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U.S. Navy Shipbuilding and Ship Procurement
Presented at the Conference on Shipbuilding and Ship Procurement Strategy for Canada
November, 2009
2
What is RAND?
• An independent, non-profit research institution
• A provider of objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing public and private sectors around the world
• A center for education and training in policy analysis
• Neither a university nor a management consultancy — but with the capabilities of both
3
Our Research Is TypicallyCharacterized by . . .
Issues that involve:
• Competing objectives and perspectives
• Intersection of public/ private interests
• "Messy" data, major uncertainties
• Implications for the future
An analytic approach that is:
• Integrative, collaborative, and multidisciplinary
• Empirical, with technical depth and methodological rigor
• Innovative, but informedby past findings
• Buttressed by demanding standards of quality and objectivity
RAND strives to build long-termrelationships with its clients
4
We Work on a Range of Maritime Issues for a Range of Research Sponsors
CNO
CINCPACFLT
USMC
OSD NAVAIR
ONR
NavalSpecialWarfare
SOCOM
DARPA
U.S.Army
U. S. Coast Guard
UKMinistry
of Defence
NAVSEA
Secretaryof theNavy
RoyalAustralianAir Force
RoyalAustralian
Navy
– Platforms
• Aircraft
• Carriers
• Surface
• Submarines
• Special operations
– Force Level Studies
– Technology
– Logistics
– Manpower/Training
– Management
6
Topics for Discussion
• U.S. Navy Ship Procurement Plans
• U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base
• Issues in U.S. Navy Shipbuilding
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Navy Has Specific Goals in Ship Programs
• Ship designs that provide greater attention to life cycle costs
• Given a design, lower procurement costs
• Given a design, faster delivery
• Reliability in design, cost, and schedule goals
• Responsiveness to unexpected, emerging requirements
Current acquisition strategies fall short in achieving these goals
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Any Acquisition Strategy Must Consider the Goals of Other Participants
• Shipbuilders– Enhanced cash flow– High return on investment– Order stability and predictability– Above average profits
• Congress– Stability in local jobs– No long-term commitments– Perceived contribution to the defense mission
of TOA committed to ships
It may be difficult to find acquisition strategies that are agreeable to all three parties
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A Sharp Downturn in the Procurement of Navy Ships Started in the Early-1990s
Source: Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, 2008
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Fiscal Year
Bat
tle
Fo
rce
Sh
ips
Pro
cure
d
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Surface Combatants Have Seen a Significant Increase in Cost
Added capabilities lead to increased costs
$10M
$100M
$1B
$10B
End Unit
Costs (then-year$)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Fiscal Year
Guided missile destroyersGuided missile frigatesDestroyers
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Those Surface Combatants That Have Been Built Have Gotten Bigger and More Complex
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
First Fiscal Year
Lig
ht
Sh
ip W
eig
ht
(000
s o
f T
on
s)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Kil
ow
atts
/To
n
Light Ship Weight
Kilowatts/Ton
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Navy Developed Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan to Provide Stability to the Industrial Base
Fiscal Year 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Aircraft Carrier 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Surface Combatant 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Littoral Combat Ships 2 3 3 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 1 2 5 5 5 5
Attack Submarines 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Ballistic Missile Submarines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Amphibious Warfare Ships 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
Combat Logistics Force 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) 1 2 2 1 2 1
Support Vessels 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total New Construction Plan 7 8 8 12 12 13 13 12 12 13 10 10 7 10 9 10 11 10 6 7 9 8 7 11 7 10 11 11 9 13
Far TermNear Term
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, February 2008
But the plan continues to change
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There Have Been Notable Changes in the Annual SBP
• FORD-class CVNs every five years
• VIRGINIA-class SSNs move to two per year
• DDG-1000 buy cut dramatically; buy more DDG-51s
• CG(X) buy reduced
• Replacement for the OHIO-class SSBNs
• QDR will suggest further changes
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Topics for Discussion
• U.S. Navy Ship Procurement Plans
• U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base
• Issues in U.S. Navy Shipbuilding
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A Number of Shipyards HaveLeft Navy Shipbuilding
96 98 00 02 04 06 088280 84 86 88 90 92 94
…
Todd Pacific
Lockheed Shipbuilding
Penn Shipbuilding
Tacoma Boat Building
Southern Shipbuilding
Tampa Shipyards
Peterson Builders
Marinette Marine
Austal USA
(stops Navy shipbuilding work)
(shuts down)
(out of business)
(bankrupt)
(shuts down)
(bankrupt)
(shuts down)
(begins LCS work)
(begins LCS work)
Currently-operatingNavy shipbuilders
Formerly-operatingNavy shipbuilders
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The Six Major Shipbuilders Are Now Ownedby Two Corporations
GENERAL DYNAMICSElectric Boat
Bath Iron Works
NASSCO
95 96 97 98 00 0199 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
GENERAL DYNAMICS Electric Boat Bath Iron Works NASSCONASSCO
LITTONIngalls
Avondale
Newport News
NORTHROP GRUMMAN IngallsIngalls AvondaleAvondale Newport NewsNewport News
…
Consolidated ownershipshipyards
Independentshipyards
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Mid-Tier Shipyards Are Making Inroads
• Martin Marinette – LCS 1 (foreign owned)
• Austal – LCS 2, JHSV (foreign owned)
• Bollinger – patrol craft, USCG cutters
• Bender – small commercial boats
• Aker Philadelphia – commercial cargo ships (foreign owned)
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The Shipyards Build a Range of Ship Types
Shipyard Type of Ships
Bath Iron Works (GD) Surface combatants
Electric Boat (GD) Nuclear submarines
NASSCO (GD) Auxiliaries
Avondale (NG) Amphibious, auxiliaries
Ingalls (NG) Surface combatants, amphibious
Newport News (NG) Nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines
Martin Marinette Small combatants
Bollinger Patrol craft
Austal Small combatants, high-speed support
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Topics for Discussion
• U.S. Navy Ship Procurement Plans
• U.S. Shipbuilding Industrial Base
• Issues in U.S. Navy Shipbuilding
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Some Questions Facing U.S. Navy Ship Procurement
• Is the future shipbuilding plan affordable?– SCN budget is flat while future calls for more new ships– Many new designs, each with cost and schedule risk
• How can certain design skills be sustained?– Larger gaps in new program starts– Desire to reuse designs to reduce costs
• What will be the impact of new missions, such as BDM?– Choice between modifying a current platform or
designing a new platform– Uncertainty on the number of ships needed
• When and how should competition be used?– Sustaining the industrial base requires allocation of work– Congress can constrain the use of competition
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Shipbuilder Competition Is Peculiar
• Since Navy requirements typically evolve, the shipbuilder probably believes it will not be bound by initial promises
– Shipbuilders generally become monopolists when competition is over and the Navy wants specification changes
– Even when a ship is built by two shipbuilders, it is probably not credible that workload will be removed entirely from a shipyard
• A shipbuilder’s motivation is to get the work through optimistic bidding
– Even “fixed-price” contracts are effectively cost-based• Changing Navy specifications are always an “out”• The Navy does not want the shipbuilder to default