SUBCOURSE EDITIONSS0134 A

US ARMY SIGNAL CENTER AND FORT GORDON

OFFENSIVE ELECTRONIC WARFARE(SC 25C-RC)

EDITION DATE: SEPTEMBER 1994

OFFENSIVE ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Subcourse Number SS0134

EDITION A

United States Army Signal Center and Fort GordonFort Gordon, Georgia 30905­5000

6 Credit Hours

Edition Date:  September 1994

SUBCOURSE OVERVIEW

This   subcourse   is   designed   to   teach   the   basic   concepts   andapplications   of   electronic   warfare,   including   the   evolution   ofelectronic warfare and the methods employed in conducting offensiveelectronic warfare operations.

The prerequisite for this subcourse is that you are a graduate of theSignal Officer Basic Course or its equivalent.

This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time itwas prepared.  In your own work situation, always refer to the latestofficial publications.

Unless   this   publication   states   otherwise,   masculine   nouns   andpronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION: You will identify the components of electronic warfare,describe the concepts of offensive electronic warfare,and the methods electronic warfare may apply to disruptthe electromagnetic environment or otherwise confuse theability   of   commanders   to   interpret   the   battlefieldsituation.

CONDITION: Given this subcourse.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competence on this task, you must achievea minimum of 70 percent on the examination.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

Subcourse Overview...................................................i

Administrative Instructions..........................................v

Grading and Certification Instructions...............................v

Lesson 1: Introduction to Electronic Warfare..................1­1

Practice Exercise.............................1­11

Answer Key and Feedback.......................1­14

Lesson 2: Electronic Warfare Operations.......................2­1

Practice Exercise.............................2­12

Answer Key and Feedback.......................2­14

Lesson 3: Jamming, Frequency Controls, and ElectronicDeception...........................................3­1

Practice Exercise..............................3­9

Answer Key and Feedback.......................3­12

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Section Page

Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations.............................A­1

Examination........................................................E­1

Student Inquiry Sheets

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LESSON 1

INTRODUCTION TOELECTRONIC WARFARE

LESSON 1

INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Critical Tasks: 01­5701.07­000101­5701.07­000201­5701.07­0003

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In   this   lesson,   you   will   learn   about   the   history   of   electronicwarfare (EW), some EW accomplishments, and the components of EW.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Define and explain EW.

CONDITION: Given this lesson.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The   material   in   this   lesson   was   derived   from   thefollowing publications: FM 34­1, FM 34­10, and FM 34­80.

INTRODUCTION

In the early years of the 20th century, the navies of the worldexpanded their use of radio for command and control.  They also beganto search the spectrum to identify and locate other nations' ships.As the threat of a major war in Europe grew, so grew the efforts ofground forces to include radio in their modernization efforts.  Radiobecame a means of communicating between ships and shore and betweenmilitary units.   By the end of this century's first decade, mostmajor   nations'   fleets   had   continuous   wave   radios.     Those   radiosallowed ships at sea to

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communicate with other ships and with shore stations.  At about thesame   time,   major   military   headquarters   were   provided   radios   toimprove communications and provide a quick method of interfacing withnational military commands.   EW closely followed the development ofradio.

1. Evolution of Electronic Warfare.  Early EW was primarily a toolused to identify ships and military units.  As nations improved theirintelligence   gathering   systems,   they   also   introduced   methods   tothwart their adversaries' means of collecting intelligence.   Codesand ciphers were developed, and the periodic changing of call signsand  frequencies  was  made  a  part  of  everyday  communications.    Thedisrupting of communications (jamming) and the creation of deceptivecommunications   practices   became   a   very   sophisticated   and   artfulpractice.

a. World War I.   During this period, EW was mostly limited tocasual monitoring of radio and some attempts at wiretapping.   Someradio direction finding was conducted; however, these early attemptswere very crude, and the results were unreliable.  The expanded useof   codes   and   ciphers   for   diplomatic   cables   continued   with   thedevelopment of military radio use during and after World War I.

b. World War  II.   The period  between the  two  world wars sawdramatic breakthroughs in the development of radio.  The use of radioin the military became commonplace.  Radios were found as far down asbattalion level.   Signal operations became more disciplined.   Codesand   ciphers   provided   transmission   security,   and   call   signs   andfrequencies were regularly changed.   By the start of World War II,most   nations   had   positions   for   EW   functions   within   their   staffelements.   Jamming of radios became a component of EW, along withcollecting, locating, and analysis.  Some major breakthroughs in codebreaking   took   place.     Several   countries,   including   Great   Britain,Poland, the USSR, and the USA, were able to read the radio messagesof other nations.

(1) By   the   end   of   World   War   II,   radios   could   be   found   atcompany level.  Transmission security continued to be a major item ofconcern, as the radio passed from the exclusive charge of the trainedsignal soldier to the less security­conscious front­line soldier.

(2) The use of deception became an integral part of planning.An interesting example of deception took place in England during thetime of the Allied invasion of France.   It was well known to theAllies that the German high command felt the main invasion would beat Calais.  The Germans believed the landings in Normandy were only aruse to draw its forces away from Calais.  To

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keep the Germans thinking along those lines, the Allies set up adeception   plan   that   included   the   communications   structure   of   anentire army.  The ruse worked so well that a large part of the Germantank   force   remained   in   the   Calais   area,   rather   than   being   usedagainst   the   Allies   at   Normandy.     Deception   operations,   which   arehighly believable to an enemy, are likely to be more successful thanless believable deceptions.

(3) Another   example   of   deception   was   the   Japanese   attack   onPearl   Harbor.     The   Japanese   Fleet   sailed   across   the   Pacific   incomplete radio silence.   At the same time, dummy radio nets in thehome islands simulated the fleet's normal radio activity.  This useof simulative electronic deception (SED) denied the U.S. the truelocation, intentions, and activities of the Japanese fleet.

(4) Code breaking was another major effort in this period.   Asuccessful example was Operation Magic (1937­1940), conducted by theU.S. against the diplomatic codes of Japan.   This effort gave theU.S.   information   about   Japanese   military   and   national   intentions.Later EW efforts against Japan led to the destruction of the Japanesecarrier fleet at Midway.  In Europe, the British success in breakingthe German code system ULTRA allowed the Allies to read German highcommand and naval traffic.   The success in defeating the submarinethreat to Allied convoys crossing the Atlantic can be attributed, inpart, to the breaking of the German codes.

(5) The   development   of   radio   detection   and   ranging   (radar)affected the outcome of World War II.   Radar was used for both theearly detection and location of aircraft and naval surface forces.The   development   of   systems   and   techniques   to   locate   and   identifyradar sets grew into separate activities.   They would eventually begiven   the   names   electronic   intelligence   (ELINT)   and   electronicsecurity (ELSEC).   Many years later, ELINT and ELSEC would play amajor roll in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

c. Korean War.  During the Korean War, EW was used by both UnitedNations (UN) and North Korean forces.  The Soviets supplied the NorthKoreans   with   ground­based   radars   that   were   used   against   Americanbombers.  U.S. forces responded by jamming enemy radars with tin­foilstrips, called chaff.

(1) Both   sides   intercepted   and   analyzed   radio   signals.     UNforces jammed enemy communications nets.  Enemy jamming capabilitieswere   not   as   effective;   however,   they   could   locate   UN   positionsthrough the technique of direction finding (DF).

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(2) The Chinese used radio silence during their move into Koreain 1950.   Thus, the UN forces were denied data on the location andintentions of the Chinese.

d. Vietnam.  Both sides used EW in Vietnam.  ELSEC and deceptionbecame an integral part of U.S.   battle planning.   For the firsttime, EW units directly supported units at the brigade and separateregiment level.

(1) In North Vietnam, Chinese and Vietnamese air defense unitscaused   the   U.S.   to   use   EW   to   protect   its   aircraft   from   radar­controlled; surface­to­air missile.

(2) In South Vietnam, both the U.S. Army and the Army of theRepublic  of  Vietnam  (ARVN)  used  EW  support  measures  (ESM)  to  aidtheir ground forces.   Captured enemy documents showed that the VietCong   and   the   North   Vietnamese   Army   were   both   very   involved   incollecting U.S. and ARVN communications.

(3) Vietnam   also   saw   the   first   large­scale   use   of   airborneplatforms   to   collect   enemy   communications   and   locate   enemy   units.However, jamming was not a major factor in this war.

e. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.   The Persian Gulf Warprovides   an   example   of   battlefield   deception.     The   undetectedpositioning of the coalition forces showed how an effective use ofradio silence and deception can influence a battle's outcome.  ModernEW   technology   was   also   used   to   seek   out   major   communicationsfacilities, determine their use, and provide targeting informationfor their destruction.

(1) ELINT was heavily used to locate and destroy the Iraqi airdefense capability.   U.S. Air Force systems suppressed radar sites.The coalition forces used jamming and lethal attacks with high­speed,anti­radiation missiles.

(2) The coalition forces used ESM to support the planning ofdeception operations.  The U.S. Marine Corps portrayed an amphibiousassault on Kuwait from the sea.   EW was used to support rehearsedlandings and to monitor the Iraqi forces' reaction (determining unitlocations and monitoring radio traffic) to the deception.

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f. The future.

(1) There   is   little   to   indicate   that   the   use   of   EW   willdiminish in the post­Cold War era.  In fact, the size of the world'sarmies grows smaller, the need for EW as a force multiplier willgrow.     The   signal   officer's   role   will   become   more   difficult,   asnations probe for weak spots in their adversaries' communications.

(2) Directed   energy   weapons   will   be   used   in   future   battles.Radio frequency and microwave energy weapons are the most likely tobe   developed   to   disrupt   or   destroy   communications.     They   couldpotentially   attack   target   emitters   as   super   jammers   to   destroyelectronic components.   Non­nuclear electromagnetic pulse generatorsor   transmitters   are   potential   EW   weapons.     If   constructed,   thesedevices   would   generate   an   electromagnetic­pulse   effect   similar   tothat of a high­altitude nuclear detonation.

2. Electronic Warfare Components.  EW is a command responsibility.It is a significant force multiplier when integrated and used withfire and maneuver.  When used properly, it exploits enemy weaknesses,protects   friendly   freedom   of   action,   and   reduces   security   andcommunication   vulnerabilities.     EW   significantly   contributes   tocommand, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM).   Figure1­1 shows the three components of EW.

Figure 1-1. EW components.

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a. ESM provides the capability to intercept, locate, and identifyenemy emitters (Figure 1­2).  This information is needed for planningjamming,   deception,   electronic   counter­countermeasures   (ECCM),   andtargeting operations.  It is integrated with the commander's overallfire   and   maneuver   plan.     The   Assistant   Chief   of   Staff   G2,Intelligence (G2), who coordinates with the Assistant Chief of StaffG3, Operations (G3), has staff responsibility for ESM operations.

Figure 1-2. ESM components.

(1) Interception   operations   provide   EW   planners   withintelligence about the enemy's location, activity, possible futureoperations,   and   electronic   disruption   capabilities.     Thisintelligence   is   passed   to   the   G3   for   planning   electroniccountermeasures (ECM) and ECCM operations.   Special EW equipment isorganic to military intelligence (MI) units at corps and division.This provides the means to intercept enemy electronic communicationsand non­communications emissions in the high frequency (HF), very HF,ultra HF, and super HF ranges.  This interception capability providescombat   information   for   the   analysts   to   determine   the   pertinentintelligence the commander needs.

(2) Identification   operations   help   to   identify   the   size(personnel   and   equipment),   type,   echelon,   and   function   of   enemyunits.   This information has great significance in the commander'sfire   and   maneuver   plans.     By   identifying   the   enemy   unit,   thecommander   and   his   staff   can   better   prepare   combat   operations.Signals analysts at the MI battalion operations center perform thisfunction.   They use automated support to collect, manage, analyze,and report intelligence data.  This intelligence is provided to thecommander and his staff for planning purposes.

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(3) Location   operations   help   planners   to   identify   likely   orpossible  enemy  intentions.    The  data  gathered  can  indicate  if  anenemy is in an offensive, defensive, or retrograde posture.  The sizeof the area an enemy is occupying is a factor in determining theenemy unit's type and size.   MI units at corps and division useairborne and ground­based sensors to locate enemy positions throughDF   of   electronic   emissions.     The   location   and   movement   of   enemyforces tells the commander and his staff what the enemy is doing orpreparing   to   do.     In   addition   to   situation   development,   locationintelligence   is   also   used   in   planning   the   targeting   of   enemypositions.

b. ECM is offensive action taken to prevent or reduce an enemy'seffective   use   of   the   electromagnetic   spectrum.     Effective   ECMoperations can degrade an enemy's combat effectiveness by degradinghis electromagnetic operations.   ECM, a staff responsibility of theG3, includes both electronic jamming and deception.

(1) Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effectiveuse of his electronic equipment.  Jamming can assist the ESM team byforcing an enemy to transmit in the clear and for longer periods.  Asa result, the ESM team can gather pertinent information about theenemy   (intentions,   location,   size,   etc.),   which   may   assist   thecommander and his staff in preparing operational plans.  Denying anenemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at key times causeschaos, disrupts combat operations, and reduces combat effectiveness.

(2) Electronic   deception   is   used   to   cause   an   enemy   tomisinterpret what his electronic collection systems receive.   It isusually conducted as part of a larger deception operation.   It isassociated   with   friendly   electromagnetic   radiations   (SED   andmanipulative electronic deception (MED)) and with those of the enemyforce (imitative electronic deception (IED)).

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c. ECCM are defensive measures used to protect friendly command,control, and communications (C3) systems from enemy EW activities.  Itis closely related to signal security (SIGSEC).  The main differencebetween the two is the type of information being protected from theenemy.  ECCM protects friendly emitters from enemy EW assets.  SIGSECprotects   the   information   friendly   forces   transmit.     ECCM   allowsfriendly forces the continual use of the electronic spectrum by anti­ESM   (preventive)   and   anti­ECM   (remedial)   activities   (Figure   1­3).ECCM falls under the direction of the G3.

Figure 1-3. ECCM components.

(1) Anti­ESM   are   actions   taken   to   deny   the   enemy   access   tofriendly   force's   electromagnetic   transmissions.     This   is   done   byavoiding the enemy force's EW operations.  To deny an enemy access tofriendly electronic assets, several actions may be taken.  An exampleis terrain masking, where a friendly radio station is placed, so anobstacle (such as a hill) is between it and the enemy.   A secondexample is avoidance (using a directional antenna).  A third exampleis emission control (operating at the lowest power needed, turning onthe transmitter only when needed, and using random scheduling forcommunicating, if possible).

(2) Anti­ECM   are   used   against   jamming,   but   cannot   be   usedagainst   deception   or   ESM.     Anti­ECM   involve   actions   taken   afterdiscovering   that   the   enemy   is   using   EW   against   friendly   forces.Effective anti­ECM methods are determining the cause of interference,recognizing the difference between jamming and natural interference,changing frequencies, or shutting down communications and switchingto alternate frequencies.

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3. Summary.

a. The use of EW followed the development of radio.  As nationsimproved their intelligence gathering systems, they also introducedmethods   to   thwart   their   adversaries'   means   of   collectingintelligence.     Codes   and   ciphers   were   developed.     The   periodicchanging   of   call   signs   and   frequencies   became   a   daily   part   ofcommunications.  Jamming and the creation of deceptive communicationspractices   became   a   sophisticated   practice.     EW   has   been   usedextensively since World War II.

b. EW contributes much to C3CM.   There are three components ofEW.

(1) ESM.     Interception   operations   provide   EW   planners   withintelligence about the enemy's location, activity, possible futureoperations,   and   electronic   disruption   capabilities.     Locationoperations   help   planners   to   identify   likely   and   possible   enemyintentions.  ESM identification operations help to identify the size,type, echelon, and function of enemy units.

(2) ECM.     These   offensive   actions   are   taken   to   prevent   orreduce   an   enemy's   effective   use   of   the   electromagnetic   spectrum.Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effective use ofhis electronic equipment.   The objective of electronic deception isto deceive an enemy through his electronic systems.

(3) ECCM.  These are defensive passive measures used to protectfriendly (C3) systems from enemy EW activities.  ECCM and SIGSEC areclosely related.

(a) Anti­ESM are actions taken to deny the enemy access tofriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

(b) Anti­ECM are used against jamming.   Anti­ECM cannot beused against deception or ESM.

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LESSON 1

PRACTICE EXERCISE

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson.  There is only one correct answer for each item.  Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows.  If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. The collecting, analyzing, locating, and identifying of enemyemitters falls under which EW component?

A. Electronic deceptionB. ECMC. ECCMD. ESM

2. Terrain masking is a technique used as part of what?

A. Anti­ECMB. Anti­ESMC. Anti­deceptionD. Anti­electronic security

3. ECCM are closely related to what?

A. Signals securityB. Signal electronic deceptionC. EW support measuresD. Signal interface systems requirements

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4. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an example of what?

A. Signal deceptionB. Imitative electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Correlation deception

5. Actions   taken   to   deny   an   enemy   entry   into   the   friendlyelectromagnetic spectrum are part of what?

A. ECMB. ESMC. RECD. ECCM

6. Early EW was primarily a locational tool used to identify what?

A. Military units and shipsB Enemy intentionsC. Enemy combat postureD. Jamming ability

7. Interception   operations   provide   EW   planners   with   informationconcerning the enemy's location, activity, and possible actions.What else do they provide?

A. FunctionB. CommandersC. Unit sizesD. Electronic disruption capabilities

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8. When integrated and employed with fire and maneuver, EW becomesa significant________.

A. Combat powerB. Force multiplierC. DistractionD. C3CM

9. Who has staff responsibility for ESM operations?

A. G1B. G2C. G3D. Signal officer

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LESSON 1

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item Correct Answer and Feedback

1. D. ESM.

The EW component in which enemy signals are collectedand emitters are located and identified is ESM.  (page1­6, para 2a)

2. B. Anti­ESM.

Terrain   masking   is   a   technique   employed   as   part   ofanti­ESM.  (page 1­8, par 2c(1))

3. A. Signal security.

Electronic counter­countermeasures (ECCM) are closelyrelated   to   signal   security   (SIGSEC).     The   maindifference   between   the   two   is   in   the   type   ofinformation being protected from the enemy.  (page1­8, para 2c)

4. C. Simulative electronic deception.

The   Japanese   carried   on   radio   traffic   in   the   homeislands,   simulating   normal   activity   of   the   fleet.(page 1­3, para 1b(3))

5. D. ECCM.

Electronic   counter­countermeasures   (ECCM)   aredefensive   measures   used   to   protect   the   use   of   theelectromagnetic spectrum from hostile farces.   (page1­8, para 2c)

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Item Correct Answer and Feedback

6. A. Military units and ships.

Early EW was primarily used for identifying ships andmilitary units.  (page 1­2, para 1)

7. D. Electronic disruption capabilities.

Interception   operations   provide   EW   planners   withinformation concerning the enemy's location, activity,possible   actions,   and   electronic   disruptioncapabilities.  (page 1­6, para 2a(1))

8. B. Force multiplier.

A command responsibility, EW is a significant forcemultiplier when integrated and employed with fire andmaneuver.  (page 1­5, para 2)

9. B. G2.

The G2 has staff responsibility for ESM operations.(page 1­6, para 2a) 

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LESSON 2

ELECTRONIC WARFAREOPERATIONS

LESSON 2

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

Critical Tasks: 01­5701.07­000101­5701.07­000201­5701.07­0003

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn about using electronic warfare (EW) onthe battlefield.

LESSON TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Define   and   explain   electronic   warfare   on   thebattlefield.

CONDITION: Given this lesson.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the subcourse examination.

REFERENCES: The   material   in   this   lesson   was   derived   from   thefollowing publications: FM 11­30, FM 24­1, FM 24­18, FM34­1, FM 34­10, FM 34­23, FM 34­80, TC 34­1, and TC34­41.

INTRODUCTION

EW is used to exploit, disrupt, and deceive enemy command, control,and   communications   (C3),   while   protecting   friendly   use   ofcommunications and non­communications systems.   It is a significantforce multiplier when integrated and used with fire and maneuver.  Itis   also   a   significant   contributor   to   C3  countermeasures   (C3CM).Offensive C3CM is the integrated use of jamming, physical destruction,and military deception to disrupt enemy C3.  Defensive C3CM includesEW and operations security to protect friendly C3  and deny an enemyinformation of intelligence value.

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1. Divisional Military Intelligence Battalion.  The mission of thedivisional   military   intelligence   (MI)   battalion   is   to   providededicated intelligence and EW (IEW) support to the division.   Thebattalion is organic to the division.  It operates under the commandand direction of the division commander and his staff. The battalionresponds   to   missions   assigned   by   the   division   Assistant   Chief   ofStaff, G2 (Intelligence) and Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operationsand Plans).

a. The   MI   battalion   in   a   heavy   division   has   four   companies(Figure 2­1).  It is authorized approximately 300 personnel at fulltables of organization and equipment (TOE).

Figure 2-1. MI battalion organization (heavy division).

(1) The headquarters, headquarters and service company (HHSC)provides command and control (C2) for all elements, including thoseunder   the   battalion's   operational   control.     It   manages   battalionassets in support of IEW operations, and supplies technical controland analysis for EW operations.   Personnel and equipment to supportthree  IEW  support  elements  are  assigned  to  the  HHSC­one  for  eachmaneuver brigade in a three­brigade division.

(2) The   collection   and   jamming   (C&J)   company   providescommunications intelligence (COMINT) collection, low­level analysis,and communications jamming support for the division.

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(3) The   intelligence   and   surveillance   (I&S)   company   providesground   surveillance   for   the   division.     It   also   provides   enemyprisoner of war (EPW) interrogation and limited counterintelligence(CI) capabilities.

(4) The EW company provides EW support measures (ESM) to thedivision.  It intercepts, locates, and identifies sources of radiatedenergy   on   the   battlefield   in   support   of   the   EW   plan.     It   alsoconducts   initial   analysis   and   prepares   reports   to   support   thecommander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and informationrequirements (IR).

(5) The   long   range   surveillance   detachment   (LRSD)   collectsinformation   by   human   intelligence   (HUMINT)   means   within   thedivision's area of operations and interest.   For planning purposes,this area extends to a depth of 50 kilometers beyond the forward lineof own troops.

(6) The   QUICKFIX   flight   platoon   provides   aerial   COMINTcollection, direction finding, and jamming support to the division.

b. The   MI   battalion   assigned   to   an   airborne   or   air   assaultdivision   has   four   companies   (Figure   2­2).     At   full   TOE,   thisbattalion is authorized approximately 360 personnel.

Figure 2-2. MI battalion organization (airborne/air assaultdivisions).

(1) The   headquarters,   headquarters   and   operations   company(HHOC) provides C2 for all battalion elements.  The HHOC is the homeof the QUICKFIX flight platoon.

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(2) The   C&J   company   performs   communications   and   non­communications intercept and direction finding operations.   It alsoperforms communications jamming.

(3) The   I&S   company   provides   ground   surveillance,interrogation, and CI support.  In an airborne division, it also hasremotely­monitored, battlefield sensor system assets.  These provideadditional ground surveillance capability.

(4) The service support company provides maintenance (vehicularand signal), food service, and signal support to the battalion.

(5) The LRSD collects information by HUMINT means within thedivision's area.

c. The MI battalion assigned to a light division is organizedwith the same philosophy as its parent division.   It is easy totransport and relies on additional assets from higher echelons forsupport   during   combat   operations.     The   battalion   receives   corpsaugmentation   for   ground­based   jamming   and   electronic   intelligencesupport.     When   the   division   is   in   a   low   intensity   conflictenvironment,   additional   CI   and   EPW   interrogation   augmentation   isprovided.   This battalion has three companies (Figure 2­3).   It isauthorized approximately 295 personnel at full TOE.

Figure 2-3. MI battalion organization (light division).

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(1) The HHSC provides C2 for all elements within the battalionand   supporting   units.     It   provides   administrative,   logistics,maintenance, and communications support for the battalion.

(2) The collection (COLL) company provides COMINT collection,line­of­bearing   (LOB)   information,   and   analysis   support   for   thedivision.

(3) The   I&S   company   provides   counterintelligence,   EPWinterrogation, and ground surveillance support for the division.

(4) The LRSD collects information by HUMINT means within thedivision's area of operations and interest.

(5) The flight platoon provides aerial support to complementground­based EW systems.

2. Electronic Warfare Battlefield Operations.  When integrated intothe overall operational scheme of maneuver, EW is a formidable forcemultiplier.   It exploits enemy electronic capabilities and protectsfriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Figure 2­4 depicts thevarious functions of EW.  ESM acquires information about the enemy.Electronic countermeasures (ECM), the offensive component, prevent orreduce an enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum.   Electroniccounter­countermeasures (ECCM), the defensive component, are actionstaken to retain friendly use of the spectrum.

a. The   interception,   location,   and   identification   of   enemyelectronic equipment can provide the tactical commander with vitalintelligence about enemy intentions, capabilities, and disposition.The type and quantity of equipment being used provides important datafor EW technicians to analyze and determine what types of units areopposing   friendly   forces.     This   information,   combined   with   theequipment's location and frequency of use, provides information onpossible enemy intentions.

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Figure 2-4. EW functions.

b. EW provides the tactical commander with accurate informationthat is used to make estimates, reach decisions, prepare orders, andexecute operational plans.  This information must reach the commanderin enough time to be used in the overall tactical scenario.   Thecommander receives two types of data (intelligence reports and combatinformation).  This is shown in Figure 2­5.

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Figure 2-5. EW provided data.

(1) Intelligence is data which results after analysis has beenconducted   on   gathered   information   (combat   and   other   intelligencereports).  It has immediate or potentially significant importance tomilitary   planning   and   operations.     It   is   given   to   the   tacticalcommander   in   the   form   of   responses   to   his   PIR   and   informationrequirement (IR).

(2) Combat   information   is   information   given   directly   to   thetactical commander before it is analyzed or evaluated.   It is alsogiven   to   the   EW   team   for   analysis.     This   highly   perishableinformation can have immediate impact on current combat plans andoperations.  Its importance is such that it cannot be delayed for thenormal intelligence analysis.   Combat information which is not ofcritical   importance   is   integrated   with   other   intelligence   reportsreceived by the EW system.  It is then analyzed for responses to thecommander's PIR and IR.

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3. Offensive Electronic Warfare Operations.

a. ESM allows the commander to know the type of enemy force he isfacing.  It is the EW component that produces combat information andintelligence reports.   This supplies the ESM team with the crucialinformation needed to answer the commander's PIR and IR.   It alsoallows the EW staff to plan ECM, ECCM, and targeting operations.

(1) The   five   major   ESM   components   are   search,   intercept,locate, identify, and report.   These five components are part of acontinuous process (Figure 2­6).  They are carried out using specialEW equipment.

Figure 2-6. ESM components.

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(2) In   the   search   component,   the   ESM   team   uses   special   EWequipment   to   search   for   enemy   electronic   transmissions.     Theintercept component occurs when the ESM team actually records thetransmissions   for   further   analysis.     Acquiring   LOB   on   thetransmissions  helps  to  locate  the  transmitter.    It  also  helps  toidentify where the equipment is located.   Identifying the emitteroccurs when all information from the previous components are combinedand analyzed.   This intelligence is given to the commander and hisstaff in various EW reports.

b. ECM are actions taken to prevent or reduce effective use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum by enemy forces.   ECM operations candegrade   an   enemy's   combat   effectiveness   by   degrading   hiselectromagnetic operations.   ECM is the staff responsibility of theG3.  It includes electronic jamming and deception.

(1) Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effectiveuse of his electronic equipment.   It also permits exploitation byfriendly ESM teams.  It allows them to gather vital information aboutenemy intentions, location, size, and other data which could help thecommander and his staff in preparing operational plans.  Denying anenemy   the   use   of   the   electromagnetic   spectrum   causes   chaos   anddisrupts his effective combat operations.   This greatly reduces hiscombat effectiveness.

(2) Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpret whathis electronic systems receive.  Normally, it is conducted as part ofa larger deception operation.   It involves actions associated withfriendly   electromagnetic   radiations   (manipulative   electronicdeception (MED)) and simulative electronic deception (SED)), and withthose   of   the   enemy   (imitative   electronic   deception   (IED)).Electronic jamming and deception are discussed in greater detail inthe next lesson of this module.

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4. The Electromagnetic Environment.

a. That battles are won depends in large part to the degree of C2

the commander exercises.  Radio is the primary means for carrying outC2.   The battlefield's electromagnetic dimension is where a uniqueform of warfare occurs.  Friendly units strive to exploit the use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum, while denying its use to an enemy.

b. A battlefield is an extremely violent and exceedingly densesignal environment, with many devices producing signals.   A singleU.S. division engaged in combat will have over 3,000 communicationsemitters working.  In addition, thousands of enemy emitters and non­communications   emitters   (radars,   jammers,   etc.)   are   propagatingsignals.  This vast amount of electronic equipment causes a saturatedfrequency spectrum.

c. Communications systems are threatened by physical damage andenemy jamming.  Friendly emitters may be targeted by enemy interceptor direction finding.  Once an enemy gets an electronic fix, he canquickly  target  friendly  forces  with  artillery  and  air  assets.    Abattlefield saturated with signals is not very user­friendly.  Thereis   much   interference   and   many   unpredictable   outcomes   due   to   thismessy environment, this electromagnetic "soup." Our forces must beable   to   operate   with   minimum   communications.     They   must   plan   tocontinue   operations   without   radio.     Alternate   means   (messenger,visual   signals,   etc.)   must   be   practiced   to   enhance   combateffectiveness.     Another   practice   is   to   reduce   the   dependence   onradio.  Too many voice messages relate to aspects of operations thatshould be addressed during the planning stage.  Proper planning andcoordination result in fewer calls being made to inquire about whatis to be done.  To effectively counter EW in combat, we must make ita continuing part of our combat preparations.

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5. Summary.   In this lesson, you learned about using EW on thebattlefield.

a. EW is used to exploit, disrupt, and deceive enemy C3, whileprotecting   friendly   use   of   communications   and   non­communicationssystems.   It is a major force multiplier when integrated and usedwith   fire   and   maneuver.     It   contributes   much   to   C3CM.     To   beeffective,   it   must   be   fully   integrated   with   the   commander'soperational plans.

b. The divisional MI battalion provides dedicated IEW support toits division.

c. The five major ESM components are search, intercept, locate,identify, and report.

d. ECM are offensive actions that include both electronic jammingand deception.

(1) Electronic   jamming   reduces   or   denies   enemy   forces   theeffective use of its electronic equipment.

(2) Electronic   deception   is   used   to   cause   an   enemy   tomisinterpret what is received by his electronic systems.

e. ECCM are defensive actions taken to retain friendly use of thespectrum.

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LESSON 2

PRACTICE EXERCISE

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson.  There is only one correct answer for each item.  Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows.  If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. ECM include electronic jamming and what else?

A. Electronic interceptionB. Electronic identificationC. Electronic avoidanceD. Electronic deception

2. Search, intercept, locate, identify, and report are componentsof what?

A. ECMB. ESMC. ECCMD. SIGSEC

3. Disrupting an enemy's emitters is achieved through which of thefollowing?

A. Communications interceptionB. Emitter locationC. Electronic jammingD. Signal analysis

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4. Information given directly to a tactical commander before beinganalyzed or evaluated is called what?

A. Intelligence reportB. Combat informationC. Tactical reportD. Priority information report

5. What   can   cause   an   enemy   to   misinterpret   what   his   electronicsystems are receiving?

A. Electronic deceptionB. Electronic jammingC. ESMD. Anti­ESM

6. What provides the tactical commander with the capability to knowwhat type of enemy forces are on the battlefield?

A. ESMB. ECMC. ECCMD. SIGSEC

7. Which statement describes any divisional MI battalion?

A. It responds to missions from the division G3 and G4B. It has 290 or fewer assigned soldiersC. It has an HHSCD. It operates under the direction of the division commander

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LESSON 2

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item Correct Answer and Feedback

1. D. Electronic deception.

The major components of ECM are electronic jamming andelectronic deception.  (page 2­9, para 3b)

2 B. ESM.

The five ESM components are search, intercept, locate,identify, and report.  (page 2­8, para 3a(1))

3. C. Electronic jamming.

Electronic   jamming   measures   are   taken   to   reduce   ordeny enemy forces' use of their electronic equipment.(page 2­9, para 3b(1))

4. B. Combat information.

Combat information is given directly to the tacticalcommander before being analyzed or evaluated.   (page2­7, para 2b(2))

5. A. Electronic deception.

Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpretwhat his electronic systems receive.  (page 2­9, para3b(2))

6. A. ESM.

ESM   provide   information   which   allows   the   tacticalcommander to know what type of enemy forces are on thebattlefield.  (page 2­8, para 3a)

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Item Correct Answer and Feedback

7. D. It   operates   under   the   direction   of   the   divisioncommander.

The   MI   battalion   is   organic   to   the   division.     Itoperates   under   the   command   and   direction   of   thedivision   commander   and   his   staff.   It   responds   tomissions assigned by the division G2 and G3.  (page2­2, para 1) 

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LESSON 3

JAMMING, FREQUENCY CONTROLS,AND ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

LESSON 3

JAMMING, FREQUENCY CONTROLS, AND ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

Critical Tasks: 01­5701.07­000101­5701.07­000201­5701.07­0003

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn about the concepts and methods ofjamming   and   the   frequency   control   methods   applied   to   electronicwarfare (EW).   You will also learn about the methods of deceptionused to confuse or distract enemy forces.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION: Define and describe the methods of jamming, frequencycontrol   mechanisms,   and   the   methods   of   electronicdeception.

CONDITION: Given this lesson.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the module examination.

REFERENCES: The   material   in   this   lesson   was   derived   from   thefollowing publications: FM 24­33, FM 34­1, FM 34­10, andTC 34­41.

INTRODUCTION

Offensive EW is the means commanders use to attack enemy electronicsystems.   It combines the use of jamming and electronic deception.It provides combat information to elements able to physically attackenemy  systems  and  equipment.   Offensive  EW  is  conducted  in  threemission areas (degrade, disrupt and deceive, and defend).   Jammingdisrupts and degrades enemy electronic systems.   Deception misleadsor   deceives   enemy   analysis   of   the   capabilities   and   intentions   offriendly forces.

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1. Jamming   Concepts.     Jamming   is   the   deliberate   radiation   orreradiation   of   energy   to   prevent   or   degrade   the   reception   ofinformation by a receiver.  The jamming function is tied directly tothe information provided by the EW support measures (ESM) componentof the EW program.   The tactics for using jamming vary with thetactical situation and the commander's plan of action.  Conceptually,the jamming transmitter is placed between the signal transmitter andthe receiver to which the transmission is directed.   However, theability to place the jammer between the transmitter and the receiveris   seldom   possible.     Thus,   many   jammers   have   enough   power   tocompensate for the additional range needed to jam signals effectively.

a. Three methods of communications jamming are commonly used onthe   battlefield.     Each   is   used   to   attack   a   different   signal   orsignals.

(1) Spot   jamming   is   directed   against   a   single   or   specificfrequency, while allowing adjacent frequencies to remain free of theeffects of the jamming.   It applies the full radiated power of thejamming transmitter against enemy signals, one frequency at a time.

(2) Barrage jamming targets multiple frequencies.   It may beused over a large portion of the frequency spectrum or the entireamplitude modulation or frequency modulation band.   Barrage jammingneeds high power to operate.  It cannot distinguish between enemy andfriendly frequencies.

(3) Sweep   jamming   is   used   to   block   several   preselectedsequential   frequencies.     It   moves   from   one   frequency   to   another,remaining   on   each   frequency   for   a   predetermined   period.     It   canaffect both friendly and enemy frequencies.

b. Various types of signal modulation can be used during jamming.These   modulation   types   are   selected   based   on   their   effectivenessagainst the transmission being attacked.  In some cases, the jammer'ssignal generator can produce only a limited number of signals.   Inother cases, the generator can produce a large number of signals orsounds.     Some   of   the   most   commonly   used   modulation   types   arediscussed below.

(1) The   stepped   tone   signal   is   a   series   of   varying   tonesnormally sent in an ascending or descending order.

(2) The bagpipe signal is like the sounds produced by a bagpipe.

(3) The gulls signal is similar to the sounds made by sea gulls.

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(4) The spark signal is like that made by a spark gap Morsetransmission.

(5) Other popular and effective signals can be applied to thejammer's carrier.  They include random Morse keying (on­off keying),random   noise,   static,   and   playback   of   previously   recordedtransmissions.

c. Reradiation jamming normally uses special equipment.  Normallydirected   against   non­communications   emitters,   there   are   someapplications of reradiation against communications receivers.   Themost widely used method uses the delayed retransmission of a recordedtransmission.  To conduct this form of jamming, a very slight delayis used when rebroadcasting the recorded signal.  The following areother forms of reradiation jamming:

(1) A repeater can intercept, alter, amplify, and retransmitsignals.

(2) Transponders   are   systems   that   automatically   send   apredetermined signal in response to the reception of a given signal.

(3) Reflection jamming uses devices, such as corner reflectorsand chaff, to confuse electronic systems by producing false signalsor images.  It is sometimes called mechanical jamming.

d. The are three major systems for executing jamming missions.They   are   ground­based   systems,   airborne   platforms,   and   expendablejammers.     Determining   the   delivery   vehicle   is   based   on   severalfactors.  These include:

(1) Target link distance.   This is the distance between theenemy transmitter and receiver.

(2) Jammer­to­receiver distance.  This is the distance from thejammer to the intended receiver.

(3) Terrain   factors.     The   line­of­sight   factor   between   thejammer and the target receiver is important.  A hill or mountain canmask the jamming signal.

(4) Effective radiated power quotient.  This is the computationof   the   effective   radiated   power   of   the   jammer   and   the   enemytransmitter.     It   is   used   to   determine   the   jammer   radiated   powerrequirement needed to defeat the transmitter.

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(5) Signal   compatibility.     This   is   the   compatibility   of   themodulation, bandwidth, and enemy signal type.

(6) Environmental   factors.     The   weather,   terrain,   andvegetation affect the considerations that apply to jammer selection.

2. Control Mechanisms.  These are established to ensure the successof all jamming missions, the protection of friendly communications,and the direction of jamming against high­value targets (HVT).

a. Positive control mechanisms ensure that the mission may bestopped at any time.

(1) The positive control list is a publication of authorizedfrequencies that can be jammed.

(2) On­off   control   is   a   centralized   method   of   controllingjamming.   It provides for the immediate initiation or stopping ofjamming missions.

b. Negative control mechanisms protect specific frequencies frombeing jammed, except as authorized on a jamming restriction list.This   method   of   control   is   executed   through   the   development   ofseparate  listings  of  frequencies  that  are  under  any  of  the  threeclassifications of frequencies.

(1) Taboo frequencies are never to be jammed for any reason.However, they can be time­controlled, and the jamming restrictionsmay be removed during particular time periods.

(2) Protected   frequencies   are   those   frequencies   used   ordesignated   for   use   by   friendly   forces   for   a   planned   or   on­goingoperation.  These frequencies are published in a protected frequencylist.

(3) Guarded   frequencies   are   listed   as   enemy­used   frequenciesexploited   by   friendly   force   ESM   or   signals   intelligence   (SIGINT).Guarded frequencies can only be jammed when the potential operationalgain outweighs the value of the information they provide.

c. A combination of negative and positive controls can be used tokeep jamming missions under control.

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3. Electronic   Deception.     This   is   normally   used   to   cause   enemyanalysts to misread the situation and provide their commander withmisleading information and intelligence that appears to be accurate.The three types of electronic deception are manipulative electronicdeception (MED), simulative electronic deception (SED), and imitativeelectronic deception (IED).   The signal officer plans and executesboth   MED   and   SED.     IED   is   primarily   conducted   by   militaryintelligence (MI) personnel.

a. MED involves altering the electromagnetic profile of friendlyforces.

(1) MED   tries   to   influence   or   alter   enemy   EW   and   SIGINTestimates of the situation.  It does this by changing the technicalcharacteristics of specified friendly communications to create falseimpressions.

(2) MED can include false traffic levels, false peaks, routing,electronic cover, and controlled breaches of communications security.It can also use non­communications devices.

(3) The   deployment   of   various   types   of   radar   to   misleadanalytic   assessments   of   the   location   of   airfields,   air   defensebatteries,   and   field   artillery   units   can   aid   in   applying   MEDeffectively.

(4) To  be  effective,  MED  must  be  developed  by  those  with  acomplete   knowledge   of   the   operational   concepts   and   procedures   offriendly communications.

b. SED can counter an enemy's EW ability to accurately read thebattlefield.   It does this by misleading the enemy about friendlyforce composition, deployment, and capabilities.

(1) The   indication   of   additional   friendly   forces   on   orapproaching the battlefield is an example of SED.   By matching thecommunications and non­communications emitters of a friendly unit andduplicating the type and volume of radio traffic normally found inthat   unit,   an   enemy   can   be   misled   into   believing   there   are   morefriendly forces on the battlefield than actually exist.

(2) The introduction of new or different electronic systems canindicate to an enemy that new systems or type units are available.

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(3) Another   method   of   conducting   SED   is   to   create   a   falseelectronic signature which indicates that a friendly unit has moved.Such deception, coupled with suppressed communications at the unit'sactual location, can alter an enemy's estimate of friendly intentions.

c. IED   can   be   conducted   against   both   communications   and   non­communications emitters.

(1) The function of IED may vary in the methods and techniquesused.  IED injects false and misleading information directly into anenemy's communications nets.   Thus, the activity may vary in scope,based on the sensitivity and sophistication of the techniques used.

(2) The scope of IED may include nuisance intrusion, deceptivejamming,   planned   message   intrusion,   and   cryptographic   intrusion.Nuisance intrusion requires language ability, a compatible radio, andlittle   technical   support.     However,   deceptive   jamming,   plannedmessage intrusion, and cryptographic intrusion need skilled operatorsto   prevent   the   enemy   from   detecting   the   level   of   success   thatfriendly EW and SIGINT are having in exploiting enemy communications.

d. The use of electronic, physical, and sonic (noise) deceptiontechniques is depicted in Figure 3­1.   The main attacking force oftanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) uses radio silence andnoise discipline.  A small deception portrays a large frontal attack.The   two   APCs   have   a   small   physical   signature.     Loudspeakers   andequipment broadcast recorded tank and APC noise.  With that and thetree line to hide in, the two APCs indicate a larger force.   Thus,the enemy is fed false data.

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Figure 3-1. Deception scenario.

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4. Summary.   In this lesson, you learned about the concepts andmethods of jamming, the frequency control methods applied to EW.  Youalso   learned   about   the   methods   of   deception   used   to   confuse   ordistract enemy forces.

a. Jamming is the deliberate radiation or reradiation of energyto prevent or degrade the reception of information by a receiver.Three   methods   of   communication   jamming   are   commonly   used   on   thebattlefield.  Each is used to attack a different signal or signals.

(1) There are several methods of communications jamming.  Spotjamming is directed against a single or specific frequency, whileallowing adjacent frequencies to remain free of the effects of thejamming.   Barrage jamming is targeted against multiple frequencies.Sweep jamming is used to block several preselected frequencies.

(2) Various   types   of   signal   modulation   can   be   used   duringjamming.    Some  of  the  common  modulation  types  are  stepped  tones,bagpipes, gulls, and spark.

(3) Reradiation jamming normally uses special equipment and isdirected against non­communications emitters.

(4) The three major systems for jamming missions are ground­based systems, airborne platforms, and expendable jammers.   Severalfactors determine the delivery vehicle.   They include target linkdistance,   jammer­to­receiver   distance,   terrain   factors,   effectiveradiated   power   quotient,   signal   compatibility,   and   environmentalfactors.

b. Control mechanisms are established to ensure the success ofall jamming missions, the protection of friendly communications, andthe direction of jamming against HVT.   Positive control mechanismsensure that the mission may be terminated at any time.   Negativecontrol mechanisms protect specific frequencies from being jammed,except as authorized on a jamming restriction list.

c. Electronic   deception   is   normally   used   to   cause   the   enemyanalysts   to   misread   the   situation   and   provide   his   commander   withinformation and intelligence which, while in appearance is accurate,is actually misleading.  The three types of electronic deception areMED, SED, and IED.   The signal officer plans and executes both MEDand SED.  IED is primarily an MI function.

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LESSON 3

PRACTICE EXERCISE

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson.  There is only one correct answer for each item.  Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows.  If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. MI personnel perform which form of deception?

A. Imitative electronic deceptionB. Collective electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Manipulative electronic deception

2. Altering   the   electromagnetic   profile   of   friendly   forces   iscalled what?

A. Simulative electronic deceptionB. Imitative electronic deceptionC. Manipulative electronic deceptionD. Signal intelligence

3. Jamming control mechanisms include both positive and negativecontrols.  Which of the following is a positive control?

A. On­off controlsB. Taboo frequenciesC. Guarded frequenciesD. Protected frequencies

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4. Which of the following is normally directed against a specificfrequency?

A. Stepped jammingB. Barrage jammingC. Sweep jammingD. Spot jamming

5. Which   form   of   jamming   is   most   often   used   against   non­communications?

A. Radiation jammingB. Reradiation jammingC. Spot jammingD. Barrage jamming

6. The application of a modulation to a type of jamming is donebecause the selected modulation does what?

A. Provides a better ground waveB. Provides a more efficient sky waveC. Performs better against the signal being transmittedD. Is most effective for the distance between the jammer and

the receiver

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7. Which of the following describes jamming?

A. A repeater can intercept and amplify, but not modify, asignal

B. A mountain cannot mask a jamming signalC. Target link distance is the distance from the jammer to the

intended receiverD. Environmental   factors   affect   the   ability   of   a   jamming

device to radiate a signal

8. What   is   the   form   of   deception   used   to   enter   an   enemycommunications net?

A. Imitative electronic deceptionB. Collective electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Manipulative electronic deception

9. Which scope of imitative electronic deception requires the leasttechnical support?

A. Cryptographic intrusionB. Deceptive jammingC. Nuisance intrusionD. Planned message intrusion

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LESSON 3

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item Correct Answer and Feedback

1. A. Imitative electronic deception.

The   signal   officer   plans   and   executes   both   MED   andSED.     IED   is   primarily   conducted   by   MI   personnel.(page 3­5, para 3)

2. C. Manipulative electronic deception.

Manipulative   electronic   deception   is   an   altering   ofthe electromagnetic profile of friendly forces.  (page3­5, para 3a)

3. A. On­off controls.

Positive   control   mechanisms   includes   the   positivecontrol list and on­off control.  (page 3­4, para 2a)

4. D. Spot jamming.

Spot jamming is directed against a single or specificfrequency   while   allowing   adjacent   frequencies   toremain free of the effects of jamming.   (page 3­2,para 1a(1))

5. B. Reradiation jamming.

Reradiation   jamming   normally   uses   special   equipmentand  is  directed  against  non­communications  emitters.(page 3­3, para 1c) 

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Item Correct Answer and Feedback

6. C. Performs better against the signal being transmitted.

These   modulation   types   are   selected   based   on   theireffectiveness against the method of transmission beingattacked.  (page 3­2, para 1b)

7. D. Environmental factors affect the ability of a jammingdevice to radiate a signal.

Weather,   terrain,   and   vegetation   affect   theconsiderations that apply to jammer selection.  (page3­4, para 1d(6))

8. A. Imitative electronic deception.

IED injects false and misleading information directlyinto an enemy's communications nets.  The activity mayvary   in   scope,   based   on   the   sensitivity   andsophistication   of   the   techniques   used.     (page   3­6,para 3c(1))

9. C. Nuisance intrusion.

Nuisance   intrusion   requires   language   ability,   acompatible   radio,   and   little   technical   support.However, deceptive jamming, planned message intrusion,and cryptographic intrusion need skilled operators toprevent an enemy from detecting the level of successthat friendly EW and SIGINT are having in exploitingenemy communications.  (page 3­6, para 3c(2))

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