $2.2 million project on 29 September 2003 that included a variety of fences and reinforced gates around main post. By the end of August 2004, Fort Sill had finished the fence project.51

Meanwhile, Fort Sill initiated other force protection projects. During 2004, the installation conducted Exercise Vigilant Watch which was composed of three training and staff exercises to train and exercise selected parts of Fort Sill's Antiterrorism Plan, Secure Home. Vigilant Watch exercised, trained, and evaluated the installation's staff and first responders (fire department, military police, installation operations center, explosive ordnance detachment, and emergency medical services), identified resource issues and training shortfalls, coordinated with Lawton's first responders, and raised anti-terrorism awareness throughout the installation and Lawton community.52

Also, to replace its old warning sirens, Fort Sill received $300,000 from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) for an Installation Attack Warning/Mass Notification System that would be a network of twenty loud speakers on poles across the installation upon completion. With control stations in the installation operations center and the military police station, the new system would have the capability of live-voice, pre-recorded messages, or seven tone warnings. Late in 2004, Fort Sill signed a contract for nine speaker systems to be erected by April 2005 and the rest to be put up in the near future and anticipated receiving additional funds from TRADOC in Fiscal Year 2005 to complete the project by erecting eleven additional speakers.53

On 1 November 2004 a bomb threat caused the evacuation of McNair Hall and Snow Hall and simultaneously tested Fort Sill's first responders. A critique by Fort Sill's Commanding General, Major General David P. Valcourt, indicated that the first responders lacked effective organization and planning. This led to a comprehensive review of the first responders' organization and planning.54 Power Projection

The end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s caused the United States to restructure its national military strategy. Rather than depending upon forward-deployed military forces in Europe as it had done for over forty years, the new strategy focused on deploying military forces from the continental United States (CONUS). Equally important, the new military strategy embraced the principles of deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution and required Army installations, such as Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to have the ability of responding rapidly to regional crises throughout the world. To help military installations fulfill their power projection requirements, Congress approved an Army Strategic Mobility Program in 1998 and funded it in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000. Besides upgrading fifteen installations, fourteen airfields, seventeen strategic seaports, and eleven

51SIGACTS, DPTM, 16 Aug 04, Doc I-84; SIGACTS, DPTM, 23 Aug 04, Doc I-85. 52SIGACTS, DPTM, 25 Oct 04, Doc I-86; Memorandum for Command Historian

with atch (Extract), subj: Annual Command History, 21 Jan 05, Doc I-87. 53SIGACTS, DPTM, 13 Dec 04, Doc I-88; SIGACTS, DPTM, 28 Jan 05, Doc I-89; Memorandum for Command Historian with atch (Extract), subj: Annual Command History, 21 Jan 05. 54SIGACTS, DPTM, 15 Nov 04, Doc I-; SIGACTS, DPTM, 8 Nov 04, Doc I-91.

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ammunition depots and plants throughout the United States, the Army Strategic Mobility Program upgraded Fort Sill's railway system. Prior to upgrading, the post's railhead had the capacity of loading and shipping approximately one hundred railcars in a day. With the completion of the new railhead in 2002, the installation had the capacity to load and ship approximately three hundred railcars during a day. Advancements also included new scales with the ability to weigh anything in the Army's inventory regardless of size or weight, a larger and more secure fenced marshaling area, a modern container and handling facility, on-site restrooms and warm-up facilities, and around-the-clock operating capabilities.55

Using these enhanced facilities, Fort Sill supported Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004. During the course of the year, the installation mobilized 5 battalions, 42 companies, 6 platoons, 6 separate units, and 32 detachments for a total 3,944 soldiers. At the same time Fort Sill demobilized 2 battalions, 11 companies, 13 separate units, and 21 detachments for a total of 1,302 soldiers.56

552000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 22-23; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 20-21. 56Memorandum for Command Historian with atch (Extract), subj: Annual Command History, 21 Jan 05, Doc I-92.

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CHAPTER TWO

LEADER DEVELOPMENT:

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION During 2004, Fort Sill trained soldiers, officers, and Marines to meet the needs of the

nation's operational forces. While the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center improved training realism in its initial entry training (IET), the U.S. Army Field Artillery School stood up its Fires Knowledge Network, employed distributive learning to train active and reserve component soldiers, worked to add new automated training aids systems, refined its officer courses, started re-designing its Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) courses, conducted new equipment training and joint training, and prepared to integrate effects based operations into the program of instruction.1

FIRES KNOWLEDGE NETWORK

Early in 2002, The U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) observed that soldiers seeking information, guidance, or mentoring often used many disjointed sources. Soldiers in the field lacked a formal means of locating information and receiving assistance from the School quickly and efficiently. In some cases, they had difficulties finding the desired information or could not find it at all.2 This situation caused the School to search for a means to provide "a one stop shop for professional knowledge required by Field Artillerymen and Fire Supporters world-wide."3 Basically, the School acknowledged the obligation to be more responsive to questions from soldiers in the field and to take advantage of advanced technology, the Internet, and computers to distribute information.4

Out of this, emerged the Fire Support Knowledge Network (FSKN) that was subsequently renamed the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) in 2003. FKN had the objective of making the resources from the Field Artillery School and Fort Sill available to all Field Artillery soldiers and being a center of a life-long learning strategy for resident and distance learning. During 2002, the School developed a concept for an automated customer service system, identified possible solutions, coordinated its efforts with other Army agencies, including Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL), met with computer software vendors, and designed a technical solution. The automated system had to permit easy access to the data base, had to facilitate a rapid response to information requests by being taxonomy driven (information organized systematically in related groups) for effective searches, and had to have the ability to share information with other data bases, among other capabilities. This effort eventually led to the Knowledge Center Platform concept by October 2002. The platform would be Internet-based and would

1"Field Artillery Training Command," Field Artillery, Nov-Dec 02, p. 32, Doc II-1,

2002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH).

22002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 24; Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05, Doc II-1.

3Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery Knowledge Center, 16 Dec 02, Doc II-2, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

4Ibid.; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 24; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 40-41.

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combine taxonomy, communities of practice (groups of people with common interests), and request for information. These three characteristics would be brought together into a distributed knowledge network and operate across the Army through the Army Knowledge Management Portal. Upon implementation the FKN would allow effective real-time collaboration between soldiers in the field and the School and provide access to manuals; white papers; tactics, techniques, and procedures; lesson plans; and other data.5

In 2003 the Field Artillery School took additional steps to make the FKN a reality. During the year, the School validated the concept, tested FKN, and merged it into the Battle Command Knowledge System at the Department of the Army (DA). At the end of the year, the School proposed to shift most of the Field Artillery School and Fort Sill online information to FKN. While the Fort Sill public website would have information open to the general public, the FKN would have information that would be available to only those with a need to know and not the general public. Basically, the School hoped to create a one-stop, controlled-access site for all non-public information and to make it available worldwide.6

After becoming operational the FKN quickly produced results in 2004. Senior Field Artillery targeting technicians created a community of practice for Army soldiers, U.S. Marines, and civilian contractors. Within this community of practice and others, soldiers, Marines, and civilians discussed tactics, techniques, and procedures in Iraq and resolved technical problems for units in Iraq, using experts in the Field Artillery School. The solutions then became available for other units preparing to deploy to Iraq and for instructors for future purposes. At the end of the year, there were over twenty sub-communities within the FKN that were dedicated to specific Field Artillery professional areas.7

Although the network was not initially cleared for classified information, it provided a "safe" place for the Field Artillery community to create, capture, and share official use only information and other sensitive information with access controlled through the AKO portal. Late in 2004, the School, however, started working with AKO to provide a similar platform on the secure internet protocol network (SIPRNET) for implementation in 2005. The secure site would allow online collaboration with classified information between the field and the Field Artillery School.8

At the end of 2004 and the start of 2005, the FKN started working on the creation of a U.S. Forces Joint Command (JFCOM) Fires Community. This site would provide a place for all services to collaborate on solving complex joint fires problems. Currently, only Army soldiers and civilians could access the FKN through the AKO portal. Initial support from the DA Chief of Information Office/G-6 proved to be very positive. In order for the JFCOM Fires Community to be successful, coordination had be made with all Department of Defense

52002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 24-25; "Fires Knowledge Network," Field Artillery

Magazine, Nov-Dec 05, p. 45, Doc II-2; Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05. 62003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 41; Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05. 7"Fires Knowledge Network," p. 45; Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05. 8"Fire Knowledge Network," p. 45; Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05.

26

(DOD) agencies to create a Federated Identity Management application that would provide unencumbered access to FKN for all DOD employees. The Field Artillery School asked the AKO portal to take the lead for DOD and to work the requirements at the DOD level.9

DISTRIBUTIVE LEARNING

In 2004 the Field Artillery School leveraged distributive learning technology to train all Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army National Guard soldiers, distributive learning permitted them to stay at home and to earn promotion points. Basically, the School's distributive learning program encompassed Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses, reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses, professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.10

INTEGRATING EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS INTO THE

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

In response to requests from the field in 2004 and early 2005 and briefings and discussions at the recent Joint Fires and Effects Seminar of 4-6 April 2005, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School (USAFACS) set out to determine the best way of integrating effects based operations (EBO) into the School's curriculum. The Deputy Commanding General for Training for Fort Sill, Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, explained in a memorandum of 31 March 2005 that this was necessary in order to train Field Artillery leaders for the ever-changing operational environment and to improve the military's effectiveness in conducting operations.11

Continuing, General Graham noted that effects based operations was not a new, distinct process. Rather, it was a mind set change. Effects based operations involved focusing planning on outcomes or effects and using all lethal and non-lethal means to create the desired effect or outcome. In other words, leaders should plan, execute, assess, and adapt operations to achieve desired effect.12

To integrate effects based operations into the School's curriculum, General Graham tasked the Directorate of Training and Doctrine/G3 in April 2005 to convene an Effects Based Operations Working Group to conduct a needs assessment across the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities). Scheduled to meet late in May 2005, the working group had the task of identifying ways to integrate effects based operations into the curriculum and updates required to doctrine/tactics, techniques, and procedures and to document material changes to aid the operational forces.13

9Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05. 10Information Paper, subj: Distance Learning Classrooms, undated, Doc II-2a;

Information Paper, subj: Multimedia Classroom, undated, Doc II-2b; Information Paper, subj: Distance Learning Products Catalog, undated, Doc II-2c. 11Memorandum for BG James C. Yarbrough, DCG, U.S. Army Infantry School, subj: Effects Based Operations, 31 Mar 05, Doc II-2d; Draft Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Based Effects Operations Symposium, 11 Apr 05, Doc II-2e. 12Memorandum for Yarbrough, subj: Effects Based Operations, 31 Mar 05; Briefing, subj: Effects Based Approach to Tactical Operations, 7 Apr 05, Doc II-2f. 13Draft Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based

27

Recognizing the need to incorporate input from the field, General Graham also announced the School's plan to convene an Effects Based Operations Symposium, tentatively scheduled for the mid-summer of 2005. Besides sharing the results of School's needs assessment, the symposium, composed of School subject matter experts, Field Artillery operational unit personnel, Combined Arms Doctrine Division personnel, Joint Forces Command personnel, U.S. Marine Corps representatives, and Combined Arms Center personnel, would provide valuable input to refine integrating effects based operations into the School's curriculum.14

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS

Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System

In 2003-2004 Fort Sill participated in designing the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) to produce a universal observer from any service or special operations forces who would be capable of applying any effect from any service in any environment. As the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Michael D. Maples, explained late in 2003, JFETS would leverage virtual reality and artificial intelligence to create immersive, experiential training situations. Representing an effort to introduce a realistic environment into training, JFETS would also replicate any environment and weather condition and consist of three primary training modules. The open terrain module would enable the universal observer to master the skills to sense high-payoff targets and to engage adversaries with the appropriate mix of joint fires and effects, while the urban terrain module would train the employment of fires and effects in a complex urban terrain and require the observer to limit collateral damage and to avoid non-combatant casualties. The fire and effects module would train commanders and battle staffs to plan and coordinate the application of lethal and non-lethal fires.15 Work on JFETS moved forward. In October 2003 the Field Artillery School opened its pilot JFETS that had been constructed by Hollywood special effects experts under the supervision of the University of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technology. Over the next several months the School demonstrated the system's capabilities. This effort validated the JFETS concept and permitted refining it based upon lessons learned.16

____________________

Operations Symposium, 11 Apr 05; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based Operations, 13 Apr 05, Doc II-2g; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based Operations Needs Assessment/Needs Analysis, 27 Apr 05, Doc II-2h; Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Input Report (27 Apr 05), 26 Apr 05, Doc II-2i; Email with atch, subj: Integrating Effects Based Operations into the Program of Instruction, 11 May 05, Doc II-2j. 14Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based Operations, 13 Apr 05; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based Operations Needs Assessment/Needs Analysis, 27 Apr 05. 152003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command History (ACH), p. 55; COL John L. Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 42-45, Doc II-50; Briefing (Extract), subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, 4-7 Nov 04, Doc II-57. 16Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command

28

Based upon the successful pilot program, the Field Artillery School opened its JFETS facility for training in September 2004 -- two years ahead of schedule. Using state-of-the-art simulation technology that employed emerging technology, U.S. Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy personnel integrated and delivered joint fires and effects. Feedback was positive. One student said that JFETS was the perfect atmosphere for soldiers who have yet to go into battle, while another one said that the training was incredible.17 Another student commented, "The Army needs to send this to all of the divisions and train all the soldiers who haven't been to war."18 In 2004 the Field Artillery School and the Institute for Creative Technology outlined key initiatives for JFETS. They included the development of a Type One Close Air Support (CAS) Trainer for training joint fires observers, development of a joint fires and effects command module (JFECM), and upgrades to the open terrain module and urban terrain module.19 Call for Fire Trainer

Meanwhile, USAFAS made progress in the Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT) program. In FY 2003 the CFFT was a TIER 1 (accept risk) priority 42 Training Mission Area (TMA) program. In FY 2004 the CFFT was designated a TIER 0 (Fully Funded, cannot accept risk) priority 7 TMA program. Based upon this, the CFFT Operational Requirements Document (ORD) received Army Oversight Council (AROC) approval and was subsequently staffed to the Joint Oversight Council (JROC) for joint interest determination. As planned, the CFFT would be an institutional (1:30, one instructor to 30 students) and a deployable training system (1:12/1:4) which would support the Army's transformation and modularity efforts.20

In the meantime, a team with representation from the Army Training Support Center (ATSC), Forces Command (FORSCOM), Program Executive Office (PEO) Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (STRI), USAFAS Futures Development Integration Center (FDIC), the Training and Training and Technology Battle Lab (T3BL), the Deputy Assistant Commandant Army National Guard (DAC ARNG), and the USAFAS G-3 New Equipment Training Team (NETT) reviewed the CFFT Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) to finalize it for formal staffing and approval through the Major Army Commands (MACOMS) and Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (DCSOPST).21

During August 2004, the beta version CFFT was installed in the JFETS OTM. This

____________________

History, 16 Mar 05; Briefing (Extract), subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, 4-7 Nov 04; Briefing, subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, Dec 04, Doc II-58; Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05, Doc II-59. 17MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc II-60; Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05; Briefing, subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, Dec 04; Email with atch, subj: TADSS Cmd History 04, 22 Feb 05, Doc II-61. 18Briefing, subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, Dec 04; Email with atch, subj: TADSS Cmd History 04, 22 Feb 05, Doc II-3. 19Ibid. 20Email, subj: TADSS Cmd History, 22 Feb 05, Doc II-4. 21Ibid.

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enabled instructors, training developers, and leaders to determine how to integrate the CFFT into existing programs of instruction (POIs). Additionally, this allowed USAFAS to identify improvements and prioritize future planned product improvements for the CFFT program. As planned, the CFFT program was scheduled to undergo rigorous developmental, integration, and customer testing early in 2005 and would undergo a Milestone C decision in April 2005.22 Engagement Skills Trainer

In January 2004 Fort Sill received twenty lanes of the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000. The EST 2000 supported three modes of marksmanship training: individual training and sustainment, collective training, and shoot/don't shoot scenario training. EST 2000 was a networked system that allowed one instructor to supervise firing on multiple lanes. It recorded the aim point and hit data with computers for after action review/playback. The EST 2000 replicated external ballistics (trajectory of round) which required soldiers to adjust aiming points according to distances to the target. The EST 2000 used actual weapons (modified—simulated recoil used compressed air) and retained ninety-five percent the weight/balance of the actual weapon. The EST 2000 played an instrumental role in training deploying/mobilizing units and individuals for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). With the limited availability of 9mm, .50 Cal and 40-mm. ammunition, the EST 2000 was also critical for keeping tenant units trained to standards. In December 2004 Fort Sill received an additional twenty lanes of EST 2000 and by March 2005, an additional sixty lanes were scheduled to be installed to support the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center initial entry training (IET) mission.23 Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

In June 2004, TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Cannon, hosted a Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT) Working Group. Based upon modularity requirements and the extended period of time that the M109A6 Paladin would be retained in the Army inventory, the working group developed three courses of action for upgrading the current FSCATT trainers. The Program Manager, TSM Cannon and PEO STRI Program Manager (PM) Ground Combat Tactical Trainer (GCTT) worked to determine the most cost efficient means to meet this training system requirement. Additionally, the FSCATT-Towed did not receive funding under the Foreign Comparative Test (FCT) FY 2004 initiative. As an interim measure, TSM Cannon, TSM Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), PEO STRI, and PM Paladin were working on a solution which would link the M109A6 FSCATT to AFATDS.24

As 2004 came to a close, the USAFAS G-3 and Futures Development Integration Center (FDIC) reorganized and formed a New Systems Division under the G-3. The New Systems Division would optimize the training development and combat development processes and assist in formulating a comprehensive long range TADSS strategy for the Field Artillery.25

WARRIOR ETHOS AND IMPROVED REALISM IN INITIAL ENTRY

22Ibid. 23Ibid. 24Ibid. 25Ibid.

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TRAINING

Under Colonel James M. Palermo the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center (USAFATC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, initiated action to make initial entry training (IET) more realistic so that IET soldiers would be better prepared for the contemporary operational environment. After he and his staff had digested the lessons learned about combat in Afghanistan and Iraq and had interviewed III Corps Artillery soldiers who had participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Colonel Palermo and his staff developed a rigorous training program for USAFATC with realistic, concrete tasks to be completed by each IET soldier. This effort built upon Colonel Palermo's efforts of 2002 to add more rigor to IET training that was composed of basic combat training (BCT), advanced individual training (AIT), and one-station unit training (OSUT). USAFATC subsequently conducted a successful pilot of that program, known as "Warrior Ethos," in November 2003 with A Battery, 1-79th Field Artillery in preparation for a full implementation of "Warriors Ethos" phase one in January 2004.26

In a memorandum on 26 November 2003, Colonel Palermo outlined his guidance for implementing phase one of "Warrior Ethos." In view of the war on terrorism, he pointed out that IET had to evolve from supporting a peacetime Army to supporting a wartime Army. Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom reaffirmed the necessity of preparing soldiers to contribute the first day that they arrived at their first unit -- a unit that already might be deployed.27

To this end, USAFATC built Strikerville during the latter months of 2003 where IET soldiers would be trained to conduct military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). During 2004, Strikerville, a mock village and renamed Freedom Town in 2004, consisted of five roads, twenty-five small buildings (shops, schools, and government building, among other structures), minefields, and a religious gravesite. Strikerville/Freedom Town offered an urban training environment where trainees performed tasks that they would be required to do if they were shipped to Iraq or Afghanistan. Using Strikerville/Freedom Town, USAFATC conducted field training exercises to teach trainees real-world combat tasks, such as inspecting vehicles, reacting to snipers and unexploded ordnance and conducting rescue missions. Such training helped make trainees better prepared for war, helped them to contribute to their assigned unit upon arrival, and enhanced their survivability.28

"Warrior Ethos" envisioned other crucial changes to IET. USAFATC planned to quadruple field training from three days to twelve consecutive days in the field at the beginning of IET where they would learn to survive without the amenities of the barracks. While they were in the field, they would live in tents, wash their clothes, and shower. Before, the first three weeks of basic combat training were generally administrative. Because

262003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 38. 27Ibid.; Cpt Joel J. Canon, et al, "The FATC and COE: Training Relevant and Ready Soldiers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 4-7, Doc II-5. 282003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 39; Canon, et al, "The FATC and COE: Training Relevant and Ready Soldiers," pp. 4-7; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Cpt Gregory P. Beatrice, 1-22 FA, USAFATC, and Cpt Michael D. Frazier, 1-40 FA, USAFATC, 31 Jan 05, Doc II-6.

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of "Warrior Ethos," the soldiers would spend their first night of training in the field, eat meals ready to eat (MRE), and learn to pack their ruck sack and to assemble their gear. To provide more realism USAFATC also outlined moving classes out of the classroom to the field in a small group setting and throwing the soldiers into a wartime scenario at the start of their training. For example, trainees would use real rifles and bayonets on the bayonet assault course rather than rubber rifles with attached metal rods for bayonets. Like deployed soldiers, the trainees would wear their flak jackets much of the time, and qualify with their M-16 rifles while wearing them.29

Based upon after action reviews and a second pilot of "Warrior Ethos" by A Battery, 1-40th Field Artillery, USAFATC made adjustments to the "Warrior Ethos" vision and its implementation phases. USAFATC did not require trainees to spend their first night in the field, did not initiate spending twelve consecutive days in the field at the beginning of IET, and did not move all the classroom instruction to the field because these initiatives were impractical. However, USAFATC put into practice using real rifles and bayonets on the bayonet assault course rather than employing rubber rifles and having the trainees wear flak jackets.30

Although "Warrior Ethos" as initially envisioned was not implemented in its entirety, USAFATC continued making IET more realistic in 2004 to prepare soldiers for the contemporary operational environment. The training center incorporated vehicle checkpoint exercises, call for fire, and troop leading procedures. USAFATC also extended first aid training to a two-day event that culminated with situational training exercises in the field, familiarized all BCT/OSUT soldiers on the M-2 and MK-19 machine guns, and ran OSUT units through a realistic live-fire field training exercise, called the Redleg Challenge. This exercise combined BCT and AIT tasks and was conducted like training for an operational battery. In the exercise live fire was integrated into situational training exercise lanes, ambushes, and opposing force attacks.31

As a part of drive to enhance realism, USAFATC added a two-week forward operating base exercise during the fourth and fifth week of training under the direction of its new commander, Colonel Christopher T. Fulton. From a temporary base, IET soldiers deployed daily to the rifle ranges for basic rifle marksmanship training and returned to resume forward operating base operations. During this field training exercise, soldiers conducted tasks that had never been taught in basic combat training. For example, they cleared a building, searched vehicles at a traffic control point, and reacted to mines and improvised explosive devices, among other tasks. The soldiers also established a perimeter around the base with concertina wire and maintained two teams of roving guards.32

292003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 39. 30Interview, Dastrup with Beatrice and Frazier, 31 Jan 05; Email, subj: Warrior Ethos and Adding More Realism to IET, 9 Feb 05, Doc II-7. 312003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 39-40; Canon, et al, "The FATC and COE: Training Relevant and Ready Warriors," pp. 4-7; Email, subj: Warrior Ethos and Adding More Realism into IET, 9 Feb 05. 32Email, subj: ATC's Piece for the Command History, 1 Apr 05, Doc II-7a; Canon, et al, "The FATC and COE: Training Relevant and Ready Warriors," pp. 4-7; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Beatrice and Frazier, 31 Jan 05; Email, subj: Warrior Ethos and Adding

32

USAFATC envisioned additional initiatives to make IET more rigorous and realistic. In the near future the training center planned to build Liberty City to augment Freedom Town, to erect a permanent forward operating base from which trainees could conduct rescue missions and humanitarian missions, and to introduce computerized basic rifle marksmanship system that would be incorporated into regular basic rifle marksmanship. The training center also intended to introduce a reflexive fire exercise where trainees would rapidly engage a target with live fire after determining if it were hostile and then move on quickly to the next target and outlined issuing trainees their M-16 rifle on the first day of training.33

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM REDESIGN

Early in 2004, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Kevin P. Byrnes, directed redesigning the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). He wanted NCOES to be relevant to an Army at war, to integrate combat experience into its program of instruction (POI), and to be synchronized with Army initiatives. He also desired to train and educate noncommissioned officers in full-spectrum operations and the contemporary operational environment and to include appropriate training and education on combined arms warfare. Moreover, he wanted NCOES to be modular so that training could be provided in TRADOC schools or through distributive learning to soldiers anywhere in the world through the Internet. NCOES also had to furnish assignment-oriented training to prepare the soldier for the next assignment.34

On 27 February 2004 the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, also gave guidance for redesigning NCOES for the near term and the long term. For the near term, he said that common core POIs had to reflect lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and had to reduce or eliminate redundancy. General Wallace added that the adjustments to common core POIs would be made within existing resources and that there would be no requirement to make common core courses shorter. Equally important, TRADOC's proponent schools, such as the Noncommissioned Officer Academy at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, had to have lessons learned incorporated into their branch-specific POIs by 1 October 2004. At the same time General Wallace tasked TRADOC service schools to provide at least two courses of action for the long-term redesign of NCOES and acknowledged as did General Byrnes that the Army had the final approval for

____________________

More Realism into IET, 9 Feb 05. 33Interview, Dastrup with Beatrice and Frazier, 31 Jan 05; Email, subj: Warrior Ethos and Adding More Realism into IET, 9 Feb 05. 34Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05, Doc II-8; Briefing, subj: BNCOC/ANCOC Adjustments and NCOES Redesign, 9 Apr 04, Doc II-9; Fact Sheet, subj: NCOES Executive Summary, 14 Apr 04, Doc II-10. See Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 TRADOC Commander's Training Guidance, 22 Jul 04, Doc II-11, for TRADOC training guidance for FY 2005. It backs up the drive to redesign NCOES. Also see The Army Training and Development Panel Report (NCO), Final Report, 2 Apr 02, Doc II-12, for background on NCO reforms.

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all redesign actions.35 As of 2004, NCOES divided the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)

and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) into two phases. While phase one was common core instruction for BNCOC and ANCOC that was branch immaterial, phase two for both courses was branch-specific training. Phase one of BNCOC trained staff sergeants (SSG) and promotable sergeants (SGT) in leadership skills, noncommissioned officer (NCO) duties, responsibilities, and authority, and taught the conduct of performance-oriented training. Phase one of ANCOC trained sergeants first class (SFC) and promotable SSGs in leadership skills, NCO duties, responsibilities, and authority and also taught them how to conduct performance-oriented training. For promotable sergeants and staff sergeants, BNCOC gave them the knowledge and skills required to lead squad-size units, and ANCOC furnished the knowledge and skills needed to lead platoon-size units. At the Field Artillery Noncommissioned Officer Academy, phase two training for BNCOC and ANCOC furnished branch-specific field artillery training.36

For the near-term redesign, TRADOC service schools and CAC presented General Byrnes with two courses of action on 9 April 2004 to make NCOES more relevant. First, TRADOC could revise the current common core for BNCOC and ANCOC. Second, TRADOC could revamp the current common core for BNCOC, could eliminate ANCOC common core, and could establish sixteen hours of instruction on lessons learned. After reviewing the options, General Byrnes directed that BNCOC common core would be revised to include a nine-hour bloc of instruction on lessons learned, that ANCOC common core would be eliminated, and that sixteen to twenty-four hours of instruction on lessons learned would be incorporated into ANCOC phase two training (branch-specific training). This would meet the needs of the senior noncommissioned officers more than revising ANCOC common core.37

To satisfy the near-term objective suspense date of 1 October 2004 established by TRADOC to incorporate lessons learned into its POIs, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) rewrote its branch-specific training. It revamped training for each MOS in Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), BNCOC, and ANCOC to incorporate lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and cultural awareness, added improvised explosive device (IED) training in BNCOC in the form of a powerpoint presentation and in PLDC in the form of a powerpoint presentation and a practical exercise, and developed training on traffic control points. In PLDC the Academy

35Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05; Briefing, subj: BNCOC/ANCOC Adjustments and NCOES Redesign, 9 Apr 04; Fact Sheet, subj: NCOES Executive Summary, 14 Apr 04. Note that CG TRADOC reiterated incorporating lessons learned into NCOES POIs in July 2004, see Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY 2005 TRADOC Commander's Training Guidance, 22 Jul 04. Also see The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report, 2 Apr 02, for background on previous reforms efforts. 36Briefing, subj: BNCOC/ANCOC Adjustments and NCOES Redesign, 9 Apr 04; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05. 37Ibid.; Fact Sheet, subj: NCOES Executive Summary, 14 Apr 04; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05.

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also initiated combative training (hand-to-hand combat), ugilistic stick fighting, and training on entering and clearing buildings, among other tasks. For training on the contemporary operational environment (COE), the Academy provided classroom instruction in PLDC, BNCOC, and ANCOC and planned to introduce field training on the COE in the near future in all courses. It also started sending noncommissioned officers in Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) to the Joint Fires and Effects Training System (JFETS) which was a virtual reality training system and initiated training on new equipment, such as the Centaur (the Lightweight Technical Fire Direction System) used by Field Artillery Tactical Data specialists and the Force Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) command and control system.38

As part of the effort to redesign NCOES, the Academy also revamped some of their instructional methodology. They added more distributive learning training, hired civilian instructors (About eighty-five percent had combat experience.), signed out laptop computers to each student, and expanded BNCOC common core from seventy-four hours to ninety-six hours without adding more training days.39

On 9 April 2004 General Byrnes, in the meantime, approved examining making a transition from the existing four-tier NCOES system to a three-tier NCOES system as a long-term redesign effort. As of 2004, NCOES consisted of four tiers: PLDC for corporals and specialists, BNCOC for sergeants who were promotable to staff sergeant, ANCOC for staff sergeants who were promotable to sergeant first class, and the Sergeant Major Academy for master sergeants and first sergeants who were promotable to sergeant major. The envisioned three-tier system would have a Warrior Leader Course for senior corporals and specialists, an Intermediate Leader Course for staff sergeants, and a Senior Leader Course for master sergeants. Each tier would focus on leadership and would be technical and functional assignment driven. Upon critical examination, however, TRADOC opted to retain the four-tier system because the three-tier system left out critical training and educational opportunities for noncommissioned officers.40

As directed by TRADOC, a restructuring team from the Field Artillery School and Noncommissioned Officer Academy developed a proposal for redesigning branch-specific training or phase two NCOES training in 2004 to support the four-tier NCOES redesign initiative. The School and Academy developed a vision that linked together the Field Artillery career map, the Master Gunner program, and NCOES. While the career map would ensure that the soldier would take the appropriate military correspondence courses, had the right military assignments, and participated in professional development that involved working on a two-year or four-year college degree or technical training, the Master Gunner program centered on unit training to prepare the soldier for NCOES. The unit Master

38Email, subj: NCOES Redesign, 2 Feb 05, Doc II-13; Interview, Dastrup with CSM Allie R. Ousley, Cmdt, NCOA, and SGM John M. Dorsey, 9 Feb 05, Doc II-14; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05. 39Ibid.; Interview, Dastrup with Ousley and Dorsey, 9 Feb 05. 40Fact Sheet, subj: NCOES Executive Summary, 14 Apr 04; Briefing, subj: BNCOC/ANCOC Adjustments and NCOES Redesign, 9 Apr 04; Email with atch, subj: NCOES, Redesign, 18 Mar 05; Interview, Dastrup with SGM Edwin V. Blount, G3 NCOES Restructuring Team Chief, 2 Feb 05, Doc II-15.

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Gunner (a sergeant first class) and the section chiefs had the responsibility of ensuring that the soldier received quality 10-, 20-, and 30-level MOS training to prepare the individual for PLDC, unofficially called the Warrior Course by the School and Academy, where the soldier (corporal or specialist) would receive additional 30-level training in preparation for eventual attendance at BNCOC, unofficially called the NCO Intermediate Course by the School and Academy, and ANCOC, unofficially called the NCO Advanced Course by the School and Academy. The restructuring team planned to have pilot courses for NCOES phase two training by Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and to execute them by FY 2007.41

The restructuring team outlined other significant aspects of the redesign effort. They had the goal of integrating NCOES and Officer Education System training more closely than before so that NCOs and officers would attend many of the same classes and go through the same training together, gathering information from the field to ensure the effectiveness of Field Artillery NCOES, teaching training developers to write better courses, providing civilian training and education, and furnishing input to the writers of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide.42

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Field Artillery Officer Basic Course During 2004, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School developed newly commissioned

second lieutenants into Field Artillery leaders in nineteen weeks and four days. To do this, the Field Artillery School conducted a three-phase Field Artillery Officer Basic Course (FAOBC). Phase one (Foundation) lasted the first seven weeks, focused on platoon leader skills (reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of a position; ammunition; aiming circle), communications; observed fire; and mounted and dismounted land navigation, to name just a few skills, and had one field training exercise. Phase two (Pillars) of six weeks took place during the eighth through thirteenth week. It concentrated on manual and automated gunnery and basic fire support and had one field training exercise. Phase three (Capstone) covered the last six weeks of the course, provided additional instruction in automated gunnery techniques, and furnished combined arms training and other critical fire support instruction, such as joint operations, a JANUS computer exercise, and a dismounted fire support officer exercise, commonly called the Light Fire Support Officer Lane. During the last two weeks of the course, the school divided the student officers into one of three specialized instructional courses or "tracks" based upon the weapon system in the first unit of assignment to give more hands-on experience. Students in the cannon tracks (heavy or light) capped FAOBC with the Redleg War that pulled together everything that they had learned during the course. During the war, they served as a member of a fire direction center and a howitzer crew, worked as a company fire support officer, and learned the basics of close air support by getting an opportunity to use it once during the Redleg War. For second lieutenants heading to a unit

41Briefing, subj: NCOES Restructuring Proposal, 21 Jan 05, Doc II-16; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 7 Feb 05, Doc II-17; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05; Interview, Dastrup with Blount, 2 Feb 04. 42Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05; Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 7 Feb 05; Briefing, subj: NCOES Restructuring Proposal, 21 Jan 05; Interview, Dastrup with Blount, 2 Feb 05.

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equipped with the Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle, the School provided a BFIST follow-on course after FAOBC. In the meantime, the School designed a Stryker follow-on course for second lieutenants whose first unit of assignment had Stryker vehicles and planned to offer it beginning in February 2005.43

Basic Officer Leader Course. Influenced by the requirement for more hands-on training, better digital training with the fielding of sophisticated command and control systems, and shared training opportunities by officers, the Army acknowledged the imperative of restructuring its Officer Education System (OES) to keep it relevant in the new and future operational environment. With this in mind, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, tasked the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General John N. Abrams, in June 2000 to convene an Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to review, assess, and provide recommendations for the development of training for the twenty-first century. Among other recommendations, the ATLDP study, released on 25 May 2001 after about thirteen thousand officers, soldiers, and family members had been surveyed and after extensive interviews had been conducted, urged reforming OES. OES had to facilitate career-long, progressive, and sequential leader development and had to prepare leaders for operating in a new strategic environment that would be characterized by regional threats, full-spectrum operations, and information-age technology. Equally important, the ATLDP study found that the quality and relevance of OES instruction failed to meet the expectations of many officers and did not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion, and rapid teaming required in full-spectrum operations. The Army missed shared training opportunities in OES because training for company grade officers was too branch-oriented.44

To remedy this problem the ADTLP study urged developing and implementing a two-phase OBC as a means of restructuring OES for second lieutenants. Phase one should provide basic small unit combat training and common core training to all second lieutenants at a central location and should focus on warfighting and the warrior ethos. Phase two should supply platoon-level, branch-specific training in tactical and technical skills. Ultimately, this training would create tactically and technically proficient second lieutenants (small unit leaders) with common bonds with their combined arms peers, with a shared training experience, and with a warrior ethos.45

Based upon the ATLDP study of May 2001 and an internal TRADOC study completed earlier in 2001, OBC underwent critical improvements later in 2001. In mid-2001 TRADOC announced that a two-phase OBC, called the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC), would be implemented by 2003 after pilot courses had been conducted to refine it. BOLC I (phase one) would be a one-site common core phase immediately following commissioning. Newly commissioned second lieutenants would attend BOLC I at a site to be determined in the near future where they would receive common-core training on ethics,

43Briefing (extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004, Doc II-18;

Briefing, subj: 15 Week 4 Day BOLC III with Tracked Follow-on Courses, 9 Dec 04, Doc II-19; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05, Doc II-20.

442001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 27-28. 45Ibid.; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 31-32; Briefing (Extract), subj: Basic Officer

Leader Course Update, 14-15 Jan 04, Doc II-21.

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leadership, and the warrior ethos, to name a few subjects. Afterwards, they would attend a branch school for BOLC II (phase two) where they would receive branch-specific training. Altogether, the two-phase BOLC could not exceed twenty weeks of instruction (the current length of OBC). Field Artillery second lieutenants would go through six weeks of BOLC I, through thirteen weeks and four days of BOLC II, and through a functional field artillery course.46

For the Field Artillery School and other TRADOC branch schools, BOLC II also meant decreased technical training in an increasingly technical environment. Directed by TRADOC, the Field Artillery School created a BOLC II program of instruction (POI) in 2001 by squeezing nineteen weeks and four days of training from the old FAOBC into thirteen weeks and four days.47 To reach the mandated course length for BOLC II, the working group abolished the instruction in some tasks entirely, reduced the time allotted to some tasks, such as manual gunnery, cut back some TRADOC common core subjects, developed comprehensive classroom tests, and abolished the practice of each branch in the School conducting its own tests.48

Although the basic philosophy of BOLC remained the same, critical changes emerged in 2002. BOLC I became the pre-commissioning phase. BOLC II became the common core portion of basic leadership training at a selected site or sites to be determined in the near future; and BOLC III became branch-specific training to prepare second lieutenants to assume their duties in their branch.49

Available resources prompted the Army to move implementing BOLC from FY 2003 to FY 2006. Initially, the Army had hoped to pull resources from the Captain's Career Course (CCC) by making it more dependent upon distributed learning (distance learning) and less dependent upon institutional training in the school house. Such a move would free up money and instructors for BOLC which would require more resources than the existing OBC. When it became clear that the proposed CCC would not produce captains that would meet the desired standards and was designed for a peacetime environment and not wartime conditions, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Army opted to reevaluate CCC and to put more resources into CCC training and withdrew them from BOLC. This then forced TRADOC to search for the resources for BOLC and to push back BOLC implementation until they could be found.50

After finding the requisite resources, the Army officially announced on 5 November 2003 that BOLC I, BOLC II, and BOLC III would be implemented during FY 2006 as part of an overall transformation of its officer education system. Although sites for the six-week BOLC II had been tentatively identified, official site selection would come after Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 with pilot courses for BOLC II and BOLC III

462001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 28-29; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 32. 472001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 29-30. 48Ibid., p. 30; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 33. 49Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 47; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj:

Memorandum of Instruction for Ft. Sill BOLC II Development, 11 Mar 04, Doc II-22; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05. 502003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 47; Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, Program Manager, OES, 7 Jan 05, Doc II-22a; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05.

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scheduled for Fys 2005 and 2006 respectively. The full implementation of BOLC would come in the fourth quarter of FY 2006. As explained in a BOLC conference in 2004, the Army planned to use BOLC to develop a corps of mature, confident, and competent lieutenants who would have a common bond with their combined arms peers and would be ready to lead small units at their first assignment.51

Upon receiving official notification late in 2004 that Fort Sill would be a BOLC II site, Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School started working on plans in 2004 to be ready for the six-week BOLC II pilot course and subsequent implementation. Based upon TRADOC guidance, BOLC II would be tough, rigorous, and physically demanding with eighty to ninety percent of the training being executed in a field environment. To support BOLC II that was being developed and implemented under the control of TRADOC and Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School focused its efforts on building and renovating all required BOLC II facilities and procuring equipment and texts.52

To prepare Fort Sill and the School developed a BOLC II stationing plan early in 2004 that outlined the required resources, such as personnel, classrooms, and ranges, and funding, to handle the expanded training load and submitted it to TRADOC in July 2004. Basically, if projections were met, the Field Artillery School would train approximately one thousand BOLC III students in technical field artillery skills and approximately three thousand BOLC II second lieutenants from all branches of the Army. Based upon a continually changing projected student load that grew in number, the Field Artillery School submitted a revised BOLC II stationing plan to TRADOC in August 2004 and another one in September 2004. Following the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army's decision to accelerate implementation from the fourth quarter of FY 2006 to the second quarter of FY 2006, the Field Artillery School revamped its stationing plan once again and sent it to TRADOC on 15 November 2004 for approval. To meet the accelerated schedule, Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School planned to utilize mobilization facilities for six months until the designated BOLC II facilities could be renovated to BOLC standards.53

As Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School designed a BOLC II stationing plan, the School simultaneously developed the branch-oriented BOLC III. After extensive analysis, the School outlined a twenty-week (19.4 weeks) BOLC III in its initial proposal to TRADOC. Such a length would permit training Field Artillery second lieutenants to standard in all critical tasks. This meant that Field Artillery second lieutenants would spend

512003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; Briefing (Extract), subj: Basic Officer Leader Course Update, 14-15 Jan 04; Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 7 Jan 05; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Request for Four Directed Military Overstrength for the Basic Officer Leaders Course Phase II, 5 Nov 03, Doc II-23. 52Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: BOLC Common Core Tasks, 18 May 04, Doc II-24; Memorandum for Distribution, subj: Memorandum of Instruction for Ft. Sill BOLC II Development 11 Mar 04; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05. 53Briefing, subj: Basic Officer Leader Course Update, 14-15 Jan 04; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004; SIGACTS DRM, 24 Aug 04, Doc II-25; SIGACTS DRM, 21 Sep 04, Doc II-26; SIGACTS DRM, 12 Oct 04, Doc II-27; SIGACTS DRM, 9 Nov 04, Doc II-28; SIGACTS DRM, 30 Nov 04, Doc II-29; Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Report, 23 Nov 04, Doc II-30; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05.

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a total of 25.4 weeks in training before reaching their operational units. The Army and TRADOC told the School that the length was too long and exceeded the twenty-week limitation for BOLC II and BOLC III and directed the Field Artillery School late in 2004 to reduce the length of its BOLC III. In view of this guidance, the School designed a 15.4 week course. It eliminated less critical tasks, decided that some BOLC III tasks would not be taught to standard, and developed follow-on courses of varying lengths for second lieutenants who were projected to be assigned to a Paladin, BFIST, Multiple-Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery System, or Stryker unit or assigned to a targeting unit. As of January 2005, the School had not received any official verification that the 15.4 week BOLC III would be approved.54 Field Artillery Captains Career Course

In 2005 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captains Career Course (FACCC).55 Field Artillery captains and senior first lieutenants went through a demanding, rigorous eighteen-week FACCC course that afforded them the last branch- specific training in their). The officers made a permanent change of station (PCS) move to the Field Artillery School where they received the equivalent of two-weeks of TRADOC common core instruction and sixteen weeks of branch tactical, technical, and warfighting instruction. After seven weeks of large-group instruction (156 hours) at the beginning of the course, the students moved into the small group instruction for the last eleven weeks (555 hours) for tactical instruction led by a small group leader from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, or an allied officer from Great Britain, Australia, or Canada. FACCC ensured that graduates were tactically and technically proficient to serve as a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a battalion/brigade/division staff officer, and a battery commander.56

In May 2004 FACCC underwent a significant change. Through that month Field Artillery captains moved in temporary duty (TDY) status to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) for generalized staff officer training of six weeks after completing FACCC at Fort Sill. To eliminate repetitive instruction, to reduce costs, and to minimize time away from operational assignments and families, the Secretary of the Army approved TRADOC's plan to merge CAS3 with OAC. This new format that began after the last CAS3 class had graduated in May 2004 made FACCC twenty weeks in length by expanding it from 711 hours of instruction to 781 hours of instruction and transferred

54Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 7 Jan 05; Briefing, subj: 15 Week 4 Day BOLC III with Tracked Follow-on Courses, 9 Dec 04; Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Report, 23 Nov 04; Email with atch, subj: G3 Biweekly Input, 20 Dec 04, Doc II-31; Email with atch, subj: Bi-weekly Update, 12 Oct 04; Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report, 27 Oct 04, Doc II-32; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05.

552000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 41-42; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Danny L. Scraper, Program Manager, OES, 7 Jan 05, Doc II-33; Briefing, subj: 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 8 Mar 04, Doc II-34.

56Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004, Doc II-35; Briefing, subj: Captain's OES, 2004, Doc II-36.

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from CAS3 tasks to the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course.57 Field Artillery Captains Career Course-Distance Learning

The Field Artillery School conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captains Career Course-Distance Learning for active Army, reserve component, or U.S. Marine Corps-Reserve first lieutenants and captains who had completed the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course in 2004. Phase IA consisted of "asynchronous" instruction (220.5 hours) using Internet-based instruction with an instructor available through email to assist and answer questions from enrolled students and was divided into eight blocks of instruction. Phase IB utilized "synchronous" and "asynchronous" instruction (139.5 hours). "Synchronous" instruction involved Internet-delivered, instructor-led instruction scheduled on weekends. Phase II consisted of a two-week active duty training (120 hours) at Fort Sill.58

NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING

Multiple-Launch Rocket System Training Throughout 2004 new equipment training teams (NETT) from the New Equipment

Training Division in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine employed a three-phase conversion training program of eighteen months to convert reserve component units to the M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).59 Phase one was conducted via distributive (distance) learning at the unit's homestation to save time and money. During the first annual training period after the unit had converted to MLRS, NETT instructors taught phase two (military occupational specialty training) at Fort Sill or at the unit's homestation on a temporary duty (TDY) status. In Phase three Fort Sill instructors traveled TDY to the unit's homestation to conduct training during weekend drills and annual training periods during the second year after conversion with a focus on the section's and platoon's ability to fight with the new system.60

During 2004, the NETTs, composed of civilian contract instructors and noncommissioned officers, completed the mission of converting Army National Guard field artillery units from cannon systems to MLRS. That year, NETTs finished training the 1-157th Field Artillery of the Colorado Army National Guard, the 2-157th Field Artillery of the Colorado National Guard, and 1-117th Field Artillery of the Alabama Army National Guard.61

57Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004; Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 7 Jan 05; "Combined Arms and Services Staff School to Merge with Officer Advanced Course," U.S. Army News Release, 12 Apr 04, Doc II-37; Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 25 Feb 05, Doc II-20.

58Information Paper, subj: Information for Course 2-6-22 (DL), 7 Jan 05, Doc II-38; Information Paper, subj: 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 7 Jan 05, Doc II-39; Briefing, subj: Captain's OES, 2004, Doc II-36.

59Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Lawrence M. Terranova, Chief, New Equipment Training Division, DOTD, 27 Jan 05, Doc II-40.

60Interview, Dastrup with Terranova, 27 Jan 05; Email with atch, subj: NET Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 3 Feb 05, Doc II-41.

61Interview, Dastrup with Terranova, 27 Jan 05; Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report, 27 Oct 04, Doc II-42; Email with atch, subj: Bi-weekly Update, 12 Oct 04, Doc II-43.

41

In the meantime, the Army began fielding the M270A1 MLRS launcher in 2002 to select active and reserve component units to replace the M270. Unlike the three-phase M270 conversion training program, NETTs conducted a seven-week training program because the units receiving the M270A1 were already qualified on the MLRS and only required training to acquaint them with the new launcher and to receive skill identifier training. Through 2004 NETTs conducted training for eleven MLRS units. Specifically, they conducted M270A1 new equipment training for the 1-21st Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, 3-13th Field Artillery, and 1-142nd Field Artillery of the Arkansas Army National Guard in 2004 and planned to train the 2-18th Field Artillery, Fort Sill; and 1-147th Field Artillery of the South Dakota Army National Guard in 2005.62 Cannon New Equipment Training

In August 2003 the Paladin 155-mm. Self-Propelled Howitzer New Equipment Training Team (NETT) composed of active component and Army National Guard instructors completed training its last unit, the 2-109th Field Artillery of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, and shifted its mission to converting field artillery units to the M198 155-mm. Towed Howitzer and the XM777 155-mm. Towed Howitzer that was under development. After undergoing certification training for towed cannons, the team conducted M198 new equipment training for the 4-11th Field Artillery in March 2004 that was part of the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team being formed in Alaska and that was converting from the M119 105-mm. Towed Howitzer to the M198 until it later would be converted to the M777A1 155-mm. towed howitzer.63 Other New Equipment Training

In 2004 the New Equipment Training Division in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine participated in other new equipment training efforts. After completing training on the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in 2003, the HIMARS NETT trained the participants for the operational test that was conducted in November 2004 and planned to conduct its first new equipment training in March 2005 with the 3-27th Field Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The division also executed urgent training on the MMS-Profiler (a new meteorological system) for the 1-10th Field Artillery, the 1-9th Field Artillery, 1-41st Field Artillery, and the 1-76th Field Artillery, Fort Stewart, before they deployed to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the meantime, the division supported the Stryker new equipment training team during the fall of 2004 with one noncommissioned officer to train soldiers on the Stryker fire support vehicle, trained the 1-9th Field Artillery, 1-10th Field Artillery, the 1-41st Field Artillery, and the 1-76 Field Artillery at Fort Stewart on the Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System (IPADS) in the early fall of 2004, and coordinated obtaining people for new equipment teams for the Knight combat observation lasing team vehicle, the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), and the

62Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Update, 23 Nov 04; Email with atch, subj: Bi-

weekly Update, 12 Oct 04, Doc II-44; Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report, 27 Oct 04; Email with atch, subj: G3 Biweekly Input, 20 Dec 04, Doc II-45; SIGACTS DPTM, 28 Jan 05, Doc II-46; Interview, Dastrup with Terranova, 27 Jan 05. 632003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 53; Interview, Dastrup with Terranova, 27 Jan 05; Email with atch, subj: NET Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 3 Feb 05.

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Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). The division also prepared for new equipment training on the M777 155-mm. Towed Howitzer to be fielded shortly and the Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT).64

JOINT TRAINING

During 2004, the Field Artillery School solidified its role in joint training. Over the past several years, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the warfighting potential of integrated joint forces and highlighted the challenges of conducting complex military operations involving the application of fires from each of the services. Coordinating the joint attack of targets, synchronizing fires with maneuver, providing land fires to support aviation, achieving synergistic fires and effects, executing time-sensitive targeting and deconflicting joint fires required joint standards and training.65 Joint Training Center for Fires and Effects Integration

Although the U.S. military forces recognized an increasing interdependence between the services, they also lacked a joint training center that focused on the integration of fires and effects. Each service relied upon its component school to train its element of the joint fires team; and this situation hampered joint fires integration. To eliminate this deficiency, Fort Sill proposed establishing a Joint Training Center for Fires and Effects Integration on post and noted that this fully supported the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joint Fires Initiative to promote horizontal coordination among the forces.66

As of 2004, the Joint Training Center for Fires and Effects Integration remained a concept. In the mid-summer of 2004, Fort Sill explained that the center would provide training in the integration of all joint lethal and non-lethal effects to include field artillery, close air support, naval gunfire, information operations, and electronic warfare. Although the Commanding General of TRADOC and the Chief of Staff of the Army recognized Fort Sill as the fires and effects center for the Army, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy did not acknowledge this because they had their own fires training locations and opposed consolidation under the Army. As a result of this situation, the Field Artillery School focused its attention on Fort Sill as the Army's fires training and integration center and reaffirmed that the installation was a part of a fires training network that was composed of the other armed services' fires training locations.67

64Interview, Dastrup with Terranova, 27 Jan 05; Email with atch, subj: Bi-weekly Update, 12 Oct 04; Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report, 27 Oct 04; Email with atch, subj: G3 Biweekly Input, 20 Dec 04. 652003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc II-47. 662003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; Valcourt, Bray, and Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5. 67Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc II-48; Interview, Dastrup with COL Gary Kinne, Dir, JACI, USAFAS, 23 Feb 05, Doc II-49; COL John L. Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp.

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Joint Fires and Effects Course

In 2003 work began on the Joint Fires and Effects Course (JFEC). The Field Artillery School planned that the course would furnish stand-alone training for personnel working in joint fires and effects cells (JFEC) from the brigade combat team-level and above. The School also intended to incorporate certain modules from the course into its Captains Career Course and Warrant Officer Advanced Course to provide them with the appropriate training.68 From 27 September 2004 to 15 October 2004, the Field Artillery School conducted its first JFEC. The three-week course had twenty-five students from all of the armed services; focused on teaching joint doctrine; the basics of information operations; joint targeting; and the tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning, synchronizing, and executing joint fires and effects in support of a joint task force and joint force commander; and provided a simulation-based practical exercise. Based upon after action reviews, the School planned to make some modifications to the course by furnishing additional information operations, effects-based operations, and space operations and projected offering the next course in April 2005.69 Although the Joint Fires and Effects Course pilot of the fall of 2004 was successful, the Field Artillery School noted deficiencies -- the lack of instructors, funding, and materials -- that required correction to ensure the viability of the course. In view of the deficiencies, the Field Artillery School envisioned four options. First, it could suspend the course until the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) could properly resource it. However, this option failed to meet the intent of Fort Sill's Commanding General and would delay implementation. Second, the school could continue the course utilizing borrowed resources and personnel. However, this would not solve long-term support issues and would make the course dependent upon outside support. Third, the School could work with Joint Forces Command, the Department of the Army, and the other armed services to obtain sponsorship and joint qualified instructors. Although this option would build an internal capability at Fort Sill, among other things, the manpower system would not be sufficiently responsive. Last, the School could contract out instructors. This would provide in-house instructors and fill short-term requirements, but it would be expensive and fail to address long-term funding and sustaining the course.70

____________________

42-44, Doc II-50; Valcourt, Bray, and Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5. 682003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 55; COL John L. Haithcock, Jr., "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 42-44, Doc II-50; Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Gary Kinne, Dir, JACI, 23 Feb 05, Doc II-49; Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04, Doc II-51. 69Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly Update, 28 Oct 04, Doc II-52; MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5, Doc II-53; Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05, Doc II-54; Briefing, subj: Joint Initiatives at Fort Sill, ca. Late-2004, Doc II-55; Interview, Dastrup with Kinne, 23 Feb 05. 70Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc II-48; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires and Effects Course Decision Brief,

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In view of the four options, the School recommended blending options two and three. In November 2004 the School proposed contracting out instructors to cover the gaps in current abilities and to acquire joint qualified multi-service personnel and official sponsorship. The Commanding General concurred with the recommendation; and action to implement it began.71 Live Ordnance Close Air Support Training

Through the mid-1990s, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School provided live ordnance close air support (CAS) training. On 18 July 1995 the culmination of numerous errors, however, caused a serious training accident that led the School to abolish live ordnance CAS training. During an Air Force exercise that day, an A-10 aircraft dropped a 500-pound bomb on Thompson Hill on Fort Sill's West Range. The incident killed an Army officer and injured twelve other service members. After extensive investigations into the accident, the Field Artillery School abandoned live ordnance CAS training; but Fort Sill permitted the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force to continue training on the installation. As of late 2003, the programs of instruction for noncommissioned officers and warrant officers provided no CAS training at all, while the officers attending the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course had a two-hour block of CAS training in the classroom. Second lieutenants attending the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course had a four-hour block of CAS training that was followed by the Redleg War where select student officers actually participated in CAS training without live ordnance. With the goal of improving CAS training, the School planned to implement a four-hour block of CAS training using simulation technology.72 In the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Irag where live ordnance CAS proved to be effective, the School explored the potential of implementing live ordnance CAS training once again. Believing that officers and noncommissioned officers needed exposure to such training, the School reexamined the safety issues, found ways to improve safety without compromising the quality of training, and worked with the U.S. Air Force to reinstate live ordnance CAS training. On 10 February 2004 School leaders briefed the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General (P) David P. Valcourt. Convinced of the requirement for such training and the School's ability to conduct it safely, General Valcourt approved reintroducing it.73

____________________

2 Nov 04, Doc II-56. 71Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires and Effects Course Decision Brief, 2 Nov 04. 722003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 55-56; Email, subj: Live CAS for Annual Command History, 16 Feb 05, Doc II-62. 73Email, subj: Live CAS for Annual Command History, 16 Feb 05; Interview, Dastrup with COL Stephen D. Mitchell, Dir, DOTD, 14 Dec 04, Doc II-63; "Joint Thunder Rocks Sill," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 13 May 03, pp. 1a, 2a, Doc II-64; COL John L. Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 42-45, Doc II-65; MAJ John R. Watson, "Operation Joint Thunder," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, p. 23, Doc II-66; Memorandum, subj: Field Artillery and Fires and Effects Themes and Messages, 10 Jun 04, Doc II-67.

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Following a pilot live ordnance CAS test in March 2004, the Field Artillery School reinstated the use of live ordnance CAS in the Officer Basic Course Redleg War, the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course, and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy and added a four-hour block of instruction in a simulator in the Officer Basic Course. Initially, the School conducted the training in the Guard Unit Armory Devise-Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST) and subsequently taught the block of instruction in the Joint Fires and Effects Training System. (JFETS). Capitalizing on the lessons learned from this pilot test and the newly implemented safety measures, the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery held a large scale CAS exercise in May 2004.74

NON-LETHAL INSTRUCTION

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Buildings in New York City and the Pentagon led to many changes in the U.S. Army. Besides being concerned with traditional combat operations, the Army became involved in tracking down terrorists and fighting an invisible enemy. To adjust to the new environment the Army tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill to take the lead in the integration of lethal (kinetic) and non-lethal (non-kinetic) fires and effects planning. With the extension of fire support beyond the traditional battlefield role with the addition of responsibility for non-lethal effects, USAFAS had to prepare field artillery officers to defend or affect information and information systems and to influence decision making through electronic warfare, psychological operations, military deception, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and other non-lethal means to complement lethal means.75 To do this the School initiated non-lethal instruction in its warrant officer courses and then added it to its officer and noncommissioned officer courses in 2004-2005. School instruction focused on teaching commanders and staff officers how to collect and use information. Instruction also covered the role of information operations at the tactical level, information superiority, effects-based operations, effects-based thinking, the purpose and scope of information operations, offensive and defensive information operations, and the effects planning cycle, among other topics.76

74Email, subj: Live CAS for Annual Command History, 16 Feb 05; Interview, Dastrup with COL Stephen D. Mitchell, Dir, DOTD, 14 Dec 04; "Joint Thunder Rocks Sill," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 13 May 03, pp. 1a, 2a; Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," pp. 42-45; Watson, "Operation Joint Thunder," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, p. 23; Memorandum, subj: Field Artillery and Fires and Effects Themes and Messages, 10 Jun 04. 75Statement of Work, Development of Resident Tactical Information Operations Course, undated, Doc II-69; Memorandum for BG James C. Yarbough, DCG, U.S. Army Infantry School, subj: Effects Based Operations, 31 Mar 05, Doc II-70; Tactical Information Operations Course Brochure, undated, Doc II-71; Interview, Dastrup with Andre Williams, WOES Branch, 30th FA, 19 May 05, Doc II-72. 76Briefing, subj: Tactical Information Operations IPR, 17 Feb 05, Doc II-73; Briefing (Extract), subj: LTC Wallace Update, 14 Jun 04, Doc II-74; Email with atch, subj: Courses Instructing Non-lethal/Effects-based Operations, 19 May 05, Doc II-74a; Interview, Dastrup with CW3 John Watson, Warrant Officer Advance Course Instructor, 30th FA Battalion, 23 May 05, Doc II-74b.

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With information operations growing in importance as attested by OIF, a critical element of non-lethal instruction centered on developing a Tactical Information Operations Course of three weeks. The School designed this course for individuals who would be responsible for the integration, coordination, and synchronization of information operations in their unit, opened it to all officers, warrant officers, and staff noncommissioned officers (staff sergeant and above) who occupied positions of battalion commander, company and battery commander, operations officer, effects coordinator, information operation officer, civil affairs officer, and others. Ultimately, this course aimed to teach the students to identify the target and then to select the appropriate effect to achieve the desired result.77

77Tactical Information Operations Course Brochure, undated; Briefing (Extract), subj: LTG Wallace Update, 14 Jun 04; Briefing, subj: Tactical Information Operations IPR, 17 Feb 05; CPT Gary J. Schreckengost and CPT Gary A. Smith, "IO in SOSO at the Tactical Level: Converting Brigade IO Objectives into Battalion IO Tasks," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 11-15, Doc II-75; COL Allen W. Batschelet, "Information Operations for the Joint Warfighter," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 8-10, Doc II-76.

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CHAPTER THREE

COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:

FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION During 2004, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. To accomplish this, the School pursued key initiatives to make jointness a reality; participated in the Transformation of the Army effort; developed fire support doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and made significant progress towards introducing new equipment and weapons.

JOINT ISSUES

The Universal Observer/Joint Fires Observer

During 2003, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School participated in defining and developing the strategy for developing the universal observer. Basically, the universal observer would be a qualified service member who would request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires and would provide targeting information and terminal guidance in support of Type 2 and 3 close air support. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Kevin P. Byrnes, clarified, the universal observer, however, would not have weapons release authority for any type of close air support.1 As the Field Artillery School explained, two definitions of the universal observer existed. One outlined that the future force soldier with access to the communications network could transmit a call for fire. The other said that the universal observer would be specifically trained to employ joint fires and close air support. As of 7 January 2004, the Army and the Field Artillery School supported the latter definition. To this end, they advocated providing specific training at the Field Artillery School.2 Over the next several months, the concept of the universal observer evolved. During 2004, the Field Artillery School agreed to change the name of the universal observer to joint fires observer (JFO) with the new name becoming official in February 2005. The JFO would be a qualified service member who would request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires to include field artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire. The JFO would also be authorized to provide targeting information and conduct terminal guidance operations in support of Types 2 and 3 close air support (CAS) controls. Until the JFO concept was fully developed and implemented, Field Artillery officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers would be qualified in enhanced forward observer training, including Types 2 and 3 CAS controls, by completing the Joint Firepower Observer Course conducted by the Army Joint Support Team at the Air-Ground Operation School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, as agreed upon in the Army-Air Force Warfighter Conference at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on 29 November 2004.3

12003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58. 22003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58. 3MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 1-4, Doc III-1; Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint

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Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School initiated action to provide JFO training at Fort Sill. Supporting JFO training would involve standing up an Air Force detachment and expanding the restricted military airspace surrounding Fort Sill in 2005.4 Information Operations and Electronic Warfare

Working with the Information Operations proponent at the Combined Arms Center, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) in the Field Artillery School proposed developing an additional skill identifier producing course for tactical-level information operations. The course would train individuals assigned to information operation positions at the brigade or below without having to re-designate their functional areas to Information Operations Functional Area 30 and would start in April 2005 as a pilot course.5 A core information operations element, electronic warfare included electronic warfare support, electronic attack, and electronic protect. Although the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth was the proponent, Fort Sill would be the specified proponent for electronic attack and would incorporate it into instruction in the Field Artillery School.6 Joint Terminal Attack Controller (Ground) Memorandum of Agreement

In 2003-2004 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and Army participated in developing a memorandum of agreement to standardize the certification and qualification process of the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (ground). Effective on 15 January 2004, the memorandum outlined that military services with associated terminal attack controller (TAC), forward air controller (FAC), and terminal controller (TC) schools with plans to train Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC) would ensure that their training would comply with the certification and qualification process to ensure standardized training and qualification criteria. The memorandum also authorized the Marine Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Tactical Air Control Party Course, the U.S. Air Force Ground Operations School Terminal Attack Controller Course, and the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center Terminal Controller Course to conduct JTAC certification training. Ultimately, the military services wanted to standardize requirements for the JTAC, qualification and sustainment training, and the needed equipment. Although limited resources, lack of an accurate number of TAC qualified personnel, and administrative concerns initially caused the Air Force to disapprove the memorandum of agreement, the Air Force eventually signed it after its issues had been

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Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-2. Type 1 CAS (danger close) is when the risk of fratricide requires the controller to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and target. Type 2 CAS is when visually acquiring the target is not possible. Type 3 CAS is when the attacking aircraft imposes a low risk of fratricide. See MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5, Doc III-39. 4Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Gary Kinne, Dir, JTAC, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-3; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Fires Strategic Quick Wins, 10 Feb 05, Doc III-4. 5Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-2; COL John L. Haithcock, Jr., "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 42-44, Doc III-5. 6Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration," pp. 42-44.

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satisfactorily addressed as did the Army. As of early 2005, all of the armed services were awaiting implementation instructions from the Joint Force Command.7 Air Warfare Center Detachment Support to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

and Fort Sill

In 2003 the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, worked with the Air Warfare Center to bring an Air Warfare Center Detachment to their respective installations to provide liaison and exercise support. As the memorandum of understanding that would become effective on 1 January 2004 after the authorized individuals had signed it noted, the Air Warfare Center would locate a permanent detachment at Fort Leavenworth and a permanent detachment at Fort Sill. Part of the Joint and Combined Arms Integration Office at Fort Sill, the detachment would support the installation's Joint Fires and Effects Center and facilitate joint operations by assisting in the development of joint fires doctrine, by coordinating live close air support training for III Corps Artillery and the Field Artillery School, by participating with the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill in joint experimentation, and by providing instruction. Based upon the signed agreements, an Air Force lieutenant colonel would report to Fort Sill in May 2005 and the rest of the detachment would report in 2005-2006.8 Co-locating Battlefield Coordination Detachments with Air Operations and

Training/Experimentation Combined Air Operation Centers

At the Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks on 29-30 November 2004, the Army and Air Force agreed to align active component Battlefield Coordination Detachments with each Falconer Air Operations Center and to align reserve component National Guard Battlefield Coordination Detachments with Training/Experimentation Combined Air Operation Centers. This would facilitate jointness.9

FORCE DESIGN AND COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS

Transformation of the Army

Unit of Employment and Modularization. Upon becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army in August 2003, General Peter J. Schoomaker acknowledged the requirement to accelerate the Transformation of the Army, to improve Army's wartime relevance and

7Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-2; 2003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 58-59; COL David R. Brown, USAF, "JTAC MOA vs. JTTP," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 18-21, Doc III-6. 8Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-2; 2003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 59-60; Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Gary Kinne, Dir, JACI, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-3; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Fires Strategic Quick-Wins, 10 Feb 05, Doc III-4. 9Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Gary Kinne, Dir, JACI, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-4; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Fires Strategic Quick-Wins, 10 Feb 05, Doc III-4; Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-2.

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readiness, and to institutionalize a joint and expeditionary mindset.10 Above all, General Schoomaker understood that the Army had to respond rapidly and had to commence operations immediately upon arrival in distant theaters of operations. However, the post-Cold War Army lacked the required flexibility and responsiveness to meet such demands. In support of military operations during the past five years, for example, the Army had to modify its corps and divisions by dismantling or reorganizing them for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The difficulty of using existing formations coupled with the need to employ land forces immediately with little time to reorganize caused General Schoomaker to step up the pace of the transformation started in 1999 under Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, who had a three-phase program for transformation -- the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force -- that would take years to unfold. General Schoomaker replaced the Legacy Force and Interim Force with the Current Force and the Objective Force with the Future Force and started speeding up the fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance the Current Force so that it would be relevant and ready and could conduct major combat operations across the full spectrum of conflict.11 Besides introducing Future Force capabilities sooner, Schoomaker pressed to restructure the Army's force. Beginning in late 2003 and early 2004, Schoomaker initiated the process of modularizing the Army's forces to provide land combat power that could be task organized for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, or support operations as part of a joint campaign.12 This set in motion a comprehensive effort to transform the Army at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels by replacing the service's existing brigades, divisions, corps, and echelons-above corps with new organizations. As outlined in the Unit of Employment Operations White Paper of 23 January 2004 and refined in the Unit of Employment White Paper of 20 March 2004, the Army planned to create the Unit of Employment (UEy) as the theater, operational-level, land force and joint support organization and the Unit of Employment (UEx) as the primary warfighting headquarters. Most likely commanded by a lieutenant general, the UEy would consolidate most functions performed by the corps and Army service component commands into a single operational echelon and would be the primary vehicle for Army support to the regional component commander's area of responsibility. Equally important, the UEy that was approved in November 2004 for standing up would have the ability to be tailored, would command land forces in major operations, would support the rest of the joint team, would provide army capabilities to the combatant commander, and would tailor and support the UEx that was approved in September 2004 for standing up.13

102003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 60-61. 11Ibid.; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04, pp. 1-1, 1-6, Doc III-7; Briefing, subj: Modular Army Overview, 5 Apr 04, Doc III-8. 12Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04, pp. 1-1, 1-6; Briefing, subj: Modular Army Overview, 5 Apr 04. 132003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63; Interview, Dastrup with Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, 3 Mar 05, Doc III-9; White Paper, subj: Unit of Employment Operations, 20 Mar 04, pp. 9-12, Doc III-10; Briefing, subj: U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation, undated, Doc III-

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As discussed in the Unit of Employment Operations White Paper of 20 March 2004, the UEx commanded by a major general or a lieutenant general would serve as the Army's primary tactical and operational warfighting headquarters. The Army envisioned that the UEx would not have a fixed structure beyond its headquarters because it would be completely modular and could be deployed as a pure headquarters without subordinate units. As a result, its supporting brigades -- an aviation brigade, a battlefield sustainment brigade, a maneuver enhancement brigade to preserve the freedom of maneuver for the UEx by controlling terrain or features, a fires brigade, and a battlefield sustainment brigade would be attached or assigned depending upon the operations. Each brigade would have organic signal and sustainment capabilities. In addition, the UEx would have the ability to control a mix of heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (BCT) for different missions but could control more brigade combat teams in protracted stability operations. Given its modularity, the UEx would have the ability to adjust its organization for each operation.14 Fires Brigade in the UEx. As delineated in 2003 and 2004, fires brigade would play a critical role in the UEx although it might or might not be stationed with the UEx. It would plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations to provide close support and precision strike for the joint force commander, the UEx, and the BCTs. Although the fires brigade could be tasked organized with additional units, such as rocket and cannon battalions, depending upon the situation, its organic units would include a headquarters and headquarters battery, a fires and effects cell to give the ability to plan and execute lethal and non-lethal effects, a support battalion, a signal company, and a target acquisition battery with four AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars, two Lightweight Countermortar Radars, and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) company with seven tactical UAVs. With its organic rocket battalion, either Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the fires brigade would provide long-range fires to support the UEx in shaping the battlespace and conducting counterstrike. However, the bulk of the fires from the fires brigade would come from assigned assets. Typically, this would be two rocket battalions and two cannon battalions. In some instances, the fires brigade would reinforce the BCTs with fires.15 Including the first fires brigade in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood,

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11; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04, pp. 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10; Briefing, subj: Modular Army Overview, 5 Apr 04. 14Briefing, subj: How the UEx Fights, 29 Mar 04, Doc III-12; Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-12a; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04, pp. 1-16, 1-17; White Paper, subj: Unit of Employment Operations, 20 Mar 04, pp. 57-59. 15Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05; Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04, Doc III-13; Briefing, subj: How the UEx Fights, 29 Mar 04; MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 1-4, Doc III-14; Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Brigade, 4 Dec 04, Doc III-15; Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan (Extract), 9 Nov 04, p. 12, Doc III-16; Briefing, subj: Modularity/Transformation, Jan 05, Doc III-17; Briefing, subj: U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation, undated; FA and Joint Fires and Effects Themes and Messages, 29 Dec 04, Doc III-18; Msg, ca 18 Mar 05, Doc III-19.

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Texas, that was stood up on 16 December 2004, the Field Artillery School anticipated that a total of thirteen fires brigades would be in the Total Force. Although the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General David P. Valcourt, consistently stated that in a perfect world each UEx would have a fires brigade, circumstances dictated otherwise. The realities of force structure constraints dictated a fewer number of fires brigades than the number of UExs. The Army Campaign Plan brief to the Chief of Staff of the Army late in 2004 set the number of active component fires brigades at six with an additional six fires brigades in the Army National Guard. The remaining elements of the 2nd Infantry Division Artillery headquarters would remain until the final decision about the disposition of the division could be made in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.16 Brigade Combat Team and Modularity. A major part of the Transformation of the Army involved restructuring the Army's main combat unit. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the division served as the Army's primary fighting organization. Formed with a standard number of brigades or regiments and a division base of specialty troops, the division fought battles to gain tactical advantage under a command of a corps. Although its battles typically took place over considerable space, the division's brigades operated close to each other and depended upon each other for reinforcement. Normally, the brigade had three or four combat maneuver battalions and received its specialty support from division-level units, such as division artillery. Even though doctrine stressed flexibility in brigade organization, the tendency for habitual relationships between the combat brigades and their supporting units led to de facto fixed organizations that proved to be valuable in combat.17 To build upon the tactical experience of the last years of the twentieth century and the practice of habitual association and to provide more flexibility, the Army opted to abandon the division as its primary fighting unit. The Army planned to use the brigade composed of battalion-size and company-size subunits as the major means of conducting tactical engagements. Two standard BCTs, formerly called Units of Action through 2003, would replace the task-organized combinations formed in the current division. One BCT variant would be a standard armored brigade (heavy), and the other would be the standard infantry brigade. Equipped with the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer as an interim solution until the M777 towed 155-mm. howitzer could be fielded, the Stryker BCT would comprise the third standard maneuver brigade. These modular maneuver brigades would be stand-alone warfighting elements, would have organic maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistics subunits and have a fixed table of organization and equipment.18 For example, the infantry

16MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 1-4, Doc III-20; CPT Michael M. Stump, "4th ID Stands Up Army's First Fires Brigade," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, p. 27, Doc III-21; FA and Joint Fires and Effects Themes and Messages, 29 Dec 04; Msg, ca 18 Mar 05; Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05. 172003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 63; Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04, pp. 1-13, 1-14; White Paper, subj: Unit of Employment Operations, 20 Mar 04, p. 10. 18Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04; White Paper, subj: Unit of Employment Operations, 20 Mar 04, pp. 10-11; "Army Announces FY05 and FY06 Modular Brigade Force Structure Decision," U.S. Army News Release, 23 Jul 04, Doc III-22;

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BCT would have sixteen towed 105-mm. howitzers (the M119 until a better towed 105-mm. could be developed), one AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radar, four Lightweight Countermortar Radars under development, one Profiler that was a state-of-the-art meteorological system, and two Improved Positioning Azimuth Systems (IPADS). The heavy BCT would have sixteen self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers (Paladin), an AN/TPQ-37 (Version eight) radar, an AN/TPQ-36 radar, four Lightweight Countermortar Radars, one Profiler, and two IPADS.19 Influenced by the existing international political scene, the Army initiated the process of converting to modular BCTs in 2003. The 3rd Infantry Division that had just returned from Iraq in September 2003 successfully tested the modularity concept the concept in March 2004 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Subsequently, the Army announced the creation of BCTs in the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 4th Infantry Division in the near future and its intention of forming forty-eight BCTs in the active component and thirty-four BCTs being formed in the Army National Guard by 2010. In view of this restructuring, General Valcourt made the formation of fires battalions for the BCT the Field Artillery's first priority.20 The Future Force. In 2017 these BCTs would begin the transition into Future Combat Systems (FCS) brigades. They would become fully-equipped FCS units with advanced command and control capabilities and would be deployable on C-130, C-17, and C-5 aircraft to provide the desired responsiveness, deployability, agility, and versatility. When all of these modular BCTs had become operational, the Army would shift from a division-based to a brigade-based force with the capability of being tailored rapidly and effective to close with and destroy the enemy.21

EQUIPMENT

The Initial Armored Vehicle/Stryker Vehicle

As the Army developed organizational designs for the Interim Brigade Combat Team and the Objective Force, the Army simultaneously outlined a plan to equip the Interim Brigade Combat Team with Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) family of medium armored vehicles and the Objective Force with the Future Combat System (FCS).22 To acquire the

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Briefing, subj: Modular Army Overview, 5 Apr 04; Briefing, subj: U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation, undated. 19Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05; Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04; Briefing, subj: FDIC Modularity Smart Book, 25 Jan 05, Doc III-23; Briefing, subj: FDIC Fires Battalion, 105T, 22 Feb 05, Doc III-24; Briefing, subj: FDIC Fires Battalion, 155SP, 22 Feb 05, Doc III-25; Briefing, subj: Heavy BCT, 15 Sep 04, Doc III-26; Briefing, subj: Infantry BCT, 8 Feb 05, Doc III-27. 20Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05; Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," pp. 1-4; Valcourt, "Issues and Answers," pp. 1-3; Interview, Dastrup with Bankston, 2 Mar 04; "Army to Reset into Modular Brigade-Centric Force," Army News Service, 24 Feb 04; Briefing, subj: U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation, undated; Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04. 212003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 63; Interview, Dastrup with Bankston, 3 Mar 05; Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05.

222001 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

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IAV, the Army hosted platform performance demonstrations in December 1999 and January 2000 at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where manufacturers displayed their medium-weight vehicles to give a sense of what was available before formal requirements for the system were written. The demonstrations also allowed the Army to communicate its requirements to industry, to permit refining requirements, and to explore current vehicles for adapting to platform requirements and potential technology insertion. Nine contractors accepted the challenge and fielded thirty-five different systems. Of these, only three manufacturers submitted tracked systems; and only United Defense, which fielded nine variants of the M113 personnel carrier and the M8 armored guns system, a light tank system that the Army had canceled on the eve of production, was an American firm.23

Following up on the December and January demonstrations, the Army's Source Selection Evaluation Board held a thirty-day series of events to grade the performance and endurance of the thirty-five vehicles. During June 2000, the board operated seven days a week with two ten-hour shifts daily and ran the vehicles through various tests. Colonel (P) Donald F. Shenk, the IAV Program Manager at the Tank and Automotive and Armament Command, Dearborn, Michigan, explained the need for wheeled or tracked vehicles with cross-country speed, mobility, and maneuverability. Basically, the Army outlined the object of finding a family of vehicles that was air transportable, was capable of immediate employment upon arrival in the theater of operations, and had the greatest degree of commonality possible. Other desired characteristics included low sustainment costs, fuel economy, and maintainability. As of August 2000, the IAV selection process centered on the infantry carrier vehicle with eight configurations and two variants, the mobile gun system and the self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, and had a goal of choosing the vehicle or platforms, as the Army called them, sometime in the summer or fall of 2000.24

Selecting an IAV generated a controversy. As early as October 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki expressed his interest in a wheeled vehicle as a possible solution. This prompted the Army to discard tradition by giving wheeled vehicles more attention than it had done for years and to counter the cultural bias that had caused them to receive little attention. This aggravated the proponents of tracked vehicles because they feared that wheeled vehicles would be favored in IAV competition at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Also, advocates of tracked vehicles decried the possibility of adopting a wheeled vehicle because the latter had less cross-country capabilities. Proponents of wheeled vehicles, in the meantime, pointed out that they were simpler to maintain and were more reliable, while the supporters of track vehicles added that such a comparison was unfair because track vehicles were driven on much more difficult terrain and that the Army would be foolish to go with wheeled vehicles for their speed when they were vulnerable to getting stuck in mud, rocks, and other terrain over which tracks would glide. Reflecting a moderate position, Lieutenant Colonel Dana Pittard of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division that was converting to the Initial Brigade Combat Team organization at Fort Lewis espoused adopting the best vehicle. It did not matter to him whether it ran on wheels or tracks. As the arguments indicated, each type of vehicle had its own merits and liabilities. For example,

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Command History (ACH), p. 65. 23Ibid., pp. 65-66. 24Ibid., p. 66.

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initial testing demonstrated the wheeled vehicle's ability to travel faster on the road and the track vehicle's cross-country superiority and failed to determine a clear winner, according to Colonel Shenk. Adopting either one meant tradeoffs. The wheeled vehicle sacrificed cross-country mobility for speed, and the tracked vehicle forewent speed for cross-country mobility.25

After assessing the various IAV candidates, the Army made its decision. On 17 November 2000 it announced awarding the IAV contract to GM General Dynamics Land Systems that built light armored vehicles for the U.S. Marine Corps, the Canadian forces, the Saudi Arabian military, and the Australian army. The company would manufacture its Light Armored Vehicle (LAV III) as the IAV in two variants, the infantry carrier vehicle and the mobile gun system. Both would be wheeled. LAV III offered commonality by using a single chassis for all ten configurations, would enable units to take fewer spare parts, and would reduce the logistical burden. Moreover, LAV III could move at sixty miles per hour and travel in convoys at forty miles per hour and would provide the Interim Brigade Combat Team with tactical speed on the battlefield. Other benefits included strategic mobility via a C-130 and low sustainment costs and quiet operation, which would permit soldiers to move stealthily in battle.26

The decision surprised some tracked vehicle manufacturers and caused a vigorous response. Believing that they had been overlooked, they countered that their proposals were significantly stronger than the winner on several key points. Specifically, United Defense, the producer of the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light and the M8 Armored Gun System, observed that its proposal was less expensive, that it met the Army's requirements, and that it could be delivered earlier than the LAV III. Along the same lines the president and chief executive of Vision Technologies Kinetics insisted that his company's tracked vehicle performed better than the LAV III in the competition.27

Late in November 2000, the Director of the Army's Acquisition Corps, Lieutenant General Paul J. Kern, reflected upon the decision to obtain the LAV III in light of the debate about the choice of vehicles.28 After acknowledging that "wheels cannot outperform tracks in all situations," he explained, "This is an off-the-shelf procurement today of what we see is the best capability for mobility with wheeled vehicles."29 The LAV III was a solid choice "if you go very quickly across, not necessarily highways, but improved roads, and [it] gives us a very good cross-country mobility as well," according to General Kern.30

In December 2000 United Defense LP, one of the contractors that had bid for the IAV, filed a formal protest against the contract awarded to GM Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems by insisting that the Army had failed to adhere to its published criteria for evaluating the proposed IAV. United Defense contended that the tests emphasized the benefits of wheeled vehicles and downplayed the strengths of track vehicles.

252000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77. 26Ibid., p. 77. 27Ibid., pp. 77-78. 28Ibid., p. 78. 29"Kern Says Vehicle Award Does Not Settle Debate Over Wheels and Tracks,"

Inside the Army, 20 Nov 00, p. 6, Doc III-47, 2000 USAFACFS ACH. 30Ibid.

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In comparison, the request for purchase, the operational and organizational plan, and the operational requirements document provided opportunities for both wheeled and tracked vehicles. This created a disconnect between the evaluation scenarios and the performance requirement documents. Additionally, United Defense protested that the Army utilized an extended road march to justify its choice and that the road march was never part of the performance criteria. The request for purchase document described a terrain profile for the IAV that featured fifty percent cross-country travel, thirty percent on secondary road, and twenty percent on primary road. Despite these and other test failings and the fact that the protest forced developmental work to stop, the Army expressed confidence with its selection of a wheeled vehicle by GM Defense and General Dynamics Lands Systems. It would hold up under scrutiny.31

Four months later on 9 April 2001, the General Accounting Office denied United Defense's protest after reviewing it, permitting the Army to restart the IAV program by purchasing IAVs for six Interim Brigade Combat Teams as well as the institutional Army for training purposes. As General Shinseki pointed out in July 2001, the Army hoped to have its first IAVs in mid-2002 and to complete fielding them in 2005 and subsequently in February 2002 named the vehicle Stryker after two Medal of Honor winners, Private First Class Stuart S. Stryker, who had served World War II, and Specialist Robert F. Stryker, who had served in Vietnam.32

Given the controversy over the selection process, Congress inserted a provision in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 Defense Authorization Act mandating a live competition between the IAV III and the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier to ensure that the costly procurement was really necessary. The Army opposed the measure. The test would detract from readiness and would slow down the transformation process because it would cost the service additional money and because the service would be prohibited from spending any money on fielding the third Initial Brigade Combat Team with LAV III. In light of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the competition would be even more deleterious to national security. Readiness had to be expedited. Notwithstanding this, the Congress still planned conducting the live competition sometime in 2002 but outlined a caveat in the authorization act. If the Army could provide timely and satisfactory information that Congress required without conducting a live competition, the test might not be necessary, according to the Undersecretary of the Army, Les Brownlee.33

Letters written to Senators Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania by Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, in November 2001 caused Congress to change its mind. Basically, Secretary White wrote that the test would be costly, that it would distract the Army during a critical time, and that it would not generate any new data. In response to this line of reasoning, Congress dropped the mandate to conduct comparison testing of the LAV III and M113 in FY 2002 Defense Appropriation Act, but it set certain conditions before the Secretary of Defense could grant the waiver. Unable to meet Congressional conditions, the Army conducted the comparison test between the Stryker and the M113 at Fort Lewis, Washington, in September 2002, where the former demonstrated its

312000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 322001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 68-69. 33Ibid., p. 69.

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superiority.34 After a little over two years of work on the Stryker IAV, the Army saw the fruits of

its labors in 2002. On 12 April 2002 General Shinseki accepted the first vehicle on behalf of the Army. Slated to be the workhorse of the Interim Brigade Combat Team, the vehicles represented the first of two thousand to be delivered to the Interim Brigade Combat Teams over the next decade. The system would provide the Interim Brigade Combat Teams with more firepower and protection than their existing vehicles but would be more deployable than the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the M2 Abrams that were currently in the inventory.35 At the acceptance ceremony, General Shinseki noted, "It [the Stryker] resonates with what we expect it will give to the Army -- a quick strike capability with greater staying power."36

Millennium Challenge 2002, a joint Army-Air Force exercise, reinforced General Shinseki's optimism by demonstrating the Stryker's deployability. During the exercise of July-August 2002, the Army deployed a company of four Strykers from Fort Lewis, Washington, via strategic airlift (C-17s) to an intermediate staging base. Here, they were loaded onto C-130s and airlifted to an airfield in the middle of the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, where the Army conducted a joint interoperability exercise with the Marine Corps. From the Army's perspective the exercise reaffirmed the vehicle's deployability even though some material deficiencies were noted that required fixing.37 The vehicle was a battlefield "enabler," according to the Army.38 Echoing this, General Shinseki remarked at the Association of the U.S. Army on 4 September 2002, "Stryker's performance during Millennium Challenge at the National Training Center last month demonstrated the bridge for bringing together our rapidly deploying and versatile light forces and our lethal, survivable heavy forces."39

Additional tests conducted in 2003 buttressed General Shinseki's observation. During a series of operational evaluations in 2003, the Stryker demonstrated its strategic mobility. Conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, Arrowhead Lightning I, an operational evaluation of the Stryker vehicle and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, employed six Air Force National Guard C-130 aircraft to fly sixteen sorties on 1 April 2003 from Southern California Logistics Airport to Bicycle Lake Army Airfield, a dirt landing strip at the NTC, and twenty-one sorties on 2 April 2003. Altogether, the Air Force National Guard transported thirty fully loaded Stryker vehicles with their crews to participate in a ten-day operational evaluation of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division) and to determine its operational readiness. From California the Army shipped 152 vehicles, including 60 of the nineteen-ton Strykers, to the Fort Sill railhead facility where they arrived on 26 and 27 April 2003. After loading the vehicles onto railcars, Fort Sill and Fort Lewis personnel shipped them to Fort Polk beginning on 3 May 2003. It

34Ibid., pp. 69-70; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 70. 352002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 53-54. 36CSA Remarks at IAV Rollout Ceremony, 12 Apr 02, p. 3, Doc III-23, 2002

USAFACFS ACH. 372002 USAFACFS, p. 54. 38Ibid. 39Speech, Shinseki, 4 Sep 02, p. 5, Doc III-32, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

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took forty-five C-17 sorties and only forty-six hours to deploy the Strykers from Fort Sill to Fort Polk. Interim observations from this certification exercise indicated that the Stryker vehicle and the Stryker brigade demonstrated the ability to deploy rapidly and to conduct combat missions across the range of military operations. Subsequently, Stryker vehicles and brigades started deploying to Iraq in December 2003 in support of Operation Iraq Freedom; and later the Field Artillery School received six Strykers in April and November 2004 for training purposes.40 The Precision Effects Study and the Course Correcting Fuse

Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types of such munitions, such as the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for such munitions. Prompted by the Americans' restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces, often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy forces limited the American ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions with SADARM becoming the preferred killing munition for cannon artillery.41 Recognizing that SADARM was expensive, the Army searched for less expensive precision munitions. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry and to conduct the Precision Effects Study to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within twenty-four to thirty-six months.42 Various proposals to improve precision emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting fuse (CCF) offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that it would vastly improve the

402003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 71; COL G. Keith Herring, "Flagship Sill: A Power Projection Platform for 100-Plus Years," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04, pp. 19-21, Doc III-28; Fact Sheet, subj: Stryker 8-Wheel Drive Armoured Combat Vehicles, USA, 4 Feb 05, Doc III-29; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Completes Stryker Brigade Certification, undated, Doc III-30; DPTM SIGACTS, 30 Apr 04, Doc III-31; DPTM SIGACTS, 12 Oct 04, Doc III-32. 41Approved Precision Effects Study Plan, undated, Doc III-32a; Email with atch, subj: Precision Effects Study, 23 May 05, Doc III-32aa. 42Approved Precision Effects Study Plan, undated; Memorandum for Cdr, USAFACFS, et al, subj: Precision Effects Study, 20 Nov 03, Doc III-32b; Precision Effects Study Announcement, undated, Doc III-32c; Fact Sheet, subj: Precision Effects, undated, Doc III-32d; Sandra I. Erwin, "Cannons, Rocket and Missiles: A Growth Industry in the Army," www.nationaldefensemagazine.org, Doc III-32f; Interview, Dastrup with Thomas Hills, Sr Analsyst, Analysis Branch, FDIC, 23 May 05, III-32g.

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accuracy 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development CCF could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 with the first spiral and by FY 2010 with the second spiral that would represent the full performance fuse. Besides accelerating FS3, buying some Denel ammunition for testing, and purchasing more Lightweight Countermortar Radars (LCMR), USAFACFS and the working group aggressively worked during 2004-2005 with the industry to provide the Field Artillery with a course-correcting fuse for its 155-mm. and 105-mm. cannons.43 Capabilities Needs Assessment

Early in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, the Field Artillery School's Futures Development Integration Center (FDIC) participated in the Army's Capabilities Needs Assessment (CNA) to identify critical Field Artillery Future Force operational capabilities that were partially met by current systems, developmental systems, and emerging technologies. As a part of the Army's CNA effort, FDIC subsequently outlined critical insights into Field Artillery capability shortfalls. For the Current Force, FDIC pointed out the requirement for responsive, networked, precision fires; improved non-lethal capabilities; increased ability and speed of analysis and information dissemination; and increased ability for sustained, high operational tempo, among others. The Future Force required modular, tailorable forces with the ability to deploy rapidly in mission configuration; lethality overmatch; and enhanced countermine capabilities, among others.44

Examining the Current Force's requirement for responsive, networked, precision fires, for example, revealed technological shortfalls. As an October 2004 briefing pointed out, field artillery weapon systems lacked sufficient ranges and responsive, precision lethality against moving targets and had limited observation, designation, target acquisition, and target location capability to employ joint fires, insufficient joint doctrine for observers, and a difficulty achieving effects against bunkers.45

The Future Force requirement for the Field Artillery lethal overmatch also had technological shortfalls. Field artillery weapon systems lacked precision loiter kill capability, the ability to kill moving targets at long range, and networked mortar capabilities and had a sustainment tail that was too large. Potential solutions included continuing the loitering

43Email with atch, subj: Precision Effects Study, 23 May 05; MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber Decision, Today's Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 1-3, Doc III-32dd; Routing Sheet, undated, Doc III-32e; Fact Sheet, subj: Rankings of 24 Proposals, undated, Doc III-32h; Briefing, subj: Precision Effects Study Results for TRADOC Commander, 4 Feb 04, Doc III-32i; Briefing, subj: Phase II - Precision Effect Study Recommendations, undated, Doc III-32j; Briefing, subj: Courses of Action for Accelerated Course Correcting Fuse Development, 30 Apr 04, Doc III-32k. 44Briefing, subj: Capability Needs Assessment: Residual Gaps, 5 Oct 04, Doc III-33; Email with atch, subj: CY2004 FDIC-USAFAS History Input, 16 Feb 05, Doc III-34; Email, subj: Message 3 of 3 Short Summary, 21 Feb 05, Doc III-35; Email with atch, subj: 2004 History - FDIC USAFAS, 4 Mar 05, Doc III-36. 45Briefing, subj: Capability Needs Assessment: Residual Gaps, 5 Oct 04; Email with atch, subj: 2004 History - FDIC USAFAS, 4 Mar 04.

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attack munition efforts with the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) to provide precision loiter kill capability, continuing acoustic sensor, smart munitions efforts, conducting research and development for sensor-observer-shooter linkages, and developing onboard weapon system platform tactical command and control capability to kill moving targets at long range. To reduce the size of the sustainment tail the Field Artillery had to conduct research and development for reduced weight, smart munitions with increase lethality.46

Based upon guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Field Artillery School formulated its top priority technologies and systems for Army Transformation and the Future Force. Top priorities included developing the Excalibur 155-mm. munition, the Precision Guidance Kit for 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer non-guided projectiles to improve their accuracy, the Multi-Mission Radar, the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, Dismounted Optic to provide the dismounted observer with an integrated, lightweight, hand-held capability to detect, identify, and locate targets rapidly and accurately, enabling fuse components, and improved sub-munitions.47 XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile

Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy, the U.S. Army explored the need of adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (fifty kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would be able it to hit within six meters of the target. The projectile's modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purposed Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for area targets, the Search-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets -- soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support, would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the Paladin self-propelled howitzer, the Lightweight 155-mm. towed howitzer under development, and the Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 with DPICM, in FY 2007 with SADARM, and in FY 2010 with Unitary.48

Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur's initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team, caused another shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a school decision paper to

46Briefing, subj: Capability Needs Assessment: Residual Gaps, 4 Oct 04. 47Ibid.; Email, subj: Message 3 of 3 Short Summary, 21 Feb 05; Email with atch, subj: 2004 History - FDIC USAFAS, 4 Mar 05.

482004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75.

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switch Excalibur's initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin's decision, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead beginning in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it had a low collateral damage effect. This caused Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.49

In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using the Global Positioning System and an inertial measurement unit, the Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery's digitized cannon range from twenty-seven kilometers to thirty-five kilometers with the XM777 155-mm. towed howitzer and the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and fifty plus kilometers with the Crusader. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and would give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.50

Raytheon's technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various developmental options with the programs. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur's airframe was untested whereas TCM's had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company that would be politically troublesome. Third, the Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that had essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each program. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor and possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.51 As the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., wrote on 21 November 2001 about the merger, "It is in the best interests of the Army. . . ."52

The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements; and the merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and the Kingdom Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for cooperative development of Excalibur

492000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 50Ibid., p. 79. 512001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 52Memorandum for Army Acquisition Executive, subj: Merger of Excalibur XM892

and Trajectory Correctable Munitions Programs, 21 Nov 01, Doc III-85a, 2001 USAFACFS ACH.

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with the Sweden providing $57 million.53 Meanwhile, Excalibur went through key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief

of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field the Excalibur to the Crusader in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 with Block I and the Paladin Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer and the Lightweight 155-mm. Howitzer with Blocks II and III respectively. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus on developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.54

Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate fielding by employing "spiral development."55 Basically, this approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the new program to deliver the Unitary Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version, Unitary Excalibur, would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. A second version, enhanced Unitary Excalibur, with more capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. The third version would meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and would be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.56

Meanwhile, development moved forward during 2003-2004. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 towed 155-mm. howitzer with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular

532001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 54Ibid., p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77. 55Email msg with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002

USAFACFS ACH. 562002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; Memorandum for

Dir, FDIC, Fort Monroe, VA, subj: Approval of ORD for the Precision Engagment Projectile, Excalibur, 30 Sep 04, Doc III-37; Memorandum for Acting Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Army, subj: Excalibur Precision Engagement Projectile ORD, 16 Sep 04, Doc III-38; MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc III-39; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ J. Riley Durant, TSM Cannon, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-40.

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Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile's physical compatibility with the XM777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the systems development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinnay Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. About one year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.57

Meanwhile, studies conducted in 2002 and 2003 validated Excalibur development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would fill an existing deficiency -- the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.58

As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. For example, the Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement fully the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 reinforced that Excalibur Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the need for the munition. Ultimately, these studies and others indicated that Excalibur and other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the Crusader self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and reaffirmed the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision munition.59

Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) for the Excalibur late in 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School planned to present its case for a formal acceleration of the munition to the Army Resource and Requirements Board early in 2005 which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating the acquisition program. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent need statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. While one would be the program outlined in the 2004 ORD, the second would be

572003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; Valcourt, Bray, Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," pp. 1-5. 582003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 59Ibid.

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the accelerated program with less capability.60 Precision Guidance Kit, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program, and

Insensitive Munitions Programs

During 2004, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center conducted several cannon munitions programs besides Excalibur to improve accuracy and to reduce collateral damage. A low-cost, fuse-size module intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, Precision Guidance Kit would significantly improve their accuracy, reduce the amount of ammunition required for missions, and enhance the current and future forces' indirect fire accuracy by using the Global Position System to provide location during flight and make trajectory corrections. The School also worked on the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program which would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles and would be capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as non-lethal, multi-spectral smoke, and infra-red illumination.61 Although the U.S. military's munitions stockpile was among the safest in the world, the military's commitment to keeping technically advanced to meet insensitive munitions requirements caused the U.S. Army to work on fielding such munitions. By design such munitions would be able to withstand unplanned stimuli such as heat from a bonfire, fuel fire, shock from a bullet or shell fragment, and chain reactions from detonating munitions. During 2004 the Field Artillery School participated in demonstrations at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, with the M795 projectile.62 Modular Charge Artillery System

Since the beginning of cannon artillery in the fourteenth century, crew members had to measure how much gunpowder to load into their artillery pieces. This required them to ladle powder into the cannon and later as technology improved to cut bag charges and then to dispose of unused increments by burning them. Besides wasting powder, this practice of using and cutting bag charges was time consuming. At the end of the twentieth century, the Field Artillery had four different types of bag charges for the 155-mm. howitzer: M3 (green bag), M4 (white bag), M119 (Charge 7 Red Bag), and M203 (Charge 8S Combustible Case). All but the M119 and M203 required soldiers to burn the unused powder. During the last decade of the 20th Century, the Field Artillery also had an urgent need to develop a less sensitive solid propelling charge system that would be compatible with the Crusader self-

60Interview, Dastrup with Durant, 7 Mar 05. 61MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, "State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc III-41; Interview, Dastrup with Doug R. Brown, Dep Dir, TSM Cannon, 16 Feb 05, Doc III-42; Briefing (Extract), subj: Requirements Update, undated, Doc III-43; Briefing, subj: TSM Cannon Smart Book, Dec 04, Doc III-44; Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly, 24 Nov 04, Doc III-45; Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update, 13 Dec 04, Doc III-46; Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update, 5 Jan 05, Doc III-47; Email, subj: TSMC Comments, 13 Apr 05, Doc III-47a. 62Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update, 13 Dec 04; DOD Acquisition Manager's Handbook for Insensitive Munitions (Extract), Jan 04, pp. 1-8, Doc III-48.

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propelled 155-mm. howitzer's automated ammunition handling system that was under development at that time. This situation led to the development of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) which was approved in November 2000 to replace the existing bag propellant system. MACS would consist of two different modular increments (M231/M232) for the Army's 155-mm. cannon systems and would facilitate automated ammunition handling systems. Also, MACS would provide significant improvements in logistics, range, and simplicity when compared to the existing 155-mm. family of bag propellants (M3, M4, M119, and M203).63 MACS promised to represent a major departure from the existing "bag" field artillery propellant charges. Upon fielding, MACS would introduce "build-a-charge" concept compared to the current "cut charge" procedures where bags were cut to create the desired charge and would eliminate the need to dispose of unused increments because all increments would be identical to all others in the same lot designation. For example, the M231 which would replace the M3 and M4A2 propelling charges could be fired singly (charge one) or in pairs (charge two) to engage targets from three to twelve kilometers, while the M232 which would supplant the M4 in the near term and the M119 and M203 in the future could be fired in groups of three or more from Charge 3 (three M232s) to Charge 5 (five M232s) at targets exceeding twenty-nine kilometers.64 Following full materiel release of MACS M231 in April 2003, the Army started fielding MACS in two phases. Beginning in June 2003, it initiated phase one by fielding the M231. Because of the limited number of M231s, units would have to continue using current bag propellants until depletion. Phase two started in March 2004 with M232. However, because of the vast number of M119 and M203 charges in the inventory and the M232 production rate, the M232 would not be available for training until late 2004.65 As the Army started fielding MACS, it made a critical decision about the caliber for the Non-Line of Sight Cannon that influenced MACS development. On 15 January 2004 the Army approved a thirty-nine caliber tube for the Non-Line of Sight Cannon that was scheduled to replace Crusader that had a fifty-two caliber tube. Because MACS was initially designed for fifty-two caliber 155-mm. cannons, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

63James S. Pearson, "Modular Charge Artillery System (MACS)," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04, pp. 55-56, Doc III-49; Interview with atch, Dastrup with James S. Pearson, TSM Cannon, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-50; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Change to the ORD for the MACS, 17 Nov 00, Doc III-51; Operational Requirements Document for Modular Artillery Charge System M231/M232 (Extract), 17 Nov 00, Doc III-52; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Abbreviated System Evaluation Plan for MACS, XM232E1 Product Improvement Program, 5 Nov 04, Doc III-53; Email with atch, subj: MACS Paper, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-54. 64Materiel Fielding Plan, MACS, 15 Aug 00, p. 4, Doc III-55; Fact Sheet, subj: 155-mm. MACS, undated, Doc III-56; Memorandum for See Distribution (Extract), subj: Change to the ORD for the MACS, 17 Nov 00; Pearson, "Modular Charge Artillery System," pp. 55-56. 65Memorandum for MG John J. Deyermond, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army Materiel Command, subj: Full Materiel Release of M231 MACS, 22 Apr 03, Doc III-57; Pearson, "Modular Charge Artillery System," pp. 55-56.

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Command (TRADOC) System Manager Cannon and the Field Artillery School subsequently recommended optimizing MACS for a thirty-nine caliber 155-mm. cannon. After careful consideration the Army approved the recommendation in November 2004. Ultimately, the M232 optimization plan would increase tube life, decrease residue, and reduce flash and blast overpressure that would be damaging for a thirty-nine caliber tube by adjusting the chemical composition of the M232 and would make the M232A1.66 Non-Line of Sight-Cannon

In October 1999 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, outlined his vision of the Army's future. He wanted a full-spectrum, strategically responsive dominant force that would succeed in any type of operation. In response to the vision, the Army began the transformation process with the goal of fielding six Interim Brigade Combat Teams to meet immediate operational needs while implementing the long-term transformation to the Objective Force. This involved acquiring the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), called the Stryker, for the Interim Force and the Future Combat System (FCS) for the Objective Force.67

To field the FCS the Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched a collaborative effort beginning in May 2000 to define and demonstrate future combat systems. The FCS would supplant the IAV as the primary weapon/troop carrying platform for the Objective Force. As the centerpiece of the Objective Force, FCS would be a family of vehicles and would have four primary functions -- indirect fire, direct fire, infantry carrier, and sensor -- and would therefore be a system of battlefield capabilities. Additionally, the FCS would be a replacement for the seventy-ton Abrams tank, would have the same lethality and crew survivability as the Abrams tank, would be fifty tons lighter, and would be critical for creating the objective force that was expected to be formed beginning in 2008-2012. Ultimately, FCS would make heavy forces lighter, would make lighter forces more lethal, would reduce logistical demands, would function in the operational environment of the future, would enable the Objective Force's Units of Action to dominate ground combat across the entire spectrum of operations, and would enhance their ability to conduct decisive tactical maneuver.68

Although the FCS remained in the conceptual exploration phase of development in 2001, the Army worked out more details concerning the program in cooperation with industry.69 In the Mission Needs Statement of November 2001, the Army wrote, "The FCS is the networked systems of systems that will serve as the core building block within all maneuver . . . echelons to develop overmatching combat power, sustainability, agility, and

66Email with atch, subj: MACS Paper, 24 Mar 05; Briefing, subj: MACS 232-39 Caliber Optimization Program, 8 Jul 04, Doc III-58; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Abbreviated System Evaluation Plan for MACS XM232E1 Product Improvement Program, 5 Nov 04.

672002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 61.

682000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 70; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 61-62.

692001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 70-71.

67

versatility necessary for full spectrum military operations."70 The FCS would revolve around a family of platforms of advanced, networked space-, air-, and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems that would include manned and unmanned platforms with the largest being lighter than current mechanized systems, even though functional and tactical requirements would be achieved by a single vehicle system or platform. The Army intended an indirect fire system to be part of the FCS endeavor.71

When the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld terminated the Crusader 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer development program in May 2002, he told the Army to accelerate development of the FCS-Cannon, properly known as the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS)-Cannon, and provided the funds saved with the termination of Crusader to evaluate developing a FCS-cannon system to support the Objective Force.72 Out of this tasking emerged a concept technology demonstration program with United Defense and General Dynamics as principle contractors to examine technological possibilities to furnish a material solution for the FCS-Cannon, to deliver Block One capability by Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, and to develop a strategy to achieve the objective solution. Within six months the Army completed a study to determine the Non-Line of Sight-Cannon's requirements. Tentative requirements as of December 2002 established a maximum range of thirty to forty kilometers, a minimum range of three to four kilometers, a rate of fire of six to ten rounds a minute, automated ammunition handling, interoperability with all Unit of Action and Unit of Employment systems, and C-130 deployable. The Army also noted that the NLOS-Cannon had to employ all current and developmental munitions.73

Late in 2002 and early in 2003, the Army outlined various options to field Block One. Initially, the Army had four potential variants for the FCS-Cannon -- a track and wheeled 105-mm. howitzer and a track and wheeled 155-mm. howitzer. While either caliber was viable, either tracks or wheels were also viable. However, the Army noted that it would select the best features of the existing designs to field a demonstrator by October 2003 that would serve as the basis of the Block One NLOS-Cannon.74

To develop the demonstrator by the October 2003 deadline, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School merged the four variants early in 2003 based upon additional study to produce one option -- a 155-mm. caliber weapon system with a band track. On 29 January 2003 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Michael D. Maples, explained the rationale for the merger. A single piece of steel reinforced rubber that would replace the conventional articulated steel tracks, the band track offered increased mobility over wheeled versions during cross-country operations, would be lighter than a wheeled variant, and would meet the FCS operational requirements document requirement for highway speed. The 155-mm. caliber would provide better force effectiveness, greater lethality, and more munition types.75 General Maples cautioned in January 2003, "This action

70Mission Need Statement (Extract), FCS, 2 Nov 01, Doc III-49, 2001 USAFACFS

ACH. 712001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 71. 722002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 732002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 742002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 63. 75Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81.

68

is not a recommendation to make a final decision on caliber or chassis design. We will continue to work with the materiel developer, the Lead System Integrator, and the TRADOC community to analyze requirements and investigate the best overall materiel solution."76

Within a few months the contractor, United Defense Industries, Inc., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, tested a prototype NLOS-Cannon at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The prototype featured a modified XM777 155-mm. towed howitzer tube mounted on a platform that had been designed by United Defense's Ground Systems Division of San Jose, California, a fully automated ammunition loading system, and a magazine that was capable of holding twenty-four, one hundred-pound projectiles. The platform used an advanced band-track system and was propelled by a hybrid electric diesel engine to provide improved mobility performance and to reduce fuel consumption. In August 2003 the prototype successfully fired its first round. Two months later in October 2003, the prototype completed four, five-round missions at six rounds per minute successfully and later finished several other missions at a slower rate of fire. By the end of October 2003, the prototype had fired 140 rounds.77

As development of the prototype moved forward, the Army acknowledged in March 2003 the difficulty of designing a NLOS-Cannon that would be deployable by a C-130 aircraft and searched for satisfactory compromises. Full compliance with FCS operational requirements would produce a cannon that would far exceed the weight restriction of twenty tons and would not be C-130 deployable. In view of this, the Army conducted numerous analyses during the rest of 2003 to find a design that would meet the transportability requirements but would retain the desired combat requirements. Suggested design compromises, for example, eliminated automated resupply, reduced the caliber of the 155-mm. tube to decrease the range capability, proposed a 105-mm. tube, limited armor, and deployed the cannon with a limited amount of fuel and ammunition on board, among other compromises. As might be expected, the Army found these compromises to be unsatisfactory.78

In view of this, the Army formed a team of experts from government and private industry in December 2003 to examine capability versus transportability. Emerging results in January 2004 revealed significant shortfalls in expected capabilities of combat platforms that would be C-130 transportable. It became clear that some requirements had to be modified to achieve C-130 transportability.79

Discussion on transportability continued through the rest of 2004. The twenty-ton weight limitation meant adding kits, such as additional armor, to the NLOS-Cannon to make it combat ready within four to six hours to meet the material handling equipment requirement. In other words, the cannon had to be combat ready within six hours after offloading from a C-130. Noting that NLOS-Cannon could not make the weight limitation of twenty tons and that the cannon had to be completely combat ready upon offloading, the Program Manager for Future Combat System, Unit of Action, Brigadier General Charles

76Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: FCS Cannon Demonstrator, 29 Jan 03,

Doc III-61, 2002 USAFACFS ACH. 772003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81. 78Ibid.; pp. 81-82. 79Ibid.; p. 82.

69

Cartwright, advocated a twenty-four ton weight limitation and stopped work on the twenty-ton version in November 2004 in favor of work on the twenty-four ton version. As a major participant in the cannon's development, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) neither endorsed the stoppage or the twenty-four ton weight as 2004 drew to a close.80

In May 2004 the Army and Field Artillery, in the meantime, made a key decision on the caliber of the Non-line of Sight Cannon. Based upon careful analysis, they opted for a thirty-eight caliber, 155-mm. howitzer. The 155-mm. howitzer tube was fifty-eight percent more effective against personnel targets than the 105-mm. tube under consideration and eighty-two percent more effective against materiel targets than a 105-mm. tube. Also, the Army and Field Artillery selected the thirty-eight caliber tube over the longer thirty-nine caliber tube, trading four kilometers of range using the M549 rocket-assisted projectile, to save 1,367 pounds. This would make the NLOS-Cannon C-130 deployable with about twenty-five percent of its basic load of ammunition and still satisfy the NLOS-Cannon operational requirements document objectives that specified performance and force effectiveness for transportability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.81

As the Army examined the transportability and the caliber issues, it restructured the Future Combat System program to meet congressional guidance and to get new technology to the force faster. The restructuring would mature and accelerate the most critical and promising technologies within the Future Combat System program to enable the Army to incorporate technological developments as new technologies matured and to permit inserting Future Combat System technology into the brigade combat teams, formerly called Units of Action, according to Cartwright. To accomplish this, the Army opted to slow down development on manned Future Combat System variants and to accelerate work on unmanned variants.82

This restructuring also included congressional direction with NLOS-Cannon. Congress directed the Army to field NLOS-Cannon in 2010 as part of the Future Combat System and to develop the NLOS-Cannon independent of the Future Combat System if the

80Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, 2 Mar 05, Doc III-59; Briefing, subj: NLOS Cannon Update, undated, Doc III-60; "Army, Boeing, SAIC Accelerate Future Combat Systems' Contribution to the Current Force," Boeing News Release, 22 Jul 04, Doc III-61; Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon, 14 Mar 05, Doc III-62. 81Ibid.; Interview, Dastrup with Doug R. Brown, Dep Dir, TSM Cannon, 16 Feb 05, Doc III-63; MAJ Charles J. Emerson, Maj Mark H. Laflamme, and COL (R) James E. Cunningham, "NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 05, pp. 7-11, Doc III-64; MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber Decision, Today's Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 1-3, Doc III-65; Briefing, subj: Non-Line of Sight Cannon Caliber Decision, 10 May 04, Doc III-66; Interview, Dastrup with Emerson, 2 Mar 05. 82"Army Accelerates Selected FCS Capabilities," U.S. Army News Release, 22 Jul 04, Doc III-67; "Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems," Army News Services, 23 Jul 04, Doc III-68; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems, undated, Doc III-69; Briefing, subj: NLOS Cannon Update, undated; Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon, 14 Mar 05.

70

Future Combat System could not achieve the 2010 fielding. To meet this guidance the Army increased the number of NLOS-Cannon Increment 0 prototypes from three to six and decided to deliver them by 2008 for developmental testing. The Army also chose to field NLOS-Cannon Increment 1 which made improvements to Increment 0 in 2010 for developmental testing and operational testing, to make an initial production decision in 2012, and to field NLOS-Cannon in 2014 at the same time as the remainder of the manned ground variants of the Future Combat System. In fact, NLOS-Cannon became the lead manned ground vehicle variant.83 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer

When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward-deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army's interest more than before. Lightweight weapons were more strategically and tactically deployable than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps also planned to field a towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a joint operational requirements document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Picatinney Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements and to add digital capabilities later, while the Army chose to introduce a digitized LW155 which would take longer to field.84

After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and 2001. Unveiled at Picatinney Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held out great promise. The howitzer's reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deployability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of thirty kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.85

83Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon, 14 Mar 05; Briefing, subj: NLOS Cannon Updated, undated; Interview, Dastrup with Emerson, 2 Mar 05; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems, undated.

842003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

85Ibid.; pp. 64-65.

71

Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the "production representative" requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.86 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user's test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.87

In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment of the XM777 from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, Camp Pendleton, California, and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California, to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in the joint operational requirements document of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately four thousand rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and other minor equipment problems, it met its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Mirmar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making satisfactory progress.88

Based upon the tests and especially the operational assessment test of June 2002, the Navy held a Milestone C decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of ninety-four howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development of the XM777.89 After this decision had been made, the contractor delivered its first U.S.-built pilot-production EMD XM777 from its Hattiesburg, Mississippi, facility for testing.90

More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army's LW155 distinguished the Army's howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. howitzer, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced

86Ibid.; p. 65. 872000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 88Ibid.; p. 65. 89Ibid.; pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84. 902002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66.

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Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000. After analyzing six proposals from private industry, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army's LW155 from the basic LW155 (type classified as the M777 in 2003) for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated it the XM777E1 (type classified as the M777E1 in 2003) and made the Army the lead agency.91 With the emergence of the M777E1, two LW155 programs existed -- the M777 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities and the M777E1 with digital capabilities.92

In 2001 a critical problem unexpectedly challenged the viability of the TAD program. Early in the year, the Army realized that it had underestimated program costs and lacked the funding to continue. This caused the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, to ask the Army for additional funding and to examine the possibility of terminating the TAD program and restarting it. The Army subsequently increased the existing funding of $52 million by almost $22 million. When a second funding problem was identified in the summer of 2001, all parties involved in the program concurred that it would be impossible to get more money so soon after the increase in the spring of 2001. As a result, General Yakovac gave the Program Manager and the Field Artillery School ninety days to find a solution. If they failed to provide a solution, he planned to terminate the program and to try to restart it correctly. In response to the tasking, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, searched for ways to continue work on TAD because of the need to digitize towed artillery and to abandon wire and aiming circles and even suggested taking a block approach at the minimum to develop the TAD but retired before a final decision was reached.93

After succeeding General Stricklin in August 2001, Major General Michael D. Maples evaluated three different courses of action for TAD. He could recommend terminating and restarting the program, funding a block approach, or pushing for a full development program. Each had strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing that terminating and restarting the program ran the risk of losing all funding and presented other problems, General Maples rejected it. Pushing for the full TAD also presented the possibility of losing the entire program because of funding issues. As a result, General Maples opted for a two-block approach. Based upon XVIII Airborne Corps Airborne/Air Assault package requirements, block one TAD would have objective hardware and limited software to provide limited communication capabilities with the fire direction center and would be fielded in 2006. Block two TAD would be the objective hardware and objective software and would be fielded sometime after block one had been introduced. Late in the fall of 2001, General Yakovac accepted the block approach but cautioned the Field Artillery School and General Maples that funding constraints might force them to live with only block one. Even so, work began on block one hardware and software late in 2001 with a successful early user

912000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS

ACH, pp. 66-67. 92Ibid.; p. 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; Report, subj: Force Application

Working Group, 26 Oct 04, Doc III-70. 932001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89.

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assessment held in July 2002.94 In July 2002 General Maples reiterated the significance of TAD on his cover

memorandum to the revised JORD that was later approved by TRADOC in September 2002.95 "The XM777E1 version of the LW155, with its embedded Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package will increase these forces' [Marine Corps field artillery units, and Army light, medium, and special purpose forces] strategic deployability, lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility," he wrote the Commander of TRADOC on 30 July 2002 subsequent to the XM777E1 early users test of 16-18 July 2002 where a mockup TAD-equipped howitzer was well received by Army and Marine Corps personnel. The successful completion of the TAD detailed design review on 30 October 2002 allowed moving into building and testing actual TAD components and software.96

Following the Milestone C low-rate initial production decision in November 2002 and the TAD design review, the program shifted focus to the TAD-equipped M777E1. The Army and Marine Corps began aggressively pursuing efforts to combine future M777 and M777E1 testing with the objective of a single system operational test late in FY2004.97

In 2003 development moved forward. In February 2003 the contractor delivered the first of two pre-production XM777s from its factory in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Initially intended by the contractor to help transfer construction technology and expertise from the United Kingdom to the new factory in Hattiesburg, these systems proved vital in combining M777 and M777E1 testing during the year. Subsequently, the contractor rebuilt three XM777s with TADS. These systems were used for electro-environmental effects, wear, fatigue, blast overpressure, extreme cold weather, software, and other testing during the year. In July 2003 the government and contractor started integrating the Excalibur 155-mm. projectile with the M777 by firing seven ballistic simulator rounds successfully. Altogether, the four LW155s (one M777 and three M777E1s) passed their respective tests during the year. Based upon this, the Marine Corps and Army held an operational test readiness review in December 2003. At that time all parties agreed that the system was sufficiently mature to begin operational test and evaluation.98

In 2004 the Marine Corps and Army conducted a four-phase Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation to determine the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the M777 and M777E1 with both the TAD Digital Fire Control System and the onboard conventional Optical Fire Control. With the TAD Digital Fire Control System turned off, both services considered the M777E1 with onboard conventional Optical Fire Control to be representative of the base M777. From 14 January 2004 to 3 March 2004, they carried out the Artic phase at Fort Greely, Alaska, using a pilot production M777E1 with TAD Digital Fire Control System which was the most advanced of the EMD howitzers to determine system's ability to operate in cold weather. Five months later from 25 August 2004 to 24 October 2004, they held the temperate phase at Twenty Nine Palms, California, using the low-rate initial production howitzer. Subsequently, the Marine Corps and Army carried

942001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68. 952002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68. 96Ibid. 97Ibid.; pp. 68-69; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86.

98Ibid.

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out the Amphibious phase at Camp Pendleton, California, from 25 October 2004 to 31 October 2004 and the Port Operations phase at Naval Station, San Diego, California, on 1 November 2004. With the exception of the Artic phase, the other phases employed the low-rate initial production howitzer. Altogether, test crews fired over twelve thousand rounds. Along with other tests, this successful operational test and evaluation prompted both services to determine that the M777 and M777E1 were operational effective and operational suitable.99

In the meantime, the M777E1 and M777A1 passed other significant milestones. Early in 2004, it successfully completed an airdrop test, a software test, a mobility test, and a logistics test. Late in 2004, Fort Sill received three M777A1s new equipment training scheduled for early 2005.100

Meanwhile, the Marines and Army made programmatic decisions. During the latter months of 2004, the JORD went through Joint Requirements Oversight Council staffing beginning with the Force Application Board on 26 October 2004, the Functional Capabilities Board on 2 November on 2004, and the Joint Capabilities Board on 2 December 2004. Upon reviewing the program, the Joint Capabilities Board recommended a "paper" Joint Requirements Oversight Council that subsequently approved the Operational Requirements Document on 31 January 2005. Shortly afterward 23 February 2005, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Littoral and Mine Warfare, Roger Smith, and the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems, Kevin Fahey, briefed the M777 program to their superiors in the Department of the Navy which led to an approval to enter into full-rate production. On 3 March 2005 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Acquisition, John J. Young, signed the Full-Rate Production Decision Memorandum. That same day the Marine Corps approved fielding the M777.101

99Email with atch, subj: Lightweight Towed 155, 11 Mar 05, Doc III-71; Report, subj: Force Application Working Group Meeting, 26 Oct 04; Interview with atch, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, 8 Mar 05, Doc III-72; Memorandum, subj: Independent Evaluation Report for the Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation of the M777E1 LW155 with TAD Program, 8 Feb 05, Executive Summary, pp. 1, 5, 8-10, Doc III-73; Minutes, FCB, 2 Nov 04, Doc III-74. 100Email with atch, subj: Lightweight Towed 155, 11 Mar 04; Report, subj: Significant Activities, 13 May 04, Doc III-75; Report, subj: Significant Activities, 15 Jul 04, Doc III-76; Memorandum, subj: Proposed Test Plan for Airdrop Certification Testing of M777 LW155mm Howitzer, 23 Jul 04, Doc III-77; Report, subj: Significant Activities, 8 Apr 04, Doc III-78; Report, subj: Significant Activities, 16 Sep 04, Doc III-79; Msg, subj: Good News Daily, 28 Oct 04, Doc III-80; Email with atch, subj: LW155 History, 8 Mar 05, Doc III-81; Memorandum for Joint Program Manager, LW155, 3 Mar 05, Doc III-82; Memorandum for Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, subj: Advanced Towed Cannon Artillery System ORD, 31 Jan 05, Doc III-83; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Yager, 8 Mar 05; Minutes, LW155 FCB,2 Nov 04; Memorandum for Commanding General Marine Corps Systems Command, subj: Full Rate Production Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155) Program, 10 March 05, Doc III-84. 101Email with atch, subj: Lightweight Towed 155, 11 March 05.

75

Multiple-Launch Rocket System

Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2004 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision and making the launcher more responsive. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including MLRS. Also, the high dud rate of munitions, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate led to the requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket with a range of forty-five kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A range of forty-five kilometers would increase the commander's ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews.102

After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS rocket rocket with the M77 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) with a standard fuse in 2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Desert Storm in limited quantities, it turned its developmental efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under development and that could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free-flight MLRS rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket's global positioning system (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of fifteen kilometers to a maximum of sixty to seventy kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional fifteen kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit equipped scheduled for 2004. Technical problems arose in 2000 and caused the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.103

The restructured schedule and rising production costs in 2000-2001 caused the Army to hold a Special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 required the Army to determine if the system was essential to national security, to assess the availability of an alternative with equal or greater capability, to ascertain if the program was

1022000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87. 1032000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72.

76

adequately staffed to control costs, and to assess if unit costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions satisfactorily, then development would be stopped. The review favorably answered the questions; and development continued.104

As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests of 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than seventy kilometers to the target area and dispensed its submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.105

Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between fifteen to seventy kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket's maturity and accuracy and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). Operational testing was scheduled for 2005, and an initial operational capability was planned for 2006. Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved GMLRS for fielding. Upon fielding, GMLRS would enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extend the range of MLRS fifteen kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket would not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.106

Additional testing occurred in 2004. During September and October 2004, Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than twenty-four GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements and that the rocket could be delivered in 2005.107

Meanwhile, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket. Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring the unitary rocket. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a time-delay fuse, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or

1042001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 105Ibid., pp. 72-73. 106Ibid., p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89.

107Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeffrey L. Froysland, TSM RAMS, 8 Mar 05, Doc III-85; Lockheed Martin News Release, 11 May 04, Doc III-86.

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targets and then detonate the rocket. Besides the availability of three different fuses, the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket would be equipped with an anti-jam antenna to maintain accuracy in the presence of GPS jamming.108

After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 Guided Unitary MLRS passed Milestone B in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability in 2007. The initial Guided Unitary would have only a point detonating and a delay fuse, while the follow-on Guided Unitary MLRS rocket would have a proximity fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition's effects to the mission requirements.109

Even before operational testing could be done on the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004 following extensive discussions, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement to the Army on 12 October 2004 for the rocket. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment to attack high pay-off targets and provide large area coverage at the same time; and Guided Unitary MLRS met those requirements.110

The Army validated General Metz's request on 6 January 2005 and accelerated work on the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket. Within 194 days the Army would ship 72 rockets with the point detonating and delay fuse to OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Six months later, the Army would send an additional 144 rockets. Three hundred days after the delivery of the 144 rockets, the Army would dispatch the remaining 234 rockets with point detonating, time delay, and proximity fuse capabilities.111

In the meantime, work progressed on a self-destruct fuse for Guided DPICM MLRS. Initially, the Army had the objective of reaching a hazardous dud rate of less than one percent and conducted a competition using self-destruct fuses from four different companies in 2003. During competition, KDI Precision Technologies' (an American company) fuse achieved a dud-rate of less than one percent and was selected by the Army as the primary fuse vendor pending full-rate production verification. The other vendors were currently in a fly-off to determine who would be the backup vendor.112

MLRS Launcher Upgrade. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and improvements to its fire control system

1082000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89. 109Ibid.

110Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeffrey L. Froysland, TSM RAMS, 8 Mar 05. 111Memorandum with atch for Director, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-86a; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 8 Mar 05. 1122003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 89-90.

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and launcher drive system. To combat the growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by decreasing the time to aim, displace, and reload the launcher.113 For several years the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two modernization efforts would produce the M270A1 launcher early in the twenty-first century. Subsequently, the Army opted to modernize the MLRS chassis into the M993A1 Carrier by adding a power take off pump to maintain precise, constant engine revolutions per minutes, and by improving its electrical system, among other things.114

Over the years, developmental work on the M270A1 launcher progressed. Based upon successful testing of the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System early in 1998 to demonstrate that the deficiencies identified in 1997 testing had been fixed, the Program Executive Officer of Tactical Missiles, Brigadier General Willie Nance, approved the low-rate initial production (LRIP) of forty-five launchers on 28 May 1998. At the same time he established a goal of conducting the initial operational test and evaluation in September 1999 and fielding the launchers in the fourth quarter of FY 2000.115

Meanwhile, the Transformation of the Army Campaign Plan caused the Army to revise the number of M270A1 launchers to be purchased. Initially, the Army had planned to buy 857 launchers. With the emphasis shifting to medium forces of the Objective Force of Army Transformation, the Army cut the number to 412 in 1999. These launchers would go to the counterattack forces of the III Corps. Subsequently in February 2001, the Army increased the number of launchers to 456 to ensure that sufficient systems were fielded to include U.S. Forces, Korea. A few months later in August 2001, the Army cut the number of battalions to be fielded with the M270A1 from twenty to fifteen based upon the Army's recapitalization decision. In 2002 the Army further decreased the number of M270A1 battalions to be fielded to ten and decided to retain the M270 battalions until the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) could be fielded and replace them sometime in the future. Thus, in three years, the number of battalions of the M270A1 to be fielded decreased from twenty to ten for a fifty percent reduction with fielding to be completed in March 2006. This reduction reflected the growing emphasis upon the Transformation of the Army and the M270A1's ties with the Legacy Force, later called the Current Force.116

In September 2000 system integration anomalies, in the meantime, emerged that adversely influenced system functionality and operational safety. This forced the Army to move the early system integration testing phase from December 2000 to March 2001 and to reschedule initial operational test and evaluation from April-May 2001 to August-September

1132000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 74. 1142000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 74. 1152000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75. 116Ibid., p. 75.

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2001. To meet the new schedule the contractor made numerous software fixes, while revised crew procedures during reload and maintenance operations were implemented to ensure soldier safety so that the system would be ready for testing in 2001.117

In 2001 the M270A1 underwent the scheduled testing. Early in the year, the Army conducted a logistical demonstration test and followed this with a maintenance demonstration test. In April 2001 the Army held an extended system integration test at Fort Sill to determine the system's readiness to enter into initial operational test and evaluation in August 2001. Based upon the success of the integration test, the Army administered a two-phase initial operational test and evaluation in the fall of 2001. The Army held the ground phase at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the flight phase at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Designed as a side-by-side comparison with the M270 launcher, the ground phase consisted of three, ninety-six hour operational scenarios. During the flight phase, the M270A1 launcher fired a variety of MLRS munitions (M26 basic rocket, M26A2 extended-range rocket, M28A1 reduced-range practice rocket, and M39A1 ATACMS Block 1A). In each phase soldiers from the 1-12th Field Artillery operated both the M270 and the M270A1 launchers. Based upon the results of the operational testing that was concluded in October 2001, the Army test and evaluation community deemed that the M270A1 was suitable and effective. The M270A1 demonstrated its ability to load, hide, move, aim, shoot, and reload in an unprecedented manner. When it was compared to the M270, it reduced nearly every time standard to include total mission cycle time, launcher lay, the completion of fire, reload, and the last round fired to first movement. The shorter times improved effects on target and increased soldier survivability by demonstrating that the launcher could receive, process, service the target, and move long before the crew would be susceptible to counterfire.118

In 2002 the Army continued software improvements, conducted integration testing with various rocket and missile munitions at White Sands Missile Range, and started fielding the M270A1. The 2nd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, received the eighteen systems in April 2002 and started training on them shortly afterwards. About the same time the 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery of the 49th Armored Division of the Texas Army National Guard that was a roundout unit to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) obtained new M270A1 launchers and initiated training. In the meantime, the Army fielded M270A1 launchers to the 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery in Korea in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, the 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery in Korea in the first quarter of FY 2003, and the 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in the first quarter of FY 2003. In response to world events, the Army moved up fielding the M270A1 to the 2-4th Field Artillery nearly one year to December 2002. Subsequently, the Army fielded ten M270A1 launchers to the Republic of Korea Army in 2003, fielded the M270A1 to 1-21st Field Artillery in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, in the first quarter of FY 2004, and planned to equip the 3-13th Field Artillery at Fort Sill with the launcher in the second quarter of FY 2004. As planned, ten battalions, prepositioned stocks, and institutional training and testing centers would receive the 225 launchers with fielding completed in 2006. Of the ten battalions, five

1172000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 124-25; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75. 1182001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76.

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had their M270A1s at the end of 2003.119 Fielding continued into 2004. Early in the year, the 1-21st Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry

Division, Fort Hood, Texas, received its M270A1s. Later, the 3-13th Field Artillery received its M270A1s just prior to part of the unit deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and then the 1-142nd Field Artillery of the Arkansas Army National Guard received its launchers. The 3-13th Field Artillery's launchers were equipped with the Improved Weapons Interface Unit that would allow them to shoot precision-guided munitions to be fielded in the near future, while the 3-13th Field Artillery's, the 1-142nd Field Artillery's, and the 1-21st Field Artillery's launchers came with the six hundred horsepower engines that replaced the five hundred horsepower engine to permit keeping up with the Bradley fighting vehicles. Altogether, the Army fielded sixty-five M270A1s in 2004 and had plans to field forty more launchers in 2005.120 Non-Line of Sight Launch System

In "Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century" in the Field Artillery Magazine in the May-June 1998 edition, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, outlined the school's vision of the future for fire support. Among other things, the vision proposed an advanced fire support system that would be a family of precision missiles. They would have the capability of attacking with precision or loitering over the target area before attacking with precision and would not require a large, heavy, expensive and crew-intensive launch platform.121

Out of this vision evolved the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) NetFires technology demonstration program. Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing Corporation began work on the concept definition in 1998 to establish an initial concept. In 1999 the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill became the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) proponent to give DARPA and the contractor teams the information needed to develop critical design parameters and system characteristics. One year later in August 2000, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon started fabricating the system with detailed design for both missile variants (precision attack missile and loiter attack missile) being completed later in the year. Basically, NetFires, later renamed the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) to avoid confusion with Fort Sill's Networked Fires concept, would consist of a container/launch unit with fifteen containerized missiles, and an on-board computer and communications system. NLOS-LS would deliver two missile variants -- the loiter attack missile (LAM) with a range of seventy kilometers plus a loitering time of approximately thirty minutes and the precision attack missile (PAM) with a maximum range of forty kilometers.122

1192002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92. 120Interview with atch, Dastrup with Charles H. Akin, TSM RAMS, 17 Feb 05, Doc III-87; Email with atch, subj: TSM RAMS Training Report, 14 Feb 05, Doc III-88; Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Input Report, 15 Feb 05, Doc III-89; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher Upgrade and Fielding, 1 Mar 05, Doc III-90.

1212002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102.

122Ibid., p. 103; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 122-23; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 93; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS

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Over a period of several years beginning in 2001, the DARPA-managed NetFires/NLOS-LS technology demonstration program designed, fabricated, tested, and demonstrated small, container-launched missiles to provide massive, responsive, precision firepower early in a conflict. NetFires/NLOS-LS would be designed for a low logistics burden and low life-cycle cost. The system would be shipped in its launching container, would require no additional launch support equipment, and could be fired remotely from trucks, a variety of other platforms, or the ground. NetFires/NLOS-LS rounds would be ready to fire almost immediately, resulting in a much faster response time and a higher potential rate of fire than possible with current howitzers or missile launchers and would provide a precision non-line-of-sight (NLOS) capability. Equally important, NetFires/NLOS-LS would operate within Battle Command System, would be one of eighteen Future Combat Systems core systems, and would be organic to the Unit of Action in the Objective Force.123

In June 2002 the Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and Fort Sill's Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory began a cooperative examination of NetFires/NLOS-LS Command, Control, and Communications (C3). From November 2002 through September 2003, they conducted four experiments to develop NLOS-LS C3 technical requirements and demonstrated a networked C3 solution.124

In the meantime, on 25 October 2002 there was a successful test of the NetFires/NLOS-LS controlled test vehicle number one at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The entire system, including the missile, container/launcher unit, and test control unit performed flawlessly. Preliminary review of the pre-launch and post-launch data indicated that all primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved. Upon ignition of the flight test motor, PAM controlled test vehicle number one left the launch canister vertically. The thrust vector control assembly successfully guided the missile during the first three seconds of flight. The missile successfully pitched over toward its intended impact area. In the first forty seconds of flight, the missile performed each of its programmed maneuvers prior to apogee of approximately twenty thousand feet. At that point the missile successfully performed its second and third set of maneuvers. Following the completion of the third set of maneuvers, preliminary review of the data indicated that the missile successfully glided to its intended impact point.125

In view of the successful tests, the Army initiated a formal NetFires/NLOS-LS acquisition program in 2003. In June 2003 oversight of the program moved from the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill to the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Rockets and Missiles (RAMS). Concurrently, the Army established Fiscal Year (FY)

____________________

Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-86a. 1232001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 122; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 103-04; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; "DOD Says Budget Cut, Ending NLOS-LS would be Detrimental to FCS," Inside the Army, 12 Jul 04, p. 3, Doc III-91; "Army Considering Cuts to FCS Non-Line of Sight Launch System," Inside the Army, 12 May 04, pp. 1, 6, 7, Doc III-92; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-86a. 1242003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05.

1252003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94.

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2010 for equipping the first unit for operational testing and FY 2013 for full operational capability. In the meantime, in controlled test vehicle number two, a PAM was launched and flew nineteen kilometers using only GPS navigation to impact twenty-nine inches from the intended target. Two months later in August 2003, in guided vehicle test number one, a PAM was launched and flew nine kilometers using its semi-active laser seeker to locate successfully and to impact a stationary target that was being laser designated by a ground observer.126

Work on the Non-Line of Sight Launch System moved forward in 2004. In March 2004 the Army signed a contract with NetFires, a limited liability company established by Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon, for a six-year System Design and Development (SDD) of the Non-Line of Sight Launch System. This contract included designing the unattended Container Launch Unit, the Loitering Attack Missile, and the Precision Attack Missile. After considering termination of the Non-Line of Sight Launch System, the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 subsequently modified the system's acquisition program. The bill cut Non-Line of Sight Launch System funding by $15 million, accelerated work on the Precision Attack Missile, and slowed down work on the Loiter Attack Missile. The bill retained the Loiter Attack Missile in the science and technology base for further maturation and permitted moving the Precision Attack Missile into System Design and Development because its technology was easier to integrate with the Current Force than the Loiter Attack Missile's.127

In view of the funding modification, the Army revamped its fielding plan with the intent of fielding the Non-Line of Sight Launch System's Precision Attack Missile and Container Launch Unit by 2008. To accomplish this objective the Army accelerated developing the Precision Attack Missile and Container Launch Unit to get it to the field as soon as possible through spiral development. Development would proceed in discrete phases or blocks, each of which would result in the development of fieldable prototypes. Moving into the next phase or block meant that the prototype had to meet specific performance parameters. Also, as one of the first three Future Combat System systems to be employed in the Current Force, NLOS-LS with PAM would be incorporated into the Fires Battalion of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team in 2008. This organization later would be transformed into a modular brigade and finally became the FCS Unit of Action in 2014.128

126Ibid.; pp. 94-95; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05. 127Fact Sheet, subj: Lockhart Raytheon JV Gets Billion Dollar Non-Line of Sight Contract, 23 Mar 04, Doc III-93; Fact Sheet, subj: Netfire Limited Liability Company Receives $1.1 Billion Contract for System Development, 22 Mar 04, Doc III-94; Briefing (Extract), subj: Non-Line of Sight Launch System, 27-28 Oct 04, Doc III-95; Interview with atch, Dastrup with CPT Samual S. Ancira and MAJ Mark H. Laflamme, TSM RAMS, 25 Feb 05, Doc III-96; MAJ Charles J. Emerson, Jr., and MAJ Mark H. Laflamme, "NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04, pp. 7-11, Doc III-97; Email with atch, subj: Non-Line of Sight Launch System, 28 Feb 05, Doc III-98; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-86a.. 128Email with atch, subj: Non-Line of Sight Launch System, 28 Feb 05; Briefing

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High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

Acknowledging that the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) M270 and M270A1 launchers lacked the ability to support light, airborne, and air assault divisions and forced/early entry contingency forces operations and lacked the inter-theater tactical deployability to meet Stryker and Objective Force requirements, the Army continued working on fielding the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in 2004. Upon being fielded, HIMARS would provide the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces and emerging Objective Force requirements. HIMARS would not only replace the aging towed M198 155-mm. Howitzer but also the M270 and M270A1 launchers as they reached the end of their service life. The HIMARS mission as part of the MLRS fleet of launchers would provide field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires for Army, theater, corps, and joint/coalition forces and future Objective Force Unit of Action and Unit of Employment Support operations.129 A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system that would be capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The Operational and Organization Plan stated that U.S. light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and M270 MLRS launchers, these systems' lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS unit and would expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.130 Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the

____________________

(Extract), subj: Future Combat Systems: FCS Documentation Plan and Spiral KPP Concept, undated, Doc III-99; Briefing, subj: NLOS-LS Program Update, 8 Sep 04, Doc III-100; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Ancira and Laflamme, 25 Feb 05; Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS, 28 Feb 05, Doc III-101; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05..

1292002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95.

1302002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78.

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light forces. It would do this while remaining as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability capabilities would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 cannons, MLRS launchers, and HIMARS launchers revealed that the HIMARS was approximately twenty percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately seventy percent more effective than the M198 alternative.131 In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) on 3 December 1992 that outlined the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.132 In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high-payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force artillery structure. In light of this evidence, the Army subsequently funded HIMARS.133 Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, planned to conduct an Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, "shooters," and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These selected systems would be C-130 deployable and would be used by the first-to-fight forces anywhere in the world. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes.134 In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI's assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 launcher's time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS. With the recommendation from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), HIMARS was selected as one of only four "leave behind" systems following the ACTD to provide a limited go-to-war capability. Three HIMARS prototype launchers remained with the 3-27th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg and one was sent to Lockheed-Martin, Dallas, Texas, for troubleshooting after the ACTD.135 One year later on 19 October 1999, TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS Operational Requirements Document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for sixteen HIMARS battalions -- two in the active force and fourteen in the

131Ibid., p. 78. 132Ibid. 133Ibid. 134Ibid., pp. 78-79. 135Ibid., p. 79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97.

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Army National Guard.136 HIMARS made significant progress the following year.137 Impressed by the exercise

in July 2000 where HIMARS demonstrated its deployability and firepower and influenced by need for a general support weapon system to furnish fire support in the early stages of amphibious operations, the U.S. Marine Corps decided in December 2000 to participate with the Army in the EMD phase by purchasing two EMD HIMARS for a two-year user evaluation program in 2002-2004. In view of this development, the Army announced that EMD HIMARS would be delivered in FYs 2001 and 2002 for testing by the Army (six launchers) and U.S. Marine Corps (two launchers) and that low-rate initial production would begin in FY 2003.138

The Army which had the lead in developing HIMARS and the Marine Corps made several key decisions with the system in 2001. Early in the year, the Marine Corps announced its plans for HIMARS. Upon receiving its two EMD HIMARS in October 2002, it would form them into a platoon for early user training; would train the crew; and would refine techniques, tactics, and procedures and general support doctrine. To move the aging MLRS M270 launcher out of the inventory faster, the Army decided later in 2001 to field HIMARS to selected M270 units before replacing the M198s as initially intended with the exception of the first unit equipped being an M198 unit. The Army decided to put soldiers on the EMD launcher at Fort Sill in August 2002 for an extended system integration test (ESIT) of the October 1999 HIMARS Operational Requirements Document's (ORD) key performance parameters.139

Other critical developments influenced HIMARS in 2001-2002. In August 2001 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army designated HIMARS as an acquisition category (ACAT) I project and increased the number to be purchased from 363 to 888 for two key reasons. First, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan designated HIMARS as an Interim to Objective Force system, meaning that it would play a key role in the Transformation of the Army. Second, the Army made the MLRS M270 launcher part of the Legacy Force, renamed Current Force in 2002, and did not intend to spend additional funds to modernize it beyond the M270A1 that was under development. Making the HIMARS an ACAT I acquisition also gave it more visibility and more oversight by the Department of the Army than previously when it was an ACAT II. Subsequently on 16 May 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense redesignated the HIMARS as an ACAT ID to indicate that the Department of Defense would have oversight of development because of its importance in the future force. Seven months later on 17 December 2002, the Secretary of Defense downgraded HIMARS to ACAT IC give more authority to the Army.140

In the meantime, the Army conducted two extended system integration tests. After training the crews the Army held the first test during the last two weeks of August 2002 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Still in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, one EMD HIMARS demonstrated the ability to receive a fire mission, to move to the firing point,

1362002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 1372000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 125-30; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 138Ibid. 1392000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80. 140Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 98.

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to fire the mission, and to reload and basically proved its ability to perform all of its key performance parameters during two, sixty-hour exercises. One year later in December 2003, the Army completed a second ESIT. Using the same launchers that had been employed in the first ESIT but had improvements that would be found in the low-rate initial production launchers, the Army gathered performance and reliability data for a low-rate initial production configured launcher.141

Following the low-rate initial production decision of March 2003 that outlined the Army's plan to purchase eighty-nine HIMARS and the Marine's intention of buying four HIMARS for additional testing before full production, both services also conducted two production qualification tests in an operational environment in 2003. On 19 November 2003 a C-130 flew the combat-loaded HIMARS more than 650 nautical miles from Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to a dirt airstrip, known as an assault landing zone (ALZ) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to determine how fast it could be offloaded and ready for a fire mission. After landing the Army crew unloaded the HIMARS vehicle in less than five minutes; and the launcher was fully operational and ready to receive a fire mission in less than fifteen minutes. After receiving a digital fire mission, the crew drove the launcher to the firing point and successfully fired six MLRS reduced-range practice rockets. This test demonstrated the system's strategic mobility and its ability to support the early entry forces. Following this test, the Army and Marines conducted the second test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where they successfully fired an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from a HIMARS launcher.142

Further testing took placed in 2004. In January 2004 a HIMARS, manned by an Army crew from the New Equipment Training Division, U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) underwent additional testing to include a flight demonstration that consisted of firing 180 reduced-range practice rockets at pace simulating the Operational Mode Summary Mission profile. While the test did much to demonstrate that HIMARS could meet its performance and reliability requirements, enough software and hardware issues occurred to warrant further investigation and testing once the appropriate system improvements were made. Subsequently in April 2004, HIMARS low-rate initial production launchers fired four Guided MLRS rockets at the White Sands Missile Range to verify Guided MLRS interoperability with the HIMARS launcher, successfully verified rocket performance, and demonstrated the new version of software.143

In June 2004 HIMARS underwent Extended System Integration Test (ESIT) III at White Sands Missile Range. In this test two Low-Rate Initial Production launchers (LRIP) and one LRIP configured launcher, manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, TSM RAMS, and contractor personnel, were put through an operationally realistic scenario consisting of dry and live fire missions (180 reduced-range practice rockets). Test results validated system improvements made since ESIT II and HIMARS's readiness to enter the Operational Test scheduled for September 2004.144

1412002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99.

1422003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: HIMARS History, 16 Mar 05, Doc III-102. 143Email with atch, subj: HIMARS History, 16 Mar 05. 144Ibid.

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Prior to the follow-on testing, a Maintainability and Logistics Maintenance Demonstration was held with soldiers to test the fault isolation and built in test capability of HIMARS and the ability of HIMARS to be repaired and maintained by an Army crew. Also during this time, HIMARS conducted additional developmental testing including nuclear hardening testing, an automotive endurance test and the firing of additional tactical rockets and missiles.145

Following the successful conclusion of ESIT III, the Army and contractors directed their focus and energy towards preparing for the Combined Guided MLRS and HIMARS Initial Operational Test (IOT) scheduled for September 2004. In the Ground IOT which was conducted at Fort Sill, crews from the 2-18th Field Artillery tested three HIMARS LRIP launchers and six resupply vehicles (RSVs) with resupply trailers in an operationally realistic scenario over two ninety-six hour field training exercises. Following the ground phase, the launchers and crews moved to White Sands Missile Range where the flight phase was conducted. Train-up of the crews and maintainers began in July 2004 and continued into August 2004. In the ground IOT at Fort Sill, the three launchers successfully fired 120 live-fire missions totaling 719 reduced-range practice rockets and conducted approximately 240 dry missions. In the IOT flight phase eighteen Guided MLRS rockets and one ATACMS missile were fired to further demonstrate the ability of HIMARS to conduct live-fire missions using representative Army crews under realistic conditions and the ability of Guided MLRS to meet its operational requirements.146 Following the successful IOT, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin a contract in December 2004 for continued low-rate initial production.147

In the meantime, HIMARS participated in the Counterstrike Task Force exercise at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in November-December 2004. As part of this Department of the Army-directed exercise, HIMARS simulated the firing of Guided Unitary MLRS rockets to determine the timelines associated with firing MLRS munitions in these scenarios and to find ways to reduce the time between the acquisition of an enemy mortar or rockets system and the attack of these systems. The Guided Unitary Rocket which was under development was chosen because the need in certain theaters to limit collateral damage.148 As part of this effort, HIMARS used a prototype command and control system located on the launcher known as Enhanced Command and Control (C2). This system allowed the launcher to communicate directly with sensors, reducing the sensor to shooter timeline, as C2 nodes

145Ibid. 146Ibid. 147Ibid.; Interview, Dastrup with LTC William E. Field, TSM RAMS, 3 Mar 05, Doc III-103; Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin's HIMARS Launcher Successful in Series of Production Qualification Tests, 16 Feb 04, Doc III-104; Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin's HIMARS Successfully Fires Guided MLRS Rockets in Recent Testing, 11 May 04, Doc III-105; Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Receives $109 million Contract for Low-Rate Production of Combat-Proven HIMARS, 3 Jan 05, Doc III-106; Email, subj: TSM RAMS, 26 Nov 04, Doc III-107; Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly Update, 27 Oct, 28 Oct 04, Doc III-108. 148Email with atch, subj: HIMARS History, 16 Mar 05; Interview, Dastrup with Field, 3 Mar 05; MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05, pp. 1-4, Doc III-109.

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were bypassed. At the end of 2004, Enhanced C2 was an unfunded Block II requirement for HIMARS that was expected to be fielded in 2007.149 Army Tactical Missile System and Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Army worked on the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II and soon coupled it with the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) in 1994. BAT was designed to employ acoustic and infrared seekers to acquire, classify, and destroy moving armored combat vehicles deep within enemy territory (one hundred kilometers or more). BAT would also have allocation logic to minimize the possibility of multiple BATs engaging a single vehicle and a large acquisition footprint to locate targets within four kilometers of the dispense point.150

After successful testing during the late 1990s, the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) of December 1998 approved entry into low-rate initial production with ATACMS Block II BAT and prepared for the Defense Acquisition Board of February 1999 which had oversight responsibilities for the missile. Successful testing in 1999 led to awarding a low-rate initial production contract in the fall of 1999 with operational testing scheduled in 2000 and initial operational capability for 2001.151

During 2000, ATACMS Block II underwent successful testing. Based upon the results of an operational test in May 2000, the Army concluded that the command and control systems, computers, and target acquisition systems could support ATACMS Block II. Subsequently in August 2000 a test conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, demonstrated the missile's ability to deliver the BAT submunitions to their targets accurately.152

However, the Deputy Undersecretary for Operational Research for the Army decided to suspend the operational testing for the ATACMS Block II BAT scheduled for 2001. He determined that the BAT's seekers would not meet the operational requirements and directed the Army to conduct two BAT drop tests and a missile shoot in 2002. If those tests proved to be successful, the ATACMS Block II BAT would resume operational testing.153

Even before the additional tests could be conducted, the Army's testing community questioned the ATACMS Block II BAT's ability to hit certain countermeasure targets effectively. This caused the Army to hold a special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) in April 2002 to review the acquisition strategy for Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I) BAT under development that would be carried by ATACMS II and would attack stationary armored vehicles and surface-to-surface missile (SSM) transporter erector and launcher (TELS). Rather than making a decision about the future of ATACMS Block II BAT in April 2002, the Army Acquisition Executive, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., postponed making one pending the outcome of an Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). On 9 May 2002 the AROC approved the operational requirements document for the ATACMS Unitary and approved changing the BAT operational requirements document

149Email with atch, subj: HIMARS History, 16 Mar 05. 1502000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 131-35. 151Ibid. 152Ibid. 1532001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82.

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to add as a delivery platform an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in light of the successes of the armed American UAVs in Afghanistan in 2001 and to proceed with UAV and P3I BAT demonstrations and testing. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive directed BAT program to be restructured to reflect the requirement to integrate it with an UAV and to conduct demonstration tests.154

Shortly afterwards on 15 October 2002, a congressional joint appropriations meeting on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 budget terminated the BAT program, leaving the Army with less than one hundred ATACMS Block II BATs in its inventory, and allocated funding for developing and testing the P3I BAT multi-mode seeker technology to be carried on a variety of platforms (ATACMS and Guided-Multiple-Launch Rocket System). Like the BAT but more robust, the P3I BAT would employ acoustic sensors to locate moving targets. Once the acoustic sensor had acquired the target (surface-to-surface missile transporter erector launchers, heavy multiple rocket launchers, and armor), the multi-mode seeker would use its millimeter wave and imaging infrared sensors to track the target to impact. When the system was employed against a silent, stationary target, the submunition would fly a pre-programmed search path and use its millimeter wave and infrared seekers to detect, acquire, and track a target to impact in adverse weather and battlefield obscurants.155

Meanwhile, the Army fielded the Congressionally-directed Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) ATACMS in 2002. Highly responsive, near all-weather, long-range, and GPS-aided, the Quick Reaction Unitary ATACMS added a further deep strike capability for responsive precision employment in areas of dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments. It would provide the corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack time sensitive targets where collateral damage, fratricide, bomblet dud rates, or pilot/aircraft risk might be of concern. It had a range of 270 kilometers and a point detonating fuse.156 Initially, Congress provided $7 million for the development, testing, and procurement of the ATACMS Block IA QRU missile but increased funding. Additional congressional supplemental appropriations in 2001 through 2004 placed 326 QRU systems under contract with 150 of these systems having been delivered through December 2004. The Army's procurement plan only covered procurement of these missiles until FY 2008 unless otherwise directed by Congress.157 In an effort to ensure continued procurement of QRU missiles since no requirement previously existed for the munition, the recommendation was made during the General Officer level adjudication of comments made to the ATACMS Unitary ORD that QRU specific data be added to the ORD expressing it as an increment to the objective Unitary missile. Initially, the idea met some resistance because some feared that QRU would then be viewed as an adequate solution for the objective missile. Based on the fact, however, that QRU met one of three key performance parameters (KPPs) as well as several other factors,

1542000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-35; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100. 1552002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83. 156Ibid., p. 83; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101.

157Email with atch, subj: ATACMS Annual Command History, 22 Feb 05, Doc III-110.

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the decision was made to incorporate spiraling the QRU to ATACMS Unitary in the Unitary ORD.158 Shortly thereafter, the General Officer level comment matrix was sent forward to the Future Center's Director for Capabilities Developments for review and signature. Because he was unavailable, his Deputy Director signed in his absence on 29 November 2004. Pending additional adjustments currently being made to the ORD at the Army level, the signed document was scheduled to be loaded onto the Knowledge Management Database System (KMDS) for joint level review. Upon completion of the joint review, the ORD would then go before several boards preceding the final decision to accept, partially accept, or reject the document.159 In December 2002 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the requirement for an armed Hunter using the BAT submunition with an integrated Semi-Active Laser (SAL) seeker system to be operational by 1 February 2003. Until this, the BAT had been qualified as a submunition in the ATACMS Block II. Both ATACMS Block II and the BAT submunition finished production in December of 2003 with 88 missiles fielded and 1,300 BATs included. As a result of the VCSA directive, the Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) Project Offices successfully completed and demonstrated an Army-directed nine-week Viper Strike (VS) Program at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The VS (two-pound shaped charge warhead) leveraged the BAT airframe and subsystems by replacing the terminal seeker with the SAL seeker. The SAL seeker provided for lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) precision point targeting of an unlimited vehicle threat target set. Moving, stationary, hot, cold, hard, or soft targets could be engaged using a designator from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or from the ground. Although it was still collected, data from the acoustic subsystem was not used in an engagement. The current configuration of Viper Strike used a strap-down seeker that restricted the search field of view for target acquisition. As a result, near vertical attack trajectory against a target was required for optimal performance. For attack of targets between buildings in urban areas, this near vertical attack would be ideal if a line-of-sight (LOS) from a laser designator could be maintained during an engagement. This nine-week program and demonstration validated the Viper Strike (VS) concept and provided the Army an opportunity to deploy armed UAVs with a lethal precision strike capability with minimal collateral damage.160 During the 18 April 2003 Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) decision for the Future Combat System, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army subsequently asked about the status of weaponizing UAVs. As tasked by the VCSA to review the requirement for an armed UAV capability and to provide the way ahead, TRADOC provided the VCSA with an information paper entitled "Road Ahead for Weaponization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS)" on 20 June 2003 that outlined the recommended courses of action. Subsequently, the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army directed the execution of the

158Ibid.; Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05, Doc III-86a. 159Email with atch, subj: ATACMS Annual Command History, 22 Feb 05. 1602003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02.

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near-term actions involving VS outlined in the paper.161 In late June 2003 the Army fielded a VS to a Hunter UAV unit in Iraq. To meet the 30 September 2003 deadline, a joint effort by the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Air Vehicles and Rockets and Missiles (proving the fire support perspective), Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Program Manager Viper Strike, and the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Rucker, Alabama, finalized the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and the concept of operations (CONOPS).162 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided ATACMS with its first combat test since Operation Desert Storm of 1991. From 20 March 2003 to 10 April 2003, field artillery units fired over 450 ATACMS missiles in support of joint combat operations with thirteen Quick Reaction Unitiary ATACMS being part of the initial preparation of the battlefield that allowed the ground campaign to commence.163 During the Mother of All Sandstorms (24-27 March 2003) that had a one hundred-meter visibility and winds gusting up to fifty knots with thousands of Iraqi paramilitary in the area, "Ground based indirect fires (ATACMS) were absolutely critical . . . " according to Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III, the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 3rd Infantry Division.164 This organic fire support capability allowed the ground commander the freedom to maneuver his forces out of contact while setting the conditions for his next fight and permitting him the flexibility to adapt to overcome the actions of an interactive, thinking enemy.165

In the meantime, 2003 saw another variant of the ATACMS missile brought to life -- ATACMS Penetrator (ATACMS-P) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). ATACMS-P ACTD phase took nine ATACMS IAs and converted them to the ACTD model. After the tests six ACTD residual missiles would be sent to U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK), the requesting command. The ATACMS-P ACTD was a separating earth penetrating warhead, designed to attack hard and deeply buried targets. On 11 March 2004 the first ATACMS-P ACTD missile was successfully launched from a M270A1 launcher and scored a direct hit at a range in excess of 130 kilometers. Although the ACTD effort was successful, the Army terminated a follow-on effort to fund Transformation and other higher priority.166 Firefinder Radars

As the Firefinder Q-36 Version 7 radar was being developed and fielded, the Field Artillery School introduced another change to its counterfire radar system modernization program in 1990. Because the existing Firefinder Q-37 radar was based upon 1970s technology and because the Q-36 modernization effort would not meet all of the Field Artillery's radar requirements as initially planned, the School identified the need for developing the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System (ATACS) to replace the Q-37. The Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System would take advantage of leap-

161Ibid.; p. 102. 162Ibid. 163Ibid. 164Patrecia S. Hollis, "3d ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed Battlefield," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 03, p. 12, Doc III-80b, 2003 USAFACFS ACH. 1652003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103. 166Ibid.; Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 04, Doc III-111.

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ahead technology to give the Army a passive system or, at a minimum, passive or active cuing, would reduce the equipment and manpower needs significantly, and would furnish support to the corps area of influence in AirLand Operations. In addition, it would be capable of driving on and off a C-130 and larger aircraft and air insertion by CH-47D helicopter and would reduce crew size from twelve to six to cut personnel costs.167

As it fielded the Q-37 Block I that was an upgrade to the Q-37 as an interim measure, the Army initiated developmental work on the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire Radar, renamed the AN/TPQ-47 in 1998. Besides utilizing advanced technology to furnish dramatically improved capabilities over the Q-37, the Q-47 would replace all Q-37s, including the Q-37 Block I, on a one-for-one basis and would meet the needs of the objective force.168

Challenges influenced the Q-47 program in 2001. In February 2001 a new program manager revised the acquisition strategy to reduce risk to the program. He incorporated a limited user test in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 and a low-rate initial production of three systems in FY 2004 and six systems in FY 2005. Later in December 2001, the Raytheon, the contractor, reported problems with the power amplifier modules and technical difficulties with the antenna software integration and said that it could not meet the date set for the limited user test. The Army assembled a Red Team and sent it to Raytheon to appraise the extent of the problems. Because of the Red Team's analysis, the limited user test was moved to the second quarter of FY 2005 with a low-rate initial production of three systems in FY 2006 and five systems in FY 2007 and with the first unit equipped in the first quarter of FY 2008. In the meantime, the Department of Defense officially designated the Q-47 program as an ACAT II in May 2001. Later on 27 December 2002, the Army officially approved the request of the popular name, the Phoenix Battlefield Sensor System, as the official designation of the AN/TPQ-47 radar.169

Although additional work promised to eliminate any technical deficiencies, the Army terminated the developmental contract with Raytheon in September 2004. Along with the escalating costs and scheduling delays, the Phoenix radar's existing ninety-degree search radius failed to meet the needs of the Army. In view of the contemporary operational environment, the Army required a radar with the ability to spot targets in a 360-degree radius and turned its attention to acquiring a radar with such capabilities.170 Profiler

In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started working to replace the existing meteorological measuring set that used antiquated technology by obtaining data from

1671995 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 141-42. 1682000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 135-37; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 1692001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 104; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2003 USAFACFS

ACH, p. 104; Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112. 170Interview, Dastrup with Sammy Coffman, Dep Dir, FDIC, 10 Feb 05, Doc III-112a; Email with atch, subj: Weekly Training Update, 7 Apr 05, Doc III-112b; "Army Cancels Radar Project Developed by Joint Venture," www.Boston.com, 3 Nov 04, Doc III-112c.

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radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver with the Profiler. As the operational requirements documents, signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) explained, the Profiler would provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to five hundred kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model that acquired information from weather satellites, the current radiosonde, and the integrated meteorological system for the employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munition selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army let the contract for the system to the Environmental Technologies Group (now Smith Industries) of Baltimore, Maryland, and issued a developmental schedule. Operational testing would be in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems would begin in the third quarter of FY 2003. Production of eighty-three systems would begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be in the second quarter of FY 2005.171

Progress with the program moved forward in 2003. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003 with a Milestone C decision expected for the third quarter of FY 2003 and fielding to begin in the second quarter of FY 2005. During March and April 2003, Profiler had a successful system functional demonstration; and Milestone C Decision was granted in May 2003. Developmental testing of the system continued through the rest of 2003 at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, while the initial operational test and evaluation completed late in 2004 revealed software deficiencies that required correcting. As a result, the Army pushed the full-rate production decision back from March 2005 to April 2005.172 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System

The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS in 1981.173

Because of age and escalating maintenance costs, the Army acted. In June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on 12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Position and Azimuth System (IPADS). The Army selected L3 Communications of New York in August 2003 to produce the system. Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Fort Sill and a milestone

1712000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 138; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 84-85. 1722001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; Email with atch,

subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112; Email with atchs, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05, Doc III-113.

1732002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 85.

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decision was made in June 2004 to field the system beginning in 2005.174 The Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and Knight

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle. In 2003-2004 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) continued working on fielding the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) that was programmed to be the successor to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV). Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.175

After funding became available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms got their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality and promised to solve the problems created by the M981 as illustrated by Operation Desert Storm (ODS).176 As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The fire support mission package initially included a laser designator (later removed as a requirement), a ring laser gyro and inertial navigation systems, a forward entry device, a lightweight computer unit, and associated components to process digital information. The M7 BFIST would also have a laser range finder, a global positioning system, a driver's thermal viewer, and a battlefield combat identification system (when it became available) to reduce the probability of fratricide.177

Beginning in 1999, the Army started fielding the M7 BFIST. In 2000-2001 it fielded a total of forty-nine M7 BFIST vehicles to the 3rd Infantry Division, the Field Artillery School, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. In 2002 the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, received thirty-one BFISTs. Two years later in 2004, the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea received nineteen M7 BFISTs.178

The other BFIST, the M7A1, would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package. The M7A1 would have two second-

174Ibid.; pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; Email with atch, subj: RDDI

Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112; Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05, Doc III-113; Information Paper, subj: L3 Communications Space and Navigation Awarded Multi-Year Contract, 12 Aug 03, Doc III-114; Information Paper, subj: L-3 Wins $70 Million Army-Marine Work, 15 Aug 03, Doc III-115; Fact Sheet, subj: IPADS, 15 Mar 05, Doc III-115a.

1752000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39.

176Ibid., pp. 140-41; Briefing, TSM Sensors, undated, Doc III-115b. 1772000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 141; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 42, 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106.

1782000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 141; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 42; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-113.

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generation FLIR sights. The second-generation FLIR on the M7A1 would double the target identification range of the first-generation FLIR on the M7.179 After several years of work on BFIST, the project manager modified the acquisition strategy in 1999 for the M7A1 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially expected. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, as of 2003 and 2004, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions.180

At the beginning of the summer of 2004, the 4th Infantry Division received the first of twenty-two M3A3 BFISTS. Due to modularity, the division received enough A3 BFISTS to equip two Units of Action. However, modularity created a demand for more M7s and M3A3 BFISTS than were financed for production. This prompted the Program Manager Office to search for additional funds for the production of the required vehicles.181

Knight (formerly Striker). Meanwhile, the Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) also employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and urged developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.182

In 1999-2002 several critical events with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the M707 Striker and conducted a successful air-drop test to

1792000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 141-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 107. 1802001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05. 181Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05; Email with atchs, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05, Doc III-113.

1822000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144.

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demonstrate Striker's ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would also be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Equally important, the Army decided in 2001 to equip the first Initial Brigade Combat Team with Striker in lieu of the Fire Support Vehicle variant of the Interim Armored Vehicle because the latter would not be ready for the brigade's operational test in 2002. When the first Initial Brigade Combat Team received their Fire Support Vehicle's late in 2002, the Striker would then be available to be fielded another unit. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002. Meanwhile in 2002, the Army announced that the procurement of Striker in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 would total fifty-four vehicles but later reduced the number to focus funding on the Objective Force under development. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.183

Fielding the Knight continued in 2003-2004. In 2003 the vehicle went to the 1st Armored Division, 10th Infantry Division, and units in the North Carolina and South Carolina Army National Guard. Fieldings in 2004 included the 25th Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 101st Infantry Division, and the 101st Air Assault Division. The 3rd Infantry Division received their Knights with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3). As of the end of 2004, the Army planned to field the Knight to the 10th Mountain Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard, and the 4th Infantry Division in 2005.184 Fire Support Sensor System (FS3)

The FS3 was an engineer change proposal to the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The engineer change proposal integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) onto the LRAS3 that in turn could be mounted on the Knight and Stryker fire support vehicle (potentially BFIST in the future). The FS3 would be complemented by the platform's mission equipment package, providing very accurate self-location and accurate target location. The FS3 would be the most capable observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.185 The Dismounted Optic System

In response to a capabilities shortfall in the Field Artillery, the Army initiated the Dismounted Optic System (DIOPTIC) program in 2003. The DIOPTIC would provide the dismounted observer with an integrated, lightweight, hand-held capability to detect, identify, and locate targets rapidly and accurately and to transmit targeting data to the appropriate

183Ibid., p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 108. 184Email msg with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112; Email with atchs, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05, Doc III-113. 185Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05; MAJ Karen P. Walters, "Target Location and Laser Designation via Electro-Optic Sensors," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04, pp. 22-23, Doc III-116.

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effects provider immediately.186 As planned, the DIOPTIC would reduce the dismounted observer's combat load by replacing the M22 Binocular and the Miniaturized Eye-Safe Laser Infrared Observation Set (MELIOS) with a single-system and would provide approximately a forty percent reduction in the weight that the dismounted observer had to carry. The DIOPTIC also would supply an integrated night vision capability to support the Army's goal to "dominate the night." Rapid and accurate transmission of targeting data would significantly reduce target-processing time and operator error and would increase responsiveness to forces in contact. The DIOPTIC would operate as a direct view optic if power failed to enable mission accomplishment in a degraded mode. DIOPTIC increment one would fill the most urgent warfighter needs as expressed in Operation Iraqi Freedom after action reports. Future DIOPTIC increments would leverage technological advances and link with planned Soldier as a system block improvement to ensure joint interoperability with all variants of the Land Warrior and Mounted Warrior Soldier systems.187 In 2003 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved the DIOPTIC Operational and Organizational Plan to proceed with the development of an Initial Capabilities Document in conjunction with a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System analysis. Having been drafted and staffed worldwide, the DIOPTIC initial capabilities document was completed and forwarded to TRADOC for validation. TRADOC validated Initial Capabilities Document in July 2004 and sent it forward to the Army for review and staffing by the Army Oversight Council in February 2005.188 Joint Effects Targeting System

In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corp Board (AMCB) convened to discuss a common laser-targeting device and directed the services to develop a common system requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began the process of developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, this capability would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, and special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire). The TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers through all existing and planned wave forms. If the JETS were approved, the Army envisioned introducing an enhanced DIOPTIC to meet the TLDS portion of the JETS materiel solution. As of February 2005, The JETS initial capabilities document (ICD) has been completed and sent out for worldwide staffing.189 The Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

1862003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 110. 1872003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 110-11. 188Ibid.; p. 111; Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05. 189Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112; Email with atchs, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05, Doc III-113.

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Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision-guided munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not a man-portable system. In response to this situation and the lack of a man-portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquiring it. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about twenty pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to ten kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system's weight to thirty-five pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.190

Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. The Army developed a corrective action plan as a result; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army made the decision to move into low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models, but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon influenced the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, were scheduled to share sixty-six LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded fifteen test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system's weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.191

In December 2003 the Army made the full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted its fielding priorities at the same time. Priority of the LRIP systems shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division.

1902000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46. 1912001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS

ACH, p. 110.

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Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received twenty-one LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division's COLTs received twenty LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School to incorporate the latest technology into training for enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.192 Lightweight Countermortar Radar

Over the past several years, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light, early and force entry forces, the Special Operations Forces had a critical need for a lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the LCMR prototype that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of seven thousand meters and a minimum range of one thousand meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area. 193 In 2004 the Army started fielding the Special Operations Forces Increment I version of LCMR to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increment I met the immediate needs of deployed army forces, while future spirals (Increment II out) would satisfy the capability gaps identified the Operational and Organizational Concept of 2004.194 Command, Control, and Communications Systems

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. Because the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) was large, heavy, and based on 1950s and 1960s technology, the Army decided to supplant it. In response to a memorandum of 13 November 1978 from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering that authorized a new computer for fire support command, control, and communications, the Army initiated

192Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar 05, Doc III-112; Walters, "Target Location and Laser Designation via Electro-Optic Sensors," pp. 22-23, Doc III-116. 193CW3 Daniel W. Caldwell, "Radar Planning, Preparation and Employment of 3-Tiered Coverage: LCMR, Q-36, and Q-37," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, pp. 43-45, Doc III-116a; Briefing, TSM Sensors, undated, Doc III-115b; MG David P. Valcourt, "Change and Opportunity -- Steady in the Harness," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04, pp. 1-3, Doc III-116b. 194Operational and Organizational Concept for the LCMR (Extract), 25 May 04, pp. 1-6, Doc III-116c; Capability Development Document for LCMR (Extract), 22 Nov 04, pp. 1-15, Doc III-116d; Email with atch, subj: LCMR Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 19 May 05, Doc III-116e.

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work on a successor system to TACFIRE. The Army wanted the new system to optimize operational efficiency, simplify training, ease maintenance requirements, reduce life cycle costs, and improve survivability. After three years of work in 1981, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) approved developing the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to replace TACFIRE and to be a part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) which would be a family of computers, peripherals, operating systems, utilities, and software and would support each individual battlefield operating system.195

After a decade of work on the hardware and the software that was fraught with many developmental delays, the Army decided to field AFATDS software but to introduce it incrementally in versions with each building on the previous to get the software to the field sooner.196 On 27 April 1990 the Army signed a contract with Magnavox for version one (later renamed AFATDS 96) software. Fielded in 1996-1997, version one (AFATDS 96) software provided initial functionality at all echelons of fire support from the corps to platoon level and integrated field artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and close air support into planning and execution functions.197

To accommodate growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army planned to field three different variations of AFATDS version two software between 1997 and 1999 as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and version three AFATDS software in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version Seven in 2000 to match the Army Battlefield Control System numbering). Fielded in 1998 after developmental delays, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above-corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before.198 Later after completing developmental work and correcting deficiencies in 2000, the Army fielded AFATDS 98 that was the first AFATDS software version to address specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.199

As AFATDS 98 was being fielded to active component units and reserve component units, work on AFATDS A99 moved forward in 2001-2002. Extensive tests in 2001 indicated that AFATDS A99 was capable but that it still required some software corrections that pushed material release and fielding back from 2001 to 2002.200

Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS A99, renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Control System (ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. Specifically, it reorganized and simplified

1952000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 148-49. 196Ibid., pp. 149-50. 197Ibid., pp. 150-51. 198Ibid., pp. 151-52; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 111; Email, subj: AFATDS Version

7, 24 Feb 05, Doc III-117. 1992000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 153-54; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112. 2002000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 154-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90.

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menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, incorporated technical fire direction, and was replaced by AFATDS Version 6.3.1 software in 2003. Equally important, the new capabilities of Version 6 allowed eliminating the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Also, AFATDS A99/6 had improved interoperability with other Army Battlefield Control Systems and underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems, including the French ATLAS, the German Adler, the Italian SIR, and the United Kingdom Bates as a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity.201

As fielding AFATDS 6.3.1 was progressing with final fielding to the active component being completed in 2004, the Army moved forward with AFATDS 6.4 which was formerly AFATDS Version 7. Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum standard. To ensure full integration with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working on AFATDS 6.4 in 2003-2004 with the goal of fielding it in 2005. The School also began work on the Effects Management Tool which was a notebook computer designed to hook into AFATDS and Fire Support Coordinator Synchronization Tool that ran on notebook- or tablet-size personal computer. The Fire Support Coordinator Synchronization Tool would provide the fire support coordinator with relevant and near-real time tactical information on fires, targets, and units and would be fielded starting in 2005.202

Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility the Field Artillery and the Army aggressively pursued hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the Palm Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the lightweight tactical fire direction system (LWTFDS) for fielding.203

Of the new systems, the PFED was the closest to materiel release beginning in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. A small, one-channel communications capable, portable computer for the forward observer in all divisions, the PFED which was compatible with AFATDS would allow the forward observer to request or coordinate fire missions, provide combat information, receive orders and information, and interface with laser devices. Initially, the Field Artillery and the Army planned to field PFED beginning in March 2004 or April 2004 but moved that date up to February 2004 in order to equip the 3-7th Field Artillery so that the unit had the system before it deployed to Iraq.204

The LWFTDS, called Centaur, would use palm-size computer hardware similar to the

2012000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91.

202Interview with atch, Dastrup with William D. Sailers, Dep Dir, TSM FATDS, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-118; Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update for 22 Dec 04, 28 Dec 04, Doc III-119.

2032002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113. 2042003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 113-14; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Sailers, 23 Feb 05; Fact Sheet, subj: PFED, undated, Doc III-120; Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systems, undated, Doc III-121; TRADOC News Service, "Field Artillery Fielding Preps 25th Infantry Division for Operation Iraqi Freedom Rotation 3 Deployment," 16 Mar 04, Doc III-122.

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PFED and would eventually replace the battery computer system (BCS) hosted on the lightweight computer unit and would be a stand-alone device. The LWFTDS would also provide early-entry automated fire support capabilities, technical fire control for light fire direction centers and cannon firing platoon leaders, would compute automated safety, and would be fielded starting in FY 2004.205 DEPTH AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK BATTLE LABORATORY

Networked Fires II Command and Control (C2) Experiment

The Command and Control (C2) of Networked Fires II Experiment was conducted from 19 January 2004 to 6 February 2004 and was nested within the Battle Lab Collaborative Simulations Environment (BLCSE) federation of Battle Labs and within the Unit of Action Developmental (UADEV) II Networked Battle Command Experiment conducted at Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Laboratory (UAMBL). Within this environment a real time widely distributed simulations driven experiment using human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations belonging to various Battle Labs/proponents replicated specialized and necessary battlefield functionalities and systems. This federation of models included Objective Force OneSAF Testbed Baseline (OFOTB), Mounted Warfare OneSAF Testbed Baseline (MWOTB), FIRESIM XXI, ATCOM, SLAMEM, EADSIM, ALCES, WECM, UC (Universal Controller), and CMS2.206 The exercise was conducted in two phases. In phase one, Preparation and Training (13–28 January 2004), the world class blue force (WCBF) refined the Unit of Action (UA) Operations Orders and developed the 2nd Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) plans for the exercise during a planning conference on 13–15 January 2004 with training, map exercises (MAPEX), Situational Training Exercises (STXs), and a trial run being conducted on 20–28 January 2004. In phase two, Experimental Runs (29 January–6 February 2004), the record exercise trials were conducted from 29 January to 5 February 2004, and the final after action review (AAR) was conducted on 6 February 2004.207 The overarching purpose of the exercise focused on critically examining and command and control of Networked Fires for the Future Army Force. This effort was only one element of a multiphase, multi-year effort that would inform the Army's transformation in joint capabilities for the Units of Action and Units of Employment. In the initial effort in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 focused on networked fires capabilities and processes for the Unit of Action (UA) in order to fully support the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) priority one experimentation guidance to support key decisions that would inform milestone events for Future Combat System Battle Command. In FY 2005 and beyond the networked fires experimentation and analysis would broaden in scope in order to refine and solidify the capability through the fielding of the threshold and objective Units of Action and include the examination of networked fires for the Unit of Employment (UE).208 The overall experiment objective was to assess the ability of the UA Commander to execute battle command through Networked Fires. Experiment events provided the

2052003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 114; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Sailers, 23 Feb 05; Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systems, undated, Doc III-123. 206Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124. 207Ibid. 208Ibid.

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opportunity to examine critical C2 of Networked Fires as it unfolds from planning through execution and to obtain qualitative and quantitative results to support the following additional study objectives:

1. Provide observations, insights or findings on required networked fires processes, and automated applications and enablers that can be used for the development of the FCS Battle Command software. 2. Provide observations, insights or findings that support the TRAC led post-milestone B System Design and Development (SDD) Key Performance Parameter (KPP) analysis focused on Networked Lethality. 3. Gain initial insights on UA Fires and Effects Cell staff functions and procedures.

4. Gain insights needed to continue to mature emerging Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for the employment and sustainment of the NLOS BN.209

Study issues included: Study Issue 1.1. How are networked fires planned? Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) 1.1.1: What information about

networked fires capabilities and requirements for the UA was required at the time of UA mission planning?

EEA 1.1.2: What Battle Command System automation and tools were required and used to support networked fires planning?

EEA 1.1.3: How was the commander's plan for networked fires disseminated to the force and ingrained in the battle command architecture as a result of mission planning?

EEA 1.1.4: During the operation what adjustments were made to the Commander's plan for networked fires?

Study Issue 1.2: How were networked fires dynamically applied and assessed? EEA 1.2.1: How were targets developed, fused and nominated for engagement

with networked fires? EEA 1.2.2: How did the network enable the application of networked fires to

dynamically attack targets with enhanced responsiveness? EEA 1.2.3: What were the dynamics that changed the UA's ability to apply

networked fires throughout the operation? EEA 1.2.4: How were the effects of networked fires assessed? Study Issue 1.3: How were networked fires managed for the commander? EEA 1.3.1: What UA staff organization(s) were involved in managing

networked fires? EEA 1.3.2: What battle command system applications were used and/or

required to enable the management of networked fires for the commander? EEA 1.3.3: How was networked fires management performed? Study Issue 1.4: How did the organic NLOS BN impact the

UA commander's plan for networked fires? EEA 1.4.1: How were NLOS BN capabilities employed to support the UA

operation? EEA 1.4.2: What were the NLOS BN requirements for sustainment and

replenishment?

209Ibid.

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EEA 1.4.3: What were the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) between the UA Fires and Effects Cell and the NLOS BN HQ?210

The complete analytic methodology was presented in the analysis plan for this study. In summary, however, the methodology originated with a pre-experiment analysis phase characterized by issue development and definition by the study host in conjunction with help from HQ, TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). In this phase a cross walk of FCS and UA Organizational and Operational (O&O) requirements was made against the insights and findings related to the issues being proposed for this study, that had been produced in various TRADOC analytic events to date (i.e. to determine what is known and what isn’t known).211

The study issues were firmly identified and then decomposed into measurable components and worded as questions to be answered through the application of the analysis proposed in this study. The major analytic events were the human-in-the-loop experiments already described for January 2004 through June 2004 and supported (as required) by drill-down analysis that is performed shortly after each of these events.212

The purpose of these drill-down events was to conduct a more focused examination of critical networked fires capabilities and/or processes that were either illuminated or could not be achieved during the primary human-in-the-loop experiment. The human-in-the-loop experiments quantitative data outputs from FIRESIM XXI and OFOTB distributed interactive simulation (DIS) models and other integrated models would be used to the maximum extent possible to provide a daily record of how networked fires enabled the operational plan and battle in simulation. Qualitative data collection instruments would primarily be player and subject matter expert (SME) interviews, as well as surveys and observations collected as appropriate. Data collectors would administer the instruments and be recorders and facilitators to the daily after action reviews (AAR) and hot washes. After ENDEX of each experiment, all the data was analyzed, and reports and the study sponsor in accordance with HQ, TRADOC guidelines, developed briefings of initial, interim and final insights and findings.213

Prior to explaining or discussing the findings, a general discussion of the philosophy behind our analytic approach was necessary. This explanation of methodology and process set the tone for the rationale behind our current interim insights. By design, the UAVDEV2 JAN04 Battle Command and Networked Fires and Effects Experiment were driven by many loosely controlled HITL players. This experiment was designed to flesh out new concepts. As such, its HITL players were liberally afforded operational flexibility to accommodate exploration. This approach yielded discovery and assessment of potential ways that soldiers might interpret and employ these concepts at the various decision nodes. It also provided an excellent big picture subjective assessment of the new concepts.214

Conversely, leaving HITL players largely unconstrained did not lend itself well to objective statistical post-analyses because experimental design control was sacrificed in lieu of exploratory flexibilities. Because of these migrating and uncontrolled conditions

210Ibid. 211Ibid. 212Ibid. 213Ibid. 214Ibid.

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introduced by HITL players, consistent sampling quantities under similar conditions were often either unavailable or untraceable. As such, many traditional and objective statistical measures (i.e., ammunition efficiency) were best postponed to follow-on analysis where HITL players would be removed. Attempts to extract such measures directly from this experiment could be dangerously misleading.215

HITL experiments provided pointer data for more detailed analytic work and study but clearly provided proof in principle views of concepts. Thus, it became important to look at and study multiple sources of information to attain a clearer view of what actually happened during any single event. Skewed numbers or missed and poorly used individual elements might have a logical explanation when the whole picture was considered rather than specific or micro detailed views being reviewed. For example, when you look at why so many precision attack munitions (PAM) were used during the fight you have to consider it was the longest shooting precision-guided weapon immediately available to all players/users/operators.216

During this experiment joint assets were marginally played. This meant a reduced set of destructive tools were made available to the UA and CAB commanders and their subordinates to inflict the required damage prior to setting the conditions for precision maneuver and finishing decisively as directed by the commander within his battle plan. It should also be remembered that the Future Force would be command centric and mission oriented. Reduced resources in one area caused a cascading effect in other areas, thus no or marginal JOINT asset availability meant a greater reliance on internal assets. Additionally the UA had only one battery of supporting HIMARS which could shoot a single "six-pack" or one ATACMS round before it had to recycle through a reloading process, which had an availability timeline associated with it. To further focus his force, the UA commander allowed CAB commanders to use their internal assets LOS, BLOS, and mortar fires in order to engage the most dangerous targets and targets within their areas of operation and responsibility which was immediately assumed to be within their range capabilities. The UA commander further stated that the NLOS BN assets were to engage with its assets the deeper targets and provide supporting fires within the entire UA's area of operation and responsibility which was also interpreted to mean within their range capabilities. During the modified MDMP process the UA commander further said the CAB commanders were to position, secure, and care for the firing batteries for which they had.217

Each battle ran within the used vignettes presented challenges. The total effect and outcome was success according to the UA commander. In fact during the final after action review, he clearly praised the networked fires and effects system on achieving the desired outcomes. The enemies NLOS systems were destroyed to fifty percent level within three hours of start time. His LOS systems were destroyed to a fifty-five percent level within 4.5 hours. The shortest battle run was six hours, and the longest battle run was ten hours. All battle runs together were twenty-four hours.218

Munitions usage was generally speaking twice what was projected for seventy-two

215Ibid. 216Ibid. 217Ibid. 218Ibid.

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hours with PAM being significantly more than projected. The OMS/MP appears to be sustainable and within analytically projected and studied system profiles on the whole. For NLOS-C the achieved sustained profile in this experiment was three missions per cannon per hour, four rounds per cannon per hour, three rounds reloaded per cannon per hour, and two reloads per cannon per hour. The average number of rounds fired per mission was nine rounds with three rounds being fired on three cannons per mission normally. This was done for efficiency and latency reasons with some consideration given to effectiveness.219

NLOS-C was most often used to suppress, neutralize, disrupt, and delay enemy maneuver forces. NLOS PAM was used to destroy enemy systems at range. HIMARS was used to provide both long-range suppressive fires and shocking wide area coverage on threat permanent and semi permanent positions. Detailed analysis of munitions systems without regard to intent and background would lead the casual observer and analysts with the sensing the systems were generally misused and ineffective in relation to specified historically based, current force systems, and attrition-based Cold War measures of success and in relation to these standards they may be right.220

Generally, comments about doctrine covered concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures within the experimentation construct. Sorting them had some value because they pointed to the requirement for review of basic precepts. However, it would be wrong to adopt because of the maturity of the surrogate systems and the techniques and procedures used to employ the UA, the CAB, the NLOS-battalion (BN), the Fires and Effects Center (FEC), or other associated combat elements.221

The NLOS-Bn's footprint was so large that the ability of the NLOS battalion commander to sustain his force and maintain it operational capabilities might become a major challenge. By having him serve as only a unit commander, his role might be diminished and the FEC might marginalize the effect that his perceived and sometimes-real logistics problems might have on the outcome of the actual combat operation. Training and roles missions and task performance need careful definition and further study.222

Making universal observers and shooters of everyone would reduce the focus and prioritization of fires and effects. With everyone trying to say his effort was a priority, nothing would become a priority. This effects doctrine, individual soldier training, and battle command and networked fires system design as well.223

C2 (FIRESIM GUI) design as a surrogate has pointed to the requirement that soldiers will need a system that was easily trained in three to five days for apprentice level usage. It would require two to four weeks for demonstrated journeyman level expertise. Expert or master level expertise, however, would require both formal training and hands-on on-the-job formalized training.224

The experiment further demonstrated the value of simulation in training the future force. It pointed the way to a distributed collaborative environment for integrated staff and

219Ibid. 220Ibid. 221Ibid. 222Ibid. 223Ibid. 224Ibid.

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individual soldier training. However, it should be noted that at the current level of maturity of the BLCSE and federate members that this environment had to many training distracters to validate or verify training readiness for either a unit's, staff's, or individual soldier's combat readiness. The potential was there but needed development and emphasis.225

Experimentation proved the value of the military decision making process (MDMP) as far as leadership was concerned. Although numerous comments pointed out that the experiment had a disjointed MDMP, this seemed to reinforce the requirement for a similar type process or modified MDMP process to adjust for distributed collaboration between nodes and echelons of command to include staff action. This could be accounted for in training, unit standard operating procedures, and material design with limited system artificial intelligence or automated/assisted decision-making and collaboration.226

This experiment was hindered by the lack of doctrinal understanding and training. Although much of this could be set aside as a scheduling issue it was more endemic than that. With smaller staffs and fewer personnel being required to do more tasks, the multifaceted and trained individual who was expert in several areas would become crucial to this force. Within the FEC personnel were expected to know their traditional area of expertise but they were suppose to be knowledgeable in such divergent areas as space weapons usage and employment, physiological operations, civil military affairs operations, information operations, aviation, air defense, air space management and control, and Joint (USAF, Navy, USMC) operations when necessary. Additionally, a level of sophisticated automated systems usage and management was expected. Collaboration and distributed automated teaming would be a leadership challenge in training, planning, executing multiple simultaneous combat operations.227

Nodal functionality from automated systems to personnel management and task allocation needed continued definition. The current state of experimentation provided limited insights into specific operations. For example the FEC membership appeared to be correct, however, inter-staff and intra-staff operations definition needed further clarification. Role, mission, and task definition without participation would not help system or organizational development.228

On several occasions the NLOS-Battery commanders requested that the NLOS-LS PAM CLUs be tasked organized and placed under the control of the NLOS-Bn. This might have been a reflection of to few players or the lack of ability to control all the required resources effectively. This however, also suggested that modularity within the UA and mission might be required to support specific tactical operations for limited durations.229

The networked fires (materiel) portion of the battle command system needed clear functional description. This appeared in the User Functional Description (UFD) for the Battle Command system. There was clearly a need for the system to have user directed and assisted artificial intelligence to help focus UA combat operations to provide commander centric solutions, warning, alerts, alternative solutions, and effects and fires management in relation

225Ibid. 226Ibid. 227Ibid. 228Ibid. 229Ibid.

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to available assets.230 User profiles and database management and system purging would become critical in

relation to information management. However, there remained a requirement for backup of data for future usage during such activities as AARs and investigations into why operations were executed in the manner they were.231

The primary findings on personnel were also found in the UFD. However they focused on man machine interface requirements for the networked system. Operational system requirements fell into areas of simplicity of design and intuitive system usage.232

This experimentation was not designed to provide information for future development of facilities, however one could draw the conclusion that a simulated collaborative environment like the BLCSE could be proliferated through the force to reduce training cost and increase training efficiency. This investment would require and extensive effort in the area of building, hardware, software, and people resources.233

Prior to execution of any experiment an attempt at independent verification and validation of all federate member models and simulations databases should be considered. This effort would look at baseline AMSAA data base compliance, verify common noun naming for entities, ensure common database, common simulations times, common performance characteristics are captured within PDUs. The agency would also ensure common data collection and reduction post processing were ready and in place and tested prior to experiment start. This agency would further be tasked to certify players were trained and ready to begin the experiment. The certification process could be as simple as a statement from each of the directors or sponsors of federate members.234 Command and Control (C2) of Networked Fires and Integrating Experiment 04

In June 2004 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) experimentation into Battle Command issues for Unit of Action came to a focal point with the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) Integrating Experiment 04 (IE04). The purpose of the experiment was to assess the ability of the UA commander to exercise effective battle command in a representative stressful future operating environment. HQ, TRAC's three primary objectives were: 1. In support of Networked Battle Command (FCS Key Performance Parameter [KPP] #2), identify the effects on battle command actions and the ability of the UA to achieve mission success during varied network dependability conditions to support AROC, JROC, and MS B Update decisions.

2. As a battle command technology enabler, inform the Future Combat System (FCS) Battle Command System software development User Functional Description (UFD) in support of the Lead System Integrator (LSI) software build. 3. As processes in support of executing effective battle command, identify and refine UA inter- and intra-nodal functions in support of UA O&O refinement and mission training

230Ibid. 231Ibid. 232Ibid. 233Ibid. 234Ibid.

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plan (MTP) development.235 Two significant lanes of developmental experiments that were spearheaded by the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL) and the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (D&SA BL) shaped this showcase event. Both battle labs nested their Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 experimentation and analytical plans to examine battle command issues for the Unit of Action (UAMBL) of which the Command and Control (C2) of networked fires (Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory (D&SABL) was a critical component and process. Two C2 of networked fires developmental experiments were conducted in October 2003 and January 2004 in conjunction with UAMBL's developmental experiments. The October 2003 experiment was a grass roots examination of networked fires processes and enabling capabilities that were required to support the Unit of Action Company fight. In the January 2004 experiment, the examination of C2 of networked fires was graduated to focus on processes and enabling capabilities that were required to support the Unit of Action Combined Arms Battalion. With the successful completion of these building block events, the examination of battle command and C2 of networked fires for the UA logically progressed to the UA (Brigade-level) and hence the IE 04 event focused on the Unit of Action and was enabled by the Unit of Tactical Employment X (UTEx).236 (Study Issues) The complimentary nature of the D&SABL study plan was such that while the central theme for FY 2004 TRADOC experimentation was UA Battle Command, the Battle Lab facilitated this by examining C2 of networked fires. The intent was to exploit human-in-the-loop experiment venues to examine the C2 and management of networked fires as it unfolded in dynamic virtual scenarios from planning through execution and to obtain the qualitative and quantitative results that would answer the following study objectives: 1. Provide observations, insights and findings on required networked fires processes and the automated tools and applications that enabled these processes, in order to support the development of the FCS Battle Command software.

2. Provide observations, insights and findings that support the TRAC-led post milestone B System Design and Development (SDD) Key Performance Parameter (KPP) analysis focused on Networked Lethality.

3. Gain initial insights on UA Fires and Effects Cell staff functions and procedures. 4. Gain insights needed to continue to mature Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

(TTP) for the employment and sustainment of the NLOS battalion.237 These study objectives were further broken down into the following C2 of Networked Fires study issues which provided the common analytical thread for all of the FY04 experiments the battle lab executed in conjunction with the UAMBL, and HQ, TRAC:

Study Issue 1.1. How are networked fires planned? The purpose of this study issue was to review and codify over the course of several escalating experiments, the actual procedures used to plan networked fires within the UA. In analyzing how the various echelons of fires and effects cells from the company up to the UA accomplish planning, full consideration would be given to the automation available to each Fires Cell, the level of

235Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124. 236Ibid. 237Ibid.

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networked connectivity required and achieved, and the commander's intent and guidance which would be translated into targeting priorities and attack guidance. The following four Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) were prescribed for this study issue.

EEA 1.1.1: What information about networked fires capabilities and requirements for the UA was required at the time of UA mission planning?

EEA 1.1.2: What Battle Command System automation and tools were required and used to support networked fires planning?

EEA 1.1.3: How was the commander's plan for networked fires disseminated to the force and ingrained in the battle command architecture as a result of mission planning?

EEA 1.1.4: During the operation what adjustments were made to the commander's plan for networked fires?238

Study Issue 1.2: How were networked fires dynamically applied and assessed? The purpose of this study issue was to observe and record the dynamic application of fires and effects based upon the approved plan and analyze how the plan was executed. Ideally, a well-thought out plan would provide the required fires and effects when and where they are needed, combining the deliberate attacks of verified target locations with the attacks of opportunity targets that present themselves as credible threats with the potential to hamper or derail the UA operation. The goals were to record how and when automated networked fires processes were dynamically adjusted based on the unfolding operation, what were the assessments and judgments being made by the Fires and Effects cell and what were the effects being delivered. These goals were translated into the following EEAs.

EEA 1.2.1: How were targets developed, fused and nominated for engagement with networked fires?

EEA 1.2.2: How did the network enable the application of networked fires to dynamically attack targets with enhanced responsiveness?

EEA 1.2.3: What were the dynamics that changed the UA's ability to apply networked fires throughout the operation?

EEA 1.2.4: How were the effects of networked fires assessed?239 Study Issue 1.3: How were networked fires managed for the commander? This study

issue focused on the fires and effects organizations that are identified in the O&O concepts to have responsibilities for planning, coordinating and synchronizing the application of Army and Joint effects. The intent for studying this issue was to document the involvement of the various "fires and targeting personnel" who were spread out across various C2 vehicles within the UA Command node. Such documentation would hopefully serve to validate the FA School's premise that the UA Fires and Effects Cell (FEC) was not limited to those personnel who were physically located in the FEC C2V. With clarity on the extent of the collaboration exhibited by the complete FEC, we hoped for associated insights on the automated battle command tools that were used and implied to be needed, which could then be translated into user functional descriptions for FCS battle command system software development. The following EEAs were developed to guide the study of this issue.

EEA 1.3.1: What UA staff organization(s) were involved in managing networked fires?

238Ibid. 239Ibid.

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EEA 1.3.2: What battle command system applications were used and/or required to enable the management of networked fires for the commander?

EEA 1.3.3: How was networked fires management performed?240 Study Issue 1.4: How did the organic NLOS BN impact the UA commander's plan for

networked fires? This study issue built upon the findings of the NLOS Requirements for the Unit of Action Concept Experimentation Program (NLOS Requirements CEP) that was conducted in January 2003 with the special emphasis on employment considerations for the organic NLOS battalion. The three EEAs that further guided the examination of the NLOS BN were intended to identify the nature of the dynamic requirements placed on the organization technically and tactically through networked fires processes. Real strides in quantifying sustainment and replenishment requirements were anticipated from the first ever continuous 72-hour simulated operation planned with IE04. The EEAs for this study issue were:

EEA 1.4.1: How were NLOS BN capabilities employed to support the UA operation?

EEA 1.4.2: What were the NLOS BN requirements for sustainment and replenishment?

EEA 1.4.3: What were the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) between the UA Fires and Effects Cell and the NLOS BN HQ?241A derivative of the DPG-derived, TRADOC-approved Caspian Sea 2.0 scenario was used as a basis of this experiment. In that scenario, a U.S. led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to rescue hostages, defeat an insurgent dissident movement, and restore the host nation's legitimate government. The lead ground element of that CJTF was a UEx, and the UA under investigation in these experiments was one of four UAs in that UE. The concept of operations within the scenario was multi-phased as described below. These operations were modified in a hasty MDMP process conducted at UAMBL during the pilot test and modified several times during the actual operation. The actual overlays were classified SECRET.242

240Ibid. 241Ibid. 242Ibid.

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Phase IIA operations required the 1st UA to conduct an attack immediately following a vertical maneuver into the enemy rear. The UA attacked to the west to link up with 3rd UA and to seize a C-17 capable airfield for use as the UE FOB. Operations in this phase featured multi-directional attacks through open and rolling terrain.243 In Phase IIB operations the 1st UA continued offensive actions immediately after the link up with 3rd UA. The 1st UA continued attacking to the northeast to defeat enemy forces in zone and to seize a series of objectives that isolated the capitol city from reinforcement. A battalion-level vertical maneuver and a company-sized air assault were supposed to be featured in this portion of the scenario. However neither was executed because of limitations in the current state of the federated simulations.244 Finally, in Phase III operations, the 1st UA continued the attack into the capitol city to seize the Rebel High Command center. The 2nd combined arms battalion was the main effort in this phase; executing dismounted urban combat operations enabled by mounted forces.245 Significant Insights/Findings:

Study Issue 1: How are networked fires planned? a. The concept and doctrine surrounding networked fires and effects

continued to prove challenging in execution. How to execute networked fires processes and manage it were not clearly defined or fully developed.

b. Flexible and robust networked fires automated rule sets were needed within a fully automated system. Early in the planning process these rule sets needed to be defined, created, and assigned to correspond to the commander's intent and concept of operation.

c. In performing its primary function to manage the networked fires process the UA FEC was challenged by inexperienced NLOS mission initiators and poor targeting techniques. In accordance with the UA O&O concept everyone on the battlefield was a sensor and theoretically able to initiate NLOS missions as needed. The experiment demonstrated that fire support training was essential at all levels to improve fires management and the effectiveness of fires. Options recommended improving fires management included adding more Career Management Field (CMF) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) personnel to the UA organization and reinstalling the Fire Support Team (FIST) concept within the combined arms battalions.

D. Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT) and FIST. E. Recommendation that UAV operators be cross-trained as 13F and outfitted with

laser range-finding devices. Study Issue 2: How were networked fires dynamically applied and assessed? Key to the dynamic application of networked fires was the automated battle

command process and architecture combined with trained personnel in the Fires and Effects Cell (FEC). In this experiment the Effects Coordinator was given the rudimentary capability to alter the attack guidance matrix (AGM) within the networked fires software (Fire Sim XXI) in order to adjust the priority of targets to engage. If the attack guidance needed to be altered, he would bring up the AGM graphical user interface (GUI) tab and change color

243Ibid. 244Ibid. 245Ibid.

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indicators for selected target types from green to red and vice versa. This input would instruct the software which targets to engage and which not to engage. The ECOORD could reset to the default AGM when the desired effects were achieved. In practice, this process was not very robust or flexible to meet all of the demands for fires across the UA. One of its major shortcomings was that it was not linked to an automated battle damage reporting process. Regardless, this initial capability provided insight into a tool that should be developed further.246

Study Issue 3: How are networked fires managed for the commander? a. Networked fires were managed by the combined and networked

collaborative efforts of all of the fires and effects personnel situated throughout the UA HQ node. This responsibility did not solely reside with the personnel within the UA FEC vehicle. The experiment produced recommendations for personnel adjustments within the UA FEC. Recommendations were made to add an effects officer in CIC 2, to replace the AVN officer within the FEC with an ADAM officer. The CIC 1 Effects NCO recommended that the NCO authorization be elevated to an officer. These recommendations were to be included in the next update review of the UA O&O document.

b. The issue was raised about where the ECOORD should work; and more specifically, what the relationship between the ECOORD and NLOS BN Commander should be. In this experiment both the ECOORD and NLOS BN commander were of equal rank (LTC) with the ECOORD assumed to be more experienced, having already had battalion command. The ECOORD was physically located with the UA Commander in MCG1 while the NLOS commander was located with his unit. The relationship was one of mutual respect and support with UA commander regularly communicating with the NLOS commander to discuss the employment of critical targeting and fires capabilities. Regardless of how well this relationship worked, having two Fire Support lieutenant colonels in the UA might not happen. As such, during the experiment AAR the USAFACFS Commandant stipulated that if the senior Field Artillery commander in the UA was the NLOS BN CDR, then he was also the ECOORD, collocated with the UA commander in the mobile command group. An experienced fires officer in the UA Fires and Effects Cell would ably assist the ECOORD as the Assistant ECOORD while the Deputy Commander and S3 would tactically employ and sustain the NLOS BN.

Study Issue 4: How did the organic NLOS BN impact the UA Commander’s plan for networked fires?

a. The NLOS Battalion's CLIII UAV targeting capability was a high priority capability for the UA. During the course of the battle when the NLOS BN sustained significant losses to its CLIII UAV, the UA commander directed that CL II UAV's be redirected to lead the aerial recon effort into engagement areas ahead of the CLIII UAV's. His intent was to have the CL II's expose the ADA threat without sacrificing CL III's.

b. NLOS Battalion CRO and Sro operations needed clarification, definition and study. The NLOS BN did not have organic resupply assets; there were no more ammo platoons. The consumption rate and the demonstrated OPTEMPO of the NLOS BN were enormous. This was not unlike what has been seen in previous experiments. The dilemma for the UA was determining how NLOS systems could be sustained around-the-clock so that

246Ibid.

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they were available and able to meet the commander's guidance for fires. This issue was not answered in IE04 and warrants further study and evaluation. CASCOM representatives have identified the issue and were working to provide solutions.247 Conclusions. The June 2004 IE04 experiment was an excellent culminating analytical event for the study of Battle Command and the C2 of Networked Fires for the Unit of Action. In addition to the investigation and discovery achieved in UA-level networked fires processes and capabilities, the experiment provided an excellent first look at the new capabilities and organizations for the Fires SUA. Within the Fires focal area, the examination of Networked Fires C2 enabled by the Fires SUA was successful except in the areas of attrition and force effectiveness data collection. The last two areas needed careful scrutiny and realignment throughout the federation. Recommendations for developing study issues for follow-on experimentation were included in the body of the report.248 Unit of Action Developmental Experiment #3: Urban Operations

Unit of Action Developmental Experiment #3: Urban Operations (UADEV 3), was the final experiment for Fiscal Year 2004. It was conducted at the Fort Knox, Unit of Action Battle Lab (UAMBL), on 23 August thru 2 September 2004. This plan supports the TRADOC Army Concept Development and Experimentation Program (ACDEP) and was conducted by the following agencies: UAMBL-EAD, TSM, COTD; TRAC, Ft. Leavenworth; Air Maneuver Battle Lab, Ft. Rucker; Depth & Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, Ft. Sill; Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab; and TRADOC, Futures Center, ADCSINT.249 Experiment Objectives. For this experiment, the following objectives were identified and explored: 1. Assess the use of proposed methodologies to investigate required correlation of forces for dismounted infantry operations with an FCS equipped force in urban environments. 2. Investigate the capabilities of the UA RSTA SQD to provide close support and armed reconnaissance in an urban environment. 3. Investigate required shaping capabilities of an FCS equipped force in an urban environment. 4. Investigate federation requirements to represent the effects of a degraded network and determine factors which effect mission success of a FCS equipped UA. The scenario that was used during UADEV3 was a direct derivation of the TRADOC Caspian 2.0 scenario and was a continuation of the scenario employed to drive previous UAMBL experimentation. It involved operations conducted by a Unit of Action under the control of a UEx headquarters in pursuit of a Joint Campaign Plan. The UEx was conducting the decisive operation for the Joint Force and in order to do so the UA had to attack into urban terrain. The focus of this experiment involved the operations of the UA reinforced by key UEx and Joint enablers. Limitations and Constraints.

247Ibid. 248Ibid. 249Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124

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Limitations. The current configuration of the BLCSE limited the availability of quantifiable data that could be used to underpin all objectives. For this experiment, the two factors that most impacted quantifiable data were :ATCOM/OTB interaction. This resulted in inaccurate and inconsistent performance of entities represented in the ATCOM model. This included all manned aviation platforms, and Class IVa UAVs. This impacted the survivability of the platforms, the lethality of the platforms and the flight profiles of the platforms themselves. This limitation prohibited the use of quantifiable data to underpin capabilities of the RSTA Squadron. TTPs developed and used in this experiment had to be revalidated once these issues are resolved. Latency within the federation. Although much better than previous experiments, latency within the federation, specifically caused by and propagated through the SA servers resulted in unplanned and unmeasured degradation of the network. This had an impact on the UAs ability to provide responsive network fires throughout the duration of the experiment. Constraints. All simulations and models provided the best possible representation of an urban environment. This was dependant upon the capabilities of the individual models and simulations. AMSAA currently had no performance data for urban environments. Correlation of Force definition did not exist relating to the FCS equipped UA. An evolving technique was explored during this event. Evolving Insight(s) and Operational Lessons Learned. Objective 1: Assess the use of proposed methodologies to investigate required Correlation of Forces (COF) for dismounted infantry operations with an FCS equipped UA in urban environments. Evolving Insights and Lessons Learned: Using FCS Operational and Organizational Concepts the FCS equipped UA in the Urban Operations experiment, with support from UE and Joint, generated calculated COFs greater than 2:1 on the objective. Calculation of Correlation of Forces: Based upon battle outcomes, the analytic methodology of calculating COF provided an acceptable means of determining combat power of both friendly and enemy elements. The UA staff did not utilize any structured type of COF calculation during the actual experiment. Commanders relied upon intuition to determine friendly forces required to successfully complete a given objective. The commanders success criteria was tied to BDA of high payoff targets (HPTs) Without perfect intelligence and accurate ways to measure BDA, commanders were unaware of the success of their shaping operations and could take advantage of the COF that existed on the objective. The urban fight revealed the following operational insights: The majority of the UA's losses in the urban scenario were due to the lack of minefield detection and neutralization capability. When employing all available enablers, the CAB was able to dominate the battle space. Using UA ISR assets in a layered approach, consisting of ground and air, manned and unmanned platforms, tied to responsive precision fires, the UA was able to successfully fight the concept within an urban environment.

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Recommendations: Provide commanders and staffs an automated battle-tracking tool that enabled the commander to view confirmed BDA, track current status of Blue forces and aid in COF calculations based upon commanders input tied to decision points. Objective 2: Investigate the capabilities of the UA RSTA SQDN to provide close support and armed reconnaissance in an urban environment. As discussed in the limitations section of this report, federation maturity negatively impacted ability to collect quantitative data to underpin the adequacy of the RSTA squadron. However, the following lessons were observed. 1. Fort Rucker believed the RSTA SQDRN organization is sufficient for urban operations. However, maneuver elements within the UA believed that the RSTA SQDRN needed a ground component element for operations within urban environments. 2. The UA CDR's decision criteria for employing manned systems (ARH, AH-64) was the destruction of threat radar-guided ADA systems. The UA required assistance from the UE and Joint assets to located and destroy those ADA assets. 3. The single-most frequently used asset in the urban fight was the UAVs. 4. Issues surrounding UAV employment techniques/TTPs, modeling shortfalls, UAV operator/staff training shortfalls, and survivability have to be further investigated. 5. RSTA Squadron was more effective in isolating the objectives than providing close support on the objective in the urban area. The most important RSTA SQDN function in urban fight was to provide persistent, continuous surveillance. The second most important function was conducting shaping operations-isolating the threat. 6. More TTPs, SOPs or adequate collection plans were required to integrate RSTA assets and information into the overall collection plan down to battalion and company levels. Recommendations: 1. Conduct follow-on experiments or excursions focused on close support and armed reconnaissance in urban areas. 2. Train commanders and staff on sensor/UAV reconnaissance planning and executing. The focus of the training should be: persistent and redundant coverage techniques, target acquisition and identification, FCS systems capabilities, cross-leveling/planning techniques to ensure coverage of main objective areas. 3. Add more IO/ISR play/scripting to experiments focused on RSTA capabilities and/or on urban-specific objectives. 4. Add/improve IO/ISR functions, behaviors and effects in the models and battle command surrogate. 5. Develop and/or refine TTPs for integrating RSTA and planning/executing ISR/collection plans down to the battalion and company levels. 6. Investigate means within UA to mitigate risk to manned aviation from radar-guided ADA. Objective 3: Investigate required shaping capabilities for an FCS equipped force in an urban environment. Operational Insights and Lessons Learned. The FCS equipped UA was very successful in setting conditions for the urban fight. Throughout the earlier phases of the operation, the UA was successful destroying/neutralizing HPTs on successive objectives. This enabled the UA to focus CAB assets on setting conditions for the urban fight. The end result was a paralyzing effect on the Threat remaining on the final objective, and resulted in a

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decisive assault phase characterized by very few infantry on infantry engagements. Graphic Control Measures were required to ensure network fires effectiveness. Control measures were not only need to ensure coverage by responsive fires but also to ensure corresponding sensor coverage to enable network fires. Linear Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) were useful for linear operations, but were less useful in noncontiguous operations. Further experimentation was required to ensure relevant and responsive control measures are matched with FCS capabilities. New FSCMs might be needed (i.e. effects management area or effects battle handover line). Future experimentation across the full-spectrum of operations had to be conducted before requirements can be substantiated. Application of network fires in urban operations 1. Automatic fire mission including radar detected targets provides responsive fires, however, impacts effectiveness and increases the risk of fratricide or ROE violations. This resulted in a demand for more human interaction when operating in and around urban areas. 2. Networked Fires architecture had to be tailored within urban operations. Discussions of including or excluding assets (AVN and BLOS) more capable of providing needed precision had to be underpinned through additional analysis. 3. Basic load and Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM) had to be flexible or adaptable to evolving urban operations fight. Current AGM design and figuration needed more precise design implementation to adjust for ROE, ammunition selection, and multiple levels of priority based on time, terrain, unit, space. AGM needs automated linkage to sustainment operations (ammunition and combat configuration of the unit UBL/ABL) Recommendation: A comprehensive list of issues and supporting data had to be compiled. Issues had to be assigned to the proponent and UAEE as appropriate. Solutions should be vetted and tested across the federation. TTPs had to be developed, documented and distributed across all analytical venues to determine and evaluate potential solutions. Objective 4: Investigate federation requirements to represent the effects of a degraded network and determine factors which effect mission success of an FCS equipped UA. 1. Evolving Insights and Lessons Learned: Current configuration and methodology for implementing the effects of a degraded network lacked understanding and involvement of appropriate SMEs to ensure accurate representation of the network and the effects of the network. 2. ALCES, the current network model, contained rigid architecture, which has not been fully evaluated and analyzed by architecture and concept SMEs. 3. Network degradation occurred within the federation due to artificial stimuli (local loading problems, unreliable hardware within the federation, and due to lack of oversight and control of cell structure). 4. Other forms of communications (CHAT and Voice) were not degraded. 5. Within Urban Operations the effects of any type of degradation of the network would be amplified. The responsiveness of the network fires, BDA and friendly situational awareness was degraded and reduced the effectiveness of the UA within an urban environment. Recommendation: A working group consisting of architecture SMEs, Model and Simulations SMEs and proponent SMEs needed to be assembled to fully understand the

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architecture and to insure proper representation of the network in relation to the units and cells that were actually being represented in the experiment. Focused analysis had to be conducted to ensure insights and operational lessons learned were based upon an accurate representation of the network. Conclusion: This experiment facilitated the examination and analysis of all objectives. The levels of understanding of how a FCS equipped UA conducts urban operations has been greatly enhanced and would be refined and documented for future experimental work. Several key operational insights and lessons learned were captured for evaluation and analysis over the next 30 days. Many integral components of the concept were validated and/or refined. TTPs were developed and implemented throughout the experiment and would be evaluated for correctness and applicability through full-spectrum operations. The notable exception to the success of this experiment lies in our ability to underpin the "adequacy" of the RSTA Squadron organization. Due to federation limitations, this objective could not be fully examined and analyzed. A priority analysis effort had to be focused on this evaluation to fully understand the capabilities and vulnerabilities of this organization.250 Omni Fusion Experiments

Omni Fusion was a series of five experiments that were already in progress for fiscal year 2005. Build 0, conducted in September 2004, was a MAPEX which laid the foundation for further experimentation for Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 by producing the initial task organization, and operations order for the UEx. Build One was a continuation of Build 0 and the results of FY 2004 in that it aimed to assess and collect data on insights identified in last year's experiment. Build One would be conducted through a collaborative federation of battle labs from Fort Sill, Fort Knox, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Lee, Fort Rucker, and Fort Benning. Unlike a Warfighter Exercise which aimed to train division level and higher staffs, Battle Lab experiments drew from the experience and skills of military, civilian, and contractor subject matter experts to test and observe concepts of the Future Force and the Modular Force. Fort Sill participation included a total of 68 players who replicated player staff and players in the following echelons: Fires Brigade,NLOS (Non Line of Sight) Battalion of the Future Combat System (FCS) equipped Unit of Action (UA), Fires and Effects Cells (FECs) of the UEx. The Battle Lab examined the following objectives as part of TRADOC and proponent guidance: 1. Does the current staff structure of the Fires BDE facilitate accomplishment of the missions and tasks we expect of that organization? 2. Are the staff structures of the various FECs correct and can they accomplish the missions and tasks we expect of those organizations? 3. Is the mix of rocket/missile and cannon battalions for the Fires Bde correct? 4. What assets are needed to augment the effectiveness of the Fires Brigade? We also examined the following tactics, techniques, and procedures: 1. Sustainment Operations 2. UAV / AUAV Operations 3. Loitering Attack Munitions (LAM) and Precision Attack Munitions (PAM) operations 4. ISR / Targeting Integration

250Ibid.

D

e

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5. Findings from the experiment will be incorporated into continued development of further experimentation in FY 05.251 FY 05 Omni Fusion Experimentation, Build 0, Fort Leavenworth, KS

The Unit of Employment Seminar and Wargame Experiment (Build 0, Omni Fusion) was conducted at the Battle Command Battle Lab – Leavenworth (BCBL-L) from 27 September 2004 to 7 October 2004. SMEs from the military, DoD, and contractor personnel from all training centers participated in order to create a UEx staff and role-play maneuver and support brigade commanders. In addition, the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) was represented in order to conduct data collection and analysis of issues and tasks of the participating organizations. Fort Sill participants included LTC Siltman as the Fires Brigade Commander and MAJ Emmert and Mr. Steve Smith as fires and effects staff officers within the UEx G3. Contractors filled the lead UEx staff positions and were from Booz Allen Hamilton (Retire 06-07 Officers). Concept of the Experiment Purpose. To determine the UEx requirements for and corresponding capabilities of Support Brigades necessary to accomplish UEx operational goals across shaping, decisive, and stability operations. Method. Conduct military wargaming at the UEx level utilizing the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the classified Caspian Sea scenario. Endstate. The compilation of a specific list of tasks derived from the AUTL and UJTL and identified for each operation and SBDE. Objectives of the Experiment. Set the Omni Fusion experiment "Road to War" and produce the UEx operational concept/scenario and orders.

1. Identify UEx requirements of Support Brigades. 2. Identify UA/BCT requirements of Support Brigades. 3. Identify Support Brigade requirements of other Support Brigades. 4. Refine Support Brigade organizations for FY 2005 experimentation.

The Mobile Command and Control (MC2) system was a planning tool, including digital maps and operational graphics, which greatly facilitated the MDMP especially when determining ranges of weapon systems, and reconciling these ranges with planning targets. Fort Sill personnel reviewing weapons systems, sensors and their corresponding capabilities in the MC2 system spent considerable effort. The second system utilized was Group Systems. This tool was utilized to submit and record RFIs during the MDMP and to review and identify tasks from the AUTL and UJTL. In addition, this electronic collaboration tool allowed experiment participants and analysts to capture information concerning the requirements and tasks, both specified and implied, assigned to the SBDEs by the UEx staff.252 Comments from the experiment Issue. Availability of reinforcing fires brigade. Discussion. Due to the amount of terrain to be covered by the UEx during Major Combat Operations (MCO) in a Non-contiguous battlefield a reinforcing fires brigade greatly contributed to the success of shaping operations. This was especially true, when as in the

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case of this experiment; FA battalions were pushed down to the BCTs in a reinforcing role in order to facilitate their success. Recommendation. Based on METT-TC, assign a reinforcing fires brigade to the UEx during MCO. Issue. Location of non-lethal resources within the C2 structure. Discussion. Even though there is an IO representative in the FEC, he neither owned nor controlled any non-lethal assets. The location of these non-lethal assets such as electronic warfare, civil affairs, and psychological operations within the C2 structure of the UEx had to be identified and or standardized in order to facilitate mission planning and execution. Recommendation. Create and standardize a C2 structure within the UEx under the direction of a deputy chief of staff for fires and effects, Field Artillery O-6 position. Issue. Mitigation of threats in gray areas of non-contiguous battlespace. Discussion. Within the scenario maneuver units bypassed significant enemy positions and units, thus leaving the ME Brigade vulnerable as they conducted missions through non-contiguous areas. This included MP units as they patrolled the MSR. Recommendation. Reinsert the FEC designed within the ME brigade in order to plan fires and effects within the gray areas of the non-contiguous battlespace and to execute and coordinate fires within the rear area and along LOCs. Issue. Weapon systems outrange ground-based sensors. Discussion. With the cancellation of the Q-47 radar system, our weapon systems often outranged the ability to detect and identify targets, especially during MCO. Recommendation. There had to be integration between the Army and the sensors being developed through Joint Improvement and Modernization (JIM) projects to include space based sensors. Additionally, class IV UAVs could be utilized in order to both acquire and target at ranges that maximized the capabilities of our Field Artillery weapon systems. Issue. Vulnerability of MLRS and HIMARs to bypassed enemy units. Discussion. In order to support the UEx mission during the scenario MLRS and HIMARs units from the fires brigade often had to move forward in order to range targets. The light self-defense capability of these systems coupled with the large signature of their weapons systems left them vulnerable to attack from bypassed enemy units. Recommendation. In order to protect these valuable weapon systems they needed to have either improved direct fire systems attached or be task organized with maneuver forces. Issue. Validity of a targeting meeting with Network Fires. Discussion. Despite the digital enablers utilized with Network Fires, some sort of human-in-the-loop synchronization had to take place among the various weapon systems such as CAS, UAVs, NLOS LS, and non-lethals. This would ensure that the correct effects based system is being utilized. This included utilizing FSCMs such as NFAs and RFLs. Recommendation. Continue to hold a joint targeting working group at all levels in order to synchronize all available effects based systems. Participant comments and lessons learned. Reinforcing fires brigade. As already noted the reinforcing fires brigade greatly contributed to the successful planning of the mission. It enabled the UEx fires brigade commander to push down both cannon and rocket battalions to the BCTs in an OPCON status. This additional fires brigade came from the UEy, from V Corps, which the 1st UEx had passed

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through. What is uncertain is whether it is realistic that the UEy would assign or even have available an additional fires brigade to reinforce the UEx. In the case of V Corps, they certainly would have need for their own Fires Brigade. Shaping operations. The scope of this wargaming exercise was limited to MCO. The MDMP began with phase 2 of the operation after units already completed deployment, RSOI, and shaping operations. What was not clear was what shaping operations the UEy executed prior to phase 2 operations. Additionally, phase 3 of the operation (SASO) was not wargamed. This was of particular importance due to the fact that the role of fires and effects would change to reflect the diverse battlespace. Also command relationships would change as different units, MPs for example, would require more fires and effects support.

Airspace deconfliction. Due to the increase amount of UAVs, both armed and targeting operating within the battlespace, defining the A2C2 structures was of great importance. This was further compounded when you add in Army Aviation and the addition of NLOS-LS. In addition to the deconlfiction of airspace specific roles had to be determined for all elements that have operation control of UAVs. One example of this was monitoring NAIs so you did not have 3 different elements observing the same area and to a lesser extent acquiring and engaging enemy targets. Issues arising during the MDMP and Operation development are as follows:

1. The Fires Bde should be comprised of 3 rocket and 2 cannon battalions. Upon initial review of Task Org this was not the case. The cannon units were not decided on nor were they built into the system. After analysis it was determined the 2 cannon battalion would be comprised of strictly Paladin systems. One Paladin BN was OPCON to the SBCT, and the other was OPCON to the HBCT. The SBCT commander had issues with maneuverability and self-protection that his organic M777s could or could not provide during the second and third phase of the operation. As the war game showed the SBCT utilized the Paladin BN to its fullest potential.

2. The inclusion of the 41st Bde as a reinforcing Bde was critical to the success of the overall operation. The question was, how realistic is it for the UEx to have cart blanche over the 41st Bde? What were the UEy requirements on this unit? The fires assets were fully committed to the UEx. The war game did not address this issue. The success of the UEx was dependent on the 41st Bde fires. This needs to be address in the next build.

3. The re-supply question was a pressing issue. Not new information was gathered on the functions of the logistics and support brigades. As it was stated by the Sustainment commander in his finial AAR comment, "Potential shortfall in supporting Fires Bde on the fluid battlefield during shaping and decisive operations." This was a significant issue that needed to be addressed. The implications of artillery units not having ammunition resources in later stages of conflict would be frightening. Build 1 was scheduled for January 2--5 to February 2005 to follow on with the completed order created in Build 0. Focus of this build would be to continue to identify the composition and relationships of the support brigades. The integration of the Fires and Effects Cell throughout the BCTs and the roles they performed. The personnel required for maintaining and operating the Fires Brigade.253

253Ibid.

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Extensible C4I Simulation (ExCIS) and FireSim XXI Integration for the Army

Constructive Training Federation

The USAFAS G3 and Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) for the U.S. Army entered into a contract with Tec Masters Inc and the University of Texas at Austin to build tactical communication interfaces into the Fire Support Test Directorates (FSTD) ExCIS program. The endstate would be the merger of FireSim and ExCIS functionalities into one program and platform. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 University of Texas completed its requirements and delivered ExCIS to TMI for testing. Concurrently, the Battle Lab worked with PEO-STRI and the National Simulations Center to ensure the newest version of FireSim (v5.0p) and ExCIS would be included in the Army Constructive Training Federation version 2 validation in March-April 2005. This effort represented a leap ahead in simulation technology for fire support training by enabling a simulation to replicate an AFATDS on a tactical network. This was more commonly known as "native AFATDS." In 2004 the Battle Lab sought funding to continue the merger of the two simulations onto one platform.254 Combat Training Center Replication of Fires

While the RoF methodology adjudicated indirect fire effects with high fidelity in realistically sized/shaped impact areas, the Simulated Area Weapons Effect/MILES II (SAWE/MILES II) methodology did not. RoF adjudicated for fire-and-forget smart munitions; and SAWE/Miles did not. RoF vastly improved suppression assessments. This data-driven methodology could easily be updated as new munitions were added to the force. The instrumentation systems originally fielded to the Combat Training Centers (CTC) were adequate for adjudicating direct fire, line-of-sight weapon systems. However, adjudication for indirect and air delivered ordinance was inadequate. SAWE/MILES II was developed to fill the gap. Based on a review of the methods of simulating indirect fires and battle damage assessment at the CTCs the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory wrote "Indirect Fire Simulation and Battle Damage Assessment at the Maneuver Combat Training Centers." This paper proposed improvements over existing CTC methodologies to assess indirect fires and the recommendations were approved by TRADOC in July 2001.255 The Battle Lab met with each CTC to provide them an overview of the methodologies for improving fires replication in the instrumentation systems. NTC and JRTC concurred with the Battle Lab's recommendations and went forward with the Battle Lab to receive funding from the CTC Program for implementation at NTC. The complete merger and implementation of the new methodology was completed at NTC in Aug 2004. At the time there was no plan to begin implementation at JRTC or CMTC. The Battle Lab planned follow-on efforts for fires replication at the CTCs to focus on the development of the CTC-Objective Instrumentation System (CTC OIS).256 Joint Fires and Effects Course

The Battle Lab supported the Joint Fires and Effects Course conducted in September 2004. This course focused on teaching the skills to conduct a Joint Targeting Control Board. In addition to providing facilities, hardware, and subject matter technical expertise, the

254Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124 255Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124. 256Ibid.

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Battle Lab furnished a simulated scenario to stimulate the Battle Command Systems in use by the students. This made the Battle Lab and Fort Sill the only location where simulation stimulation of Battle Command Systems is used to teach Joint Targeting procedures.257 Field Artillery School Battle Simulation Center

The Battle Simulation Center (BSC) provided simulations support to the Captain's Career Course, Officer Basic Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Warrant Officer Basic Course, and Warrant Officer Advanced Course. Training events focused on planning and executing fires at Maneuver Task Force and Brigade levels. Students developed plans during classroom instruction and executed them during simulated combat using the Janus or JCATS battle focused trainers. The BSC also supported training for III Armored Corps Artillery units and for Field Artillery Brigades assigned to the Army National Guard. The BSC provided a simulated environment for the train-up prior to the 212th FA Brigade's Joint Close Air Support Exercise conducted in Apr-May 04. The 142nd Field Artillery Brigade (Arkansas Army National Guard) conducted a major training event using the Digital Battelstaff Sustainment Trainer (DBST) in September 2004. The BSC provided a realistic combat scenario that stressed planning and executing fires and conducting counterfire at the Brigade level and planned to conduct an exercise for the 45th FA Bde (Oklahoma Army National Guard) and the 130th FA Bde (Kansas Army National Guard) in FY 2005.258 Air Assault Expeditionary Force (AAEF) Spiral B

In February 2004, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed the United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) Soldier Battle Lab (SBL) to head the Air Assault Expeditionary Force (AAEF) study to be conducted in a constructive, virtual, and live force-on-force field environment. The AAEF study consisted of four spirals (A-D) conducted between FY 2004 through FY 2007. TRADOC intended this experiment to demonstrate tactical and vertical maneuver of mounted forces enabled by emerging C4ISR technologies in support of the DARPA directed Future Combat Systems (FCS) advanced technology program. As of 2004 and early 2005, SBL was finalizing the coordination and planning for AAEF Spiral B, which would examine how an emerging network and the integration of technologies would increase the survivability and lethality of a platoon size, modular combat unit. This exercise would focus on measuring the enhanced capabilities and networked lethality using the advanced C4ISR technology of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Beginning in May 2005, SBL planned to conduct the Base Case pilot test to be followed by the Advanced Concept test in October 2005. This experiment would consist of an Air Assault IBCT capable of operating within ranges up to one hundred kilometers from their parent organization, using both manned and unmanned platforms during the timeframe 2014. Spiral B would incorporate a simulation wrap-around simultaneously with a live field exercise using both UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft during the Base Case and Advanced Concept testing.

257Ibid. 258Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124.

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Additionally, the Spiral B wrap-around would include both direct and indirect fires, organic and joint through simulation and modeling. As of 2004-2005, selection criteria were being determined for technologies that would be integrated into Spiral B experimentation. The Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (D&SABL) provided recommendations for advanced technologies, munitions, and a fire support Battle Command system to support the planning, coordinating, controlling, and execution of fires and effects. Munitions currently being considered for the wrap-around included the Excalibur (Block I–Unitary), the Precision Attack Missile (PAM), and the Loitering Attack Missile (LAM).259 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Penetrator Demonstration (TPD) Advanced

Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)

The Battle Laboratory was designated at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) battle laboratory sponsor of the ATACMS Penetrator Demonstration, an approved ACTD. This ACTD was a proof of concept demonstration of a standoff ballistic missile delivered Penetrator weapon for use in counter-proliferation role against hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT). The ACTD would validate the military utility of a Navy designed earth-penetrating warhead mated to the ATACMS. The TACMS Penetrator was composed of an ATACMS Block IA missile with a transition section and a warhead consisting of a release assembly and cowling replacing the Block IA warhead and nose cone. The Army's Precision Fires Rockets and Missile System Program Office (PFRMS) were designated as the lead service's representative and systems integrator. The Navy's Strategic Systems Program Office was designated as the ACTD technical manager. The Navy in coordination with the Army Lead Service's representative would provide oversight of the project through an overarching integrated product team (OIPT). The demonstration phase of the ACTD would consist of numerous ground tests and two possible three-flight tests ending prior to Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 and two of the flight test have been executed with a fifty percent hit ratio to the target. Lack of funding has cancelled any follow-on program. The ACTD would deliver six residuals to the operational manager before fiscal year 2005. The operational manager for the ACTD was the C/J3 U.S. Forces Korea. The Battle Laboratory was designated at the operational manager's representative in his absence. In this role the Battle Laboratory would act to protect and communicate the operational manager's guidance and instructions to the OIPT and other Integrated Product Teams (IPT) throughout the life of the ACTD. In addition, the Battle Laboratory would have joint responsibility with the PFRMS Program Manager's Office as the ACTD Transition Manager.260 Joint Fires Initiative Block 2, Limited Objective Experiment (JFI-2)

Joint Fires Initiative Block 2 (JFI-2) provided the Joint Force Commander the ability to employ the weapon of his choosing and to reduce the kill chain timeline for immediate targets during dynamic linear and non-linear operations. The JFI-2 Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) 1, conducted 7-23 September 2004, was the first of a three-phase technical/operational assessment. JFI-2 built on the Block 1/Time Sensitive Targeting capability officially approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel in August 2003. It incorporated inputs from the USJFCOM/CENTCOM Lessons Learned initiatives from

259Ibid. 260Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05, Doc III-124.

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Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as inputs from the other combatant commanders. As a result, sixty-three joint fires requirements were identified, of which forty three focused on the engagement phase of the time sensitive targeting cycle. The LOE was conducted based on a Joint Task Force (JTF) scenario simulation. Dynamic fires vignettes were run to force cross-component interactions. The experiment included distributed JTF/Component fires elements participating from USJFCOM, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island, U.S. Air Force Transformation Center at Langley Air Force Base, and U.S. Army Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill. Communications feeds were also provided to the experimentation network from Ft. Gordon. The LOE provided an initial evaluation of the individual Quick Wins and tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as a first look at software interoperability. The Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab participated with a twelve-man cell representing a Fires and Effects Cell at the UEx command level. III Corps Artillery, USJFCOM J9 and PM AFATDS supported the Battle Lab. The Battle Lab observed several insights during the Experiment. Fire Support Coordination Measures will be required. Traditional battle- and air-space deconfliction might be inadequate for the Future Force. The universal observer vision was realized. Army artillery and Air Force fires were able to "swap" (pass) targets between each other and AFATDS and ADOCS seem to provide a common reference for training joint fires execution. A series of vignettes were conducted within a tactical scenario designed to stress the functions, interoperability, and the integration of new software/functions into existing tactical systems. Fort Sill and the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (DSABL) participation was to develop a tactical plan and system structure to replicate the functions of the Army Forces (ARFOR) Division Fire Support Element/Fires Effect Cell (FSE/FEC). As the Division artillery headquarters for the 31st Infantry Division, the FSE/FEC was required to perform action, intelligence requirements, and the delivery of effects on enemy targets within zone. Initial plans held that DSABL would perform roles as the Joint Forces Land Component. The next JFI experiment was scheduled for November 2005 (Talisman Saber) in Australia.261 Sea Viking 2004 (SV04)

Sea Viking 2004 was a Marine Corps led, JFCOM co-sponsored, experimentation campaign designed to assess Joint Forcible Entry capabilities in 2015 and beyond. The Force Entry concept pathway was planned to leverage existing activities and capitalize on Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons learned. The Army's themes for Sea Viking 2004 were Network Enabled Battle Command, Shaping Operations and Decisive Simultaneous, and Distributed Operations (ACDEP FY04/05 Plan). The Army's objectives were to exercise and verify Joint interdependence through joint command and control, joint fires, focused logistics, joint ISR, and joint SOF, among others. (Especially service-unique or Title X-mandated services.), to identify gaps between Navy and Army concepts for future resolution, to ensure that the employment of all Army forcible entry forces (airborne and air assault, Stryker and FCS-equipped Units of Action) was consistent

261Ibid.

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with Joint and Army Future Force Concepts, to employ and sustain Army forces from Sea Base, and to test other initiatives, such as the Afloat Forward Staging Base and Joint Fires. The Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab participated as the TRADOC-designated lead for the 2015 and beyond Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Working Group. The purpose of the working group was to identifying capability sets/shortfalls for Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Army Units of Actions (UA) level CONOPS. The Fort Sill-led working group's CONOPS was selected by a panel of Senior Mentors during the Capabilities Seminar, 17-21 May 2004 as the CONOPS for the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) held in October 2004. Sea Viking 2004 highlighted shortfalls in Operational and Strategic Lift capabilities, Joint Logistics, and Joint ISR. The Army and Fort Sill also planned to expand the dialogue with the Marine Corps Experimentation Command on Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) to further cement USMC/Army common position on the Joint Enabling Concept and to increase mutual understanding of service concepts.262

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAEF, Air Assault Expeditionary Force AAR, After Action Review ABCS, Army Battlefield Control System AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant ACAT, Acquisition Category ACH, Annual Command History ACR, Armored Cavalry Regiment ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADAM, Air Defense Airspace Management ADT, Active Duty Training ADOCS, Automated Deep Operations Coordination System AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AG, Adjutant General AGM, Attack Guidance Matrix AGR, Active Guard Reserve AHR, Annual Historical Review AI, Artificial Intelligence, Air Interdiction AIT, Advanced Individual Training AKO, Army Knowledge Online AMRDEC, Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center API, Application Program Interface ARFOR, Army Forces ARNG, Army National Guard AROC, Army Oversight Council ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council ASAS, All-source Analysis System ASI, Additional Skill Identifier ASMP, Army Strategic Mobility Program ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System ATACS, Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System ATC, Artillery Training Center ATCAS, Advanced Towed Cannon System ATCCS, Army Tactical Command and Control System ATCOM, Advanced Tactical Combat Model ATDL, Army Training Digital Library ATLAS, Advanced Technology Light Artillery System ATLDP, Army Training and Leader Development Panel ATSC, Army Training Support Center ATTD, Advanced Technological Transition Demonstration AUSA, Association of the United States Army BASOPS, Base Operations BAT, Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition BAT P3I, BAT Preplanned Product Improvement

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BCBL, Battle Command Battle Laboratory BCD, Battlefield Coordination Detachment BCPT, Battle Command Post Training BCS, Battery Computer System BCT, Brigade Combat Team BDA, Battlefield Damage Assessment BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle BLCS, Battle Lab Collaborative Simulations Environment BLOS, Beyond Line-of-Sight BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course BOLC, Basic Officer Leaders Course BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure BSC, Battle Simulation Center C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance CABCC, Combined Arms Battle Command Course CALC, Combined Arms Leader Course CASC, Combined Leaders Staff Course CALL, Center for Army Lessons Learned CAS, Close Air Support CAS3, Combined Arms Services Staff School CATA, Combined Arms Training Activity CATS, Combined Arms Training Strategy CCC, Captains Career Course CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command CEP, Concept Evaluation Program/Concept Experimentation Program CG, Commanding General CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer CGS, Command Ground Station CGSC, Command and General Staff College CIF, Central Issue Facility CIM, Centralized Installation Management CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force CMF, Career Management Field COB, Command Operating Budget COE, Contemporary Operational Environment COF, Correlation of Forces COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team CONOPS, Concept of Operations CONUS, Continental United States CPT PME, Captain Professional Military Education C-RAM, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortars CRSS, Common Reconfigurable Sensor System CSTF, Counterstrike Task Force

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CTC, Combat Training Center DA, Department of the Army DAB, Defense Acquisition Board DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard DAIG, Department of the Army Inspector General DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DAWE, Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment DBST, Digital Battlestaff Sustainment Trainer DCA, Directorate of Community Activities DCD, Directorate of Combat Developments DCG, Deputy Commanding General DCP, Directorate of Civilian Personnel DCSOPST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training DCST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training DENTAC, U.S. Army Dental Activity DIOPTIC, Dismounted Optic System DIS, Distributed Interactive Simulation DIVE, Dynamic Interactive Virtual Environment DL, Distance Learning/Distributive Learning DMD, Digital Message Device DMWR, Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOC, Directorate of Contracting DOCC, Deep Operations Coordination Cell DOD, Department of Defense DOES, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization DOIM, Directorate of Information Management DOL, Directorate of Logistics DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine DOTE, Directorate of Training and Evaluation DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition DPS, Directorate of Public Safety DPTM, Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization DPW, Directorate of Public Works DRID, Defense Reform Initiative Directive DRM, Directorate of Resource Management D&SABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DTLOMS, Doctrine, Training, Leader Development,

Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers DTRA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency EADSIM, Extended Air Defense Simulation EBO, Effects Based Operations ECC, Effects Coordination Cell ECP, Engineering Change Proposal

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EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing EEA, Essential Elements of Analysis EDTM, Enlisted Distribution Target Model EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development EEO, Equal Opportunity Office ER, Extended Range ESIT, Extended System Integration Test EST, Engagement Skills Trainer FA, Field Artillery FAC, Forward Air Controller FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course FADAC, Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer FAIR, Federal Activities Inventory Reform FAOAC, Field Artillery Officer Advance Course FAOBC, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course FAS, Field Artillery School FAST, Future Army Schools Training FATC, Field Artillery Training Center FBCB2, Force Battle Command Brigade and Below FCS, Future Combat System FDC, Fire Direction Center FDIC, Futures Development and Integration Center FDS, Fire Direction System FDTE, Force Development Test and Evaluation FEC, Fires and Effects Center FECC, Fire Effects Coordination Cell FED, Forward Entry Device FF, Firefinder F2C2, Future Fires Command Control F2DSS, Future Fires Decision Support System FIST, Fire Support Team FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle FKN, Fires Knowledge Network FLIR, Forward Looking Infrared FLOT, Forward Line of Troops FM, Field Manual FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command FOTE, Follow-on Test and Evaluation FOX, Forward Observer Exercise Simulation FPCON, Force Protection Condition FS3, Fire Support Sensor System FSC, Fire Support Center FSCAOD, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed

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FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications FSE, Fire Support Element FSKN, Fire Support Knowledge Network FSO, Fire Support Officer FSST, Fire Support Sustainment Tool FSTS, Fire Support Training Strategy FTX, Field Training Exercise FUE, First Unit Equipped FY, Fiscal Year GAO, General Accounting Office GCTT, Ground Combat Tactical Trainer GD, Gunnery Department GLPS, Gun Laying Positioning System GPS, Global Positioning System GS, General Support GSM, Ground Station Module GSU, Garrison Support Unit GUARDFIST II, Guard Unit Armory Device-Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer II GUI, Graphical User Interface GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator GWOT, Global War on Terror HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HITL, Human-in-the Loop HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HQ, Headquarters HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IAV, Interim Armored Vehicle IBCT, Initial/Interim Brigade Combat Team ICT, Institute for Creative Technology IDT, Inactive Duty IED, Improvised Explosive Device IET, Initial Entry Training IFCS, Improved Fire Control System IFSAS, Interim Fire Support Automated System/Initial Fire Support Automated System ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System IMA, Installation Management Agency IMI, Interactive Multimedia Instruction IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System IPDS, Improved Positioning Determining System IPT, Integrated Product Team IRAC, Internal Review and Audit Compliance

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IRR, Individual Ready Reserve JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate JACKKNIFE, Joint Networked Fires and Effects JAG, Judge Advocate General JCATS, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation JFCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command HistorianJFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer

System JFECS, Joint Fires and Effects Course JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System JIM, Joint Improvement and Modernization JORD, Joint Operational Requirements Document JPSD, Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office JROC, Joint Oversight Council JRTC, Joint Readiness Training Center JSTARS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller KPP, Key Performance Parameter KW, Kiowa Warrior LAM, Loiter Attack Missile LARIAT, Loiter and Route Interactive Analysis Tool LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program LCD, Liquid Crystal Display LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LED, Light Emitting Diode LFED, Lightweight Forward Entry Device LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder LOAL, Lock-on-after Launch LOS, Line-of-Sight LRAS3, Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production LW, Lightweight MAPEX, Map exercise MAPS, Modular Azimuth Positioning System MCA, Military Construction, Army MC2, Mobile Command and Control MCO, Major Combat Operations MDMP, Military decision making process MEDDAC, U.S. Army Medical Activity MELIOS, Miniaturized Eye-Safe Laser Infrared Observation Set METL, Mission Essential Task List MICOM, U.S. Army Missile Command MLRS, Multiple-Launch Rocket System MOA, Memorandum of Agreement MOS, Military Occupational Specialty MOUT, Military Operations in Urban Terrain

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MRE, Meals Ready to Eat MRS, Mobility Requirements Study MSTAR, MLRS Smart Tactical Rocket/Manportable Surveillance and Target Acquisition

System MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment MTP, Mission Training Plan MTT, Mobile Training Team MTW, Major Theater War MUSE, Multiple Unified Simulation Environment NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO, Noncommissioned Officer NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System NET, New Equipment Training NETD, New Equipment Training Detachment NETT, New Equipment Training Team NFE, Networked Fires Environment NLOS, Non-Line of Sight NSWC, Naval Surface Warfare Center NSWCDD, Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren Division NTC, National Training Center OAC, Officer Advance Course OBC, Officer Basic Course OCIE, Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment OCONUS, Outside Continental United States ODCSOPS, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations ODCPRO, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs OES, Officer Education System OFOTB, Objective Force OneSAF Testbed Baseline OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom OIPT, Overarching Integrated Product Team OMA, Operational Maintenance, Army OPTEMPO, Operational Tempo O&O, Organizational and Operational ORD, Operational Requirements Document OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSUT, One-Station Unit Training OTM, Open Terrain Module PAM, Precision Attack Missile PAO, Public Affairs Office PCS, Permanent Change of Station PEO, Program Executive Officer PERSCOM, Personnel Command PFED, Palm Forward Entry Device PFRMS, Precision Fires, Rockets, and Missile System

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PI, Product Improvement PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course PM, Program Manager POI, Program of Instruction POM, Program Objective Memorandum POV, Privately Owned Vehicle P3I, Preplanned Product Improvement PQT, Production Qualification Test QAO, Quality Assurance Office RAM, Random Access Memory RAMS, Rocket and Missile Systems RC, Reserve Component RFPI, Rapid Force Projection Initiative RFPI ACTD, Rapid Force Projection Initiative Advanced

Concept Technology Demonstration RIF, Reduction-in-Force RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition RTI, Regional Training Institute SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition SASO, Stability and Support Operations SATS, Standard Army Training System SAWE-MILES, Simulated Area Weapons/MILES SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team SBL, Soldier Battle Laboratory SDD, System Design and Development SGT, Sergeant SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment SRM, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization STX, Situational Training Exercise SSC, Small-scale Contingency SSG, Staff Sergeant SSM, Surface-to-Surface Missile ST, Special Text STOW, Synthetic Theater of War STRAP, System Training Plan STRI, Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office TAC, Terminal Attack Controller TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations TASS, The Army School System TATS, Total Army Training System TBG, TRADOC Budget Guidance

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TC, Terminal Controller TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances TDY, Temporary Duty TELS, Transporters, Erectors, and Launchers TF, Task Force TIM, Transformation in Installation Management TMA, Training Mission Area TOC, Tactical Operations Center TPFDD, Time-Phased Deployment Document TPSO, Theater Precision Strike Operations TRAC, TRADOC Analysis Center TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRAP, TRADOC Remedial Action Program TSC, Training Service Center TSM, TRADOC System Manager TSP, Training Support Package TSSAM, Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile T3BL, Training and Training and Technology Battle Laboratory TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures UA, Unit of Action UADEV, Unit of Action Development UAMBL, Unit of Action Manuever Battle Laboratory UAV, Unmanned aerial/air vehicle UE, Unit of Employment UFD, User Functional Description USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College USAFAC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center USAFACFS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill USAFACS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFATC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center USAIC, U.S. Army Infantry Center USAOTEC, U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command USAR, U.S. Army Reserve USFK, United States Forces, Korea USFJCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command USMC, U.S. Marine Corps UTM, Urban Terrain Module VS, Viper Strike VSEL, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited VTC, Video Training Conference VTT, Video Teletraining WCBF, World Class Blue Force WIDD, Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate

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WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course WRAP, Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program

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APPENDIX ONE

STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

COURSE INITIAL INPUTS GRADUATES

FACCC 272 271

FACCC-DL 422 305

FAOBC 1,113 1,049

WOES 85 85

BNCOC 1,693 1,674

ANCOC 709 705

PLDC 721 703

OTHER COURSES 3,068 2,969

TOTAL 8,083 7,761

USAFATC 13,208 11,718

GRAND TOTAL FOR FY2004 21,291 19,479 Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Production Figures for FY 2004, 4 Feb 05, Doc II-68. Note: USAFATC figures include BCT, OSUT, AIT, and US Marines.

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APPENDIX TWO

KEY USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery: MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 03-present

Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School/Deputy Commanding General-Training: BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 03-23 Aug 04 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 04-present

Deputy Assistant Commandant-National Guard BG Robert T. Bray, Jul 03-29 Jul 04 COL James R. White, 1 Sep 04-present Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine/G3

COL Stephen D. Mitchell, 1 Oct 02-present Commander, 30th Field Artillery Regiment/Director, Gunnery Department and Fire Support

and Combined Arms Operations Department COL Richard G. Cardillo, Jr., 1 Oct 02-25 Jun 04 COL Anthony J. Puckett, 25 Jun 04-present

Commander, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center: COL J. Palermo, 19 Jun 02-Mar 04 COL Christopher T. Fulton, Mar 04-present

Commandant, Noncommissioned Officers Academy: CSM C. McPherson, 21 Jun 01-15 Jan 04 CSM Allie Ousley, 15 Jan 04-present

Director, Futures Development Integration Center COL Clyde Page, Jun 03-present

Quality Assurance Office: DR Phyllis Robertson, Oct 01-Nov 04 MR. A.D. Saul, Nov 04-present

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APPENDIX THREE

KEY USAFACFS PERSONNEL

Commanding General/Commandant of U.S. Army Field Artillery School/Chief of Field Artillery: MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 03-present Chief of Staff:

COL Mark A. Graham, 28 Jul 03-12 Jul 04 COL James M. MacDonald, 12 Jul 04-present

Deputy Commanding General-National Guard: BG David Greer, May 01-29 Jul 04 BG Robert T. Bray, 29 Jul 04-present

Garrison Commander: COL G. Keith Herring, Jul 03-present Director, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation:

Brenda J. Spencer-Ragland, Jan 02-present Director, Directorate of Civilian Personnel:

John D. Kerr, 29 Sep 96-present Director, Directorate of Information Management:

Kathy Banks, Dec 02-present Director, Directorate of Logistics:

T.S. Haymend, 12 May 96-present Director, Directorate of Contracting:

Bernie Valdez, Jan 97-present Director, Directorate of Resource Management:

Robert L. Hanson, 8 Jul 96-present Director, Directorate of Public Works COL Mark A. Soltero, Dec 03-present Director, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security: COL David A. Rozell, Jul 02-Jul 04 Lawrence B. Lane, Jul 04-present

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APPENDIX FOUR

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, l9 Jul l9ll-l5 Sep l9l4 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep l9l4-26 Jun l9l6 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul l9l7-26 Sep l9l7 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-ll May l9l8 BG Laurin L. Lawson, ll May l9l8-l8 Dec l9l8 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec l9l8-l0 Jun l9l9 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun l9l9-9 Jul l9l9 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct l9l9-l Jul l923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul l923-l Apr l928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr l928-l2 Dec l929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb l930-3l Jul l934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep l934-l0 May l936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun l936-3l Jul l940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug l940-22 Dec l940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun l942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun l946-9 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, l2 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

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MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 01 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 01-9 Dec 03 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 03-present Note: Since World War I, the school commandant has also served as post commander of Fort Sill.

142

APPENDIX FIVE

CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 22 Dec 1927-15 Dec 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun l946-15 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, l2 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 01 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 01-9 Dec 03 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 03-present Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during the war. On 9 March 1942 the War Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of a general wartime reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War

143

Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942. In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and its successors considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122.

Note: "Three Chiefs," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow's dates of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS records list 15 February 1981 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin's tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

144

APPENDIX SIX

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT/

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR TRAINING COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jul 1930 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987

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BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989 BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 03 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 03-23 Aug 04 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 04-present Note: With the official creation of Training Command on 4 January 1993, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School also became the Deputy Commanding General for Training. Even though Fort Sill dissolved Training Command on 1 October 2002, the position of Deputy Commanding General remained.

146

APPENDIX SEVEN

USAFACFS MISSION ORGANIZATION CHART

Source: Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2004, p. 43.

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APPENDIX EIGHT

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1. Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004. 1a. USAFACFS FY05 Command Training Guidance, undated. 2. Biography, Col (P) Mark A. Graham. 3. Col Stephen D. Mitchell, "Transformation of the FA Center and School," Field

Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 4. "Field Artillery School," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 5. Briefing, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 14 Jul 04. 6. Concept Plan, Executive Summary, 2004. 7. Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jim W. Reid, Directorate of Resource

Management, 13 Jan 04. 7a. SIGACTS, DRM, 15 Jan 04. 8. SIGACTS, DRM, 23 Mar 04. 9. SIGACTS, DRM, 4 May 04. 10. SIGACTS, DRM, 22 Jun 04. 11. SIGACTS, DRM, 10 Aug 04. 12. SIGACTS, DRM, 12 Oct 04. 12a. Interview, Dastrup with Col James M. McDonald, Chief of Staff, USAFACFS,

22 Nov 04. 13. Information Paper with atch, subj: School Model 89, 27 Apr 89. 14. Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, AD Artillery Center, et al, subj: School Model 89

Approval and Requirement to Implement, 27 Apr 89. 15. Email with atch, subj: School Reorganization, 18 Feb 05. 15a. Interview, Dastrup with Shirley Dismuke, Act Dir, STRATCOM, 2 Mar 05. 16. Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05. 17. Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05. 18. Email with atch, subj: Interview with Dr. Dastrup, 8 Mar 05. 19. Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 05. 20. LTC Michael D. Borg, "New Fort Sill Counterstrike Task Force Needs You,"

Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04. 20a. Email with atch, subj: Counterstrike Task Force Input to Annual Command

History, 11 May 05. 21. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams,

"State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 21a. Memorandum for Director, Counterstrike Task Force, subj: Coordination of

2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 21 Mar 05. 21b. Notes, BG Mark A. Graham, undated. 22. "CounterStrike Task Force: How to Protect Troops from GWOT Insurgents,"

Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 23. Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05. 23a. Memorandum for Cdr, US Army Field Artillery Center, School, and Fort Sill,

148

22 Apr 05. 24. MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery

Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 25. Email with atch, subj: IMA Input to Annual Command History, 10 Feb 05. 26. Email with atch, subj: Installations as Flagships, 5 Dec 03. 27. Briefing, subj: FY04 OMA Allocation Options, 4 Dec 03. 28. Email, subj: NETCALL #18 -- IMA FY04 Funding Letter, 5 Jan 04. 29. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY2004 IMA Operations and

Maintenance Army Funding Letter, undated. 30. Email, subj: FY04 Budget Cash Flow Problem, 18 Mar 04. 31. Email, subj: IMA Cash Flow Problem, 17 Mar 04. 32. Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison OMA FY04 Budget Execution Guidance, 16 Mar

04. 33. Email, subj: IMA Mid-Year Review Briefing to VCSA, 4 May 04. 34. Email, subj: IMA Directors NETCALL #27 -- FY04 MYR, 12 May 04. 35. Email, subj: Fort Sill Garrison Budget, 28 May 04. 36. Email, subj: Mid-Year Review Results-Guidance Forthcoming, 9 May 04. 37. DPTM SIGACTS, 19 Jul 04. 38. DPTM SIGACTS, 4 Jun 04. 39. DPTM SIGACTS, 11 Jun 04. 40. Briefing, subj: Mid-Year Review, 26 May 04. 41. Briefing, subj: Garrison Midyear Budget Review, 8 Jun 04. 42. Email, subj: Reduction in BOS Annual Funding Program, 13 May 04. 43. Email, subj: IMA Directors NETCALL #30 -- FY04 Budget Update to

NETCALL #27: Actions Required for Remainder of FY04, 27 May 04. 44. Email, subj: FY04 Budget Brief to IMA RM, 21 May 04. 45. Email, subj: SPBAC with CG, 26 May 1300-1500 Regimental Room 305,

McNair Hall, 25 May 04. 46. Email, subj: FY04 Execution Guidance -- Follow-up to NETCALL #30, 8 Jun

04. 47. Email, subj: FY04 OMA Execution Update with ABO - 27 Aug, 27 Aug 04. 48. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY04

Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 18 Feb 04. 49. Briefing, subj: FY04 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance Brief, 9 Feb 04. 50. SIGACTS, DRM, 9 Feb 04. 51. SIGACTS, DRM, 23 Mar 04. 52. SIGACTS, DRM, 8 Jun 04. 53. SIGACTS, DRM, 6 Jul 04. 54. Email with atch, subj: FY04 Mission TBG UFRs, 31 Jan 04. 55. SIGACTS, DRM, 24 Aug 04. 56. SIGACTS, DRM, 7 Sep 04. 57. SIGACTS, DRM, 21 Sep 04. 58. SIGACTS, DRM, 12 Oct 04. 59. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 TRADOC Commanding

Training Guidance, 30 Apr 04.

149

60. Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04. 61. Email, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 23 Feb 05. 62. Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04. 63. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 14

May 04. 64. TRADOC FY05 TBG Narrative Guidance, May 04. 65. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 Appropriated TRADOC Budget

Guidance, undated. 66. Email with atch, subj: FY05 FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 23 Feb 05. 67. Briefing, subj: FY05 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance UFR Brief, 18

Jan 05. 68. Briefing, subj: FY05 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 24 Nov 04. 69. TRADOC FY05 ATBG Narrative Guidance, Nov 04. 70. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY05

TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated. 71. Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 4 Jun 04. 72. Briefing, subj: FY05 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 21 Jun 04. 73. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery, Fort Sill, 22 Jul 04. 74. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 Operation and Maintenance

Army (OMA) Funding Letter, 17 Sep 04. 75. SIGACTS, DRM, 9 Nov 04. 76. SIGACTS, DRM, 30 Nov 04. 77. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY06-11

POM, 24 Dec 03. 78. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY07-11 TRADOC Program Review

for Operation and Maintenance Army and Other Procurement, Army Data Call, 2 Nov 04. 79. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY07-11 TRADOC Program Review

for Operation and Maintenance, Army, and other Procurement, Army Data Call, 10 Nov 04. 80. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander's Statement - FY07-11

POM Review Data Call, 6 Dec 04. 81. Briefing, subj: FY07-11 Program Review, 2 Dec 04. 82. Email, subj: FY07-11 Program Review Data Call, 23 Feb 05. 83. Email with atch, subj: Fy07-11 Program Review Data Call, 23 Feb 05. 84. SIGACTS, DPTM, 16 Aug 04. 85. SIGACTS, DPTM, 23 Aug 04. 86. SIGACTS, DPTM, 25 Oct 04. 87. SIGACTS, DPTM, 21 Jan 05. 88. SIGACTS, DPTM, 13 Dec 04. 89. SIGACTS, DPTM, 28 Jan 05. 90. SIGACTS, DPTM, 15 Nov 04. 91. SIGACTS, DPTM, 8 Nov 04. 92. Memorandum for Command Historian with atch (Extract), subj: Annual

Command History, 21 Jan 05.

CHAPTER TWO

150

1. Email with atch, subj: Fires Knowledge Network, 9 Feb 05. 2. "Fires Knowledge Network," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 2a. Information Paper, subj: Distance Learning Classrooms, undated. 2b. Information Paper, subj: Multimedia Classrooms, undated. 2c. Information Paper, subj: Distance Learning Products Catalog, undated. 2d. Memorandum for BG James C. Yarbrough, DCG, U.S. Army Infantry School,

subj: Effects Based Operations, 31 Mar 05. 2e. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based

Operations Symposium, 11 Apr 05. 2f. Briefing, subj: Effects Based Approach to Tactical Operations, 7 Apr 05. 2g. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based

Operations, 13 Apr 05. 2h. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFACS Tactical Effects Based

Operations Needs Assessment/Needs Analysis, 27 Apr 05. 2i. Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Input Report (27 Apr 05), 26 Apr 05. 3. Email with atch, subj: TADSS Cmd History, 22 Feb 05. 4. Email, subj: TADSS Cmd History, 22 Feb 05. 5. Cpt Joel J. Canon, et al, "The FATC and COE: Training Relevant and Ready

Soldiers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04. 6. Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Gregory P. Beatrice, 1-22 FA, USAFATC, Cpt

Michael D. Frazier, 1-40 FA, USAFATC, 31 Jan 05. 7. Email, subj: Warrior Ethos and Adding More Realism to IET, 9 Feb 05. 7a. Email, subj: ATC's Piece for the Command History, 1 Apr 05. 8. Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 18 Mar 05. 9. Briefing, subj: BNCOC/ANCOC Adjustments and NCOES Redesign, 9 Apr 04. 10. Fact Sheet, subj: NCOES Executive Summary, 14 Apr 04. 11. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY05 TRADOC Commander's

Training Guidance, 22 Jul 04. 12. The Army Training and Development Panel Report (NCO), Final Report, 2 Apr

02. 13. Email, subj: NCOES Redesign, 2 Feb 05. 14. Interview, Dastrup with CSM Allie R. Ousley, Cmdt, NCOA, and SGM John M.

Dorsey, 9 Feb 05. 15. Interview, Dastrup with SGM Edwin V. Blount, G3 NCOES Restructuring Team

Chief, 2 Feb 05. 16. Briefing, subj: NCOES Restructuring Proposal, 21 Jan 05. 17. Email with atch, subj: NCOES Redesign, 7 Feb 05. 18. Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004. 19. Briefing, subj: 15 Week 4 Day BOLC III with Tracked Follow-on Courses, 9

Dec 04. 20. Email, subj: BOLC and CCC, 22 Feb 05. 21. Briefing (Extract), subj: Basic Officer Leader Course Update, 14-15 Jan 04. 22. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Memorandum of Instruction for Ft. Sill

BOLC II Development, 11 Mar 04.

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22a. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, Program Manager, OES, 7 Jan 05. 23. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Request for Four Directed Military

Overstrength for the Basic Officer Leaders Course Phase III, 5 Nov 03. 24. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: BOLC Common Core Tasks, 18 May

04. 25. SIGACTS, DRM, 24 Aug 04. 26. SIGACTS, DRM, 21 Sep 04. 27. SIGACTS, DRM, 12 Oct 04. 28. SIGACTS, DRM, 9 Nov 04. 29. SIGACTS, DRM, 30 Nov 04. 30. SIGACTS, DRM, 23 Nov 04. 31. Email with atch, subj: G3 Biweekly Input, 20 Dec 04. 32. Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Input, 27 Oct 04. 33. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, Program Manager, OES, 7 Jan 05. 34. Briefing, subj: 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 8 Mar 04. 35. Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Updated, Summer 2004. 36. Briefing, subj: Captain's OES, 2004. 37. "Combined Arms and Services Staff School to Merge with Officer Advanced

Course," U.S. Army News Release, 12 Apr 04. 38. Information Paper, subj: Information for Course 2-6-22 (DL), 7 Jan 05. 39. Information Paper, subj: 30th Field Artillery Regiment, 7 Jan 05. 40. Interview, Dastrup with Maj Lawrence M. Terranova, Chief, New Equipment

Training Division, DOTD, 27 Jan 05. 41. Email with atch, subj: NET Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 3 Feb 05. 42. Email with atch, subj: G3/G4 Biweekly Update Report, 27 Oct 04. 43. Email with atch, subj: Bi-weekly Update, 12 Oct 04. 44. Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Update, 23 Nov 04. 45. Email with atch, subj: G3 Biweekly Input, 20 Dec 04. 46. SIGACTS, DPTM, 28 Jan 05. 47. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams,

"State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 48. Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual

Command History, 16 Mar 05. 49. Interview, Dastrup with Col Gary Kinne, Dir, JACI, USAFAS, 23 Feb 05. 50. Col John L. Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill

Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04. 51. Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, Nov-Dec 04. 52. Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly Update, 28 Oct 04. 53. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy Williams, "State

of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 54. Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Updated, 11 Jan 05. 55. Briefing (Extract), subj: Joint Initiatives at Fort Sill, Late 2004. 56. Briefing, subj: Joint Fires and Effects Course Decision Brief, 2 Nov 04. 57. Briefing (Extract), subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, 4-7 Nov 04. 58. Briefing, subj: Training Joint Fires and Effects, Dec 04.

152

59. Briefing (Extract), subj: Chief of Field Artillery Update, 11 Jan 05. 60. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy Williams, "State

of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 61. Email with atch, subj: TADSS Cmd History 04, 22 Feb 05. 62. Email, subj: Live CAS for Annual Command History, 16 Feb 05. 63. Interview, Dastrup with Col Stephen D. Mitchell, Dir, DOTC/G3, 14 Dec 04. 64. "Joint Thunder Rocks Sill," Fort Sill Cannoneer, 13 May 04, pp. 1a, 2a. 65. Col John L. Haithcock, "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill

Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04. 66. Maj John R. Watson, "Operation Joint Thunder," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-

Oct 04. 67. Memorandum, subj: Field Artillery and Fires and Effects Themes and Messages,

10 Jun 04. 68. Email, subj: Student Production Figures for FY 2004, 4 Feb 05. 69. Statement of Work, Development of a Resident Tactical Information Operations

Course, undated. 70. Memorandum for BG James C. Yarbrough, DCG, U.S. Army Infantry School,

subj: Effects Based Operations, 31 Mar 05. 71. Tactical Information Operations Course Brochure, undated. 72. Interview, Dastrup with Andre Williams, WOES Branch, 30th FA, 19 May 05. 73. Briefing, subj: Tactical Information Operations IPR, 17 Feb 05. 74. Briefing (Extract), subj: LTG Wallace Update, 14 Jun 04. 74a. Email with atch, subj: Courses Instructing Non-lethal/EBO, 19 May 05. 74b. Interview, Dastrup with CW3 John P. Watson, Warrant Officer Advance Course

Instructor, 30th FA, 23 May 05. 75. Cpt Gary J. Schreckengost and Cpt Gary A. Smith, "IO in SOSO at the Tactical

Level: Converting Brigade IO Objectives into Battalion IO Tasks," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04.

76. Col Allen W. Batschelet, "Information Operations for the Joint Warfighter," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04.

CHAPTER THREE

1. MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery

Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 2. Email with atch, subj: Joint Training and Joint Issues for 2004 Annual Command

History, 16 Mar 03. 3. Interview, Dastrup with Col Gary Kinne, Dir, JTAC, 23 Feb 05. 4. Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Fires

Strategic Quick Wins, 10 Feb 05. 5. Col John L. Haithcock, Jr., "Joint Fires and Effects Integration Center: Fort Sill

Initiatives for the Joint Force," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04. 6. Col David R. Brown, "JTAC MOA vs. JTTP," Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb

05. 7. Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Oct 04.

153

8. Briefing, subj: Modular Army Overview, 5 Apr 04. 9. Interview, Dastrup with Daniel L. Bankston, FDIC, 3 Mar 05. 10. White Paper, subj: Unit of Employment Operations, 20 Mar 04. 11. Briefing, subj: U.S. Field Artillery in Transformation, undated. 12. Briefing, subj: How the UEx Fights, 29 Mar 04. 12a. Email with atch, subj: Transformation of the Army, 4 Apr 05. 13. Briefing, subj: Chief of Field Artillery Updated, Nov-Dec 04. 14. MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug

04. 15. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Brigade, 4 Dec 04. 16. Fires Brigade Organizational and Operational Plan (Extract), 9 Nov 04. 17. Briefing, subj: Modularity/Transformation, Jan 05. 18. FA and Joint Fires and Effects Themes and Messages, 29 Dec 04. 19. Msg, ca 18 Mar 05. 20. MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field Artillery

Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 21. Cpt Michael M. Stump, "4th ID Stands Up Army's First Fires Brigade," Field

Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 22. "Army Announces FY05 and FY06 Modular Brigade Force Structure Decision,"

U.S. Army News Release, 23 Jul 04. 23. Briefing, subj: FDIC Modularity Smart Book, 25 Jan 05. 24. Briefing, subj: FDIC Fires Battalion 105T, 22 Feb 05. 25. Briefing, subj: FDIC Fires Battalion, 155SP, 22 Feb 05. 26. Briefing, subj: Heavy BCT, 15 Sep 04. 27. Briefing, subj: Infantry BCT, 8 Feb 05. 28. Col G. Keith Herring, "Flagship Sill: A Power Projection Platform for 100-Plus

Years," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04. 29. Fact Sheet, subj: Stryker 8-Wheel Drive Armoured Combat Vehicles, USA, 4

Feb 05. 30. Fact Sheet, subj: Army Completes Stryker Brigade Certification, undated. 31. DPTM SIGACTS, 30 Apr 04. 32. DPTM SIGACTS, 12 Oct 04. 32a. Approved Precision Effects Study Plan, undated. 32aa. Email with atch, subj: Precision Effects Study, 23 May 05. 32b. Memorandum for U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, et al, subj:

Precision Effects Study, 20 Nov 03. 32c. Announcement, undated. 32d. Fact Sheet, subj: Precision Effects, undated. 32dd. MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber Decision,

Today's Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes," Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 04, pp. 1-3

32e. Routing Sheet, undated. 32f. Sandra I. Erwin, "Cannons, Rockets and Missiles: A Growth Industry in the

Army," www.nationaldefensemagazine. org. 32g. Interview, Dastrup with Thomas Hills, Sr Analysist, Analysis Branch, FDIC, 23

154

May 05. 32h. Fact Sheet, subj: Rankings of 24 Proposals, undated. 32i. Briefing, subj: Precision Effects Study Results for TRADOC Commander, 4

Feb 04. 32j. Briefing, subj: Phase II - Precision Effects Study Recommendations, undated. 32k. Briefing, subj: Courses of Action for Accelerated Course Correcting Fuse

Development, 30 Apr 04. 33. Briefing, subj: Capability Needs Assessment: Residual Gaps, 5 Oct 04. 34. Email with atch, subj: CY2004 FDIC-USAFAS History Input, 16 Feb 05. 35. Email, subj: Message 3 of 3 Short Summary, 21 Feb 05. 36. Email with atch, subj: 2004 History - FDIC USAFAS, 4 Mar 05. 37. Memorandum for Dir, FDIC, Fort Monroe, VA, subj: Approval of ORD for the

Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur, 30 Sep 04. 38. Memorandum for Acting Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics, Army, subj: Excalibur Precision Engagement Projectile ORD, 16 Sep 04. 39. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams,

"State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 40. Interview, Dastrup with Maj J. Riley Durant, TSM Cannon, 7 Mar 05. 41. MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams,

"State of the Field Artillery," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 42. Interview, Dastrup with Doug R. Brown, Dep Dir, TSM Cannon, 16 Feb 05. 43. Briefing (Extract), subj: Requirements Updated, undated. 44. Briefing, subj: TSM Cannon Smart Book, Dec 04. 45. Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly Update, 24 Nov 04. 46. Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update, 13 Dec 04. 47. Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update, 5 Jan 05. 47a. Email, subj: TSMC Comments, 13 Apr 05. 48. DOD Acquisition Manager's Handbook for Insensitive Munitions (Extract), Jan

04. 49. James S. Pearson, "Modular Charge Artillery System (MACS)," Field Artillery

Magazine, Mar-Jun 04. 50. Interview, Dastrup with James S. Pearson, TSM Cannon, 16 Mar 05. 51. Memorandum for See Distribution (Extract), subj: Change to the ORD for the

MACS, 17 Nov 00. 52. Operational Requirements Document for Modular Artillery Charge System

M231/M232 (Extract), 17 Nov 00. 53. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Abbreviated System Evaluation Plan

for MACS, XM232E1 Product Improvement Program, 5 Nov 04. 54. Email with atch, subj: MACS Paper, 24 Mar 05. 55. Material Fielding Plan, MACS, 15 Aug 00. 56. Fact Sheet, subj: 155-mm. MACS, undated. 57. Memorandum for MG John J. Deyermond, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S.

Army Materiel Command, subj: Full Materiel Release of M231 MACS, 22 Apr 03. 58. Briefing, subj: MACS 232-39 Caliber Optimization Program, 8 Jul 04. 59. Interview, Dastrup with Maj Charles J. Emerson, TSM Cannon, 2 Mar 05.

155

60. Briefing, subj: NLOS Cannon Update, undated. 61. "Army, Boeing, SAIC Accelerate Future Combat Systems' Contribution to the

Current Force," Boeing News Release, 22 Jul 04. 62. Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon, 14 Mar 05. 63. Interview, Dastrup with Doug R. Brown, Dep Dir, TSM Cannon, 16 Feb 05. 64. Maj Charles J. Emerson, Maj Mark H. Laflamme, and Col (Ret) James E.

Cunningham, "NLOS Systems for the Modular and Future Forces," Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04.

65. MG David P. Valcourt, "Issues and Answers: NLOS-C Caliber Decision, Today's Modularity, Counterfire, and Sound Bytes," Field Artillery Magazine, Aug 04.

66. Briefing, subj: Non-Line of Sight Cannon Caliber Decision, 10 May 04. 67. "Army Accelerates Selected FCS Capabilities," U.S. Army News Release, 22 Jul

04. 68. "Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems," Army News Services, 23

Jul 04. 69. Fact Sheet, subj: Army Moves Up Fielding of Future Combat Systems, undated. 70. Report, subj: Force Application Working Group, 26 oct 04. 71. Email with atch, subj: Lightweight Towed 155, 11 Mar 05. 72. Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TSM Cannon, 8 Mar 05. 73. Memorandum, subj: Independent Evaluation Report for the Multi-Service

Operational Test and Evaluation of the M777E1 LW155 with TAD Program, 8 Feb 05. 74. Minutes, FCB, 2 Nov 04. 75. Report, subj: Significant Activities, 13 May 04. 76. Report, subj: Significant Activities, 15 Jul 04. 77. Memorandum, subj: Proposed Test Plan for Airdrop Certification Testing of

M777 LW155 Howitzer, 23 Jul 04. 78. Report, subj: Significant Activities, 8 Apr 04. 79. Report, subj: Significant Activities, 16 Sep 04. 80. Msg, subj: Good News Daily, 28 Oct 04. 81. Email with atch, subj: LW155 History, 8 Mar 05. 82. Memorandum for Joint Program Manager, LW155, 3 Mar 05. 83. Memorandum for Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics, subj: Advanced Towed Cannon Artillery System ORD, 31 Jan 05.

84. Memorandum for Commanding General Marine Corps Systems Command, subj: Full Rate Production Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155) Program, 10 Mar 05.

85. Interview, Dastrup with Jeffrey L. Froysland, TSM RAMS, 8 Mar 05. 86. Lockheed Martin News Release, 11 May 04. 86a. Memorandum with atch for Dir, TSM RAMS, subj: Coordination of 2004

USAFACFS Annual Command History, 4 Apr 05. 87. Interview, Dastrup with Charles H. Akin, TSM RAMS, 17 Feb 05. 88. Email with atch, subj: TSM RAMS Training Report, 14 Feb 05. 89. Email with atch, subj: Biweekly Input Report, 15 Feb 05. 90. Email, subj: MLRS Launcher Upgrade and Fielding, 1 Mar 05.

156

91. "DOD Says Budget Cut, Ending NLOS-LS would be Detrimental to FCS," Inside the Army, 12 Jul 04.

92. "Army Considering Cuts to FCS Non-Line of Sight Launch System," Inside the Army, 12 May 04.

93. Fact Sheet, subj: Lockmart Raytheon JV Gets Billion Dollar Non-line of Sight Contract, 23 Mar 04.

94. Fact Sheet, subj: Netfire Limited Liability Company Recieves $1.1 Billion Contract for System Development, 22 Mar 04.

95. Briefing (Extract), subj: Non-Line of Sight Launch System, 27-28 Oct 04. 96. Interview with atch, Dastrup with Ctp Samual S. Ancira and Maj Mark H.

Laflamme, TSM RAMS, 25 Feb 05. 97. Maj Charles J. Emerson, Jr., and Maj Mark H. Laflamme, "NLOS Systems for

the Modular and Future Force," Field Arillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 04. 98. Email with atch, subj: Non-Line of Sight Launch System, 28 Feb 05. 99. Briefing (Extract), subj: Future Combat Systems: FCS Documentation Plan and

Spiral KPP Concept, undated. 100. Briefing, subj: NLOS-LS Program Update, 8 Sep 04. 101. Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS, 28 Feb 05. 102. Email with atch, subj: HIMARS History, 16 Mar 05. 103. Interview, Dastrup with LTC William E. Field, TSM RAMS, 3 Mar 05. 104. Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin's HIMARS Launcher Successful in

Series of Production Qualification Tests, 16 Feb 04. 105. Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin's HIMARS Successfully Fires

Guided MLRS Rockets in Recent Testing, 11 May 04. 106. Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Receives $109 Million Contract for

Low-Rate Production of Combat-Proven HIMARS, 3 Jan 05. 107. Email, subj: TSM RAMS, 26 Nov 04. 108. Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Semi-Monthly Update, 27 Oct 04. 109. MG David P. Valcourt, "Field Artillerymen as Force Multipliers," Field

Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 05. 110. Email with atch, subj: ATACMS Annual Command History, 22 Feb 05. 111. Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 04. 112. Email with atch, subj: RDDI Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 24 Mar

05. 112a. Interview, Dastrup with Sammy Coffman, Dep Dir, FDIC, 10 Feb 05. 112b. Email with atch, subj: Weekly Training Update, 7 Apr 05. 112c. "Army Cancels Radar Project Developed by Joint Venture," www.Boston.com,

3 Nov 04. 113. Email with atch, subj: FDIC CG Bi-Weekly Update, 2 Apr 05. 114. Information Paper, subj: L3 Communications Space and Navigation Awarded

Multi-Year Contract, 12 Aug 03. 115. Information Paper, subj: L-3 Wins $70 Million Army-Marine Work, 15 Aug

03. 115a. Fact Sheet, subj: IPADS, 15 Mar 05. 115b. Briefing, TSM Sensors, undated.

157

116. Maj Karen P. Walters, "Target Location and Laser Designation via Electro-Optic Sensors," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04.

116a. CW3 Daniel W. Caldwell, "Radar Planning, Preparation, and Employment of 3-Tiered Coverage: LCMR, Q-36, and Q-37," Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, pp. 43-45.

116b. MG David P. Valcourt, "Change and Opportunity -- Steady in the Harness," Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Jun 04, pp. 1-3.

116c. Operational and Organizational Concept for the LCMR (Extract), 25 May 04. 116d. Capability Development Document for LCMR (Extract), 22 Nov 04. 116e. Email with atch, subj: LCMR Input to 2004 Annual Command History, 19

May 05. 117. Email, subj: AFATDS Version 7, 24 Feb 05. 118. Interview with atch, Dastrup with William D. Sailers, Dep Dir, FATDS, 23 Feb

05. 119. Email with atch, subj: FDIC Input to CG Semi-Monthly Update for 22 Dec 04,

28 Dec 04. 120. Fact Sheet, subj: PFED, undated. 121. Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systems, undated. 122. TRADOC News Service, "Field Artillery Fielding Preps 25th Infantry Division

for Operation Iraqi Freedom Rotation 3 Deployment, 16 Mar 04. 123. Fact Sheet, subj: Effects Systems, undated. 124. Email with atch, subj: Air Assault Expeditionary Force, 7 Mar 05.

158

INDEX

A

Army Knowledge Online, 24 Austin, BG Lloyd J. III, 91

B Base Realignment and Closure, 37 Bolton, Claude M., Jr., Army Acquisition Executive, 88 Brownless, Les, Undersecretary of the Army, 56 Byrnes, GEN Kevin P., 19, 32, 33, 34, 47

C

Cartwright, BG Charles, 68, 69 Central Command, 15 Centralized Installation Management, 15 Combined Arms Services Staff School, 39 Counterstrike Task Force, 14

D

Department of Defense, 100 Department of the Army, 25 Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, 11 Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 10, 11, 41 Directorate of Training and Evaluation, 12

E

Effects Based Operations, 26

F

Fire Support and Combined Arms Department, 10 Fires Knowledge Network, 24, 25 Fulton, COL Christopher T., 31 Futures Development and Integration Center, 12

G

Global War on Terrorism, 17, 19, 20 Graham, BG Mark A., 8, 9, 20, 26, 27

159

I Installation Management Agency, 16, 17

J

Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, 11, 13, 14

K

Kern, LTG Paul J., 55

L

Lieberman, Senator Joseph, 56

M

Maples, MG Michael D., 9, 10, 27, 62, 67, 72, 73 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 77

O

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), 29, 37, 58 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 29, 37, 46, 58, 91

P

Palmero, COL James M., 30

R

Rumsfeld, Donald, Secretary of Defense, 67

S

Santorum, Senator Rick, 56 Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., 49, 50 Secure Internet Protocol Network, 25 Shenk, COL (P) Donald F., 54 Shinseki, GEN Eric K., 36, 50, 54, 57, 62, 66 Strategic Communications Office, 13 Stricklin, MG Toney, 60, 61, 80

T

160

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 62 Transformation in Installation Management, 15

U

U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, 24 U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 9, 10, 11, 26, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 60, 67, 72, 80, 83, 86, 92, 93, 94, 98, 101 U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center, 30, 31, 32 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 66, 73, 81, 93, 94, 97 U.S. Forces Joint Command, 25

V

Valcourt, MG David P., 14, 19, 20, 22, 44, 52

W

Wallace, LTG William S., 32 Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate, 10, 12 White, Thomas E., Secretary of Defense, 15, 56

Y

Yakovac, MG Joseph L., Jr., 61, 72