Summer 2004

NPQ | After 9/11 we all understand that out of failed states like Afghanistan

come terrorists like Al Qaeda. Is that why the focus of your new book is on

state building — the long-term antidote to terrorism?

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA | For me, the issue goes beyond terrorism arising from

failed states to the broader problem of why the rest of the Third World outside of

East Asia — from Latin America to Africa to the Middle East — has been unable to

develop. The old answer was that the non-developing countries just needed a new set

of free market policies —“the Washington consensus”— and then they’d be on the

road forward. That is only true for India, the one case where functioning self-

governing institutions are in place, but until recently, their economic policies have

been counterproductive. With market liberalization, India is now poised to take off

in the next years just like China.

The truth of the matter is that the real problem for most of the Third World is

more political — bad institutions and bad governance. That has been the under-

emphasized aspect of development theory. Development requires governance first of

all. By that I mean the core functions of a society that cannot be privatized and done

by the market or outsourced — providing the rule of law, protection of property

rights, protection of individual rights, physical security, infrastructure. The domi-

nant problem in the Third World is not too much government, but not enough

government or no government at all.

For the promise of “the end of history” to come true, competent self-governing

institutions have to come into being. That is why state building is important.

NPQ | Mustn’t a state be democratic to develop?

FUKUYAMA | Well, before you have democracy you have to have government.

Period. You have to have a functioning state that can, first of all, provide security and

the economic basics. It can be authoritarian and still develop. Most of East Asia has

done well under authoritarian governance. It is only over the longer term as the

society grows more prosperous and there are greater social demands for participation

that not having democracy becomes problematic from a development standpoint.

The cutoff is usually about , per capita. At that point a country has usually

US Must Balance Hard Power With Soft Power

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The End of History and

the Last Man. H

- U S. H NPQ

N G M .

The real problem for most

of the Third World is more

political — bad institutions

and bad governance.

That has been the under-

emphasized aspect of

development theory.

Summer 2004

The historical record shows

that where state-building

has been successful —

Germany, Japan, South

Korea — American forces

have stayed for at least

two generations, that is

40 or 50 years.

transformed itself from an agricultural, raw-materials-exporting country to a largely

urban, industrialized one.

Then, people are less willing to tolerate an authoritarian government. Not to have

a democracy then becomes destabilizing because democracy is the basis of legitimacy

in modern societies. We see this in Hong Kong today, where the per capita income

is far beyond the cutoff point at about ,.

NPQ | Just as Marx thought industrialization had to precede socialism, for

you competent government must come before democracy?

FUKUYAMA | Yes.

NPQ | The United States is trying state-building in Iraq. Where does that stand?

FUKUYAMA | The reason there is so much trouble in Iraq is that the US did not

anticipate how the state would just collapse when Saddam fell. There was a vacuum of

sheer administrative capacity. The people who could connect the phones, get the water

running, the oil flowing and, most of all, provide physical security just weren’t there.

Though the disappearance of police is a universal condition of most post-conflict

situations, the Bush administration completely failed to anticipate that, and it

should have.

NPQ | How much can a distant foreign power do in terms of state-building?

If the US can’t even get little Haiti on the right track, how can it bring good

governance and democracy to Iraq and the entire Middle East?

FUKUYAMA | I don’t think it can. That is why I was not very enthusiastic about

undertaking the Iraq war in the first place. The historical record shows that where

state-building has been successful — Germany, Japan, South Korea — American

forces have stayed for at least two generations, that is or years. Those countries

where the US has stayed five years or less — Haiti is a good example — have not had

any lasting change or are worse because of US intervention.

If we had gone into Iraq with the understanding it would take that level of

commitment, we might accomplish something. That is not the case. The Bush

administration’s lack of planning underscores the lack of seriousness with which the

war was undertaken.

Nonetheless, we have to realize there are periodically times when it is in the US, and

indeed global, interest to undertake the right kind of state-building commitment.

NPQ | By justifying the war on the basis of eliminating mass destruction

weapons that weren’t there instead of on rebuilding the Middle East, doesn’t

the US now lack the legitimacy to fulfill the political objective for which its

military might paved the way?

Summer 2004

The US needs to repair all

its alliance relationships

damaged in its one-sided

use of hard power.

FUKUYAMA | That is absolutely right. Without a buy-in by the American public,

the whole state-building project is unsustainable. Typically what happens is that we

get enthusiastic about the military intervention, and then interest wanes after a

couple of years. The real problems begin to set in around year four or five after the

intervention, usually in another presidential cycle with a president from another

party who wasn’t an architect of the policy.

This is what happened in Nicaragua. The US first went in there in , but then was

out by after the election. Roosevelt felt it wasn’t his war. More recently, Bush

felt that intervention and nation-building in Haiti were Clinton’s policies, not his.

Enduring change in Japan, Germany and South Korea came as a result of

bipartisan strategic consensus over decades. We don’t have that in Iraq.

NPQ | After the Madrid terrorist attacks, (German Chancellor) Gerhard

Schroeder, (French President) Jacques Chirac and (EU High Representative)

Javier Solana all said that terrorism couldn’t be fought by military means

alone, but by development in the Third World. Indeed, the EU security

strategy calls for anticipatory or “preventive engagement” in contrast to the

US strategy of “preemptive war.” Isn’t “preventive engagement” the same as

your idea of state-building?

FUKUYAMA | If that is more than a slogan, then, yes, the idea is on the same track.

Often, though, it is difficult to anticipate the outbreak of a violent and destabilizing

eruption, yet it is only that outbreak that enables you to mobilize the consensus and

resources to act. Politically, it is never very likely that democratic governments can

act in the abstract.

Europeans pride themselves on their “soft power” approach to international

problems. Nation-building fits in that category. The US has gone the other route

with its “hard power” approach. Consequently, there has been a de facto division of

labor where the US goes in and does all the fighting and the Europeans come in after

to clean up and rebuild.

This only gets you so far because both components of power are ultimately

necessary. You cannot do without either of them. For that reason, the US needs to

repair all its alliance relationships damaged in its one-sided use of hard power. As the

hegemonic power, though, the US can’t just offload all the soft duties to the

Europeans or the Japanese. We need to complement US might with a more serious

commitment to state-building.

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