U.S ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL

ANNUAL COMMAND HISTORY (RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2008 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2008

BY

COMMAND HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

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COMMANDER’S INTRODUCTION The Annual Command History for 2008 captures key mission support activities,

training and leader development initiatives, and combat development accomplishments for the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill.

While Soldiers and civilians at Fort Sill worked to ensure local safety and security, the Field Artillery and Fort Sill continued to transform to meet future requirements. In support of the U.S. Army’s Transformation, the Field Artillery led the way in futures development and integration. In addition to emerging weapons systems, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon, the M777 155-mm. Towed Howitzer, and the NLOS Launch System, field artillery munitions, such as the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) and the Excalibur Unitary, assured unparalleled precision lethal fires in the near future. To enhance the Field Artillery’s precision capabilities even more, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Precision Guidance Kit.

Fort Sill’s core mission remained training Soldiers and leaders for Field Artillery units of the operational forces. While the 434th Field Artillery Brigade enhanced realism in Initial Entry Training to prepare Soldiers better for the Contemporary Operational Environment, the Field Artillery School provided Field Artillery leaders with world-class training and instruction. The School furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and Soldiers better for their next or first assignment. Recognizing the impact of non-standard missions in the Contemporary Operational Environment on Redlegs, the Field Artillery School energetically developed reset training programs for individuals and units to retrain Redlegs in core Field Artillery competencies and made nonlethal fires a Field Artillery core competency.

As part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission to co-locate Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery training at one location, the Field Artillery Center and the Air Defense Artillery Center, the latter at Fort Bliss, Texas, worked to create the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill.

In support of the Army’s initiatives on jointness, Fort Sill’s Joint and Combined Integration Directorate served as the Army’s hub for joint command and control developments and issues and conducted the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course and the Joint Fires Observer Course, while the Field Artillery School taught the Tactical Information Operations Warfare Course and the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course to develop Soldiers and leaders with the abilities of providing nonlethal effects.

Around the world, Redleg Soldiers are the pride of the Nation’s forces. At home, Field Artillery units continue to train to unprecedented levels of high-quality performance -- preparing for whatever challenges wait them. Now more than ever, the Caissons are indeed rolling along.

PETER M. VANGJEL Major General, USA Commanding General

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PREFACE

The 2008 Annual Command History for the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Command Historian’s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Fires Center of Excellence made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, equipment requirements, and mission support.

Because the Fires Center of Excellence was involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Command Historian’s Office under the direction of the Commanding General selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History.

Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian’s work. After they are collected from the various Center organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Command Historian’s Office. All documents are available for use by Center and School staffs, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request.

Because new documents are often found after research and writing are completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Command Historian’s Office.

In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Command Historian’s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Command Historian

U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE i COMMANDER’S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND MISSION SUPPORT Organization 1 New Assistant Commandant for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School 1 Base Realignment and Closure 2005 and the Fires Center of Excellence 2 Mission Support 15 Residential Communities Initiative 15 Fort Sill and South West Oklahoma Community Partnership Council 16 Lawton-Fort Sill Co-Op Program 17 Mission Budget 18 Army Radar Approach Control 19 Power Projection 20 CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION Introduction 21 Commanding General’s Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 2008 21 Return of the King 21 Joint Fires OIF/OEF Initial Impressions Report 22 Writing Doctrine 23 The Joint Fires University Concept 24 Reset, Mobile Training Teams, and Collective Training Evaluation Teams and Atrophy of Skills 27 Distance Learning 32 Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes 32 Fire Support Coordinator Course 33 Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 35 Joint Fires Effects Trainer System 35 Call-for-Fire Trainer 36 434th Field Artillery Brigade 36 Warrior Training 36 Warrior Transition Course 37 Gender-integrated Training 38

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Reserve Component Mobilization to Support 434th Field Artillery Brigade 39 Noncommissioned Officer Education System Course Expansion 40 Integrating Warrant Officers into the Basic Officer Leaders Course II 41 Officer Education System 42 Basic Officer Leaders Course II 42 Basic Officer Leaders Course III 43 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course and Expansion 43 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course- Distance Learning 45 Pre-command Course and Expansion 46 Adding Nonlethal Fires as Core Competency 46 Field Artillery Captain Attrition 47 New Field Artillery Museum 49 Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 49 Fort Sill’s Joint Fires Center of Excellence Training Initiatives 50 Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence Concept 51 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Course 52 Joint Fires Observer Course 53 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 53 The 138th Combat Training Squadron 53 Nonlethal Training 54 Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course 54 Tactical Information Operations Course 55 CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 57 Field Artillery Campaign Plan for 2007-2008 57 2008 Fires Symposium 59 Force Design and Combat Developments 59 Transformation of the Army 59 Modularization 59 Division and Corps 60 Fires Brigade 62 Theater Army 64 Brigade Combat Team Review 64 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study 65

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Future Combat System 66 Equipment 67 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile 67 Precision Guidance Kit 73 Future Cannon Munitions Suite 75 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon 75 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 81 Current Cannon Programs 88 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 88 Paladin Integrated Management Program 91 Multiple-Launch Rocket System 92 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 101 Army Tactical Missile System 109 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System 114 Firefinder Radars 121 Artillery Meteorology 122 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System 124 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and Knight 125 Fire Support Sensor System 129 Joint Effects Targeting System 129 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 130 Lightweight Countermortar Radar 131 Paladin Operations Center Vehicle 132 Command, Control, and Communications Systems 132 Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortars 136 Fires Battle Laboratory 138 Glossary 146 Appendix One Student Production for Fiscal Year 2008 158 Appendix Two Key USAFAS Personnel 159 Appendix Three Key USAFCOEFS Personnel 160 Appendix Four Field Artillery School Commandants 161 Appendix Five Chiefs of Field Artillery 163 Appendix Six Assistant Commandants 165 Appendix Seven USAFCOEFS Mission Organization Chart 167 Appendix Eight USAFAS and Fort Sill Mission Organization Chart, 2008 168 Appendix Nine Approved Fires Center of Excellence Model, January 2007 169 Appendix Ten List of Documents 170 Index of Names 182

CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND MISSION SUPPORT

MISSION Influenced by the new field artillery technology introduced after the Spanish-

American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and inadequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in September 1911. While War Department, General Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911 integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers.1

In 2008 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade composed the training mission of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) and continued the tradition started in 1911. During the year, USAFCOEFS trained the field artillery forces of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders, designed and developed fire support tactics and doctrine, supported unit training and readiness, mobilized and deployed operating forces, maintained installation infrastructure and services, and prepared for the co-location of the Air Defense Artillery Center and School from Fort Bliss, Texas, with the Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill as directed by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) of 2005.2

ORGANIZATION New Assistant Commandant for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School

On 8 September 2008 Colonel (P) Ross Ridge succeeded Colonel (P) Richard C. Longo as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. Colonel Ridge was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery in 1980 after graduating from Indiana University, Bloomington. After completing the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 36th Field Artillery, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, Augsburg, Germany, as an Air Defense Platoon Leader, Fire Direction Officer, and a Battery Executive Officer. After attending, the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, he was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division. During this assignment, he served as an assistant S-3, battery

12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 7.

2Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery School Update, Summer 2004, Doc I-1, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; USAFACFS FY05 Command Training Guidance, undated, Doc I-1a, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Commanding General, TRADOC, subj: Official Designation as the U.S. Army Joint Fires Center of Excellence, 8 Aug 06, Doc I-1. In 2006 the TRADOC renamed the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill to reflect the collocation of the Air Defense Artillery Center and School and the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill at Fort Sill.

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commander, brigade fire support officer, and as the aide-de-camp to the commanding general. His next assignment was at the U.S. Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, where he held the positions of battalion fire direction center combat trainer, firing battery combat trainer, and field artillery battalion S-3 combat trainer.

After attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1993, Colonel Ridge was assigned to Division Artillery, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, as the assistant fire support coordinator. He was later assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, as the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division fire support officer. In 1994 he deployed to Haiti in support of Operation Uphold Democracy where he served as the brigade civil-military officer for Port-au-Prince. Upon redeployment, Colonel Ridge served as the executive officer for the 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery. He later served a joint tour with the Joint Interagency Task Force-West in Alameda, California, where he was forward deployed to Bangkok, Thailand, as the Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Counternarcotics Forward Detachment and was responsible for the U.S. Department of Defense counter-drug support in Southeast Asia. Later, he was assigned to Fort Lewis, Washington, where he served as Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. After command he remained at Fort Lewis where he was assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command as Chief, Effects Division, Initial Brigade Coordination Cell.

After attending the U.S. Army War College, he was assigned to the operations group at Fort Irwin, California, as the deputy commander. From 2003 to 2007, Colonel Ridge served in the Republic of Korea as the Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division Artillery, Camp Stanley; the Chief of Staff, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud; and executive officer to the Commander, UN Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces-Korea. Following his assigned in Korea, he was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Chief of Staff of the Strategic Effects Directorate, MNF-I, from 2007-2008. He assumed the duties of the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School on 8 September 2008.3

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 2005 AND THE FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Preparation for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 During recent years, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process

demonstrated its ability to transform the military. From 1988 through 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) closed 112 Army installations and realigned 26 others to create more efficiency and effectiveness within the Army’s installation infrastructure. Combined with over 230 minor BRAC actions undertaken throughout DOD during the four BRAC rounds, the major closures or realignments rationalized much of DOD’s infrastructure and saved billions of dollars in the process. In view of this achievement through 1995, three successive Secretaries of Defense urged further rationalization of the military’s infrastructure through additional BRAC actions. This would save additional billions of dollars annually, free up excess capacity, permit funding facilities that were actually required, support warfighting, and furnish quality-of-life improvements for men

3Official Biography, Colonel (P) Ross E. Ridge, Doc I-1.

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and women in the military services. Basically, another BRAC would improve DOD’s ability to improve its warfighting capabilities.4

Although the Bush Administration wanted to conduct a BRAC in 2003, Congress opposed such action but later approved one in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002. This authorization permitted a BRAC to be conducted in FY 2005 to realign DOD’s infrastructure and eliminate any excess physical capacity that diverted scarce resources from defense capability. On 15 November 2002, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, explained that BRAC 2005 would permit reconfiguring DOD’s current infrastructure into one that would maximize warfighting capability and efficiency. Equally important, BRAC 2005 would help reshape the military, would create multi-mission and multi-service bases, would help optimize military readiness, and would help realize significant monetary savings.5

At the same time the act required the Secretary of Defense to publish selection criteria by 31 December 2003 to be used in making recommendations for closure or realignment and specified that military value would be the primary consideration in making recommendations for closure or realignment. Military value criteria included the current and future mission capabilities and the operational readiness of DOD’s total force; the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace; the ability to accommodate contingency operations, mobilization, and future total force requirements; and the costs of operations and manpower implications.6

Against this backdrop, Fort Sill appeared to have solid credentials that would prevent its closure. As evident by its support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, the installation’s new rail facility and unit movement facility efficiently shipped personnel and equipment to the theaters of operation to demonstrate its capabilities as a premier power projection platform. While Fort Sill’s mild climate permitted year around training, the installation’s varied terrain provided excellent training ranges. Also, the post had a joint mission and worked with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force. As the home to the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, Fort Sill trained Field Artillerymen for the Army and the Marine Corps and utilized Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers to augment the School’s staff. U.S. Air Force aircraft regularly provided close air support on the west range for the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course while the installation’s radar approach control supported the 80th Flight Training Wing from Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, in conducting the EURO-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program. In addition, the installation’s Falcon Range supported between 1,600 to 1,800 Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Air National Guard fighter sorties per year; and Henry Post Army Airfield supported C-17 tactical short take-off and landing training for units stationed at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma.7

Equally important, Fort Sill had the capability of adding new missions. The

42003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 20-21; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 7. 5Ibid., p. 7.

6Ibid.

7Ibid., p. 8.

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installation had the training acres, training support facilities, varied terrain, and available airspace to support all types of joint training and had mild weather to permit uninterrupted training year around. Surrounded by Air Force bases, Fort Sill also offered the ideal location for acquiring expanded Army missions and expanded joint missions. Beyond the plans for becoming the Army’s Fire and Effects Integration Center, the installation envisioned becoming a key training facility for Joint Fires and Effects because it was the home of the Field Artillery and was therefore an ideal location for the facility.8 BRAC Decision of 2005

After extensive study BRAC 2005 outlined its recommendations in May 2005. Besides closing and relocating Fort Sill’s Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), moving the installation’s Regional Confinement Facility to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and relocating the 95th Division (Training) to Fort Sill, BRAC 2005 proposed moving a fires brigade from Fort Sill to Fort Bliss, Texas, and to locate it with existing maneuver units there or those scheduled to be moved to the Texas installation. This action would create space at Fort Sill for transferring an air defense artillery unit from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill to become part of the Net Fires Center at the latter. BRAC 2005 also recommended relocating the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Center and School at Fort Bliss to Fort Sill and co-locating it with the Field Artillery (FA) Center and School to form the heart of the Net Fires Center. This would consolidate field artillery and air defense artillery training and doctrine development at a single location, fit with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) model at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where the Military Police, Engineer, and Chemical Centers and Schools were co-located, and would functionally align related branch centers and schools at one location to foster consistency, standardization, and training proficiency. At the same time creating the Net Fires Center would permit the Army to reduce the number of military occupational skills (MOS) training locations, support Army Transformation by co-locating institutional training, and gain synergy for the two artillery branches.9

Upon notification of the BRAC 2005 recommendations for creating a Net Fires Center, renamed the Fires Center of Excellence late in 2005, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss developed a concept plan to co-locate the ADA Center and School and the FA Center and School together at Fort Sill. Completed in mid-July 2005, the plan proposed merging some functions and organizations if manpower savings could be created while keeping others separate. In keeping with MANSEN, the draft plan envisioned creating one center staff under a major general and merging the ADA Center’s and FA Center’s combat development functions into one organization.10 Other functions, however, would remain separate. For example, Fort Sill proposed keeping the ADA School and FA School as

8Ibid.

9Ibid., pp. 8-9; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 5-6.

102005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 9; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 5; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 6.

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separate organizations with each having a brigadier general as a commandant even though some of their training activities would be integrated.11 The 2005 Implementation Plan

To create the Fires Center of Excellence Fort Sill and Fort Bliss, meanwhile, developed a three-phase implementation plan in 2005. During phase one (FY 2006), the two installations would activate a virtual Fires Center of Excellence, would expand the Fires Center of Excellence’s staff functions to receive an advance party from the ADA Center, and would start constructing the required facilities to accommodate ADA training based upon the availability of the funding. This phase would also include the creation of a collaborative capabilities development integration function (combat developments) for air defense and fire support combat developments. In phase two (FY 2007) or the initial operational capability, the ADA School Headquarters and elements of initial military training for noncommissioned officers, officers, and warrant officers would move to Fort Sill. Equally as important, a Commanding General for the Fires Center of Excellence would be designated. In phase three (FY 2008) or full operational capability, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss would complete the realignment of the ADA Center’s functions to Fort Sill. In the meantime, one ADA brigade would move from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill while Fort Sill would receive the 95th Training Division (Institutional Training), close the Regional Confinement Facility and move it to Fort Leavenworth, close the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and move it to Ohio, Colorado, or Indiana, and transfer a fires brigade to Fort Bliss to enhance training and force stabilization.12

Building the Fires Center of Excellence began in June 2005. At that time the FA School and the ADA School took the first collaborative step towards the co-location. In January 2006 the FA School established the Fires Integration Division (FID) in its Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) to be the central clearing house for all BRAC related issues with the ADA School’s move to Fort Sill and staffed it with FA and ADA soldiers by 2007. The school recognized the need for a robust management structure to serve as the primary point of contact for Center of Excellence (CoE) issues, planning, and other related tasks. Cooperating with its counterpart in the ADA School, the division worked with the directorates from both schools to establish a virtual Fires Center of Excellence.13

Initially conceived in January 2006 and stood up on 1 June 2006, the virtual Fires Center of Excellence started the actual integrated staff planning process of creating the Fires Center of Excellence. The virtual Fires Center of Excellence had a virtual Capabilities Development Integration Directorate (CDID), a virtual training and doctrine development capability, and a virtual Knowledge Management Network capability. The virtual DOTD, overseen by the directors of the FA and ADA schools’ DOTDs, for example, worked to integrate training and doctrine development efforts. The virtual Fires Center of Excellence also employed integration cells in both schools (Fires Integration Division in the FA School) to integrate functions horizontally and digitally. Using email

112005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 9; 2006 USAFCOEFS, p. 5. 122005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 9-10; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 6-7. 132006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 8; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 7.

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and periodic video teleconferences, cell members provided the horizontal integration across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains, participated in regularly-held summit meetings to work through Fires Center of Excellence issues, and held home-on-home meetings where both commandants were briefed and decisions were made.14

Other actions reflected the effort to create the Fires Center of Excellence. In June 2006 the ADA School and FA School held a fires seminar to signal the creation of the virtual Fires Center of Excellence. This represented a name change for the seminar. Previously, the FA School had called it the Field Artillery Seminar or the Senior Fire Support Seminar. At that June 2006 Fires Seminar, both schools announced the selection of the Fires Center of Excellence logo to further represent the creation of the virtual Fires Center of Excellence. The following year, the ADA Center and FA Center merged their respective professional bulletins. Developed electronically in a collaborative effort between the FA and ADA magazine staffs, the Fires Bulletin was first published as the May-June 2007 edition. As the Deputy Director of DOTD in the Field Artillery School explained in 2007, combining the two branches’ professional bulletins into the Fires

Bulletin was a key step towards integrating professional development as hiring a Senior Executive Service official, Mr. Kirby Brown, in August 2007 to head the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate also did.15

Meanwhile, construction on the ADA facilities began. On 27 August 2007 dignitaries from the ADA and FA Schools and other government agencies participated in a ground-breaking ceremony for the new ADA Advanced Individual Training (AIT) facilities on the Fires Center of Excellence campus on Fort Sill Boulevard across from the Henry Post Army Airfield. One year later in August 2008, contractors had completed eleven new buildings, and renovated fourteen, while contracts had been awarded for more new construction.16 The New Implementation Plan

Meanwhile, the Fires Center of Excellence movement concept plan changed. Late in 2005 and early 2006, the Commanding General of TRADOC, General William S. Wallace, concluded that implementing the Fires Center of Excellence concept plan of 2005 was unfeasible. Achieving full operational capability in 2008 as originally intended was impossible. In view of this, Fort Bliss and Fort Sill developed a new implementation plan that established a full operational capability in 2009 as directed by General Wallace. Budgetary problems, however, delayed starting facilities construction from early 2007 to late 2007 which caused a difference of opinion on the proposed movement timeline between Fort Sill and Fort Bliss as of September 2007. The ADA School suggested delaying the move of the main body because military construction had just started at Fort Sill. Under its revised plan, the center-level staff move would be postponed from January

142006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 8-9; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 7. 152007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 7-8; BRAC Update, TRADOC Senior Leader

Conference, 11-15 Aug 08, Doc I-2. 162007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 7-8; BRAC Update, TRADOC Senior Leader

Conference, 11-15 Aug 08.

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2009 to July 2009, while the 6th ADA Brigade’s move would be postponed from the spring of 2009 to the spring of 2010. In comparison, the FA School preferred retaining the basic movement schedule of 2009 believing that Fort Sill would be able to accommodate the ADA School even though some of the facilities would not be complete.17

Although the two schools had not resolved the movement dates by the end of 2007, both sides planned on executing the move on the delayed timeline. The new initial operating capability would be moved from the first quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2009; and the new full operational capability date would be moved back from 2009 to the third quarter of 2010. Based upon the new timetable, advance parties from the ADA center staff, the 6th ADA Brigade, and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) would arrive late in 2008. In June 2009 the ADA Commandant, Deputy Assistant Commandant, and the command group staff would come to Fort Sill. They would be followed closely by the center-level staff elements and the NCOA in the summer of 2009. At the end of 2007, Fort Sill anticipated that the first ADA class would be taught late in 2009 and expected growth from around 31,500 people at Fort Sill to 42,000 people by the time that all of the moves had been completed and that the Fires Center of Excellence had been completely stood up would occur. Yet, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss candidly noted the requirement of conducting dual ADA School operations at Fort Bliss and Fort Sill until the move had been completed. The ADA School would be shrinking at Fort Bliss while growing in size at Fort Sill.18

Work on the FCOE continued into 2008 with movement dates becoming more firm. In January 2008 the ADA School’s new Commandant, Major General Howard B. Bromberg, directed Fort Bliss to be proactive by moving elements as soon as possible and gave guidance to plan and move the ADA Assistant Commandant to Fort Sill in January 2009. Subsequently, the Commandants of the FA and ADA Schools briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 21 February 2008 on the plan and movement dates. Coming out of these briefing, all parties agreed that a significant advance party would start arriving at Fort Sill around June 2008 with the new ADA Commandant arriving at Fort Sill sometime between January 2009 and June 2009 based upon the one star slating. The ADA center-level main body moves would start late in the spring of 2009, while the bulk of the 6th ADA Brigade would move sometime between November 2009 and May 2010. Meanwhile, the ADA School would continue to look at what classes and agencies could move earlier as the buildings became available at Fort Sill.19

As 2008 wore on, more information about the class moves emerged although classroom space might be constrained. At a BRAC course movement briefing on 4 September 2008, the ADA School indicated that eighteen courses would move from Fort

172007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 8. 182007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 9; Memorandum for Record with atch, subj:

Information Delivered by Major Williams, FID, 6 May 08, Doc I-3. 19Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: BRAC Input to 2007 Annual

Command History, 13 Mar 08, Doc I-4 Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: Information Delivered by Major Williams, FID, 6 May 08.

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Bliss to Fort Sill. Five would move in FY 2009, and thirteen would move in FY 2010. Specifically, professional military education courses for ADA noncommissioned officers would begin at Fort Sill in August 2009. The ADA Warrant Officer Advanced Course would start in October 2009; and the ADA Captains Career Course for the active component would begin in August 2009. Initial military training courses for ADA would start in January 2010, while the Basic Officer Leader Course III would begin in March 2010. The first ADA AIT classes would start at Fort Sill in January 2010 with all being taught at Fort Sill by April 2010. Until ADA training ceased at Fort Bliss in mid-2010, ADA courses would be taught in two locations with split operations being necessary.20 TRADOC’s Centers of Excellence Concept and the Fires Center of Excellence

As this work of actually moving the ADA School to Fort Sill unfolded, TRADOC established its center of excellence models -- a multi-branch model and a single branch model -- in mid-2005. With co-location of the ADA Center and the FA Center, Fort Sill would fit into the multi-branch model where the alignment of functions or combined functions would exist. Basically, this multi-branch model as it existed in October 2005 provided for a center commander (major general), a general staff that would consolidate the center and installation staffs, and two separate branch schools for functional training and emphasized combining functions and organizations where commonality existed. TRADOC, however, permitted variance if appropriate and required each branch school’s commandant to justify all deviations. Additionally, the TRADOC multi-branch Center of Excellence model provided for a basic combat training unit, a Directorate of Training (DOT), a Directorate of Training Support (DOTS), a Directorate of Doctrine and Training Development (DOTD), and a Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) for combat developments.21

Later in 2005, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss announced their proposed model organization for the Fires Center of Excellence that deviated from the TRADOC model in two critical aspects. First, the center Directorate of Training and Directorate of Training Support functions were merged into one center-level Directorate of Training and Support. This would allow for additional savings in personnel and resources and would execute joint, Army capstone training, doctrine, and lessons learned issues. Second, the proposal created a DOTD at the branch school level. Given the current structure of the FA School and the ADA School, merging their separate DOTDs into one center-level function as outlined by the TRADOC model would not be practical because the two branches were unique and divergent and because branch-specific lessons learned and training development and doctrine needed to be in the two schools. This proposal therefore provided for a center-level DOTD equivalent and branch-level DOTDs. However, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss envisioned merging the two branch-level DOTDs into one center

20Information Paper, subj: FCOE Range, Classroom, and Simulation

Requirements, 8 Sep 08, Doc I-5; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence, FY09 BRAC Course Movement, 4 Sep 08, Doc I-6; Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of Excellence FY09 BRAC Course Movement, 17 Sep 08, Doc I-7; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence, BRAC Update, 6 Dec 08, Doc I-8.

212005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 10; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 6.

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DOTD sometime in the future where all training development and doctrine and lessons learned would be captured. Also, they planned to rotate the assignment of the center’s commanding general between the two Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery branches on a regular basis.22

Subsequently in 2006, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss added a Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) at the center. It would represent the Army on all joint fires matters, coordinate air support for Army training exercises, instruct all air courses for the officer education system, warrant officer education system, and noncommissioned officer education system, and be a proponent for the Joint Fires Observer Course, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Course, and Battlefield Coordination Detachment.23

As of May-June 2006, the Fires Center of Excellence model which was approved by General Wallace, on 14 March 2006 consisted of seven primary center-level organizations that would be capable of executing the combined FA and ADA missions and would be non-branch-specific. They included a Noncommissioned Officer’s Academy (NCOA) that would be created by combining the FA and ADA Noncommissioned Officer Academies under one sergeant major commandant and would support furnish functional training and leader development through the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC), Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) for Career Management Fields 13 (FA) and 14 (ADA). Center-level organizations also included the Directorate of Training and Support (DOTS) that would focus on center-level administrative tasks; the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) that would focus primarily on ADA and FA doctrine, joint doctrine, and training instruction, among other services; the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) that would merge FA and ADA capabilities development functions; the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) that would be the center’s link to all aspects of joint fires; the Army Training Center with one brigade that would conduct basic combat training for all entry-level soldiers and the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) II; and the branch schools with one brigade each. This organization would give the center three brigades: the 6th ADA Brigade as part of the ADA School, the 428th FA Brigade as part of the FA School, and the 434th FA Brigade for initial military training and abandoned the multiple DOTDs initially proposed late in 2005 in favor of a single center-level DOTD. This organization would also maintain separate ADA and FA commands.24

For the remaining months of 2006, the Fires Center of Excellence organization with a FA brigade, an ADA brigade, and Army Training Center brigade as major components continued unchanged for key reasons. First, it met BRAC guidance, received approval from the FA School and ADA School Commandants and the Commanding General of TRADOC, provided unity of command for training, readiness, and oversight, and achieved ninety-six percent of the TRADOC directed structure savings

22

Ibid., pp. 6-7. 23

Ibid., p. 7. 24

Ibid., pp. 7-8; 2007 USAFCOESFS ACH, pp. 10-11.

10

(TRADOC wanted 412 positions saved, and Fires Center of Excellence provided 396.). Even so, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) at TRADOC proposed a new Center of Excellence multi-branch model in October 2006. To save additional manpower the DCSRM outlined a two-brigade Fires Center of Excellence model and included a noncommissioned officer academy, a basic combat training office for initial entry training, a Directorate of Training, a Directorate of Training Support, a Directorate of Training Development, and a Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate on the center staff.25

Thus, as the Field Artillery School and Air Defense School moved into 2007, they had to justify their Fires Center of Excellence model with three brigades because of the DCSRM’s two-brigade center proposal and the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s (USAMAA) one-brigade structure that saved even more resources. Despite stiff opposition, the three brigade center prevailed. In January 2007 Fort Sill and Fort Bliss conducted a summit meeting to address the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) development and the reduction in manpower and brigade structure. Basically, they agreed that the three brigades would support training better and be leader focused which was the core mission, meet TRADOC savings guidelines, maintain branch identity, preserve the ADA and FA branch commandants’ roles in training and leader development, and would be command centric. However, the organization created risk in center staff and combat and training development because of the cuts in personnel. DCSRM’s and USAMAA’s proposals created even more risk. DCSRM’s two-brigade proposal created significant risk in performing training and combat developments, eliminated subject matter experts from the schools, and risked branch identity. Finally, USAMAA’s one-brigade organization exceeded TRADOC savings guidelines, eliminated training and doctrine core functions, dissolved branch identity, among other key issues, and created unacceptable risk. Also, BOLC II for second lieutenants established in 2006 in the 428th FA Brigade would transfer to the 6th ADA Brigade when it arrived at Fort Sill to give the ADA brigade three full-sized battalions. On 26 January 2007 the Commanding General of TRADOC reaffirmed his commitment to the three-brigade organization with three battalions each.26

By mid-2007 Fort Sill and Fort Bliss had their proposed Fires Center of Excellence design in place that included the three brigades, merged some functions and organizations to meet the manpower savings required by BRAC, and had a proposed TDA concept design plan. The design created a center-level staff consisting of the commanding general, chief of staff, center staff (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-6/Command Information Officer/Knowledge Management, G-8, Strategic Communications, and Quality Assurance Office), A Headquarters Detachment, A Noncommissioned Officer’s Academy, all joint training programs supervised by Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, and directorates of activities. The design merged the training and doctrine development functions of the FA and ADA into the DOTD and provided a DOTS to oversee common training support and other functions. This organization also integrated

252006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 7-8. 262006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 11; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 11.

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the development of capabilities horizontally and vertically across and within the FA and ADA by consolidating the branches’ combat development functions under CDID, including the TRADOC Capabilities Managers (TCM), formerly called TRADOC System Managers, who oversaw system acquisition. The design also provided for the FA School, the ADA School, and the Army Training Center.27

Although this design remained the same through early 2008, a proposal to modify it arose later in the year as leaders at Fort Sill and Fort Bliss started questioning the need for DOTS. In order to maintain similarity with the TRADOC model, they had initially adapted the DOTS which co-located smaller, distinct agencies and functions that supported both schools into one organization but left training execution to the school brigades. This organization gave DOTD the responsibility for training and doctrine development and placed support organizations that could stand alone in DOTS. With this in mind and the questionability of the overhead required to support DOTS, serious discussions led to the decision in September 2008 to abolish DOTS because DOTD already performed many of DOTS’s proposed functions. This would free up positions for redistribution to other directorates and permit building a robust G-3 and would support the Commanding General’s future of moving the FCOE organization to a Fires University concept.28 Tables of Distribution and Allowance Concerns

Ultimately, the goal of BRAC centered on saving resources (money and personnel). Early in the BRAC process, BRAC tasked Fort Sill and Fort Bliss to develop the Fires Center of Excellence TDA based upon the TDA for FY 2007; and this involved finding 417 positions to be eliminated through consolidation. Because of the need to cut personnel, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss had to identify functions for elimination that would have a direct impact upon the ability of the Fires Center of Excellence to accomplish its mission. As of April 2006, the FA School had identified 163 positions for elimination while the ADA School had found 233 positions for elimination for a total of 396. Even though they fell short of the BRAC goal of 417, both installations believed that their reduction of 396 positions from the FY 2007 TDAs was a realistic savings and would not seriously hinder mission accomplishment.29

However, eliminating the 396 positions still came at a cost. In April 2006 the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Colonel (P) James M. McDonald, explained that Battle Laboratory reductions to meet BRAC personnel objectives would

272007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 12. 28Briefing, subj: Structure Update, 13 Aug 08, Doc I-9; Briefing, subj: Structure,

25 Aug 08, Doc I-10; Briefing, subj: Current Fires CoE Model, 22 Aug 08, Doc I-11; Briefing, subj: BRAC Management Way Ahead, 29 Jul 08, Doc I-12; Minutes, Fires Executive Council, 4 Sep 08, Doc I-13; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Youngkin and James H. Wollman, FCOE FID, 21 Jan 09, Doc I-14; Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE Fires Executive Council, 29 Aug 08, Doc I-15; Briefing, subj: FCOE GAO Visit, 26 Jan 09, Doc I-16; Email with atch, subj: DOTS Decision Brief PPT, 11 Aug 08, Doc I-17; Email with atch, subj: BRAC 2008, 20 Feb 09, Doc I-18.

292006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 9.

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result in the loss of specialized military capability to support experimentation and that DOTD would not be able to augment New Equipment/Doctrine Training and Tactics Teams with MOSs from Career Management Field 13 to support Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle, Army Tactical Missile System, Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System missile, and other training. Basically, eliminating positions would hamper the school’s ability to perform its training mission.30

Meanwhile, outside factors influenced the Fires Center of Excellence model. Directed by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, USAMAA visited Fort Sill in February-March 2006 to study workload and ultimately recommended the most efficient and effective Fires Center of Excellence structure. USAMAA found 614 positions for elimination and recommended a Fires Center of Excellence with one brigade. Shortly afterwards in May 2006, the Army directed TRADOC to reduce its military and civilian manpower from 54,902 to 45,817 between FY 2008 and FY 2011 because it had to move 14,581 active component spaces from the institutional Army to the operational force over a period of several years. In response, TRADOC issued new guidance to assess alternative COE models developed by USAMAA and TRADOC DCSRM that would create greater savings. Basically, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss had to find more positions to cut or justify eliminating only 396 positions.31

As Fort Sill and Fort Bliss moved into the fall of 2006, they reviewed the USAMAA model, the TRADOC model, and their own FCOE model which eliminated 396 positions. In a briefing to the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) of TRADOC, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, on 15 November 2006, Fort Sill told him that the USAMAA cut was an unacceptable risk for the Fires Center of Excellence because the student load would climb dramatically between FY 2006 and FY 2011 and because the Center’s personnel strength would concurrently decline. As a result, the Fires Center of Excellence’s ability to perform its core missions and functions would be seriously jeopardized. Also, TRADOC’s cut of 412 positions which did not include band and range positions being cut from the ADA TDA would severely restrict the Fires Center of Excellence’s ability to perform its core missions and functions. Although the Fires Center of Excellence’s 396 personnel reductions which included the band and range positions cut from the ADA TDA (80-90 positions) to make the real difference between TRADOC and Fires Center of Excellence around one hundred positions created risks to complete the core missions and functions, they met the TRADOC’s and Department of the Army’s BRAC savings and FCoE goals and objectives and complied with Center of Excellence organizing principles established by TRADOC. As Fort Sill briefed General Metz in November 2006, reducing the TDA by 396 spaces was the maximum reduction allowable to maintain operational, organizational, and training effectiveness. However, there was significant risk associated with these savings. Along with the three-brigade organization (one for ADA, FA, and ATC), this continued to be the installation’s position into 2007.32

30

Ibid., pp. 9-10. 312007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 13. 322006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 10; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 13-14.

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Additional work by Fort Sill and Fort Bliss eventually produced a final FCOE TDA. They started with the TRADOC Center of Excellence model by retaining the three brigades, maintaining commandant oversight of the FA and ADA branch schools, and consolidating some functions. In January 2007 they presented a FCOE TDA that saved three hundred personnel spaces to the Commanding General of TRADOC that came with risks, meaning an increased workload, an increased span of control, and reduced effectiveness. All of this meant that some functions and tasks had to be curtailed in scope or cut. Despite the risks associated with the reduced number of personnel, the Commanding General of TRADOC approved the TDA with three hundred positions being cut and acknowledged the risks. Later in July 2007 after a few modifications, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss submitted their final TDA concept plan with three hundred spaces saved to TRADOC for approval. This number did not include the band and range personnel cuts (80-90) from the ADA TDA to reflect almost the initial 396 personnel cut. After a few modifications that did not change the TDA savings, TRADOC approved the plan in November 2007 and forwarded it to the Army in the fall of 2007.33

Based upon meetings with TRADOC and the Army during the latter months of 2007, Fort Sill and Fort Bliss expressed confidence about the approval of their concept plan but expressed their urgency getting the plan approved. On 21 February 2008 they briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army about the importance of approving the concept plan as soon as possible to keep the move of the ADA School and Center operating as smoothly as possible and to meet the deadline of 2011 established by Congress for creating the FCOE. With this in mind, the Army approved the plan on 16 April 2008 that outlined the initial operational capability for the FCOE in the fourth quarter of FY 2009 and the full operational capability in the third quarter of FY 2010.34

Within months after it had been approved, the commandants of the two schools pointed out the failure of the FCOE concept plan to consider new and emerging missions. Among the new missions, the FCOE had the training mission for counter rockets and missiles (CRAM), electronic warfare, tactical information operations, and joint training. For example, CRAM was resourced through Global War on Terrorism funding and needed to be established as a program of record to develop doctrine and training products and standardize training for professional/initial military education and functional courses. The electronic warfare training mission required additional people and dedicated facilities to build an Electronic Warfare School at Fort Sill. If this did not happen, the Army would lack electronic warfare expertise. These and the other emerging missions had the potential of causing changes in the concept plan and TDA. So, as the FCOE moved into 2009, it faced acquiring funding for missions that emerged after the concept plan had

332007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 14; Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of

Excellence Update, 16 Jun 08, Doc I-19; Summary of Discussions, Fires Review of Concept Drill, 30 Aug 07, Doc I-20.

34Fires Review of Concept Drill summary of Discussions, 30 Aug 07; Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of Excellence Update, 16 Jun 08; Interview, Dastrup with Youngkin and Wollman, 21 Jan 09.

14

been developed according to the board of directors meeting in January 2009.35 BRAC Management Process

Meanwhile, the ADA and FA School commandants observed the need to formalize managing the BRAC process. To this end early in 2008, they established a board of directors chaired by the ADA and FA School Commandants that met quarterly during the year to furnish oversight and ensure the alignment of BRAC actions with the Army’s strategic objectives. Beneath the board of directors, they formed the FCOE executive council chaired by the chiefs of staff of Fort Bliss and Fort Sill and select mission and garrison directors. The FCOE executive council conducted monthly video teleconferences to ensure synchronization across the functional working groups. Just below the executive council were the synchronization meetings for each installation. Chaired by the Fires Integration Division (FID) at Fort Sill and its Fort Bliss counterpart, the meetings tracked the progress of the various functional working groups, resolved issues, and developed special topics for the board of directors, while the functional work groups provided solutions and plans to resolve issues.36

During the year, the board of directors meetings kept track of many critical issues. They provided oversight to the FCOE volunteer program that was designed to identify the civilian positions to be moved from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill and to ensure filling vacant positions with qualified personnel. In May 2008 the board of directors examined CRAM requirements that had to be met for training to start on Fort Sill in April 2010 and approved constructing interim CRAM training facilities using prefabricated metal structures and portable classrooms until permanent ones could be built in two to five years. Immediately following this decision, the board decided to use an existing motor pool in the ADA campus to serve as the interim CRAM training facility; and funding was provided to make the necessary renovations so that they would be ready early in April 2010. Three months later in September 2008, the board firmed up the FCOE’s initial operational capability of the fourth quarter of FY 2009 and the full operational capability of the 3rd quarter of FY 2010, agreed that leader development should reside in DOTD to centralize the management of officer, noncommissioned officer, and civilian leader development and to serve as a single point of coordination for TRADOC and other outside agencies on leader development issues and activities. In January 2009 the board pointed out the need to obtain resources to fund the new and enduring missions that the FCOE concept plan did not address.37

35Interview, Dastrup with Youngkin and Wollman, 21 Jan 09; Briefing (Extract),

subj: TRADOC DCG Update, 16 Jun 08, Doc I-20a; Briefing (Extract), subj: FCOE BRAC Summit, 14 Oct 08, Doc I-21; Briefing, subj: FCOE BRAC Update, 6 Dec 08; Email with atch, subj: BRAC 2008, 20 Feb 09.

36Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE BRAC Management, 28 Mar 08, Doc I-22; Executive Summary, FCOE Management Process Video Teleconference, 7 Mar 08, Doc I-23; Interview, Dastrup with Youngkin and Wollman, 21 Jan 09.

37Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE Executive Council, 1 May 08, Doc I-24; Briefing (Extract), subj: FCOE Board of Directors Meeting, 15-16 May 08, Doc I-25; Interview, Dastrup with Youngkin and Wollman, 21 Jan 09; Email with atch, subj:

15

MISSION SUPPORT Residential Communities Initiative

Recognizing the existence of inadequate military housing which was deteriorating and needed replacement or major renovation, Congress passed the Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act in 1996. This eventually led to the Residential Communities Initiative in 1996 as authorized by Congress. Through the initiative which involved teaming with the private sector, the Army would have the ability to improve family and unaccompanied personnel housing through new construction, renovation, and privatization of management more quickly at lower costs. Basically, the initiative outlined developing, constructing, and even privatizing management to meet the Army’s long-term needs for military housing. Using the Residential Communities Initiative, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment established a requirement in 2005 to improve housing at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, through the Army’s Residential Communities Initiative.38

In 2005 Fort Sill had over 1,400 family houses that ranged from adequate to inadequate in condition. Given this and the lengthy waiting time for housing on Fort Sill and certainly influenced by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 recommendation to move the Air Defense Artillery Center and School at Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Sill in the near future, the Army launched the Residential Communities Initiative at Fort Sill in 2005 to eliminate inadequate housing by repairing or replacing it over a period of years. Specifically, Fort Sill planned to replace Artillery Village with new housing with the first two phases of construction being completed by 2007 and the third being finished later. As a part of the initiative, the installation also started an extensive renovation project. This included renovating kitchens, bathrooms, carports and electrical wiring in 328 Geronimo housing units, damp-proofing basements in 160 housing units, replacing sewer mains and service lines in 54 Quanah Parker Square housing units, and upgrading electrical wiring in 382 housing units. Upon completion of the renovation and construction projects, Fort Sill would have eliminated inadequate housing and simultaneously provided an excellent quality of life for its soldiers and their families.39

In September 2006 military families started moving from Artillery Village into the new housing. The housing consisted of duplexes with 1,600-1,800 square feet of space and three to four bedrooms. Each had a two-car garage and kitchen appliances.40

One year later, Fort Sill took another critical step in the Residential Communities Initiative. On 28 September 2007 the Army announced the selection of Picerne Military Housing to develop a plan to renovate and privatize more than 1,600 houses on the post

____________________ BRAC 2008, 20 Feb 09.

382007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 14.

392005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 10-11.

402006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 11-12.

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to improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families. Basically, Picerne planned to implement a development plan to improve the quality of life for families at Fort Sill, provide ongoing maintenance, and maintain and expand relationships with qualified, local subcontractors and vendors. The company outlined building over seven hundred new houses, renovating over nine hundred houses, and demolishing over four hundred houses to reduce density. This would ultimately provide three neighborhood centers with dedicated amenities and connect all new and existing neighborhoods.41

To staff the operation which would bring new neighborhood centers and community facilities, Picerne expected to add three to five employees at its headquarters at North Kingstown, Rhode Island, to hire more than one hundred employees in the Fort Sill/Lawton vicinity to renovate housing or construct new housing that would be designed around the natural environment, and to privatize family housing beginning in November 2008.42

On 19 August 2008 Fort Sill and Picerne Military Housing became partners during an official signing ceremony. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, and John Picerne, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Picerne Military Housing, participated in the signing ceremony that initiated the beginning of a fifty-year partnership between the housing developer and the installation. For the next fifty years, Picerne would have the responsibility for the construction, renovation, maintenance and management of Fort Sill’s on-post housing which included grass mowing, lawn fertilizing, and twenty-four hour emergency service, among other things. Together, Fort Sill and Picerne developed the Community Development and Management Plan which was the blueprint for the fifty years of the project. After Congress approved the plan, Picerne assumed responsibility for 1,411 family housing units on 1 November 2008, while Fort Sill became the thirty-first military installation to transfer to privatized housing.43 Fort Sill and South West Oklahoma Community Partnership Council

Taking the Fort Riley, Kansas, Regional Integration Committee (RCI) as a model, Fort Sill and communities in Southwest Oklahoma joined forces late in 2008 to strengthen already strong relationships and to forge a vision for the area. From the perspective of the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, and other Fort Sill leaders, a regional integration committee would make Fort Sill and Southwest Oklahoma the model of community cooperation and involvement. To accomplish this goal, they proposed holding regularly scheduled meetings chaired by the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence and local community mayors of Southwest Oklahoma where they could share

412007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 15. 42“Army Announces Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Partner for Residential Communities

Initiative,” Army News Release, 28 Sep 07, Doc I-26; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 16. 43FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 Dec 08, Doc I-27; News Release, subj: Fort

Sill and Picerne Military Housing Join Forces on Housing, 19 Aug 08, Doc I-28; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill Housing, 16 Jan 09, Doc I-29; Memorandum, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council Meeting, 31 Mar 09, Doc I-30.

17

information, discuss issues, and create task forces to examine and resolve issues of common concern, such as tourism, recreational facilities, and quality of life.44

As the initiative unfolded late in 2008, General Vangjel appointed a staff agency, led by Colonel Raymond P. Lacey, to run the program for Fort Sill and coordinate the installation’s effort with over one hundred local community members, ranging from mayors, to county commissioners to Native American tribe leaders to utility companies to educational institutions to Oklahoma State agencies to the Association of South Central Oklahoma Governments, and to bring them together in an inaugural meeting to present the regional committee initiative vision and set up formal governance (a charter to be signed in May 2009), the way ahead, and the frequency of meetings. On 16 January 2009 the Fort Sill and the local communities held their first meeting where General Vangjel explained the importance of the council and its role in making a difference in the lives of community residents. A subsequent council meeting on 13 February 2009 formalized the name of the council as the Fort Sill and South West Oklahoma Community Partnership Council.45 Lawton-Fort Sill Co-Op Program

In 2008 Fort Sill and the City of Lawton recognized that a solid community relationship was important to any military installation. Fort Sill and the City of Lawton improved their relationship by founding the Lawton/Fort Sill Co-Op Program in 1980. The program affiliated military units from Fort Sill with civilian firms and organizations in the local community, emphasized one to one relationships between a military unit and

44Ltr, Kevin L. Jackson, Senior Planner, City of Lawton, to MG (Ret) Toney

Stricklin, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, 10 Jul 08, Doc I-31; Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Information Brief, 17 Nov 08, Doc I-32; Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Concept Brief, 5 Dec 08, Doc I-33; Executive Summary, Regional Integration Committee Concept Brief to CG, 19 Dec 08, Doc I-34; Email with atch, subj: Part 2 of the Regional Planning Initiative, 27 Feb 09, Doc I-35; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council, 3 Mar 09, Doc I-36.

45Interview, Dastrup with COL Robert S. Bridgford, Garrison Commander, Fort Sill, 25 Feb 09, Doc I-37; Email with atch, subj: History from Garrison on Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council, 24 Feb 09, Doc I-38; Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Concept Brief, 22 Dec 08, Doc I-39; Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Concept Brief, 5 Dec 08; Email with atch, subj: History from Garrison on Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council, 24 Feb 09; Executive Summary, Community Partnership IPR #1 with CG, 30 Dec 08, Doc I-40; Executive Summary, Community Partnership IPR #2 with CG, 30 Dec 08, Doc I-41; Memorandum for Ft. Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council Members, subj: Ft. Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council Minutes, 22 Jan 09, Doc I-42; Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Information Brief, 17 Nov 08, Doc I-43; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council, 3 Mar 09.

18

a local business, and tried to get as many people involved as possible and to increase communications, cooperation, and understanding between Lawton and Fort Sill. Funding for the program was half and half. Family, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation provided funds for each military organization while civilian organizations were required to be members of the Lawton/Fort Sill Chamber of Commerce (LFCC) ($500 per year) and the Co-Op committee ($200 per year). The bylaws were being revised in 2008 to include communities within a fifty-mile radius of Fort Sill.46

During the year, the Installation Co-Op Coordinator supervised the Co-Op Program and served as the liaison between Fort Sill and Lawton Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber’s Director of Government and Military Affairs supervised the Co-Op Program on the civilian side and served as the liaison between the Chamber and Fort Sill. The Chamber administered the program through the Co-Op Executive Committee compromised of military and civilian members which meet monthly. In addition, the Co-Op Coordination Council (CCC) met monthly and was represented by each of the Co-Op partnerships. The council planned and organized the program’s community-wide activities.47

During 2008, the Co-Op conducted various activities. It held the Co-Op Intramural Program which included basketball, racquetball, spring and fall softball, golf, volleyball, and bowling, the Bill Smith Memorial Golf Tournament, Military Appreciation/Co-Op Family Day, Co-Op Open House Month, Co-Op Leadership Softball Game, Buffalo Burger Cookout, semi-annual general membership socials, and other activities.48 Mission Budget

Mid-way through 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sent Fort Sill its budget projection for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. On 16 May 2008 the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management wrote, “We will not be resourced in FY 09 [$4.3 billion] at the level we have enjoyed in FY 08 [$5.1 billion]. But FY 09 still represents a marked improvement over our fiscal posture from a just a few short years ago.”49 Based upon this, Fort Sill planned to receive $98.6 million for FY 2009 as compared to $91.2 million for FY 2008. As directed by TRADOC, the installation had to provide sufficient funding for initial military training, professional military education for officers and warrant officers, professional military education for noncommissioned officers, civilian education, reserve component training, joint

46Email with atch, subj: Co-OP Program for Lawton Chamber of Commerce, 25

Feb 09, Doc I-43a; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Partnership Council, 3 Mar 09.

47Email with atch, subj: Co-OP Program for Lawton Chamber of Commerce, 25 Feb 09.

48Email with atch, subj: Co-OP Program for Lawton Chamber of Commerce, 25 Feb 09; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Partnership Council, 3 Mar 09.

49Memorandum for Director of Resource Management, TRADOC Schools/Activities, subj: FY09 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 16 May 08, Doc I-44.

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individual training, collective training, and functional training. Despite the modest increase in funding, Fort Sill had to establish spending priorities for FY 2009 to ensure meeting TRADOC priorities and implementing its core functions established by regulation.50 Army Radar Approach Control

In 2008 the Fort Sill’s Army Radar Approach Control (ARAC) continued to provide service to the installation’s training mission and even saw increased use in 2007-2008. The Joint Force Observer (JFO) Course and live ordinance close air support (CAS) training in the officer and noncommissioned officer courses expanded the use of Fort Sill’s ARAC at Henry Post Army Airfield. In addition, training the Oklahoma National Guard controllers which began in November 2007 and the United Arab Emirates F-5 program ran by the U.S. State Department created the necessity for the Department of Defense to have ownership of air traffic control operations at Fort Sill. These training activities made the post’s ARAC one of the busiest in the Army. The ARAC not only served the Army but also the Lawton/Fort Sill Regional Airport, Duncan/Halliburton Airport, and many smaller airports in the Fort Sill area.51

Although training demands remained high and kept the installation’s ARAC busy in 2008 with 760 daily operations and 128 aircraft transiting the installation’s airspace, Fort Sill learned that the Army did not plan to fund the ARAC beyond Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 or to purchase upgrade equipment. This could force CAS and field artillery training to be shut down and hamper the JFO course and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), U.S. Air Force, and Army aviation mobilization training. Also, the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles in the fires brigades, drones, and J-lens systems for the Air Defense Artillery brigade to be relocated to Fort Sill further substantiated the requirement for the digital Defense Air Surveillance Radar in FY 2011. Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, was scheduled to receive this radar upgrade in FY 2011.52

Because NATO pilot training used Fort Sill airspace, the Air Force funded a portion of the ARAC manpower; but it planned to reassess its portion if missions were

50Minutes, Mission Priority Board, 2 Jul 08, Doc I-44a; Briefing, subj: FY09

TRADOC Budget Guidance, 2 Jul 08, Doc I-45; Email with atch, subj: Emailing Commander’s Statement - FY08, 30 Jan 08, Doc I-46; FY09 TRADOC Budget Guidance Narrative, May 08, Doc I-47; Email with atch, subj: FY2008 ATBG, 6 Oct 08, Doc I-48; FY 2009 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance Narrative (Extract), Jan 09, Doc I-49; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY09 Funding Guidance, 22 Jan 09, Doc I-50; Memorandum for Director of Resource Management, TRADOC Schools/Activities, subj: FY09 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 6 Jan 09, Doc I-51; Email, subj: FY2008 ATGB, 6 Oct 08, Doc I-52; Email, subj: FY08 TBG, 30 Jan 08, I-53.

512007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 18; Email with atch, subj: ARAC for 2008 Annual Command History, 4 Mar 09, Doc I-54.

52FCOE, “Fort Sill on the Move,” 22 Aug 08, Doc I-55; FCOE, “Fort Sill on the Move,” Dec 08, Doc I-56; Interview, Dastrup with Paul Gaasbeck, Dir, DPTM, 13 Feb 09, Doc I-57; Interview, Dastrup with Buddy Thornton, ARAC, 27 Feb 09, Doc I-58; Email with atch, subj: ARAC for 2008 Annual Command History, 4 Mar 09.

20

lost due to the loss of the ARAC. The loss of Air Force funding for manpower would force Fort Sill to find additional funds to sustain aviation operations. Along with this, the requirement for new equipment prompted Fort Sill in August 2008 and December 2008 to point out to the Department of the Army the need for funding for new equipment for FY 2012 and permanent funding for continued operations. Otherwise, joint training and aviation missions would be compromised.53 Power Projection

The end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s caused the United States to restructure its national military strategy. Rather than depending upon forward-deployed military forces in Europe as it had done for over forty years, the new strategy focused on deploying military forces from the continental United States (CONUS) to crises worldwide. Equally important, the new military strategy required Army installations, such as Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to have the ability of responding rapidly to regional crises throughout the world.54

In support of power projection, the Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security’s Mobilization Office mobilized and deployed over 3,950 Army, Air Force and Navy personnel for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2008. Fort Sill also demobilized 2,741 Soldiers from 14 units in Fiscal Year 2008. The installation went through a transformational upgrade to support the mobilization of a combat aviation brigade and would continue to improve its resources and facilities to support the mobilization mission. Fort Sill also conducted extensive pre-mobilization work for the 28th Combat Aviation Brigade. Additionally, Fort Sill continued to be the Army’s Mobilization Center of Excellence for Aviation and Field Artillery.55

In preparation for deployment to Iraq in August 2008, the 34th Combat Aviation Brigade of the Minnesota Army National Guard mobilized at Fort Sill. For nearly three months, the St. Paul-based brigade trained to prepare for commanding, directing, maintaining, and operating Blackhawk utility helicopters, Chinook cargo helicopters, and Apache attack helicopters.56

53FCOE, “Fort Sill on the Move,” 22 Aug 08; FCOE, “Fort Sill on the Move,”

Dec 08; Interview, Dastrup with Thornton, 27 Feb 09; Email with atch, subj: ARAC for 2008 Annual Command History, 4 Mar 09; Memorandum for HQ AF/DA3O, subj: Army Radar Approach Control, Fort Sill, Ok, 6 Feb 09, Doc I-59; Email with atch, subj: ARAC and Power Projection Portions of 2008 Annual Command History, 11 Mar 09, Doc I-60.

542000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 22-23; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 20-21.

55Email with atch, subj: CY08 Command History - DPTMS, 11 Feb 09, Doc I-61. 56Minneapolis-St. Paul StarTribune Information Paper, 28 Mar 08, Doc I-62;

NewsOK Information Paper, subj: Fort Sill Benefiting from Military Realignment, 6 May 08, Doc I-63; Information Paper, subj: Working for the People of Minnesota, 4 Aug 08, Doc I-64; Email, subj: CY08 Command History - DPTMS, 11 Feb 09, Doc I-65.

CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION During 2008, Fort Sill trained soldiers, officers, and Marines to meet the needs of

the nation’s operational forces. While the 434th Field Artillery Brigade provided training realism in its Initial Entry Training (IET), prepared for gender-integrated training, and conducted the Warrior Transition Course, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School established resetting (retraining) units and Soldiers who had been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and had not used their field artillery core skills as a top priority to help them regain their core competencies, employed distance learning to train Active and Reserve Component soldiers, utilized sophisticated training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations to enhance training, taught officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer courses, provided joint training for U.S. military forces, and wrote new doctrine. The Army National Guard, meanwhile, conducted Field Artillery training using the Regional Training Institutes located across the United States as a part of the Total Army School System.

COMMANDING GENERAL’S TRAINING GUIDANCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

On 30 November 2007 Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill issued his training guidance for Fiscal Year 2008. He envisioned the Field Artillery as being the maneuver commander’s “premier worldwide deployable 24/7 Fire Support Force.”1 It would be manned with adaptable and resilient full spectrum warriors, equipped with the world’s best, most responsive systems, and capable of integrating and delivering timely joint lethal and nonlethal fires to dominate any operating environment.2 Besides reaffirming the Fires Center of Excellence’s support of the nation by training soldiers, airmen, and marines, integrating future weapon systems and organizations, and writing doctrine, he outlined his training priorities and accepted risk. In the coming year the Fires Center of Excellence would accept little risk or no risk with initial military training composed of basic combat training, advanced individual training, and the Basic Officer Leaders Course, supporting the war, resetting the force, developing future lethal and nonlethal fires systems, and consolidating the Air Defense School and Field Artillery School. In other areas, such as simulation, training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators, the center would accept risk.3

RETURN OF THE KING An unpublished white paper entitled, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in

Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Commanders” and written for the Chief of Staff of the Army circulated throughout the Army and the Field Artillery late in

1Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Interim

FY08 Command Training Guidance, 30 Nov 07, Doc II-1. 2Ibid.

3Ibid.

22

2007 and 2008. In cogent terms the authors of the paper warned about the Field Artillery’s radical deterioration in field artillery capabilities stemming from the Army’s transformation program underway, the military’s preoccupation with counterinsurgency, and the continuing heavy commitment of Field Artillery leaders and soldiers to non-field artillery tasks in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Basically, the authors feared that the maneuver commander would be unable to have reliable, fast, and responsive fire support and offered a “customer’s perspective” as they called their analysis.4

Influenced by this white paper and his own four-month assessment of the turbulence of recent years and its adverse impact on the Field Artillery, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, launched his “Return of the King” campaign in mid-2008. This campaign articulated a vision of making the Field Artillery the maneuver commander’s premier worldwide deployable 24/7 fire support force, manned with adaptive and resilient full-spectrum warriors, equipped with the world’s best, most responsive systems, and capable of integrating and delivering timely joint lethal and nonlethal fires to dominate any operating environment. To accomplish the vision, the Field Artillery had to have priorities. It had to prepare artillery soldiers and leaders to be successful in the current fight, transform to meet the twenty-first century, develop and grow adaptive soldiers, civilians, and leaders, reset as quickly as possible to regain core competencies, prepare for future contingencies, and sustain leaders, soldiers, and the Army family.5

Besides establishing a clear vision and priorities, General Vangjel provided recommended solutions. In the near-term the Field Artillery faced the imperative of rebuilding its experience base by expanding the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course from twenty to twenty-four weeks, expanding the Field Artillery Pre-Command Course from two to three weeks, and expanding the Noncommissioned Officer Education System by at least four weeks. The near-term solution also included re-establishing training capacity by forming mobile training teams to assist commanders with reset, developing exportable training simulations, and restoring senior Field Artillery leader oversight in the brigade combat teams. Long-term solutions comprised lengthening the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course to thirty-six weeks, among other things.6

JOINT FIRES OIF/OEF INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT In September and October 2008 the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center’s Center

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) deployed a Joint Fires Combined Arms Assessment Team (JFCAAT) to Iraq to collect observations, insights, and lessons on the integration

4White Paper, subj: The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s

Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders, undated, Doc II-2; Richard H. Sinnreich, “Field Artillery’s Effectiveness a Casualty of Wars,” Army, Jul 08, Doc II-3; Interview, Dastrup with LTC John A. Kelly, Dir, STRATCOM, 4 Feb 09, Doc II-4.

5Briefing, subj: State of the Field Artillery, undated, Doc II-5; Briefing, subj: Return of the King: Regaining Core Artillery Proficiency in an Era of Persistent Conflict and Beyond, 2008, Doc II-6.

6Briefing, subj: State of the Field Artillery, undated.

23

of Joint Fires, both lethal and nonlethal, in the conduct of operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and to provide them to the U.S. Army and joint community. The Fires Center of Excellence was designated the lead of this effort with the Director of Doctrine and Training Development as the team leader. Composed of representatives from the Field Artillery Center and School, Air Defense Center and School, U.S. Air Force, Combined Arms Center, and Aviation School, the JFCAAT conducted extensive visits and interviewed leaders from the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), 4th Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and subordinate brigades. At each level they met with the Fires Cell or Effects Cell, the Airspace Command and Control (AC2) Cell, the nonlethal planning cells, and Air Force elements. The team examined the planning, integration and synchronization of lethal effects, nonlethal effects, the targeting process, and air-ground operations in accordance with a detailed collection plan specifically developed to support CALL’s intent to gather lessons learned and trends for the Army.7

In the process the team’s findings corroborated the results of studies and interviews conducted by the Fires Center over the last two years, as well as TRADOC’s RAND Study on core competencies, reaffirming the atrophy of field artillery basic skills in officers and soldiers. These JFCAAT findings also validated the Fires Center of Excellence’s efforts at resetting the Field Artillery, focusing on core Field Artillery and Fire Support skills, emerging doctrine for lethal effects, nonlethal effects, and air-ground operations.8

WRITING DOCTRINE In 2008 Doctrine Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine published

Field Manual (FM) 3-09.60, Multiple-Launch Rocket System Operations, and FM 3-09.15, Field Artillery Meteorology, and continued in-house work on completing FM 3-09, Fire Support, FM 3-09.24, The Fires Brigade, and contracted for the revision of FM 3-09.42, Fire Support for Brigade Combat Teams, FM 3-09.23, The Fires Battalion, and FM 3-60, Targeting.9

During the year, Doctrine Division also developed and sent out FM 3-09, Fire Support, (the keystone manual for the Field Artillery) for worldwide review and comments. The division posted the manual in the normal manner on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) with an accompanying comment matrix and staffing letter and sent an e-mail to all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) schools/centers and commands. In the hopes of reaching an even wider audience and generating a greater response, the division also posted notices on the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN), the Infantry

7Email with atch, subj: Joint Fires Initiative, 2 Mar 09, Doc II-7. 8Interview, Dastrup with COL Frank E. Siltman, G-3, Fires Center of Excellence,

26 Feb 09, Doc II-8. 9Email with atch, subj: Doctrine History for 2008, 20 Jan 09, Doc II-9;

Information Paper, subj: Doctrinal Manuals, undated, Doc II-10; Information Paper, subj: Doctrinal Manuals, undated, Doc II-11; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-12; Email with atch, subj: Writing Doctrine 2008, 17 Feb 09, Doc II-13.

24

Brigade Combat Team Warfighters’ Forum, the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Warfighters’ Forum, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters’ Forum, Battlefield Coordination Detachment Forum; Fires Brigade and Fires Battalion Warfighter Forum, the Brigade-Division-Corps Combat Team Fire Support Forum, and the Battle Command Knowledge Network. Some comments have already been received from individuals who used these forums. During the year, the division also reviewed and commented on 8 Air Land Sea Application agency Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure publications, 40 joint publications, 118 Army field manuals, and 2 joint NATO Allied Joint Publications.10

THE JOINT FIRES UNIVERSITY CONCEPT In 2008 the Army recognized that its soldiers and leaders had performed well over

the past seven years but simultaneously acknowledged the requirement to improve and adapt. Prior to 11 September 2001 when terrorists flew airplanes in the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon, the Army had prepared to fight a war with large formations against a similarly arrayed force. Men who had spent years preparing for war would lead the major formations; and decisions would be made by those with the most experience, most training, and most education. Young and inexperienced officers would execute the missions given to them by the more seasoned with strategic decisions residing in the hands of general officers who had years of preparation. However, this was not the scenario that the Army and Field Artillery School projected for the future. The era of persistent conflict which was projected to be the norm into the foreseeable future and the proliferation of information technologies that permitted the almost instantaneous transfer of information created a complex battlefield where the decisions of the young and inexperienced would have strategic implications. In view of this, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General William Casey, Jr., charged the Army in his leader guidance of 2008 to transform training and education and develop soldiers and leaders who were competent in their core competencies and agile and adaptive leaders.11

The Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, promptly answered the challenge. On 1 April 2008 he published the Field Artillery Campaign Plan (FACP) to transform U.S. Army fires capabilities to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Among other things, the plan tasked the leaders of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) to develop a strategy for the creation of a Joint Fires University (JFU). JFU would enable fires excellence through a blend of institutional courses, distant learning, virtual experiences, and on-line forums. Equally important, JFU would furnish continuous access to training and education that not only supported career progression for fires officers and noncommissioned officers but also

10Email with atch, subj: Doctrine History for 2008, 20 Jan 09; Email with atch,

subj: Writing Doctrine 2008, 17 Feb 09. 11MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-14; Memorandum, subj: Draft Joint Fires University Strategy, 1 Jan 09, Doc II-15; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University from Strategy to Irreversible Momentum, 12 Dec 08, Doc II-16.

25

made available just-in-time knowledge for immerging operational requirements.12 According to General Vangjel, the Joint Fires University would be the leader in

providing education and training, developing experts in the art and science of integrating, and delivering lethal and nonlethal fires by producing soldiers, leaders, and units that would enable the maneuver commander to dominate full-spectrum operations using fires. To do this, he envisioned combining existing and emerging technologies to provide a university without walls, tapping into other service universities, and enabling soldiers to take courses of interest to broaden their knowledge and enhance joint interoperability.13

During 2008, an initial Joint Fires University notional concept emerged. On 11 July 2008 the Training Development Division in the Directorate of Training Development (DOTD) which had the lead in developing the JFU concept briefed General Vangjel on an initial strawman construct that had two options. One alternative included a JFU with a Field Artillery College with departments, an Air Defense College with departments, and a Distributive Learning College with departments. An alternative proposal in the strawman outlined a JFU with a Lethal Fires College with departments, a Nonlethal Fires College with departments, and a General Education College with departments.14

Over the next month, the concept grew more sophisticated with the creation of near-term and long-term notional structures for the JFU. On 21 August 2008 the Training Development Division briefed General Vangjel once again. For the near-term (Fiscal Years 2009-2015), the notional structure provided an organization based upon the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. The near-term organization provided a President’s Office, a Senior Advisory Board, a Personnel Management Office, a Staff and Faculty Office to train the staff and faculty, a Registrar’s Office, a Chief Information Office, an Academic Affairs Office, a Quality Assurance Office, and a Resource Management Office. Five colleges would furnish training and education with each branch (Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery) having its own training brigade and proponency office. To ensure high-caliber instructors and professors, the concept put forward minimal qualifications and established military experience as being highly desired and even suggested creating honorary academic chairs that would provide expertise beyond the permanent faculty. For the long-term (Fiscal Years 2015 and beyond) notional structure which assumed growing commonality between the Field Artillery and the Air Defense Artillery retained the above organizations. However, the

12Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery,” pp. 1-8; Joint Fires University:

Providing Experts in the Art and Science of Fires, undated, p. 1, Doc II-17; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept-Strategy-Implementation, 21 Aug 08, Doc II-18; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, Chief, Training Development Division, DOTD, 21 Jan 09, Doc II-19.

13Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery,” pp. 1-8; Interview, Dastrup with Peterson, 21 Jan 09.

14Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept, 9 Jul 08, Doc II-20; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University: From Strategy to Irreversible Momentum, 9 Jan 09, Doc II-21.

26

branch schools would be dissolved in favor of unit, officer training and education, enlisted training and education, and joint lethal and nonlethal fires integration colleges or tactical fires, unit, and strategic and operational fires colleges.15

Regardless of the JFU’s structure, General Vangjel understood the need to change the way of training and educating officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. Besides developing a culture of life-long learning, the JFU had to shift the focus of instruction from familiarization of a wide-range of topics to mastery level in core competencies, to integrate adaptive leadership development into all courses, to use a university approach to training and education by employing specialists as instructors, to change the paradigm of training from seventy percent small group leader (SGL) instruction and thirty percent subject matter expert (SME) to seventy percent SME instruction and thirty percent SGL instruction, and to raise the standard to mastery of a subject rather than familiarization. Also, the JFU had to leverage information technology to create a university without walls and move towards functional courses (electives). Ultimately, Vangjel wanted JFU graduates with a depth of knowledge.16

By the end of 2008, the Training Requirements Development Division had taken specific steps to implement the JFU. It developed a three-phase draft implementation strategy, a draft JFU organization, draft tenets/objectives/tasks, and a draft governance organization and staffed the draft implementation strategy to a limited audience. The division also established partnerships with universities and military institutions, and initiated marketing the JFU.17

Meanwhile, General Vangjel requested an independent assessment of the JFU to provide food for thought with an emphasis upon organization design, process, and training strategy and contracted with the Boeing Company/Creative Technologies, Inc. to conduct it. Phase one findings of the Boeing study which was published in October 2008 recommended creating a Joint Fires University that would move beyond the traditional institutional mindset of the current school house brigades and produce manpower savings. As the Boeing report explained, the notional JFU would encompass a Technical School, a Leadership School, an Initial Military Training School, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE) general staff, and the TRADOC Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) with the Commanding General of the FCOE serving as the president and chairman of the Fires Enterprise Board of Directors. Ultimately, the study sought to provide FCOE leadership with new opportunities to address existing and emerging missions within the range of available resources.18

15Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University-Concept-Strategy-Implementation, 21

Aug 08; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University: From Strategy to Irreversible Momentum, 9 Jan 09.

16Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept, 9 Jul 08; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept-Strategy-Implementation, 21 Aug 09

17Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University: From Strategy to Irreversible Momentum, 12 Dec 08; Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University: From Strategy to Irreversible Momentum, 9 Jan 09, Interview, Dastrup with Peterson, 21 Jan 09.

18The Boeing Company/Creative Technologies Inc, Fires Center of Excellence -

27

To do this, the study suggested a functional (versus branch) alignment of training and leader development with consolidated staff functions. The three schools above would furnish functional alignment across the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery and create opportunities to share resources for classes, courses, and programs. For example, the Fires Technical School would unite technical training for the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) and Field Artillery (FA) Schools with parallel structures below the school for each branch’s activities, while the Fires Leader Development School would furnish functional leader development by bringing together the Fires Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Fires Captain’s Career Course, the Warrant Officer Career Course, the Pre-Command Course, and the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate. This organization would permit a future combined Captain Career Course for both ADA and FA captains. The Initial Military Training School would continue providing initial entry training and pick up the Basic Officer Leaders Course II.19

RESET, MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS, AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING EVALUATION TEAMS AND ATROPHY OF SKILLS

During the first years of the twenty-first century, the Field Artillery performed a wide variety of Army missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Initial operations in OIF and OEF in 2001-2003 provided field artillery units with opportunities to perform their traditional missions of synchronizing and delivering timely cannon, rocket, and missile fires to support the maneuver forces. In recent years, non-standard missions, such as patrolling, providing base defense, and convoy operations, dominated the Field Artillery’s time with some Field Artillery units furnishing fire support missions.20

As outlined in the Army Campaign Plan Update of 20 July 2006, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) recognized that Field Artillerymen were not performing their traditional field artillery missions in OIF or OEF and feared a deterioration of their fire support skills. He responded by directing the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Field Artillery School to assess the state of competency of Field Artillery lieutenants to determine if non-standard missions in recent years had degraded their basic branch skills and if they required additional or refresher training. Along with other Army leaders, the VCSA recognized the perish ability of field artillery core skills in view of the operational environment.21

Tasked by the VCSA in July 2006 to look at the state of training for lieutenants, the Field Artillery School surveyed field artillery tactical commanders, School instructors, and students at the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) to

____________________ Integration Study, Phase I, 29 Oct 08, pp. 3, 5, Doc II-22; Interview, Dastrup with Peterson, 21 Jan 09.

19The Boeing Company/Creative Technologies Inc, Fires Center of Excellence - Integration Study, Phase I, 29 Oct 08, pp. 11-12.

20CSM (Ret) Jeffrey L. Moyes, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 10-11, Doc II-23. 212006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), p. 15.

28

determine how seriously field artillery skills had been degraded and issued its findings and solutions. Completed in August 2006, the assessment found that non-standard mission assignments were having an adverse impact on junior officers’ ability to retain branch core competency skills in both the Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically, lieutenants had lost branch technical skills of fire direction, fire support, and weapon-specific platoon leader skills as a result of the non-standard missions. Besides degrading the Field Artillery’s ability to function across the spectrum of conflict, Field Artillerymen, in this case, officers were not tactically and technically proficient to be promoted to more senior levels of Field Artillery responsibility. On the positive side, non-standard missions reinforced leader skills.22

The same survey also took the liberty of examining the impact of non-standard missions on majors and noncommissioned officers and unit training. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Major General David C. Ralston, wrote in a memorandum to the VCSA on 7 August 2006, leaders at all levels have experienced the atrophy of field artillery-specific skills. Field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers also experienced diminished field artillery skills.23

In that same memorandum General Ralston outlined potential ways of addressing the problem of resetting (retraining) soldiers, officers, and units in field artillery core competencies. The Field Artillery School could increase the length of FACCC. This would furnish more time to retrain senior first lieutenants and captains in branch core competencies after having limited or no tactical experience with these functions in their first assignments. Also, the School could bring entire battalions back to proficiency after spending eighteen or more months performing non-field artillery missions. This could be done by sending mobile training teams to unit locations as necessary or using the Fires Knowledge Network to provide “reach back” capability by furnishing lesson plans, interactive multimedia training products, and other materials via the computer and Internet to soldiers and units in the field. As General Ralston and others in the Field Artillery School understood, such training would require resources regardless of the means of furnishing the retraining.24

As a means of implementing the retraining options, General Ralston chartered the Field Artillery War on Terrorism Reset Task Force on 23 August 2006 to develop a concept plan to reset the Field Artillery force. Assigned this mission, the task force looked at employing institutional and unit training to reset soldiers and units. As far as institutional training was concerned, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System

22

Ibid.; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 21; Memorandum for VCSA, subj: Response to VCSA Tasker to Assess FA Lieutenant Training, 7 Aug 06, Doc II-24; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset, 3 Oct 08, Doc II-25. Note: CAC later in September 2006 officially expanded the assessment to staff sergeants, sergeants first class, and majors, see Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset, 3 Oct 08; HQ TRADOC Tasking Order, subj: TRADOC Task # IN 000564, 29 Aug 06, Doc II-26.

232006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 16. 24

Ibid.

29

(NCOES), the Officer Education System (OES), and the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) had to focus on core field artillery and leader skills more than they had done. Unit training moreover had to be tailored to meet each unit’s needs. In a briefing to the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, on 2 October 2006, the task force outlined using paper-based training support packages, mobile training teams (MTT), video teleconferences, and web-based distance learning packages, among other means, for the needed unit reset training. For unit-oriented reset training to succeed, each unit had to determine its needs so that the School could identify training products, assets, and methods, could obtain funding, and could prioritize training (Who gets what and when.).25

With the task force taking the lead, the School initiated action. During the last months of 2006, it solicited ideas, concepts, training plans, hardware, software, and simulations from industry, sought input from resetting commanders to gain a better understanding of the impact of non-standard missions on soldiers and units, and started developing the mechanisms to help field commanders to “re-Red” their soldiers and units as quickly as possible.26

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army (DA) implemented its Army Force Generation Model in July 2006 to help reset units and soldiers. The model revolved around a three-year cycle of reset/train, ready, and available phases. During the reset/training phase, units coming out deployment would have the opportunity to conduct individual and collective training. For example, Soldiers who were eligible would attend their respective professional military education courses, such as Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course, while units would have time to build and train. If the unit received a deployment assignment, it would have approximately one more year to train for that mission. Ultimately, the model would enable soldiers and units to reestablish their core skills, mitigating the impact of non-standard missions. In the ready phase units would conduct mission preparation and higher level collective training with other operational headquarters, while in the available phase, units were available for deployment. However, the Department of the Army did not anticipate the Army Force Generation model being fully implemented until 2011.27

The Field Artillery School’s reset plan to solicit ideas, concepts, training plans, hardware, software, and simulations from industry and input from commanders was a high priority in 2007, fit neatly into the Army Force Generation model, and began to take shape in 2007 around institutional and unit training. Besides holding industry days to learn about the latest technology, the School made institutional training more realistic. The Noncommissioned Officer Academy, for example, incorporated a four-day, live-fire exercise into its Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for military occupational specialty (MOS) 13B30 (cannon crewmember) and 13M30 (MLRS crewmember) where the students went to the field and executed their core competency tasks of training their subordinates to execute field artillery tasks. The Academy conducted its first live-fire

25

Ibid.; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 21-22. 262006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 16-17; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 22. 272007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 22.

30

exercise in March 2007. Also, the Academy instituted situational-based practical exercises in 2007-2008 to provide a more realistic training experience and some core field artillery experiences. The Field Artillery School added live-fire exercises in capstone exercises for Advanced Individual Training Soldiers, Noncommissioned Officer Academy students, and Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course students, and Basic Officer Leaders Course III students.28

While institutional training was still basically a one-size-fits-all approach, unit training support required a totally different methodology. This training had to meet the specific needs of the unit and revolved around “reach-back” services and MTTs. As it evolved in 2006-2008, “reach-back” capabilities exploited the Internet. Soldiers could access interactive multi-media training subdivided by MOS and skill level by logging onto the Army Knowledge Network. For more robust training needs, the School provided MTTs. Unlike the normal MTT designed for new equipment training that taught a specific program of instruction, reset MTTs geared their training to satisfy the needs of the unit. For example, one team taught refresher training on manual gunnery and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to the 18th Fires Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007. The training consisted of two weeks of manual gunnery computation and safety training and two weeks of AFATDS refresher training. During the same year, another team trained the 2-8th Field Artillery at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, in manual gunnery, survey, AFATDS, and counter-mortar radar while other teams trained the 2-320th Field Artillery at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 4-320th Field Artillery at Fort Campbell, and 4-319th Field Artillery in Afghanistan.29

The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division of the 428th Field Artillery Brigade also sent reset MTTs to units. During 2007, the division helped with field artillery certification and qualification by using the coach-teach-mentor methodology. While visiting a unit, the division’s team mentors established a certification plan in a three-day process. After meeting with the unit’s leadership, the team conducted workshops with the master gunner, operations sergeant, and platoon sergeants, while the digital master and his noncommissioned officers participated in a workshop to reset their skills. On the last day the team divided unit personnel into working groups to facilitate the development of draft digital and cannon or Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) certification programs. The Field Artillery Master Gunner Home Page complemented this initiative. The page had all points of contact and up-to-date examples of unit certification programs and standing operation procedures as well as changes in the Field Artillery. Also, the division supported the two-week Field Artillery Master Gunner and Digital Master Course. The course taught current doctrine, training management, crew-served weapons, and small arms. Field Artillery weapon-specific tracks and fire direction operations helped master gunners and digital masters implement their unit’s training and

28

Ibid., pp. 22-23; CSM (R) Jeffrey L. Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 10-11. Note: Jeffrey L. Moyer was the Deputy Branch Chief for the Field Artillery Lessons Learned/Reset Branch in DOTD.

292007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 23; Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” pp. 10-11.

31

certification programs.30 Although these efforts produced solid results, the School acknowledged that they

were just a start. It had to continue improving “reach-back” capabilities by enhancing communications with the commanders in the field and examining better methods to deliver training via the Internet. This came about in 2008 in the form of updates on the Fires Knowledge Network, the commanding general’s monthly e-note, the Redleg 7 Report, and fires and effects video-teleconferences.31

Reset efforts continued unabated in 2008. MTTs supplied training to noncommissioned officers in all MOSs and were designed to train the trainer and develop subject matter expertise to help field artillery units to regain their core skills. During the year, the School also employed MTTs to meet NCOES demands to ensure relevance. For example, one MTT focused on training master gunners to ensure that the commander had a weapon system expert on training, safety, ammunition, and resupply and maintenance operations. Having a qualified master gunner gave a battalion an individual with the skills to help reset the unit. Besides training master gunners, MTTs provided reset training to fifteen active component and National Guard battalions as well as eighteen batteries at unit home station and in theater. The training, for example, covered field artillery safety, manual gunnery, AFATDS, Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System, MOS 13B Cannon Crewmember, and M198 155-towed artillery specific crew drill.32

With help from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, funded two contract mobile training teams -- the Battery and Below MTT and the Collective Training Evaluation Team (CTET) -- at the end of 2008. For the reset effort, this was a major breakthrough. Through 2008 the School paid for MTTs out-of-hide, meaning that it took resources from other activities to fund the MTTs. In some instances, the School took MTT instructors from the instructional base.33

Both teams had the mission of restoring fires warfighting skills and field artillery core competencies and were scheduled to be available for unit training beginning in 2009. While the Battery and Below MTT would focus on leader training and train-the-trainer instruction covering cannon battery operations, the CTET would concentrate on collective and leader training on core Field Artillery skills and tasks at the platoon, battery, and battalion levels. Specifically, the CTET would deploy to the home station and develop, plan, and execute platoon, battery, and battalion fire support element/fire support team, combat observation lasing team (COLT), and fire direction center training.

302007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 23-24. 31

Ibid., p. 24; Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” pp. 10-11. 32CSM Joseph D. Smith, “The FA NCO: Absolutely Mission Essential,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 4-5, Doc II-27; Moyer, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,” pp. 10-11; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset, 3 Oct 08.

33Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 17 Feb 09, Doc II-28; Interview, Dastrup with LTC David S. Lee, Chief, FA Lessons Learned/FA Reset, DOTD, 17 Feb 09, Doc II-29.

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Such training would enhance the unit’s ability to operate within a full-spectrum environment.34

DISTANCE LEARNING In 2008 the Field Artillery School leveraged distance learning technology to train

all Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army National Guard soldiers, distributive learning permitted them to stay at home and earn promotion points. Basically, the School’s distance learning program exploited computers and other information technologies to furnish Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses, reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses, professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.35

Distant learning also took advantage of the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) that was redesigned with expanded capacity. Fires Center of Excellence homepage on FKN was divided into forums that contained fully-functional blog and conference capabilities so that Field Artillerymen around the world could share real-time experiences, engage in relevant discussions, exchange ideas, share tactics, techniques, and procedures, and participate in field artillery training courses.36

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES Established in the 1990s, the Total Army School System (TASS), a composite

school system comprised of Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard institutional training systems, continued to play a key role in training in the Field Artillery Soldiers in 2008. During the year, the five Field Artillery Regional Training Institutes (RTI) and their supporting training batteries as a part of TASS furnished standardized resident and non-resident (distance learning) individual training using The Army Training System (TATS) courseware, were accredited by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill, and taught almost everything that was taught in the Field Artillery School. The RTIs trained students in Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) or areas of consideration, special qualification identifier, additional skill identifier, or language identifier code, augmented mobile training teams, provided aggressive distance learning courses, and implemented multi-phase courses to include MOS Training for MOS reclassification and the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course for noncommissioned officers. Field Artillery RTIs also supported active duty installations with new training initiatives

34MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-30; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery CTET, 5 Dec 08, Doc II-31; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 10 Dec 08, Doc II-32; Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 11 Feb 09, Doc II-33; Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 20 Feb 09, Doc II-34.

35Fact Sheet, subj: DOTD Distributive Learning/Multimedia Classroom Request, undated, Doc II-35.

36MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 09, pp. 1-8, Doc II-36.

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like the model for the Warrior Leader Course and implemented a capstone, live-fire exercise for MOS 13B (Cannon Crewmember) MOS 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist), and MOS 13F (Fire Support Specialist) for the Army National Guard in several different locations.37

Although RTIs were organized and chartered to conduct reserve component individual training, they participated in training the entire force and helped with reset and other training. For example, the Field Artillery subject matter expert at the RTI from the Wisconsin Army National Guard at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, helped the Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Fort Sill by furnishing several instructors for a reset mobile training team. Also, Active Component Soldiers took advantage RTIs for training. RTIs even provided assistance with functional courses, such as the Tactical Information Operations Course, anticipated providing Joint Fires Observer (JFO) training in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 to meet the need for more JFOs, and helped redesign Noncommissioned Officer Education system courses so that more leaders and soldiers could pursue their professional education objectives through either resident courses or non-resident courses at an RTI.38

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR COURSE In recent years the modularization of the Army dramatically altered the Field

Artillery. Under the old division organization, the field artillery battalion commander of a direct support battalion served as the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the maneuver brigade, while the division artillery commander was the division’s FSCOORD. In the corps, the corps artillery commander performed FSCOORD duties. These commanders therefore wore two hats. Besides being the senior field artillery commander, they were FSCOORDs. The FSCOORD (FA commander) had the responsibility for properly manning, equipping, and training all fire support personnel in traditional fire support tasks as well as non-traditional civil-military operations and information operations and oversaw the fire support cell. Modularization significantly changed these roles. In the brigade combat team (BCT) the fires commander no longer served as the FSCOORD. The FSCOORD was a staff officer on the BCT commander’s staff. He was one of three lieutenant colonels. The executive officer and the S-3 operations officer were the other two. The BCT also had a deputy commanding officer who was a colonel on the modified tables of organization and equipment. Usually, a lieutenant colonel filled the slot. Basically, the BCT FSCOORD had responsibility for lethal and nonlethal fires but no command duties which resided with the BCT fires battalion commander. He did not have the command authority to manage, equip, or train any of the fire support personnel in the maneuver battalions. Aside from a few hours of

37Interview, Dastrup with COL Robert W. Roshell, DAC ARNG, USAFAS, 9

Mar 09, Doc II-37; LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” draft article, Fires Bulletin, pp. 4-14, Doc II-38; Email with atch, subj: ARNG Regional Training Institutes, 11 Mar 09, Doc II-39.

38Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” pp. 4-14; Interview, Dastrup with Roshell, 9 Mar 09; Email with atch, subj: ARNG Regional Training Institutes, 11 Mar 09.

34

training in the schoolhouse, most BCT FSCOORDS were untrained in the full scope of the responsibilities of their new nonlethal role and really had no to access to formal training. In the past field artillery battalion and brigade commanders attended in the Field Artillery School’s Pre-command Course where they learned about FSCOORD responsibilities. Because they did not attend the Pre-command Course that was designed for commanders, BCT FSCOORDs could not expand and refine their skills prior to assuming their duties)39

In view of such circumstances, the Field Artillery School created a FSCOORD course to equip FSCOORDs with the right fire support skills and confidence to integrate lethal and nonlethal fires and rebuild field artillery core competency skills that were being eroded by Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. During 2007, the School conducted two pilot courses at the BCT to corps level. The Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, decided to center instruction in the course on the BCT level because there were over seventy BCTs that were receiving limited training. General Vangjel believed that the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course was doing a good job of training captains to be battalion fire support officers and that the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) was doing a good job focusing on division and higher command fire support coordination.40

In 2008 the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Colonel (P) Richard C. Longo, supervised the design of the FSCOORD course. The course was opened to all members of the BCT (and other brigade) fires cells from staff sergeant to lieutenant colonel. Because he wanted each student to be confident upon graduation to deploy immediately to OIF or OEF, the School focused the course on current doctrine and a review of traditional fire support basics and used the experiences gained from the combat training centers, units deployed in theater, and combat-experienced FSCOORDS on post to train FSCOORDS. As a result, the course evolved throughout the year to meet the needs of the students and to reflect lessons learned in OIF and OEF. Using multimedia, video training conferences, and other forms of instruction, the course provided instruction on the BCT fires cell, Army Battle Command Systems, the military decision-making process, and other critical subjects. Students also became familiar with the Joint Forward Observer program, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operation Forces, collateral damage estimate, and airspace command and control issues and were introduced to the capabilities and challenges of the Excalibur precision 155-mm. munition and the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System munition. Besides receiving a

392007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), p. 26; COL Kevin M. Batule and COL (Ret) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 08, pp. 26-28, Doc II-40; Email with atch, subj: FSCOORD Course, 10 Feb 09, Doc II-41; Staff Action Sheet, 10 Jul 09, Doc II-40a.

402007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 27; Batule and Janosko, “Training the Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” pp. 26-28; Interview, Dastrup with Theodore J. Janosko, FSCOORD Crse Dir, 9 Jan 09, Doc II-42.

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disk with all unclassified classes and pertinent orders, hard copies of key publications, each student was given reach-back capability to any of the instructors via FSCOORD websites on the Fires Knowledge Network, unclassified or classified email, or telephone.41

Meanwhile, General Vangjel launched an initiative in his Field Artillery Campaign Plan for 2008 to make the fires battalion commander the BCT FSCOORD. In July 2008 he recommended to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) making the fires battalion commander in the BCT the FSCOORD and abandoning the practice of using a staff officer as the FSCOORD. TRADOC approved the change. Interestingly, BCT commanders had already designated their fires battalion commanders as the FSCOORD and charged them with the responsibility for readiness of the entire BCT fires system.42

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System

In recent years Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF) in Afghanistan demonstrated the warfighting potential of integrated joint fires. To train military personnel in employing joint fires, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School used the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) in 2008. JFETS was adaptive and realistic system because it could replicate almost any environment that American soldiers and leaders would encounter and provided them with a capability to execute multiple, adaptive fire support training scenarios that placed them in a variety of operational environments. It consisted of a fires and effects command module, an open terrain module, an urban terrain module, a close air support module, and an after-action report module. In his state of the branch report for 2008, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, wrote that no other Army system could emulate virtual fires in realistic open, urban, and close-air support environments and also furnish the commander with a responsive after-action capability to assess training. Given this capability in the Field Artillery School, leaders started exploring in 2008 how to provide the JFETS experience in a mobile system to meet corps and division commanders’ requirements, to enable on-site joint force observers and U.S. Air Force joint tactical air controller training, and to facilitate core-skill training for Army National Guard units.43

Despite this, the Army did not fund JFETS for 2009 although it recognized the system as a valid requirement. Even so, Congress furnished funding to keep the system

412007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 27; Batule and Janosko, “Training the Full-

Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” pp. 26-28; Memorandum, subj: FSCOORD Course Information Paper, 20 Nov 08, Doc II-43; Interview, Dastrup with Janosko, 9 Jan 09; Email with atch, subj: FSCOORD Course, 10 Feb 09.

42MG Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 1-3, Doc II-43a

43MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow: Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-44; Briefing, subj: JFETS, undated, Doc II-45; Briefing, subj: JFETS, 29 Jan 09, Doc II-46.

36

operating and allocated some funding to procure more JFETS modules at a low-rate production level while the School worked with operational units to encourage them to submit operational needs statements to the Army.44 Call-for-Fire Trainer

During 2008, the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) served as the Army’s simulation system of record for training Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F, Fire Support Specialist, and Joint Fires Observers on observed fire and close air support tasks and was replacing the aging Guard Unit Armory Device-Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST). The CFFT institutional 1:30 (one instructor to thirty students) configuration was being fielded to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions, Reserve Component institutional training sites, and operational mobilization installations, while the CFFT transportable 1:4 and 1:12 systems were being fielded to support brigade combat teams, special operation forces, fires brigades, and forward training sites in theater. As of 2008, 150 CFFTs were fielded with the last system scheduled for fielding in Fiscal Year 2015.45

Currently under development CFFT II would incorporate the ability to conduct classified training and mission rehearsal scenarios, interoperate with joint distributive simulation federations worldwide and was scheduled for operational testing in March 2009.46

434th FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE Warrior Training

During the past several years, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) made considerable improvements in providing realistic and relevant training in Initial Entry Training (IET). To keep pace with the constantly evolving threats in the contemporary operational environment, TRADOC worked with theater commanders from Central Command (CENTCOM) and combat veterans from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to identify skills required for soldiers to survive in combat, turned them into Warrior Tasks (individual soldier skills) and Warrior Drills (group skills designed to teach a unit to react and survive) for IET soldiers to master, and incorporated them into its program of instruction at its basic combat training centers. These tasks and drills were based upon the premise that all soldiers had to be warriors first and then technical experts.47

Because the tasks and drills were dependent upon lessons learned on the battlefield, the number fluctuated from year to year but still focused on shooting, moving, communicating, and warfighting. For example, the 434th Field Artillery Brigade had forty Warrior Tasks and eleven Warrior Drills (also called Battle Drills) in 2006 and

44Email, subj: JFETS, 20 Jan 09, Doc II-47; Email with atch, subj: JFETS, 2 Mar

09, Doc II-48. 45FA Themes, Messages, and Talking Points (Extract), 29 May 08, Doc II-49. 46FA Themes, Messages, and Talking Points (Extract), 29 May 08. 472007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USFCOEFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 29; Information Paper, subj: Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Apr 06, Doc II-50.

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2007. During 2007 and 2008, the Warrior Tasks continued focusing on shooting, moving, communicating, and warfighting with a special emphasis on an urban environment. However, early in 2008, TRADOC implemented and placed additional emphasis on the five desired outcomes for basic combat training. Coupled with the 434th Field Artillery Brigade’s Essential Soldier Skills (ESS), TRADOC’s five desired outcomes, Warrior Tasks, and Warrior Drills produced soldiers who were adaptive, proficient, confident, proud, and ready to fight upon entering the ranks of an Army at war immediately upon graduation from basic combat training.48 Warrior Transition Course

In 2004 the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy faced the challenge of reducing the number of their personnel, while the U.S. Army required more soldiers to fight the War on Terrorism. In light of these circumstances, the Army developed the Warrior Transition Course (WTC) to permit former sailors and airmen in the grades of E-1 to E-7 to remain on active duty by turning them into Army soldiers and to bring former soldiers back into the Army. As long as they met the enlistment eligibility requirements, sailors, airmen, and former soldiers went through the five-week WTC which was designed to provide the Army with trained, disciplined, motivated, and physically fit soldiers who were team-oriented, demonstrated the Warrior Ethos, espoused the Army’s core values, and were combat ready for deployment.49

The Army implemented WTC in August in 2004. Initially, the U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, had the WTC mission. While the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry provided the training, the 46th Adjutant General Battalion furnished reception operations. As the training base expanded, the New Mexico Army National Guard began providing instructor training and conducting the course at Fort Knox in May 2005. Following publication of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) WTC Implementation Plan, the command relocated WTC to New Mexico Army National Guard facilities in 2006. The 1-515th (WTC) Battalion furnished the training at the Onate Training Complex, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Meanwhile, TRADOC gave reception operations to the 95th Adjutant General (Reception) Battalion at Fort Sill, while the 3-413th Reception Battalion Transition Team, U.S. Army Reserve Command, assisted with reception operations at the White Sands Missile Range.50

Because the course continued to grow, TRADOC decided on 15 February 2007 to give a portion of the WTC training mission to the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center (434th Field Artillery Brigade) with the first class starting on 1 March 2007. The 434th Field Artillery Brigade sent former marines, Coast Guard sailors, sailors, airmen, and soldiers through a rigorous course that included rifle marksmanship, improvised

48

Ibid.; Email with atch, subj: 434th FAB Input to 2007 Annual Command History, 28 Mar 08, Doc II-51; Information Paper, subj: Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Apr 06.

492007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 31-32.

50White paper, subj: WTC, 21 Oct 08, Doc II-52.

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explosive device training, hand grenade training, convoy live fire, foot marches, and other critical training. Through the end of 2007, the course had trained 1,306 and graduated 1,026 new soldiers or approximately one third of the total student load while the 95th Adjutant General Battalion on Fort Sill processed all WTC soldiers and then shipped approximately two thirds of the WTC soldiers to White Sands for training with the rest remaining at Fort Sill. Although WTC Soldiers were considered trainees, the 434th Field Artillery Brigade placed them in a special category. They were not basic trainees nor permanent party soldiers. While they had greater privileges than basic trainees, they did not have the full privileges of a permanent party soldier.51

Because the Commanding General of TRADOC wanted an active component installation to conduct WTC, he gave it to Fort Sill. In January 2009 Fort Sill assumed entire WTC mission. To accommodate the increased mission, the Army diverted seven cycles of basic combat training from Fort Sill to Fort Knox and other basic combat training sites. Also, the 434th Field Artillery Brigade converted six basic combat training batteries to WTC batteries to handle the increased training load. Of these six batteries, one was a holdover battery to manage soldiers who had sustained an injury or required retraining. Anticipating the needs to meet the Basic Combat Training surge during the summer of 2009, the 434th Field Artillery Brigade planned to convert three WTC batteries back to basic combat training batteries. Once the surge had finished, three batteries would convert back to BCT.52 Gender-Integrated Training

Over a period of eight months in 1998 and 1999, the Army made significant changes in Initial Entry Training (IET) that had a momentous impact on Fort Sill. On 24 and 25 June 1998 the Deputy Commanding General for IET at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Lieutenant General William J. Bolt, visited Fort Sill. He met with commanders, observed training, talked with noncommissioned officers and soldiers in IET and visited the post’s One-Station Unit Training (OSUT). During his visit, he announced TRADOC’s intention to close one of its gender-integrated training (GIT) bases -- Fort McClellan, Alabama -- as a result of the downsizing of the Army and therefore had to move its chemical and military police GIT from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard, Missouri. Because Fort Leonard Wood lacked sufficient space for the additional training and because female soldiers were entering the Army in increasing numbers, TRADOC had to relocate GIT to some other unspecified location. On 29 January 1999 the Army officially announced that Fort Leonard Wood’s GIT would be transferred to Fort Sill on a temporary basis until additional facilities could be built at the

51White paper, subj: WTC, 21 Oct 08; Robyn Baer, Fort Sill Cannoneer, “Fort

Sill Taking on More Warrior Transition Course Soldiers,” Army News, 6 Nov 08, Doc II-53.

52Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael C. Lee, 434th Field Artillery Brigade S-3, 12 Jan 09, Doc II-54; Information Paper, 434th FAB, subj: All WTC to be Held at Fort Sill, undated, Doc II-55; Baer, “Fort Sill Taking on More Warrior Transition Course Soldiers;” Information Paper, subj: All WTC to be Held at Ft. Sill, undated, Doc II-56; Email with atch, subj: Warrior Transition Course, 9 Feb 09, Doc II-57.

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Missouri installation. In July 1999 GIT began at Fort Sill and concluded in 2001 when the Fort Leonard Wood facilities had been completed.53

In 2008 the 434th Field Artillery Brigade which conducted Basic Combat Training at Fort Sill learned that it would pick up GIT with a start date of July 2009 because of increased numbers of females entering the Army and because of the lack of facilities at Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Jackson, South Carolina. To accomplish the mission, Fort Sill started renovating barracks and other facilities and prepared to receive female drill instructors early in 2009.54 Reserve Component Mobilization to Support 434th Field Artillery Brigade

In January 2007 the President of the United States requested Congress to increase the end-strength of the Army by 74,200 soldiers across the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components by expanding the number of soldiers from 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 by Fiscal Year 2013. The initiative, “Grow the Army,” came out of this appeal to provide additional ground forces to meet strategic demands, mitigate persistent capability shortfalls, and reduce stress on soldiers and their families. With this plan, the Army outlined increasing the number of infantry brigade combat teams, support brigades, and combat support and combat service support units. “Grow the Army” would require additional funding for personnel, infrastructure, and equipment. Addressing the plan, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated in September 2007 that it would permit revitalizing and balancing the force, reducing deployment periods, increasing time for soldiers at home station between deployments, and improving capability.55

For Fort Sill the initiative involved expanding basic combat training conducted by the 434th Field Artillery Brigade. Annually, the brigade experienced a summer surge of basic trainees in initial entry training (IET) and turned to the 95th Division (Training) for assistance. This generally consisted of utilizing the Reserve Component during their two-week annual training period and placing it under an Active Component basic combat training battalion in the 434th Field Artillery Brigade during the surge months of June-September. Therefore, augmentation by the Reserve Components to help with training was not unusual. However, “Grow the Army” initiative meant expanding the training base for the foreseeable future, prompting the Army to mobilize the 1st Battalion, 355th Field Artillery Regiment, 95th Division (Training) on 1 April 2008 for one year to help the 434th Field Artillery Brigade handle the growth in IET. During Fiscal Year 2008, the battalion completed six training cycles of nine weeks each and trained over one thousand

531999 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACF) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 31-32; Email, subj: Gender Integrated Training, 13 Jan 09, Doc II-58.

54Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael C. Lee, 434th FAB S-3, 12 Jan 09, Doc II-59; Email, subj: Gender Integrated Training, 13 Jan 09.

55Information Paper, subj: Grow the Army, undated, Doc II-60; GAO Report, subj: Force Structure Initiative -- Need for Greater Transparency for the Army’s Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, 18 Jan 08, Doc II-61; Information Paper, subj: The Field Artillery School: 434th Field Artillery Brigade and 1-355th Field Artillery Battalion, 23 Oct 08, Doc II-62.

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IET Soldiers in the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in an extensive period of instruction mandated by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that included training such as basic rifle marksmanship, combatives (hand-to-hand combat), and convoy live-fire exercises.56

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM COURSE EXPANSION

In recent years the non-standard missions of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) caused Field Artillerymen’s core skills to atrophy. Pre- and post-course surveys conducted by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill with the students at the Noncommissioned Officer Academy validated this. In fact, some noncommissioned officers felt that they could perform a critical task only with the help of another leader or graphic aid. As General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Services Committee on 31 March 2008, soldiers were training for counterinsurgency operations and focusing on the mission of the brigade that they would be replacing in Iraq or Afghanistan and were not training for full-spectrum operations.57

Because of this, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Fort Sill took action. Supporting the Field Artillery Campaign Plan of the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, leaders from the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the Field Artillery School and Academy submitted a concept plan through General Vangjel to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to increase the length of Field Artillery Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses to reset soldiers in core skills, to improve skill proficiency, to incorporate additional training, such as nonlethal fires, to address current and emerging core-competency requirements, and to compensate for reduction in time for unit and self-development training. On 10 July 2008 the Commanding General of TRADOC approved implementation.58

The approved concept addressed several key issues. Depending upon which one of the eight Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), the course would expand from one to three weeks. Expansion was the most critical for MOSs 13B Cannon Platoon Sergeant and 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist, in the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) and in MOSs 13B Cannon Section Chief and 13F Fire Support Specialist in the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). This expansion would strive for more mastery of skills rather than familiarization and restating learned skills and build critical thinking and adaptive,

56Information Paper, subj: 1-355 Regiment, Aug 08, Doc II-63; Information

Paper, subj: 434th Field Artillery Brigade and 1-355th Field Artillery Battalion, 23 Oct 08; Email with atch, subj: Reserve Component Mobilization, 10 Feb 09, Doc II-64.

57CSM Dean J. Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Aug 08, pp. 20-21, Doc II-65. 58Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” pp. 20-21; Briefing,

subj: NCOEs Expansion and Transformation, 5 Sep 08, Doc II-66; Briefing, subj: The Requirement, 30 May 08, Doc II-67.

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flexible leadership. According to the Command Sergeant Major Dean J. Keveles, the Commandant of the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the expansion of course lengths would help reset core field artillery skills and make graduates more adaptable to today’s complex operating environment.59

With pilot courses to begin in May 2009, expanded courses would play a vital role in the transformation of noncommissioned officer education TRADOC-wide. The academy’s BNCOC was redesignated as the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and ANCOC as the Senior Leader Course (SLC). Beyond the name change, the courses shifted the focus in ALC from squad to squad/platoon and in SLC from platoon to platoon/battery while thirty-five hours of the First Sergeant Course was incorporated in SLC with the First Sergeant Course being phased out in January 2010.60

INTEGRATING WARRANT OFFICERS INTO THE BASIC OFFICER LEADERS COURSE II

In July 2002 the U.S. Army issued its Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ADTLP) Phase III - the Warrant Officer Study. Among other things, the study noted that the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) failed to meet the needs of the Army and warrant officers and required a thorough revision to provide the right training at the right time. The study also urged integrating warrant officers into the officer corps and making WOES a subset of the Officer Education System (OES) rather than stand-alone system as it was currently. This could be done by taking all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mandated common core training out of the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) and having all warrant officers receive this training in the Officer Candidate School (OCS), the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) II for new second lieutenants, or distance learning. This would leave WOBC with only branch technical training.61

Following up on the study’s recommendation for shared training experiences for warrant officers and commissioned officers and the Army Modernization Plan’s proposal to produce warrant officers and officers who were bonded and grounded in the common fundamentals of leadership and possessed sound conceptual and interpersonal skills, the Army Training Directorate and TRADOC developed a course of action in 2005. They decided to integrate warrant officers into BOLC II, a six-week course that provided a common training experience for all second lieutenants and was built on problem-based learning to produce competent and confident warrior leaders. While TRADOC wanted integration to be done in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the Army proposed FY 2009. Regardless of when integration would begin, the Commander of the 428th Field Artillery

59Jim Tice, “NCO Training Overhaul,” Army Times, 22 Dec 08, Doc II-68;

Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” pp. 20-21; Briefing, subj: NCOEs Expansion and Transformation, 5 Sep 08; Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessment, 5 May 08, Doc II-68a.

60 Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” pp. 20-21; Briefing, subj: NCOEs Expansion and Transformation, 5 Sep 08; Tice, “NCO Training Overhaul.”

612007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 35.

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Brigade at Fort Sill explained that it could be accomplished by adding two additional BOLC II companies at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Sill (one at each installation), adding approximately thirty-six cadre members per additional company, and adding more battalion staff to support the increased student load that would grow by approximately one thousand students and would be equally distributed to all ten BOLC II companies. Moreover, ten warrant officer cadre members would displace ten captain cadre members (five at Fort Benning and five at Fort Sill).62

Understanding the advantages of integrating warrant officers into BOLC II, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved such action on 9 November 2005 with implementation coming in October 2008 after pilot courses had been conducted to determine strengths and weaknesses. However, the Field Artillery School urged moving the first BOLC II class with warrant officers back into the second quarter of FY 2009 to give more time to add the additional battalion and staff. On 7 May 2008, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7 signed a memorandum delay integrating warrant officers into BOLC II until the third quarter of FY 2009.63

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM Basic Officer Leaders Course II

In 2008 the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) I, BOLC II, and BOLC III formed a three-tier training process for newly commissioned second lieutenants. BOLC I involved pre-commissioning training at the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in American colleges and universities, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Army National Guard Officer Candidate Schools. BOLC I was literally the fundamental building block for all officers within the Army Officer Education System.64

Following graduation from BOLC I, newly commissioned second lieutenants attended BOLC II. A six-week course, BOLC II produced adaptive and agile leaders who could deal with cultural differences of the nation’s adversaries, friends, and neutrals and trained leaders on the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). In 2008 BOLC II provided a common training experience for all second lieutenants built on problem-based learning to produce competent and confident warrior leaders. More importantly, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS), the training formed bonds of trust earlier in the officer corps (In the past this occurred at the Army’s Command and General Staff College.). From the first day of training through graduation, second lieutenants assumed leadership roles. Specifically, the second lieutenants went through basic rifle

622007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 35-36. 632007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 36; Email, subj: WOES Input to 2008 Annual

Command History, 25 Feb 09, Doc II-69; CW5 David P. Welch, “Warrant: The Legacy of Leadership as a Warrant Officer--90 Years of Technical Expertise in the Army,” On

Point, Summer 2008, pp. 6-13, Doc II-70; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: BOLC Policy and Guidance, 24 Apr 08, Doc II-71.

64Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2008, Doc II-72; Briefing, subj: BOLC Overview, undated, Doc II-73; Lisa Alley, “BOLC Gets Green Light for Officer Education,” Army News, 25 Feb 05, Doc II-74.

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marksmanship, trained on tactical radios, learned land navigation, conducted urban operations of entering and clearing a room, practiced first aid, and engaged in physical fitness activities on confidence courses and road marches.65

Although the cadre taught classes, the students conducted much of the instruction during the course. During week five, for example, the students led several platoon attacks to accomplish a key task, such as securing a building, clearing a room, exercising the rules of engagement, or seizing a critical resource or person. All of this training took place in Liberty City, a specially created urban environment on Fort Sill. During week six, the students trained in company-size units. They conducted missions, such as a quick reactionary force, from a forward operating base.66 Basic Officer Leader Course III

Once Army lieutenants graduated from Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) II, they attended their military occupational specialty (MOS) producing school. For Field Artillery second lieutenants this meant attending BOLC III (fifteen weeks and four days) at the Field Artillery School in 2008. Although instruction focused on light or towed artillery, BOLC III trained Field Artillery second lieutenants to be competent platoon leaders, company fire support officers, and battery fire direction officers, developed adaptive and agile leaders, and prepared officers for full-spectrum missions by incorporating the contemporary operating environment within field artillery training. Following BOLC III, second lieutenants went through two weeks of assignment-oriented training on the Multiple-Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System or the M109A6 Self-Propelled Howitzer if they were assigned such units.67 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course and Expansion

In 2008 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC). Field Artillery captains and senior first lieutenants went through a rigorous twenty-week FACCC course that afforded them the last branch-specific training in their career and some staff training. The officers received the equivalent of two-weeks of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) common core instruction and sixteen weeks of branch tactical, branch technical, warfighting, and staff work instruction. After large-group instruction (six weeks) at the beginning of the course on gunnery, advanced fire direction officer responsibilities, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the students moved into the small group instruction (SGI) for the last thirteen weeks for tactical and staff instruction led by a small group leader (SGL) from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, or an allied officer from Great Britain, Australia, or Canada. Small-group instruction provided situational-

652007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History, pp. 36-37; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2008.

662007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 36-37; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2008; Briefing, subj: BOLC II Overview, undated.

67Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2008; Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, DOTD OES Manager, 9 Jan 09, Doc II-75.

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based practical exercises on counterinsurgency tasks, field artillery core competencies, and other learning methodologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for the asymmetrical battlefield who were also technically proficient to serve as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion fire direction officer, and a battalion/brigade/division/brigade combat team staff officer.68

In 2008 FACCC went through another major redesign to keep it relevant with the contemporary operating environment, updated doctrine, and lessons learned. The first redesign of February 2006 met the challenges, demands, and skill sets required by the contemporary operating environment. Released in February 2008, the second met the challenges of a corps of young officers who lacked field artillery experience, aligned the program of instruction with emerging doctrine, incorporated lessons learned from past redesigns, and revamped training to stay abreast of the changing contemporary operating environment. The school also added a new command and control module, more in-depth instruction on how to coordinate nonlethal fires, updated counterinsurgency operations theory, planning and application instruction, and practical exercises to furnish the students with instruction that could serve in lieu of fire support and field artillery experience that they might have missed in their initial assignments.69

Atrophy of skills drove the second redesign. Surveys performed in December 2007 identified that two out of three captains who reported to the course had not performed traditional company-grade field artillery tasks or basic field artillery skills that they had learned in the Basic Officer Leaders Course III.70

Even though the redesigns of FACCC since 2006 had kept pace with emerging doctrine, three critical gaps still existed. Because captains had not been performing traditional field artillery skills and had been conducting non-standard missions in Operations Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), they lacked competency in core field artillery skills. Also, FACCC did not provide assignment-oriented training to prepare officers for their next assignment. Last, officers lacked the skills to be integrators of nonlethal fires required in Field Manual 3-0. Basically, they required additional training in core competencies, instruction in lethal and nonlethal integration, and assignment-oriented training.71

68Briefing (Extract), subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, “First or Not at All,” 14

May 08, Doc II-76; Briefing, subj: FACCC Expansion: Preparing Leaders for the Future, 4 Sep 08, Doc II-77.

69Memorandum thru Cdr, 428th FAB, Chief, Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO), Dir, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), and Asst Cmdt, for CG, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOE), subj: Decision Brief for Expansion of the Field Artillery Captains’ Career Course, 4 Sep 08, Doc II-78; MAJ Peter M. Sittenauer and MAJ Cornelius L. Morgan, “FACCC: Redesigned for Today and Tomorrow,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 16-19, Doc II-79; Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 9 Jan 09. 70Sittenauer and Morgan, “FACCC,” pp. 16-19. 71Memorandum thru Cdr, 428th FAB, Chief, FAPO, Dir, DOTD, and Asst Cmdt,

for CG, USAFCOE, 4 Sep 08; Briefing, subj: FACCC Expansion: Preparing Leaders for the Future, 4 Sep 08; Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 9 Jan 09.

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To eliminate these training gaps, the Field Artillery expanded the length of FACCC in 2008 (the third redesign) with the first class conducted under the expanded format starting in 2009. The existing twenty-week course did not get past the familiarization level of instruction in many skills. This was particularly true concerning resetting field artillery captains with their core competencies -- the most pressing concern being the atrophy of lethal skills. As a result, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOE), supported a two-phase expansion program for FACCC. The first phase or short-term fix would expand the course to twenty-four weeks. The additional weeks would permit the School to immerse the student officers in practical applications to develop the skills needed to become experts at coordinating lethal fires at the battalion level and delivering lethal fires at the battery level. Basically, the first phase of expansion would fix two of the three gaps -- core competency and assignment-oriented training. The second or long-term solution would extend the course to thirty-six weeks and address the gap of integrating nonlethal fires. According to General Vangjel, integrating nonlethal fires was a required core competency which was echoed by the Combined Arms Center Commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV at the Fires Seminar in 2008.72 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Distance Learning

During 2008, the Field Artillery School conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (Distance Learning) for reserve component officers. Phase IA consisted of “asynchronous” instruction using Internet-based instruction with an instructor available through email to assist and answer questions from enrolled students and was divided into eight blocks of instruction. Phase IB utilized “synchronous” and “asynchronous” instruction. Synchronous instruction involved Internet-delivered and instructor-led instruction on weekends. Phase II consisted of a two-week active duty training at Fort Sill.73

Because of the need to standardize training for the active and reserve components so that both received the same training, the Field Artillery School initiated action in 2008 to revamp FACCC (Distance Learning). This meant finding ways to keep the distance learning portion that was Internet- and computer-based current with existing doctrine and the current operational environment by finding more efficient ways of delivering it. As of the end of 2008, the School was still searching for ways to keep distance learning

72Sittenauer and Morgan, “FACCC,” pp. 16-19; Memorandum thru Cdr, 428th

FAB, Chief, FAPO, Dir, DOTD, and Asst Cmdt, for CG, USAFCOE, 4 Sep 08; Briefing, subj: FACCC Expansion: Preparing Leaders for the Future, 4 Sep 08; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA Branch Update, Nov 08, Doc II-80; COL Frank J. Siltman and LTC John P. Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 6-8, Doc II-81; Interview, Dastrup with Scraper, 9 Jan 09; Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessment, 5 May 08, Doc II-81b.

73Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, DOTD OES Director, 9 Jan 09, Doc II-81a.

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abreast of doctrine changes. 74 Pre-command Course and Expansion

In 2008 the Field Artillery School initiated action to modify the current two-week Pre-Command Course by adding an additional week of Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) training for Fires and Brigade Combat Team commanders. Much like their subordinate officers, lieutenant colonels’ and colonels’ traditional field artillery skills and tasks had deteriorated in recent years by conducting non-standard missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Besides restoring lost competencies necessary to train, develop, and lead fires battalions, the course aimed to build new competencies in precision targeting, tactical information operations, electronic warfare, and lethal and nonlethal fires and train fire support coordinators. Ultimately, the course intended to develop leaders with the ability to synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires in contemporary military operations.75

ADDING NONLETHAL FIRES AS A CORE COMPETENCY Over the years, Field Artillery officers and soldiers have integrated and employed cannon, rocket, and missile fires, close air support, and mortars as lethal fires but had not been doctrinally tied to nonlethal fires. However, recently they had been involved in information operations and other non-traditional roles. At the 2008 Fires Seminar the Commander of the Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, told participants that nonlethal fires was now a requirement for the Field Artillery. Reinforcing General Caldwell’s position, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, made nonlethal fires a part of his future vision of the branch. Field Artillery officers and soldiers had to be comfortable integrating information operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations into the targeting process.76 To accomplish this, the Field Artillery School initiated action in 2008 to train and equip officers and soldiers with the requisite skills so that they would become experts in lethal and nonlethal fires. The School integrated the appropriate training in functional courses, such as the Tactical Information Operations Course, the Fire Support Coordinator Course, and the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, and added nonlethal training to officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer training to

74Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, DOTD OES Director, 9 Jan 09. 75Briefing, subj: Requirement, 30 May 08, Doc II-82; Field Artillery

Precommand Course Schedule, 14 Jan 09, Doc II-83; Email, subj: Gap Mitigation Action, 15 Jan 09, Doc II-84; Email with atch, subj: Pre-Command Course, 10 Feb 09, Doc II-85; Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessment, 5 May 08, Doc II-85a.

76Col Frank J. Siltman and Ltc John P. Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 6-8, Doc II-85b; Email with atch, subj: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency, 14 Jul 09, Doc II-85c.

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give them a working knowledge and basic understanding of nonlethal fires and their relationship with lethal fires.77

FIELD ARTILLERY CAPTAIN ATTRITION Within thirty days of becoming the Chief of Field Artillery and Commandant of

the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel drafted a letter to the Commanding General of the Human Resources Command about the serious challenge of retaining Field Artillery captains. The demand for captains in 2007 simply exceeded the supply and promised to do so in 2008. According to General Vangjel, four factors contributed to the shortage: attrition, military transition team (MITT) requirements, frequent brigade deployment, and early career field designation and branch detail programs.78

Over the past five years, the attrition rates of Field Artillery captains increased from six percent in 2003 to seventeen percent in 2007. In fact, this unprecedented attrition in 2007 created serious shortages throughout the Field Artillery. The perceived lack of career opportunities with the decrease in battery command assignments with the creation of the modular Army and frequent deployments caused many captains to leave the Army, contributing to the shortage.79 Addressing the rising attrition, General Vangjel noted, “The long term impact of this is devastating -- not only our ability to man the growing Army with Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, but also our ability to be selective at those ranks.”80 Not even the financial bonuses would likely entice captains with multiple deployments of twelve to fifteen months each to stay in because they saw no end in sight for the deployments. Reflecting this trend, the Army approved 233 resignations by captains through May 2008 with 17 pending.81

As General Vangjel explained in October 2007, MITTs also contributed to the shortages in operational units. Between July 2006 and June 2007, 115 captains and senior first lieutenants were assigned to MITTs. From July 2007 through June 2008, he anticipated that 178 captains would be assigned to transition teams. This would be the tactical equivalent of fourteen to fifteen brigade combat teams worth of captains, creating shortages in combat units.82

77Siltman and Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder,” pp. 6-8. 78Ltr (Draft), CG, USAFAS, to CG, HRC, subj: Cpt Attrition, 2 Oct 07, Doc II-

86; Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessment, 5 May 08, Doc II-86a.

79Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 3 Oct 07, Doc II-87; Draft Notes, subj: Initial Impressions: Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07, Doc II-88; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-89; Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 1 Nov 07, Doc II-90.

80Memorandum, subj: Greybeards, 9 Nov 07, Doc II-91. 81Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 11 Oct 07, Doc II-92; Briefing, subj: FA Captains,

3 Oct 07; Ltr (Draft), Vangjel to CG, HRC, subj: Initial Impressions, Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07; Draft Notes, subj: Initial Impressions: Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07; Briefing, subj: Personnel Assessment Backup Slides, 1 May 08, Doc II-93.

82Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 3 Oct 07; Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 11 Oct 07;

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Besides using up many captain resources, the MITTs led to another serious problem. Many Field Artillery captains chose to remain with their current units with which they had already deployed and with which they would deploy in the future rather than attend the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) and subsequently be assigned to MITT to deploy for a second or third twelve to fifteen month tour. This ultimately led to staffing field artillery battalions with non-FACCC graduates who were less qualified than FACCC graduates. In fact, almost every field artillery battalion had at least one non-FACCC graduate in battery command because of the limited numbers of FACCC graduates. General Vangjel added that FACCC needed to graduate at least thirty active duty Field Artillery officers from each FACCC to meet adequately the requirements for transition teams, brigade combat teams, and battery command slots.83

The increasing number of brigade deployments, career field designation, branch detail, and imbalanced accessions also contributed to the shortages. While the deployments increased the demand for more Field Artillery captains, career field designation by majors who wanted to get out of the Field Artillery into a functional area and branch detail programs took captains away from the branch for other assignments to compound the problem generated by the attrition in 2008. In fact, major requests for a branch transfer or career field designation out of the Field Artillery went from a historical average of five annually to forty-seven in 2007. As General Vangjel explained in May 2008, imbalanced accessions also played a part in the shortages. For 2008, nearly fifty percent of the new Field Artillery second lieutenants would come from the Officer Candidate School (OCS). From the General’s perspective, this was critical because OCS graduates historically did not serve as long as those from the U.S. Military Academy and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). If OCS accessions remained high, the Field Artillery would have a shortage of officers to meet lieutenant colonel and colonel requirements in twelve to fifteen years.84 To reduce the shortages, General Vangjel outlined several courses of action in 2007-2008. In a briefing on 22 February 2008, he encouraged assigning more Field Artillery officers and noncommissioned officers to top ROTC programs to persuade cadets to select Field Artillery, reducing accessions from OCS, and requiring the U.S. Military Academy to fill Army requirements by sending more graduates into the Field Artillery. In fact, the U.S. Military Academy would only permit ninety-eight cadets to go into the Field Artillery whereas the Army wanted 150.

____________________ Ltr (Draft), Vangjel to CG, HRC, subj: Initial Impressions, Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07;

83Ltr (Draft), CG, USAFAS, to CG, HRC, subj: Cpt Attrition, 2 Oct 07; Draft Notes, subj: Initial Impressions: Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07; Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 3 Oct 07.

84Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 11 Oct 07; Briefing, subj: FAPO Input to CG PCC Brief, 15 Jan 08, Doc II-94; Draft Executive Summary - 90 Day Field Artillery Assessment, 15 Jan 08, Doc II-95; Ltr (Draft), subj: Draft CG 90 Day Assessment Letter (Personnel), 15 Jan 08, Doc II-96; Draft Executive Summary - Field Artillery Personnel Assessment, 28 Apr 08, Doc II-97; Memorandum for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessment, 5 May 08, Doc II-98.

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He also suggested reducing operational tempo for Field Artillery officers who were among the most deployed officers in the Army, reducing MITT requirements for Field Artillery officers, finding ways to expand time between deployments, and making the Field Artillery more attractive by increasing command opportunities and working to position battlefield coordination detachment, garrison, and training support brigade commanders for selection to general officer.85

In his state of the branch article in the Fires Bulletin of October-December 2008, General Vangjel related successes with the above initiatives. Air Defense Artillery officers helped reduce operational tempo by assuming responsibility for one third of the MITT assignments, alleviating burdens on Field Artillery captains and allowing them to return to Field Artillery units upon graduation from FACCC. The Field Artillery also took steps to make MITT assignments more attractive by requesting a $5,000 to $10,000 bonus for serving in one and designating some MITT assignments as key development positions for mid-grade officers. In the meantime, aggressive support of ROTC Leader Development Assessment Course and the U.S. Military Academy Cadet Field Training and Mounted Maneuver Training increased the number of graduates selecting the Field Artillery by thirty-three percent in 2008. Also, command opportunities improved.86

NEW FIELD ARTILLERY MUSEUM For the Fort Sill, its museum played an important role in 2008. To the American

public and Army Soldiers, it told the story of Old Fort Sill and the Field Artillery, serving as a critical educational facility. The Base Realignment and Closure Committee (BRAC) 2005, however, mandated a critical transformation by moving the Air Defense Artillery museum with its historical artifacts from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Sill. The Fort Sill museum would change from a single museum to a museum complex that would include the Fort Sill museum which would occupy buildings around Old Post Quadrangle and other key sites on Fort Sill, the Field Artillery museum, and the Air Defense Artillery museum. Of the three the Fort Sill museum was already open. The Field Artillery museum was scheduled to open in June 2009, and the Air Defense Artillery museum was scheduled to open in 2010 or 2011.87

JOINT AND COMBINED INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE During 2008, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) continued to

serve as the Commanding General’s primary staff proponent for all joint fires and effects related issues, including the development, integration, and execution of all joint

85Email, subj: FA Captains Follow-up, 29 Oct 07, Doc II-99; Briefing, subj:

Personnel Status Input, 22 Feb 08, Doc II-100; Ltr (Draft), subj: Draft CG 90 Day Assessment Letter (Personnel), 15 Jan 08; Draft Executive Summary - 90 Day Field Artillery Assessment, 15 Jan 08; Draft Executive Summary - Field Artillery Personnel Assessment, 28 Apr 08.

86MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-101.

87Mitch Meador, “Super-sneak Preview,” Lawton Constitution, 3 Feb 09, p. 1a, Doc II-102; Kevin Young, “New FA Museum Set to Open in June,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 22 Jan 09, p. 1a, Doc II-103.

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instruction, training, and doctrine development at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School and Fort Sill. In this role JACI prepared, reviewed, and coordinated all joint issues with the Joint Staff, Component Commands, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Fort Sill staff. It also supervised and managed the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, the Joint Fires Observer Course, and the Electronic Warfare Course, provided Air Force participation for joint training, and exercises, and coordinated live air support activities to Fort Sill. JACI also was the proponent for the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) and ensured that the Foreign Liaison Officers were providing their expertise to the Field Artillery School.88 Fort Sill Joint Fires Center of Excellence Training Initiatives

During 2008, Fort Sill launched three critical Fires Center of Excellence training initiatives -- Henry Post Army Airfield improvements, Joint Triangle Initiative, and Joint Fires Center. Concerning Henry Post Army Airfield, the installation recommended continuing funding for the Army Radar Approach Control (ARAC) to protect training and airspace coordination with military and commercial aircraft. A lack of continuous radar coverage would cause the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to intervene and degrade training. Fort Sill also wanted to transition to the Digital Airport Surveillance Radar to increase coverage and deconfliction capabilities and to extend the airfield’s runway from 5,000 to 6,200 feet to accommodate refueling and joint fires aircraft. At the present, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard pilots who trained with Fort Sill’s Joint Forward Observers had to take off from the civilian airfields where they were stationed, fly to a military field, load their ordnance, refuel, fly over to train at Fort Sill, and then fly home. Lengthening the runway would permit pilots to land, refuel, stay overnight, and participate in face-to-face after action reviews conducted with ground controllers to take the place of video teleconferences.89

The Joint Fires Triangle initiative involved Fort Sill, Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, and Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. In a Congressional briefing, Fort Sill proposed an enduring relationship among the three military installations that would furnish 29,000 square kilometers of airspace to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps by overlapping and expanding each installation’s area of operations. The initiative also advocated partnerships that would create tangible and intangible systems and policies and support the strategic support capabilities of each installation. For example, Fort Sill’s Fires Center of Excellence ran eighteen Joint Fires Observer courses a year. With the extension of the Henry Post Army Airfield runway and the proposed Air Force partnerships, the Fires Center of Excellence could double the training capacity. Already, two letters of agreements and two Inter-service Support Agreements signed by the Fires Center of Excellence, the 82nd Flight Wing, Sheppard Air Force Base, and the 97th Airlift Wing, Altus Air Force Base were promising, but this was just the foundation.90

88Information Paper, subj: JACI, 2 Feb 09, Doc II-104. 89Congressional Briefing Chart, 17 Feb 09, Doc II-105; FCOE, Fort Sill on the

Move, 22 Aug 08, Doc I-106. 90Congressional Briefing Chart, 17 Feb 09; FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 22 Aug

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The third initiative, the Joint Fires Center of Excellence, recommended creating an enduring true joint fires training school that would meet the needs and resources of all branches of the service. The school would be an institution and knowledge center dedicated to the execution and study of full spectrum operations, would be a storehouse of lessons learned from all branches of the service for integration into training, and would facilitate the interoperability of current and future combat systems, an efficient use of limited Army and Air Force resources, and Army-Air Force talks.91 Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence Concept

The Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on 23 January 2008 and 10 February 2009 generated joint tasks for the Army and Air Force to develop and create greater joint training opportunities to support the Global War on Terrorism. Specifically, the 23 January 2008 talks focused on the need for more joint training, while the 10 February 2009 talks highlighted the need for routine joint training and identified the requirement to exploit experimentation capabilities using exercises like Earth, Wind, and Fire and Omni Fusion and the necessity for a Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence. This led Fort Sill to propose that its Fires Center of Excellence was postured to add more joint training and to note that Fort Sill, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, and Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, could form a triangle to create a Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence.92

As the White Paper entitled “The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence” noted, the military of 2008 had numerous training centers that focused on joint warfighter training. Three prominent centers included the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Training rotations provided opportunities for joint operations and assets to be applied. After the training had been completed, units returned to their home stations to conduct after action reviews and to train at the service level again.93

With this in mind, Fort Sill pointed out in 2008 the potential of a joint force training center dedicated to producing joint warfighters in Southwest Oklahoma and North Texas. Fort Sill’s Fires Center of Excellence, the 82nd Flying Training Wing at Sheppard Air Force Base, and the 97th Airlift Wing at Altus Air Force Base were uniquely located to create a triangle of installations to assist each other in their current training missions and pave the way for creating joint training venues to enhance their own training missions and create enduring joint training opportunities.94

____________________ 08.

91Congressional Briefing Chart, 17 Feb 09. 92White Paper, subj: The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence,

undated, pp. 8-9, Doc II-107. 93White Paper, subj: The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence,

undated, p. 2. 94White Paper, subj: The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence,

undated, p. 3.

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Two Letters of Agreement and two Inter-Service Support Agreements focused on training and provided the framework for the individual installations to work their own training requirements with limited usage of each other’s capabilities. However, these agreements only scratched the surface. By examining each other’s training requirements and seeking joint training opportunities, mutually supported joint training could be realized with little or no increase in resources. In time this triangle could be expanded to include Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, to exploit its organic Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to furnish command and control with Fort Sill’s organic air defense systems. Other installations in close proximity to Fort Sill could also reap the benefits of a joint training center that would supply twenty-nine thousand square miles of airspace. Adding the collective ranges, airspace, and airfields would create a user-friendly training environment of diverse capabilities. A Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence could be developed with a minimal impact to each installation -- Fort Sill, Altus Air Force Base, and Sheppard Air Force Base -- and enhance each’s training.95 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Course

Impressed with Fort Sill’s joint efforts, including the Joint Forward Observer Course, the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, the Electronic Warfare Course, and the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer which supported close air support training on the installation, the Commander of the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, envisioned early in 2007 the potential synergies of moving a portion of the four-week Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Qualification Course to Fort Sill to help train additional critically needed JTACs. At the time, the Warfare Center had to increase the number of graduates from its JTAC course to meet the growing need for JTACs, faced limited training capacity at Nellis Air Force Base, required additional room for an advanced JTAC instructor’s course, and sought a centrally-located site in the continental United States. As a result, the U.S. Air Force saw Fort Sill as a possible location to meet its JTAC requirements and conducted studies in April 2007 and May 2008 to determine the feasibility of moving a portion of the JTAC Qualification Course from Nellis Air Force Base to Fort Sill. Based upon the favorable results of the studies, the Air Force started conducting the fourth week of JTAC training at Fort Sill in 2008 where the students had the opportunity of applying the training received during the first three weeks of the course in the classroom and simulators in field exercises. Fort Sill taught two classes of four students each in 2008.96

Meanwhile, the Air Force still contemplated locating an entire JTAC course at Fort Sill for several key reasons. First, Fort Sill had the potential of capturing training

95White Paper, subj: The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of Excellence,

undated, pp. 3-4. 96Email with atchs, subj: JFO Production, 4 Mar 09, Doc II-108; 2007 U.S. Army

Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 40-41; Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col G. Todd Lang, JACI, 4 Mar 09, Doc II-109; Lt Col G.Todd Lang, “JFO Sustainment: A Critical Requirement,” draft article for Fires Bulletin, pp. 1-12, Doc II-110.

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synergies with Joint Fires Observers’ (JFO) field training, having a range within thirty minutes of the classroom, incorporating field artillery fires into training scenarios, having easy access to Razorback Range, Arkansas, and Smokey Hill Range, Kansas, and pooling resources with Canadian JTACs who conducted their field phases at Fort Sill. As of 2008, the Air Force did not plan on making the JTAC course at Fort Sill a stand-alone course. Initially, Nellis AFB would provide all academic and simulator training and send a portion of the students to Fort Sill for their field week. The Fort Sill JTAC course would possibly receive full accreditation as a stand-alone school. However, the Air Force had not yet decided in 2008 to locate a JTAC course at Fort Sill.97 Joint Fires Observer Course

In 2007 two Joint Fires Observer schools -- one at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and one at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany -- existed. The one at Fort Sill graduated 271 Joint Fires Observers during Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. Because of the need for more Joint Fires Observers (JFO) to support close air support and provide targets for Joint Terminal Attack Coordinators (JTAC), Fort Sill graduated 509 JFOs in FY 2008 in 10 resident courses and 8 mobile training team courses. In these courses, instructors taught students to use a variety of munitions, fuses, aircraft, and guidance methods for coordinate-dependent weapons that required precise coordinates or laser-guided bombs that required detailed knowledge of communications, laser codes, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide these weapons safely in the close proximity of friendly troops. The JFO also was proficient at surface-to-surface calls for fires, naval call for fires, AC-130 aircraft calls for fires, and close combat attack five-line call for fires.98 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course

In 2008 Joint Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) provided instruction to joint fires and effects team members from all services, coalition forces, and other government agencies to apply and generate joint lethal and nonlethal fires and effects. JOFEC provided each student a baseline knowledge of joint and service fires capabilities, platforms, operational environment doctrine, the joint targeting process, and how the joint fires and effects system operates and prepared students to function effectively at the joint/operational level in a full spectrum of military operations. The course also exercised the students’ knowledge through practical exercises where they applied the principles of joint lethal and nonlethal fires and effects.99 The 138th Combat Training Squadron

The Oklahoma Air National Guard announced in 2007 plans to stand up the 138th

97Email with atchs, subj: JFO Production, 4 Mar 09; Interview, Dastrup with

Lang, 4 Mar 09; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill Historian, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-111. 982007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), p. 41; Email with atchs, subj: JFO Production, 4 Mar 09; Lang, “JFO Sustainment,” draft article for Fires Bulletin, 4 Mar 09, pp. 1-12; Interview, Dastrup with Lang, JACI, 4 Mar 09; Email with atch, subj: JFO White Paper, 13 Jul 09, Doc II-111a.

99Information paper, subj: Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, 2 Feb 09, Doc II-112.

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Combat Training Squadron at Fort Sill in 2008 to provide support for training. The squadron would be aligned under the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate at Fort Sill and act as the school house liaison between the U.S. Army’s Fires Center of Excellence and the U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The squadron would furnish Air Force instructors/subject matter experts to plan, prepare, and execute the Joint Fires Observer Course; plan, prepare, and present instruction to the U.S. Army Field Artillery School on Air Force subjects; coordinate air support for Fort Sill training, exercises, and demonstrations; and manage Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) training, qualifications, evaluation, and the performance of JTAC duties for all Fort Sill JTACs. However, unresolved issues prevented activating the squadron in 2008, leaving Fort Sill with Detachment 1, 138th Operations Group to support the training.100

NONLETHAL TRAINING Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course

In recent years the Army renewed its interest in electronic warfare as a part of information age warfare. On 30 October 2003 the Department of Defense concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the applications and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational awareness, to disrupt command and control, and to develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States’ electronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Subsequently on 15 May 2004, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the specified proponent for electronic warfare in the Army. Later on 23 November 2004 the CAC commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, selected the Commander of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) in 2006, as the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack for brigade, division, and corps and doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. Working with CAC, USAFACFS developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army, to establish roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare functions, and to begin the process of updating electronic warfare DOTMLPF.101

In 2008 the Field Artillery School continued to be the trainer for offensive electronic warfare planning, synchronization, and integration for brigade and higher organizations. The School’s Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (AOEWC) lasted six weeks, awarded an additional skill identifier of 1J upon graduation, and trained

1002007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 42-43; Memorandum of Agreement, subj: Funding of Base Operations support for the 138th Fighter Wing, the 6th Combat Training Squadron, and the Air Force Doctrine Center, undated, Doc II-113; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill Historian, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-111.

1012005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 43-44; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 36-37.

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the electronic warfare officer to plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute electronic warfare for the maneuver commander. Specifically, the course taught electronic warfare fundamentals, current electronic warfare threat and systems, and the establishment of brigade combat team, division, and corps electronic warfare cells, among other subjects, and had been taught twelve times since 2006 when it was first taught.102

As of 2008, the AOEWC was one of two electronic warfare courses taught at Fort Sill. The second of three Functional Area 29 pilot courses was scheduled for January 2009 for officers in the career field to train them to be experts in electronic warfare and to be a part of an electronic attack team to integrate the efforts of the communication or signal soldiers and military intelligence soldiers who worked in the electronic protect and electronic support teams. Electronic warfare officers were staff officers who understood the situation in terms of the threat in order coordinate and request help. Courses for warrant officers and enlisted soldiers were scheduled to begin in April 2009. Along with the existing courses that produced graduates with the additional skill identifier 1J, these courses would help train the 1,511 electronic warfare personnel required by the Army over the next three years. Eventually, the Army would have 3,719 electronic warfare specialists in the 29-series career field.103 Tactical Information Operations Course

With information operations growing in importance as attested by Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and other recent operations in complex societies with no central authority and many different ethnic groups, political identities, and religious groups, information operations assumed greater importance, especially at the tactical level. Tasked by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) took the lead for information operations training for the brigade and below by designing a three-week Tactical Information Operations Course and assigned the 30th Field Artillery Regiment, reflagged as the 428th Field Artillery Brigade on 7 December 2006, to head course development to meet the need.104

In 2008 the Field Artillery School completed the second full year of teaching the Tactical Information Operations Course. The course trained officers and noncommissioned officers, including students from the Active and Reserve Components and other military services, to perform as members of an information cell at the brigade combat team and lower and gave them a working knowledge of tactical information

102MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-114; Briefing, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, US Army Field Artillery Center and School, 6 Jun 08, Doc II-115; Jeff Crawley, “Class a Glimpse of Future,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 19 Feb 09, p. 1a, Doc II-116; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-117.

103Crawley, “Class a Glimpse of Future,” p. 1a; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09.

1042006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 2, 3, 35; Information Paper, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Jan 09, Doc II-118.

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operations integration. The course also taught students how to analyze the informational environment, to execute information operations in a complex environment, and to assess the results and provided a practical exercise to validate the students’ learning. Also, the school offered mobile training team instruction to the field upon request.105

Based upon solid reviews of the course, the Field Artillery School anticipated adding a course of similar design to the Intermediate Level Education curriculum at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, entitled “Targeting in a Hybrid Environment” sometime in Fiscal Year 2009 and urged all Functional Area 30 Information Officers to attend the course as a part of their professional development requirements.106

105MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc II-119; Information Paper, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Jan 09, Doc II-120; Information Paper, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Jan 09.

106MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow -- Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8.

CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:

FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS INTRODUCTION

During the year, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. To accomplish this, the School developed the Field Artillery Campaign Plan, participated in the Transformation of the Army effort; and made significant progress with introducing new equipment and weapons.

FIELD ARTILLERY CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR 2007-2008 Upon becoming the Chief of Field Artillery and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill late in 2007, Major General Peter M. Vangjel reached the same conclusion about the Field Artillery Campaign Plan of 2006 as his predecessor, Major General David C. Ralston, had. The 2006 plan focused too much on material improvements and really did not lay out how to reach the desired end state of a complete capabilities-based and relevant force. Equally important, it did not address the changes in the world since 11 September 2001 when terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon. In view of the terrorist attack, although the risk of an attack by another state was less likely and could not be dismissed, the threat of a weapon of mass destruction attack by a non-state terrorist organization and terrorism grew in significance. For the Field Artillery, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) reaffirmed that the world had changed and blurred the former clear distinction between combat and post-combat operations.1

This led to General Vangjel’s approved rewording of the Field Artillery’s enduring mission and approved vision as part of the Field Artillery Campaign Plan of 2007. Rather than stating that the mission of the Field Artillery was to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fires and to help integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operations as stated on Fort Sill’s home page, he wanted the enduring mission to state that the mission of the Field Artillery was to support joint and maneuver commanders by integrating and delivering lethal and nonlethal fires across the spectrum of operations. His vision for the branch was that it would be the maneuver commander’s premier worldwide, deployable, 24/7 fire support force manned with adaptable and resilient full-spectrum warriors, equipped with the world’s best, most responsive systems, and capable of integrating and delivering timely joint lethal and nonlethal fires to dominate any operating environment.2

To ensure this, the emerging draft Field Artillery Campaign Plan of 2007

12006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 41; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 46; Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb 09, Doc III-1; Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb 09, Doc III-2.

22007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 46; Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb 09.

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recognized the need for critical changes in the Field Artillery School and educating and training officers. The School had to modify what it taught and how it taught because its graduates had to leave as experts without the need for additional training by the receiving operational unit. This meant improving the quality of instruction by relying more upon subject matter experts and reducing the general instruction of tactics and major combat operations in the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course. The School also had to consider creating a course for majors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College because of the rapid changes in technology and because of the deterioration of core field artillery competencies in the contemporary operational environment where Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders did not routinely perform basic field artillery skills and therefore lost them.3

Basically, the campaign plan of 2007 envisioned two key tasks. First, rebuilding the Field Artillery was paramount to offset the decline in core field artillery competencies by retraining Soldiers and leaders and by replacing worn out equipment. Second, transforming the Field Artillery was critical to create the future force.4

In 2008 the Field Artillery Campaign continued as a crucial effort to rebuild and transform the Field Artillery and to support current Army operations. As a multi-year effort to carry the branch from 2008 to 2015, the plan outlined establishing Field Artillerymen as the Army’s integrators of lethal and nonlethal fires, redefining individual and collective core competencies, redefining the institutional education construct to meet changing requirements, developing and providing exportable training and education programs, transforming the Fires Knowledge Network to provide interactive, responsive, and comprehensive “reach back” capability, fielding weapon systems, munitions, and materiel required to defeat the twenty-first century adversary, and developing and fielding “coalition friendly” command and control systems. As a comprehensive document, the Field Artillery Campaign Plan of 2008 addressed every aspect of Field Artillery fires and fire support, provided the strategic direction, operational focus, objectives, and tasks necessary to coordinate the efforts of the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery community, and established the vision for the future and a roadmap of specific objectives and tasks to get there by creating four lines of effort (Sustaining Soldiers, Leaders, and Families; Supporting Current Operations; Regenerating; and Transforming for Future Operations). The plan also served as a means of remaining synchronized with the Army’s transformation efforts and a way of identifying lines of attack for leveraging Army and joint transformation programs to meet Field Artillery requirements.5

3Ibid., pp. 46-47; Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb

09. 4Ibid.

5Field Artillery Talking Points: The Field Artillery Campaign Plan, undated, Doc III-3; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 1-3, Doc III-4; Field Artillery Campaign Plan Executive Summary, 3 Sep 08, Doc III-5; Briefing, subj: FA Campaign Plan: Return of the King, 19 Aug 08, Doc III-6; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires

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2008 FIRES SYMPOSIUM On 15-17 July 2008 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) held its second annual fires symposium. This time it was at Dallas, Texas. The symposium provided leaders of industry and the Army with insights into the challenges faced by the Fires community. Speakers at the symposium included Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Chief of Field Artillery; Major General Howard B. Bromberg, Chief of Air Defense; Dr. Preston M. Geren, Secretary of the Army; Lieutenant General Michael V. Vane, Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center; and other Army leaders. General Vangjel furnished an update on the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence that was part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 and that would colocate the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and U.S. Army Air Defense Center at Fort Sill. He also initiated discussion on the Field Artillery School’s challenge of developing a fires strategy to carry fire support into the future. General Vangjel also stressed the importance of accurate and quick fires and changing institutional training to place more emphasis on interagency and joint cooperation and to incorporate more computerized simulations, and precision fires.6

FORCE DESIGN AND COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS Transformation of the Army

Modularization. Work on transforming the Army continued in 2008. Upon becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army in August 2003, General Peter J. Schoomaker acknowledged the requirement to accelerate the Transformation of the Army, to improve the Army’s wartime relevance and readiness, and to institutionalize a joint and expeditionary mindset.7 Above all, the Army had to respond rapidly and had to commence operations immediately upon arrival in distant theaters of operations. However, the post-Cold War Army lacked the required flexibility and responsiveness to meet such demands. In support of military operations during the past five years, for example, the Army had to modify its corps and divisions by dismantling or reorganizing them for operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The difficulty of using existing formations coupled with the need to employ land forces immediately with little time to reorganize caused General Schoomaker to step up the pace of the transformation started in 1999 under his predecessor, General Eric K. Shinseki, who had a three-phase program for transformation -- the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force -- that would take years to unfold. General Schoomaker replaced the

____________________ Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8, Doc III-7; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jay Grigg and LTC X.L.D. Mays, Field Artillery Campaign Plan coordinators, 20 Jan 09, Doc III-8.

6“2008 AUSA Fires Symposium -- 15-17 July,” Fires Bulletin-, May-Jun 08, p. 28, Doc III-8a; Fact Sheet, subj: 2008 AUSA Fires Symposium -- 15-17 Jul, undated, Doc III-8b; Agenda, subj: Army Fires Symposium and Exposition, undated, Doc III-8c; Report by Paul McLeary, Senior Editor, Defense Technology, subj: Army Fires in the Future, 16 Jun 08, Doc III-8d; Briefing, subj: AUSA Fires Symposium and Exposition, Concept Brief, 12 Apr 08, Doc III-8e.

72003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 60-61.

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Legacy Force and Interim Force with the Current Force and the Objective Force with the Future Force and started speeding up the fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance the Current Force so that it would be relevant and ready and could conduct major combat operations across the full spectrum of conflict.8

Besides introducing Future Force capabilities sooner, Schoomaker pressed to restructure the Army’s force. Beginning in late 2003, Schoomaker initiated the process of modularizing the Army’s forces to provide land combat power that could be task organized for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, or support operations as part of a joint campaign. As the Army explained in 2005 and 2006, modularization would move the Army from dependence upon large, powerful, fixed organizations (divisions) to reliance upon smaller, self-contained, lethal organizations (brigade combat teams) with the capabilities for the full range of missions. They would be a trained and ready member of the joint force and be comprised of adaptive, competent, and confident soldiers and leaders.9

Division and Corps. The modularization effort set in motion a comprehensive effort to transform the Army at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels by replacing the service’s existing brigades, divisions, corps, and echelons-above corps with new organizations. As outlined in the Unit of Employment Operations White Paper of 23 January 2004 and refined in the Unit of Employment White Paper of 20 March 2004, the Army planned to create the Unit of Employment (UEy) as the theater, operational-level, land force and joint support organization and the Unit of Employment (UEx) as the primary warfighting headquarters. Most likely commanded by a lieutenant general, the UEy, designated as a corps in 2004, would consolidate most functions performed by the corps and Army service component commands into a single operational echelon and would be the primary vehicle for Army support to the regional component commander’s area of responsibility. Equally important, the corps which was approved in November 2004 for standing up would be able to be tailored, would command land forces in major operations, would support the rest of the joint team, would provide army capabilities to the combatant commander, and would tailor and support the UEx that was approved in September 2004 for standing up and was designated later in the year as a division.10

As discussed in the Unit of Employment Operations White Paper of 20 March 2004, the division commanded by a major general would serve as the Army’s primary tactical and operational warfighting headquarters. The Army envisioned that the division would not have a fixed structure beyond its headquarters because it would be completely modular and could be deployed as a pure headquarters without subordinate units. As a result, its supporting brigades -- an aviation brigade, a battlefield sustainment brigade, a maneuver enhancement brigade to preserve the freedom of maneuver for the division by controlling terrain or features, a fires brigade, a battlefield surveillance

8Ibid.; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 49-50.

9Ibid., p. 50; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 45; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of

Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 42. 102003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 50; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 42.

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brigade, and a battlefield sustainment brigade could be attached or assigned depending upon the operations. Each brigade would have organic signal and sustainment capabilities. In addition, the division would have the ability of controlling a mix of heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (BCT) for different missions. Given its modularity, the division would have the ability to adjust its organization for each operation.11

The Army further modified the corps and division in 2005. It designated the corps as an Army-level organization with a lieutenant general in command, while the division would be either a division- or corps-level command under a major general or a lieutenant general depending upon its mission. As explained late in 2005, the corps would be organized as an operational level unit, could function as the headquarters for a Joint Force Land Component, could provide command and control for two or more two-star divisions, and could function as an Army force as part of a joint force. The division would be a modular organization, would be the warfighting headquarters, and would normally have four brigade combat teams. Among other organic assets, each brigade combat team would have an organic fires battalion with two batteries of eight weapons each, organic target acquisition assets, and an organic forward support company.12

In 2006 the Army moved closer to completing work on the corps and finished key work on the division. During the year, the Army developed a corps design with a headquarters, a special troops battalion, and a tactical command post. The design also provided for a fires and effects cell, renamed fires cell in 2007, to integrate lethal and nonlethal fires, to provide target production, and to receive, prioritize, and action subordinate requests for fires and effects, among other responsibilities. The Army planned to vet the corps design in 2007.13

The Army never completed work on the corps design as initially intended. In November 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army decided to make the corps a tactical headquarters rather than an operational headquarters as had been the initial aim. This forced the Field Artillery School and other Army agencies to start over on the corps design in 2008 to give it functions that the theater army formerly had and to make it a tactical and operational headquarters by creating a fourth corps headquarters for command and control of major combat operation functions.14

Meanwhile, TRADOC finished the modular division’s headquarters design and force structure complete with a main command post, a tactical command post, a special troops battalion, and a fires and effects cell (fires cell) that would provide services similar

112003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 51; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 46. 12

Ibid., p. 46. 132006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 43; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 49-50. 142007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 50; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael Hughes,

Concepts Branch, CDID, 9 Apr 09, Doc III-9; Interview, Dastrup with Dan Bankston, Chief Concepts Branch, CDID, 9 Apr 09, Doc III-10; Information Paper, subj: Theater Army 5.1 Redesign Implications for Corps Fires Cells, 29 Jan 09, Doc III-11; Briefing, subj: Theater Army Redesign 5.2 Update, 17 Feb 09, Doc III-12; Email with atch, subj: Transformation Portion of the 2008 Annual Command History, 14 May 09, Doc III-12b.

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to the corps fires cell and presented it to the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General David H. Patraeus, on 2 August 2006 for review and approval. General Patraeus approved it; and TRADOC then sent the design to Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Army’s divisions for staffing. Initial feedback from FORSCOM and the divisions indicated acceptance of the new design. Besides providing a stand-alone headquarters that could deploy to furnish command and control unconstrained by permanently fixed formations of organic forces and being able to operate with heavy, light, or Stryker brigade combat teams in any combination, this design added new capabilities, such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and information operations, to more traditional division functions. Army approval for the division redesign finally came in mid-2007.15

Fires Brigade. As delineated in 2003-2008, the fires brigade would play a critical role in the modular division although it might or might not be stationed with the division. It would plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations to provide close support and precision strike for the joint force commander, the division, and the brigade combat teams (BCTs). Although the fires brigade could be tasked organized with additional units, such as rocket and cannon battalions, depending upon the situation, its organic units would include a headquarters and headquarters battery, a fires and effects cell for planning and executing lethal and nonlethal effects, a support battalion for logistical support, a signal company, and a target acquisition battery with four AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars and two Lightweight Countermortar Radars. With its organic rocket battalion, composed of either the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the fires brigade could provide long-range fires to support the division in shaping the battlespace and conducting counterstrikes. However, the bulk of the fires from the fires brigade would come from assigned assets. Typically, this would be two rocket battalions and two cannon battalions. In some instances, the fires brigade would reinforce the BCTs with fires.16

The fires brigade also had an organic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) company of seven tactical UAVs and two ground control stations to control armed UAVs. To accomplish its close support mission the fires brigade would normally employ a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile systems. Yet, this mix would not provide the brigade with the ability to furnish lethal effects while simultaneously limiting collateral damage and precision close support, among other critical gaps. For such effects, the fires brigade would have to depend upon joint fires. To eliminate this dependency and gap in fire support, the Army allotted armed UAVs to provide the fires brigade with the precision organic capability to support shaping and close support operations and to give the capability of penetrating threat airspace during day and night operations in all kinds of weather. As outlined in the armed UAV operational concept in December 2004, the armed UAV would provide flexible, responsive precision close support fire to destroy critical enemy capabilities and would shape subordinate unit operations. Equally as important, the fire brigade’s armed UAVs would provide flexible, responsive physical

152006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 43-44; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 50. 162004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 50; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 47.

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damage assessment of attack operations and long-range target acquisition capabilities.17 In 2007 budgetary considerations prompted the Program Executive Officer for

UAVs, renamed Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), to reassess placing UASs in the fires brigade. After serious study the Program Executive Officer took away the UAS ground control station and the extended range/multi-purpose Sky Warrior UAS from the fires brigade and made them organic to the aviation brigade. This left the Fires Brigade with a Shadow UAS platoon equipped with the Shadow UAS and prompted the Field Artillery School to recommend integrating Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) into the fires brigade tables of organization and equipment to give the brigade the capability of tracking moving targets and obtaining top secret/special compartmental information.18

This latter concern stemmed from the Army’s reconsideration of the placement of the Trojan Spirit II system. Early in 2006, it provided a Trojan Spirit II to the fires brigade to give it top secret/special compartmental information connectivity to perform its mission within the modularity concept. As of mid-2006, the Trojan Spirit II was the only proven system that could furnish such connectivity for the fires brigade even though the Joint Network Node (JNN) was expected to provide this connectivity sometime in the future. However, constrained resources prompted the Army to review the placing the Trojan Spirit II in non-military intelligence units. In September 2006 the Department of the Army therefore began staffing a revised basis of issue plan for the Trojan Spirit II which removed the system from the aviation brigade, battlefield surveillance brigade, and fires brigade. Although the Army conceded that these units required top secret/special compartmental information connectivity, it pointed out the existence of other alternatives. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) disagreed and urged the Army to reconsider. The Army concurred with the aviation brigade’s, the battlefield surveillance brigade’s, and the fires brigade’s requirements for top secret/special compartmental information connectivity but said that they could obtain such connectivity through the Warfighter Information Network, formerly the Joint Network Node (JNN) network, even though it was not the approved solution. Such arrangement had worked successfully in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Based on this, the Army stood firm against providing the aviation brigade, the fires brigade, and the battlefield surveillance brigade with the Trojan Spirit II.19

Including the first fires brigade that was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, that was not organic to the division, and that was stood up on 16 December 2004 with the 2-20th Field Artillery Battalion (MLRS) as an organic element, the Field Artillery School anticipated in 2004-2005 that a total of twelve fires brigades would be in the Total Force. Although the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General David P. Valcourt, consistently stated that in a perfect world each division would have a fires brigade, circumstances determined otherwise. The realities of force structure constraints dictated a fewer number of fires brigades than the number of

17

Ibid. 18

Ibid.; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51. 192006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 46; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51.

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divisions. The Army Campaign Plan briefed to the Chief of Staff of the Army late in 2004 set the number of active component fires brigades at six with an additional six fires brigades in the Army National Guard. As December 2006 and early 2007, the Army planned to have six fires brigades in the active component, while the Army National Guard would have seven fires brigades to give a total of thirteen by the time that the transformation had been completed.20

Recognizing the importance of the fires brigade to division commanders for training and readiness, the Army acknowledged the need for more. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) 1015 established the requirement for three more brigades to meet the increasing demand for their services. Although many requirements were competing for resourcing, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, with support from division commanders urged the Army to provide the resourcing for additional fires brigades.21

Theater Army. In 2008 the Army Campaign Plan 2009 continued the modularization process that had started several years earlier and took action to deal with an end strength of 547,000 personnel. On 29 December 2008 Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, directed redesigning the theater army headquarters to balance operating and generating force requirements within the 547,000 soldier end strength. This meant reducing the theater army capability to perform only as a joint task force/joint force land component for small scale contingencies, redesigning the theater headquarters with a main command post and a contingency command post, and deleting the operational command post and major combat operation functions by migrating them to the corps. The main command post retained its planning and other responsibilities, while the operations command post would be structured so that it could deploy rapidly and get into theater to give the theater a headquarters to run operations up to thirty days. If it had to function for more than thirty days, the operations command post would require augmentation.22 Brigade Combat Team Review

On 6 August 2008 the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 requested the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with assistance from the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to conduct a holistic review of the brigade combat team designs. He wanted this review to validate and refine the required

202005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 45-46. 21Email with atch, subj: Transformation Portion of the 2008 Annual Command

History, 14 May 09, Doc III-12b; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 1-3, Doc III-12c; Col Samuel R. White, Jr., “The Fires Brigade: A Critical Capability in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 08, pp. 41-45, Doc III-12d.

22Interview, Dastrup with Hughes, 9 Apr 09; Information Paper, subj: Theater Army 5.1 Redesign Implications for Corps Fires Cells, 29 Jan 09; Briefing, subj: Theater Army Redesign 5.2 Update, 17 Feb 09; Email with atch, subj: Theater Army, 4 May 09, Doc III-12a; Email with atch, subj: Transformation Portion of the 2008 Annual Command History, 14 May 09, Doc III-12b.

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capabilities for the heavy and infantry brigade combat teams taking into account new doctrine, lessons learned from current operations, and on-going operational assessments. Basically, this meant addressing critical capabilities gaps and eliminating them. TRADOC subsequently designated the U.S. Army Infantry Center with assistance from the U.S. Army Armor Center as the lead for this effort.23

Although it was not the lead, the Field Artillery School participated in the review and found critical fire support capability gaps. Only four of the five combat observation lasing teams were resourced (personnel) at the specified level in the brigade combat teams. Also, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team required enhanced fire support capabilities. To address the combat observation lasing team gaps, the School recommended finding the additional personnel spaces from “Grow the Army” initiative. Also, the School advised enhancing counterfire in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team by taking spaces from the brigade special troops battalion in the heavy and infantry brigade combat teams. On 25 November 2008 TRADOC endorsed this latter recommendation by adding a fires cell to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team without taking any assets from other sources.24 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study

Late in 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed the Sustainment Center of Excellence at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Centers of Excellence to conduct an analysis to support the Department of the Army development of a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy and implementation plan. As the lead, the Sustainment Center of Excellence set out to examine the operational impact and risk of reducing the brigade objective table of organization tactical wheeled vehicles by ten, twenty, and forty percent respectively within each phase of the Army Force Regeneration cycle. Essentially, the study aimed to determine if the Army had too many trucks, to develop approaches to optimize the number of tactical wheeled vehicles across the Army, and to analyze the risk of reducing tactical wheeled vehicles.25

Although this study which got underway late in 2008 planned to examine light, medium, and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles, it sought to change the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicles strategy and conduct a focused validation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team tactical wheeled vehicle requirements to examine reductions, substitutions, and slight organization modifications. Through 2006 the Vice Chief of the Army approved a strategy based upon the recapitalization of light tactical wheeled vehicles

23Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, subj: Requirements

Determination for the Brigade Combat Team and Armored Cavalry Holistic Review, 25 Nov 08, Doc III-13; Interview, Dastrup with Dan Bankston, Chief, Concepts Division, CDID, 9 Apr 09, Doc III-14.

24Briefing, subj: BCT Holistic Review Update, 24 Oct 08, Doc III-15; Interview, Dastrup with Bankston, 9 Apr 09; Memorandum, subj: Requirements Determination for the Brigade Combat Team and Armored Cavalry Holistic Review, 25 Nov 08.

25Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-16; Briefing, subj: IBCT Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Analysis, 20-22 Jan 09, Doc III-17; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study, 11 Feb 09, Doc III-18.

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(High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles [HMMWV]), the procurement of medium tactical wheeled vehicles, and the recapitalization of heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. Based upon demands from Operation Iraqi Freedom for soldier protection and the limited practical growth of the HMMWV, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy shift in 2007 to procure new light tactical wheeled vehicles, namely the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and to keep as many wartime procured vehicles as possible. From 2007 onwards, however, the tactical wheeled vehicle strategy wrestled with the desire to keep pace with war-time protection demands and the limited ability to afford a new vehicle.26 Future Combat System

In October 1999 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, outlined his vision of the Army’s future. He wanted a full-spectrum, strategically responsive dominant force that would succeed in any type of operation. In response to the vision, the Army began the transformation process with the goal of fielding six Interim Brigade Combat Teams to meet immediate operational needs while implementing the long-term transformation to the Objective Force. This involved acquiring the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), called the Stryker, for the Interim Force and the Future Combat System (FCS) for the Objective Force.27

To field the FCS the Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched a collaborative effort beginning in May 2000 to define and demonstrate future combat systems. The FCS would supplant the IAV as the primary weapon/troop carrying platform for the Objective Force, called Future Force by Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, after 2003. As the centerpiece of the Objective Force/Future Force, FCS would be a family of vehicles with four primary functions -- indirect fire, direct fire, infantry carrier, and sensor -- and would therefore be a system of battlefield capabilities. Ultimately, FCS would make the heavy forces lighter, make the lighter forces more lethal, reduce the logistical demands, function in the operational environment of the future, enable the Objective Force/Future Force to dominate ground combat across the entire spectrum of operations, and enhance their ability to conduct decisive tactical maneuver.28

As Brigadier General (P) Charles A. Cartwright explained in 2005, the Future Combat System would form the core of the Army’s efforts to ensure that the Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team (FBCT) could move, shoot, and communicate better than ever in the Army’s history and better than any opponent that it would face in the twenty-first century. Although the FCS would be composed of eighteen systems, later fourteen systems, bound together by a distributed network, the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), the NLOS Cannon (NLOS-C), and four classes of

26Briefing, subj: Developing a Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy for the Army,

19 Dec 08, Doc III-19; Briefing, subj: Draft IBCT TWV Study, 13 Mar 09, Doc III-20. 272002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 61. 282000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 70; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 61-62.

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), renamed Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in 2007, formed the heart of the future fire support system.29

In 2008 the FCS program underwent key modifications. In the past five years of operations, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) had been in the highest demand. As a result of capability gaps found in the IBCT in 2007 and 2008 as identified in operational needs statements by IBCT commanders, the Army adjusted its FCS program to provide the necessary capabilities to the infantry units first. Using a process known as “spin-outs” developed in 2005, the Army planned to insert new technologies into IBCTs as they became available and decided on 28 June 2008 to accelerate the delivery of new FCS capabilities to the IBCTs in the war zones years ahead of the original schedule. Emerging technologies, such as Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors, NLOS-LS, Network Kits for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, and Ground Soldier Ensemble, would be provided to furnish immediate leap-ahead capabilities to the IBCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan.30

For the Field Artillery School fielding NLOS-LS meant redesigning fire support for the IBCT which was not initially designed for the system, while accelerating fielding of UASs meant stepping up the pace of deciding the proper mix and missions of UASs in the IBCT and how they would communicate with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. Meanwhile, the Army and Field Artillery School initiated action to determine how the FCS would fight and how lethal and nonlethal effects would be integrated into FCS units.31

EQUIPMENT Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile

Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy, the U.S. Army explored the need of adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended

292006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH,

pp. 46-47. 30“Future Combat Systems: Leap-ahead Capabilities Now,” Association of the

United States Army, Aug 08, pp. 1-4, Doc III-21; “Future Combat Systems Restructuring, A Balancing Act,” Army News Service, 9 Feb 07, Doc III-22; “Future Combat Systems: Restructuring A Balancing Act,” American Forces Press Service, 11 Feb 07, Doc III-23; “Army Accelerates Delivery of Future Combat Systems Technologies,” American Forces Press Service, 27 Jun 08, Doc III-24; Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 13 Mar 09, pp. 4, 6, Doc III-25; Interview, Dastrup with Bob Nelson, Concepts Branch, CDID, 9 Apr 09, Doc III-26.

31Interview, Dastrup with Nelson, 9 Apr 09; Memorandum, subj: UAS Sensors and Payloads IPT Meeting, 17-18 Jun 08, 14 Jul 08, Doc III-27.

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ranges (fifty kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would be able it to hit within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for area targets, the Search-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets -- soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support, would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer (XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 with DPICM, in FY 2007 with SADARM, and in FY 2010 with Unitary.32

Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team, caused another shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a school decision paper recommending switching Excalibur’s initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it produced low collateral damage. This caused Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.33

In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using the Global Positioning System and an inertial measurement unit, the Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery’s digitized cannon range from twenty-seven kilometers to thirty-five kilometers with the XM777 towed 155-mm. howitzer under development and the Paladin and fifty plus kilometers with the Crusader under development. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.34

Raytheon’s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various

322004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75. 332000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 34

Ibid., p. 79.

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developmental options with the programs. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur’s airframe was untested whereas TCM’s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that had essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each program. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.35 As the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., wrote on 21 November 2001 about the merger, “It is in the best interests of the Army. . . .”36

The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and the Kingdom of Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of Excalibur with the Sweden providing $57 million.37

Meanwhile, Excalibur went through key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field the Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight 155-mm. Howitzer. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.38

Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral development.”39 Basically, this approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the new program to deliver the

352001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 36Memorandum for Army Acquisition Executive, subj: Merger of Excalibur

XM892 and Trajectory Correctable Munitions Programs, 21 Nov 01, Doc III-85a, 2001 USAFACFS ACH.

372001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 38

Ibid., p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49.

39Email msg with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

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Unitary Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version (Block/Increment I), Unitary Excalibur, would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. A second version (Block/Increment II), enhanced Unitary Excalibur, with more capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. The third version (Block/Increment III) would meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and would be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.40

Meanwhile, development moved forward during 2003-2004. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) Towed 155-mm. Howitzer with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile’s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the systems development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinnay Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. Later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.41

Studies conducted in 2002 and 2003, in the meantime, validated Excalibur development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would fill an existing deficiency -- the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.42

As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and the Guided Multiple-Launch

402002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, p. 62. 412003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 422003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78.

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Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement fully the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 reinforced that Excalibur Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the need for the munition. Ultimately, according to these studies and others, Excalibur and other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the Crusader howitzer to reaffirm the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision munition.43

Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding the munition. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition’s development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating the acquisition program. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia-1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less capability, Increment Ia-2 would be the program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would continue development and be fielded to M777A2 and Paladin units.44

In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent needs statement of August 2004 from Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component Command for a precision guided cannon artillery munition and designated Excalibur as the materiel solution. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany Excalibur.45

Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. On 1 September 2005 the contractor fired two Excalibur projectiles from a Paladin using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS). Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, and completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15 September 2005, the Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting within seven meters of the target to

43

Ibid. 442004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51. 452005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51.

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bring the program a step closer to filling the urgent requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armor Division soldiers by March 2006.46

More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July 2006 fired twenty-two rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the munition’s reliability and lethality when twenty-three out of twenty-five rounds hit within six meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to permit fielding the Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July 2007. The Limited User Test results also satisfied the urgent release requirement and permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground with the M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer, Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of ten meters, allowing material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and testing beginning in 2008.47

Excalibur quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagdad. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired Excalibur Ia-1 (the urgent requirement Excalibur) in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), while Canadian forces had also fired the munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer deployed to Afghanistan.48

Meanwhile in 2008, the Field Artillery School educated commanders of deploying units using New Equipment Training Teams (NETT). During 2008, it trained units on the benefits and terminal effects of Excalibur Ia-1 and completed training its twenty-ninth battalion. For example, NETTs explained that the munition had to be fired at a high angle to achieve the maximum range and optimal flight path to perform terminal maneuver to achieve a near vertical angle of attack. As it neared the target, the projectile oriented itself to a near-perpendicular angle of fall to optimize the lethal effects on the intended target. This characteristic made Excalibur Ia-1 an ideal solution for engagements in complex and urban settings because it created a minimal amount of collateral damage. Also, Excalibur Ia-1 had roughly the same explosive power as an M107 high-explosive projectile. Because of its near-perpendicular angle of descent, it

462005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56. 472006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; Interview,

Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18 Feb 09, Doc III-28. 48Email with atch, subj: XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile

2008, 30 Mar 09, Doc III-29; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56.

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furnished several orders of magnitude more lethality and more uniform detonation pattern. Excalibur Ia-1 had the ability to penetrate four inches of reinforced concrete which was the thickness of the typical load-bearing roof and could penetrate and detonate with devastating lethality.49 Precision Guidance Kit

Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types of such munitions, such as the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for such munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces, often occupying positions in or near populated areas; enemy forces limited the Americans’ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions with SADARM becoming the preferred killing munition for cannon artillery.50

Recognizing that SADARM was expensive, the Army initiated a search for less expensive precision munitions. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study, to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions, and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within twenty-four to thirty-six months.51

Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that CCF/PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development CCF/PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and by FY 2010 with the second increment that would represent the full

49Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18 Feb

09; LTC Noel D. Grubb and Mark W. Belcher, “Excalibur: New Precision Engagement Asset in the Warfight,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 14-15, Doc III-30; Briefing, subj: Excalibur/PEFCS/EPLIAFS NET/DTT - FY07-FY08, undated, Doc III-31; Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09, Doc III-32; Email with atch, subj: XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile 2008, 30 Mar 09.

502004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58.

51Ibid.

74

performance fuse.52 In 2005 USAFACFS explained that the Precision Guidance Kit, a low-cost, fuse-

size module, intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System (GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would reduce the amount of ammunition required for missions. Basically, the PGK would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work, forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing and approval which came on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.53

As of late 2006, the Army planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point-detonating and proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of fifty meters or less, and would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism with fielding in FY 2010. The follow-on increments would provide additional capabilities. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming, improve delivery accuracy to thirty meters, add delay and GPS time-fuse functions, address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants, and be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.54

In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005 the Program Executive Officer, Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with developing the kit, the Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term solution and awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development with a shoot off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for development of Increment I with an accuracy of fifty meters circular error probable. Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off by meeting the accuracy requirements of less than or equal to fifty meter circular error probable. Eighteen of their rounds impacted within thirty meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer, Ammo approved and signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit PGK to enter

52

Ibid, pp. 58-59. 532005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52.

54Ibid., p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58.

75

the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition. Subsequently, Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant Techsystems an eighteen-month System Development and Demonstration contract on 18 May 2007 to proceed with development of the PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive and testing in 2009. In the meantime, the Army anticipated fielding to start in 2010 with purchases running through 2013.55

In 2008 the PGK program outlined three PGK projectiles. PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high explosive. PGK Increment II for 155-mm. high explosive and 105-mm. high explosive, and PGK Increment III for the Non-line of Sight Cannon.56 Future Cannon Munitions Suite

To upgrade existing 105/155-mm. munitions to meet the Army’s transformation objectives and to modernize the U.S. Army’s stockpile of cannon munitions, developmental efforts moved forward in 2005-2008 with the Future Cannon Munitions Suite (formerly Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program) which would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles and would be capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as nonlethal, multi-spectral smoke, and infra-red illumination. During those years, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) in 2006, developed a capabilities production development document for a 105-mm. IM High Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (Pff) round for staffing which the Department of the Army approved on 18 July 2007, and projected fielding in 2010. The U.S. Marine Corps approved the 155-mm. insensitive munition, high-explosive munition in July 2007. One year later on 31 October 2008, the Army approved the 105/155-mm. infra-red illumination capabilities documents. One of the top priorities for the Commanding General of Fort Sill, the Pff round would be an insensitive munition, meaning that it would not detonate unexpectedly by a spark or rough handling, would be filled with 9,300 3-mm. tungsten balls, and would be used against soft and light-skinned targets. 57 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon

In October 1999 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, outlined his vision of the Army’s future. He wanted a full-spectrum, strategically responsive dominant force that would succeed in any type of operation. In response to

552006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58. 56Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18 Feb

09, Doc III-33; Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09, Doc III-34; Email with atch, subj: XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile 2008, 30 Mar 09, Doc III-29.

572005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18 Feb 09, Doc III-35 ; Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09, Doc III-36; Email with atch, subj: XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile 2008, 30 Mar 09, Doc III-29.

76

the vision, the Army began the transformation process with the goal of fielding six Interim Brigade Combat Teams to meet immediate operational needs while implementing the long-term transformation to the Objective Force. This involved acquiring the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), called the Stryker, for the Interim Force and the Future Combat System (FCS) for the Objective Force, called Future Force by the Chief of Staff of the Army after 2003.58

To field the FCS the Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched a collaborative effort beginning in May 2000 to define and demonstrate future combat systems. The FCS would supplant the IAV as the primary weapon/troop carrying platform for the Objective Force. As the centerpiece of the Objective Force, FCS would be a family of vehicles and would have four primary functions -- indirect fire, direct fire, infantry carrier, and sensor -- and would therefore be a system of battlefield capabilities. Additionally, the FCS would replace the seventy-ton Abrams tank, would have the same lethality and crew survivability as the Abrams tank, would be fifty tons lighter, and would be critical for creating the objective force that was expected to be formed beginning in 2008-2012. Ultimately, FCS would make heavy forces lighter, make lighter forces more lethal, reduce logistical demands, function in the operational environment of the future, enable the Objective Force’s Units of Action to dominate ground combat across the entire spectrum of operations, and enhance their ability to conduct decisive tactical maneuver.59

Although the FCS remained in the conceptual exploration phase of development in 2001, the Army worked out more details concerning the program in cooperation with industry.60 In the Mission Needs Statement of November 2001, the Army wrote, “The FCS is the networked systems of systems that will serve as the core building block within all maneuver . . . echelons to develop overmatching combat power, sustainability, agility, and versatility necessary for full spectrum military operations.”61 The FCS would revolve around a family of platforms of advanced, networked space-, air-, and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems that would include manned and unmanned platforms with the largest being lighter than current mechanized systems, even though functional and tactical requirements would be achieved by a single vehicle system or platform. The Army intended an indirect fire system to be part of the FCS endeavor.62

When the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld terminated the Crusader 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer development program in May 2002, he directed the Army to accelerate development of the FCS Cannon, properly known as the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) Cannon, and provided the funds saved with the termination of Crusader to

582002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 61. 592000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 70; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 61-62. 602001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 70-71. 61Mission Need Statement (Extract), FCS, 2 Nov 01, Doc III-49, 2001

USAFACFS ACH. 62

Ibid., p. 71.

77

evaluate developing a FCS cannon system to support the Objective Force.63 Out of this tasking emerged a concept technology demonstration program with United Defense and General Dynamics as principle contractors to examine technological possibilities to furnish a material solution for the NLOS Cannon, to deliver Block One capability by Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, and to develop a strategy to achieve the objective solution. Within six months the Army completed a study to determine the NLOS Cannon’s requirements. Tentative requirements as of December 2002 established a maximum range of thirty to forty kilometers, a minimum range of three to four kilometers, a rate of fire of six to ten rounds a minute, automated ammunition handling, interoperability with all Unit of Action and Unit of Employment systems, and C-130 deployable. The Army also noted that the NLOS Cannon had to employ all current and developmental munitions.64

Late in 2002 and early in 2003, the Army outlined various options to field Block One. Initially, the Army had four potential variants for the NLOS Cannon -- a track and wheeled 105-mm. howitzer and a track and wheeled 155-mm. howitzer. While either caliber was viable, either tracks or wheels were also viable. However, the Army planned to select the best features of the existing designs to field a demonstrator by October 2003 that would serve as the basis of the Block One NLOS Cannon.65

To develop the demonstrator by the October 2003 deadline, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School merged the four variants early in 2003 based upon additional study to produce one option -- a 155-mm. caliber weapon system with a band track. On 29 January 2003 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Michael D. Maples, explained the rationale for the merger. A single piece of steel reinforced rubber that would replace the conventional articulated steel tracks, the band track offered increased mobility over wheeled versions during cross-country operations, would be lighter than a wheeled variant, and would meet the FCS operational requirements document requirement for highway speed. The 155-mm. caliber would provide better force effectiveness, greater lethality, and more munition types.66 General Maples cautioned in January 2003, “This action is not a recommendation to make a final decision on caliber or chassis design. We will continue to work with the materiel developer, the Lead System Integrator, and the TRADOC community to analyze requirements and investigate the best overall materiel solution.”67

Within a few months the contractor, United Defense Industries, Inc., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, developed a demonstrator NLOS Cannon and tested it over several years at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The demonstrator featured an XM777 155-mm. towed howitzer tube mounted on a platform that had been designed by United Defense’s Ground Systems Division of San Jose, California, a fully automated ammunition loading system, and a magazine that was capable of holding twenty-four, one

632002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 642002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 652002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 63. 66

Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81. 67Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: FCS Cannon Demonstrator, 29 Jan 03,

Doc III-61, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

78

hundred-pound projectiles. The platform used an advanced band-track system and was propelled by a hybrid electric diesel engine to provide improved mobility performance and reduce fuel consumption. In August 2003 the demonstrator successfully fired its first round. Two months later in October 2003, the demonstrator successfully completed four, five-round missions at six rounds per minute and later finished several other missions at a slower rate of fire. Two years later in April 2005, the demonstrator fired its one thousandth test round to display the cannon’s potential.68

As development of the demonstrator that was serving as a proof-of-principle test-bed for NLOS Cannon moved forward, the Army acknowledged in March 2003 the difficulty of designing a NLOS Cannon that would be deployable by a C-130 aircraft and searched for satisfactory compromises. Full compliance with FCS operational requirements would produce a cannon that would far exceed the weight restriction of twenty tons and would not be C-130 deployable. In view of this, the Army conducted numerous analyses during the rest of 2003 to find a design that would meet the transportability requirements but would retain the desired combat requirements. Suggested design compromises, for example, eliminated automated resupply, reduced the caliber of the 155-mm. tube to decrease the range capability, proposed a 105-mm. tube, limited armor, and deployed the cannon with a limited amount of fuel and ammunition on board, among other compromises. As might be expected, the Army found these compromises to be unsatisfactory.69

In view of this, the Army formed a team of experts from government and private industry in December 2003 to examine capability versus transportability. Emerging results in January 2004 revealed significant shortfalls in expected capabilities of C-130 transportable platforms. It became clear that some requirements had to be modified to achieve C-130 transportability.70

Discussion on transportability continued through the rest of 2004. The twenty-ton weight limitation meant adding kits, such as additional armor, to the NLOS Cannon to make it combat ready within four to six hours to meet the material handling equipment requirement. In other words, the cannon had to be combat ready within six hours after offloading from a C-130. Noting that NLOS Cannon could not make the weight limitation of twenty tons (the initial objective weight limit for the NLOS Cannon and other FCS manned ground vehicles) and that the cannon had to be full combat capable ready upon offloading, the Program Manager for Future Combat System, Unit of Action, Brigadier General Charles Cartwright, advocated a twenty-four ton weight limitation and stopped work on the twenty-ton version in November 2004 to work on the twenty-four ton version with TRADOC concurrence.71

682003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. pp. 57-58. The

demonstrator has been incorrectly called a prototype. It is not the prototype cannon. The actual prototype is scheduled to be delivered to Yuma Proving Ground in the summer of 2007.

692003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 81-82; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58. 702003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82. 712004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence

79

In May 2004 the Army and Field Artillery School, in the meantime, made a key decision on the caliber of the NLOS Cannon. Based upon careful analysis, they opted for a thirty-eight caliber, 155-mm. howitzer tube. The 155-mm. howitzer tube was fifty-eight percent more effective against personnel targets than the 105-mm. tube under consideration and eighty-two percent more effective against materiel targets than a 105-mm. tube. Also, the Army and Field Artillery School selected the thirty-eight caliber tube over the longer thirty-nine caliber tube, trading four kilometers of range using the M549 rocket-assisted projectile, to save 1,367 pounds. This would make the NLOS Cannon C-130 deployable with about twenty-five percent of its basic load of ammunition and still satisfy the NLOS Cannon operational requirements document objectives that specified performance and force effectiveness for transportability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.72

As the Army examined the transportability and the caliber issues, it restructured the Future Combat System program to meet congressional guidance and to get the new technology to the force faster. The restructuring would mature and accelerate the most critical and promising technologies within the Future Combat System program to enable the Army to incorporate technological developments into the force as new technologies matured and to permit inserting Future Combat System technology into the brigade combat teams, formerly called Units of Action. To accomplish this, the Army slowed down development on manned Future Combat System variants and accelerated work on unmanned variants.73

Congressional direction also influenced the development of NLOS Cannon. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 appropriation legislation Congress mandated delivering the cannon in 2008 and reiterated the same delivery date one year later. In FY 2005, however, Congress directed the Army to deliver NLOS Cannon for testing 2008 and fielding in 2010 as part of the Future Combat System and to develop it independently of the Future Combat System if the Future Combat System could not achieve the 2010 fielding. To meet this guidance the Army decided in 2005 to boost the number of NLOS Cannon Increment 0 prototypes from three to six and later in 2006 increased the number to eight for developmental testing. The Army also chose to field a variant of the early prototype NLOS Cannon in 2010 for developmental and operational testing, to make an initial production decision in 2012, and to field NLOS Cannon in 2014 at the same time as the remainder of the manned ground variants of the Future Combat System. In fact, NLOS Cannon became the lead manned FCS ground vehicle variant.74

During 2005, key developments occurred. In October 2005 the lead system integrator held an industry day to solicit ideas for the NLOS Cannon resupply vehicle from industry. When the ideas came back late in the year, the Army established June 2006 for the completion of the statement of work and request for proposal and planned to issue construction bids in November 2006. Later in December 2005, the contractor

____________________ and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 61.

72Ibid.; p. 69.

73Ibid.

74Ibid.; 69-70; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 62.

80

started building the firing platform for integration on a surrogate chassis in the fall of 2006.75

Progress on fielding NLOS Cannon continued. Early in 2006, the Army completed a draft request for proposal to design an automated Large Caliber Ammunition Resupply capability that would be used by the FCS mortar, FCS mounted cannon system, and the NLOS Cannon and held an industry day on 30 August 2006 for interested companies to examine the draft Large Caliber Ammunition Resupply vehicle proposal upon which to base their bids. Three companies offered proposals, and the Army accepted all three and awarded them contracts to help refine the requirement and assist the Army in determining the technical feasibility.76

Meanwhile, on 29 September 2006 the contractor, BAE Systems, unveiled the NLOS Cannon firing platform at its Land and Armament division in Minneapolis. Made of a combination of high-strength steel and aluminum, the platform incorporated a cannon assembly. Subsequently, the contractor delivered the platform to Yuma Proving Ground on 6 October 2006, fired the first round from the NLOS Cannon platform on 23 October 2006, and geared for testing in 2007 and 2008.77

Work on NLOS Cannon progressed well in 2007. Between January 2007 and April 2007 the cannon successfully completed stability assessment. Subsequently, the NLOS Cannon working group completed a draft NLOS Cannon Capability Production Document in August 2007 and submitted it to TRADOC and other stakeholders two months later in October 2007. Other notable accomplishments included a rate of fire demonstration, Army command and control system testing, and Excalibur firing. Also, integration of early prototype chassis and mission modules began for vehicle deliveries in the summer of 2008. While all of this was transpiring, the NLOS firing platform had fired 1,150 rounds as of 31 December 2007.78

Meanwhile, Congressional funding reductions for the FCS program in 2007 prompted the Army to reset its modernization efforts, to reduce the number of FCS platforms from eighteen and fourteen, and to extend the timeline for buying and fielding them to stay within budget. For example, at the original Milestone B approval, the first FCS brigade combat team would have achieved initial operational capability in 2010 with the prototype NLOS cannons delivered in 2008. Although the new FCS brigade combat team fielding schedule was still being worked on, overview briefings on the schedule in 2007 showed that the first FCS brigade combat team’s initial operational capability would be 2014 with full operational capability in 2017, that the NLOS Cannon was still the lead variant in the FCS family of systems, that the cannon would have a common chassis with the FCS family of vehicles and have similar interoperability, mobility, and survivability characteristics, and that the cannon leveraged work done with the Crusader

752005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 59-60; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 62. 762007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 62; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence

and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 59-60. 772007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 782007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 63.

81

program.79 In 2008 NLOS Cannon passed crucial milestones. BAE Systems placed the

NLOS Cannon on the Manned Ground Vehicle to complete the first prototype and showed it for the first time at the National Mall, Washington, D.C., in June 2008. The Manned Ground Vehicle was the common platform for the eight FCS variants upon which a unique mission module was placed. BAE took this prototype through final laboratory testing before it went to the Army test site in August 2008. Using this prototype, the Army fired the first round on 17 September 2008, fired fifteen more missions, continued testing through the rest of the year, and planned to receive four more prototypes (P4, P5, P6, and P7) in 2009 for testing. These prototypes would then be put through rigorous testing to ensure meeting performance requirements as well as core program tactical firing table and mobility testing. Concurrently as component technologies were developed, they would be incorporated into the NLOS Cannon to improve its performance and maintain a high level of commonality with other FCS vehicles. In the meantime, P3 prototype went through limited mobility testing at Santa Anna, California, where its hybrid electric drive and high power diesel engine demonstrated phenomenal mobility.80

In the meantime, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, reaffirmed NLOS Cannon’s importance. As of December 2008, the Army had programmed NLOS Cannon to support fifteen Future Brigade Combat Teams and was considering it for the Striker Brigade Combat Team. General Vangjel added, “It it therefore imperative that we support NLOS-C. . . .”81 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer

When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward-deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army’s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons were more strategically and tactically deployable than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps also planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer

792007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 63. 80Briefing, subj: Cannon Smart Book, 30 Jan 09, Doc III-37; BAE Information

Paper, 13 Jun 08, Doc III-38; BAE Information Paper, undated, Doc III-39; BAE Information Paper, 13 Jun 08; BAE Information Paper, 6 Oct 08, Doc III-40; FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 Dec 08, Doc III-41; Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon Apr 09, 6 Apr 09, Doc III-42.

81FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 Dec 08, Doc III-43.

82

(LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Pica tinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements and to add digital capabilities later, while the Army chose to introduce a digitized LW155 which would take longer to field.82

After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and 2001. Unveiled at Pica tinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held out great promise. The howitzer’s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deploy ability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of thirty kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.83

Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.84 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user’s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.85

In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment test of the XM777 from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty-Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California; to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in the Joint Operational Requirements Document of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately four thousand rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and other minor equipment problems, it met its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making

822003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

83Ibid., pp. 64-65.

84Ibid., p. 65.

852000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65.

83

satisfactory progress.86 Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of

May-June 2002, the Navy held a Milestone C decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of ninety-four howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development of the XM777.87 After this decision had been made, the contractor delivered its first U.S.-built, pilot-production EMD XM777 from its Hattiesburg, Mississippi, facility for testing.88

More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s LW155 distinguished the Army’s howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000. After analyzing six proposals from private industry, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army’s LW155 from the basic LW155 (type classified as the M777 in 2003) for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated it as the XM777E1 (type classified as the M777E1 in 2003) and made the Army the lead agency.89 With the emergence of the M777E1, two LW155 programs existed -- the M777 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities and the M777E1 with digital capabilities.90

In 2001 a critical problem unexpectedly challenged the viability of the TAD program. Early in the year, the Army realized that it had underestimated program costs and lacked the funding to continue. This caused the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, to ask the Army for additional funding and to examine the possibility of terminating the TAD program and restarting it. The Army subsequently increased the existing funding of $52

86

Ibid., p. 65. 87

Ibid., pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84. 882002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66. 892000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67. 90

Ibid., p. 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72.

84

million by almost $22 million. When a second funding problem was identified in the summer of 2001, all parties involved in the program concurred that it would be impossible to get more money so soon after the increase in the spring of 2001. As a result, General Yakovac gave the Program Manager and the Field Artillery School ninety days to find a solution. If they failed to provide a solution, he planned to terminate the program and to try to restart it correctly. In response to the tasking, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, searched for ways to continue work on TAD because of the need to digitize towed artillery and to abandon wire and aiming circles and even suggested taking a block approach at the minimum to develop the TAD but retired before a final decision was reached.91

After succeeding General Stricklin in August 2001, Major General Michael D. Maples evaluated three different courses of action for TAD. He could recommend terminating and restarting the program, funding a block approach, or pushing for a full development program. Each had strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing that terminating and restarting the program ran the risk of losing all funding and presented other problems, General Maples rejected it. Pushing for the full TAD also presented the possibility of losing the entire program because of funding issues. As a result, General Maples opted for a two-block approach. Based upon XVIII Airborne Corps Airborne/Air Assault package requirements, Block One TAD would have objective hardware and limited software to provide limited communication capabilities with the fire direction center and would be fielded in 2006. Block Two TAD would be the objective hardware and objective software and would be fielded sometime after Block One had been introduced. Late in the fall of 2001, General Yakovac accepted the block approach but cautioned the Field Artillery School and General Maples that funding constraints might force them to live with only Block One. Even so, work began on Block One hardware and software late in 2001 with a successful early user assessment held in July 2002.92

In July 2002 General Maples reiterated the significance of TAD on his cover memorandum to the revised JORD that was later approved by TRADOC in September 2002.93 “The XM777E1 version of the LW155, with its embedded Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package will increase these forces’ [Marine Corps field artillery units, and Army light, medium, and special purpose forces] strategic deployability, lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility,” he wrote the Commander of TRADOC on 30 July 2002 subsequent to the XM777E1 early users test of 16-18 July 2002 where a mockup TAD-equipped howitzer was well received by Army and Marine Corps personnel. The successful completion of the TAD detailed design review on 30 October 2002 allowed moving into building and testing actual TAD components and software.94

Following the Milestone C low-rate initial production decision in November 2002 and the TAD design review, the program shifted focus to the TAD-equipped M777E1. The Army and Marine Corps began aggressively pursuing efforts to combine future

912001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89. 92

Ibid., p. 89; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68. 93

Ibid., p. 68. 94

Ibid.

85

M777 and M777E1 testing with the objective of a single system operational test late in FY 2004.95

In 2003 development moved forward. In February 2003 the contractor delivered the first of two pre-production XM777s. Initially intended by the contractor to help transfer construction technology and expertise from the United Kingdom to the new factory in Hattiesburg, these systems proved vital in combining M777 and M777E1 testing during the year. Subsequently, the contractor rebuilt three XM777s with TADS. These systems were used for electro-environmental effects, wear, fatigue, blast overpressure, extreme cold weather, software, and other testing during the year. In July 2003 the government and contractor started integrating the Excalibur 155-mm. projectile with the M777 by firing seven ballistic simulator rounds successfully. Altogether, the four LW155s (one M777 and three M777E1s) passed their respective tests during the year. Based upon this, the Marine Corps and Army held an operational test readiness review in December 2003. At that time all parties agreed that the system was sufficiently mature to begin operational test and evaluation.96

In 2004 the Marine Corps and Army conducted a four-phase Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) to determine the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the M777 and M777E1 with both the TAD Digital Fire Control System and the onboard conventional Optical Fire Control. With the TAD Digital Fire Control System turned off, both services considered the M777E1 with onboard conventional Optical Fire Control to be representative of the base M777. From 14 January 2004 to 3 March 2004, they carried out the Arctic phase at Fort Greeley, Alaska, using a pilot production M777E1 with TAD Digital Fire Control System which was the most advanced of the EMD howitzers to determine system’s ability to operate in cold weather. Five months later from 25 August 2004 to 24 October 2004, they held the temperate phase at Twenty Nine Palms, California, using the low-rate initial production howitzer. Subsequently, the Marine Corps and Army carried out the amphibious phase at Camp Pendleton, California, from 25 October 2004 to 31 October 2004 and the Port Operations phase at Naval Station, San Diego, California, on 1 November 2004. With the exception of the Arctic phase, the other phases employed the low-rate initial production howitzer. Altogether, test crews fired over twelve thousand rounds. Along with other tests, this successful operational test and evaluation prompted both services to determine that the M777 and M777E1 were operational effective and operational suitable.97

In the meantime, the M777E1 and M777A1 (the type classified designation for the LW155) passed other significant milestones. Early in 2004, it successfully completed an airdrop test, a software test, a mobility test, and a logistics test. Late in 2004, Fort Sill received three M777A1s and began standing up a new equipment training team, scheduled to be activated early in 2005.98

95

Ibid., pp. 68-69; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86. 96

Ibid. 972004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74. 98

Ibid., p. 74; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of

86

The Marines and Army also made programmatic decisions in 2004-2005. During the latter months of 2004, the JORD went through Joint Requirements Oversight Council staffing beginning with the Force Application Board on 26 October 2004, the Functional Capabilities Board on 2 November on 2004, and the Joint Capabilities Board on 2 December 2004. Upon reviewing the program, the Joint Capabilities Board recommended a “paper” Joint Requirements Oversight Council that subsequently approved the Operational Requirements Document on 31 January 2005. Shortly afterward on 23 February 2005, the Program Manager briefed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Littoral and Mine Warfare (Roger Smith), the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems (Kevin M. Fahey), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Acquisition (John J. Young), and others on the M777 and M777A1 programs, the results of the Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation, and the program’s readiness to enter into full-rate production. On 21 March 2005 the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems approved full-rate production of the TAD for the Army.99

Meanwhile, fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in the Marine Corps. The MOT&E guns were refurbished and issued as training assets to the Marine Detachments at the Field Artillery School and the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first live fire of the M777 and received fifty-five of the planned ninety-four M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial operational capability with the M777. Meantime, six M777s were field to the Canadian Army in response to an urgent foreign military sales request which in turn shipped four to Afghanistan in January 2006 and fired their first mission with the howitzer on 17 February 2006. Based upon the successes with the M777s in 2006, the Canadian Army asked in 2007 to buy thirty-six more to augment their existing twelve M777s, while the Australian army asked for thirty two.100

Work on the software for the TAD and hardware moved forward in 2006. The Block One software for the M777A1 successfully completed its testing in April 2006. Simultaneously, effort focused on improved Block IA software that would provide Joint Variable Message Format messaging between the howitzer and the fire direction center and would enable the howitzer to program the XM982 Precision Guided Projectile. A Block IA software dry-run readiness review was conducted on 28 March 2006, leading to a Block IA software dry run test from April through July 2006. A Block IA record test readiness review was conducted on 31 July 2006 with record testing from August through September 2006. During the Block IA tests, the contractor and the Army verified the

____________________ Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 64.

992005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64. 100

Ibid., pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67.

87

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS) 6.4.0.1 software functionality with the M777A2 and the XM982 Excalibur projectile. The final software test of the year, the Government Confidence Demonstration of September-October 2006 held at Fort Sill established the interoperability of AFATDS Block IA software, Excalibur, and the M777 using two fully configured M777A2s and five simulated M777A2 howitzers. On 6 November 2006 six XM982 Excalibur guided projectiles and twelve M795 conventional projectiles with M767/M767A1 inductively set fuses were successfully fired from an M777A2 at Yuma Proving Ground as part of an Excalibur end-to-end demonstration to prove out the linkages from AFATDS to the M777A2 to the EPIAFS fuse setter and finally to the XM982 and fuses. Based on this, Headquarters, U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Life Cycle Management Command certified Block IA software for ready use on 9 November 2006. As software testing progressed, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer at the Yuma Proving Ground in September-October 2006. Together, the successful Block I software testing and the successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.101

Concurrent with these testing activities, maintenance and operator training began with the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. During August 2006, a new equipment training team provided maintenance training that was followed by operator training in September 2006 and a live-fire exercise at Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island of Hawaii in October 2006. In November and December 2006 after their return to Schofield Barracks, the howitzers and prime movers were retrofitted from the M777 to the M777A1 configuration in December 2006. This retrofit was followed by M777A1 training in January and February 2007.102

Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated M777A2 (Excalibur version of the system) testing and fielding. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired the first Excalibur from the M777A2. This led to full material release for the M777A2-Excalibur system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S. Marine Corps on 7 September 2007 and fielding to the 3rd, 321st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in July 2007 and upgrading the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment in August 2007. By the end of the year, 3rd Battalion, 321st Regiment was deployed to Afghanistan, and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, and four Marine M777A2 batteries, including 3rd, 11th Marines, were deployed to Iraq.103

Fielding the M777A2 continued into 2008. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, the 1st Battalion, 108th Field Artillery Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment, and the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment received their

1012006 USAFCOEFS ACH, P. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66. 1022006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 68. 1032007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; Email with atch, subj: FCOE Big Events

2008, 23 Feb 09, Doc III-44.

88

howitzers.104 Meanwhile, other crucial developments occurred. B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st

Field Artillery Regiment and the Marine Corps conducted the first joint operational M777A2 air assault using the howitzer and the Marine Corps V-22 Osprey aircraft on 29 May 2008. Subsequently on 2 July 2008, B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment conducted the first operational airdrop of the howitzer. Later, the 1st Battalion, 108th Field Artillery Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard conducted familiarization live firing at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, on 20 July 2008 to complete its new equipment training and become the first Army National Guard to receive and fire the howitzer. On 22 November 2008 the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Drum, New York, completed new equipment training just prior to deploying in a “deviation” fielding directly to an IBCT fires battalion. In the meantime, C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment, fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and later, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery fired the first Excalibur in Operation Iraqi Freedom from the howitzer on 26 April 2008.105 Current Cannon Programs

M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer. Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements. They included a cold weather recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by the LASIP Block I and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February 2005.106

104Email with atch, subj: FCOE Big Events 2008; Draft LW155 Fielding Plan,

undated, Doc III-45. 105Email with atch, subj: 2008 FCOE Big Events, 23 Feb 09; Email, subj: Excal,

25 Feb 08, Doc III-46; Email, subj: Ft. Bragg - Successful Drop Mission, 3 Jul 08, Doc III-47; Email, subj: M777, 8 Jul 08, Doc III-48; Email, subj: Notes, 13 Oct 08, Doc III-49; Briefing (Extract), subj: 3-321 FAR V-22 Sling Load/Raid Training, undated, Doc III-50; Email, subj: 3/10 LW155, 17 Oct 08, Doc III-51; Email with atch, subj: Lightweight 155 and M119 2008, 6 Mar 09, Doc III-52.

1062000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65.

2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 66.

89

With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm. howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm. howitzers. However, in August 2004, the GOSC, pressured by the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), re-evaluated the situation and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the shortages. Shortly after, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102 howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.107

Two secondary issues soon emerged. First, the Army had insufficient tow kits for the M1097 HMMWV, the howitzer’s prime mover. Together, a search for missing tow kits that recovered some limited production of tow kits late in 2005 allowed fielding new units to continue. Ultimately, testing proved the capability of the standard 4,200-pound HMMWV bumper to tow the M119A2 safely; and in November 2006 the tow kit was declared no longer required. Second, the Army’s decision to up-armor all HMMWVs halved their payload capacity, causing the Army to begin looking for a different prime mover.108

Operations in Afghanistan in the meantime magnified known limitations with the M119 series howitzer. Extensive efforts were undertaken by the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), formerly the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), the Program Manager, and Rock Island Arsenal to address base plates being damaged by continuous high charge, high-angle firing. This same condition brought to light problems with the M187A1 fire control mount. To ease the stress on the howitzers caused by firing charge 8 M913 Extended Range high-explosive projectile at high angles, the Army rushed the new M927 Extensive Range high-explosive projectile to the theater of operations.109

Meanwhile, in July 2007 the Army initiated first article testing and production qualification testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for the M119A2. Concurrently, rebuilt howitzers were fielded to the 1-6th Field Artillery of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain), Fort Drum, New York. Delays caused by problems with the howitzer recuperator that arose during testing moved fielding back from June 2007 to October 2007.110

Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008, while new equipment training teams converted five battalions to the M119A2 in 2008. Over a period of eight months, the teams trained the 1-141st Field Artillery of the Louisiana Army National Guard, the 2-122th Field Artillery of the Illinois Army National Guard, the 1-133rd Field Artillery of the Texas

1072005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 1082006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 109

Ibid. 110

Ibid.

90

Army National Guard, the 1-107th Field Artillery of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, and the 1-118th Field Artillery of the Georgia Army National Guard using new production weapons. Delivery of M119A2 howitzers to the units was scheduled to take place in 2009.111

Meanwhile, another critical issue arose with the M119A2 in 2006. With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 and the phasing out of the M102 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer, the M109A5 Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, and the M198 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap between the Infantry Brigade Combat Team and Heavy Brigade Combat Team because the latter would have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also preclude the howitzer from using Excalibur-like precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit that would convert dumb munitions into precision munitions. The lack of precision in turn would lead to less accuracy and make dispersed operations more difficult to perform. In view of this, the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) took steps to develop the requirements and acquire the funds for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the M777. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) that had been signed on 15 June 2007, the Field Artillery School issued a request for information to digitize the M119A2. Input was used to refine the MCP requirements and subsequently to develop a digitization strategy.112

Work on digitizing the M119A2 continued into 2008. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the USAFCOEFS, Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and the Army G8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin on digitizing the M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks -- Block One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle velocity management), noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware had caused the initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012, but pointed out that the delay would enable pulling forward key capabilities that were originally scheduled for delivery in FY 2013. Meanwhile, a preliminary design review was conducted on 10 June 2008 and another one in December 2008.113

111Weekly Significant Activities Report, 14 Jun 08, Doc III-53; Memorandum,

subj: Full Materiel Release of the M119A2 105-mm. Towed Light Howitzer, 10 Jun 08, Doc III-54; Email with atch, subj: 2008 FCOE Big Events, 23 Feb 09, Doc III-55; Briefing (Extract), subj: IBCT M119A2 Fieldings, 9 Oct 08, Doc III-56; Information Paper, subj: M119A2 NET VIP Day, 7 Aug 08, Doc III-57; Weekly Significant Activities Report, 14 Jun 08, Doc III-58.

112Ibid., pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70.

113Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TCM Cannon, 3 Mar 09, Doc III-59;

91

As this planning moved forward, the 4-25th Field Artillery and the 2-319th Field Artillery participated in Early User Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and November 2008 respectively. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding of operational considerations to the engineers.114

Paladin Integrated Management Program. In the fall of 2007 the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) -- the M109A6 Self-Propelled 155-mm. Howitzer (Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) -- through the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army approved the capabilities production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109 FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms, and initiated testing in 2008.115

The Army intended PIM program to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sustainability of the platforms out to 2060. The upgrade would also permit the Paladin to fire the Excalibur precision munition and fuses, such as the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK). Operationally, PIM would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more easily sustainable, and more lethal. However, sustainment was the number one reason for PIM. To achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat System Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the heavy brigade combat team’s (HBCT) Bradley fighting vehicle. For example the PIM

____________________ Weekly Significant Activities Report, 26 Jan 08, Doc III-60; Memorandum for Record, subj: M119A2 Howitzer Digitization, 28 Jan 08, Doc III-61; Email with atch, subj: 2009 Big Events, 23 Feb 09; Trip Report, 9-12 Jun 08, Doc III-62; Weekly Significant Activities Report, 4 Oct 08, Doc III-63; Briefing, subj: M119A2 105-mm. Towed Howitzer, 2 Oct 08, Doc III-64; Email, subj: EUA 1.1 Trip Report, 14 Nov 08, Doc III-65; Briefing, subj: Delta System Requirements Review/System Concept Review, 16 Dec 08, Doc III-66; Email with atch, subj: Lightweight 155 and M119 2008, 6 Mar 09.

114Email with atch, subj: 2009 Big Events, 23 Feb 09; Weekly Significant Activities Report, 15 Nov 08, Doc III-67; Trip Report, 16-19 Sep 08, Doc III-68; Email with atch, subj: Lightweight 155 and M119 2008, 6 Mar 09.

1152007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; BAE Information Paper, 15 May 08, Doc III-69; BAE Information Paper, 14 Mar 08, Doc III-70; FA Themes, Messages, and Talking Points (Extract), 29 May 08, Doc III-71; Email with atch, subj: PIM Apr 09, 6 Apr 09, Doc III-72; BAE Fact Sheet, subj: BAE Systems Receives $21.8 million Contract Modification from U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command for the Design and Development of M109A6 PIM Vehicles, 15 May 08; BAE Fact Sheet, subj: PIM OCV, undated, Doc III-73; BAE Fact Sheet, subj: PIM OCV, undated, Doc III-74; MAJ Corey B. Chassé, “PIM: The Next Generation Paladin,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 08, pp. 12-13, Doc III-75.

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would use the Bradley’s engine and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the NLOS Cannon including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field around 2012, the PIM M109 FOV would give the heavy brigade combat team upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of accurate and timely fires.116

The M109 FOV successfully completed two milestone decisions during 2008 which included the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews. Upon successful completion of these reviews, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of FY 2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the Milestone C decision currently scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of the Milestone C decision, the program would move forward into Low-Rate Initial Production and produce limited quantities of the vehicles. Once delivered to the field around 2012, the PIM M109 FOV would give the Heavy Brigade Combat Team upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of accurate and timely fires.117 Multiple-Launch Rocket System

Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2008 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision and fielding them. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including MLRS. Also, the high dud rate of munitions, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate led to the requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket with a range of forty-five kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A forty-five kilometer range would increase the commander’s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews.118

After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS rocket with the M77 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) with a standard fuse in 2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Desert Storm in limited quantities, it turned its developmental efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under

1162007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; BAE Information Paper, 15 May 08; BAE Information Paper, 14 Mar 08; Email with atch, subj: PIM Apr 09, 6 Apr 09.

117Email with atch, subj: PIM Apr 09, 6 Apr 09. 1182000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87.

93

development and could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free-flight MLRS rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket’s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of fifteen kilometers to a maximum of sixty to seventy kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional fifteen kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.119

The restructured schedule and rising production costs in 2000-2001 prompted the Army to hold a Special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 required the Army to determine if the system was essential to national security, to assess the availability of an alternative with equal or greater capability, to ascertain if the program was adequately staffed to control costs, and to assess if unit costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions satisfactorily, then development would be stopped. The review favorably answered the questions; and development continued.120

As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests of 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than seventy kilometers to the target area and dispensed its submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.121

Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between fifteen to seventy kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket’s maturity and accuracy

1192000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72. 1202001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 121

Ibid., pp. 72-73.

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and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). Operational testing was scheduled for 2005, and an initial operational capability was planned for 2006. Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding, GMLRS would enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extend the range of MLRS fifteen kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket would not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.122

Additional testing occurred in 2004. During September and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than twenty-four GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GLMRS with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005.123

Meanwhile, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket. Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate the rocket. Besides the availability of three different fuses, the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket would be equipped with an anti-jam antenna to maintain accuracy in the presence of GPS jamming.124

After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the Guided Unitary MLRS rocket warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 Guided Unitary MLRS passed Milestone B in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability scheduled for 2007. The initial Guided Unitary MLRS rocket would have only a point detonating and a delay fuse, while the objective rocket would incorporate the third mode (proximity) of the tri-mode fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition’s effects to the mission requirements.125

122

Ibid., p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89. 1232004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68. 1242000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73.

1252007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73.

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Even before operational testing could be done on the initial Guided Unitary MLRS rocket, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004 following extensive discussions, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment to attack high pay-off targets and provide large area coverage at the same time; and the initial Guided Unitary MLRS met those requirements.126

On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz’s request and accelerated work on the initial Guided Unitary MLRS rocket to provide it sooner than planned. In May 2005 the contractor, Lockheed Martin, delivered seventy-two rockets with the point detonating and delay dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496 Guided Unitary MLRS rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest would be used for further development and testing.127

Within months of Congressional guidance, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Manager Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) dispatched a seven-person team to Iraq in May 2005 to train field artillery units on the initial Guided Unitary MLRS rocket. The team visited to the XVIII Airborne Corps in Iraq first. Before employing the rocket, the commanding general wanted a validation test to determine the rocket’s effectiveness. B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery shot the first validation rocket at fifty-three kilometers and hit the target. The same battery fired another validation shot of four rockets at sixty-seven kilometers and hit and destroyed the target. Subsequently, the team briefed the 19th Battle Coordination Detachment in Qatar and trained it how to reduce airspace coordination time.128

Combat operations also validated the initial Guided Unitary MLRS rocket. On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at fifty-three kilometers and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the same area, killing insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired 1,042 GMLRS Unitary rockets.129

Although initial GMLRS Unitary Rockets with point detonating and delay fuse

1262004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1272005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; Email with

atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09, Doc III-71a.

1282005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1292006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH,

p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74. Email with atch, subj: None, 6 Apr 09, Doc III-72.

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capabilities requested by General Metz performed well in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 and generated a paradigm shift that permitted using it in close proximity (two hundred meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had a minimum of two thousand meters as the safe distance from friendly forces, work on the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket with software upgrades, new trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse proceeded. Phase two engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated the maturity of the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket. This permitted moving to Milestone C decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective rocket. Successful completion of the operational testing resulted in full-rate production decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse rocket configuration.130

Meanwhile, the Army searched for a viable candidate to replace GMLRS DPICM. GMLRS DPICM was a lethal munition. However, its dud rate was too high, causing potentially too much collateral damage. In view of this, Central Command’s rules of engagement prohibited employing the munition in Iraq or Afghanistan. This prompted the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center (AMRDEC) to search for an alternative and to demonstrate a Kinetic Energy Rod warhead successfully at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in December 2006. The Kinetic Energy Rod warhead did not contain any explosive munitions and could be employed without any environmental concerns over unexploded ordnance. At the direction of the Product Manager for Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets, the Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in the Field Artillery School initiated an alternative warhead comparative analysis early in 2007 with the Kinetic Energy Rod and an Explosively Formed Penetrator warhead to determine if they were viable candidates to replace GMLRS DPICM. Basically, alternative warhead candidates had to meet the same operational requirements as GMLRS DPICM.131

In 2008 the Army pressed forward to develop an alternative to GMLRS DPICM, recognizing the need to minimize unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure associated with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions and collateral effects from the use of force in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the Army recognized the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did not provide the same capability and effects, the Department of Defense officially announced a moratorium on the production and use of DPICM rounds that would leave more than one percent duds after arming and initiated action in June 2008 to develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM. At that time the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army’s desire to transition to an alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitiary rockets in-lieu of

1302006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; Email with

atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09. 1312007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to

2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

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future planned DPICM procurement.132 MLRS Launcher. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm

of 1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and improvements to its fire control system and launcher drive system. To combat the launcher’s growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by decreasing the time required to aim, displace, and reload the launcher. For several years the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two modernization efforts would produce the M270A1 launcher early in the twenty-first century. Subsequently, the Army opted to modernize the MLRS chassis into the M993A1 Carrier by adding a power take off pump to maintain precise, constant engine revolutions per minutes, and by improving its electrical system, among other things.133

Over the years, developmental work on the M270A1 launcher progressed. Based upon successful testing of the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System early in 1998 to demonstrate that the deficiencies identified in 1997 testing had been fixed, the Program Executive Officer of Tactical Missiles, Brigadier General Willie Nance, approved the low-rate initial production (LRIP) of forty-five launchers on 28 May 1998. At the same time he established the goal of conducting the initial operational test and evaluation in September 1999 and fielding the launchers in the fourth quarter of FY 2000.134

Meanwhile, the Transformation of the Army Campaign Plan caused the Army to revise the number of M270A1 launchers to be purchased. Initially, the Army had planned to buy 857 launchers. With the emphasis shifting to medium forces of the Objective Force of Army Transformation, the Army cut the number to 412 in 1999. These launchers would go to the counterattack forces of the III Corps. Subsequently in

132Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD

Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harms to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-76; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Va, subj: Directed Requirement for GMLRS Alternative Warhead Rockets, 25 Jun 08, Doc III-77; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, 7 Nov 08, Doc III-78; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, subj: GMLRS Program Alternative Warhead Initiative -- Acquisition Decision Memorandum, 7 Nov 08, Doc III-79; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

1332000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 74.

1342000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75.

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February 2001, the Army increased the number of launchers to 456 to ensure that sufficient systems were fielded to include U.S. Forces, Korea. A few months later in August 2001, the Army cut the number of battalions to be fielded with the M270A1 from twenty to fifteen based upon the Army’s recapitalization decision. In 2002 the Army further decreased the number of M270A1 battalions to be fielded to ten and decided to retain the M270 battalions until the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) could be fielded and replace them sometime in the future. Thus, in three years, the number of battalions of the M270A1 to be fielded decreased from twenty to ten for a fifty percent reduction with fielding to be completed in March 2006. This reduction reflected the growing emphasis upon the Transformation of the Army and the M270A1’s ties with the Legacy Force, later called the Current Force.135

In September 2000 system integration anomalies, in the meantime, emerged that adversely influenced system functionality and operational safety. This forced the Army to move the early system integration testing phase from December 2000 to March 2001 and to reschedule the initial operational test and evaluation from April-May 2001 to August-September 2001. To meet the new schedule the contractor made numerous software fixes, while revised crew procedures during reload and maintenance operations were implemented to ensure soldier safety so that the system would be ready for testing in 2001.136

In 2001 the M270A1 underwent the scheduled testing. Early in the year, the Army conducted a logistical demonstration test and followed this with a maintenance demonstration test. In April 2001 the Army held an extended system integration test (ESIT) at Fort Sill to determine the system’s readiness to enter into initial operational test and evaluation in August 2001. Based upon the success of the integration test, the Army administered a two-phase initial operational test and evaluation in the fall of 2001. The Army held the ground phase at Fort Sill and the flight phase at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Designed as a side-by-side comparison with the M270 launcher, the ground phase consisted of three, ninety-six hour operational scenarios. During the flight phase, the M270A1 launcher fired a variety of MLRS munitions (M26 basic rocket, M26A2 extended-range rocket, M28A1 reduced-range practice rocket, and M39A1 ATACMS Block 1A). In each phase soldiers from the 1-12th Field Artillery operated both the M270 and the M270A1 launchers. Based upon the results of the operational testing that was concluded in October 2001, the Army test and evaluation community deemed the M270A1 to be suitable and effective. The M270A1 demonstrated its ability to load, hide, move, aim, shoot, and reload in an unprecedented manner. When it was compared to the M270, it reduced nearly every time standard to include total mission cycle time, launcher lay, the completion of fire, reload, and the last round fired to first movement. The shorter times improved effects on target and increased soldier survivability by demonstrating that the launcher could receive, process, service the target, and move long before the crew would be susceptible to counterfire.137

135

Ibid., p. 75. 1362000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 124-25; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75. 1372001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76.

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In 2002 the Army continued software improvements, conducted integration testing with various rocket and missile munitions at White Sands Missile Range, and started fielding the M270A1. The 2-20th Field Artillery, the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, received eighteen systems in April 2002 and started training on them shortly afterwards. About the same time the 2-131st Field Artillery of the 49th Armored Division of the Texas Army National Guard, a roundout unit to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), obtained new M270A1 launchers and initiated training. In the meantime, the Army fielded M270A1 launchers to the 1-38th Field Artillery in Korea in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, the 6-37th Field Artillery in Korea in the first quarter of FY 2003, and the 2-4th Field Artillery at Fort Sill in the first quarter of FY 2003. In response to world events, the Army moved up fielding the M270A1 to the 2-4th Field Artillery nearly one year to December 2002. Subsequently, the Army fielded ten M270A1 launchers to the Republic of Korea Army in 2003, fielded the M270A1 to 1-21st Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood in the first quarter of FY 2004, and planned to equip the 3-13th Field Artillery at Fort Sill with the launcher in the second quarter of FY 2004. As planned, ten battalions, prepositioned stocks, and institutional training and testing centers would receive the 225 launchers with fielding completed in 2006. Of the ten battalions, five had their M270A1s at the end of 2003.138

Fielding the M270A1 continued as planned. Early in 2004, the 3-13th Field Artillery received its M270A1s just prior to a part of the unit deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and then the 1-142nd Field Artillery of the Arkansas Army National Guard received its launchers. Altogether, the Army fielded sixty-five M270A1s in 2004.139

The following two years, the Army fielded the M270A1 to the 2-18th Field Artillery at Fort Sill and the 1-147th Field Artillery of the South Dakota Army National Guard. These fieldings left one M270A1 battalion of the programmed ten M270A1 battalion set to be fielded as of the end of 2005. In 2006 the Army completed fielding the M270A1 to the active component and the reserve component when the 2-20th Field Artillery and the 1-21st Field Artillery at Fort Hood and the 2-131st Field Artillery of the Texas Army National Guard each received their final six launchers.140

In the midst of the fieldings, the Army upgraded the M270A1. During 2005, thirteen launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery at Fort Sill received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both DPICM and Unitary. Subsequently, the upgraded M270A1 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery were deployed to support OIF where the battalion was the first M270A1 unit to fire a Guided MLRS Unitary in combat. Later in October 2005, thirteen launchers from 2-20th Field Artillery at Fort Hood were upgraded with IWIUs and were deployed to OIF to replace the launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery. Thirteen launchers from 2-4th Field

1382002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92. 1392004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 1402005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72, 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 74.

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Artillery also received IWIUs as part of the scheduled IWIU upgrades.141 Meanwhile, the Army conducted two significant M270A1 modification projects --

machine gun mount and Auxiliary Power Unit and Environmental Control Unit (APU/ECU) in 2005. OIF after action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1’s launcher chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. Several designs of the mount were evaluated with a prototype being developed. Thirteen early prototypes were provided to the 3-13th Field Artillery during its OIF deployment. Although feedback had not been obtained from the 3-13th Field Artillery as of December 2005 to generate any modifications to the SAW, several test firings led to design changes with the final design being provided to Program Manager Crew Served Weapons for procurement in 2006. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units were equipped with this machine gun mount.142

Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army had to find a way to improve conditions in the cab. It opted for installing the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) to control adverse climate conditions and permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems. The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) would provide a reduction in maintenance time and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The EPU/APU consisted of an environmental control unit and an auxiliary power unit. The auxiliary power unit was a diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity. This would permit the launcher to remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off. The ECU was an 18,000 BTU environmental control unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in OIF. Several test firings were conducted as part of the validation of the APU/ECU. The first test involving soldiers took place in the spring of 2006 and was successful to permit fielding to the 2-4th Field Artillery, the 2-131st Field Artillery, and 2-20th Field Artillery in 2007.143

With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army, meanwhile, initiated the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command

1412005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 142

Ibid.; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 1432005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78.

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and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.144

Meanwhile, TCM RAMS worked on a block improvement strategy for the MLRS M270A1 launcher and HIMARS in 2007-2008. Specifically, the strategy sought to improve command and control, addressing a capability gap by integrating a prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kit and by improving battle space awareness by integrating blue forces tracking into MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS, among other things, in 2008. For the long-term (2011-2017) the plan outlined migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available, the further incorporation of on-board situational awareness, and the integration of limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. Beyond 2017 the plan identified incorporating tactical fire control functions managed at the battery, and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and adding the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others.145

In 2008 the Army continued employing the M270A1 in Operation Iraqi Freedom and completed an initiative to improve training. On 28 May 2008, the Army accepted the M270A1 Organizational Maintenance Trainer to enhance institutional and individual training, using down-loadable software, of launcher maintenance tasks trained during advanced individual training. This trainer used the same computer hardware as the previously developed HIMARS Organizational Maintenance Trainer.146 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

Acknowledging that the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) M270 and M270A1 launchers lacked the ability to support light, airborne, and air assault divisions and forced/early entry contingency forces operations and lacked the inter-theater tactical deployability to meet Stryker and Objective Force requirements, the Army continued working with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in 2008. Upon being fielded, HIMARS would provide the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces and emerging Objective Force requirements.

1442007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78. 1452007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and

HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 09, Doc III-80; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2008, 8 Apr 09, Doc III-81.

146Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 Mar 09; Email with atch, subj: MLRS OMT User Manual and Instruction for Installing Single Screen Version, 17 Mar 09, Doc III-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09, Doc III-71a.

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HIMARS would not only replace the aging towed M198 155-mm. Towed Howitzer but also certain M270 and M270A1 launchers as they reached the end of their service life. The HIMARS mission as part of the MLRS fleet of launchers would provide field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires for Army, theater, corps, and joint/coalition forces and future Objective Force Unit of Action, renamed brigade combat team in 2003, and Unit of Employment, renamed division in 2005.147

A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The Operational and Organization Plan stated that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and M270 MLRS launchers, these systems’ lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.148

Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the light forces. It would do this while remaining as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability capabilities would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 cannons, MLRS launchers, and HIMARS launchers revealed that the HIMARS was approximately twenty percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately seventy percent more effective than the M198 alternative.149

In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development

1472002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09, Doc III-71a.

1482002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78. 149

Ibid., p. 78.

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because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.150

In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high-payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army funded HIMARS.151

Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, planned to conduct an Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These selected systems would be C-130 deployable and would be used by the first-to-fight forces anywhere in the world. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes.152

In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI’s assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 launcher’s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS. With the recommendation from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), HIMARS was selected as one of only four “leave behind” systems following the ACTD to provide a limited go-to-war capability. Three HIMARS prototype launchers remained with the 3-27th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, and one was sent to Lockheed-Martin, Dallas, Texas, for troubleshooting after the ACTD.153

One year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS Operational Requirements Document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for sixteen HIMARS battalions -- two in the active force and fourteen in the Army National Guard.154

HIMARS made significant progress in 2000.155 Impressed by the exercise in July 2000 where HIMARS demonstrated its deployability and firepower and influenced by the need for a general support weapon system to furnish fire support in the early stages of amphibious operations, the U.S. Marine Corps decided in December 2000 to participate with the Army in the EMD phase by purchasing two EMD HIMARS for a two-year user

150

Ibid. 151

Ibid. 152

Ibid., pp. 78-79. 153

Ibid., p. 79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97. 1542002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 1552000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 125-30; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79.

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evaluation program in 2002-2004. In view of this development, the Army announced that EMD HIMARS would be delivered in FYs 2001 and 2002 for testing by the Army (six launchers) and U.S. Marine Corps (two launchers) and that low-rate initial production would begin in FY 2003.156

The Army which had the lead in developing HIMARS and the Marine Corps made several key decisions with the system in 2001. Early in the year, the Marine Corps announced its plans for HIMARS. Upon receiving its two EMD HIMARS in October 2002, it would form them into a platoon for early user training; would train the crew; and would refine techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) and general support doctrine. To move the aging MLRS M270 launcher out of the inventory faster, the Army decided later in 2001 to field HIMARS to selected M270 units before replacing the M198s as initially intended with the exception of the first unit equipped being an M198 unit. The Army decided to put soldiers on the EMD launcher at Fort Sill in August 2002 for an extended system integration test (ESIT) of the October 1999 HIMARS Operational Requirements Document’s (ORD) key performance parameters.157

Other critical developments influenced HIMARS in 2001-2002. In August 2001 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army designated HIMARS as an acquisition category (ACAT) I project and increased the number to be purchased from 363 to 888 for two key reasons. First, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan designated HIMARS as an Interim to Objective Force system, meaning that it would play a key role in the Transformation of the Army. Second, the Army made the MLRS M270 launcher part of the Legacy Force, renamed Current Force in 2002, and did not intend to spend additional funds to modernize it beyond the M270A1 under development. Making the HIMARS an ACAT I acquisition also gave it more visibility and more oversight by the Department of the Army than previously when it was an ACAT II. Subsequently on 16 May 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense redesignated the HIMARS as an ACAT ID. This would give Department of Defense oversight of development because of its importance in the future force. Seven months later on 17 December 2002, the Secretary of Defense downgraded HIMARS to ACAT IC give more authority to the Army.158

In the meantime, the Army conducted two extended system integration tests (ESIT). After training the crews the Army held the first test at Fort Sill during the last two weeks of August 2002. Still in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, one EMD HIMARS demonstrated the ability to receive a fire mission, to move to the firing point, to fire the mission, and to reload and basically proved its ability to perform all of its key performance parameters during two, sixty-hour exercises. One year later in December 2003, the Army completed a second ESIT. Using the same launchers that had been employed in the first ESIT but with improvements that would be found in the low-rate initial production launchers, the Army gathered performance and reliability data for a low-rate initial production configured launcher.159

156

Ibid. 1572000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80. 158

Ibid.; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 98. 1592002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99.

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Following the low-rate initial production decision of March 2003 which outlined the Army’s plan to purchase eighty-nine HIMARS and the Marine’s intention of buying four HIMARS for additional testing before full production, both services conducted two production qualification tests in an operational environment in 2003. On 19 November 2003 a C-130 flew the combat-loaded HIMARS more than 650 nautical miles from Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to a dirt airstrip, known as an assault landing zone (ALZ) at Fort Sill, to determine how fast it could be offloaded and ready for a fire mission. After landing the Army crew unloaded the HIMARS vehicle in less than five minutes; and the launcher was fully operational and ready to receive a fire mission in less than fifteen minutes. After receiving a digital fire mission, the crew drove the launcher to the firing point and successfully fired six MLRS reduced-range practice rockets. This test displayed the system’s strategic mobility and ability to support the early entry forces. Following this test, the Army and Marines conducted the second test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where they successfully fired an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from a HIMARS launcher.160

Further testing took placed in 2004. In January 2004 a HIMARS, manned by an Army crew from the New Equipment Training Division, U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) underwent additional testing to include a flight demonstration that consisted of firing 180 reduced-range practice rockets at pace simulating the Operational Mode Summary Mission profile. While the test did much to demonstrate HIMARS’s ability to meet its performance and reliability requirements, enough software and hardware issues occurred to warrant further investigation and testing once the appropriate system improvements were made. Subsequently in April 2004, HIMARS low-rate initial production launchers fired four Guided MLRS rockets at the White Sands Missile Range to verify Guided MLRS interoperability with the HIMARS launcher, successfully verified rocket performance, and demonstrated the new version of software.161

In June 2004 HIMARS underwent Extended System Integration Test (ESIT) III at White Sands Missile Range. In this test two Low-Rate Initial Production launchers (LRIP) and one LRIP configured launcher, manned by Army, Marine, TSM RAMS, and contractor personnel, were put through an operationally realistic scenario consisting of dry and live-fire missions (180 reduced-range practice rockets). Test results validated system improvements made since ESIT II and HIMARS’s readiness to enter the Operational Test scheduled for September 2004.162

Prior to the follow-on testing, a Maintainability and Logistics Maintenance Demonstration was held with soldiers to test the fault isolation and built in test capability of HIMARS and the ability of HIMARS to be repaired and maintained by an Army crew. Also during this time, HIMARS conducted additional developmental testing including nuclear hardening testing, an automotive endurance test and the firing of additional tactical rockets and missiles.163

1602003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86. 161

Ibid. 162

Ibid. 163

Ibid., p. 87.

106

Following the successful conclusion of ESIT III, the Army and contractors directed their focus and energy towards preparing for the Combined Guided MLRS and HIMARS Initial Operational Test (IOT) scheduled for September 2004. In the Ground IOT which was conducted at Fort Sill, crews from the 2-18th Field Artillery tested three HIMARS LRIP launchers and six resupply vehicles (RSVs) with resupply trailers in an operationally realistic scenario over two, ninety-six hour field training exercises. In the ground IOT the three launchers successfully performed 120 live-fire missions totaling 719 reduced-range practice rockets and conducted approximately 240 dry missions. Following the ground phase, the launchers and crews moved to White Sands Missile Range to conduct the flight phase. Train-up of the crews and maintainers began in July 2004 and continued into August 2004. In the IOT flight phase eighteen Guided MLRS rockets and one ATACMS missile were fired to further exhibit the ability of HIMARS to conduct live-fire missions using representative Army crews under realistic conditions and the ability of Guided MLRS to meet its operational requirements.164 Following the successful IOT, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin a contract in December 2004 for continued low-rate initial production.165

In the meantime, HIMARS participated in the Counterstrike Task Force exercise at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in November-December 2004. As part of this Department of the Army-directed exercise, HIMARS simulated the firing of Guided Unitary MLRS rockets to determine the timelines associated with firing MLRS munitions in these scenarios and to find ways to reduce the time between the acquisition of an enemy mortar or rockets system and the attack of these systems. The Guided Unitary Rocket which was under development was chosen because of the need in certain theaters to limit collateral damage.166 As part of this effort, HIMARS used a prototype command and control system located on the launcher known as Enhanced Command and Control (C2). This system allowed the launcher to communicate directly with sensors, reducing the sensor to shooter timeline, as C2 nodes were bypassed. At the end of 2004, Enhanced C2 was an unfunded Block II requirement for HIMARS that was expected to be fielded in 2007.167

A sensor to effects demonstration was conducted on 14 April 2005 at the White Sands Missile Range. During the demonstration, an Air Force Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle acquired the target and digitally transmitted a call for fire to a HIMARS launcher. The launcher computed the firing solution, and the crew attacked the target with an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile.168

HIMARS fielding began in earnest in 2005 and carried into the following years. In March 2005 the 3-27th Field Artillery, Fort Bragg, received the first M142 launchers with Initial Operating Capability (IOC) established on 29 June 2005. All M142 launchers were produced with the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU), unlike M270A1

164

Ibid. 165

Ibid. 166

Ibid. 167

Ibid., pp. 87-88. 1682005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80.

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launchers which were being upgraded as IWIUs became available. The acquisition strategy involved procuring seventeen M142 battalions -- five for the active component and twelve for the reserve component. The next M142 fielding occurred in 6 March 2006-11 May 2006 for the 1-181st Field Artillery of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In 2007 the 1-158th Field Artillery of the Oklahoma Army National Guard and the 5-3rd Field Artillery received HIMARS launchers, and the following year the 1-14th Field Artillery, the 2-300th Field Artillery of the Wyoming Army National Guard, and the 5-3rd Field Artillery were equipped with HIMARS.169

Although the Army Acquisition Executive, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., approved moving HIMARS into full-rate production and type classification on 6 July 2005, key developmental activities took place afterwards. During 2005, the Army, Marines, and Air Force conducted a joint forces demonstration involving an Army and Marine HIMARS and an Air Force C-17 flight crew from Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Several technologies were demonstrated during the flight -- keeping the fire control system energized, using High Frequency radios (Harris 150), and maintaining the Global Positioning System (GPS) throughout the flight. These capabilities were desired to answer Key Performance Parameters in the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document and an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) initiated by the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery. This demonstration also reaffirmed the launcher’s ability to be inserted into an airfield to conduct fire missions and helped refine tactics, techniques, and procedures. Subsequent enhanced initialization experiments conducted in April 2006 and October 2006 to meet the same Operational Needs Statement of the XVIII Airborne Corps demonstrated the ability of the HIMARS launcher to receive GPS data while being transported by a C-17 aircraft so that the launcher could roll off the aircraft with the fire control system initialized to permit completing a fire mission quickly.170

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement on 20 October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and XVIII Airborne Corps for increased crew protection in the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006, the near-term solution involved using a modified design of the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC) developed for use with the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or “appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C-130. This modified cab design was designated the Low Signature Armored Cab-HIMARS (LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of forty-three pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine gun mount was also developed as part of after

1692005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 84; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 Mar 09, Doc III-83; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

1702006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 84-85.

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action reviews and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew protection, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection Cab late in 2006. The cab would incorporate enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in 2009. During 2007, the Increased Crew Protection Cab went through a series of tests including a live fire test and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing.171

Testing the Increased Crew Protection cab continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and contractor completed the final test which consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the Increased Crew Protection cab configured HIMARS to ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. It was a developmental test with the flavor of an operational test. Soldiers from the 5-3rd Field Artillery, Fort Lewis, Washington, operated the launchers and fire direction center at the operational mode summary/mission profile rates during a two-week exercise at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Test results indicated that the Increased Crew Protection cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational criteria and demonstrated that the launcher’s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to make it survivable in a hostile threat environment.172

With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army initiated acquisition action for the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.173

The following year 2008, TCM RAMS continued exploring long-range communications. The 3-27th Field Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducted a

1712005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88. 172Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual

Command History, 12 Mar 09; HIMARS Increased Crew Protection Cab Enhanced Field Exercise Final Report, Executive Summary, 18 Sep 08, Doc III-84.

1732006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88.

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high frequency user demonstration with two HIMARs launchers and one battery operations center. In June 2008 TCM RAMS removed the high frequency equipment and installed a satellite communication radio for further user demonstration with the intention of proving the concept and developing associated tactics, techniques, and procedures.174

Meanwhile, TCM RAMS worked on a block improvement strategy for the MLRS M270A1 launcher and HIMARS in 2007-2008. Specifically, it sought to improve command and control and address a capability gap with the integration of a prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kits and plans to improve battle space awareness by integrating blue forces tracking into the HIMARS in 2008. For the long-term (2011-2017) the plan outlined migrating HIMARS launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System radios when they became available, further incorporation of on-board situational awareness and the integration of limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. Beyond 2017 the plan identified incorporating more robust tactical fire control functions currently managed at the battery and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others.175 Army Tactical Missile System

After several years of full-scale engineering and development in the 1980s, the Army fielded the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in 1990 to meet the pressing requirement for attacking second-echelon forces and soon tested it in battle. During Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army fired over thirty ATACMS later renamed ATACMS I as newer versions were introduced. A decade later, the Army fired over 450 ATACMS I during Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003. Both operations demonstrated the system’s combat effectiveness.176

Operational considerations in 1991-1992, meanwhile, raised the necessity of an extended-range ATACMS. The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command’s concern about theater missile defense and the Field Artillery’s requirement for greater range to engage more targets led to the development of ATACMS IA. It integrated an onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) to augment the inertial navigation system of ATACMS I to achieve improved accuracy that permitted reducing the payload to achieve the requisite extended range. Production began in 1997 with fielding in 1998. During Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, field artillery units launched over forty ATACMS IAs against enemy targets.177

174Email with atch, subj: MLRS and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual Command

History, 12 Mar 09. 175Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual

Command History, 16 Mar 09; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2008, 8 Apr 09.

1761999 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 132-33; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09, Doc III-71a.

1771999 USAFACFS ACH, p. 133; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81.

110

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Army also worked on ATACMS II and made it the primary carrier for the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) in 1994 when the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army terminated the Army’s participation in the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) because of test failures with TSSAM and growing costs. BAT was designed to employ acoustic and infrared seekers to acquire, classify, and destroy moving armored combat vehicles deep within enemy territory (one hundred kilometers or more). BAT would also have allocation logic to minimize the possibility of multiple BATs engaging a single vehicle and a large acquisition footprint to locate targets within four kilometers of the dispense point.178

After successful testing during the late 1990s, the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) of December 1998 approved low-rate initial production with ATACMS II BAT and prepared for the Defense Acquisition Board of February 1999 which had oversight responsibilities for the missile. Successful testing in 1999 led to a low-rate initial production contract in the fall of 1999.179

During 2000, ATACMS II underwent successful testing. Based upon the results of an operational test in May 2000, the Army concluded that the command and control systems, computers, and target acquisition systems could support ATACMS II. Subsequently in August 2000, a test conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, demonstrated the missile’s ability to deliver the BAT submunitions to their targets accurately. Although the ATACMS II went into limited production in 2002, the evolving nature of the contempory operating environment from an armored force to small, more dispersed elements that sought shelter in urban or complex dwellings caused the Army to end the missile’s production in 2004.180

Meanwhile, the Deputy Undersecretary for Operational Research for the Army decided to suspend the operational testing for the ATACMS II BAT scheduled for 2001. He determined that the BAT’s seekers would not meet the operational requirements and directed the Army to conduct two BAT drop tests and a missile shoot in 2002. If those tests proved to be successful, the ATACMS II BAT would resume operational testing.181

Even before the additional tests could be conducted, the Army’s testing community questioned the ATACMS II BAT’s ability to hit certain countermeasure targets effectively. This caused the Army to hold a special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) in April 2002 to review the acquisition strategy for Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I) BAT under development that would be carried by ATACMS II, would attack stationary armored vehicles and surface-to-surface missile (SSM) transporter erector and launcher (TELS), and would be more robust than BAT. Rather than making a decision about the future of ATACMS II BAT in April 2002, the Army Acquisition Executive, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., postponed making one pending the

1781996 USAFACFS ACH, p. 131; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-35; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 81-81. 179

Ibid., p. 82. 180

Ibid.; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

1812001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82.

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outcome of an Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). On 9 May 2002 the AROC approved the operational requirements document for the ATACMS Unitary and approved changing the BAT operational requirements document to add an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) carrier vehicle in light of the successes of the armed American UAVs in Afghanistan in 2001 and directed UAV and P3I BAT demonstrations and testing. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive directed the BAT program to be restructured to reflect the requirement to integrate it with an UAV and to conduct demonstration tests.182

In December 2002 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the requirement for an armed Hunter UAV using the BAT submunition with an integrated Semi-Active Laser (SAL) seeker system to be operational by 1 February 2003 for testing. Until this, the BAT had been qualified as a submunition in the ATACMS II. Both ATACMS II and the BAT submunition finished production in December of 2003 with 88 missiles fielded and 1,300 BATs included. As a result of the VCSA’s directive, the Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) Project Office successfully completed and demonstrated an Army-directed nine-week Viper Strike (VS) Program at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The VS (two-pound shaped charge warhead) leveraged the BAT airframe and subsystems by replacing the terminal seeker with the SAL seeker. The SAL seeker provided for lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) precision point targeting of an unlimited vehicle threat target set. Moving, stationary, hot, cold, hard, or soft targets could be engaged using a designator from the UAV or from the ground. Although it was still collected, data from the acoustic subsystem was not used in an engagement. The Viper Strike configuration used a strap-down seeker that restricted the search field of view for target acquisition. As a result, near vertical attack trajectory against a target was required for optimal performance. For attack of targets between buildings in urban areas, this near vertical attack would be ideal if a line-of-sight (LOS) from a laser designator could be maintained during an engagement. This nine-week program and demonstration validated the Viper Strike (VS) concept and provided the Army an opportunity to deploy armed UAVs with a lethal precision strike capability with minimal collateral damage.183

During the 18 April 2003 Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) decision for the Future Combat System, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army subsequently asked about the status of weaponizing UAVs. As tasked by the VCSA to review the requirement for an armed UAV capability and to provide the way ahead, TRADOC provided the VCSA with an information paper entitled “Road Ahead for Weaponization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS)” on 20 June 2003 that outlined the recommended courses of action. Subsequently, the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army directed the execution of the near-term actions involving VS outlined in the paper.184

In late June 2003 the Army fielded a Viper Strike to a Hunter UAV unit in Iraq.

1822000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-35; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02;

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100. 183

Ibid., pp. 101-02; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90. 184

Ibid., pp. 90-91.

112

To meet the 30 September 2003 deadline, a joint effort by the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Air Vehicles and Rockets and Missiles (proving the fire support perspective), Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Program Manager Viper Strike, and the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Rucker, Alabama, finalized the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and the concept of operations (CONOPS).185

Meanwhile, the ATACMS II BAT program changed dramatically in view of the success with the UAV program. On 15 October 2002 a congressional joint appropriations meeting on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 budget terminated the BAT program on 15 October 2002 and allocated funding for developing and testing the P3I BAT multi-mode seeker technology to be carried on a variety of platforms (ATACMS, Guided-Multiple-Launch Rocket System, and unmanned aerial vehicle), leaving the Army with less than one hundred ATACMS II BATs in its inventory. Later in 2004 when ATACMS II went out of production, the Army concentrated its attention on using the remaining BAT submunitions and P3I BAT submunitions with UAVs. Basically, ATACMS II would no longer be employed to carry BAT or P3I BAT submunitions.186

Like the BAT but more robust, the P3I BAT would employ acoustic sensors to locate moving targets. Once the acoustic sensor had acquired the target (surface-to-surface missile transporter erector launchers, heavy multiple rocket launchers, and armor), the multi-mode seeker would use its millimeter wave and imaging infrared sensors to track the target to impact. When the system was employed against a silent, stationary target, the submunition would fly a pre-programmed search path and use its millimeter wave and infrared seekers to detect, acquire, and track a target to impact in adverse weather and battlefield obscurants.187

Meanwhile, the Army fielded the Congressionally-directed Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) ATACMS in 2002 in response to the urgent need statement from Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Korea, of 2001. Highly responsive, all-weather, long-range, and GPS-aided, the QRU ATACMS added a further deep strike capability for responsive precision employment in areas of dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments. It would provide the corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack time sensitive targets where collateral damage, fratricide, bomblet dud rates, or pilot/aircraft risk might be of concern. It had a range of 270 kilometers and a point detonating fuse.188

Initially, Congress provided $7 million for the development, testing, and procurement of the ATACMS IA QRU missile but increased funding. Additional congressional supplemental appropriations in 2001 through 2004 placed 326 QRU systems under contract with 150 of these systems having been delivered through December 2004. The Army’s procurement plan only covered procurement of these

1852003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101-02; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91. 1862002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84. 1872002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 1882002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 83; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, p. 84.

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missiles until FY 2008 unless otherwise directed by Congress.189 In an effort to ensure continued procurement of QRU missiles since no

requirement previously existed for the munition, the recommendation was made during the General Officer level adjudication of comments to the ATACMS Unitary ORD that QRU specific data be added to the ORD expressing it as an increment to the objective Unitary missile. Initially, the idea met some resistance because some feared that QRU would then be viewed as an adequate solution for the objective missile. Based on the fact, however, that QRU met one of three key performance parameters (KPPs) as well as several other factors, the decision was made to incorporate spiraling the QRU to ATACMS Unitary in the Unitary ORD.190

Shortly thereafter, the General Officer level comment matrix was sent forward to the Future Center’s Director for Capabilities Developments for review and signature. Because he was unavailable, his Deputy Director signed in his absence on 29 November 2004. Pending additional adjustments currently being made to the ORD at the Army level, the signed document was scheduled to be loaded onto the Knowledge Management Database System (KMDS) for joint level review. Upon completion of the joint review, the ORD would then go before several boards preceding the final decision to accept, partially accept, or reject the document. In 2006 the Army approved the Unitary ORD.191

While Joint Staff comments on the ORD were being resolved in 2005, the Army took steps to improve the QRU ATACMS besides integrating the system into the ATACMS operational requirements document for approval. The Army updated the guidance package to increase the attack angle to near vertical and renamed the missile the ATACMS 2000, subsequently type classified at the M57.192

In 2006 the Army had two Unitary QRU ATACMS. One became the M48, while the other, the XM57, was undergoing testing and would provide vertical attack to minimize collateral damage. During the year, the Army conducted several successful XM57 test flights and initiated action to develop an optimized warhead with a Tri-mode fuse that would give the Unitary the ability to execute an air burst, a point detonation, or delay missions. Two years later in 2008, the Army Aviation and Missile Command approved full materiel release of the Army Tactical Missile System Unitary M48 fuse.193

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided ATACMS with its first combat test since Operation Desert Storm of 1991. From 20 March 2003 to 10 April 2003, field artillery units fired over 450 ATACMS missiles in support of joint combat operations with thirteen QRU ATACMS being part of the initial preparation of the battlefield that

1892004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89. 1902003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 89-90; 2006 U.S.

Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 89. 1912004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 89-90; 2006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89. 1922005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to

2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09. 1932006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; Email with atch, subj: none, 6 Apr 09, Doc

III-85; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

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allowed the ground campaign to commence. During the Mother of All Sandstorms (24-27 March 2003) that had a one hundred-meter visibility and winds gusting up to fifty knots with thousands of Iraqi paramilitary in the area, “Ground based indirect fires (ATACMS) were absolutely critical . . . “ according to Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III, the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 3rd Infantry Division.194 This organic fire support capability allowed the ground commander the freedom to maneuver his forces out of contact while setting the conditions for his next fight and permitting him the flexibility to adapt to overcome the actions of an interactive, thinking enemy.195

Despite this success and others in OIF and the global war on terrorism, scarce funding prompted the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., to sign a memorandum to terminate ATACMS. This required the Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space to cancel all remaining contract actions as required. This involved closing out production facilities after final deliveries had been made in FY 2008. The Army’s request for additional eighty four ATACMS to replenish stockpiles in the FY 2008 Supplemental Budget led to the Army’s decision in April 2008 to move termination activities scheduled for 2009 to 2010.196 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System

In “Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century” in the Field Artillery Magazine in the May-June 1998 edition, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, outlined the school’s vision of the future of fire support. Among other things, the vision proposed an advanced fire support system that would be a family of precision missiles. They would have the capability of attacking with precision or loitering over the target area before attacking with precision and would not require a large, heavy, expensive and crew-intensive launch platform.197

Out of this vision evolved the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) NetFires technology demonstration program. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing Corporation began work on the concept definition in 1998 to establish an initial concept. In 1999 the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill (renamed the Fires Battle Laboratory in 2006) became the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) proponent to give DARPA and the contractor teams the information needed to develop critical design parameters and system characteristics. One year later in August 2000, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon started fabricating the system with detailed design for two missile variants (precision attack missile and loiter attack missile) being completed later in the year. Basically, NetFires would consist of a

194Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed Battlefield,” Field

Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 03, p. 12, Doc III-80b, 2003 USAFACFS ACH. 1952003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91. 1962007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 93; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: Update to the FY07 ATACMS Program Termination Program, 22 Apr 08, Doc III-86; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

1972002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102.

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container/launch unit with fifteen containerized missiles and an on-board computer and communications system. NetFires would deliver two missile variants -- the loiter attack missile (LAM) with a range of seventy kilometers plus a search time of approximately thirty minutes and the precision attack missile (PAM) with a maximum range of forty kilometers.198

Over a period of several years beginning in 2001, the DARPA-managed NetFires technology demonstration program designed, fabricated, tested, and demonstrated small, container-launched missiles to provide massive, responsive, precision firepower early in a conflict. NetFires would be designed for a low logistics burden and low life-cycle cost. The system would be shipped in its launching container, would require no additional launch support equipment, and could be fired remotely from trucks, a variety of other platforms, or the ground. NetFires rounds would be ready to fire almost immediately, resulting in a much faster response time and a higher potential rate of fire than possible with current howitzers or missile launchers and would provide a precision non-line-of-sight capability. Equally important, NetFires would operate within the Battle Command System (a command and control system), would be one of eighteen Future Combat Systems (FCS) core systems, and would be organic to the Unit of Action in the Objective Force, later renamed brigade combat team.199

In June 2002 the Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory began a cooperative examination of NetFires Command, Control, and Communications (C3). From November 2002 through September 2003, they conducted four experiments to develop technical requirements and demonstrated a networked C3 solution.200

In the meantime, on 25 October 2002 there was a successful test of the NetFires controlled test vehicle number one at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The entire system, including the missile, container/launch unit, and test control unit performed flawlessly. Preliminary review of the pre-launch and post-launch data indicated that all primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved. Upon ignition of the flight test motor, PAM controlled test vehicle number one left the launch canister vertically. The thrust vector control assembly successfully guided the missile during the first three seconds of flight. The missile successfully pitched over toward its intended impact area. In the first forty seconds of flight, the missile performed each of its programmed maneuvers prior to apogee of approximately twenty thousand feet. At that point the missile successfully performed its second and third set of maneuvers. Following the completion of the third set of maneuvers, preliminary review of the data indicated that the

198

Ibid., p. 103; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 122-23; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 93; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. Because of Base Realignment and Closure 2005 initiatives that involved collocating the Air Defense Artillery Center and School and the Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, TRADOC changed the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory name to the Fires Battle Laboratory.

1992001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 122; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 103-04; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81.

2002003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81.

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missile successfully glided to its intended impact point.201 In view of the successful tests, the Army initiated a formal NetFires acquisition

program which was renamed the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) late in 2002 to avoid confusion with Fort Sill’s evolving Networked Fires concept for the Objective Force. In June 2003 oversight of the program moved from the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill to the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Rockets and Missiles (RAMS). Concurrently, the Army established Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 for equipping the first unit for operational testing and FY 2013 for full operational capability. In the meantime, in controlled test vehicle number two, a PAM was launched and flew nineteen kilometers using only GPS navigation to impact twenty-nine inches from the intended target. Two months later in August 2003, in guided vehicle test number one, a PAM was launched and flew nine kilometers using its semi-active laser seeker to locate and impact a stationary target that was being laser designated by a ground observer.202

Work on the NLOS-LS moved forward in 2004. In March of that year, the Army signed a contract with NetFires, a limited liability company established by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, for a six-year System Design and Development (SDD) of the system. This contract included designing the unattended Container/Launch Unit (CLU), the Loitering Attack Missile, and the Precision Attack Missile. After the termination of the NLOS-LS had been considered, the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2005 subsequently modified the system’s acquisition program. The bill cut NLOS-LS funding by $15 million, accelerated work on the Precision Attack Missile, and slowed down work on the Loiter Attack Missile. Although the LAM was deemed capable of meeting all of its threshold requirements, this bill returned it to the science and technology base for further maturation and permitted moving the Precision Attack Missile into System Design and Development because its technology was easier to integrate with existing command and control systems than Loiter Attack Missile’s.203

In view of the funding modification, the Army revamped its FCS fielding plan with the intent of fielding the NLOS-LS’s Precision Attack Missile and CLU by 2010. To accomplish this objective the Army accelerated developing the Precision Attack Missile and CLU to get it to the field as soon as possible through an evolutionary spiral development. Development would proceed in four discrete phases or blocks, called spin outs, each of which would result in the development of fieldable prototypes to the Current Force, such as the first CLU prototype being delivered to the Army in December 2005. Moving into the next spin out meant that the prototype had to meet specific performance parameters. As one of the first three Future Combat System systems to be employed in the Current Force, NLOS-LS with PAM would initially be incorporated into the fires battalion of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) and then the other

2012003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 2022002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103; 2003 USAFACFS ACH; pp. 94-95; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 81-82. 203

Ibid, p. 82; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 78.

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modular brigades. This HBCT organization later would be transformed from a modular brigade into the FCS Brigade Combat Team, formerly called Unit of Action, in 2014.204

In 2005 the Army made a number of other key decisions with the NLOS-LS program. In the HBCT command and control for the system would be the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and would reside in a dedicated control cell added to the Fires Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. This High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle-mounted system would plan and execute NLOS-LS missions and allow communication with missile in flight to engage moving targets. Two control cells would be provided to the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team (EBCT) at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 2008. After evaluation of the control cell and launch units, passage of acquisition Milestone C, and entry into limited rate initial production in 2008, operational testing would be conducted with initial operational capability for NLOS-LS coming in 2010.205

In 2006 Fort Sill began experiencing the consequences of the Army’s decision to accelerate fielding the NLOS-LS in 2008 for FCS Spinout One. One of the first consequences involved the need for a command and control system to take the place of the FCS Battle Command System which would not support NLOS-LS until after 2010. Another consequence required a decision where the NLOS-LS would be located within the modular brigade combat team structure and was complicated by the delay in the availability of the Joint Tactical Radio System radios for the CLU and the controlling headquarters. By mid-2006 the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) had decided that the NLOS-LS section, consisting of eleven personnel and six CLUs, would be assigned to the headquarters battery of the fires battalion in the HBCT. Meanwhile, the Army published system requirements as a capabilities description document within the FCS Operational Requirements Documents which was approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee on 27 April 2006.206

Because of the earlier decision to use AFATDS as NLOS-LS’s command and control system, the Army developed requirements in 2006 that would add functionality to AFATDS and the Forward Observer System. An interface control document was written and numerous interoperability meetings were held to ensure that the CLU and PAM would interface completely through AFATDS. The Project Office provided funding for this effort and modifications to the Forward Observer System to allow the forward observer to engage moving targets with PAM and send messages to the missile in flight.207

The Army completed other critical milestones with NLOS-LS in 2006. Even though LAM was still being used in experimentation, work was halted on the system because of the lack of funding. Meanwhile, TRADOC started crucial preparations for

2042004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75; 2006 U.S.

Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 77; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 80.

2052006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 2062006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 81. 2072006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 79.

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fielding the first NLOS-LS section by assembling the EBCT at Fort Bliss, Texas. The EBCT would be responsible for evaluating all spin out systems to determine their effectiveness before a final decision would be made to field them to the Army. As a result, Fort Sill began preparing the necessary soldier and leader training materials and developing test plans and procedures.208

Filmed in 2006, the Discovery Channel presented a “Future Weapons” segment in February 2007 devoted to the significance of NLOS-LS precision capabilities and small operational footprint. On 2 May 2007 at the request of Major General Charles A. Cartwright, the Program Manager for FCS, the Army conducted a low-velocity airdrop test at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from twelve hundred feet. There were no visual damages on the CLU. Developmental testing did not go well in 2007 as hoped. The last successful NLOS-LS test flight, an Enhanced Ballistic Test Vehicle (EBTV), was conducted at White Sands Missile Range in April 2007. The next three Captive Test Vehicle (CTV) flights (July through November) ended in failure but for unrelated reasons.209

Meanwhile, influenced by competing priorities and needs, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASAALT) restructured the FCS program in January 2007 by eliminating or deferring some systems and requirements. The description of the spin out scheme was changed by referring to the final FBCT spin out as the objective design. This effectively reduced the number of spin outs from four to three. There was little effect on NLOS-LS, except that the success of Spinout One came to depend more and more on fewer systems.210

As TRADOC gathered together the Spin Out test unit in 2007 to demonstrate the technical readiness of unattended ground sensors, the NLOS-LS, and the fledgling Battle Command System, the EBCT was temporarily flagged as 5-1st Field Artillery and renamed the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) with the NLOS-LS section assigned to the 1-3rd Field Artillery. Control of the AETF was formally transferred from the Unit of Action Battle Lab (UAMBL) at Fort Knox to the Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID) at Fort Bliss in March 2007. Contributing to the effort, TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) prepared and had oversight of materials needed to conduct a number of AETF training events such as the tactical leader’s course (TLC), the new material information briefing (NMIB), and new equipment training (NET). This preparation led to fielding of prototype production CLUs and prototype control cells to the NLOS-LS new equipment training team (NET) of the AETF by a combined military, government and contractor team in October, 2007. This fielding was necessarily complex due to the revolutionary nature of NLOS-LS and changes that were made to the Forward Observer System and AFATDS, requiring the retraining of 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical System Specialists), 13F (Fire

208

Ibid., p. 79; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09, Doc III-71a.

2092007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 81-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 12 May 09.

2102007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 82.

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Support Specialist), and 13A/131A (Warrant Officer) soldiers in the employment of precision munitions. To support the prototype fielding, TCM RAMS completed a major rewrite of Special Text 3-09.65 which was released in September 2007.211

Numerous studies and integration events also occurred throughout 2007. They included logistics demonstrations, FCS Experiment 1.1 connectivity display, analysis of munition mixes and numbers of systems, Army Research Lab (ARL) Control Cell experiments and studies on mission throughput and MANPRINT issues at the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (DSABL), and a series of software integration exercises at Fort Sill and Baltimore, Maryland, designed to evaluate requirements implementation and “shake out” hardware and software incompatibilities. Through analysis and compromise, the number of CLUs required to support a modular BCT was determined to be twenty-four, although only six per brigade were funded in the program objective memorandum in the out years, as the idea of proliferating NLOS-LS beyond the HBCT gained acceptance. Thus, work continued unabated along many avenues to prepare NLOS-LS for a rigorous technical and operational test schedule in 2008.212

Modeled after a heavy brigade combat team, AETF meanwhile tested the CLU and control cell hardware and software in 2008 at Fort Bliss, while the NLOS-LS Program Management Office/Netfires LLC conducted PAM developmental testing at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The Program Management Office/Netfires LLC conducted a total of six PAM test flights, completed the captive test vehicle (CTV) and began the Army guided test vehicle (GTV) series. Although some of the test objectives were deferred, the flights were generally successful. However, the annual window for cold weather testing in Alaska was missed due to late delivery of test missiles by the contractor.213

Tests also encompassed all aspect of system utilization from tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical movement and employment of the system to exercising the digital fire mission thread from sensor to shooter. The tests consisted of a technical field test, a force development test and evaluation, and a preliminary limited user test. All of them supported the FCS Spin Out I testing program, including flight tests. The first PAM test flight in November 2008 scored a direct hit on a T-72 tank. The second test in December 2008 demonstrated the PAM’s ability to acquire a laser designated target with its semi-active laser seeker, process the target information, and transfer the information to its imaging infrared mode seeker for final target processing and attack. Later in December 2008, NLOS-LS completed its third successful flight test by making a direct hit on a T-72 tank. The tests scheduled for 2009 would include sixteen more GTV flights and a Limited User Test. Upon the successful completion of the tests and passage of a

2112007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 82. 2122007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 82-83. 213Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS Command History, 12 Mar 09, Doc III-87;

MAJ Christopher L. Shields and LTC Arthur G. Weeks, “NLOS-LS and PAM: Precision Fires for the Brigade Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 19-21, Doc III-88; Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS 2008 Command History, 31 Mar 09, Doc III-89.

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critical program review, low-rate initial production would begin.214 Experimentation and simulation in 2008 failed to yield a definitive answer on the

right number of control cells for the platoon which had grown from an eleven-man section to a platoon of twelve with the inclusion of a 13A Field Artillery officer as platoon leader. The control cell, collocated with the CLUs, received fire missions via AFATDS, sent the mission data to a specific CLU, using the Single Channel Radio System and Soldier Radio Waveform, and relayed communications between the forward observer and the missile. The Fort Gordon Signal Center championed plans to field additional radios to forward observers for direct communication to the missile in flight, but the idea lost inertia due to unanticipated limitations of the Joint Tactical Radio System and repeated slips in that program’s schedule. While the intent was also to replace the modified missile radio being used in the prototype control cell with a JTRS ground mobile radio (GMR) for communication with CLUs and missiles in flight, it became clear that that this temporary solution would have to make do for the foreseeable future.215

Meanwhile, FCS and Army leadership decided that the Spin Out systems would provide greater advantage if first fielded to IBCTs rather than HBCTs to give them additional situational awareness and self-protection capabilities and organic precision fires which they did not have. This necessitated rewriting the Spin Out Capabilities Production Document (CPD) with an IBCT focus as well as all supporting documentation and rewriting Special Text 3-09.65 to reflect an IBCT focus and staffing it with the intent of releasing it in December 2008 which did not happen. The new version struggled with the NLOS-LS platoon’s limited self-defense capability and recommended teaming it with a cannon platoon for security. This replaced the earlier operational concept formulated by DARPA where CLUs would be scattered around the battlefield with little or no means of security. In addition, collocating NLOS-LS with a firing battery would provide the IBCT with the means of engaging long- and short-range targets with precision and area munitions throughout the brigade’s battle space. Along with this turmoil caused by the change in leadership and Soldiers in the AETF, the change to an IBCT organization would require revalidating some events already completed.216

214Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS 2008 Command History, 31 Mar 09; MAJ

Christopher L. Shields and LTC Arthur G. Weeks, “NLOS-LS and PAM: Precision Fires for the Brigade Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 19-21; Raytheon Information Paper, 9 Dec 08, Doc III-90; Raytheon Information Paper, 23 Dec 08, Doc III-91; MG (Ret) David C. Ralston and Patrecia Sladen Hollis, “PGM Effects for the BCT Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Mar 09, pp. 22-27, Doc III-92.

215CW4 (Ret) Robert A. Nelson and LTC William E. Field, “NLOS-LS in the Army Evaluation Task Force,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 07, pp. 28-30, Doc III-93; Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS 2008 Command History, 31 Mar 09, Doc III-94.

2162007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 83; Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS Command History, 12 Mar 09; Email, subj: NLOS-LS ST, 12 Mar 09, Doc III-95; Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS 2008 Command History, 31 Mar 09; Information Paper, subj: Current Key Parameters for NLOS-LS, undated, Doc III-96.

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Firefinder Radars As the Firefinder Q-36 Version 7 radar was being developed and fielded, the Field

Artillery School introduced another change to its counterfire radar system modernization program in 1990. Because the existing Firefinder Q-37 radar was based upon 1970s technology and because the Q-36 modernization effort would not meet all of the Field Artillery’s radar requirements as initially planned, the School identified the need for developing the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System (ATACS) to replace the Q-37. The Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System would take advantage of leap-ahead technology to give the Army a passive system or, at a minimum, passive or active cuing, would reduce the equipment and manpower needs significantly, and would furnish support to the corps area of influence in AirLand Operations. In addition, it would be capable of driving on and off a C-130 and larger aircraft and air insertion by CH-47D helicopter and would reduce crew size from twelve to six to cut personnel costs.217

As it fielded the Q-37 Block I which was an upgrade to the Q-37 as an interim measure, the Army initiated developmental work on the ATACS. Besides utilizing advanced technology to furnish dramatically improved capabilities over the Q-37, ATACS would replace all Q-37s, including the Q-37 Block I, on a one-for-one basis and would meet the needs of the objective force.218

Challenges altered the program. In 1999 the Army redesignated the ATACS program as the AN/TPQ-47 (Q-47). Technological problems and schedule delays necessitated the rebaselining of the Q-47 program several times. In 2002, the Army redesignated the radar program as the Phoenix Battlefield Sensor System (PBS2). Hardware reliability issues and software interface developmental delays forced the Army to terminate the development contract with Raytheon in September 2004. The problem with cost overruns and schedule delays was compounded by the Army’s transition to the modular force and redefining the contemporary operational environment. The Phoenix system, while providing increased capability in range and accuracy, was a 90-degree sensing system when it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Army required a 360-degree sensing capability.219

Because of the demise of the Phoenix Program, the Army deferred approved long range counterfire target acquisition capability requirements. However, the medium range threat set (cannon and rockets) and the 360-degree medium range coverage identified a capability gap with no fielded solution. The Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in the Field Artillery School then began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar that would incorporate new technology into an existing radar to close that gap with a relatively short developmental cycle. The Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and accuracy against cannon and rockets in

2171995 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 141-42. 2182000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 135-37; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 2192005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 91.

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a 90-degree mode, and would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree capability against only mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and rockets. In January 2007 the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to produce a prototype in thirty months and intended to have the first unit equipped in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2010.220

Lockheed Martin and the Syracuse Research Corporation made significant progress with the EQ-36 in 2007-2008. In the spring of 2007, the prototype successfully completed a counterfire target acquisition testing in 90- and 360-degree modes at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Later in November and December 2007, the contractors tested a prototype EQ-36 again at Yuma Proving Ground. During the tests which were designed to evaluate the radar’s ability to meet Army requirements, the prototype successfully located the firing positions of rockets and mortar launchers in a 360-degree mode. In May 2008 the contractor announced the delivery of two EQ-36 radars by the summer of 2009 and two by the fall of 2009, and one by early 2010.221

FDIC meanwhile turned its attention to the Special Operations Forces Command (SOCOM) program to develop a Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). The Army formally designated the LCMR as the AN/TPQ-48 and awarded a contract to Syracuse Research to develop and produce the radar with the first unit being equipped in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. This radar would provide 360-degree coverage against a short-range mortar threat and would be easily transportable. Requirements documentation was written and approved to adopt the SOCOM requirement as a baseline and to utilize a spiral development strategy to achieve the full capability needed for fielding to the Army. An operational needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range were increased while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept. The initial LCMR Increment One was developed for use by SOCOM and had a range of five kilometers with a target location error of 100-plus meters, while Increment Two provided more rugged hardware and better software and was part of the counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) system of systems. As of 2006 the Army had 150 additional Increment Two Q-48s under contract for delivery in 2008. Increment Three would double the range to ten kilometers and was under contract for delivery for testing and subsequent fielding to the brigade combat teams and fires brigades.222 Artillery Meteorology

In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS) with the MMS-Profiler. The MMS produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given

220Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97. 221Lockheed Martin Information Paper, 27 May 08, Doc III-98; Information

Paper, Lockheed Martin and Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-99. 2222006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; MG

David C. Ralston, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 06, pp. 1-5, Doc III-99a; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09.

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the current state of operational Numerical Weather Prediction systems, the single local balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried a high operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System (TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to five hundred kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that acquired information from weather satellites and other MET sensors for use in the employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler system to Environmental Technologies Group (now Smith Industries) of Baltimore, Maryland. The initial program schedule called for Operational Testing in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and Low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter of FY 2003. Production of eighty-three systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be in the second quarter of FY 2005.223

Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill. Following these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. In all, the Army fielded sixteen LRIP Profiler systems. The Profiler program began full-rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM) Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted the initial five full-rate production Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the Army approved full material release. At the end of 2007, Fort Sill began establishing requirements for the Block II Profiler system which would consist of a single vehicle with a removable laptop system as well as elimination of the balloon and radiosonde.224

As of March 2008, the Army had fielded twenty-one FRP configuration Profiler

2232005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92.

2242007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95.

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systems. Efforts began to retrofit all LRIP systems to the FRP configuration. Due to end of life on the existing shelter that Profiler was hosted on, a redesign effort was undertaken to repackage the Profiler into the Command Post Platform (CPP) as well as to replace the Tactical-Very Small Aperture Terminal (T-VSAT) system with the more robust Global Broadcast System (GBS). The first CPP Profiler was scheduled for completion late in 2008. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, made the decision, based on numerous tests to eliminate the need to use the balloon and radiosonde with the Profiler.225 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System

The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS in 1981.226

Because of age and escalating maintenance costs, the Army acted. In June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on 12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Positioning and Azimuth Determining System (IPADS). The Army selected L3 Communications of New York in August 2003 to produce the system. Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Fort Sill; and a milestone decision was made in June 2004 to field the system beginning in 2005. Fielding began in August 2005 under a conditional material release until 2007. In 2006 and early 2007 Fort Sill worked to incorporate a SAASM Global Positioning System (GPS) Card into the system which would almost eliminate zero velocity updates (ZUPs) and extend its area of coverage. The GPS augmented IPADS would be called IPADS-G. On 19 January 2007 a Full Materiel Release (FMR) was granted for the IPADS.227

Work on the system continued into 2008. In February 2008 an IPADS-G prototype was successfully tested over a distance of 230 kilometers for sixty minutes without stopping for a ZUP. The radial error was less than three meters. Testing was in process to extend the distance and time as well as to integrate the IPADS system into the uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. As of March 2008, there were

2252001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: TPO Sensor Input, 27 Mar 08, Doc III-97a; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97.

2262002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 85.

227Ibid.; pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp.

93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97.

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130 systems fielded to the Army and the full complement of sixty-three systems was fielded to the U.S. Marine Corps.228 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and Knight

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle. In 2007-2008 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) continued fielding the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) that was programmed to be the successor to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV). Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.229

After funding became available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms got their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality and promised to solve the problems created by the M981 as illustrated by Operation Desert Storm (ODS).230 As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The fire support mission package initially included a laser designator (later removed as a requirement), a ring laser gyro and inertial navigation systems, a forward entry device, a lightweight computer unit, and associated components to process digital information. The M7 BFIST would also have a laser range finder, a global positioning system, a driver’s thermal viewer, and a battlefield combat identification system (when it became available) to reduce the probability of fratricide.231

Beginning in 1999, the Army initiated fielding the M7 BFIST. In 2000-2001 it fielded a total of forty-nine M7 BFIST vehicles to the 3rd Infantry Division, the Field Artillery School, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. In 2002 the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, received thirty-one BFISTs. Two years later in 2004, the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea received nineteen M7 BFISTs.232

The other BFIST, the M7A1, would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package. The M7A1 would have two second-generation FLIR sights. The second-generation FLIR on the M7A1 would

228Email with atch, subj: TPSO 2008, 27 Mar 08, Doc III-97a; Email with atch,

subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97. 2292000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39. 230

Ibid., pp. 140-41; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 2312000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 141; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 42, 2002

USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106. 2322000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 141; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 42; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94.

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double the target identification range of the first-generation FLIR on the M7.233 After several years of work on BFIST, the project manager modified the

acquisition strategy in 1999 for the M7A1 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially expected. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, as of 2003 and 2004, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions.234

At the beginning of the summer of 2004, the 4th Infantry Division received the first of twenty-two M3A3 BFISTS. Due to modularity, the division received enough A3 BFISTS to equip two Units of Action, later renamed brigade combat teams. However, modularity created a demand for more M7s and M3A3 BFISTS than were financed for production. This prompted the Program Manager Office to search for additional funds for the production of the required vehicles.235

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 the Program Manager Office secured supplemental funding from Congress. This allowed the 4th Infantry Division to complete modularity fielding with two additional Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) equipped with M7 BFISTs. Additional funding would also permit the 4th Infantry Division to replace the two M7-equipped HBCTs with the more modern M3A3 BFISTs in FY 2008. Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division began converting from M7 BFISTs to M3A3 BFISTs in FY 2005 and would complete conversion to four HBCTs with M3A3 BFISTs by the end of FY 2007.236

In FY 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit M3A3 BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) for under armor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the BFIST with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available. This integration began in 2008 with first unit to be fielded in June 2010. The Critical Design was approved in June 2008 with a limited user test scheduled for the first quarter of FY 2010.237

Meanwhile in 2006, work began on writing a Capability Production Document (CPD) for the Bradley Family of Vehicles. Fort Sill participated along with the Infantry and Armor Centers and included a requirement for the BFIST to have the capability to

2332000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 141-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 107. 2342001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95. 2352004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95. 2362005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 89; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 94-95.

237Ibid., p. 95; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-

97.

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locate a target and designate it while under armor and on the move. This new requirement addressed survivability and lethality capability gaps that existed with the both M7 and M3A3 BFIST.238

Knight. The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) also employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and urged developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.239

In 1999-2002 several critical events with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the M707 Striker and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would also be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Equally important, the Army decided in 2001 to equip the first Initial Brigade Combat Team with Striker in lieu of the Fire Support Vehicle variant of the Interim Armored Vehicle because the latter would not be ready for the brigade’s operational test in 2002. When the first Initial Brigade Combat Team received their Fire Support Vehicle’s late in 2002, the Striker would then be available to be fielded another unit. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002. Meanwhile in 2002, the Army announced that the procurement of Striker in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 would total fifty-four vehicles but later reduced the number to focus funding on the Objective Force under development. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.240

238Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09. 2392000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144. 240

Ibid., p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88;

128

Fielding the Knight continued in 2003-2004. In 2003 the vehicle went to the 1st Armored Division, 10th Infantry Division, and units in the North Carolina and South Carolina Army National Guard. Fieldings in 2004 included the 25th Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 101st Infantry Division, and the 101st Air Assault Division. The 3rd Infantry Division received their Knights with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3). As of the end of 2004, the Army planned to field the Knight to the 10th Mountain Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard, and the 4th Infantry Division in 2005.241

Key actions occurred in 2005 and 2006. In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the current M1025 version of the HMMWV and the planned replacement the M1114 would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because of increased vehicle weight that created excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement. Subsequently, on 17 April 2006 Headquarters Department of the Army G3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to change the platform of the M707 Knight systems from the M1114 HMMWV based system to a M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system.242

Shortly afterwards, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles, designating the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle base system as the M1200 Armored Knight. Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007. Subsequently, the 10th Mountain Division received five Armored Knights in October 2007. Funding was in place for 370 platforms that would provide all COLT teams in the Army with the M1200 Armored Knight. The 101st Division received the first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007. Regular fielding began in February 2008 and would be completed in 2013.243

Meanwhile in December 2006, work began on a new Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Lightweight Fire Support Platform and continued into 2007. The new CDD established a requirement to provide all COLTs and selected Fire Support Teams in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with the capability to target while

____________________ 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108.

2412004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96. 2422005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; Information Paper, subj: Finding of No

Significant Impact for the M1200 Armored Knight, 17 Apr 06, Doc III-100; M1200 Armored Knight Draft Supplemental Environmental Assessment (Extract), Oct 08, Executive Summary, p. 1, Doc III-101;

243Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97; Briefing, subj: PM Fire Support Platforms Overview, 2007, Doc III-102; Fact Sheet, subj: Armored Knight, 2007, Doc III-103.

129

on the move and under armor. This capability would provide greater lethality and survivability for fire supporter. The CDD was released for TRADOC validation in February 2009.244 Fire Support Sensor System

The Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) was an engineer change proposal to the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The engineer change proposal integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) onto the LRAS3 that in turn could be mounted on the Knight and Striker fire support vehicle (potentially BFIST in the future). The FS3 would be complemented by the platform’s mission equipment package, providing very accurate self-location and accurate target location. The FS3 would be the most capable observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.245

Fielding the FS3 began in 2006. The 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, was retrofitted with the FS3 in February-April 2006. The 4th SBCT received its FS3s in July-September 2006 while the 3rd SBCT, currently deployed, would be retrofitted upon returning from its overseas deployment. The Field Artillery School received its first FS3s in November 2006. The sensor system replaced the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) on the school’s Stryker Fire Support Vehicles. During 2007 work started on integrating the FS3 onto the M3A3 BFIST and continued into 2008.246 Joint Effects Targeting System

In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) convened to discuss a common laser-targeting device and directed the services to develop a common system requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, this capability would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, and special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire). TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers through all existing and planned wave forms. If the JETS were approved, the Army envisioned introducing an enhanced DIOPTIC to meet the TLDS portion of the JETS materiel solution. As of February 2005, the JETS initial capabilities document (ICD) had been completed and sent out for worldwide staffing. On 19 September 2005 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the ICD. As of the end of 2005, requirements determination was underway.247

244Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09. 2452004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 96. 2462005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History,

4 Mar 09, Doc III-97. 2472004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

130

In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead component for JETS. The Army designated Program Executive Office Soldier as the material developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document has begun with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS inclement one was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009.248 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision-guided munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not a man-portable system. In response to this situation and the lack of a man-portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquiring it. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about twenty pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to ten kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system’s weight to thirty-five pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.249

Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. The Army developed a corrective action plan as a result; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army made the decision to move into low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models, but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in

____________________ Command History (ACH), p. 97.

248Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97. 2492000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46.

131

New York City and the Pentagon influenced the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, were scheduled to share sixty-six LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded fifteen test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system’s weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.250

In December 2003 the Army made the full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted its fielding priorities at the same time. Priority of the LRIP systems shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received twenty-one LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received twenty LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School to incorporate the latest technology into enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.251

In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved accelerating LLDR production and included increases in funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2113 Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per month, doubling every six months until a full rate production of forty per month would be achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the entire active and reserve components.252

FY 2007 saw increased production and fielding. By the end of the fiscal year, scheduled production would be up to twenty-two per month. In October 2006 of FY 2007, the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort. These efforts included an improved day-and-night imaging performance, solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability and a five-pound overall weight reduction to the system. The improvement would be available in FY 2010 without an increase in unit cost.253 Lightweight Countermortar Radar

Over the past several years, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to

2502001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 2512004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 2522005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94. 253Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97.

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accompany light, early and force entry forces, the Special Operations Forces had a critical need for a lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) prototype that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of seven thousand meters and a minimum range of one thousand meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area.254

In 2004 the Army started fielding the Special Operations Forces Increment I version of LCMR to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increment I met the immediate needs of deployed army forces, while future spirals (Increment II and out) would satisfy the capability gaps identified the Operational and Organizational Concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006, Increment II provided more rugged hardware and better software and was part of the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) system of systems, while Increment III would double the radar’s range to ten kilometers and improve its accuracy to a fifty-meter target location error.255 Paladin Operations Center Vehicle

The Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in the Field Artillery School initiated the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) in 2005 based on comments received from units in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as two Operational Needs Statements (ONS) received from 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division. In October 2005 there was a start of work meeting to begin development of a Capability Production Document (CPD). The U.S. Army Field Artillery Center approved the CPD on 1 February 2006; and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command approved it on 9 February 2006. The CPD was then forwarded to the Department of the Army for further action.256

The program was designed to replace the M577s and M1068s in the Paladin battalion and the platoon-level command and control vehicles. The POCV was based on the M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle (FAASV) chassis with the ammunition handling equipment removed and replaced with computer workstations that would allow for battle command on the move. The survivability, mobility, and common logistics would increase the capability of the Paladin battalion.257 Command, Control, and Communications Systems

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. Because the Tactical Fire

2542004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100.

2552004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97.

2562005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 94.

257Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History, 4 Mar 09, Doc III-97.

133

Direction System (TACFIRE) was large, heavy, and based on 1950s and 1960s technology, the Army decided to supplant it with a new system. In response to a memorandum of 13 November 1978 from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering that authorized a new computer for fire support command, control, and communications, the Army initiated work on a successor system to TACFIRE. The Army wanted the new system to optimize operational efficiency, simplify training, ease maintenance requirements, reduce life cycle costs, and improve survivability. In 1981 after three years of work, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) approved developing the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to replace TACFIRE and to be a part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) which would be a family of computers, peripherals, operating systems, utilities, and software and would support each individual battlefield operating system.258

After a decade of work on the hardware and the software that was fraught with many developmental delays, the Army decided to field AFATDS software but to introduce it incrementally in versions with each building on the previous to get the software to the field sooner. On 27 April 1990 the Army signed a contract with Magnavox for version one (later renamed AFATDS 96) software. Fielded in 1996-1997, version one software provided initial functionality at all echelons of fire support from the corps to platoon level and integrated field artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, and close air support into planning and execution functions.259

To accommodate growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army planned to field three different variations of AFATDS version two software between 1997 and 1999 as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and version three AFATDS software in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version Seven in 2000 to match Army Battlefield Command System numbering). Fielded in 1998 after developmental delays, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above-corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. Later after completing developmental work and correcting deficiencies in 2000, the Army fielded AFATDS 98 that was the first AFATDS software version to address specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.260

As AFATDS 98 was being fielded to active component units and reserve component units, work on AFATDS A99 moved forward in 2001-2002. Extensive tests in 2001 indicated that AFATDS A99 was capable but that it still required some software corrections that pushed material release and fielding back from 2001 to 2002.261

Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS

2582000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 148-49. 259

Ibid., pp. 149-51. 260

Ibid., pp. 151-54; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112. 2612000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 154-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90.

134

A99, renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. Specifically, it reorganized and simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, incorporated technical fire direction, and was replaced by AFATDS Version 6.3.1 software in 2003. Equally important, the new capabilities of Version 6 allowed eliminating the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Also, AFATDS A99/6 had improved interoperability with other Army Battlefield Command Systems, underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems, including the French Automation des tires et liaison de l-Artillery sol-so (ATLAS), the German Artillerie Daten, Lage und Einsatz-Rechnerverbund (ADLER), the Italian (Sistema Informatico di Reggimento (SIR), and the United Kingdom Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES), and was a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity (ASCA) as of 2007.262

ASCA Version 4 software was fielded by various nations in 2004 and 2005 and was adopted by NATO as STANAG 2245. In 2006 the United Kingdom began transitioning from BATES to Fire Control-Battlefield Information System Application (FC-BISA). The estimated fielding date for FC-BISA was 2010. In 2007 successful ASCA Version 5 Technical testing occurred with an operational evaluation scheduled for 2009. AFATDS software with ASCA Version 5 would be fielded by the U.S. Army in 2010.263

As the fielding of AFATDS 6.3.1 moved forward in 2004, the Army proceeded with the development of AFATDS 6.4 which was formerly AFATDS Version 7. Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum standard, and directed that ABCS was “Good Enough” and that the Army did not need to develop a Version 7 software package. To ensure full integration with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 in 2003-2004. Early in 2005, a general officer steering committee approved universal fielding and training on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4. Subsequently, the Army conducted operational testing at Fort Hood, Texas, provided collective training to active and reserve component units, initiated training in the Field Artillery School in October 2005, and began fielding ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 to the Total Force with completion scheduled for the end of Fiscal Year 2006. Only one Army Guard battalion remained to be fielded, and this came in 2007. In addition to this, AFATDS Version 6.4.0.1, supporting Excalibur, was fielded in 2007, while AFATDS Version 6.4.0.2 was released in September 2008. Priority fielding went to units deploying or deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and

2622000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 102-03; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104.

2632006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 104-05; Email with atch, subj: Command, Control, and Communications Systems 2008, 10 Mar 09, Doc III-104.

135

AFATDS Version 6.5 was granted full materiel release in December 2008.264 During 2007 and 2008, work to restructure AFATDS software to permit it to be

installed and run on personal computers with a Windows operating system began. The ability to operate on Windows increased the options for reusing commercial software applications and helped to control program costs. The first AFATDS Windows version software, version 6.5.1, was scheduled to begin fielding in May 2009. New notebook computers would be fielded in conjunction with the AFATDS Windows based software. Version 6.5.1 contained the same features as the UNIX version 6.5 and was compatible with version 6.5. A Windows version and a UNIX version of software would be provided for each software issue until all UNIX based systems were replaced with the Windows based hardware.265

In 2005 the School also began work on the Effects Management Tool (EMT) which was fire support software that ran on a notebook computer that connected to AFATDS on a local area network. A parallel effort involved developing the Fire Support Coordinator Synchronization Tool that ran on notebook- or tablet-size personal computer. The Fire Support Coordinator Synchronization Tool would provide the fire support coordinator with a remote automated device when he was away from his AFATDS. The Fire Support Coordinator Synchronization Tool would provide relevant and near-real time tactical information on fires, targets, and units and was still in development in 2007 and 2008.266

Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility the Field Artillery and the Army aggressively pursued hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (LWTFDS) (Centaur) for fielding.267

Of the new systems, the PFED was the closest to materiel release beginning in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. A small, one-channel communications capable, portable computer for the forward observer in all divisions, the PFED which was compatible with AFATDS would allow the forward observer to request or coordinate fire missions, provide combat information, receive orders and information, and interface with laser devices. Initially, the Field Artillery and the Army planned to field PFED beginning in March 2004 or April 2004. However, an urgent material release requested by units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) prompted the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager for Field Artillery Tactical Data

2642005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; Email with

atch, subj: Command, Control, and Communications Systems 2008, 10 Mar 09. 265Email with atch, subj: Command, Control, and Communications Systems

2008, 10 Mar 09. 2662004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105. 2672002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105.

136

Systems (TSM FATDS), redesignated as TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) Fire Support Command, Control, Communications (FSC3) in 2006, to move the fielding date up to February 2004 in order to equip the 3-7th Field Artillery so that the unit had the system before it deployed to Iraq. Full materiel release came in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005.268

The LWFTDS (Centaur) would use palm-size computer hardware similar to the PFED, replaced the Backup Computer System (BUCS), and was a stand-alone device. Centaur would also provide early-entry automated fire support capabilities, technical fire control for light fire direction centers and cannon firing platoon leaders, would compute automated safety, and would be fielded starting in FY 2004. As testing indicated, Centaur reduced the time required to compute technical fire direction. Because of an urgent material request by units headed to OIF, TSM FATDS fielded Centaur earlier in 2004 than initially scheduled. In 2007 the Army initiated plans to add limited communications to Centaur to permit download of Muzzle Velocity Data and Meteorological Data from AFATDS and communicate with the Gun Display Unit Replacement (GDU-R).269

COUNTER-ROCKET, ARTILLERY, AND MORTAR In response to the wide range of indirect fire and unconventional threats to U.S.

forces serving in the Global War on Terrorism, the Multi-National Forces, Iraq submitted an operational needs statement to answer the warfighting commanders’ request for a counter-indirect fire capability. Subsequently, U.S. Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to take the lead and to work with in-theater commanders and the Army staff to find solutions to defeat the insurgents and to protect U.S. soldiers and Marines from enemy indirect fires, particularly rockets and mortars, with improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct action being other major sources of injury. This effort, known as Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortars (C-RAM), combined seven tenets into a holistic solution to defeat enemy indirect fires. The tenets included shape, sense, warn, intercept, protect, respond, and integrate. Because of the Field Artillery’s role in combined arms warfare, the Field Artillery School had the responsibility for the shape, warn, sense, and respond tenets and established the Counterstrike Task Force (CSTF) in August 2004 to meet that responsibility.270

2682003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 113-14; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, p. 97, 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 105-06.

2692003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 114; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; Email with atch, subj: Command, Control, and Communications Systems 2008, 10 Mar 09.

270Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 05, Doc I-19, 2004 USAFACFS ACH; Ltc Michael D. Borg, “New Fort Sill Counterstrike Task Force Needs You,” Field

Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 04, p. 17, Doc I-20, 2004 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: Counterstrike Task Force Input to Annual Command History, 11 May 05, Doc I-20a, 2004 USAFACFS ACH; MG David P. Valcourt, BG Robert T. Bray, and CSM Tommy A. Williams, “State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-

137

CSTF’s initial efforts in 2004-2005 produced a wide array of developmental capabilities. The task force looked at ways of providing early warning of incoming rounds, improving overhead protection at base camps, intercepting rounds, improving radar acquisitions of indirect fire, and improving counterfire response times and integrated Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery capabilities to counter enemy indirect fire.271

In cooperation with Fort Bliss’s Intercept Task Force and the C-RAM Program Director, the CSTF conducted a C-RAM capabilities demonstration in 2005 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Through the use of “real world” scenarios, demonstration participants integrated current systems and tactics, techniques, and procedures for immediate use for Central Command. The demonstration proved that the integration of the C-RAM systems of systems (the Lightweight Countermortar System, the Sentinel Radar, the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System, the Wireless Audio Visual Emergency System, and the AN/TPQ-36 or 37 Firefinder Radar), the use of predictive analysis tools, integrated sensor operating pictures for the Joint Defense Operations Center, improved warning systems, integrated clearance of fires procedures for the Joint Defense Operations Center, and forward operating base sense and warn coverage capabilities enabled forward operating base commanders to anticipate and respond to enemy actions in a timely manner.272

Unlike traditional means of countering enemy rockets, artillery, or mortars by employing radars to track the enemy shell back to its source for destruction by counterfire, C-RAM not only complemented existing counterfire radar systems but also took a more aggressive approach. It integrated sensors, imagery, interception, a warning system, and other components to detect, locate, and combat incoming fires. Although the system was tailored for each site in Iraq, it provided the ability to kill not only the incoming enemy fires by intercepting them but also the “shooter.” Since C-RAM had

____________________ Dec 04, pp. 1-5, Doc I-21; Memorandum for Director, Counterstrike Task Force, subj: Coordination of 2004 USAFACFS Annual Command History, 21 Mar 05, Doc I-21a, 2004 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: CSTF History, 8 Feb 05; MG David C. Ralston, “State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 06, pp. 5, Doc III-104a; Maj Christopher C. Corbett, “First C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery Organizes for Combat,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 16-18, Doc III-104b. Note: These tenets were still valid in 2008 according to the Project Manager for C-RAM, see Project Manager, C-RAM Information Paper, undated, Doc III-104bb.

2712004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 15; BG Robert P. Lennox, “NetFires Center of Execllence,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 06, pp. 4-7, Doc III-104bbb.

272Chief of FA E-Note, Nov 05, Doc III-2, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Chief of FA E-Note, Jan 06, Doc III-3, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Ltc Christopher R. Mitchell, “C-RAM Battery: Proposal Would Place Majors in Command of Air Defense Artillery’s Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar Batteries,” Air Defense Artillery Magazine Online, Jan 06, Doc III-4, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Patrecia S. Hollis, “NetFires Center of Excellence,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 06, pp. 4-7, Doc III-5, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Corbett, “First C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery Organizes for Combat,” pp. 16-18.

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become operational about three years ago, U.S. military forces employed it to protect military personnel and installations. In fact, as of 2008 C-RAM furnished over 1,500 localized warnings of incoming attacks so that troops could take protective cover. It also disabled its first incoming round in March 2006 and intercepted its one hundredth round in March 2008.273

In view of C-RAM’s effectiveness, the Army changed the program’s status in 2008. In 2004 the Army approved C-RAM as an initial capability. In 2008 the Army decided to make it a program of record with a program manager and Congressional oversight. As a result, the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill began producing a capability production document for current and future capabilities.274

FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY Project Name: Earth, Wind and Fire 2008 (EWF 08) Event Dates: June 2008 M &S Contributions: The Fires Battle Laboratory’s Constructive Simulations Branch served as the

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Lead for Earth, Wind and Fire 2008 (EWF 08), a top priority TRADOC Future Force Concept experiment. This team of M&S professionals conceived and led the simulation developments and integrations to construct the EWF 08’s Joint distributed interactive simulation federation which replicated and stimulated a “2017” Future Force consisting of the Future Combat System (FCS) Brigade Combat Team, a Fires Brigade, an Aviation Brigade, Space and Missile Defense, Air Force assets, and an equally futuristic opposing force.275

This Fires Battle Laboratory M&S development team made the EWF 08 M&S federation possible by first enhancing FireSim XXI to provide a realistic Common Operating Picture (COP) and the soldier-in-the-loop command and control surrogates which were then integrated with live tactical C4ISR systems.

FireSim XXI simulated the Field Artillery and maneuver forces at Fires Battle Laboratory and integrated with diverse simulations across many distributed sites to include: EADSIM and RTOS at AMDBL-Ft. Bliss (to simulate the air defense and directed energy), EADSIM at SMDBL-Huntsville (for Joint and National sensors), ATCOM at AMBL-Ft. Rucker (Army aviation), CES at SIGCEN-Ft. Gordon

273LTG Wilson Shoffner, “Transformation of Artillery: Continuity and Change,”

Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 09, pp. 4-8, Doc III-104c; Information Paper, subj: Countering Capability Intercepts 100 Rocket, Mortar in Iraq, 9 May 08, Doc III-104d; Information Paper, 447th Expeditionary Group, 21 Jan 09, Doc III-104dd; Briefing, subj: C-RAM and Base Defense Presentation to the 2009 AUSA Fires Symposium, 17-19 Mar 09, Doc III-104ddd.

274Information Paper, subj: Countering Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars, 2008, Doc III-104e; “Army C-RAM Intercepts 100th Mortar Bomb in Iraq,” Defense Update, May 08, Doc III-104f.

275Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab’s 2008 History, 17 Apr 09, Doc III-105. The entire Fires Battle Laboratory section is based upon this document.

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(communication effects), STAGE at USAF’s DMOC-Kirtland AFB (fixed-wing air), and FireSim XXI at ARDEC-Picatinny Arsenal (special weapons) among other M&S simulations and tools. The EWF08 federation was further developed to interoperate with live tactical C4ISR to include: Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS), Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS), and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) among others.

This “6000+” entity-level M&S federation supported seamless integration of all Fires with realistic, resolute air-to-air and air-to-ground air space de-confliction.

The functionality, the fidelity, and the scale of this EWF 08 simulation federation elevated the M&S state-of-the-art in U.S. Army experimentation to new levels of realism and tactical utility.

EWF 08 outcomes provided insights for U.S. Army doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with emphasis on Brigade-and-Below airspace command and control to ensure the seamless integration of fires during tactical operations.

Project Name: Omni-Fusion 2008 (OF 08) Event Dates: Sep 2008 M &S Contributions: The Fires Battle Laboratory Constructive Simulations Branch served as the

Simulations Technical Lead for the Field Artillery proponent in TRADOC’s Omni-Fusion 2008 (OF 08) experiment. The Fires Battle Laboratory simulated, integrated, and tested a futuristic fires force for the OF08 simulated battlefield. This large-scale, high-priority TRADOC experiment employed fifteen models, simulations, C2 devices, and M&S tools to simulate over 18,000 entities distributed across 11 simulation sites (9 TRADOC Battle Labs, the ARCIC Headquarters, and the Ft. Gordon NOSC).

The OF 08 Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) architecture stimulated Brigade-and-Below staffs as well as the Future Modular Division staff. It also provided them a Common Operating Picture (COP). OF 08 soldier-in-loop operational staffs were immersed on a realistic simulated battlefield where full spectrum operations were supported.

For OF 08, FireSim XXI was modified to afford Blue and Red Force operational teams with Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) capabilities necessary to plan and direct tactical movements of simulated units in semi-automated fashion. FireSim XXI’s external Call-For-Fire (CFF) mission processing was enhanced to accommodate network CFFs which use the commander’s guidance to allocate fires.

To support OF 08 technology goals, FireSim’s first High-Level Architecture (HLA) version was created using Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) Middleware libraries.

OF 08 outcomes will support the reset of organizations training to regain their core competencies and will aid the design of future systems, organizations, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).

In addition, the OF 08 establishment of the BLCSE Federation 2.0 impacted the future of Army experiments by transitioning TRADOC from Distributed Interactive Simulations (DIS) to High-Level Architecture (HLA), and by accommodating initial employment of OneSAF in Army experimentation. The Fires Battle Laboratory played a

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significant role in these top-priorities. TRADOC M&S infrastructure initiatives. Project Name: Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) Event Dates: Continuous and ongoing development. M&S Contributions: The initiative simulated and integrated “Fires” for the Joint Fires and Effects

Trainer System (JFETS), the U.S. Army’s state-of-the-art immersive training environment. JFETS enables live forward observers and staff to train realistically in fast-paced, mobile scenarios, and in complex, urban combat settings using photorealistic and computer-generated scenes.

Project Name: Thunder Fusion I (CRADA event) Event Dates: 21-24 Oct 2008 M &S Contributions: The Fires Battle Laboratory’s Constructive Simulations Branch served as the

Operational and Technical Lead for Thunder Fusion I, the initial investigation event in support of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Space & Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT) and Raytheon to explore the integration of Field Artillery and Integrated Air & Missile Defense from 2008 to 2012. Fires Battle Laboratory, FCoE participated in the CRADA through a memorandum of agreement with SMDC. Thunder Fusion I was the first of three planned events to explore potential benefits of networking sensors and integrating Air & Missile Defense (AMD) and Field Artillery (FA) battle command systems to provide increased target location accuracy and simplify clearance of ground and airspace for fires.

Fires Battle Lab constructed Thunder Fusion’s Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) federation to generate its synthetic battlefield and replicate the sensor and platform functionalities, and the virtual command and control system and network functions above and below the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) command echelon. Simulations were integrated with live battle command systems, visual displays and operators to perform the key functions of the SBCT Main CP and compare Thunder Fusion’s alternative battle command and system architectures.

Simulations included: (1) FireSim XXI to simulate functionality of FA FireFinder Radar, LCMR,

Shadow unmanned aerial systems (UAS), Reconnaissance Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) Stryker ground patrols, friendly FA and threat firing platforms, and FA conventional and precision munition capabilities; to provide Forward Area Air Defense Data Link (FDL) format air tracks to live battle command systems (for each architecture) and FA sensor data feeds to live and virtual AFATDS.

(2) SISTIM to simulate the Fires Battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) to Firing Battery FDC/gun line, stimulating AFATDS and Fire Control System digital messaging.

(3) Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) to simulate ADA sensor platforms, Sentinel and Patriot; to provide Patriot sensor feed Tactical Digital

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Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J)/Link-16 message format air tracks to the ADA battle command system, Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2), AMDWS and Total Battlefield Situational Awareness (TBSA) system.

Case 1 (Base) represented the current battle command architecture with Army Battle Command System (ABCS) version 6.4 linkages and unilateral sensor-to-shooter linkages existing in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team with division and theater asset support provided. Case 2 (Prototype) utilized a prototype battle command system architecture that provided Fires, Air and Maneuver staff sections a common 3-dimensional (3D) viewing system and digital clearance of fires capability. Case 2 also replicated the effects of Field Artillery sensors that communicate over a futuristic network to fuse and correlate target data, providing improved target location accuracy for FA lethal fires. Case 2 featured a prototype Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and Total Battlefield Situational Awareness (TBSA) tools provided by Raytheon.

Thunder Fusion I objectives were to explore operational improvements to the clearance of joint precision fires by networking sensors and integrating battle command systems. Specific focus was on:

(1) Streamline clearance of fires, deconfliction of airspace and ground by integrating battle command systems.

(2) Improve target acquisition by fusing data from multiple sensors. Insights gained were: (1) Fused RADAR data in Case 2 improved target location accuracy;

increasing the number of targets meeting selection criteria in accordance with rules of engagement, and increasing the use of precision munitions.

(2) Battle Command System Architecture in Case 2 achieved faster and simpler ground and air deconfliction through the use of common clients that depict munition flight paths for FA firing solutions in relationship to the air and ground situation in 3D. Analysis showed a reduction in airspace coordination timelines by fifty percent in Case 2 over Case1. However, when airspace coordination for fires is required in either case, timelines remain too long to engage fleeting targets with lethal FA fires. In these cases additional sensors must be available for immediate cueing to track fleeting targets that are initially acquired by battlefield radar.

Project Name: Hamilton Digital Training Facility (HDTF) “Fires” simulation Event Date(s): Periodic throughout 2008. M&S Contributions: Provided simulation of real world Fires architectures and tactical interfaces for

Fort Sill’s Hamilton Digital Training Facility (HDTF) and for the U.S. Air Force Distributed Mission Operations Center (DMOC) at Kirtland AFB in support of periodic Virtual Flag joint fire training exercises. In addition, stimulated fielded Fires structures for HDTF to support Mission Readiness Exercises (MRE) for 7 Fires Regiments from 75th FiB and 214th FiB. These MREs supported unit training and enabled validation of their Fires Battalions to enter ARFORGEN and for deployment. The HDTF staff employed FireSim XXI and the FireSim-related M&S tools to simulate (and to stimulate)

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“Fires” structures for these exercises; the Fires Battle Lab M&S developers maintained FireSim to support.

Project Name: Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE) Event Dates: November/December 2008 M &S Contributions: The Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE) (formerly called Air

Assault Expeditionary Force) managed by Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL) at Fort Benning, Georgia, in coordination with TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), conducted experiments through live force-on-force and constructive, virtual-land simulations. AEWE provided a repeatable, credible, validated venue for network enabled small unit experimentation focused on emerging technologies and concepts in a live field environment providing operational insights across the DOTMLPF supporting AEWE Campaign Objectives and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for the current and future force.

Live AEWE experiments at Fort Benning, called Spirals, provided infrastructure, maneuver area, and fully instrumented ranges and facilities needed to conduct distributed/dispersed experiments over a 225-square-mile training area. AEWE experimentation supported critical Army efforts to shorten material developments, to support the evolution of relevant doctrine and TTPs, and to support the current force/fight while examining future force requirements through a linked campaign of experimentation.

Fires Battle Laboratory contributed to AEWE Spiral E by simulating the real-time “Fires” responses for AEWE’s robust C4ISR structure which included manned AFATDS and FBCB2 nodes. To do so, FireSim’s simulated “Fires” force was seamlessly integrated with AEWE’s live C4ISR architecture. Fire requests which originated from modern sensors, live c2 systems, and Land Warrior systems were allocated and fired (as tactically appropriate) by FireSim- simulated fire units. In addition, FireSim simulated AEWE’s counterfire radars and the counterfire fight.

In parallel, to support Spiral E analytics, FireSim also simulated the “Fires” force for AEWE’s purely constructive simulations federation.

The purpose of Spiral E was to inform Future Combat System (FCS) to Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) acceleration, inform the PM-FCS, Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID) and PM Land Warrior on weight, power, form-fit protection of the Experiment Force (EXFOR) Soldier load, integrate Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV); provide Soldier feedback on protection and power, enhanced night vision capability for PM-FCS, FFID, and PM Land Warrior; inform/validate optimum manning, organization and structure of the company to PM-FCS, FFID, PM Land Warrior and TCM-Soldier; provide input to PM-FCS on the optimum mix/allocation of UAS at Battalion and below; inform FFID and PM-FCS on impact of UAS at company level; develop TTPs for Battle Command Systems, UAS, UGV and Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) supporting doctrine and training development to inform AEWE strategic partners; provide insights to FCS to IBCT on BOIP, DOTMLPF issues/questions and Warfighting issues/questions.

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Project Name: Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability – Entity Resolution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF)

Event Dates: JLCCTC-ERF simulation integration support is continuous and ongoing; ERF v5.0 integration culminated in July 2008 and a maintenance release version, ERF v5.1, was tested and validated in November 2008. The Fires Battle Lab’s field/lab support to worldwide JLCCTC-ERF sites is continuous, ongoing, and unfunded.

M &S Contributions: Simulated current fielded Fires architectures with FireSim XXI and seamlessly

interfaced live Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) with FireSim-simulated “Fires” structures and ExCIS FSA for the Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability – Entity Resolution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF). JLCCTC-ERF is the U.S. Army’s simulation-driven federation used to provide worldwide Brigade-and-Below staff training. ERF simulations stimulate C4ISR systems in a unit’s tactical operations center. ERF sites facilitate Battlestaff collective training by challenging staffs to react to incoming digital information while executing their commander's tactical plan. ERF simulation/training sites include: Ft. Hood, TX; Ft. Lewis, WA; Ft. Stewart, GA; Ft. Bragg, NC; Ft. Drum, NY; Ft. Campbell, KY; Ft. Carson, CO, Ft. Wainwright, AK; Ft. Richardson, AK; Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA; Schofield Barracks, HI; Camp Casey (2ID Warfighter BCTC), Korea; Ft. Dix, NJ; Ft. Polk, LA (BCTC); Ft. Irwin, CA (NTC); Ft. Sill, OK (BCTC); and Reserve sites.

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) validated and accepted modified ERF federations (to include FireSim) via Operational Requirements Evaluations (ORE) for ERF v5.0 (July 2008) and ERF v5.1 (November 2008).

Fires Battle Lab’s dominant ERF M&S challenge for 2008, was making FireSim comply with ERF’s High Level Architecture (HLA) of choice, i.e., JFCOM’s JLVC HLA. This major FireSim code development (led by Ron Laird) achieved “native” HLA compliance for FireSim (i.e., this HLA compliance required no “middleware” or external “gateway” software).

Another major ERF M&S challenge stemmed from the fielding of AFATDS Software Block II, which was considerably different from previous versions. A tandem effort between FireSim developers and ExCIS developers (UT-CAT) is ongoing and on-track to maintain FireSim interoperability with AFATDS Software Block II.

Project Name: Closed-Loop Simulation Event Date(s): Ongoing into 2009. M&S Contributions: Fires Battle Laboratory’s M&S developers are working to integrate live FA

systems, simulators, and simulations to provide a flexible, plug-and-play “closed-loop” training capability for the 5th Brigade Combat Team (BCT)/1st Armored Division Fires Battalion. Though the Army already owned M&S potentially useful to this cause, the complex and necessary integrations of these M&S tools with tactical systems and with one another were either undone or outdated.

Fires Battle Laboratory’s ongoing integrations within this effort include the development of a “message parser” to translate AFATDS messages into a format understood and actionable by the Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

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(FSCATT). Also under development are the software developments necessary to facilitate digital forward observer (FO) training as requested by TCM Cannon. The final goal is to provide a closed-loop simulation capability for an observer in the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) to generate the FO calls-for-fire using real-world tactical systems (e.g., Forward Observer System (FOS)) and send them either through AFATDS (FSE/FDC, etc.) to guns simulated by constructive simulation and/or to FSCATTs -- and/or send them through the NLOS Control Cell for firing action -- to complete the loop.

As the final product takes shape, the M&S must accommodate the requirements of many. E.g., Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID) is working with Ft. Sill to integrate the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) into the architecture, and the Battalion Commander asked the development team to determine a means to place a Company Observer Laser Team (COLT) into the CCTT and to integrate the COLT into the final solution.

Several component-level technical challenges were met in 2008, and this project continues on-track and on-target in 2009.

Project Name: Cameron University MOA Event Date(s): Jan 2009 (est. MOA); Summer 2009 (first students) M&S Contributions: Established a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Fires Battle Lab

and Cameron University’s Department of Computing and Technology to expose their most advanced Computer Science students to real world M&S development problems in a professional workplace. This MOA affords FBL with opportunities identify and recruit promising local M&S development talent, and marks progress in Fort Sill’s quest for a mutual M&S working relationship. FBL will host their first Computer Science students in the Summer 2009 semester. Cameron credits are to be award for successful projects.

Project Name: Close Combat Networked Weapons & Sensors (CCNW&S) Event Date(s): April/May 2008 M&S Contributions: In support of a key US Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and

Engineering Center (AMRDEC) led Army Training Objective (ATO), the Soldier Battle Lab conducted the CCNW&S Experiment to quantify the potential force-multiplying battlefield effects of “networked” close combat weapon and sensor systems within the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).

Fires Battle Lab integrated FireSim XXI into CCNW&S’s live-virtual-constructive environment at Fort Benning to simulate the exercise’s 105mm howitzers and its 120mm mortars. FireSim’s fire units responded to heavy mission loads from live, manned FBCB2’s and from Mission DB Protocol Data Units (PDU) generated by Universal Controllers. This CCNW&S environment featured tactical networking of weapons and sensors in a Company-sized dismounted unit - a capability that does not normally exist in the real-world.

Project Name: FCoE Simulations Strategy Event Date(s): Ongoing

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M&S Contributions: In response to the increasing complexity of Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

efforts at Fort Sill, coupled with the transition to a Center of Excellence supporting the FA and ADA Schools, Mr. Kirby Brown, the Deputy Commanding General of Fort Sill, established the Simulations Integrated Product Team (IPT) on 19 June 2008 to address these challenges. The initiatives of the Simulations IPT were to develop a Strategic Plan for Simulations that included all stakeholders and to conduct an organization review and recommend an optimum organization for management and planning of simulations.

Under the direction of the Fires Battle Laboratory, M&S Division, the Simulation Strategy team guided the IPT and contributed to the initiatives by first completing historical and doctrinal research of simulation initiatives Army wide. The team then recommended a simulations management organization to lead current and future simulation efforts within the new Fires CoE organization. A new simulations organization was adopted under the G3/5/7 of the new Fires Center of Excellence staff. After receiving input from many IPT members and stakeholders regarding shortfalls for use and integration of simulations, the team developed and received approval of a Gap Analysis for simulation gaps and inefficiencies. This formed the basis for the drafting and staffing of the Fires Simulation Strategy, pending approval NLT Jun 2009.

The completion of these initiatives and implementation of the strategy will resolve current simulation challenges, streamline training capability/interoperability, and position the Fires CoE for agile integration of emerging simulation technologies in support of training and experimentation requirements.

Project Name: Trident Warrior 2008 (TW08). Event Dates: 9-30 Jun 2008. M &S Contributions: Fires Battle Laboratory supported the U.S. Navy’s annual major FORCEnet Sea

Trial sponsored by Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) for Trident Warrior 08, a Navy experiment intended to provide a rapid fielding of improved FORCEnet Command and Control warfighting capability to the fleet. It included supporting tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) to best use this capability to optimize execution of Naval operations.

In support of the Marine Detachment (MARDET), Fires Battle Laboratory stimulated a host of manned C4ISR systems within the Fires Integrated Test Bed to replicate a USMC Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (CRAM) architecture. In this Joint venture, Fires Battle Lab simulation/stimulation capabilities enabled the ground counterfire common operating picture (COP) to be sent over a Maritime network to forces afloat and the amphibious forces were provided situational awareness of the enemy indirect fire picture. TW09 planning has begun and the U.S. Navy is actively seeking fires initiatives experimentation.

GLOSSARY AAEF, Air Assault Expeditionary Force AAR, After Action Review ABCS, Army Battlefield Command System AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant ACAAP, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program ACAT, Acquisition Category ACH, Annual Command History ACR, Armored Cavalry Regiment ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADA, Air Defense Artillery ADTLP, Army Training and Leader Development Panel AETF, Army Evaluation Task Force AEWE, Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AG, Adjutant General AGM, Attack Guidance Matrix AHR, Annual Historical Review AI, Artificial Intelligence, Air Interdiction AIT, Advanced Individual Training ALC, Advanced Leader Course ALZ, Assault Landing Zone AMCB, Army/Marine Corps Board AMRDEC, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center ANCOC, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course AOEWC, Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course API, Application Program Interface APU, Auxiliary Power Unit AR2B, Army Requirements and Review Board ARAC, Army Radar Approach Control ARCIC, Army Capabilities Integration Center ARFOR, Army Forces ARL, Army Research Laboratory ARNG, Army National Guard AROC, Army Oversight Council ASAALT, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council ASAS, All-source Analysis System ASI, Additional Skill Identifier ASMP, Army Strategic Mobility Program ASV, Armored Security Vehicle ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System ATACS, Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System ATC, Artillery Training Center

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ATCAS, Advanced Towed Cannon System ATCCS, Army Tactical Command and Control System ATCOM, Advanced Tactical Combat Model ATDL, Army Training Digital Library ATLAS, Advanced Technology Light Artillery System ATLDP, Army Training and Leader Development Panel ATSC, Army Training Support Center ATTD, Advanced Technological Transition Demonstration AUSA, Association of the United States Army AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System BASOPS, Base Operations BAT P3I, BAT Preplanned Product Improvement BAT, Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition BCBL, Battle Command Battle Laboratory BCD, Battlefield Coordination Detachment BCPT, Battle Command Post Training BCS, Battery Computer System BCT, Brigade Combat Team BCTP, Battle Command Training Program BDA, Battlefield Damage Assessment BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle BFSA, Blue Force Situational Awareness BLCS, Battle Lab Collaborative Simulations Environment BLOS, Beyond Line-of-Sight BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course BOLC, Basic Officer Leaders Course BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure BSC, Battle Simulation Center C2, Command and Control C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance CAS, Close Air Support CAST, Close Air Support Trainer CBRNE, Chemical, Biological, radiological, and Nuclear Explosive CCC, Captains Career Course

Co-Op Coordination Council CCF, Course-correcting Fuse CCNW&S, Close Combat Networked Weapons and Sensors CDD, Capability Development Document CDID, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command CEP, Concept Evaluation Program/Concept Experimentation Program CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer CFLCC, Coalition Forces Land Component Command

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CG, Commanding General CGRS, Common Grid Reference System CGS, Command Ground Station CGSC, Command and General Staff College CIF, Central Issue Facility CIM, Centralized Installation Management CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force CMF, Career Management Field COB, Command Operating Budget COE, Center of Excellence/Contemporary Operational Environment COF, Correlation of Forces COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team

Concept Technology Demonstration CONOPS, Concept of Operations CONUS, Continental United States COP, Common Operating Picture CPD, Capabilities Production Document CPP, Command Post Platform CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement C-RAM, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortars CRSS, Common Reconfigurable Sensor System CSTF, Counterstrike Task Force CTC, Combat Training Center CTET, Collective Training Evaluation Team CTV, Captive Test Vehicle D&SABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DA, Department of the Army DAB, Defense Acquisition Board DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian DAIG, Department of the Army Inspector General DAMA, Defense Against Mortar Attack DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DCA, Directorate of Community Activities DCD, Directorate of Combat Developments DCG, Deputy Commanding General DCP, Directorate of Civilian Personnel DCSINT, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence DCSOPST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training DCSRM, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management DCST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training DENTAC, U.S. Army Dental Activity DFAS, Defense Finance and Accounting Service DFCS, Digital Flight Control System DIOPTIC, Dismounted Optic System

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DIS, Distributed Interactive Simulation DIVE, Dynamic Interactive Virtual Environment DL, Distance Learning/Distributive Learning DMD, Digital Message Device DMOC, Distributed Mission Operations Center DMWR, Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOC, Directorate of Contracting DOD, Department of Defense DOES, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization DOIM, Directorate of Information Management DOL, Directorate of Logistics DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine DOTE, Directorate of Training and Evaluation DOTMLPF, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and

Facilities DOTS, Directorate of Training Support DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition DPS, Directorate of Public Safety DPTM, Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization DPW, Directorate of Public Works DRM, Directorate of Resource Management DSABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DTLOMS, Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, DTT, Doctrine, Tactics, and Techniques EBCT, Evaluation Brigade Combat Team EBO, Effects Based Operations EBTV, Enhanced Ballistic Test Vehicle ECC, Effects Coordination Cell ECOORD, Effects Coordinator ECP, Engineering Change Proposal ECU, Environmental Control Unit EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing EDTM, Enlisted Distribution Target Model EEA, Essential Elements of Analysis EEO, Equal Opportunity Office EGT, Effects Guidance Tool EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development ER, Extended Range ESIT, Extended System Integration Test ESS, Essential Soldier Skill EST, Engagement Skills Trainer EW, Electronic Warfare EXFOR, Experiment Force F2C2, Future Fires Command Control

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F2DSS, Future Fires Decision Support System FA, Field Artillery FAA, Federal Aviation Administration FAASV, Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle FAC, Forward Air Controller FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course FACP, Field Artillery Campaign Plan FADAC, Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer FAOAC, Field Artillery Officer Advance Course FAOBC, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course FAS, Field Artillery School FATC, Field Artillery Training Center FBCB2, Force Battle Command Brigade and Below FBCT, Future Brigade Combat System FCS, Future Combat System FDC, Fire Direction Center FDIC, Futures Development and Integration Center FDO, Fire Direction Officer FDS, Fire Direction System FDTE, Force Development Test and Evaluation FEC, Fires and Effects Center FECC, Fire Effects Coordination Cell FECM, Fires and Effects Command Module FED, Forward Entry Device FF, Firefinder FFID, Future Force Integration Directorate FID, Fires Integration Division FIST, Fire Support Team FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle FLIR, Forward Looking Infrared FLOT, Forward Line of Troops FM, Field Manual FMTV, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles FOB, Forward Operating Base FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command FOTE, Follow-on Test and Evaluation FOXS, Forward Observer Exercise Simulation FPCON, Force Protection Condition FRAGO, Fragmentary Order FRP, Full-rate Production FS3, Fire Support Sensor System FSC, Fire Support Center FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications FSCAOD, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

151

FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed FSCOORD, Fire Support Coordinator FSE, Fire Support Element FSKN, Fire Support Knowledge Network FSO, Fire Support Officer FSST, Fire Support Sustainment Tool FSTS, Fire Support Training Strategy FTX, Field Training Exercise FUE, First Unit Equipped FY, Fiscal Year GAO, General Accounting Office GBS, Global Broadcasting System GCTT, Ground Combat Tactical Trainer GIT, Gender-integrated Training GLPS, Gun Laying Positioning System GMR, Ground Mobile Radio GOSC, General Officer Steering Committee GPS, Global Positioning System GS, General Support GSM, Ground Station Module GSU, Garrison Support Unit GUARDFIST II, Guard Unit Armory Device-Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer II GUI, Graphical User Interface GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Location Designator GWOT, Global War on Terror HBCT, Heavy Brigade Combat Team HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HITL, Human in the Loop HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HQ, Headquarters HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IAV, Interim Armored Vehicle IBCT, Initial/Interim Brigade Combat Team ICD, Initial Capabilities Document ICT, Institute for Creative Technology IDT, Inactive Duty IED, Improvised Explosive Device IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers IET, Initial Entry Training IFCS, Improved Fire Control System IFSAS, Interim Fire Support Automated System/Initial Fire Support Automated System ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System

152

IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System IPDS, Improved Positioning Determining System IPT, Integrated Product Team IWIU, Improved Weapon Interface Unit JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate JACKKNIFE, Joint Networked Fires and Effects JAG, Judge Advocate General JCATS, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation JEFEX, Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System JFCAAT, Joint Fires Combined Arms Assessment JFCOE, Joint Fires Center of Excellence JFCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command JFECS, Joint Fires and Effects Course JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System JFO, Joint Fires Observer JFU, Joint Fires University JIM, Joint Improvement and Modernization JLCCTC-ERF, Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability - Entity

Resolution Federation JNN, Joint Network Node JOFEC, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course JORD, Joint Operational Requirements Document JPSD, Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office JROC, Joint Oversight Council JRTC, Joint Readiness Training Center JSTARS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller KPP, Key Performance Parameter LAM, Loiter Attack Missile LARIAT, Loiter and Route Interactive Analysis Tool LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program LCD, Liquid Crystal Display LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LED, Light Emitting Diode LFCC, Lawton/Fort Sill Chamber of Commerce LFED, Lightweight Forward Entry Device LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder LOAL, Lock-on-after Launch LOS, Line-of-Sight LRAS3, Long-range Advanced Scout Surveillance System LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production LSAC, Low Signature Armored Cab LSAC-H, Low Signature Armored Cab HIMARS

153

LSI, Lead System Integrator LVC, Live-virtual Constructive LW, Lightweight LWTFDS, Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System M&S, Modeling and Simulation MACS, Modular Artillery Charge System MANCEN, Maneuver Support Center MANPRINT, Manpower Personnel Integration MAPEX, Map exercise MAPS, Modular Azimuth Positioning System MARDET, Marine Detachment MC2, Mobile Command and Control MCA, Military Construction, Army MCG, Mobile Command Group MCO, Major Combat Operations MDMP, Military decision making process MELIOS, Miniaturized Eye-Safe Laser Infrared Observation Set METL, Mission Essential Task List MICOM, U.S. Army Missile Command MITT, Military Transition Team MLCS, Modular Launcher Communication System MLRS, Multiple-Launch Rocket System MMS, Meteorological Measuring Set MNF-I, Multinational Force Iraq MOA, Memorandum of Agreement MOS, Military Occupational Specialty MOUT, Military Operations in Urban Terrain MRE, Meals Ready to Eat MRE, Mission Readiness Exercises MRS, Mobility Requirements Study MSTAR, MLRS Smart Tactical Rocket/Manportable Surveillance and Target Acquisition

System MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment MTP, Mission Training Plan MTT, Mobile Training Team MUSE, Multiple Unified Simulation Environment NCO, Noncommissioned Officer NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System NET, New Equipment Training NETD, New Equipment Training Detachment NETT, New Equipment Training Team NETWARCOM, Naval Networked Warfare Command NFE, Networked Fires Environment NLOS, Non-Line of Sight

154

NSWC, Naval Surface Warfare Center NSWCDD, Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren Division NTC, National Training Center O&O, Organizational and Operational OAC, Officer Advance Course OBC, Officer Basic Course OCIE, Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment OCONUS, Outside Continental United States ODCPRO, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs ODCSOPS, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations OES, Officer Education System OFOTB, Objective Force One SAF Testbed Baseline OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom OIPT, Overarching Integrated Product Team OMA, Operational Maintenance, Army ONS, Operational Needs Statement OPLAN, Operational Plan OPNET, Operational New Equipment Training OPORD, Operation Order OPTEMPO, Operational Tempo ORD, Operational Requirements Document OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSUT, One-Station Unit Training OTM, Open Terrain Module P3I, Preplanned Product Improvement PAM, Precision Attack Missile PAO, Public Affairs Office PBS2, Phoenix Battlefield Sensor System PCS, Permanent Change of Station PD-CFFT, Product Director, Call for Fire Trainer PEO STRI, Program Executive Officer for Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation PEO, Program Executive Officer PERSCOM, Personnel Command PFED, Palm Forward Entry Device Pff, Preformed Fragmentation Round PFRMS, Precision Fires, Rockets, and Missile System PGK, Precision Guidance Kit PI, Product Improvement PIM, Paladin Integrated Management PK, Probability of Kill PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course PM, Program Manager POCV, Paladin Operations Center Vehicle POI, Program of Instruction POM, Program Objective Memorandum

155

POV, Privately Owned Vehicle PQT, Production Qualification Test PSS-SOF, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces QAO, Quality Assurance Office QRU, Quick Reaction Unitary RAM, Random Access Memory RAMS, Rocket and Missile Systems RC, Reserve Component RCIED, Radio-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices RFPI ACTD, Rapid Force Projection Initiative Advanced RFPI, Rapid Force Projection Initiative ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition RTI, Regional Training Institute S&C4ISR, Space and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer, Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition SATS, Standard Army Training System SAW, Squad Automatic Weapon SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team SBL, Soldier Battle Laboratory SDD, System Design and Development SGT, Sergeant SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SLC, Senior Leader Course SMDC/ARSTRAT, Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment SOCOM, Special Operations Forces Command Historian SRM, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization SSC, Small-scale Contingency SSG, Staff Sergeant SSM, Surface-to-Surface Missile ST, Special Text STOW, Synthetic Theater of War STRAP, System Training Plan STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office STRI, Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation STX, Situational Training Exercise T3BL, Training and Training and Technology Battle Laboratory TAA, Total Army Analysis TAC, Tactical Command Center

Terminal Attack Controller TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations

156

TAMMS, Target Area Meteorological Measuring System TASS, Total Army School System TATS, The Army Training System TBG, TRADOC Budget Guidance TBSA, Total Battlefield Situational Awareness TC, Terminal Controller TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition/TRADOC Capabilities Manager TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances TDY, Temporary Duty TECS, Target Effects Coordination System TELS, Transporters, Erectors, and Launchers TF, Task Force TFSO, Training Set Fire Observation TIM, Transformation in Installation Management TIMS, Target Identification and Meteorological System TLDS, Target Location Designation System TMA, Training Mission Area TOC, Tactical Operations Center TPFDD, Time-Phased Deployment Document TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRAP, TRADOC Remedial Action Program TSC, Training Service Center TSM, TRADOC System Manager TSP, Training Support Package TSSAM, Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures T-VSAT, Tactical-Very Small Aperture Terminal UA, Unit of Action UADEV, Unit of Action Development UAMBL, Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Laboratory UAS, Unmanned Aerial System UAV, Unmanned aerial/air vehicle UE, Unit of Employment UFD, User Functional Description UGS, Unattended Ground Sensor UGV, Unmanned Ground Vehicle USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College USAFAC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center USAFACFS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill USAFACS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFATC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center USAFCOE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence USAFCOEFS, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill USAIC, U.S. Army Infantry Center

157

USAMAA, U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency USAOTEC, U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command USAR, U.S. Army Reserve USFJCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command USFK, United States Forces, Korea USMC, U.S. Marine Corps USPACOM, U.S. Pacific Command UTM, Urban Terrain Module VC, Virtual Character VCSA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army VS, Viper Strike VSEL, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited VTC, Video Training Conference VTT, Video Teletraining WCBF, World Class Blue Force WIDD, Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate WLC, Warrior Leadership Course WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course WOES, Warrant Officer Education System WRAP, Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program WTC, Warrior Transition Course

158

APPENDIX ONE STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

428th Field Artillery Brigade Course Initial Inputs Graduates FACCC 2-6-C22 283 282 FACCC DL 97 97 FABOLC III 840 849 BOLC II 3,781 3,748 WOES 124 125 Direct Commissioning Course 97 97 AIT 6,629 6,441 USMC 1,392 1,359 Other Courses 2,627 2,512 Total 15,780 15,510

434th Field Artillery Brigade BCT 13,462 12,932 Warrior Transition Course 1,566 1,506 Total 15,028 14,438

Noncommissioned Officer Academy BNCOC 1,073 1,061 ANCOC 452 449 Warrior Leadership Course 644 441 Total 2,169 1,951

Grand Total for FY2008 33,067 31,899 Foreign Military Students 147 147

Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Production FY08, 16 Mar 09, Doc II-121.

159

APPENDIX TWO KEY USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery:

MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 07-present Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School:

COL Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 07-1 Jul 08 COL Anne M. Baker, 2 Jul 08-8 Sep 08 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 08-present

Deputy Assistant Commandant-National Guard COL Robert W. Roshell, 1 Feb 07-present Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine

COL Frank J. Siltman, 1 Jun 06-present Joint and Combined Integration Directorate COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 26 Sep 06-1 Apr 08 COL Billy F. Sprayberry, 30 Jun 08-present Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment

COL John S. Fant, 11 Jul 08-present Commander, 434th Field Artillery Brigade:

COL Richard F. Bowyer, 8 Jun 08-present Commandant, Noncommissioned Officers Academy:

CSM Dean J. Keveles, 19 Nov 07-present Director, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate Kirby Brown, 27 Aug 07-present

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APPENDIX THREE KEY USAFCOEFS PERSONNEL

Commanding General/Commandant of U.S. Army Field Artillery School/Chief of Field Artillery:

MG Peter M. Vangjels, 13 Sep 07-present Chief of Staff:

COL John Uberti, 7 Aug 07-Jul 08 COL Petrenko, Aug 08-present

Deputy Commanding Officer-Army National Guard: COL (P) Ricky G. Adams, 28 Sep 06-present

Garrison Commander: COL Robert S. Bridgford, 10 Jul 07-present

Director, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation: Brenda J. Spencer-Ragland, Jan 02-present

Director, Directorate of Civilian Personnel: John D. Kerr, 29 Sep 96-present

Director, Directorate of Information Management: Kathy Banks-Monroe, Dec 02-present

Director, Directorate of Logistics: T.S. Haymend, 12 May 96-Oct 05 Denise Taylor, 2 Oct 05-present

Director, Directorate of Human Resources James A. Miller, 2008-present

Director, Directorate of Resource Management: Robert L. Hanson, 8 Jul 96-Apr 08 Julie S. Young, Apr 08-present

Director, Directorate of Public Works Randy Butler, 18 Apr 05-present

Director, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security: Thomas R. Kelly, 1 Oct 07-present

Director, Directorate of Emergency Services Robert Pirtle, 2007-present

161

APPENDIX FOUR FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, l9 Jul l9ll-l5 Sep l9l4 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep l9l4-26 Jun l9l6 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul l9l7-26 Sep l9l7 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-ll May l9l8 BG Laurin L. Lawson, ll May l9l8-l8 Dec l9l8 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec l9l8-l0 Jun l9l9 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun l9l9-9 Jul l9l9 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct l9l9-l Jul l923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul l923-l Apr l928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr l928-l2 Dec l929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb l930-3l Jul l934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep l934-l0 May l936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun l936-3l Jul l940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug l940-22 Dec l940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun l942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun l946-9 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, l2 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

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MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 07 MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 07-present

Note: Since World War I, the school commandant has also served as post

commander of Fort Sill.

163

APPENDIX FIVE CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun l946-15 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, l2 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 *MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 07 *MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 07-present

Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during the war. On 9 March 1942 the War Department

164

abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of wartime reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942.

In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the Field Artillery School and its successors considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122.

Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow’s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS’s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin’s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS’s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

165

APPENDIX SIX ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jul 1930 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987 BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

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BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005 COL (P) James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006 COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006 COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007 COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-present

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APPENDIX SEVEN USAFCOEFS MISSION ORGANIZATION CHART

12 Aug 2008. In September 2008 DOTS was dissolved to reduce overhead.

CenterCG

Personal Staff

GarrisonCommand

CSM

Chief of Staff

AC FA School

ACADA School

NCOA 434th FA Bde Director of Training & Support

Director Training & Doctrine

Cap Dev & Integration

DHR DMWR DPTMS DOL DPW DOIM RMO

G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4 G-6/CIO G-8 STRATCOM QAO

•Initial Military Training•Functional Training•Leader Development &Education•Training Support

•Concepts•Requirements•Experimentation

•Doctrine•Training Spt•Collective Tng•Lessons Learned

•Training Spt•Ldr Dev & Educ

•IMT•BCT

•Functional Tng•Ldr Dev & Educ

Joint & Combined

6th ADA Bde 428th FA Bde

•System integration

Dep Cdr

•BOLC II

FCOE MAG

Fires CoE ModelDeviations from TRADOC Model:

Joint and Combined Integration (JACI)

SES for Dep Cdr/CDID Dir

•Foreign LNO’s•Jonint Training•Air Force Detachment

Source: FCOE Briefing Chart, 2008, Doc II-122.

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APPENDIX EIGHT

DCG/AC

& DAC

NCOA434th FA BDE USMC Det

USAG Ft Sill

(Garrison - IMA)

(Org Chart Separate)

EO RETENTION

FAPO

SGS

PROTOCOL

G1

PAO

DRM

G4

SAFETY

G6/CIO

428th FA BDE

LNOs

Joint & Combined

Integration

Strat

Comms

FA

Journal

AF Det

JT Ops/Tng

ARNG DCG

QAO

IGSJA

CSTF

G3

CG/CMDT

CoS

TENANT UNITS/ORGANIZATIONS

III Corps Artillery

(FORSCOM)

DFAS

OTC FSTDMEDDAC

DENTAC4th Bde,

75th Div

DMPO

Indicates an administrative/coord relationship

Indicates org auths split between Msn & IMA

Indicates non-TRADOC Organizations

TSM

CANNON

TSM FATDS

TSM RAMS

FDIC

BATTLE

LAB

TPO

SENSORS

Req’s, Force

Design and

Analysis

Force

Integration

and Concepts

40th MP DetRegional

Confinement

Facility

DOTD

U.S. Army Field Artillery School and Fort Sill Mission

Organizational Chart

Source: Briefing, subj: 428th FAB, First or Not at All, 14 May 08, Doc II-123.

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APPENDIX NINE APPROVED FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE MODEL

JANUARY 2007

CenterCG

Personal Staff

GarrisonCommand

CSM

Chief of Staff

AC FA School

ACADA School

NCOA 434th FA Bde Dir of Tng & Support

Doctrine & Tng Dev

Cap Dev & Integration

DHR DMWR DPTMS DOL DPW DOIM RMO

G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4 G-6/CIO G-8 SPC QAO

•Initial Military Training•Functional Training•Leader Development &Education•Training Support

•Concepts•Requirements•Experimentation

•Doctrine•Training Spt•Collective Tng•Lessons Learned

•Training Spt•Ldr Dev & Educ

•IMT•BCT

•Functional Tng•Ldr Dev & Educ

Joint & Combined

6th ADA Bde 428th FA Bde

Relationship Pending2

•System integration

Dep Cdr

•BOLC II3

FCOE MAG

1 VOCO by VCSA2 TRADOC DCSPIL, FORSCOM, IMCOM and DA working to define senior mission commander staffstructure and relationship to garrison staffs3 BOLC II will resides only in the 6th ADA Bde

Approved Fires CoE Model1

Deviations from TRADOC Model:

G6/CIO and DTAC (in the DOTS) vice a KM Office

More robust L2I staff

Joint and Combined Integration (JACI)

More Robust ADA Proponency Office

SES for Dep Cdr/CDID Dir

Source: Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of Excellence Organization, 21

May 07, Doc II-125, 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH.

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APPENDIX TEN LIST OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1. Official Biography, Colonel (P) Ross E. Ridge. 2. BRAC Update, TRADOC Senior Leader Conference, 11-15 Aug 08. 3. Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: Information Delivered by Major

Williams, FID, 6 May 08. 4. Memorandum for Record, subj: BRAC Input to 2007 Annual Command

History, 13 Mar 08. 5. Information Paper, subj: FCOE Range, Classroom, and Simulation

Requirements, 8 Sep 08. 6. Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence, FY09 BRAC Course Movement, 4

Sep 08. 7. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of Excellence, FY09 Course Movement,

17 Sep 08. 8. Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence BRAC Update, 6 Dec 08. 9. Briefing, subj: Structure Update, 13 Aug 08. 10. Briefing, subj: Structure, 25 Aug 08. 11. Briefing, subj: Current Fires COE Model, 22 Aug 08. 12. Briefing, subj: BRAC Management Way Ahead, 29 Jul 08. 13. Minutes, Fires Executive Council, 4 Sep 08. 14. Interview, Dastrup with LTC Matthew Youngkin and James H. Wollman,

FCOE FID, 21 Jan 09. 15. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE Fires Executive Council, 29 Aug 08. 16. Briefing, subj: FCOE GAO Visit, 26 Jan 09. 17. Email with atch, subj: DOTS Decision Paper PPT, 11 Aug 08. 18. Email with atch, subj: BRAC 2008, 20 Feb 09. 19. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires Center of Excellence, Update, 16 Jun 08. 20. Summary of Discussions, Fires Review of Concept Drill, 30 Aug 08. 20a.Briefing (Extract), subj: TRADOC DCG Update, 16 Jun 08. 21. Briefing (Extract), subj: FCOE BRAC Summit, 14 Oct 08. 22. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE BRAC Management, 28 Mar 08. 23. Executive Summary, FCOE Management Process Video Teleconference, 7

Mar 08. 24. Briefing (Extract), subj: Fires COE Executive Council, 1 May 08. 25. Briefing (Extract), subj: FCOE Board of Directors Meeting, 15-16 May 08. 26. “Army Announces Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Partner for Residential Communities

Initiative,” Army News Release, 28 Sep 07.

171

27. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 De 08. 28. News Release, subj: Fort Sill and Picerne Military Housing Join Forces on

Housing, 19 Aug 08. 29. Briefing, subj: Fort Sill Housing, 16 Jan 09. 30. Memorandum, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership

Council Meeting, 31 Mar 09. 31. Ltr, Kevin L. Jackson, Senior Planner, City of Lawton, to MG (Ret) Toney

Stricklin, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army, 10 Jul 08. 32. Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee

Information Brief, 17 Nov 08. 33. Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee

concept Brief, 5 Dec 08. 34. Executive Summary, Regional Integration Committee Concept Brief to CG,

19 Dec 08. 35. Email with atch, subj: Part of the Regional Planning Initiative, 27 Feb 09. 36. Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership

Council, 3 Mar 09. 37. Interview, Dastrup with COL Robert S. Bridgford, Garrison Commander,

Fort Sill, 25 Feb 09. 38. Email with atch, subj: History from Garrison on Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma

Community Partnership Council, 24 Feb 09. 39. Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee

Concept Brief, 22 Dec 08. 40. Executive Summary, Community Partnership IPR #1 with CG, 30 Dec 08. 41. Executive Summary, Community Partnership IPR #2 with CG, 30 Dec 08. 42. Memorandum for Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership

Council Members, subj: Fort Sill and SW Oklahoma Community Partnership Council Minutes, 22 Jan 09.

43. Briefing, subj: Greater SW Oklahoma Regional Integration Committee Information Brief, 17 Nov 08.

43a. Email with atch, subj: Coop Program for Lawton Chamber of Commerce, 25 Feb 09.

44. Memorandum for Director Resource Management, TRADOC Schools/Activities, subj: FY09 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 16 May 08.

44a. Minutes, Mission Priority Board, 2 Jul 08. 45. Briefing, subj: FY09 TRADOC Budget Guidance, 2 Jul 08. 46. Email with atch, subj: Emailing Commander’s Statement - FY08, 30 Jan 08. 47. FY09 TRADOC Budget Guidance Narrative, May 08. 48. Email with atch, subj: FY2008 ATBG, 6 Oct 08.

172

49. FY2009 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance Narrative (Extract), Jan 09.

50. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: FY09 Funding Guidance, 22 Jan 09.

51. Memorandum for Director of Resource Management, TRADOC Schools/Activities, subj: FY09 Appropriation TRADOC Budget Guidance, 6 Jan 09.

52. Email, subj: FY2008 ATBG, 6 Oct 08. 53. Email, subj: FY08 TBG, 30 Jan 08. 54. Email with atch, subj: ARAC for 2008 Annual Command History, 4 Mar 09. 55. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 22 Aug 08. 56. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, Dec 08. 57. Interview, Dastrup with Paul Gaasbeck, Dir, DPTM, 13 Feb 09. 58. Interview, Dastrup with Buddy Thornton, ARAC, 27 Feb 09. 59. Memorandum for HQ AF/DA30, subj: Army Radar Approach Control, Fort

Sill, 6 Feb 09. 60. Email with atch, subj: ARAC and Power Projection Portions of 2008 Annual

Command History, 11 Mar 09. 61. Email with atch, subj: CY08 Command History, DPTMS, 11 Feb 09. 62. Minneapolis-St. Paul, StarTribune Information Paper, 28 Mar 08. 63. NewsOK Information Paper, subj: Fort Sill Benefitting from Military

Realignment, 6 May 08. 64. Information Paper, subj: Working for the People of Minnesota, 4 Aug 08. 65. Email, subj: CY08 Command History - DPTMS, 11 Feb 09.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Interim FY08 Command Training Guidance, 30 Nov 07.

2. White Paper, subj: The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders, undated.

3. Richard H. Sinnreich, “Field Artillery’s Effectiveness: A Casualty of War,” Army, Jul 08.

4. Interview, Dastrup with LTC John A. Kelly, Dir, STRATCOM, 4 Feb 09. 5. Briefing, subj: State of the Field Artillery, undated. 6. Briefing, subj: Return of the King: Regaining Core Artillery Proficiency in an

Era of Persistent Conflict and Beyond, 2008. 7. Email with atch, subj: Joint Fires Initiative, 2 Mar 09. 8. Interview, Dastrup with COL Frank E. Siltman, G-3, Fires Center of

Excellence, 26 Feb 09. 9. Email with atch, subj: Doctrine History for 2008, 20 Jan 09. 10. Information Paper, subj: Doctrinal Manuals, undated. 11. Information Paper, subj: Doctrinal Manuals, undated.

173

12. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8.

13. Email with atch, subj: Writing Doctrine 2008, 17 Feb 09. 14. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8. 15. Memorandum, subj: Draft Joint Fires University Strategy, 1 Jan 09. 16. Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University from Strategy to Irreversible

Momentum, 12 Dec 08. 17. Joint Fires University: Providing Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,

undated. 18. Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept-Strategy-Implementation, 21

Aug 08. 19. Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, Chief, Training Development Division,

DOTD, 21 Jan 09. 20. Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University Concept, 9 Jul 08. 21. Briefing, subj: Joint Fires University: From Strategy to Irreversible

Momentum, 9 Jan 09. 22. The Boeing Company/Creative Technologies, Inc., Fires Center of

Excellence - Integration Study, Phase I, 29 Oct 08. 23. CSM (Ret) Jeffrey L. Moyes, “MTTs: Resetting FA Core Competencies,”

Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 10-11. 24. Memorandum for VCSA, subj: Response to VSCA Tasker to Assess FA

Lieutenant Training, 7 Aug 06. 25. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset, 3 Oct 08. 26. HQ TRADOC Tasking Order, subj: TRADOC Task # IN 000564, 29 Aug

06. 27. CSM Joseph D. Smith, “The FA NCO: Absolutely Mission Essential,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 4-5. 28. Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 17 Feb

09. 29. Interview, Dastrup with LTC David S. Lee, Chief, FA Lessons Learned/FA

Reset, DOTD, 17 Feb 09. 30. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8. 31. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery CTET, 5 Dec 08. 32. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 10 Dec 08. 33. Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 11 Feb

09. 34. Email with atch, subj: Reset Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 20 Feb

09. 35. Fact Sheet, subj: DOTD Distributive Learning/Multimedia Classroom

Request, undated. 36. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 09, pp. 1-8. 37. Interview, Dastrup with COL Robert W. Roshell, DAC ARNG, USAFAS, 9

174

Mar 09. 38. LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and

NCOs,” draft article, Fires Bulletin, pp. 4-14. 39. Email with atch, subj: ARNG Regional Training Institutes, 11 Mar 09. 40. COL Kevin M. Batule and COL (Ret) Theodore J. Janosko, “Training the

Full-Spectrum BCT FSCOORD,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 08, pp. 26-28. 40a. Staff Action Sheet, 10 Jul 09. 41. Email with atch, subj: FSCOORD Course, 10 Feb 99. 42. Interview, Dastrup with Theodore J. Janosko, FSCOORD Crse Dir, 9 Jan 09. 43. Memorandum, subj: FSCOORD Course Information Paper, 20 Nov 08. 43a. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08,

pp. 1-3. 44. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8. 45. Briefing, subj: JFETS, undated. 46. Briefing, subj: JFETS, 29 Jan 09. 47. Briefing, subj: JFETS, 20 Jan 09. 48. Email with atch, subj: JFETS, 2 Mar 09. 49. FA Themes, Messages, and Talking Points (Extract), 29 May 08. 50. Information Paper, subj: Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, Apr 06. 51. Email with atch, subj: 434th FAB Input to 2007 Annual Command History,

28 Mar 08. 52. White Paper, subj: WTC, 21 Oct 08. 53. Robyn Baer, “Fort Sill Taking on More Warrior Transition Course Soldiers,”

Army News, 6 Nov 08. 54. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael C. Lee, 434th FAB S-3, 12 Jan 09. 55. Information Paper, subj: All WTC to be Held at Fort Sill, undated. 56. Information Paper, subj: All WTC to be Held at Fort Sill, undated. 57. Email with atch, subj: Warrior Transition Course, 9 Feb 09. 58. Email, subj: Gender Integrated Training, 13 Jan 09. 59. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael C. Lee, 434th FAB S-3, 12 Jan 09. 60. Information Paper, subj: Grow the Army, undated. 61. GAO Report, subj: Force Structure Initiative -- Need for Greater

Transparency for Army’s Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, 18 Jan 08. 62. Information Paper, subj: The Field Artillery School: 434th Field Artillery

Brigade and 1-355th Field Artillery Battalion, 23 Oct 08. 63. Information Paper, subj: 1-355 Regiment, Aug 08. 64. Information Paper, subj: 434th Field Artillery Brigade and 1-355 Field

Artillery Battalion, 23 Oct 08. 65. CSM Dean J. Keveles, “NCOES: Restoring NCO Core Competency,” Fires

Bulletin, Jul-Aug 08, pp. 20-21. 66. Briefing, subj: NCOEs Expansion and Transformation, 5 Sep 08. 67. Briefing, subj: The Requirement, 30 May 08. 68. Jim Tice, “NCO Training Overhaul,” Army Times, 22 Dec 08. 68a. Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch

175

Assessment, 5 May 08. 69. Email, subj: WOES Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 25 Feb 09. 70. CW5 David P. Welch, “Warrant: The Legacy of Leadership as a Warrant

Officer -- 90 Years of Technical Expertise in the Army,” On Point, Summer 2008, pp. 6-13.

71. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: BOLC Policy and Guidance, 24 Apr 08.

72. Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2008. 73. Briefing, subj: BOLC Overview, undated. 74. Lisa Alley, “BOLC Gets Green Light for Officer Education,” Army News, 25

Feb 05. 75. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, DOTD OES Manager, 9 Jan 09. 76. Briefing (Extract), subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, “First or Not at All,”

14 May 08. 77. Briefing, subj: FACCC Expansion: Preparing Leaders for the Future, 4 Sep

08. 78. Memorandum thru Cdr, 428th FAB, Chief, Field Artillery Proponency

Office, Dir, DOTD, and Asst Cmdt, for CG, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, subj: Decision Brief for Expansion of the Field Artillery Captains’ Career Course, 4 Sep 08.

79. MAJ Peter M. Sittenauer and MAJ Cornelius L. Morgan, “FACCC: Redesigned for Today and Tomorrow,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 16-19.

80. Briefing (Extract), subj: FA Branch Update, Nov 08. 81. COL Frank M. Siltman and LTC John P. Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got

Harder: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 6-8.

81a. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Scraper, DOTD OES Director, 9 Jan 09. 81b. Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch

Assessment, 5 May 08. 82. Briefing, subj: Requirement, 30 May 08. 83. Field Artillery Pre-command Course Schedule, 14 Jan 09. 84. Email, subj: Gap Mitigation Action, 15 Jan 09. 85. Email with atch, subj: Pre-Command Course, 10 Feb 09. 85a. Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch

Assessment, 5 May 08. 85b. Col Frank J. Siltman and Ltc John P. Frisbie, “Fire Support Just Got Harder:

Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08, pp. 6-8. 85c. Email with atch, subj: Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency, 14 Jul

09. 86. Ltr (Draft), CG, USAFAS, to CG, HRC, subj: Cpt Attrition, 2 Oct 07. 86a. Memorandum (Draft) for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch

Assessment, 5 May 08. 87. Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 3 Oct 07. 88. Draft Notes, subj: Initial Impressions, Field Artillery Captains, 2 Oct 07. 89. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8.

176

90. Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 1 Nov 07. 91. Memorandum, subj: Greybeards, 9 Nov 07. 92. Briefing, subj: FA Captains, 11 Oct 07. 93. Briefing, subj: Personnel Assessment Backup Slides, 1 May 08. 94. Briefing, subj: FAPO Input to CG PCC Brief, 15 Jan 08. 95. Draft Executive Summary - 90 Day Field Artillery Assessment, 15 Jan 08. 96. Ltr (Draft), subj: Draft CG 90 Day Assessment Letter (Personnel), 15 Jan 08. 97. Draft Executive Summary - Field Artillery Personnel Assessment, 28 Apr 08. 98. Memorandum for CG, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Branch Assessments,

5 May 08. 99. Email, subj: FA Captains Follow-up, 29 Oct 07. 100. Briefing, subj: Personnel Status Input, 22 Feb 08. 101. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8. 102. Mitch Meador, “Super-sneak Preview,” Lawton Constitution, 3 Feb 09, p.

1a. 103. Kevin Young, “New Fa Museum Set to Open in June,” Fort Sill Cannoneer,

22 Jan 09, p. 1a. 104. Information Paper, subj: JACI, 2 Feb 09. 105. Congressional Briefing Chart, 17 Feb 09. 106. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 22 Aug 08. 107. White Paper, subj: The Army’s Joint Close Air Support Center of

Excellence, undated. 108. Email with atch, subj: JFO Production, 4 Mar 09. 109. Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col G. Todd Lang, JACI, 4 Mar 09. 110. Lt Col G. Todd Lang, “JFO Sustainment: A Critical Requirement,” draft

article for Fires Bulletin, pp. 1-2. 111. Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill Historian, 10 Mar 09. 111a. Email with atch, subj: JFO White Paper, 13 Jul 09. 112. Information Paper, subj: Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, 2 Feb

09. 112a. Email, subj: The 138th Combat Training Squadron, 5 Mar 09. 113. Memorandum of Agreement, subj: Funding of Base Operations Support for

the 138th Fighter Wing, 6th Combat Training Squadron and the Air Force Doctrine Center, undated.

114. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow, Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8.

115. Briefing, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 6 Jun 08.

116. Jeff Crawley, “Class: A Glimpse of Future,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 19 Feb 09, p. 1a.

117. Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09. 118. Information Paper, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Jan

09. 119. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

177

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 1-8. 120. Information Paper, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Jan

09. 121. Email with atch, subj: Student Production FY08, 16 Mar 09. 122. Briefing Chart, subj: Fires COE Model, 12 Aug 08. 123. Briefing, subj: 428the FAB, First or Not at All, 14 May 08.

CHAPTER THREE 1. Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb 09. 2. Email with atch, subj: Field Artillery Campaign Plan, 26 Feb 09. 3. Field Artillery Talking Points: The Field Artillery Campaign Plan, undated. 4. MG Peter M. Vangjels, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08,

pp. 103. 5. Field Artillery Campaign Plan Executive Summary, 3 Sep 08. 6. Briefing, subj: FA Campaign Plan: Return of the King, 19 Aug 08. 7. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: Today and Tomorrow,

Artillery Strong,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 108. 8. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jay Grigg and LTC X.L.D. Mays, Field Artillery

Campaign Plan coordinators, 20 Jan 09. 8a. “2008 AUSA Fires Symposium -- 15-17 Jul,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 08, p.

28. 8b. Fact Sheet, subj: 2008 AUSA Fires Symposium -- 15-17 Jul, undated. 8c. Agenda, subj: Army Fires Symposium and Exposition, undated. 8d. Report by Paul McLeary, Senior Editor, Defense Technology, subj: Army

Fires in the Future, 16 Jun 08. 8e. Briefing, subj: AUSA Fires Symposium and Exposition, Concept Brief, 12

Apr 08. 9. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Michael Hughes, Concepts Branch, CDID, 9 Apr

09. 10. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Bankston, Chief, Concepts Branch, CDID, 9

Apr 09. 11. Information Paper, subj: Theater Army 5.1 Redesign Implications for Corps

Fires Cells, 29 Jan 09. 12. Briefing, subj: Theater Army Redesign 5.2 Update, 17 Feb 09. 12a. Email with atch, subj: Theater Army, 4 May 09. 12b. Email with atch, subj: Transformation Portion of the 2008 Annual

Command History, 14 May 09. 12c. MG Peter M. Vangjel, “The FA Campaign Plan,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Sep 08,

pp. 1-3. 12d. Col Samuel R. White, Jr., “The Fires Brigade: A Critical Capability in an Era

of Persistent Conflict,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 08, pp. 41-45. 13. Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, subj: Requirements

Determination for the Brigade Combat Team and Armored Cavalry Holistic Review, 25 Nov 08.

178

14. Interview, Dastrup with Dan Bankston, Chief, Concepts Division, CDID, 9 Apr 09.

15. Briefing, subj: BCT Holistic Review Update, 24 Oct 08. 16. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study,

28 Jan 09. 17. Briefing, subj: IBCT Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Analysis, 20-22 Jan 09. 18. Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study, 11 Feb 09. 19. Briefing, subj: Developing a Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy for the

Army, 19 Dec 08. 20. Briefing, subj: Draft IBCT TWV Study, 13 Mar 09. 21. “Future Combat Systems: Leap-ahead Capabilities Now,” Association of the

United States Army, Aug 08. 22. “Future Combat Systems Restructuring, A Balancing Act,” Army News

Service, 9 Feb 07. 23. “Future Combat Systems: Restructuring A Balancing Act,” American Forces

Press Service, 11 Feb 07. 24. “Army Accelerates Delivery of future Combat Systems Technologies,”

American Forces Press Service, 27 Jun 08. 25. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s future Combat System: Background and

Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 13 Mar 09. 26. Interview, Dastrup with Bob Nelson, Concepts Branch, CDID, 9 Apr 09. 27. Memorandum, subj: UAS Sensors and Payloads IPT Meeting, 17-18 Jun 08. 28. Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18

Feb 09. 29. Email with atch, subj: XM892 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile

2008, 30 Mar 09. 30. LTC Noel D. Grubb and Mark W. Belcher, “Excalibur: New Precision

Engagement Asset in the Warfight,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 14-15. 31. Briefing, subj: Excalibur/PEFCS/EPLIAFS NET/DTT - FY07-FY08,

undated. 32. Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09. 33. Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18

Feb 09. 34. Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09. 35. Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, Munitions Branch, TCM Cannon, 18

Feb 09. 36. Briefing, subj: Smart Book, Munition Programs, 30 Jan 09. 37. Briefing, subj: Cannon Smart Book, 30 Jan 09. 38. BAE Information Paper, 13 Jun 08. 39. BAE Information Paper, undated.’ 40. BAE Information Paper, 6 Oct 08. 41. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 Dec 08. 42. Email with atch, subj: NLOS Cannon Apr 09, 6 Apr 09. 43. FCOE, Fort Sill on the Move, 15 Dec 08. 44. Email with atch, subj: FCOE Big Events 2008, 23 Feb 09.

179

45. Draft LW155 Fielding Plan, undated. 46. Email, subj: Excal, 25 Feb 08. 47. Email, subj: Ft. Bragg - Successful Drop Mission, 3 Jul 08. 48. Email, subj: M777, 8 Jul 08. 49. Email, subj: Notes, 13 Oct 08. 50. Briefing (Extract), subj: 3-321 FAR V-22 Sling/Raid Training, undated. 51. Email, subj: 3/10 LW155, 17 Oct 08. 52. Email with atch, subj: Lightweight 155 and M119 2008, 6 Mar 09. 53. Weekly Significant Activities Report, 14 Jun 08. 54. Memorandum, subj: Full Materiel Release of the M119A1 105-mm. Towed

Light Howitzer, 10 Jun 08. 55. Email with atch, subj: 2008 FCOE Big Events, 23 Feb 09. 56. Briefing (Extract), subj: IBCT M119A2 Fieldings, 9 Oct 08. 57. Information Paper, subj: M119A2 NET VIP Day, 7 Aug 08. 58. Weekly Significant Activities Report, 14 Jun 08. 59. Interview, Dastrup with John Yager, TCM Cannon, 3 Mar 09. 60. Weekly Significant Activities Report, 26 Jan 08. 61. Memorandum for Record, subj: M119A2 Howitzer Digitization, 28 Jan 08. 62. Trip Report, 9-12 Jun 08. 63. Weekly Significant Activities Report, 4 Oct 08. 64. Briefing, subj: M119A2 105-mm. Towed Howitzer, 2 Oct 08. 65. Email, subj: EUA 1.1 Trip Report, 14 Nov 08. 66. Briefing, subj: Delta System Requirements Review/System Concept Review,

16 Dec 08. 67. Weekly Significant Activities Report, 15 Nov 08. 68. Trip Report, 16-19 Sep 08. 69. BAE Information Paper, 15 May 08. 70. BAE Information Paper, 14 Mar 08. 71. FA Themes, Messages, and Talking Points (Extract), 29 May 08. 71a. Email with atch, subj: TCM RAMS Input to 2008 Annual Command

History, 12 May 09. 72. Email with atch, subj: PIM Apr 09, 6 Apr 09. 73. BAE Fact Sheet, subj: PIM OCV, undated. 74. BAE Fact Sheet, subj: PIM OCV, undated. 75. MAJ Corey B. Chassé, “PIM: The Next Generation Paladin,” Fires Bulletin,

Jan-Feb 08, pp. 12-13. 76. Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD

Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harms to Civilians, 19 Jun 08. 77. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and

Technology) and Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Va, subj: Directed Requirement for GMLRS Alternative Warhead Rockets, 25 Jun 08.

78. Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, 7 Nov 08. 79. Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, subj:

GMLRS Program Alternative Warhead Initiative -- Acquisition Decision Memorandum, 7 Nov 08.

180

80. Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual Command History, 16 Mar 09.

81. Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2008, 8 Apr 08. 82. Email with atch, subj: MLRS OMT User Manual and Instruction for

Installing Single Screen Version, 17 Mar 09. 83. Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS Input to 2008 Annual

Command History, 12 Mar 09. 84. HIMARS Increased Crew Protection Cab Enhanced Field Exercise Final

Report, Executive Summary, 18 Sep 08. 85. Email with atch, subj: None, 6 Apr 09. 86. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics,

and Technology), subj: Update to the FY07 ATACMS Program Termination Program, 22 Apr 08.

87. Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS Command History, 12 Mar 09. 88. Maj Christopher L. Shields and Ltc Arthur G. Weeks, “NLOS-LS and PAM:

Precision Fires for the Brigade Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 19-21. 89. Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS Command History, 31 Mar 09. 90. Raytheon Information Paper, 9 Dec 08. 91. Raytheon Information Paper, 23 Dec 08. 92. MG (Ret) David C. Ralston and Patrecia Sladen Hollis, “PGM Effects for the

BCT Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Mar 09, pp. 22-27. 93. CW4 (Ret) Robert A. Nelson and Ltc William E. Field, “NLOS-LS in the

Army Evaluation Task Force,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 07, pp. 28-30. 94. Email with atch, subj: NLOS-LS 2008 Command History, 31 Mar 09. 95. Email, subj: NLOS-LS ST, 12 Mar 09. 96. Information Paper, subj: Current Key Parameters for NLOS-LS, undated. 97. Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History, 4 Mar 09. 98. Lockheed Martin Information Paper, 27 May 08. 99. Information Paper, Lockheed Martin and Syracuse Research Corporation,

undated. 99a. MG David C. Ralston, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-

Dec 06, pp. 1-5. 100. Information Paper, subj: Finding of No Significant Impact for the M1200

Armored Knight, 17 Apr 06. 101. M1200 Armored Knight Draft Supplemental Environment Assessment

(Extract), Executive Summary, Oct 08. 102. Briefing, subj: PM Fire Support Platforms Overview, 2007. 103. Fact Sheet, subj: Armored Knight, 2007. 104. Email with atch, subj: Command, Control, and Communications Systems

2008, 10 Mar 09. 104a. MG David C. Ralston, “State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery

Magazine, Nov-Dec 06, pp. 1-5. 104b. Maj Christopher C. Corbett, “First C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery

Organizes for Combat,” Fires Bulletin, Oct-Dec 08, pp. 16-18. 104bb. Project Manager, C-RAM Information Paper, undated.

181

1-4bbb. BG Robert P. Lennox, “NetFires Center of Excellence,” Field Artillery

Magazine, Jan-Feb 06, pp. 4-7. 104c. LTG Wilson A. Shoffner, “Transformation of Artillery: Continuity and

Change,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 09, pp. 4-8. 104d. Information Paper, subj: Countering Capability Intercepts 100th Rocket,

Mortar in Iraq, 9 May 09. 104dd. Information Paper, 447th Air Expeditionary Group, 21 Jan 09. 104ddd. Briefing, subj: C-RAM and Base Defense Presentation to the 2009

AUSA Fires Symposium, 17-19 Mar 09. 104e. Information, Program Executive Office, Command, Control, and

Communications Tactical, 2008. 104f. “Army C-RAM Intercepts 100th Mortar Bomb in Iraq,” Defense Update,

May 08. 105. Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab’s 2008 History, 17 Apr 09.

182

INDEX OF NAMES

B Bolt, LTG William J., 38 Bolton, Claude M., Jr., 107, 110, 114 Bromberg, MG Howard B., 7

C Caldwell, Gen William B., IV, 46 Cartwright, MG Charles A., 118 Cody, Gen Richard A., 40

F Fahey, Kevin M., 86

L Lacey, Col Raymond P., 17 Long, Col (P) Richard C., 34

M Maples, MG Michael D., 70, 77, 84 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 29 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 95, 96

P Patraeus, Gen David H., 62

R Ralston, MG David C., 28 Ross, BG Ross, 1, 2 Rumsfeld, Donald, 76

S Schoomaker, Gen Peter J., 59, 66 Shinseki, Gen Eric K., 59, 66, 69, 75 Smith, Roger, 86 Stricklin, MG Toney, 68, 84, 114

183

Sullivan, Col John M., Jr., 86

T Thrasher, MG Alan W., 70 Thurman, LTG James D., 96

V Valcourt, MG David P., 63 Vangjel, MG Peter M., 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31, 34, 35, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57,

59, 64, 81, 90

Y Yakovac, MG Joseph L., Jr., 69, 83