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SM-62 SnarkAlthough unofficially designated a surface-to-surface ICM, the Snark was essentially asmall, turbojet-powered, unmanned aircraft. It was designed to be fired from a shortmobile launcher by means of two solid-fueled rocket boosters. Once air-borne, the Snarkwas powered by a single Pratt and Whitney J-57 turbojet I engine capable of cruising atMach 0.9 to an altitude of approximately 150,000 feet. After a programmed flight of1,500 to 5,500 nautical miles, the Snark's airframe separated from its nose cone, and themissile's nuclear warhead followed a ballistic trajectory to its target. Plans developed bythe Strategic Air Command employed the Snark against enemy defensive systems,especially radars, to ensure the effective penetration of enemy territory by mannedbombers

Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, work on the Snark missile programprogressed very slowly as a result of both limited research and development (R&D)funding and the low national priority accorded to all guided missile programs. Thissituation changed dramatically on 8 September 1955 when President Dwight D.Eisenhower assigned the highest national priority to the intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) development program. Even though the Snark was not an ICBM, the Air Forceordered its development program accelerated along with that of the Atlas missile.

In August 1945, the AAF established a requirement for a 600 mph, 5,000-mile- rangemissile with a 2,000-pound warhead. In response to an Air Force solicitation for such adevice, Northrop presented a proposal in January 1946 for a subsonic, turbojet-powered,3,000-mile range missile. That March, the company received one-year research and studycontracts for a subsonic and a supersonic missile with a range of 1,500 to 5,000 statutemiles, and a 5,000-pound payload. Jack Northrop, the company president, nicknamed theformer (MX-775A) Snark, and the latter (MX-775B) Boojum, both names from the pagesof Lewis Carroll.

The 1946 Christmas budget reduction deleted the subsonic Snark from the AAF missileprogram, but retained the supersonic Boojum. But the matter did not end there. JackNorthrop personally contacted Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Arm, and others, to save theSnark. He promised development in two and one-half years, at an average cost of$80,000 for each of the 5,000-mile missiles in a 5,000-unit production run. The notedaircraft designer and manufacturer contended that it would take several years to developthe turbojet-powered missile, with 60 percent of the effort going into the guidancesystem. Before 1947 passed into history, USAF reconstituted the Snark program, slightlymodified from the August 1945 specifications, at the same time relegating the Boojum toa follow-on status.

Air Materiel Command authorized 10 flight tests of the Snark, the first by March 1949. InJuly, General Joseph McNarney called the Snark America's most promising missileproject. But the Army and the Navy criticized both the Snark and Navaho for their highcost relative to their overall priority and unproven concept. Even Air Force enthusiasm

for the Snark cooled; in March 1950, the airmen reduced the program to the developmentof only its guidance system.

The company designated the initial version N-25. Larger and heavier than previous"flying bombs," Snark also possessed much greater performance; its J33 engine pushed itat a cruising speed of Mach .85 (with a maximum level speed of Mach .9) to a range of1,550 statute miles. A B-45 mother ship controlled the N-25, which Northrop designed tobe recovered by means of skids and a drag chute. The designers expected that recoveringthe test vehicles would cut the time and money required to develop the missile.

Numerous problems became apparent in testing the N-25 at Holloman Air Force Base.Despite a schedule calling for flight tests in 1949, the experimenters did not make thefirst attempted launch until December 1950. It failed. After another failure, the firstsuccessful flight took place in April 1951 when the missile flew 38 minutes beforerecovery. During this series of tests, the 16 sled-launched missiles flew 21 times,achieving a maximum speed of Mach .9 and a maximum endurance of 2 hours, 46minutes. With the conclusion of these tests in March 1952, 5 of the 16 N-25s remained.

The prose description and a quick glance at a photograph of a Snark fails to highlight theuniqueness of the missile. The Snark flew in a nose-high flying altitude because it lackeda horizontal tail surface as did so many of Northrop's machines. Instead of conventionalcontrol surfaces (ailerons, elevation), the Snark used elevons. A profile view reveals thatthe missile also had a disproportionally small vertical tail.

To meet the toughest challenge for the program, guidance over the proposedintercontinental distances, Northrop proposed an inertial navigation system monitored bystellar navigation. Northrop accomplished the first daylight (ground) test of this stellardevice in January 1948. This was followed by flight tests aboard B-29s in 1951-52.Between 1953 and 1958, 196 flight tests aboard B-45 aircraft provided about 450 hoursof guidance experience. The large and heavy (almost one ton) guidance system worked,but not for very long. The company claimed that the Snark could achieve a CEP* of 1.4nm.

In June 1950, the Air Force increased Snark requirements to include a supersonic dash atthe end of the 5,500 nm mission (6,350 statute miles), a payload of 7,000 pounds (laterreduced to 6,250 pounds), and a CEP of 1,500 feet. This key decision, increasingperformance requirements, invalidated the N-25.

Northrop therefore produced a new design. Basically a scaled-up N-25, the N-69 wasinitially called "Super Snark." The new requirements that swept the N-25 aside for thelarger and more difficult N-69 hurt the Snark program. As a result the program lostconsiderable time (38 months between the first flight of each). This overstates the impactsomewhat, however, as difficulties with the guidance system as well as airframe sank theprogram.

The company lengthened the fuselage, sharpened the nose shape, replaced the externalscoop with a flush scoop, and increased the launch weight. More noticeably, Northropadded a larger wing. Although Northrop slightly shortened the wing span, it broadenedthe wing by extending it further aft, thus increasing the wing area from 280 to 326 squarefeet. In addition, because wind tunnel and N-25 tests showed some instability in pitch(pitch-up), Northrop redesigned the wing with a leading edge extension, thereby givingthe Snark wing its "saw tooth" shape. A J71 engine powered the "A," ''B," and "C"models before USAF adopted the J57 in December 1953 for the "D" models.

But testing was necessary before this could occur. First, the experimentors tested threeunpowered dummy missiles with ballast to simulate the N-69. Then between November1952 and March 1953, they flew four modified N-25s fitted with two 47,000-pound-thrust boosters. In contrast, the N-69A used twin, four-second duration, 105,000-pound-thrust boosters, while N-69C and later models relied on twin, four-second duration,130,000-pound-thrust rockets.

But numerous problems beset the Northrop missile during testing. The Snark provedunstable in all but straight and level flight. Northrop compounded these difficulties whenit took engineers off the Snark project to help the company's ailing, but priority, F-89 all-weather interceptor program. Despite the reduction of test vehicles to 13 (as of February1953), the program exceeded its budget by $18.3 million. The movement of testing fromHolloman to the Atlantic Missile Range in 1952, a move opposed by Northrop, alsohindered the program. In fact, the slow construction of test facilities in Florida restrictedtesting between 1953 and 1957. There were also powerplant problems because the J71engine exceeded its fuel consumption specifications, necessitating a number of enginechanges. If these problems were not enough, the first missile delivered for flight tests wasin serious disrepair.

The program also suffered numerous test failures. The initial launch attempt on 6 August1953 failed, as did the next four. On 3 June 1954, the missile flew three and one-halfhours but exploded on landing. While USAF recovered 10 N-25s on its 21 flights, thefirst successful N-69 recovery occurred on the 31st flight on 2 October 1956. The lack ofrecoveries retarded the testing of the N-69. Northrop completed these tests by May 1955,well after the Snark's tentative activation date of April 1953 and operational date ofOctober 1953.

The problems grew worse. By May 1955, wind tunnel and flight tests indicated thatNorthrop's operational concept, terminal dive of the missile into the target, would notwork because of inadequate eleven control. Five flight tests of the IC, a nonrecoverableradio-controlled missile with fuselage speed brakes (designed to test the Snark fromlaunch into the target) confirmed these findings. In July 1955, the Air Force accepted thecompany's proposal for a different delivery concept involving a nose which detachedfrom the airframe near the target and then followed a ballistic trajectory. The redesignedmissile (N-69C, modified) first flew on 26 September l955

These aerodynamic, cost, and scheduling problems brought the missile under fire andgenerated unfavorable publicity. One bit of ridicule which outlived the program dubbedthe waters off Canaveral "Snark infested waters" because of the numerous crashes. (Infact, to some, this may well be the most memorable aspect of the entire program.) At theother extreme, a Snark in December 1956 flew too far, that is, it failed to respond tocontrol and was last seen heading toward the jungles of Brazil As one Miami paper put it,with apologies to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. "They shot a Snark into the air, it fell tothe earth they know not where." In 1982, a Brazilian farmer found the errant missile.

More importantly, Strategic Air Command (SAC), the intended user of the missile, beganto express doubts about the Snark by late 1951. Although some may suspect the motivesof a unit dominated by bomber pilots regarding a pilotless bomber that would take theman out of the machine, valid questions concerning the weapon's reliability andvulnerability emerged at this point. As early as 1951, SAC decried Snark's vulnerabilityboth on the ground and in the air. On the ground, the missile would be based atunhardened fixed sites. In the air, the subsonic (Mach .9) Snark lacked both defensivearmament and the ability for evasive maneuver. Indeed, it is difficult to quarrel with the1954 SAC command position, which was "conservative concerning the integration ofpilotless aircraft into the active inventory in order to insure that reliance is not placed on acapability which does not in fact exist." But some SAC officers in 1951 saw value in theSnark program as a way to get the command into the missile business. Or perhaps theyjust wished to make the most of a bad situation.

Criticism of the Snark came from other quarters as well. In early 1954, a blue ribbonpanel, The Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee, found important aspects of all threeAmerican long-range missile programs (Snark, Navaho, and Atlas) unsatisfactory. Thecommittee concluded that, in general, the missiles' CEPs were outdated and their baseswere vulnerable. The panel assessed the Snark as an "overly complex" missile whichwould not become operational until "substantially later" than scheduled.

The panel went on to make three recommendations. First, it recommended that USAFemploy a variety of means to assist heavy bombers: area decoys, local decoys, and ECM(electronics countermeasures). Second, it suggested that USAF extend missile CEPrequirements from one quarter nm to three-to-five nm. Clearly, this relaxation made sensein view of the much greater warhead capability soon to be available with the evolutionfrom atomic to hydrogen explosives, and the accuracy limitations of the existingguidance systems. (By mid-1954, USAF had loosened Snark's CEP requirement from1,500 to 8,000 feet.) Third, the panel recommended simplification of the Northropvehicle, entailing cancellation of both the Northrop and North American celestialnavigation systems. The committee estimated that Northrop could produce a simplifiedSnark by 1957 with quantity production in 1958-59.

But the Snark program did not appreciably improve. In fact, test problems demonstratedserious deficiencies in the weapon. In 1958, General Irvine of Air Research andDevelopment Command (ARDC) cited the Snark as an outstanding example ofunwarranted funding; and General Power, Commander of SAC, noted that the missile

added little to the command's strength. The latter wanted a reevaluation of Snark in orderto either correct deficiencies or terminate the program.

Despite Air Force reservations about the Snark, journalists presented the case for theNorthrop missile in the aviation press in the period 1955-58. They emphasized themissile's major advantages, chiefly resulting from the fact that it was a one-way,unmanned weapon. Besides not requiring a tanker fleet, advantages included fewerrequirements for ground handling, repair, and safety. Snark's advocates noted that it couldfly as fast as contemporary bombers, could be programmed for evasive maneuvers (sothey claimed), and could be adapted for low-level (500-foot) operations. Suggestions thatwould reduce prelaunch vulnerability included rotating the missiles between sites (moresites than missiles) and deploying them on old aircraft carriers. But the crucial argumentfor Snark focused on low cost. About 1/8th to 1/l0th the size of a B-52, the Snark cost aslittle as 1/20th as much as the Boeing bomber. Simply put, the Snark was cost effective.

Meanwhile, the program lumbered along. Northrop designed the "D" model Snark as arecoverable vehicle equipped with a 24-hour stellar-inertial system. In the most visiblechange, Northrop added two pylon tanks carrying a total of 593 gallons of fuel to thewing. The overall result increased the Snark's empty weight from 16,616 pounds ("C") to20,649 pounds ("D") and the gross flying weight from 36,074 pounds to 44,106 pounds.The N-69D first flew in November 1955, but did not accomplish its first successfulstellar-guided flight until October 1956.

The "E" model followed shortly. While Northrop cut 2,000 pounds from the "D's" emptyweight, the ''E" weighed 5,000 pounds more at gross flying weight. The company firstlaunched the N-69E, the prototype vehicle for the SM-62 (the operational designation,"strategic missile"), in June 1957 (it crashed within seconds), initially with a workablerudder that it later deactivated. An Air Force crew launched its first Snark on 1 October1957. These operations by SAC crews illustrated the Snark's severe problems. Of the firstseven Air Force launches, only two reached the drop zone and only one of these impactedwithin four miles of the aiming point.

The central problems remained guidance and reliability. While the first full-range testrevealed that existing maps mislocated Ascension Island, this meant little to the Snarkprogram because of the missile's gross inaccuracy. On flights out to 2,100 miles, theNorthrop missile averaged a CEP of 20 miles. The most accurate of seven full-rangeflights between June 1958 and May 1959 impacted 4.2 nm left and .3 nm short of thetarget; in fact, it was the only one to reach the target area, and one of only two missiles topass the 4,400 rim distance mark. Not until February 1960 did Snark successfullycomplete a guidance trial. Based upon the last ten launches in the program, the guidancesystem showed less than a 50 percent chance of performing to specifications. In addition,the guidance system, along with the control system, accounted for about half the testfailures; the other half were attributed to random factors. Test results indicated that Snarkhad only a one in three chance of getting off the ground and only one of the last tenlaunches went the planned distance.

In the mid and late 1950s, as more progress was made toward the deployment of theSnark ICM, SAC began to lose enthusiasm for the Snark weapon system, due primarily totwo factors. First, SAC was greatly concerned with the relatively low speed of the Snarkand its inability to operate in the stratosphere, characteristics which rendered the missilehighly vulnerable to enemy interception and destruction.

Secondly, and of even greater importance, was the Snark's poor test performance record.Throughout the Snark test program, initiated in 1952, numerous launch and guidancefailures had raised serious questions regarding the weapon system's reliability. In light ofthese liabilities, SAC advocated termination of the program. On 16 December 1958,General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command, informedGeneral Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, that: . . . the limitedoperational capability of this system adds little or nothing to the strategic offensive forceand I believe that a re-evaluation of this program is in order . . . either we should takenecessary action to integrate the Snark into the strategic inventory with a capabilitycompatible with our concept of operating or . . . take immediate action to cancel theprogram.

Nevertheless, the Air Force began to incorporate the Snark into its inventory. Whileresponsibility for the development and testing of guided missiles rested with the AirResearch and Development Command, (predecessor of today's Air Force MaterielCommand), the Strategic Air Command maintained a close liaison with the variousmissile programs by presenting SAC requirements, offering technical assistance, andsending representatives to various conferences, meetings, and field demonstrations. Atthe same time, SAC was actively engaged in developing operations plans for thoseguided missiles destined for eventual deployment with the command. Thus, on 10December 1956, SAC published a Snark operational plan that outlined the mission andrequirements for equipping, manning, siting, activating, and operating Snark units. Twomonths earlier, on 22 October, the command had established a Strategic Missile SiteSelection Panel to survey potential missile site locations. The panel considered range,expected target assignment, and the overall capabilities of the Snark ICM system whensurveying sites. On 21 March 1957, the Air Force, acting on the recommendation of theStrategic Missile Site Selection Panel, designated Presque Isle AFB, Maine, as the site forthe first Snark missile base. Two months later, on 17 May, the Air Staff selected PatrickAFB, Florida, as the training and operational testing locale for the Snark ICM. To carryout this important dual assignment at Patrick AFB, SAC activated the 556th StrategicMissile Squadron on 15 December 1957, making it SAC's first Snark and first strategicsurface-to-surface guided missile squadron. On 27 June 1958, little more than six monthsafter being activated, the 556th SMS successfully launched its first Snark from CapeCanaveral, Florida -- shortly before USAF deactivated the unit.

But in November 1959, within a year of Power's request for a program evaluation, SACrecommended cancellation of Snark (the recommendation was endorsed by ARDC).Headquarters USAF, however, rejected that proposal. Despite General Power'srecommendation, the Air Force and the Department of Defense decided to continue alimited program for the operational deployment of one Snark squadron to acquire some

missile capability until ballistic missiles became available in quantity. On 1 January1959, SAC activated the 702nd Strategic Missile Wing (ICM-Snark) at Presque Isle AFB,Maine, and assigned it to the Eighth Air Force, thus making it the first SAC missile wingto be assigned to a numbered air force. The 556th SMS at Patrick AFB was assigned tothe 702d SMW on 1 April 1959 and was scheduled to move to Presque Isle in July, butSAC inactivated the squadron on 15 July 1959 before the move could be consummated.As a result of this action and the subsequent cancellation of the programmed activation ofthe 702nd Missile Maintenance Squadron, the 702nd SMW was put in the uniqueposition of having no assigned subordinate units. All operational and maintenancefunctions associated with the Snark ICM were handled by the 702nd SMW's deputycommander for missiles. The 702d SMW placed the first Snark ICM on alert on 18March 1960 and by the end of fiscal year 1960, a total of four Snark missiles were onstrategic alert. Yet, it was not until 28 February 1961 that SAC was able to declare the702d SMW operational.

But the Snark was living on borrowed time. Shortly after taking office in 1961, John F.Kennedy scrapped the project. The Strategic Air Command's negative evaluation of theSnark's potential was reinforced on 28 March 1961 when President John F. Kennedy, in aspecial defense budget message, directed the phase out of the missile because it was"obsolete and of marginal military value" relative to ballistic missiles. The President citedthe weapon's low reliability (a particularly sore point to his Secretary of Defense),inability to penetrate, lack of positive control, and vulnerable, unprotected launch sites.Accordingly, in June 1961 [various sources report either 2 June or 25 June], SACinactivated the 702d Strategic Missile Wing at Presque Isle AFB less than four monthsafter it had been declared operational.

Surely the unit's and Snark's service trust rank as one of the briefest in peacetime USmilitary history. While the operational life of the Snark ICM was extremely short, theprogram was not without its benefits. Chief among these was the experience gained bythe Strategic Air Command in planning and carrying out the activation, training, anddeployment of guided missile squadrons and wings. Such experience would be invaluableto SAC as it prepared for the deployment of such follow-on missile weapon systems asthe Atlas, Titan, Jupiter, and Minuteman.

SM-64 Navaho

Concurrent with the Snark, another cruise missile had its brief moment in the sun.Compared to the Snark, the North American Navaho was much more dramatic andambitious. Although the two air-breathing intercontinental missiles developed together,USAF planned to get the subsonic Snark into operations first, followed by the supersonicNavaho. Eventually, both would move aside for ballistic missiles.

In December 1945, the Technical Research Laboratory of North American Aviationsubmitted a proposal to the Air Force to continue German missile research, apparently inresponse to military requirements issued late that year. North American proposed a threestage effort: first add wings to a V-2, then substitute a turbojet-ramjet powerplant for theGerman rocket engine, and finally couple this missile with a booster rocket forintercontinental range. In April 1946, the Air Force bought the first part of this schemeunder project MX-770, a 175- to 500 mile range surface-to-surface missile. In July 1947,it added the 1,500-mile range, supersonic ramjet to the program. By March 1948, theprogram called for a 1,000-mile test vehicle, a 3,000-mile test vehicle, and a 5,000-mileoperational missile. In 1950, the Air Force considered launching a Navaho from a B-36,an idea dropped the next year. Finally, in September, USAF firmed up the program, thatis, not further changing it. The Navaho program called first for the design, construction,and test of a turbojet test vehicle, followed by a 3,600-mile-range interim missiles andculminating in a 5,500-mile-range operational weapon.

USAF designated the first step, the turbojet test vehicle, the X-10. Two WestinghouseJ40WE-1 turbojets powered the X-10, which first flew in October 1953. The missile was70 feet long, configured with a canard, "V" tail, and 28-foot delta wing. Radio controlsand landing gear permitted recovery. In all, 11 vehicles flew 27 flights. On the 19th test,the North American missile reached a maximum speed of Mach 2.05, establishing aspeed record for turbojet-powered aircraft.

Unfortunately, problems hindered the follow-on (interim) missile, the XSM-64, andschedules slipped badly. In March 1952, USAF estimated that the first acceptance wouldoccur in January 1954; it occurred in April 1956, 27 months late. Similarly, a January1954 estimate expected the first flight in September 1954, a flight actually not attempteduntil November 1956. The first successful flight did not come until well into 1957. Therewas no single problem; difficulties seem to affect just about everything except the

airframe. The most serious problems, however, centered on the ramjets and auxiliarypower unit, the latter not operating successfully until February 1956.

Between the summers of 1954 and 1955, USAF considered pushing the XSM-64 intooperational service, but problems and delays in the basic program killed that idea. TheAir Force did accelerate the Navaho program in late 1955, giving it a priority second onlyto that of the ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and IRBMs (Intermediate RangeBallistic Missiles), aiming to get the intercontinental- range missile operational byOctober 1960.

The XSM-64 resembled the X-10 in size and configuration. The big difference was a 76-foot, 3-inch long booster that was used piggy-back fashion with the XSM- 64. Together,the two measured 82 feet 5 inches in length and were launched vertically.

As impressive as the XSM-64 looked on paper and to the eye, in reality the systemproved far different. The XSM-64 flight tests disappointed all, earning the project theuncomplimentary appellation, "Never go, Navaho." The first XSM-64 launch attemptedin November 1956 ended in failure after a mere 26 seconds of flight. Ten unsuccessfullaunch attempts occurred before a second Navaho got airborne on 22 March 1957, forfour minutes and 39 seconds. A 25 April attempt ended in an explosion seconds afterliftoff, while a fourth flight on 26 June 1957 lasted a mere four minutes and 29 seconds.

Little wonder then, with the lack of positive results, cost pressures, schedules slippages,and increasing competition from ballistic missiles, that USAF canceled the program afew weeks later in early July 1957. The Air Force did authorize up to five more XSM-64flights at a cost not to exceed $5 million. These tests, "Fly Five," occurred between 12August 1957 and 25 February 1958. Although harassed by problems and failures, thevehicle exceeded Mach 3, with the longest flight lasting 42 minutes and 24 seconds. Thefinal Navaho tests consisted of two launches in project RISE (Research in SupersonicEnvironment), which were equally unsuccessful. On the first flight on 11 September1958, the ramjets did not start and on the second and last flight on 18 November 1958,the missile broke up at 77,000 feet. It cost the taxpayers over $700 million to gain lessthan 1 hours of flight time. So ended the Navaho project.

Nevertheless, USAF saw the Navaho project as a leap forward in the state of the art ofmissile technology. The Navaho required new technology that resulted in a complexmissile. For example, aerodynamic heating (300 at Mach 2 and 660 at Mach 3) demandednew materials. North American used titanium alloys, much stronger than aluminum andyet 40 percent lighter than steel, as well as precious and rare metals at contact points onmuch of the electrical gear. Other untested technology and areas of risk included thecanard configuration, ramjets, guidance, and the massive rocket booster. The situationrequired North American to develop and then manufacture these various pieces of newtechnology concurrently.

On the positive side, although the Navaho did not get into service, some of itscomponents did. Some went into other equally unsuccessful North American projects

such as the F-108 and B-70. Others fared better. The Redstone used the rocket engineconcept, and the Thor and the Atlas adapted the engine. The Hound Dog, the nuclearsubmarine Nautilus for its epic under-the-ice passage of the North Pole, and the Navy'sA3J-1 Vigilante bomber, all adapted the Navaho's inertial autonavigation system.Therefore, while the Navaho proved costly, the program did have positive benefits.

SM-73 Bull GooseThe XSM-73 (WS-123A) Bull Goose was an intercontinental range surface- launcheddecoy missile. Work on the concept started in December 1952, although USAF did notrelease a request (GOR 16) until March 1953, and did not sign a contract with Fairchilduntil December 1955.

The Air Force planned to field 10 Bull Goose squadrons and buy 2,328 missiles inaddition to 53 for research and development. The first squadron was to be operational inthe first quarter of Fiscal Year 1961, the last at the end of Fiscal Year 1963. But problemswith funding, the subcontractor's fiberglass-resin bonded wing, the booster, and theengine (J83-3) delayed the program.

The delta-wing XSM-73 weighed 7,700 pounds at launch, including a 500-poundpayload. A J83 or J85 engine provided the Bull Goose with 2,450 pounds of thrust after abooster with a 50,000-pound thrust got it aloft. The specifications called for a 4,000-milerange at Mach .85 with an accuracy of plus or minus 100 nm. Sled tests began atHolloman in February 1957, with the first of 15 flights taking place at the AtlanticMissile Range in June 1957. While five tests in 1957 were successful, those in 1958 wereless so. Construction of the missile sites began in August 1958, a few months before thefirst Bull Goose flight with the YJ83 engine in November. USAF considered arming theGoose, but in early December canceled the program because of budgetary pressures andbecause the Fairchild missile could not simulate a B-52 on enemy radar. The Gooseprogram amassed a total of 28~/2 flying hours at a cost of $70 million.93

SM-65 AtlasThe Western Development Division awarded a developmentcontract for the Atlas to Convair in January 1955, andConvair completed construction of the test stands in 1956.Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporationconducted static test firings of an Atlas missile at itsSycamore Canyon test facility northeast of San Diego.

The Atlas A was the first R&D configuration that ultimatelyled to the operational Atlas D, E, and F missiles. It consisted

of minimum propellant, propulsion, and guidance systems. Its maximum range was only600 nautical miles, and its maximum altitude was 57.5 nautical miles. A total of eightAtlas As were launched--all on the Atlantic Missile Range--during the period June 1957to June 1958. The B series was the second Atlas developmental configuration. Itspropulsion system was close to operational capability, and one series B missile traveled5,500 nautical miles down the Atlantic Missile Range. Atlas 4-B, the second in the seriesB test flights, was launched successfully on 2 August 1958. The eighth missile in theseries, Atlas 10-B, placed itself into orbit with the Project SCORE payload on 18December 1958, becoming the world’s first communications satellite in the firstsuccessful use of the Atlas as a space launch vehicle.

The Convair Division of General Dynamics produced three different models of the AtlasICBM destined for deployment with the Strategic Air Command. The first operationalversion of the Atlas, the "D" model, was a one and one-half stage, liquid-fueled, rocket-powered (360,000 pounds of thrust) ICBM equipped with radio-inertial guidance and anuclear warhead. It was stored in a horizontal position on a "soft" above-ground launcher,unprotected from the effects of nuclear blast, and had an effective range, like all Atlasmodels, of approximately 6,500 nautical miles. The second Atlas ICBM configuration,the series E, possessed all-inertial guidance, improved engines (389,000 pounds ofthrust), a larger warhead, and was stored in a horizontal position in a "semi-hard" coffin-type launcher. The series "F" missile was superior to its predecessors in several ways.Like the E model, the Atlas F was equipped with all-inertial guidance, but possessedimproved engines (390,000 pounds of thrust) and a quicker reaction time due to itsstorable liquid fuel. The Atlas F missiles also were deployed in "hard" silo-lift launcherswhich stored the missiles vertically in underground, blast-protected silos and usedelevators to raise the missiles to ground level for launch.

Meanwhile, considerable progress was made in developing second-generation ICBMssuch as the Minuteman. Among the numerous advantages the newer missiles had over theAtlas was their ability to be launched from hardened and widely dispersed undergroundsilos. Minuteman was also more economical to operate, more reliable, and because of itssilo-launch capability, better able to survive a nuclear first strike than their first-generation counterparts.

Consequently, on 24 May 1963, General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,approved the recommendations of the Air Force Ad Hoc Group for phaseout of Atlas Dby the end of FY 1965 and the Atlas E's by the end of FY 1967. On 16 May 1964,Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara accelerated the phase-out of the Series E Atlasfrom the end of FY 1968 to the close of FY 1965. In addition, Secretary McNamaraordered the retirement of all Atlas F ICBMs by the end of FY 1968.

Project "Added Effort", the Air Force nickname for the programmed phaseout of all first-generation IC8Ms, began on 1 May 1964 when the first Atlas D's were taken off alert atthe 576th Strategic Missile Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California. Project Added Effortreached completion on 20 April 1965 when the last (first-generation) ICBM, an Atlas F.was shipped from the 551st Strategic Missile Squadron, Lincoln AFB, Nebraska, toNorton AFB, California, where it and other retired Atlas ICBMs were stored for futureuse as launch vehicles in research and development programs.

SM-68 Titan IThe Titan I, produced by the Glenn L. Martin Company, was a two-stage, liquid-fueled,rocket-powered (first stage - 300,000 pounds of thrust; second stage - 80,000 pounds ofthrust) ICBM which incorporated both radio and all-inertial guidance. Deployed in a"hard" silo-lift launcher, the Titan I had an effective range of 5,500 nautical miles.

The second-generation Titan II could be launched from hardened and widely dispersedunderground silos, and was thus better able to survive a nuclear first strike than their first-generation counterparts.

Consequently, on 24 May 1963, General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,approved the recommendations of the Air Force Ad Hoc Group for phaseout of the TitanI by the close of FY 1968. On 16 May 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamaraaccelerated the phase-out of the Titan I from the end of FY 1968 to the close of FY 1965.

Project "Added Effort" was the Air Force nickname for the programmed phaseout of allfirst-generation ICBMs. The operational phaseout of the Titan I weapon system wascompleted on 1 April 1965 when the last Titan I was removed from alert at the 569thStrategic Missile Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. The retired Titans were movedto Miro Loma AFB, California, for storage.

SM-68B Titan IIThe Titan II, manufactured by the Martin Company, was a large two-stage, liquid-fueled,rocket-powered ICBM that incorporated significant performance improvements over theearlier model Titan I weapon system. Titan II had more powerful engines (first stage -430,000 pounds of thrust, second stage - 100,000 pounds of thrust, compared to 300,000pounds and 80,000 pounds for the Titan I), a larger warhead, all-inertial guidance,hyperbolic fuel. and an on-board oxidizer, and the capability of being fired from ahardened underground-silo launcher.

Each Titan II silo was directly connected to an underground launch control capsulemanned by a missile combat crew of two officers and two airman. The Titan II, like theTitan I, had an effective range of ~approximately 5,500 nautical miles. The Air Force hadapproved the development of the Titan II ICBM in October 1959. By 28 March 1961, themissile force included six Titan I and six Titan II squadrons. SAC activated the first TitanII squadron on 1 January 1962 and during the next eight months activated five moresquadrons.

On 8 June 1963, the 570th Strategic Missile Squadron at Davis-Monthan became the firstTitan II unit to achieve operational status. Headquarters SAC completed the deploymentof the second-generation ICBM weapon system on the last day of 1963 when it declaredthe sixth and last Titan II unit, the 374th Strategic Missile Squadron at Little Rock AirForce Base, Arkansas, operational.

By 1981, the Titan II weapon system had served the nation for eighteen years, eight yearslonger than its predicted service life. The system's advanced age, combined with threeaccidents that destroyed two sites and killed four airmen, had cast doubts on its safety andeffectiveness. SAC, anticipating a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative, began toconsider replacement options in October 1980. One month later, the Senate ArmedServices Committee asked the Defense Department to prepare a formal Titan II safetyreport. SAC's replacement options review became the basis for the DOD safety reportreleased in February 1981. The DOD study acknowledged Titan II's significant, albeitdeclining usefulness in preserving nuclear deterrence, and recommended deactivation ofthe Titan system as part of the ICBM modernization plan. During the interim, SAC wouldcontinue to improve Titan hardware and safety procedures.

On 2 October 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci directed theretirement of the Titan II at the earliest possible time. The deactivation program,designated Rivet Cap, formally began with the removal from alert of site 571-6 at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, on 30 September 1982. Titan II deactivation was completed on23 June 1987 when technicians removed the last Titan II missile from its silo at LittleRock AFB, Arkansas. The era of liquid propellant ICBMs came to a close on 18 August1987 with the inactivation of the last Titan II wing, the 308th Strategic Missile Wing atLittle Rock AFB.

LGM-30A/B Minuteman IMinuteman is a three-stage, solid-propellant, rocket-powered ICBM with a range ofapproximately 5,500 nautical miles. Minuteman also possessed an all-inertial guidancesystem and the capability of being fired from hardened and widely-dispersedunderground-silo launchers. A consortium of five contractors produced four distinctmodels of the Minuteman ICBM weapon system, each model being an improvement overthe former: Minuteman I (models "A" and "B"), Minuteman II (model "F"), andMinuteman III (model "G"), the latter capable of carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The Minuteman I was deactivated in 1972 when the Air Force began its modernizationprocess to the Minuteman III.

The Air Force secured approval from the Department of Defense on 27 February 1958 todevelop the Minuteman. From its very inception, the Minuteman program was orientedtowards mass production of a simple, efficient, and highly survivable ICBM capable ofdestroying all types of enemy targets with consistent reliability. The Air Force hoped thatsuch a program would reverse the unfavorable trend towards succeeding generations ofprogressively more costly ICBMs and provide the Strategic Air Command with a weaponsystem that was inexpensive to operate and maintain.

During the early development phase of Minuteman, the Strategic Air Command favoredthe concept of deploying at least a portion of the programmed force (from 50 to 150ICBMs) on railroad cars. SAC submitted a requirement to the Air Staff on 12 February1959 calling for the first mobile Minuteman unit to be operational no later than January1963. To determine the feasibility of deploying Minuteman ICBMs on mobile launchers,SAC ordered a series of tests to be conducted, nicknamed "Operation Big Star."Beginning 20 June 1960, a modified test train, operating out of Hill Air Force Base, Utah,traveled across the western and central United States so technicians could study factorssuch as the ability of the nation's railroads to support mobile missile trains; problemsassociated with command, control, and communications; the effect of vibration onsensitive missiles and launch equipment; and human factors involved in the operation ofa mobile missile system. Originally, six trial runs were projected, but only four werenecessary to realize all test objectives. On 27 August 1960, the last of four MinutemanICBM test trains arrived back at Hill AFB and the Air Force announced that the test ofthe Minuteman mobility concept had been completed satisfactorily.

Despite SAC's repeated pleas in favor of mobile Minuteman, the Air Force assigned toppriority to the fixed silo-based Minuteman concept. Furthermore, on 28 March 1961,President John F. Kennedy deferred further action on the development of the three mobileMinuteman squadrons in favor of three additional squadrons of silo-based Minutemanunits. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara finally settled the issue on 7 December1961 when he canceled the mobile Minuteman development program.

A decision regarding the final size of the silo-based Minuteman ICBM force was notmade until December 1964. A new Minuteman system program directive issued on 11December 1964 established the final Minuteman force at 1,000 missiles. Three yearsearlier, on 1 December 1961, Headquarters SAC had activated the first Minutemansquadron, the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron (ICBM-Model A Minuteman I) atMalmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Only two other model "A" ICBM squadrons wereactivated by Headquarters SAC. These were the 12th Strategic Missile Squadron,activated on 1 March 1962, and the 490th Strategic Missile Squadron, activated on 1 May1962, also located at Malmstrom. The next thirteen Minuteman squadrons activated bythe Strategic Air Command were all model "B" Minuteman I units.

Strategic Air Command housed each Minuteman I, whether a model "A" or "B", in anunmanned, hardened, and widely-dispersed (three-to-seven mile intervals) underground-silo launch facility. A missile combat crew of two officers stationed in a hardened,underground launch control center monitored each flight of 10 launch facilities (fiveflights per squadron). For purposes of command, control, and communications, hardenedunderground cables linked all five launch control centers of a Minuteman squadron.

The Minuteman Force Modernization Program initiated in 1966 to replace all MinutemanI's with either Minuteman II's or Minuteman III's continued through the latter 1960s andinto the mid-70s. The last Minuteman I series "An missiles were removed from theirlaunch facilities at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, on 12 February 1969. These facilitieswere refurbished and outfitted with Minuteman II series "F" missiles. Boeing AerospaceCompany, the contractor responsible for remodeling the launch facilities, completed thenine year modernization effort on 26 January 1975 when it turned over to SAC the lastflight of ten Minuteman III missiles at the 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. WarrenAFB, Wyoming.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/mm2-3.jpg

LGM-30F Minuteman IIIn service since 1965, the Minuteman "F" was a three stage, solid propellant,intercontinental ballistic missile. Because solid propellant is so stable in storage, themissile can be stored almost indefinitely and yet be ready to launch on short notice. ThisICBM had a range of over 7,000 nautical miles and carried a single nuclear warhead. 450missiles were fielded at one time, though the Minuteman II has been decommissionedand the missiles disassembled.

On 2 October 1963, shortly after the first model "A" and "B" Minuteman I squadronsachieved operational status, Headquarters USAF issued Annex A to Specific OperationalRequirement 171 which established a requirement for the Minuteman II ICBM (Model"F"). A more advanced missile than either model of the Minuteman I, the "F" modelincorporated a new, larger second-stage, improved guidance system, a greater range andpayload capacity, and an increased capability to survive the effects of nuclear blast. Inview of the numerous advantages of the Minuteman II, Secretary of Defense Robert S.McNamara approved the Minuteman Force Modernization Program on 8 November1963. The project entailed the eventual replacement of the entire force of deployedMinuteman I ICBMs, 150 "A" and 650 "B" models, with Minuteman IIs.

To prepare for the emplacement of the newer model Minuteman II ICBM, it wasnecessary to completely retrofit the original Minuteman I launch facilities, launch controlfacilities, and associated ground equipment. The Minuteman Force ModernizationProgram began at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, on 7 May 1966 when the firstflight of ten model "B" Minuteman missiles were removed from their silos at the 509thStrategic Missile Squadron. On 1 February 1965, Headquarters SAC activated the 447thSMS at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, making it the seventeenth Minuteman squadronand the first to be equipped with "F" model missiles. Fourteen months later on 1 April1966, SAC activated the fourth Minuteman II, and the twentieth and last Minutemansquadron, the 564th SMS, at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Once the 564th SMS achievedoperational status on 21 April 1967, the deployment of the programmed force of 1,000Minuteman ICBMs was completed.

LGM-30 Minuteman IIIFive hundred Minuteman III missiles are deployed at four bases in the north-central United States: Minot AFB and Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota,Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Operational since1968, the model "G" differs from the "F" in the third stage and reentry system.The third stage is larger and provides more thrust for a heavier payload. Thepayload, the Mark 12 reentry system, consists of a payload mounting platform,penetration aids, three reentry vehicles (RVs) and an aerodynamic shroud. Theshroud protects the RVs during the early phases of flight. The mounting platformis also a "payload bus" and contains a restartable hypergolic rocket enginepowered by hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide. With this configuration, the RVscan be independently aimed at different targets within the missile's overall targetarea or "footprint". This concept is known as Multiple Independently TargetedReentry Vehicles (MIRV).

The LGM-30 Minuteman missiles are dispersed in hardened silos to protectagainst attack and connected to an underground launch control center through asystem of hardened cables. Launch crews, consisting of two officers, performaround-the-clock alert in the launch control center. A variety of communication

systems provide the National Command Authorities with highly reliable, virtuallyinstantaneous direct contact with each launch crew. Should command capability be lostbetween the launch control center and remote missile launch facilities, specially-configured EC-135 airborne launch control center aircraft automatically assumecommand and control of the isolated missile or missiles. Fully qualified airborne missilecombat crews aboard airborne launch control center aircraft would execute the NCAorders.

The Minuteman weapon system was conceived in the late 1950s anddeployed in the early 1960s. Minuteman was a revolutionary concept andan extraordinary technical achievement. Both the missile and basingcomponents incorporated significant advances beyond the relatively slow-reacting, liquid-fueled, remotely-controlled intercontinental ballisticmissiles of the previous generation. From the beginning, Minutemanmissiles have provided a quick-reacting, inertially guided, highlysurvivable component to America's nuclear Triad. Minuteman'smaintenance concept capitalizes on high reliability and a "remove and

replace" approach to achieve a near 100 percent alert rate.

By the time the last Minuteman IIs of the 564th SMS were placed on strategic alert in thespring of 1967, significant progress had been made on the development of an even moreadvanced ICBM. The Minuteman III, using modernized Minuteman I and Minuteman IIground facilities, provided reentry vehicle and penetration aids deployment flexibility,increased payload, and improved survivability in a nuclear environment. Its liquidinjection attitude control system with a fixed nozzle on an improved third stage motor

increased the Minuteman's range and the Minuteman III reentry system could deploypenetration aids and up to three Mark 12 or Mark 12A multiple independently-targetablereentry vehicles. A liquid-fueled post-boost propulsion system maneuvered the missileprior to deployment of the reentry vehicles, while upgraded guidance system electronicsenhanced computer memory and accuracy.

On 17 April 1970, an important Minuteman III milestone was reached when the firstmissile was placed in a silo assigned to the 741st Strategic Missile Squadron, Minot AFB,North Dakota. At the end of December, the 741st SMS became the first SAC MinutemanIII squadron to achieve operational status.

Strategic Air Command expected Minuteman to play an important role in the command'sforce structure beyond the year 2000. To ensure the reliability and maintainability of theMinuteman force into the next century, the Air Force initiated a major Minutemanupgrade and modification program. Rivet MILE (Minuteman Integrated Life ExtensionProgram) began 1 April 1985 at the 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB,Montana. This joint Strategic Air Command and Air Force Logistics Command effortwas the largest single missile logistics program ever undertaken within the ICBMprogram.

Through state-of-the-art improvements, the Minuteman system has evolved to meet newchallenges and assume new missions. Modernization programs have resulted in newversions of the missile, expanded targeting options, significantly improved accuracy andsurvivability. Today's Minuteman weapon system is the product of almost 35 years ofcontinuous enhancement.

Peacekeeper missile deployment also affected the Minuteman force. As part of thestrategic modernization program undertaken in 1982, Strategic Air Command deployedfifty Peacekeeper missiles in modified Minuteman III silos assigned to the 400thStrategic Missile Squadron, 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.Conversion began on 3 January 1986, when the first Minuteman came off alert, and thephaseout of the 400th SMS's Minuteman IIIs was completed on 11 April 1988.

The current Minuteman force consists of 530 Minuteman III's located at F.E. Warren AirForce Base, Wyo.; Malmstrom AFB, Mont.; Minot AFB, N.D.; and Grand Forks AFB,N.D. As a result of U.S. initiatives to cancel development programs for newintercontinental ballistic missiles and retire the Peacekeeper ICBM, Minuteman willbecome the only land-based ICBM in the Triad. To compensate for termination of theSmall ICBM and Peacekeeper Rail Garrison programs, DOD will conduct an extensivelife extension program to keep Minuteman viable beyond the turn of the century. Thesemajor programs include replacement of the aging guidance system, remanufacture of thesolid-propellant rocket motors, replacement of standby power systems, repair of launchfacilities, and installation of updated, survivable communications equipment and newcommand and control consoles to enhance immediate communications.

In order to meet warhead levels set by START II, the United States has decided topermanently DEMIRV Minuteman III missiles from their current capability to carry up tothree reentry vehicles to a newly configured single reentry vehicle system once the treatyenters into force. "Downloading" Minuteman III missiles from three reentry vehicles to

one lowers the military value of each missile; reduces the likelihood of anycountry expending resources to preemptively attack America's ICBMforce; and decreases the probability of future US leaders being force into a"use or lose" position. For a downsized force of 500 single reentry vehicleMinuteman III to continue to be an effective deterrent force, the guidancereplacement program will improve the needed accuracy and supportabilitythat is inherent in a smaller missile force. Peacekeeper missiles will bedeactivated by 2003, provided START II is ratified and enters into force.Ultimately, a total of 500 single RV Minuteman IIIs will be the nation's

ICBM deterrent force through 2020.

SpecificationsPrimary function: Intercontinental ballistic missile

Contractor: Boeing Co.

Power plant:

Three solid-propellant rocket motors;first stage, Thiokol;second stage, Aerojet-General;third stage, United Technologies Chemical SystemsDivision

Thrust: First stage, 202,600 pounds (91,170 kilograms)

Length: 59.9 feet (18 meters)

Weight: 79,432 pounds (32,158 kilograms)

Diameter: 5.5 feet (1.67 meters)

Range: 6,000-plus miles (5,218 nautical miles)

Speed:Approximately 15,000 mph (Mach 23 or 24,000 kph) atburnout

Ceiling: 700 miles (1,120 kilometers)

Guidance systems:

Inertial system: Autonetics Division of RockwellInternational;ground electronic/security system: Sylvania ElectronicsSystems and Boeing Co.

Load: Re-entry vehicle: General Electric MK 12 or MK 12A

Warheads: Three (downloaded to one as required by theWashington Summit Agreement, June 1992)

Yield:

Circular ErrorProbable:

Unit cost: $7 million

Date deployed: June 1970, production cessation: December 1978

Inventory: Active force, 530; Reserve, 0; ANG, 0

Operational Units:

20th Air Force

o 91st Space Wing, Minot AFB, ND 91st Operations Group 91st Operations Support

Squadron 740th Missile Squadron 741st Missile Squadron 742d Missile Squadron

o 321st Missile Group,Grand Forks AFB,ND

o 341th Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB,MT

o 90th Space Wing, F.E. Warren AFB,WY

LGM-118A PeacekeeperThe Peacekeeper missile is America's newest intercontinentalballistic missile. With the end of the Cold War, the US has begunto revise its strategic policy, and has agreed to eliminate themultiple re-entry vehicle Peacekeeper ICBMs by the year 2003as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. ThePeacekeeper (designated LGM-118A) is a four-stageintercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying up to tenindependently-targetable reentry vehicles with greater accuracythan any other ballistic missile. Its design combines advanced

technology in fuels, guidance, nozzle design, and motor construction with protectionagainst the hostile nuclear environment associated with land-based systems. ThePeacekeeper is much larger than Minuteman, over 70 feet long and weighing 198,000pounds. It is a four stage missile like the Minuteman III, with the first three stages beingsolid propellant and the fourth stage bu hypergolicly fueled with hydrazine and nitrogentetroxide. Although capable of carrying eleven Mark 21 RVs, treaty limits mandateddeploying the Peacekeeper with only ten RVs. The entire missile is encased in a canisterin the silo to protect it against damage and to permit "cold launch". The Minuteman IIand III ignite their first stage engines while in the LF, but the Peacekeeper is ejected bypressurized gas some fifty feet into the air before first stage ignition.

The Peacekeeper is a three-stage rocket ICBM system consisting of three major sections:the boost system, the post-boost vehicle system and the re-entry system.

The boost system consists of three rocket stages that launch the missile into space. Theserocket stages are mounted atop one another and fire successively. Three of the four stagesexhausted their solid propellants through a single adjustable nozzle which guided themissile along its flight path. Motorcases made of kevlar epoxy material held the solidpropellants. The fourth stage post-boost vehicle employed a liquid bi- propellant rocketpropulsion system to provide velocity and attitude correction for missile guidance. Thepost-boost vehicle also employed a self-contained inertial navigation system that allowedthe missile to operate independent of ground reference or commands during flight.

The 28-foot first-stage solid-fuel rocket motor weighed approximately 108,000 poundsand is capable of boosting the missile to about 75,000 feet. The 18-foot long second-stagemotor propelled the missile to an altitude of about 190,000 feet and weighed 60,000pounds. The rocket motor in the eight-foot third stage weighed 17,000 pounds andsupplied the thrust to boost the missile to about 700,000 feet. The 2,300 pound post-boostfourth stage vehicle was designed to maneuver the missile into position for the multiplereentry vehicles to deploy in their respective ballistic trajectories.

Following the burnout and separation of the boost system's third rocket stage, the post-boost vehicle system, in space, maneuvers the missile as its re-entry vehicles aredeployed in sequence.

The post-boost vehicle system is made up of a maneuvering rocket, and a guidance andcontrol system. The vehicle rides atop the boost system, weighs about 3,000 pounds(1,363 kilograms) and is 4 feet (1.21 meters) long.

The top section of the Peacekeeper is the re-entry system. It consists of the deploymentmodule, up to 10 cone-shaped re-entry vehicles and a protective shroud. The shroudprotects the re-entry vehicles during ascent. It is topped with a nose cap, containing arocket motor to separate it from the deployment module.

The deployment module provides structural support for the re-entry vehicles and carriesthe electronics needed to activate and deploy them. The vehicles are covered withmaterial to protect them during re-entry through the atmosphere to their targets and aremechanically attached to the deployment module. The attachments are unlatched by gaspressure from an explosive cartridge broken by small, exploding bolts, which free the re-entry vehicles, allowing them to separate from the deployment module with minimumdisturbance. Each deployed re-entry vehicle follows a ballistic path to its target.

The Peacekeeper was the first U.S. ICBM to use cold launch technology. The missile wasplaced inside a canister and loaded into the launch facility. When launched, high-pressuresteam ejected the canister from the launch silo to an altitude of 150 to 300 feet, and oncethe missile has cleared the silo, the first stage ignited and sent the missile on its course.This technique allowed SAC to launch the Peacekeeper from Minuteman silos despite thefact that the Peacekeeper was three times larger than the Minuteman III.

Background

Once Minuteman III deloyment was underway, Strategic Air Command's planners begantheir search for a third-generation ICBM. SAC again sought the most technologicallyadvanced system to secure increased range, variable warhead yields, and pinpointaccuracy. Several issues complicated the development and acquisition of a new ICBMsystem. The increased accuracy of Soviet missile systems spawned an intense debate overthe survivability of fixed missile sites and the best method for basing the third-generationICBM. However, the issue of funding, given an atmosphere of burgeoning federaldeficits and cost-cutting measures, impeded SAC's efforts to acquire a new missile.Nonetheless, SAC persevered and brought the Missile-X into the ICBM inventory as thePeacekeeper missile.

The search for a system to replace the Minuteman began in 1971. Strategic AirCommand, believing Minuteman technology to be obsolete, wanted a new missile thatincorporated the most advanced technology available. Essential elements on SAC's list ofrequirements were increased range, greater accuracy, and variable yield warheads tocapitalize on multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle technology. Progresstoward the new missile was made on 4 April 1972 when Headquarters Air Force assignedthe designation "Missile-X" (M-X) to the advanced ICBM and made the Space andMissile Systems Organization (SAMSO) responsible for developing it.

The issue of hardened silos versus mobility surfaced almost immediately as a major M-Xstumbling point. Improvements in Soviet ICBM forces and missile accuracy raisedserious concerns over the ability of silo-based ICBMs to survive an attack. Proposedsolutions to the problem were hardened silos and a mobile basing system. Strategic AirCommand objected to mobile basing in 1973 because of its high expense, poor accuracy,and slow reaction time. Meanwhile, the defense community continued to explore bothsolutions. One approach to mobility was an air-mobile system, and during a 24 October1974 test of the concept, SAMSO successfully launched a Minuteman I from a C-5Acargo aircraft. One month later, the Secretary of Defense, under intense political pressureto resolve basing issues and produce an economical missile system, pushed the M-X'sinitial operational capability from 1983 to 1985. At the same time, he initiated studies todetermine the feasibility of developing a common M-X/Trident missile. In July 1976,Congress, convinced that silo-based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs,refused to appropriate funds for validation of a silo-based M-X system. Congress alsodeleted funds for air-mobile basing and directed validation of either a buried trench orshelter basing plan.

The defense establishment examined nearly forty basing modes before President Cartermade his 12 June 1979 decision to proceed with full scale engineering development ofthe Missile-X. The President augmented this decision on 7 September 1979 with theselection of a horizontal multiple protective shelter basing plan for the new missile. Fullscale engineering development began one week later.

President Reagan, desiring more rapid deployment of the new missile, canceled thehorizontal shelter plan on 2 October 1981 and advocated the deployment of a limitednumber of M-X missiles in superhardened Titan II or Minuteman silos. On 22 November1982, the President further refined his position by announcing Closely Spaced Basing asthe final solution to the M-X basing problem. President Reagan used the same speech toindicate his preference for "Peacekeeper" as the name of the M-X missile. Congress,which had rejected interim Peacekeeper basing in Minuteman silos in

March 1982, also rejected Closely Spaced Basing and refused to approve Peacekeeperfunding. The Congress further insisted that the President undertake a comprehensivetechnical assessment of the ICBM and basing alternatives.

President Reagan responded by first directing Headquarters Air Force to conduct atechnical assessment. The Air Force report, completed in March 1983, advocateddeployment of a new, highly accurate ICBM in sufficient numbers to eliminate the SovietUnion's "coercive advantage." The Air Force also recommended concurrent deploymentof a survivable basing method that allowed credible, effective, and timely retaliation. Acritical point in the Air Force assessment was the need to deploy an ICBM quickly as ademonstration of national resolve to preserve deterrence.

President Reagan also appointed a Commission on Strategic Forces chaired by LieutenantGeneral Brent Scowcroft. The Scowcroft Commission's report, issued on 6 April 1983,encouraged the development of a small single-warhead ICBM to meet the long-range

threat, but recommended the immediate deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles inexisting Minuteman silos to demonstrate national will and to compensate for theretirement of Titan II ICBMs. The Scowcroft report also encouraged a vigorousexamination of all basing alternatives. President Reagan and Congress concurred with theScowcroft Commission's findings and on 10 August 1983 the Secretary of Defenseinstructed the Air Force to deploy 100 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos at F.E. WarrenAFB, Wyoming. At the same time, the Defense Secretary directed the Air Force toinitiate design of a small, single-warhead ICBM.

The Air Force successfully conducted the first test flight of the Peacekeeper June 17,1983, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. The missile traveled 4,190 miles (6,704kilometers) before dropping six unarmed test re-entry vehicles on planned target sites inthe Kwajalein Missile Test Range in the Pacific Ocean.

The first two test phases consisted of 12 test flights to ensure the Peacekeeper'ssubsystems performed as planned, and to make final assessments of its range and payloadcapability. The missile was fired from above-ground canisters in its first eight tests.Thereafter, test flights were conducted from Minuteman test silos reconfigured tosimulate operational Peacekeeper sites.

Peacekeeper production began in February 1984. Under plans prepared by Strategic AirCommand, 50 Minuteman IIIs assigned to the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron, 90th

Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, were be removed and replacedwith Peacekeeper missiles, which had an estimated service life of twenty years.Peacekeeper deployment was scheduled to begin in January 1986 and initial operationalcapability was set for December of the same year. The second increment of 50 missileswould replace Minuteman IIIs belonging to the 319th Strategic Missile Squadron at F.E.Warren. The expected completion date of the deployment was December 1989.

These plans were interrupted in July 1985 when Congress limited Peacekeeperdeployment to 50 missiles until the administration could produce a more survivablebasing plan. President Reagan's solution for basing the remaining 50 missiles, announced19 December 1986, was Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. Three days later, the 90th SMWachieved initial operational capability for Peacekeeper by placing the first flight of tenmissiles on strategic alert. Full operational capability occurred in December 1988, whenthe 90th Strategic Missile Wing accepted the fiftieth Peacekeeper missile.

Under the rail garrison concept, the remaining Peacekeeper missiles would be placed ontrains stationed at various U.S. Air Force installations. The 25 trains, each carrying twomissiles, would deploy off-base and onto the national railroad network during periods ofinternational tension to improve survivability. F.E. Warren AFB would serve as the MainOperating Base for the rail garrison force. In February 1987, the Air Force selected tenadditional bases as candidate rail garrison locations. That same year, Congressappropriated $350 million to fund rail garrison research and development. Exercisesconducted in 1988 tested and refined the concept of operations, and in May the Secretary

of Defense authorized the Air Force to proceed with Peacekeeper Rail Garrison full scaledevelopment.

A further review of ICBM moderization produced a Presidential decision in April 1989that limited the Peacekeeper system to the existing 50 missiles but directed they beredeployed from silos to rail garrison. In November, the Air Force announced theselection of seven bases to house Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. The Main Operating Basewould be F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, and the other six bases were Barksdale AFB,Louisiana; Little Rock AFB, Arkansas; Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; Dyess AFB,Texas; Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; and Fairchild AFB, Washington. December 1992 wasthe date established for delivery of the first asset.

The Air Force achieved initial operational capability of 10 deployed Peacekeepers at F.E.Warren AFB, Wyo., in December 1986. Full operational capability was achieved inDecember 1988 with the establishment of a squadron of 50 missiles.

Ballistic Missile Organization, Air Force Materiel Command (now Detachment 10, Spaceand Missile Systems Center), began full-scale development of the Peacekeeper in 1979.This organization, located at San Bernadino, Calif., integrated the activities of more than27 civilian contractors and numerous subcontractors to develop and build thePeacekeeper system.

SpecificationsPrimary function: Intercontinental ballistic missile

Contractor: Basing: Boeing Aerospace and Electronics; assemblyand test: Martin Marietta and Denver Aerospace

Power Plant:First three stages, solid-propellant; fourth stage,storable liquid (by Thiokol, Aerojet, Hercules andRocketdyne)

Length: 71 feet (21.8 meters)

Weight: 195,000 pounds (87,750 kilograms) including re-entryvehicles

Diameter: 7 feet, 8 inches (2.3 meters)

Range: Greater than 6,000 miles (5,217 nautical miles)

Speed: Approximately 15,000 miles per hour at burnout (Mach20 at sea level)

Guidance system: Inertial; integration by Rockwell, IMU by Northrop andRockwell

Warheads: 10 Avco MK 21 re-entry vehicles

Yield:

Circular ErrorProbable:

Date Deployed: December 1986

Unit Cost: $70 million

Inventory: Active force, 50; ANG, 0; Reserve, 0

Midgetman / Small ICBM

Polaris A1

The Polaris A1 weighed 28,800 lb, with a length 28.5 ft and diameter 54 in., it had arange of approximately 1000 nm. The first stage (18,400 lb) had a steel motor case;polyurethane propellant (15,200 lb) with ammonium percholorate (oxidizer) andaluminum additives. The second stage (9,400 lb) also used a steel motor case;polyurethane propellant (7,300 lb) with ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer) and aluminumadditives.

The first major development problem in the A1X flight test program manifested itself inA1X-2, the second stage of which failed in the vicinity of No. 5 thrust termination port,due to overheating. It was an insulation and bonding problem, and was a continuation ofthe type of trouble experienced in earlier flight tests. This failure generated an extensiveinvestigation of head end insulation and bonding. The head end fix with a continuousboot and potting solved one problem but introduced another, since later flightsexperienced thrust termination port failures; they did not open up and arrest the forwardmovement of the second stage, which continued on and bumped the reentry vehicle. Thecontinuous boot was probably a major contributor to the anomaly. The solution to thenew problem included scoring the boot around the periphery of each thrust terminationport.

The launch of a Lockheed-built Polaris A1 Fleet Ballistic Missile was the first in historyfrom a submerged submarine, the USS George Washington (SSBN 598). It occurred July20, 1960, off Cape Canaveral, Florida, and within three hours a second Polaris testmissile was launched. On November 15, 1960, the submarine and its 16 Polaris A1sbegan the first patrol.

On 2 June 1964, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598). returned to Charleston, SouthCarolina, to off-load missiles in preparation for overhaul at General Dynamics, ElectricBoat Division, shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. This ended the initial deployment of thefirst FBM submarine, with POLARIS A1's which began in November 1960. Finally on14 October 1965, the USS Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) returned to the U.S.,completing her initial deployment. She was the last of the first five SSBNs carrying thePOLARIS A1 to return to the U.S. for overhaul. This marked the official retirement ofthe POLARIS A1 missile from active fleet duty. These first five boats were being refittedto carry POLARIS A3 missiles.

Polaris A2

The Polaris A2 had a 1,500 mile range, weighed 32,500 pounds and was 31 feet long. Itwas the same diameter as the Polaris A1 -- four-and-a-half feet--and could be launchedfrom the same tubes inside a submarine. The first A2 travelled more than 1,400 milesfrom Cape Canaveral, Florida, when it was launched on November 10, 1960. It becameoperational on June 26, 1962, with the initial deployment of the Ethan Allen, the firstsubmarine of its class designed from the keel up as an SSBN, a nuclear-powered, ballisticmissile submarine.

SPO on 28 November 1958 directed initiation of the second-generation missile,POLARIS A2 (1500 nm), to be loaded on the sixth SSBN in October 1961. The PolarisA2 was dimensionally quite similar to Polaris A1 except the first stage was 30 in. longer.With a total weight 32,500 Ib and a length of 31 ft; the A-2 had a range approximately1450 nm. The first stage (22,400 lb) used a steel motor case; polyurethane propellant(19,200 lb) with ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer) and aluminum additives. The secondstage (9,300 lb) used a fiberglass motor case; composite modified double base propellant(7,400 lb), DDT-70 motor designed by ABL with rotating nozzles and a Mk I guidancesystem (23S Ib);

To achieve a 1500 nm POLARIS A2, the most obvious way would be to make somecomponents of the missile lighter and improve the performance of the propellants. Afterevaluating the most practical approach for maximum improvements with minimum risks,it was decided to concentrate on the second stage, reducing its associated inert weightsand improving the specific impulse of the second stage motor. Reduction of second stageinert weight would result in eight times more increase of a range increment than a similarreduction in the first stage.

The Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) under the operation of Hercules PowderCompany, took on the development of an improved propellant, a cast-in-case double base(nitrocellulose/nitroglycerin) propellant to which was added the aluminum fuel andammonium perchlorate oxidizer. The motor chamber's weight was reduced by the use ofa glass filament-wound approach versus steel. It consisted of continuously wound glassfibers with epoxy resins.

With the improvement in propellant in the second stage came an increase of thrust plumetemperature. There had been previous problems with jetevators on Al's; so an alternatethrust vector control [TVC] system was developed (e.g., rotatable nozzles). This conceptemployed a unique feature in that the axis of rotation on each of four nozzles was set atan angle and produced pure axial thrust when the nozzle was in the null position. Whenthe nozzle was rotated about its axis, the jet stream was deflected relative to the centerlineof the motor, thus permitting TVC with a minimum loss in axial thrust. Two oppositenozzles fuming together produced a component of side force in the direction towardwhich they were rotated. If they were rotated in opposite but equal directions, roll-controltorque was produced.

In addition to the second stage improvements, the POLARIS A1 first stage motor designwas lengthened by 30 in. but the same A1 propellant was retained along with jetevatorsfor TVC.

The A2 missile had considerably less development problems than the A1. The A2, beingan extension of the A1 in many aspects, had greater maturity when it entered the flighttest stage. With the primary difference in the two missiles being in the second stagemotor, it was not surprising, however, that some pre-flight problems should arise in thatarea of the A2. The new rotating nozzles, replacing the A1 jetevators, had a tendency tostick in static motor tests. Considerable effort was expended to correct this fault.Fortunately, by the time A2X-1 was flight tested, the problem had virtually disappeared.The comparatively few flight anomalies which the A2X experienced were in the mainrandom type failures.

The launch of the first A2X missile at Cape Canaveral on 11 November 1960, signaledthe beginning of an extremely successful test program. The entire A2X flight testprogram consisted of 28 vehicles, of which 19 were successful, 6 partially successful and3 fail- ures. However, 8 of these A2Xs were reconfigured for the purpose of testing Mk IIguidance and reentry vehicle materials (both for A3X application) and these were fired atvarious times in late 1961 and during 1962. They had designations such as A2G, A2M,and A2MG.

With the advent of the A2X program came the first experience with flame attenuation ofradio frequency communications during the boost phase. The new propellant used in SSmotors contained a high percentage of aluminum which caused ionized particles in theexhaust plume. When this ionized cloud came between the missile and the ground-basedradio frequency facilities, blackout of telemetry, destruct, and tracking functions

occurred. The problem was solved by relaying to down-range stations in front of themissile and the ionized plume.

The first successful submerged launch of the POLARIS A2 came from the USS EthanAllen (SSBN-608) on 23 October 1961 off the Florida coast. On 26 June 1962, thePOLARIS A2 began its initial operational patrol when the USS Ethan Allen departedCharleston, South Carolina.

The USS James Monroe (SSBN-622) on 9 January 1968 became the first submarine withPOLARIS A2's to enter overhaul and to receive POLARIS A3 capability. The USS JohnMarshall (SSBN-611) became the last submarine to give up her POLARIS A2's forPOLARIS A3 capability when she went into overhaul on 1 November 1974.

Penetration aids for the FBM reentry vehicles came under consideration several times tocounter potential improvements in the Soviet's ABM defense system. The first of thesePen-Aids was PX-1 for POLARIS A2 during the 1961 -62 time frame. This was followedby PX-2 for POLARIS A3 during the 1963 to 65 era. These programs consisted ofconcept studies and testing. In the case of PX-1, the program proceeded throughdevelopment and into production. One SSBN load of missiles was deployed with PX-1Pen-Aids but was off-loaded when the perceived ABM threat did not emerge. The rangeof the A2 was reduced when loaded with PX-1. Offloading restored the A2's capability.

Polaris A3The Polaris A3 missile was the first to have a range for 2,500 miles, and, while like theA2, it was 31 feet long (1.5 in. longer than A2) and four-and-a-half feet in diameter, itweighed 35,700 pounds--4,000 more than the A2. The design of the POLARIS A3 wasrestricted in size by the volume available in the submarine's (SSBN) launch tube. Thusthe A3 was limited to being approximately the same size as A2 but was to fly 2500 nmversus 1500 nm. Therefore, the A3 was basically a new design missile, rather than anevolution, as was A1 to A2.

The first stage (24,600 lb) usd a fiberglass motor case and nitroplasticized polyurethanepropellant (21,800 lb). The second stage (10,800 lb) also used a fiberglass motor case;composite modified double base propellant (9,000 Ib), EJC (Hercules), and a Mk 11guidance system (80 Ib). The reentry system consisted of three reentry vehicles whichtilted outboard and are ejected by small rocket motor.

The A3's first test flight took place at Cape Canaveral on August 7, 1962,k and the firstA3s went on patrol on September 28, 1964, when the USS Daniel Webster began itsinitial deployment from Charleston, South Carolina. The A3 was the first Polaris to havemultiple reentry vehicles.

The 2500 nm range of the POLARIS A3 extended FBM submarines operations to thePacific Ocean, providing greater sea room and operating area to offset the expandingSoviet anti-submarine capabilities. Another consideration for the POLARIS A3 was theneed for improved accuracy from the longer-range and increased-penetrability capabilityagainst the Soviet's emerging anti-ballistic missile defense.

To meet these objectives, the A3's design included reentry vehicle concepts, improvedguidance, fire control, and navigation systems; penetration aids (PenAids); and missiletrajectory shaping techniques. New technologies were also considered such as,advancements in propellants, electronics, materials, and TVC concepts.

Several A2X test vehicles were launched in late 1961 and 1962 for the purpose of testingimproved guidance systems and reenty vehicles for the A3. So even before POLARIS A2became operational, POLARIS A3 design and component testing was underway.

Two POLARIS A1 missiles, AlX-50 and 51, were reconfigured for tests of an advancedTVC system based upon injection of high-density fluid (Freon 114) into the exit cone ofthe nozzle, creating a shock pattern and causing the main exhaust stream to deflect. On29 September 1961, this system was successfully demonstrated during second stage flightand, after a second test 2 months later, was chosen as the baseline TVC system for the A3second stage. The outstanding advantages of the fluid injection system were its loweffective inert weight, its insensitivity to the propellant flame temperature, and thenegligible constraint imposed on primary nozzle design. At this time, the rotatable nozzleconcept was retained for the first stage.

Guidance required significant development with the systems weight and volumeallocation set at less than half that allowed in the earlier A1 and A2 missiles. Increasedcomponent accuracy was also a requirement at the longer A3 ranges. To demonstrate theeffectiveness of the new inertial instruments and a simplified computer mechanization,the proposed system was flown with excellent results on seven special A2 tests during a1-year period, starting in November 1961.An attempt was also made to obtain data on reentry vehicle materials. A special A2 flighttest missile evaluated the nylon-phenolic ablative heat shield which had been selectedfollowing an extensive ground test program.Also included in the innovations which provided the major gain in performance of thePOLARIS A3 over the A2 were improvements in propellants, chamber materials, andalternate velocity control techniques. The first stage chamber material was changed fromsteel to high-strength resin-impregnated glass roving, and the propellants were changed toformulations with higher specific impulse and density. Another significant developmentwas the replacement of the single warhead with three reentry vehicles at fixed spacingsfor more efficient target coverage and reduced vulnerability to possible defenses.The first A3 flight test was conducted at Cape Canaveral on 7 August 1962. Consideringthe challenge and redesign involved in the development of the A3 missile, it was not untilthe seventh development flight that complete success was achieved. It was during the A3development program that the concept of incorporating productioncomponents/processing was first introduced into the development phase of a program(A3X- 18) . (This approach was later to be called "production disciplines.")During June 1963, the A3X was successfully tested for the first time in a tube-launchedfiring at sea from the USS Observation Island (EAG-154). The first launching of aPOLARIS A3 missile from a submerged submarine, the USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-619), took place on 26 October 1963.The A3X flight test program started on 7 August 1962 and was completed on 2 July1964. There were a total of 38 flights, of which 20 were successful, 16 partiallysuccessful, and 2 failures. Of the 20 successes, only 15 had successful reentry vehicleoperation and ejection. It was only until the 15 A3X flights that the program began tohave a continuous series of success.

The first stage at Aerojet was plagued, in early phases, by a most negative reactionbetween the propellant and the nozzles. The inability to retain a set of nozzles for fullduration in static firings delayed the beginning of an examination of nozzle rotation. Byusing a "cooler" propellant ANP 9969 (about 6000 F flame temperature) and by beefingup the nozzles to massive proportions, using tungsten throats, the nozzle erosion problemcould be solved, but at the loss of some 90 rim in range. A3X-14, which was launchedfrom EAG-154, suffered "brain scrambling" of its guidance computer, resulting in earlydumping of the missile (command destructed at 17 sec). This anomaly was given thecode name of CLIP. The phenomenon was found to occur at the time of umbilicaldisconnect and to be generated at the missile/ground support interface.

The A3X Reentry System had a series of problems which required a major effort tocorrect. For one, the heatshield (between ES and reentry vehicle structure) lackedstructural integrity. On A3X-33 it failed, no doubt due to the thermal environment created

by the reentry vehicle rocket blasts, which were more severe than originally calculated.The severe environment was confirmed in heatshield tests at Rye Canyon, undersimulated altitude conditions. Deriving from these and other tests, extensivemodifications were made to the heatshield to make it stronger.

The POLARIS A3 missile became operational on 28 September 1964 when the USSDaniel Webster (SSBN-626) began her initial operational patrol with 16 A3 missiles.And another milestone was reached on 25 December 1964 when the USS Daniel Boone(SSBN-629) departed Apra Harbor, Guam and began the first Pacific Ocean operationalpatrol. With all the Eurasian land mass covered by the 2500-mile range of the POLARISA3 missile, the FBM System became, for the first time, a true global deterrent.

The POLARIS (A3) Operational Test (OT) program which began in September 1965 hadeffectiveness results which were significantly less satisfactory than those of the A3DASO. The POLARIS A3 OT program was suspended in January 1966 and on 17 March1966, RADM Levering Smith (Director, SPO) convened a special A3 Blue RibbonCommittee to investigate. The Blue Ribbon Committee findings and recommendationswere providedduring 29 August to 2 September 1966. Preparations to implement therecommendations were conducted between September and December 1966. ThePOLARIS A3 Blue Ribbon Phase II Recertification (corrective action implementation)program began at POMFLANT, Charleston, South Carolina, on all delivered/deployedA3 missiles in February 1967 and was completed prior to the start of the POLARIS A3Tconversion program (October 1968). The POLARIS A3 OT program resumed inNovember 1967 with greatly improved results.

Polaris B-3 StudiesDuring the 1962-1964 period strategic analysts postulated the Soviet defense would havean improved discrimination (radar) capability and a greater defense in depth with"SPRINT" type interceptors by the post-1967 period. Various advanced POLARISpreliminary design concepts were studied by LMSC to offset the perceived Soviet threat.In October 1962, the POLARIS A3a was offered. It was a 66 in. diameter missile versusthe prior 54 in. missiles. Concepts included a large single warhead, a three-warheadsystem, and penetration system options compatible with the missile system's desiredmaximum range.This was followed by various POLARIS B3 missile concepts. Various reentry systemconfigurations were evaluated (e.g., a single warhead, a cluster of multiple warheads, anaerodynamic maneuvering warhead, a low-altitude terminal dash). These configurationswere code-named B3D, B3H, B3E, etc. Finally in July 1963, Lockheed proposed aPOLARIS B3D to counter the expected (1969 to 1970) increased defense against ballisticmissiles. The POLARIS missile diameter would increase to 74 in. The SSBN launcher'sinner tube sized for a 54 in. diameter missile would be removed and non-launchable seals(pads) would be installed directly to the outer tube to accommodate the B3D's 74 in.diameter. The missile range would be in the order of 2000 nm and it would have a three-warhead system along with Pen-Aids (PX). Deployment of the warheads and PX wouldbe from a platform with a cold gas (nitrogen) control system for reentry system altitudecontrol. This was the beginning of what later became a "Bus" for reentrydeployment/targeting. The system as proposed had hard target effectiveness plusimproved penetration capability and versatility against defended urban/industrial targets.During this same time frame, the Air Force generated (1962) a requirement for a newreentry vehicle which would become known as the Mk 12. Development of this newpayload was authorized in late 1963 with the Director, Defense Research andEngineering proviso that it be a joint Navy-Air Force development. During March 1964,the General Electric Company, Reentry Systems Division, was authorized to develop itfor Minuteman and POLARIS.In May 1964, Lockheed proposed another POLARIS B3 configuration; a 74 in. diametermissile. This would double the volume and weight capability for a reentry system whencompared to POLARIS A3. The reentry system would consist of six Mk 12 typewarheads plus Pen-Aids. The range would be 2000 nm. At this time, anti-submarinewarfare (ASW) projections and forward-based tender support did not warrant a furtherincrease in missile range. Investigations of the performance potential, therefore, focusedon increased payload flexibility and improved defense penetration.Guidance and controls were within the reentry system deployment platform with a warmgas reaction system for attitude control. The "Bus" had arrived it was called the"Mailman" concept. There were other new design concepts for the B3 (e.g., first andsecond stage glass filament wound motor cases with thrust termination on the secondstage forward-facing thrust ports). Each motor had a single nozzle with fluid injection forTVC.Later in October 1964, after conducting a B3 targeting study, Lockheed proposed aconcept which extended the operation and flexibility of the "Mailman" concept by the use

of modification kits for the deployment platform. The kits provided for changing six Mk12's to four Mk 12's or twelve (new) small reentry vehicles and interchanging warm gasgenerators of the platform's attitude control system. This would vary the available energysource and provide single or multiple-targeting. This concept was "Flexi-flier."Also during this 1964 time frame, Lockheed conducted a Large Ballistic Missile (LBM)study. With accuracy improvement forecasted for the Soviet ICBM system, the U.S.ICBM system's survivability came under question. Lockheed proposed a large two-stage,solid-propellant missile weighing approximately 602,000 lb with a range of 5,500 nmwith multiple-reentry vehicles using advanced large payloads. The LBM would involvesea-basing, encapsulated in ocean depths down to 8000 ft. The Mk 17 RB, another AirForce-Navy potential development program, briefly came under consideration.The Navy's role in strategic weapon systems was assigned to the urban/industrial targets,and the LBM concept was dropped. The proposed POLARIS B3 with Mk 12 RBs wasprimarily identified as a single-target weapon. Incorporating a multiple-target capability,with a large number of smaller RBs (a new Navy Mk 3 RB) resulted in vastly improvedcost-effectiveness (low cost per target). This led to a designation change, B3 to C3.The multiple-target capability was achieved by the use of a number of smaller RBs andthe "Flexi-flier" concept (e.g., the equipment section acts as a "bus"). It has a gasgenerator, thruster valves and a control system which, after separating from the missile'sbooster system (rocket motors), provides an added velocity increment andmaneuverability in space to position and separate RBs to separate independent targets.This Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability provides theability to deliver multiple RVs to a single target or to multiple targets. The impact ofmultiple RVs attacking more than one target from a single missile is described as themissile footprint. The RVs can be laid down in a downrange stick, a crossrange stick, or acombination of both. A single target attack with multiple RVs from a single missile posesa special design consideration. To prevent multiple RV kill by a single interceptor, theRVs must be spaced along the trajectory so that the distance between any two RVs atintercept, altitude is greater than the (statistical) lethal diameter of the interceptor.Interceptor lethal diameter is determined primarily by the RB hardness and the assumedconservative interceptor warhead yield.

Poseidon C3On 18 January 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced in a special message to theCongress that his administration proposed to develop a new missile for the FBM SystemPOSEIDON. The POSEIDON C3 was to be 74 in. in diameter as compared to the 54 in.POLARIS. It was to be 3 ft longer than the 31 ft A3 and approximately 30,000 lb heavier.Despite this increase in size, the growth potential of the ballistic missile submarinelaunching system was to enable POSEIDON to fit into the same 16 launch tubes thatcarried POLARIS; modifications to the launch tubes and a new fire control system for themore complex MIRV targeting problem were to be required. POSEIDON was to carrytwice the payload of the POLARIS A3 with significantly-improved accuracy.

The Poseidon C3 was a two-stage solid propellant missile with a length of 34.1 ft. 74 in.diameter with a range of approximately 2500 nm, weight of approximately 65,000 lb. TheES (forward of the SS) is 72 in. in diameter which separates from the booster. It isequipped with the missile all inertial guidance system, a solid-propellant gas generatorPBCS and RVs. This provides maneuvering of the ES and ejection of reentry vehiclesinto ballistics trajectories to individual targets, MIRVs. Both rocket motors havefiberglass cases, with single movable nozzles. The second stage motor had six thrusttermination ports (thrusting forward) which are activated at ES separation. Multipleindividual-targeted small reentry vehicles (Mk 3) were developed as the POSEIDONpayload.

The POSEIDON C3 could carry up to 14 of the small Mk 3 RVs. These could be targetedbodies and could be targeted independently in the MIRV mode. Trajectory loft optionswere available, and the range could be extended by off-loading portions of the payload.The Post Boost Control System (PBCS), colloquially known as the "Bus," gave a largeattack The increased accuracy and flexibility of the weapon system would permit its useagainst a broader spectrum of possible targets and give added insurance of penetration ofenemy defenses. As envisioned at that time, POSEIDON was to increase the system andforce effectiveness of the FBM System by a factor of eight. This revolutionary multipletarget per missile concept changed the course of national policy, strategic forcestructures, targeting doctrines, and operational planning. It also altered the quantitativeand qualitative strategic balance.

Apart from the much-increased size and weight, the main difference between thePOLARIS A3 and the POSEIDON C3 was the latter's capability of delivering reentryvehicles to single or multiple targets. Thus the principal area of development involvedflight of the ES with the guidance system and reentry vehicles after they had separatedfrom the booster. The ES's solid-propellant gas generator and associated steeringcapability allowed the guidance system to maneuver the ES and to eject reentry vehiclesinto ballistic trajectories to individual aim points.

Development of propulsion for C3 was undertaken by a joint venture of Hercules, Inc.,and Thiokol Chemical Corporation. Both stages now had fiberglass cases. The first stage

used a composite propellant and the second stage propellant was a double base. The C3rocket motors were the first in the FBM program to feature single-movable nozzlesactuated by a gas generator and by hydraulic power units.

Other work centered on the development of an advanced all-inertial guidance system.Initial evaluations of a stellar-inertial guidance system were conducted in early 1966.Advanced development of a Mk 4 stellar-inertial guidance system was started in 1968.This effort was of an essential element of a new operational capability which becamefully matured in the TRIDENT I and II.

Lockheed entered a 1 year Concept Design Phase (CDP) from February 1965 to February1966. In March 1966, full-scale engineering development (FSED) began. However it wasnot until 12 March 1968 that a contract was executed. The Navy awarded LockheedMissiles & Space Company, Inc. (LMSC) a $456.1 million cost-plus-incentive feecontract for development and production of the POSEIDON missile system. The contractrepresents one of the first awards made by the Navy Department providing for totaloperational system development and production (OSDP).

The contract called for 25 development (C3X) type flights to be followed by 5 ProductionEvaluation Missile (PEM) flights from an SSBN. The first C3X was launched from aflatpad at Cape Kennedy on 16 August 1968 several hours before the first Minuteman IIIlaunch. In view of the initial success of the development flights, the test plan wasmodified to 20 development flights versus 25. The PEMs remained at 5. Of these 20flights, 13 were complete successes and 7 were failures. The last C3X flight was on 29June 1970. This was followed on 17 July 1970 by the firsts submerged launch of aPOSEIDON PEM successfully conducted from the USS James Madison (SSBN-627).The firing was observed by a Russian ship, LAPTEV, whose crew was unsuccessful inattempts to recover closure plate segments from the water after launch of the missile. Theremaining 4 PEMs were also successfully launched from the SSBN-627.

Finally on 31 March 1971, the USS James Madison (SSBN-627) deployed fromCharleston, South Carolina, for operational patrol with 16 tactical POSEIDON C3missiles. Deployment of the USS James Madison (SSBN-627) introduced thePOSEIDON missile into the nation's arsenal of operational deterrent weapons andbrought to successful fruition the development program announced in January 1965 for asuccessor weapon system to POLARIS. POSEIDON incorporated substantialimprovements in accuracy and resistance to counter-measures over previous generationsof missiles, but its principal advantage was in its flexibility, which provided a capacityfor delivery for multiple warheads, widely spaced, on separate targets over a variety oftarget footprints.

Trident I C-4 FBM / SLBMThe TRIDENT I (C-4) is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) developed toreplace the Poseidon missile in existing strategic missile submarines and to arm theOHIO class SSBNs. Today it is carried by the eight OHIO class submarines operating inthe Pacific. The C-4 missile was first deployed in 1979.

The TRIDENT C-4 is a long-range, multiple-warhead missile that is launched fromsubmerged submarines. Depending upon the number of warheads carried, it has almostdouble the range of the previous Poseidon missile. The C-4 is a three-stage solid fuelmissile which is powered only during the initial phases of flight. When the third stage isexhausted the missile follows a ballistic trajectory. When the first stage motor ignites andaerospike extends from the missile's nose, cutting the friction of the air flowing past themissile, thus extending its range. The third stage includes the bus that aims and dispensesthe warheads at separate targets.The missile's manufacturer, Lockheed Missiles and Space company, achieved theincrease in range without a commensurate increase in physical dimensions over thePoseidon missile through several technological advances. Those advances were made inseveral key areas, including propulsion, microelectronics and the weight-saving materialarea. Missile range is controlled by trajectory shaping with Generalized EnergyManagement Steering [GEMS). In addition, TRIDENT I uses an "aerospike" to increaseits aerodynamic performance. The spike is attached to the front end of the missile andtelescopes into position after launch.The first TRIDENT missile was launched from a flat pad at Cape Canaveral, Florida, onJanuary 18, 1977. The missile was first deployed at sea aboard the USS Francis ScottKey (SSBN 657) in October, 1979. In February of 1995, Florida successfully launched 6TRIDENT missiles in rapid succession. TRIDENT subs carry 24 of the missiles. Eachcan be independently targeted.

To achieve a 4000 nm range [ versus the 2500 nm range of the POSEIDON C3] theTrident I (C4) is a three-stage solid-propellant missile with basically the same envelopedimension as a C3 (e.g., 34.1 ft in length and 74 in. in diameter), limited by the spaceavailable in a POSEIDON SSBN launch tube. There was a weight increase toapproximately 73,000 lb. There was an increase in the C4's Nose Fairing [NF] envelope,compared to C3, to allow introduction of a solid propellant Third Stage [TS] booster in

the center of the ES/NF. Each of the three stages has a boost rocket motor with advancedpropellants, improved case materials, and a single lightweight movable nozzle with aTVC system of lightweight gas-hydraulic design.

Boost velocity control is achieved by burning all boost propulsion stages to burnout,shaping the trajectory to use all the energy, without thrust termination. This method istermed generalized energy management steering (GEMS). The ES is powered by a solid-propellant PBCS. Miniaturizing and repackaging missile electronic components alsocontributed to reduced package sizes, weights, and calibration, thereby allowing morevolume for propulsion.

In the missile electronics, improved system accuracy was achieved by incorporating astellar-inertial guidance concept, by improving the Navigation and Fire Control systems,and by more accurate control of reentry vehicle separation. Inert weights were reducedwith structures fabricated from composite graphite-epoxy materials which represent 40percent weight saving compared to similar structures made from aluminum.

The largest contribution to attaining the range increase goal came from incorporating athird boost propulsion stage. To fit within the same cylinder as the POSEIDON this thirdstage motor was to be mounted in the center of the post-boost vehicle with the reentryvehicles carried around the third stage.

The strategy adopted to achieve the remainder of the range goal was to pursue rangegaining technologies in the following general ways all in parallel: decrease inert weightthroughout the entire missile, increase the volume available for propulsive energy, andincrease the usable energy per unit volume. This strategy resulted in efforts directed todeveloping a smaller and lighter guidance system, lightweight missile structures, lowvolume and lightweight electrical and electronic components, smaller or lighter post-boost control system, an aerospike to reduce boost phase aerodynamic drag and, mostimportantly, higher performance rocket motors. In order to withstand reentry heating atlong ranges and higher ballistic coefficients, new protection materials needed to bedeveloped for the reentry vehicles.

The range extension dictates for weight reduction were complicated by the unique reentryvehicle placement around the third stage which made thrust termination difficult toengineer. And in introducing a third stage of boost propulsion and making maximum useof the available launch tube volume, the missile nose shape became so much blunter thataerodynamic drag during boost could have significantly detracted from meeting the rangeincrease goal. It therefore became important to reduce boost phase drag.

A deployable aerospike, extended shortly after launch, was incorporated to reduce thefrontal drag of the C4 NF by approximately 50 percent. The aerospike is self-containedand requires no functional interface input from other missile subsystems. A small solidpropellant gas generator provides the energy to extend and lock the aerospike intoposition. Its ignition is triggered by acceleration of the missile on ejection from thesubmarine. This unique feature, utilized for the first time on a ballistic missile, was

adopted to offset the aerodynamic drag and performance degradation of the unusuallyblunt nose fairing. A concentrated effort to reduce the Mk 4 reentry vehicle weight asmuch as possible was also conducted.

The remaining major technical challenge to achieving the range increase objective wasthe development of solid propellant rocket motors incorporating technologicaladvancements in both propellants and inert components. In recognition of the importancein the throat, carbon-carbon entrance and exit segments and either carbon or graphitecloth phenolic in other areas. An omnidirectional flexible joint enables movementrequired for thrust vector control.

Reentry system design objectives included more than doubling the maximum range atwhich the reentry vehicle with its high ballistic coefficient (weight-to-drag ratio) couldreliably withstand reentry heating without significant weight increase. The majortechnical issues involved in meeting this objective were those of materials technology.Several alternative design concepts for the nosetip, heatshield, and substrate materialswere examined in parallel during the early stages of development. A highly successfulsupplemental flight test program carried out in 1974 and1975 with surplus Atlas andMinuteman missiles helped in the early selection of materials and design concepts.

The reentry body has a tape-wrapped carbon phenolic (TWCP) heatshield bonded to athin-wall aluminum substrate for the shell and a graphite nosetip. The TWCP is similar tomaterial previously used by the Air Force for reentry bodies, but with the carbon particleseliminated. It is made from a carbonized rayon cloth, wrapped on a mandrel, and cured ina female mold. The TWCP ablates during a reentry, leaving at least a minimum amountof cool material intact to impact. The graphite is a fine-grain graphite, especiallydeveloped for strong and uniform properties. So critical was graphite quality, and sodifficult to inspect the end product, that a separate factory, a computer controlled facility,was built for its exclusive production where processes could be completed controlled.

Background

Lockheed commenced a TRIDENT I (C4) Advanced Development Program on 15November 1971, which was the start date for contract N00030-72-C-0108.The IOC of theC4 was established as CY 1979. The SECDEF on 23 December 1971 approved NavyProgram Budget Decision #317 to increase ULMS budget funding to permit accelerationof the program calling for deployment of a new class of SSBNs capable of carrying the4000 nm TRIDENT I missile and, later, the 6000 nm TRIDENT II missile. On 1November 1973, Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) Missile contract for missilesystem development plus the production of the first missiles including reentry vehicleshells. The contract provided for support equipment and technical services to outfit andsupport operation of TRIDENT I and backfit submarines, SWFPAC, POMFLANT, andtraining facilities.

The major engineering challenges of the TRIDENT missile development, which requiredinnovation as well as state-of-the-art advances, derived from the goals of doubling the

missile range in the same volume and weight while keeping the already surprisingly goodaccuracy at this doubled range. Improving the accuracy involved navigation and firecontrol improvements as well as missile and guidance. In addition to these technologicalchallenges, there were equally important design constraints derived from cost andreliability goals. Development costs were constrained in a period when inflation washigh, and different in the various segments of the economy, while inventories weregenerally very low and lead times long. Production cost was an additional major designconsideration and reliability (hence operational dependability) was, as always, given toppriority.

The accuracy of the new missile system, to maintain effectiveness, was to be equivalentat 4000 nm to that of the POSEIDON C-3 at 2000 nm. To gain the increased full payloadrange, it was necessary to give up some of the maximum possible ABM exchange ratiowhich would only be of value should the then proposed ABM Treaty be abrogated. As ahedge against such a contingency, advanced development of a maneuvering, evaderreentry vehicle capable of being carried by the missile was included in the program.Thisprovided reasonable assurance that a possible later decision to initiate engineeringdevelopment of such a system in response to Soviet ABM deployment would not requirereengineering of the weapon system. Six flight tests from 6 March 1974 to 13 November1975 developed the new reentry vehicle (Mk 4) for C4, along with a Mk 500maneuvering reentry vehicle, demonstrating the feasibility of the concept and itscompatibility with the TRIDENT missile system.

The C4 missile development flight test program commenced on 18 January 1977 with thesuccessful launching of C4X-1 from the flat pad (25C) at Cape Kennedy. This wasfollowed by 17 additional C4X launches from pad 25C. Of these 18 flights, 15 weresuccessful, 1 was a partial success, 1 was a failure and1 was a no test (due to groundsupport equipment error). The C4X program completed on 23 January 1979. This wasfollowed by the firing of 7 PEMs (Performance Evaluation Missiles versus ProductionEvaluation Missiles) from the SSBN-657 during the period 10 April 1979 through 31July 1979. PEM-1had a first stage motor failure but PEMs 2 through 7 were successful. Itwas this successful flight test program that lead to SECNAV James Woolsey to commentin January 1980 that TRIDENT I (C4) was "the most successful submarine launchedballistic missile development program to date."

Moreover, the development flight test program was progressing so satisfactorily that afterthe 12th flight test of the C4X was successfully conducted, Lockheed on 19 May 1978proposed that the total number of development (C4Xs and PEMs) be reduced from 30 to25. Following the 16th flight test which was successful, the Director of SSPO determinedon 27 November 1978 that the technical objectives of the C4 development program hadbeen met and that the development flights could be reduced from 30 to 25 flight tests (18C4Xs and 7 PEMs).

Although the flight test program was progressing satisfactorily, there were problems onthe ground. During static ground firings of rockets motors, there were two internally-induced detonations which resulted in a major effort to resolve and modify the propellant.

During another static ground firing, exercising of the flight termination system resulted inan externally-induced detonation. This resulted in a modification to the flight terminationsystem.

Finally on 20 October 1979, the USS Francis Scott Key (SSBN-657), a POSEIDONsubmarine "backfitted" with TRIDENT I (C4) missiles, deployed for deterrent patrolfrom Charleston, South Carolina, carrying 16 tactical (4000 nm) TRIDENT I (C4)missiles.

SpecificationsWeight: 73,000 lbs.

Length: 34 feet

Diameter: 74 inches

Propulsion: 3-stage solid propellent rocket

ULMS MissilesStudies related to the proliferation of POSEIDON C3 led to the conclusion that a newULMS (missile) and the new submarine concept with greater missile carrying capacitywould make the ULMS (missile) more cost-effective than POSEIDON proliferation.TheULMS missile studies tended to culminate in either a 2 or 3 stage missile with a 4500 nmrange and a weight in the order of 130,000 lb. Since the missile was to be encapsulatedand external to the SSBN, it was size limited. This led to a new FBM missile conceptapproximately 80 in. in diameter and 56 ft in length. The missile was referred to as LRC3(Long Range C3) and Lockheed's concepts included a new reentry vehicle (Mk 3A).About this time, the ULMS began to be known as the Improved Fleet Ballistic Missile(IFBM) system.

Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic MissileTrident II D-5 is the sixth generation member of the U.S. Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile(FBM) program which started in 1956. Systems have included the Polaris (A1), Polaris(A2), Polaris (A3), Poseidon (C3), and Trident I (C4). The first deployment of Trident IIwas in 1990 on the USS Tenessee (SSBN 734). While Trident I was designed to the samedimensions as the Poseidon missile it replaced, Trident II is a little larger.

The Trident II D-5 is a three-stage, solid propellant, inertially guided FBM with a rangeof more than 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 statute miles or 7,360 km) Trident II is moresophisticated with a significantly greater payload capability. All three stages of theTrident II are made of lighter, stronger, stiffer graphite epoxy, whose integrated structuremean considerable weight savings. The missile's range is increased by the aerospike, atelescoping outward extension that reduces frontal drag by about 50 percent. Trident II isfired by the pressure of expanding gas in the launch tube. When the missile attainssufficient distance from the submarine, the first stage motor ignites, the aerospike extendsand the boost stage begins. Within about two minutes, after the third stage motor kicks in,the missile is traveling in excess of 20,000 feet (6,096 meters) per second.

The ten Trident submarines in the Atlantic fleet were initially equipped with the D-5Trident II missile. The eight submarines in the Pacific were initially equipped with the C-4 Trident I missile. In 1996 the Navy started to backfit the eight submarines in the Pacificto carry the D-5 missile.

Features

The TRIDENT II Weapon System was to be an evolution of the TRIDENT I. However,going back to be an advanced technology missile capable of 4000 nm range whencarrying a similar payload as the POSEIDON (C3) would carry to approximately 2000nm. It was also constrained to fit in the submarine's circular cylinder launch tube whichcontained the C3. Thus, the new C4 missile could be used in then-existing submarines(e.g., approximately 74 in. in diameter and close to 34 ft in length). In addition, theaccuracy of the new C4 missile system was to be equivalent at 4000 nm to that of thePOSEIDON C3 at 2000 nm. To satisfy this range requirement, a TS boost propulsionstage was added to C4 to increase range along with propellant improvements and reduction in inert missile weights. Developments in the guidance system was the majorcontributor to maintaining accuracy.

Now that the new bigger TRIDENT submarine was available for the TRIDENT II (D5),the additional space could be considered in the missile design. Moreover, with thepossibility of a bigger and associated improved performance, a larger payload could beincorporated. Using the concepts from the IAP, improvements could be developed for thesubsystems of the weapon system to provide the desired improved accuracy, all leadingto hard-target capability.

Thus, with the larger submarine, the TRIDENT II (D5) Weapon System became anevolution of the TRIDENT I (C4) system with technology improve ments in allsubsystems of the weapon system: missile (guidance and reentry system), fire control,navigation, launcher and test instrumentation (non-tactical) subsystems, resulting in amissile with additional range, improved accuracy, and heavier payload.

The TRIDENT 11 (D5) is an evolution of the TRIDENT I (C4). Generically speaking,the D5 looks like the C4, only bigger, to provide for additional thrust and increasedpayload capability. The D5 is 83 in. in diameter versus 74 in. for C4, and 44.6 ft in lengthversus 34.1 ft for C4. Both missiles taper to 81 in. and 71 in., respectively, forward of thesecond stage motor.

The missile consists of a first stage section, an interstage [IS] section, a second stagesection, an Equipment Section [ES], a Nose Fairing [NF] section, and a nose cap sectionwith an aerospike. There is no adapter section like there is on C4. The D5 ES, along withcontaining all the guidance and electronics, performs the same function as the ES-adaptersection in C4 (e.g., structural support between the aft end of the NF and the forward endof the second stage motor).

The first stage and second stage motors are also primary structural components of themissile, connected by an Interstage (IS). Forward of the second stage motor, the adaptersection structure of the C4 has been eliminated in D5, and the equipment section (ES) hasbeen extended to serve as the adapter section plus ES. The third stage motor is mountedwithin and to the ES similar to C4. Structural bracketry on the forward part of the ES ismodified from C4, in order to accommodate the bigger Mk 5 reentry vehicle or, withadded fixtures, a payload of Mk 4 RBs.

The first stage section includes the first stage rocket motor, TVC system, and thecomponents to initiate first stage ignition. The IS section connects the first stage andsecond stage sections and contains electrical and ordnance equipment. The second stagesection includes the second stage rocket motor, TVC system, and components to initiatesecond stage ignition.

When compared to C4, for the D5 to achieve the longer range with its larger, heavierpayload, improvements in rocket motor performance would be required plus reductions inthe weight of the missile's components. To improve rocket motor performance, there wasa solid-propellant change. The C4 propellent carried the name of XLDB-70, translated to,cross-link double-base70 percent solid fuels. The solids consisted of HMX (His Majesty'sExplosive), aluminum, and ammonium perchlorate. The binder of these solids wasPolyglycol Adipate (PGA), Nitrocellulose (NC), Nitroglycerine (NO), andHexadiisocryanate (HDI). This propellant could have been called PGA/NG, when weconsider that D5 propellant is called Polythylene Glycol (PEG)/NG. D5 is called thisbecause the major innovation was the usage of PEG in place of the PGA in the binder. Itwas still a cross-link, double-base propellant. The use of PEG made the mixture moreflexible, more rheologic than the C4 mixture with PGA. Thus, the D5 mixture being moreflexible, an increase could be made in the amount of solid fuels; increased to 75 percentsolids resulting in improved performance. Thus, D5 propellant's is PEG/NG75. The JointVenture (the propulsion subcontractors, Hercules and Thiokol) have given a trade nameto the propellant NEPE-75.

The motor case material on the D5's first stage and second stage became graphite/epoxyversus the Kevlar epoxy of C4, an inert weight saver. The TS motor was to be Kevlarepoxy but, midway through the development program (1988), it was changed tographite/epoxy. The change was a range gainer (reduced inert weight) plus eliminatedany electrical static potential associated with Kevlar and graphite. There was also achange in all D5 rocket motor nozzles' throat material from segmented rings of pyrolyticgraphite in the entrance and throat of the C4 nozzle to a one-piece integral throat andentrance (ITE) of carbon-carbon on D5. This change was for reliability purposes.

The Equipment Section [ES] houses the major guidance and flight control electronicspackages. The TS rocket motor and its TVC system are mounted to an eject cylinder atthe center of the ES and extends forward of the ES. A small TS eject motor is recessed ina cavity on the TS motor forward dome. When the TS motor is expended, the eject motorpushes the TS motor aft, out of the ES to effect TS separation. The Equipment Sectionwas integrated with the adapter section, using graphite/epoxy versus the aluminumcomposite structures on C4. This was a weight saver, providing a range gainer. The ISdid not change, conventional aluminum. The ES mounting for the third stage rocketmotor is similar for both the C4 and D5 with an explosive zip tube used for separation,and the third stage motor has a similar eject rocket motor on the forward end of the rocketmotor.

The NF section covers the reentry subsystem components and the forward portion of theTS motor. The NF section consists of a primary structure with provisions for two jettisonrocket motors and a locking mechanism. The nose cap assembly at the forward end of theNF houses an extendable aerodynamic spike.

The D5 missile has the capability of carrying either Mk 4 or Mk 5 reentry vehicles as itspayload. The D5 reentry subsystem consists of either Mk 4 or Mk 5 reentry vehicleassemblies attached by four captive bolts to their release assembly and mounted on the

ES. STAS and pre arming signals are transferred to each reentry vehicle shortly beforedeployment through the separation sequencer unit. When released, the reentry vehiclefollows a ballistic trajectory to the target where detonation occurs in accordance with thefuze option selected by fire control through the preset subsystem.

The reentry vehicle contains an AF&F assembly, a nuclear assembly, and electronics.The AF&F provides a safeguard to prevent detonation of the warhead during storage andinhibits reentry vehicle detonation until all qualifying arming inputs have been received.The nuclear assembly is a Department of Energy (DoE) supplied physics package.

Both C4 and D5 ES PBCSs are similar except C4 had only two simultaneously burningTVC gas generators, whereas D5 has four TVC gas generators. There are two "A"generators which burn initially and provide thrust to the ES, using integrated valveassemblies (IVAs). When the gas pressure drops in the "A" generators due to burnout, the"B" generators are ignited for the remainder of the ES flight.

The post-boost flight of the C4 and D5 ES and reentry vehicle releases are different. WithC4, upon completion of the TS rocket motor burn and separation, the PBCS positions theES, which is maneuvered in space to permit the guidance system to conduct its stellarsightings. Guidance then determines any flight trajectory errors and issues corrections tothe ES flight path in preparation for reentry vehicle deployment. The C4 ES then enters ahigh-thrust mode, the PBCS driving it to the proper position in space and correct velocityfor reentry vehicle deployment. During the high-thrust mode, the ES flies "backwards"(RBs face aft to the trajectory). When the correct velocity for reentry vehicle release isobtained, the C4 ES goes into a vernier mode. (ES is adjusted so that the reentry vehiclewill be deployed at the proper altitude, velocity, and attitude.)

Upon completion of each reentry vehicle drop, the ES backs off and moves to anotherposition for subsequent reentry drops. During the backing off, gas plumes from the PBCSwill impact on reentry vehicles differently, causing reentry vehicle velocity deltas.

In the case of D5, the ES uses its PBCS to maneuver for stellar sighting; this enables theguidance system to update the original inertial guidance as received from the SSBN. Theflight control system responding to guidance reorientates the D5 ES and enters a high-thrust mode. However, in the D5 case, the ES flies forward. (RBs are basically down theline of the trajectory.) As in C4, the D5 ES (when it reaches the proper altitude, velocityand attitude) enters the vernier mode to deploy RVs. However, to eliminate the PBCSplume from impacting the reentry vehicle upon release, the ES undergoes a PlumeAvoidance Maneuver (PAM). If the reentry vehicle to be released will be disturbed by aPBCS nozzle's plume, that nozzle will be shut off until the reentry vehicle is away fromthe nozzle's plume area. With a nozzle off, the ES will react to the other three nozzlesautomatically. This causes the ES to rotate as it backs away from the reentry vehicle justreleased. In a very short time, the reentry vehicle will be beyond the influence of theplume and the nozzle is returned to normal operation. PAM is used only when a nozzle'splume will disturb the area around an RV. This PAM was one of the design changes tothe D5 to provide improved accuracy.

Another design change to help improve accuracy was to the nosetip of the Mk 5 RV. Inthe TRIDENT I (C4) missile, an error condition existed in some cases upon reentry intothe atmosphere when the nosetip ablated at an uneven rate. This caused the reentryvehicle to drift. As the design of the Mk 5 reentry was developed, the change to a shapestable nosetip (SSNT) was established. The nose of the Mk 4 reentry vehicle was boroncarbide-coated graphite material. The Mk 5 nose has a metallated center core withcarbon/carbon material, forming the rest of the nosetip ("plug"). The metallated centercore will ablate at a faster rate than the carbon/carbon parent material on the outer portionof the nosetip. This will result in a blunt, more-symmetrical shape change with less of atendency to drift and, consequently, a more-accurate and more-reliable system. Priortesting of SSNTs on some C4 missile flights had verified the design concept.

In TRIDENT I (C4), the flight control subsystem converted data signals from theguidance subsystem into steering and valve commands (TVC commands) moderated bymissile response rates fed back from the rate gyro package. In TRIDENT II (D5), the rategyro package was eliminated. The D5 flight control computer receives these missileresponse rates from the guidance system inertial measuring unit (IMU) as transmittedthrough the guidance electronic assembly (EA).

The more-extensive use of composites in D5's structure provided inert weight savings.Redesign of ordnance system D5-versus-C4, although functionally the same, in particularthe separation ordnance to "cut" structure, contributed to weight savings.

Background

The Deputy SECDEF approved a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) No. 67 on 14September 1971 for the ULMS Program, a long-term modernization plan which calledfor a new, larger submarine and a new, longer-range missile while preserving a nearer-term option to develop an extended-range POSEIDON missile. And in December 1971,the Deputy SECDEF PBD authorized an accelerated ULMS schedule with a projecteddeployment of the new SSBN and missiles in 1978. In May 1972, the term "TRIDENT"replaced "ULMS," the name "TRIDENT II" was used to designate the ultimate longer-range missile, and the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) submissionoutlined funding for the TRIDENT II (D5) program based on a 1984 IOC. Later on 3August, the SECDEF in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) advanced the D5 IOC2 years to FY 1982. So it beganoscillating D5 IOC dates and associated impacts to theTRIDENT I (C4) development program schedule.

Also on 18 October 1973, a TRIDENT I DSARC (Defense Systems Acquisition ReviewCouncil) II and an overall TRIDENT program review was conducted. On 14 March 1974,the Deputy SECDEF issued two requirements. The first requirement was parallel (to C4development) advanced development effort for major accuracy improvement in the C4and follow-on missiles (beginning of the IAP). The second requirement was for follow-on alternatives to the C4 missile, or a new D5 missile, or a variant of C4 with larger firststage motor.

The SSPO responded to this second requirement in May 1974 with a brief reportgrouping candidate missile alternatives into three basic categories: (1) C4 alternatives, 74in. missiles with varying degrees of C4 commonality; (2) various "stepped" D5 missilealternatives with an 82 in. first stage and 74 in. upper stages that were similar to C4; and(3) D5 alternatives which were all-new, 82 in. missiles.

An abnormal rate of inflation in 1974, plus future increases projected for 1975 - 76,resulted in a SECDEF directed IOC slip of the TRIDENT II to CY 1983. This wasfollowed by a SECDEF decision in January 1975 to a further slip to FY 1985 due tobudgetary problems.

On 10 February 1975, the SECDEF issued a study directive for examining feasibledegrees of the Air Force's Missile X (MX)-TRIDENT II commonality, potentialperformance degradations, and resultant cost advantages associated with the variousdegrees of commonality. It was also during this time frame that the TRIDENT IICharacteristics Study was underway. The Navy's perception of the specific militaryrequirement for TRIDENT II were in a state of flux. Hard-target capability appeared tobe in the SECDEF's mind but no firm nuclear weapons employment policy appeared. Infact, none was likely until MX commonality and possible improved accuracy alternativeswere resolved. In line with this, the SECDEF, on 23 July 1975, deferred TRIDENT IIoperational availability date (OAD) to 1987.

On 3 May 1976, the Deputy SECDEF wrote to the SECNAV, outlining the desirability ofSWS having both survivability and a wide range of capability. The TRIDENT submarine,having invulnerability as well as the potential for increased throwweight, "encouragesconsideration of options to expand our SLBM capability against the full spectrum of thetarget system." The Navy was therefore requested to develop an overall TRIDENT II

missile development plan for increasing the "utility" of the FBM system for IOC in the1980s.

In the meantime, in 1976 Congress, for the second consecutive year, denied the Navy'srequest for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding to initiateTRIDENT II conceptual development.

On 16 August 1976, when the SECNAV responded to the Deputy SECDEF above-mentioned guidance outlining TRIDENT II conceptual goals for an all new D5 hard-target systemhe noted that only minimal in-house effort could be undertaken in FY 1977.But assuming that TRIDENT II funding would be available in FY 1978, it still appearedfeasible to plan for a 1987 IOC. Meeting such a schedule, however, would definitely becontingent upon DoD waiver of normal acquisition procedures.

Subequently, trade studies were conducted to define the extent to which the more-expensive elements of the new Trident-II missile would be common with the new AirForce MX ICBM, while unique subsystems could be added to utilize the larger missilesizes usable in the MX weapon system. A TRIDENT II baseline was defined as a point ofdeparture for the study. Although uncorroborated by detailed study, the probable targetmissile that could be accommodated in the TRIDENT submarine (83 in. diameter and 44ft length) was established in order to provide maximum performance in the MXapplication. This baseline TRIDENT II, with a modification to the guidance system,additional electronics hardening, and the addition of an external protective coating fordust and debris protection, was determined to be the common missile. It satisfied theNavy TRIDENT II requirements established for this study but did not satisfy Air Forcepayload requirements.

The mostly-common missile was a variant to this common missile where, for Air Forceapplication, a unique propulsion stage was used between the common first stage andsecond stage to configure a longer three-stage missile with increased range/payloadperformance. It was estimated that 6 to 6 years would be required to develop thesemissiles after an initial year of detailed program, requirements, and interface definition.The management plan recommended that a single service, either the Air Force or theNavy, should be responsible for development and acquisition of the common or mostly-common missiles. Each service would continue to be responsible for development andacquisition of its unique weapon system elements.

In September 1978, the studies were extended to another variation of commonalitywherein two boost propulsion motors would be common for use as TRIDENT II firststage and SS, and as MX first stage and TS. Prospects for the TRIDENT II program werenot improved when Congress appropriated only $5 million of the requested $15 millionrequested for FY 1979. The SECDEF showed a 1990 IOC of the program was funded at adecremented level.

By December 1978, it was the consensus of the Navy, Air Force, and USD&RE that therelatively-small cost advantage (estimated $300 million Navy savings in 1979 dollars)

would not offset the risks and disadvantages of a common missile. SSPO internalplanning guidance was for a stand-alone TRIDENT II, IOC FY 1990. Thus, the Navy feltfree to proceed with TRIDENT II, whatever it might be, and that was the problem.

The Congress felt there was no clearly-delineated requirement for TRIDENT II, andCongressional conferences on appropriations provided only minimal budgets. In addition,the DOD and the Navy positions on types of effort and level of funding fluctuated. Infact, the Navy was instructed in November 1979 to pursue a program of incrementalsubmarine-launched ballistic missile modernization, citing the Presidential decision forfull MX development and the difficulty of funding more than one program at a time.

In March 1980, the SECDEF, in his budget submittal to Congress for FY 1981, proposeda significantly-increased level of funding for submarine-launched ballistic missilemodernization. The principle emphasis was accuracy improvement applicable to anupgraded C4, a long C4, or an all-new D5 missile which would fill the TRIDENT SSBNlaunch tube envelope and be capable of increased range, payload, as well as accuracy. Areview was to be conducted at the end of FY 1983 to select a modernization option for anIOC not later than CY 1989. As to the issue of affordability, the proposed DoD budgetrequested $36 million for FY 1981 and reprogramming from other sources of $61 millionwhich would provide $97 million for the first year of ADP.

The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recommended no funding, but the SenateArmed Services Committee (SASC) recommended a full $97 million. However, theSASC asked for a plan to be provided which incorporates "the fullest possiblecompetition... (and) should consider competing among contractors for each majorcomponent, including the integrated missile." If the plan were to reveal that competitionof such major components was not in the best interests of the U. S., then a justificationshould be supplied. Finally, $65 million was appropriated for submarine-launchedballistic missile modernization.

On 6 March 1981, as requested by the SASC, the DoD forwarded the Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missile Modernization Acquisition Plan to the Committees on ArmedServices.The letter of transmittal again endorsed an acquisition approach consonant withthe evolutionary nature of the submarine-launched ballistic missile program and DoDpolicy on the issue since 1977. Essential to the plan would be retention of the provenSSPO management structure and the existing Navy/contractor subsystem managementteams, with maximum competition at the subcontract level. Since accuracy improvementwas a major and challenging objective of the program, use of the existing contractor teamwas considered the most-efficient approach. The Plan noted that competition at the primecontractor level would result in a duplication of efforts and facilities, a significantincrease in program costs, and a delay of the proposed system IOC by approximately 2years.

On 2 October 1981, President Reagan made an address which called for modernization ofthe strategic forces. The Defense Department immediately directed the Navy to funddevelopment of the D5 missile with a December 1989 IOC. The planned TRIDENT I

missile inventory- would-be reduced from 969 to 630s and all RDT&E effort would bedirected toward "a new development, advanced technology, high accuracy D5 system."

Initially, the Navy planned to introduce D5 by backfitting it into the 12th TRIDENTsubmarine constructed for the C4 system. However, a restructured plan announced on 1June 1982 introduced the new system with the ninth new construction hull, obviating theneed for backfitting four boats, increasing the rate of deployment, and resulting in a costavoidance of $680 million (FY 1983 dollars).

And in keeping with the objective of effectiveness against the entire target spectrum,Deputy SECDEF Frank Carlucci advised the SECNAV in December 1982 to includefunding for a new RV/warhead combination for TRIDENT II. The new reentry vehicledesignated Mk 5, was to have a higher yield than the Mk 4, thus increasing the weaponsystem's effectiveness against hard targets.

Finally, the Deputy SECDEF on 28 October 1983 authorized the Navy to proceed to FullScale Engipeering Development (FSED) of the TRIDENT II (D5) SWS and initiateproduction to meet a December 1989 IOC. Thus, the third and final phase of the Navy'sULMS program long-term modernization plan was underway.

The D5 Development Flight Test Program originally consisted of 20 D5X missile flat padflights and 10 PEM flights from a TRIDENT SSBN. Flight testing began in January 1987and in 1988. The program was reduced to 19 D5Xs and 9 PEMs.

The flight test program of the missile and the guidance subsystems of the weapon systembegan in January 1987, and the overall performance results from the tests indicated thatthe missile was achieving its objectives for this phase of the program. Of the 15 testsconducted as of September 30, 1988, 11 were successful, 1 was partially successful, 2were failures, and one was a "no-test" [the 15th flight test was destroyed by commanddestruct early in its flight while the missile was performing normally at the time thedecision was made to destruct: therefore, the flight was a "no-test"]. Although themajority of the tests were successful, each of the failures involved different problems andoccurred at different stages of the missile flight.

A problem encountered during the seventh flight requires a redesign of the Post BoostControl System. During the deployment phase of the seventh flight, one of the valves inthe system, which controls the flow of hot gases through the system, remained closed andlimited the system's steering capability. Engineering evaluations indicate there wasoverheating or contamination in the valve, causing it to stay closed. The redesign wasincorporated during the 1989 testing program.

During the ninth flight test, the missile lost control and went off course about 14 secondsinto third stage flight and self-destructed. Engineering verification of the failure indicatedthat a short in one of the power supplies, which control the flight control computer,prevented the computer from providing the proper steering commands for the missile's

third stage. The problem was solved through minor changes in the flight controlcomputer. Also, there has been no reoccurrence of the problem in subsequent flight tests.

During the 13th flight, the missile encountered a problem with the thrust vector controlsubsystem on its first stage, causing it to lose control and go off course about 55 secondsinto flight.) The missile was destroyed by the range safety officer for safety reasons.

During the 15th flight, the missile was destroyed by command destruct early in its flight.The missile wars performing normally at the time the decision was made to destruct, thusresulting in a no test. A combination of events prompted the destruct action, including thespecific trajectory selected to be flown, the prelaunch weather conditions, and the missiledynamics along the flight path, which resulted in the missile looking to the range safetyofficer as though itwould cross the boundaries of the safety corridor.

Recent Developments

USS LOUISIANA (SSBN 743), the last of the 18 Trident submarines to be constructed,successfully launched one unarmed Trident II (D-5) ballistic Missile on 18 December1997. The launch from the submerged submarine took place on the United States' EasternRange, off the coast of Florida, as part of LOUISIANA's Demonstration and ShakedownOperation (DASO). The purpose of the DASO is to demonstrate the submarine crew'sability to meet the stringent safety requirements for handling, maintaining and operatingthe strategic weapons system. The DASO also confirms the submarine's ability tocorrectly target and launch a Trident missile. This was the 77th consecutive successfullaunch of the Trident II (D-5) missile since 1989; the longest string of successes in thehistory of United States' ballistic missiles

The US Navy's Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile system routinelyconducts joint DOE/Department of Defense flight tests on instrumented Mk5 ReentryBodies known as Joint Test Assemblies (JTAs). During a past flight, the JTA telemetryexperienced a single-event upset occurrence as it flew through the Van Allen Belt and theSouth Atlantic Anomaly (an intense, low-altitude high-energy proton belt). Amultidisciplinary effort by Sandia Lab scientists and engineers assembled to determinethe causal elements and to assist in devising a solution. To correct for this event, theW88-0/JTA telemetry system was redesigned by incorporating into the signal processordesign four high-energy-proton-resistant integrated circuits.

SpecificationsPrimary Function: Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

Contractor: Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., Sunnyvale,Calif.

Unit Cost: $29.1 million (current production)

Power Plant: Three-stage solid-propellant rocket

Length: 44 feet (13.41 meters)

Weight: 130,000 pounds (58,500 kg)

Diameter: 74 inches (1.85 meters)

Range: Greater than 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 statute miles,or 7,360 km)

Guidance System: Inertial

Warheads:Thermonuclear MIRV (Multiple IndependentlyTargetable re-entry Vehicle); Maneuverable Re-entryVehicle

Date Deployed: 1990

SSBN-598 George Washington-ClassFBM SubmarinesThe USS George Washington (SSBN 598) was the world’s first nuclear powered ballisticmissile submarine. Arguably, it can be considered the submarine that has most influencedworld events in the 20th Century. With its entry into service in December 1959 theUnited States instantly gained the most powerful deterrent force imaginable - a stealthplatform with enormous nuclear firepower.

These first nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range strategic missiles wereordered on 31 December 1957, with orders to convert two attack submarine hulls tomissile-carrying FBM Weapon System ships. With some compromise in deliveryschedules, the Navy agreed in January 1958 to slip the launch dates for two hunter-killerSkipjack types of fast attack submarines, the just-begun attack submarine Scorpion (SSN-589) and the not-yet-started USS Sculpin (SSN-590). Funding was provided with asupplement to the FY 1958 ship construction programm on 11 February 1958.

The first two are essentially of the hunter-killer type with a missile compartment insertedbetween the ship's control navigation areas and the nuclear reactor compartment. Thekeel of the first of these two ships had already been laid at Electric Boat, Groton,Connecticut, as the "Scorpion" and it was actually cut apart in order to insert the new 130ft missile compartment ("Sherwood Forest"), thus extending the ship's length. At othershipyards, three more ships of the same type were built, making a total of five. Theshipyards were Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Mare Island NavalShipyard, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. These were designated the 598 class shipssince the first submarine, the USS George Washington was the SSBN-598. The termSSBN means Ship Submersible Ballistic (Nuclear) with the "Nuclear" referring to theship's propulsive power.

The President signed the FY 58 Supplemental Appropriation Act on 12 February 1958funding the first three submarines. The construction, which had begun in January 1958,used funds "borrowed" from other Navy programs. The President authorized constructionof submarines 4 and 5 on 29 July 1958.The USS George Washington (SSBN-598) slipped underwater on the first strategic FBMpatrol on 15 November 1960. The USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) departed for patrol on31 January 1961. The USS George Washington (SSBN-598) resumed from patrol on 21January 1961, coming alongside the tender USS Proteus (AS-19) at New London,Connecticut. The USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) resumed from patrol on 8 March 1961,but she came alongside the same USS Proteus which had moved to Holy Loch, Scotlandbecoming the first SSBN to use Holy Loch as a refit and upkeep anchorage.On 1 July 1958, Submarine Squadron Fourteen was established.On 15 November 1960, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) deployed onoperational patrol with 16 POLARIS At (1200 nm) missiles 4 years 11 months after

RADM William F. "Red" Raborn became the director of SP, and 3 years 11 months afterthe SECDEF authorized the POLARIS

On 2 June 1964, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598). returned to Charleston, SouthCarolina, to off-load missiles in preparation for overhaul at General Dynamics, ElectricBoat Division, shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. This ended the initial deployment of thefirst FBM submarine, with POLARIS A1's which began in November 1960. Finally on14 October 1965, the USS Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) returned to the U.S.,completing her initial deployment. She was the last of the first five SSBNs carrying thePOLARIS A1 to return to the U.S. for overhaul. This marked the official retirement ofthe POLARIS A1 missile from active fleet duty. These first five boats were being refittedto carry POLARIS A3 missiles.

in the early 1980s SSBN-598 George Washington, SSBN-599 Patrick Henry and SSBN-601 Robert E Lee had their missiles removed and were reclassified as attack submarines,a role in which they served for several years prior to decommissioning.

Specifications

Builders:General Dynamics Electric Boat Division; NewportNews Shipbuilding; Mare Island; Portsmouth NavalShipyard

Power Plant: S5W Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor,2 geared turbines at 15,000 shp to one shaft

Length: 381.6 feet ( meters)

Beam: 33 feet ( meters)

Displacement:Light 5,400 tonsSurface 5,959-6,019 tonsSubmerged 6709-6888Approx tons

Speed: 20 knots surfaced,25 knots submerged

Test Depth: 700 feet

Crew: Officers, Enlisted

Armament: 16 - tubes for Polaris missiles6 - torpedo tubes

Boat ListBoat Name Builder Base Ordered Commissioned Decommissioned

SSBN-598 George Washington Electric Boat Pearl Harbor 31 Dec 57 30 Dec 59 24 Jan 85

SSBN-599 Patrick Henry Electric Boat Holy Loch 31 Dec 57 11 Apr 60 25 May 84

SSBN-600 Theodore Roosevelt Mare Island NSY Guam 13 Mar 58 13 Feb 61 28 Feb 81

SSBN-601 Robert E Lee Newport News Guam 30 Jul 58 16 Sep 60 01 Dec 83SSBN-602 Abraham Lincoln Portsmouth NSY Guam 30 Jul 58 11 Mar 61 28 Feb 81

SSBN-608 Ethan Allen-Class FBMSubmarinesThe USS Ethan Allen, (SSBN-608) operating in the Pacific as a unit of Joint Task Force8 Operation Frigate-Bird," fired the only nuclear-armed POLARIS missile ever launchedon 6 May 1962. A POLARIS A1 missile was launched from the USS Ethan Allen(SSBN-608) while submerged in the Pacific, and its nuclear warhead was detonated overthe South Pacific at the end of its programmed flight. The shot was made during the 1962atomic tests and hit "right in the pickle barrel." The captain of the 608 was Paul Lacy, andADM Levering Smith was aboard. To date, this is the only complete proof test of a U.S.strategic missile. With the ban on atmospheric testing, the chances of another similar testare remote.

The USS John Marshall (SSBN-611) became the last submarine to give up her POLARISA2's for POLARIS A3 capability when she went into overhaul on 1 November 1974.

Some of these submarines were later reclassified as attack submarines under the StrategicArms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements.

SpecificationsBuilders: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division;

Newport News Shipbuilding

Power Plant: S5W nuclear reactortwo geared steam turbines, one shaft

Length: feet ( meters)

Beam: feet ( meters)

Displacement: Approx.00 tons (0 metric tons) submerged

Speed: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)

Crew: Officers, Enlisted

Armament: 16 tubes for Polaris, six torpedo tubes.

Date Deployed:

Boat ListBoat Name Builder Bas

eOrdere

dCommissione

dDecommissione

dSSBN-608 Ethan Allen Electric Boat 17 Jul

58 08 Aug 61 31 Mar 83

SSBN Sam Houston Newport 01 Jul 06 Mar 62 06 Sep 91

-609 News 59SSBN-610

Thomas AEdison Electric Boat 01 Jul

59 10 Mar 62 30 Nov 83

SSBN-611 John Marshall Newport

News01 Jul

59 21 May 62 22 Jul 92

SSBN-618

ThomasJefferson

NewportNews

22 Jul60 04 Jan 63 24 Jan 85

SSBN-616 Lafayette-Class FBMSubmarinesThe USS James Monroe (SSBN-622) on 9 January 1968 became the first submarine withPOLARIS A2's to enter overhaul and to receive POLARIS A3 capability.

In 1974 the SSBN Extended Refit Program (ERP). was initiated. Previously, anoperational SSBN was scheduled to undergo an overhaul approximately every 7 ½ years,which resulted in taking it off line for almost 2 years. To increase the SSBNs at seaeffectiveness, it was decided to initiate a program to accomplish somepreventive/corrective maintenance (mini-overhaul) on SSBNs at its normal refit site. Thiswas done by extending a normal 32-day refit/upkeep between patrols to provide a 60-dayextended refit period. This was to be conducted at 4-year and 7 ½ year intervals afterinitial deployment or overhaul of a SSBN. The time between overhauls was thenextended to 10 years versus the 7 ½ years. The first SSBN to undergo ERP was the USSJames Madison (SSBN-627); the ERP was conducted at the Holy Loch, Scotland, tenderrefit site in September- November 1974.

Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) program in November of 1973 with themissile's IOC date established as 1979. The first of the new Ohio-Class submarines wasauthorized in 1974 but would not be available until 1979. Thus the Navy decided toborrow a page from the Extended Refit Program (ERP) book and a C3 to C4 SSBN"backfit" program was initiated in mid- 1976. Five additional SSBNs 629, 630, and 634underwent a "pierside backfit" while three other SSBNs (627, 632, and 633) werebackfitted during their normally-scheduled second shipyard overhauls.

On 10 June 1985, the White House announced the decision to dismantle a ballisticmissile submarine to remain within the SALT II ceiling on MIRVed missiles. USS SamRayburn (SSBN-635) was selected to fulfill this requirement and was deactivated on 16September 1985, with missile tubes filled with concrete and tube hatches removed.The USS Sam Rayburn was converted into a training platform - Moored Training Ship(MTS-635). The Sam Rayburn arrived for conversion on February 1, 1986, and on July29, 1989 the first Moored Training Ship achieved initial criticality. Modificationsincluded special mooring arrangements including a mechanism to absorb powergenerated by the main propulsion shaft. USS Daniel Webster (SSBN 626) was convertedto the second Moored Training Ship (MTS2 / MTS 626) in 1993. The Moored TrainingShip Site is located at Charleston, SC. The USS Sam Rayburn is scheduled to operate asan MTS until 2014 while undergoing shipyard availabilities at four year intervals.

Specifications

Builders:General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. Mare IslandNaval Shipyard Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, NewportNews Shipbuilding

Power Plant: S5W nuclear reactortwo geared steam turbines, 15,000 SHP, one shaft

Length: 425 feet (129.6 meters)

Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters)

Displacement:light 6,650 tonsstandard 7,250 tonssubmerged 8,250 tons

Speed: Surfaced 16-20 knotssubmerged: 22 -25 knots

Test depth: 1,300 feet

Crew: 13 Officers, 130 Enlisted

Armament:

16 tubes for Polaris or Poseidon4 - 21" Torpedo Tubes (All Foward)MK 14/16 Anti-ship TorpedoMK 37 Anti-Submarine TorpedoMK 45 ASTOR NuclearTorpedoMK 48 Anti-Submarine Torpedo

Boat ListBoat Name Builder Homepo

rtOrdere

dCommissio

nedDecommissio

nedSSBN-616

Lafayette Electric Boat Groton 22 Jul60 23 Apr 63 12 Aug 91

SSBN-617

AlexanderHamilton Electric Boat Groton 22 Jul

60 27 Jun 63 23 Feb 93

SSBN-619

Andrew Jackson Mare IslandNSY

23 Jul60 03 Jul 63 31 Aug 89

SSBN-620

John Adams PortsmouthNSY

23 Jul60 12 May 64 24 Mar 89

SSBN-622

James Monroe NewportNews

Charleston

03 Feb61 07 Dec 63 25 Sep 90

SSBN-623

Nathan Hale Electric Boat 03 Feb61 23 Nov 63 31 Dec 86

SSB Woodrow Mare Island Charlest 09 Feb 27 Dec 63 01 Sep 94

N-624

Wilson NSY on 61

SSBN-625

Henry Clay NewportNews

Charleston

03 Feb61 20 Feb 64 05 Nov 90

SSBN-626

Daniel Webster Electric Boat Groton 03 Feb61 09 Apr 64 30 Aug 90

SSBN-627

James Madison NewportNews

Charleston

20 Jul61 28 Jul 64 20 Nov 92

SSBN-628

Tecumseh Electric Boat Norfolk 20 Jul61 29 May 64 23 Jul 93

SSBN-629

Daniel Boone Mare IslandNSY Norfolk 21 Jul

61 23 Apr 64 18 Feb 94

SSBN-630

John C Calhoun NewportNews

Charleston

20 Jul61 15 Sep 64 28 Mar 94

SSBN-631

Ulysses S Grant Electric Boat Portsmouth

20 Jul70 17 Jul 64 12 Jun 92

SSBN-632

Von Steuben NewportNews

Charleston

20 Jul61 30 Sep 64 26 Feb 94

SSBN-633

Casimir Pulaski Electric Boat Charleston

20 Jul61 14 Aug 64 07 Mar 94

SSBN-634

StonewallJackson

Mare IslandNSY

Charleston

21 Jul61 26 Aug 64 09 Feb 95

SSBN-635

Sam Rayburn NewportNews

20 Jul61 02 Dec 64 31 Jul 89

SSBN-636

Nathaniel Green PortsmouthNSY

21 Jul61 19 Dec 64 31 Jan 87

NOTE: Hull number sequenceSSBN-618 Thomas Jefferson was last Ethan Allen-class FBM SubmarineSSN-621 Haddock attack submarine accounts for the other break in numerical hullsequence

SSBN-640 Benjamin Franklin-Class FBMSubmarinesGenerally similar to the SSBN-616 Lafayette-class, the twelve Benjamin Franklin(SSBN-640)-class submarines had a quieter machinery design, and were thus considereda separate class.

Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) program in November of 1973 with themissile's IOC date established as 1979. The first of the new Ohio-Class submarines wasauthorized in 1974 but would not be available until 1979. Thus the Navy decided toborrow a page from the Extended Refit Program (ERP) book and a C3 to C4 SSBN"backfit" program was initiated in mid- 1976. The first boat in this SSBN backfit was theFrancis Scott Key (SSBN-657). Following the deployment on 20 October 1979 ofTRIDENT I (C4) missiles on the Francis Scott, other selected SSBNs were backfittedwith the C4 [referred to as follow-on backfits]. Two additional SSBNs of this class (655and 658) underwent the "pierside backfit" while three others (640, 641, and 643) werebackfitted during their normally-scheduled second shipyard overhauls.

Two of these submarines [Kamehameha and James K Polk] were later converted toSEAL-mission capable attack submarines. In March of 1994 USS JAMES K. POLK(SSN 645) completed a 19-month conversion from ballistic missile submarine toattack/special warfare submarine at Newport News Shipbuilding. The January 1999inactivation of the POLK leaves the KAMEHAMEHA (SSN 642) as the Navy's onlyformer ballistic missile submarine equiped with Dry Deck Shelters (DDSs).

SpecificationsBuilders: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. Mare Island

Naval Shipyard Newport News Shipbuilding

Power Plant: One S5W nuclear reactortwo geared steam turbines, 15,000 SHP, one shaft

Length: 425 feet (129.6 meters)

Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters)

Displacement:light 6,650 tonsstandard 7,250 tonssubmerged 8,250 tons

Speed: surface: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)submerged: 25 knots

Crew: 13 Officers, 130 Enlisted

Armament: 16 - tubes for Polaris and Poseidon

4 - torpedo tubes with Mk48 Torpedoes

Sensors:

BPS-11A or BPS-15 surface-search radarBQR-7 sonarBQR-15 towed-array sonarBQR-19 sonarBQR-21 sonarBQS-4 sonar

Boat ListBoat Name Builder Homepo

rtOrdere

dCommissi

onedDecommissi

onedSSBN-

640 Benjamin Franklin ElectricBoat Norfolk 01 Nov

62 22 Oct 65 23 Nov 93

SSBN-641 Simon Bolivar Newport

NewsPortsmouth

01 Nov62 29 Oct 65 24 Feb 95

SSBN-642 Kamehameha Electric

BoatPearlHarbor

01 Aug62 10 Dec 65 SSN Jul 92

SSBN-643 George Bancroft Electric

BoatCharleston

01 Nov62 22 Jan 66 21 Sep 93

SSBN-644 Lewis and Clark Newport

NewsCharleston

01 Nov62 22 Dec 65 01 Aug 92

SSBN-645 James K Polk Electric

Boat Norfolk 01 Nov62 16 Apr 66 08 Jan 99

SSBN-654

George C Marshall NewportNews Groton 29 Jul

63 29 Apr 66 24 Sep 92

SSBN-655

Henry L Stimson ElectricBoat

Charleston

29 Jul63 20 Aug 66 05 May 93

SSBN-656

George WashingtonCarver

NewportNews Groton 29 Jul

63 15 Jun 66 18 Mar 93

SSBN-657 Francis Scott Key Electric

BoatCharleston

29 Jul63 03 Dec 66 02 Sep 93

SSBN-658 Mariano G Vallejo Mare Island

NSYCharleston

29 Jul63 16 Dec 65 09 Mar 95

SSBN-659 Will Rogers Electric

Boat Groton 29 Jul63 01 Apr 67 12 Apr 93

SSBN- 1965 Proposal Cancelled in1965

SSBN- 1965 Proposal Cancelled in1965

SSBN- 1965 Proposal Cancelled in

1965

SSBN- 1965 Proposal Cancelled in1965

ULMSJust as project NOBSKA in 1956 "steered" the U.S. Navy to a new generation of smallersolid-propellant POLARIS-type FBMs, so too STRAT-X/ULMS-I steered" the Navy tothe next generation SSBN/FBM system. SECDEF Robert McNamara, on 1 November1966, initiated a comprehensive study on U.S. ballistic missile performancecharacteristics required to counter potential Soviet strategic offensive forces and anti-ballistic missile proliferation in the time frame 1975 to 1985 - 90.

The study was conducted under the auspices of the Research and Engineering SupportDivision of IDA. The study was known as STRAT-X (for Strategic eXperimental). Basedon a previous study done by the IDA earlier that year called PEN-X (for "penetration ofenemy missiles, experimental"), the deliberately-nebulous title was concocted to preventbias in the study toward any land-, sea-, or air-based system. Posting the likelihood thatthe Russians would deploy, in the future, extremely-powerful and highly-accurate ICBMsas well as an effective anti-ballistic missile system, McNamara's study requestedappropriate countermeasures. The STRAT-X study was headed by General MaxwellTaylor, President of IDA. The "working" study group was headed by Fred Payne of IDA.

The "working" panel included executives from several major defense contractors andindependent corporations. The Advisory Committee were mostly military men. RADMGeorge H. Miller (OPNAV) and RADM Levering Smith, (SP-00)the Navy contingent onthe STRAT-X panel, "representing both the [Naval Operations] staff and the 'hardware'side of the Navy"- participated, but Naval Reactors Branch, which furnished the nuclearpower plans for all nuclear-powered Navy vessels, did not.

Candidate STRAT-X system concepts were evaluated for: (Primary) the ability toretaliate against a Soviet urban-industrial target and (Secondary) flexibility to performselected counterforce and controlled-response missions.

STRAT-X investigated and reviewed over 125 different missile-basing systems for thepurpose of finding the most efficient and survivable option, the only prerequisite beingthat the candidate system had to be unique in comparison with previous or existingplatforms. Going into the study, the Air Force had lobbied for a replacement for theMinuteman ICBM, and it appeared initially as though the Air Force missile might bechosen, but the requirement for new ideas also worked in the Navy's favor.

Other than submitting an improved POSEIDON, the Navy STRAT-X study teams underDr. Willie Fiedler of Lockheed proposed a different submarine concept called ULMS.After examining these and other alternatives that ranged from the sublime to theridiculous (such as missile-firing submersibles, ICBMs carried on trucks, surface ships orbarges, new bombers, seabed platforms (perhaps located in Hudson Bay)), the STRAT-Xpanel concluded in 1968 that the Navy's ULMS represented the least costly and mostsurvivable alternative. Miller claimed the panel envisioned a "rather austere" ship withlittle speed and, consequently, a small nuclear power plant. The Navy supported the view

that ULMS was to incorporate very-long-range missiles into submarines of ratherconservative design, based on existing submarine technology. The proposed submarinewould not necessarily be deep-diving and would carry more than sixteen missiles.

Upon completion of the DoD's STRAT-X Study, the Navy (SPO) continued its ownstudies of advanced undersea system concepts. Lockheed, General Electric, MIT, Sperry,and Westinghouse were all involved. Electric Boat was funded by Navships forinterfacing submarine studies.

Subsequent to STRAT-X, the ULMS effort was continued by SSP at DDRE direction.The cost of concurrently developing a new submarine and missile was judged to beinconsistent with DoD funding and dedication. Since the submarine is the long lead item(seven years from funding to IOC), minimum subsystem changes were dictated for thenew submarine.

The submarine design work subsequent to STRAT-X was directed along the encapsulatedmissile concept as opposed to the FBM concept of bare vertical launch from a fixedmount tube. RADM Levering Smith, PM- 1, stated that the encapsulated missile wouldbe retained only if real merit could be established. Electric Boat was requested by CAPTGooding (SP-20) to do a submarine feasibility study for both bare vertical andencapsulated stowage and launch of the LRC3 missile. Missile length and first stagediameter are dependent variables. Each concept was allowed to consider dimensions bestsuited to the stowage mode. The trend for vertical stowage was to make the missile short,and the trend for horizontal encapsulated stowage was to make it long until it hurts. Thetradeoffs between launch mode concepts were conducted during CY 1968.

In January 1969, the contractors involved in the stowage mode studies presented theirdata -- while the ship people favored bare vertical, the missile people favored, and SSPOwould recommend the traditional FBM bare vertical launch and stowage used onprevious Polaris submarines.

Both Electric Boat (Groton, Connecticut) and San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard (MareIsland (Vallejo), California) were requested to provide ULMS SSBN concepts. ByDecember 1969, the ULMS team at Mare Island had developed three basic hull forms,concentrating their efforts on developing an external launch tube hull.

Two of the Mare Island designs, the "FISHBONE" and " D Frame " concepts, involveadvanced pressure hull construction techniques. The FISHBONE concept, in the missilesection, is configured to present a non-circular pressure hull. It was conceived to use theinboard half of the missile tube as the primary pressure hull in the missile tube section ofthe boat. The "D Frame" achieved a similar non-circular missile tube section by using aflat plate technique outboard of the missile tube as one portion of the hydrostatic hull.

The third concept, "TWIN TUBE," was Mare Island's preferred configuration. In this hullform, the missile tubes (located in the water) have port and starboard access tubes

running fore and aft that provide access to the fore and aft part of the boat, as well asaccess to the missile tubes.

Four FBM hull configurations were offered by Electric Boat, one "external" (wet) tubedesign and three "internal" tube design: single hull, double hull, and oval hull. The threetube abreast oval hull design had a variant configuration, two tube abreast.

There were also studies made of tilting the launch tubes athwartship and/or fore/aftattitude. The athwartship angle was limited to something less than +10 deg from thevertical. The fore and aft angle could be varied quite a bit more (e.g. +90 deg possible butnot practical). A 50 deg fore/aft tilt was studied. However there was a general disbelief inany merits of loading and launching on any line that was not in line with gravity (e.g.,vertical).

These studies were evaluated and Lockheed issued a report on 9 January 1970. It statedthat the FBM Weapon System has always accepted the classic, POLARIS-POSEIDON 2x 8 columnar, vertically-tubed, missile zero pointing center, battery arrangement. Thedata indicated no significant advantages, insurmountable problems or even significantsensitivity to various arrangements. This points to the practical position of "why change,"when we might, with some assurance, find the unk-unks [unknown unknowns] hiddenwithin some other arrangement. It is these unk-unks that can react with negativesynergism to create significant problems.

The report concluded then that the classic FBM battery arrangement should bemaintained.

SSBN-726 Ohio-Class FBM SubmarinesStrategic deterrence has been the sole mission of the fleet ballistic missile submarine(SSBN) since its inception in 1960. The SSBN provides the nation's most survivable andenduring nuclear strike capability. The Ohio class submarine replaced aging fleet ballisticmissile submarines built in the 1960s and is far more capable.

Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay hosted the commissioning of USS LOUISIANA(SSBN 743) 06 September 1997 at the TRIDENT Refit Facility Drydock. Thecommissioning of LOUISIANA completed the Navy's fleet of 18 fleet ballistic missilesubmarines. The ten Trident submarines in the Atlantic fleet were initially equipped withthe D-5 Trident II missile. The eight submarines in the Pacific were initially equippedwith the C-4 Trident I missile. In 1996 the Navy started to backfit the eight submarines inthe Pacific to carry the D-5 missile.

FeaturesSSBN-726 class FBM submarines can carry 24 ballistic missiles with MIRV warheadsthat can be accurately delivered to selected targets from almost anywhere in the world'soceans. Earlier FBM ships carry 16 missiles. A cylindrical pressure hull structure of HY-80 steel is supported by circular frames and enclosed by hemispherical heads at bothends. The pressure hull provides an enclosure large enough for weapons, crew, andequipment with enough strength to enable the ship to operate deep enough to avoid easydetection.

A streamlined (fish-shaped) outer hull permits the ship to move quietly through the waterat high speeds. This outer hull surrounds the forward and aft end of the pressure hull andis not built to withstand deep submergence pressure. It is normally considered as the mainballast tanks. The superstructure is any part of the ship that is above the pressure hull.This would include the sail or fairwater area, and the area above the missile tubes. Thestreamlined hull was designed specifically for efficient cruising underwater; the Skipjackwas the first nuclear-powered ship to adopt this hull form.

The larger hulls accommodate more weapons of larger size and greater range, as well assophisticated computerized electronic equipment for improved weapon guidance andsonar performance. Improved silencing techniques reduce the chances of detection.

The Ohio-class submarines are specifically designed for extended deterrent patrols. Toincrease the time in port for crew turnover and replenishment, three large logisticshatches are fitted to provide large diameter resupply and repair openings. These hatchesallow sailors to rapidly transfer supply pallets, equipment replacement modules andmachinery components, significantly reducing the time required for replenishment andmaintenance. The class design and modern main concepts allow the submarines tooperate for 15+ years between overhauls. Each SSBN is at sea at least 66 percent of thetime, including major overhaul periods of twelve months every nine years. One SSBNcombat employment cycle includes a 70-day patrol and 25-day period of transfer of the

submarine to the other crew, between-deployment maintenance, and reloading ofmunitions.

Like all submarines in use by the U.S. Navy today, the Ohio class submarine is poweredby a pressurized water reactor (PWR) driving steam turbines to a single propeller shaft. Itcan attain depths in excess of 800 feet at speeds in excess of 25 knots.

BackgroundThe STRAT-X study in 1967 recognized that the submarine-launched ballistic missilesystem was one of the more survivable legs in the Triad strategic nuclear deterrentsystem. However, it also recognized three important facts concerning American strategicdefense capabilities which had assumed central significance in deliberations of U.S.defense planners. First, the submarine-launched ballistic system was recognized as themost survivable element in the triad of strategic nuclear deterrents. Second, though thePOSEIDON missile provided an important upgrade of the system, the SSBN force itselfwas aging and would require replacement. Third, the threat of improved Soviet ASWcapability made an enlarged SSBN operating area highly desirable.

The Navy (SSPO) commenced studies of a new Undersea Long-range Missile System(ULMS), which culminated in the Deputy SECDEF approving a Decision CoordinatingPaper (DCP) No. 67 on 14 September 1971 for the ULMS. The ULMS program was along-term modernization plan which proposed development of a new, longer-rangemissile and a new, larger submarine, while preserving a nearer-term option to develop anextended range POSEIDON. In addition to the new ULMS (extended-range POSEIDON)missile, which was to achieve a range twice that of POSEIDON, the SECDEF decisiondescribed an even longer-range missile to be required for a new submarine, whoseparameters it would, in part, determine. This second missile, subsequently termed ULMSII, was to be a larger, higher-performance missile than the extended-range POSEIDONand to have a range capability of approximately 6000 nm. The term TRIDENT (C4)replaced the extended-range missile (Advanced POSEIDON) nomenclature in May 1972,and the name TRIDENT II was used to designate the new longer range missile.

On 14 September 1971 the Deputy SECDEF had approved the Navy's DCP No. 67,which authorized both a new, large, higher-speed submarine and the TRIDENT (C4)Missile System. It was also constrained to fit in the circular SSBN cylinder launch tubewhich just contained the C3 so that the new missile could be used in then-existingPOLARIS submarines.

A Navy decision was made in November 1971 to accelerate the ULMS program withincreased funding for the ULMS SSBN. The SECDEF Program Budget Decision (PBD)of 23 December 1971 authorized the accelerated schedule with a projected deployment ofthe ship in 1978.

The President signed the FY74 Appropriations Authorization Act providing funds for thefirst TRIDENT submarine on 15 November 1973, and on 25 July 1974 the Navy awarded

a fixed-price incentive contract to General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division, forconstruction of this first TRIDENT SSBN.

In 1974 the initial Ohio program was projecte to consist of 10 submarines deployed atBangor Washington carrying the Trident-1 C-4 missile. By 1981 the program had beenmodified to include 15 boats, and at least 20 boats were planned by 1985. In 1989 theNavy anticipated a total fleet of at least 21 boats, while plans the following yearenvisioning a total of 24 boats, 21 of which would carry strategic missiles with theremaining three supporting other missions, such as special forces. However, in 1991Congress directed the termination of the program with the 18th boat, citing anticipatedforce limits under the START-1 arms control agreement and the results of the BushAdministration's Major Warship Review, which endorsed capping the program at 18boats.

The first eight Ohio class submarines (Tridents) were originally equipped with 24 TridentI C-4 ballistic missiles. Beginning with the ninth Trident submarine, USS Tennessee(SSBN 734), all new ships are equipped with the Trident II D-5 missile system as theywere built, and the earlier ships are being retrofitted to Trident II. Trident II can deliversignificantly more payload than Trident I C-4 and more accurately. All 24 missiles can belaunched in less than one minute.

Ohio-class/Trident ballistic missile submarines provide the sea-based "leg" of the triad ofU.S. strategic offensive forces. By the turn of the century, the 18 Trident SSBNs (eachcarrying 24 missiles), will carry 50 percent of the total U.S. strategic warheads. Althoughthe missiles have no pre-set targets when the submarine goes on patrol, the SSBNs arecapable of rapidly targeting their missiles should the need arise, using secure and constantat-sea communications links.

The Clinton Administration's Nuclear Posture Review was chartered in October 1993,and the President approved the recommendations of the NPR on September 18, 1994. Asa result of the NPR, US strategic nuclear force structure will be adjusted to 14 Tridentsubmarines -- four fewer than previously planned -- carrying 24 D-5 missiles, each withfive warheads, per submarine. This will require backfitting four Trident SSBNs, currentlycarrying the Trident I (C- 4) missile, with the more modern and capable D-5 missilesystem. Under current plans, following START II's entry into force, the other fourSSBNs will either be converted into special-purpose submarines or be retired.

SSBN 726 Class Submarine shipboard equipment which requires significant maintenanceduring the planned operating cycle, industrial level maintenance, which is beyond thecapability of Ship's Force, and which cannot be accomplished during the refit period(without unacceptable impact on other refit requirements), is supported by TRIDENTPlanned Equipment Repair (TRIPER) program. TRIPER equipment is removed from theship for refurbishment ashore, replaced with pre-tested, Ready for Issue units and theaffected system restored to full operational condition prior to completion of the refitperiod. Replacement is accomplished on a planned basis at intervals designed to precludethe failure of the equipment or significant degradation of its associated system.

Recent Developments

As of 1995 the Navy was studying an extension from 30 to 40 years for the SSBN-726class submarines. While 30 years was long the standard number for submarine operatinglifetime, the SSBNs would seem to have a rather more benign operating history than theSSNs. They typically operate at somewhat shallower depths, they do not experiencenearly as many excursions from their normal operating depth, and they would not operatebelow their test depth with any degree of freqency. Consequently, it would be expectedthat they could have a longer operating life than attack submarines [just as fighters wearout so much faster than bombers or transports]. As of late 1998 Navy cost and planningfactors assumed that the Ohio-class submarines would have an expected operatinglifetime of at least 42 years: two 20-year operating cycles separated by a two-yearrefueling overhaul.

As part of its long-term plan to divide the Trident fleet equally between the Atlantic andPacific fleets, beginning in 2002 the Navy will transfer three of the 10 Trident subs nowbased at King's Bay to Bangor. Of the eight Trident submarines assigned to Bangor --USS Alaska, USS Nevada, USS Henry M. Jackson and USS Alabama -- will convertfrom the older Trident I (C-4) missile to the more powerful Trident II (D-5) missile. TheNevada is scheduled to enter the Bremerton shipyard in early 2001 to begin itsconversion, and the final pair are scheduled for the refitting in 2005 and 2006.

SpecificationsBuilders: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division.

Power Plant:

One S8G nuclear reactorcore reloaded every nine yearstwo geared steam turbines,one shaft, output of 60,000 hp

Length: 560 feet (170.69 meters)

Beam: 42 feet (10.06 meters)

Displacement: Surfaced: 16,764 tonsSubmerged:18,750 tons

Speed: Official: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)Actual: 25 knots submerged speed

Operating Depth: Official: "greater than 800 feet"Actual: greater than 1,000 feet

Armament: 24 - tubes for Trident I and II,4 - torpedo tubes with Mk48 Torpedoes

Sensors: BQQ-6 Bow mounted sonarBQR-19 Navigation

BQS-13 Active sonarTB-16 towed array

Crew: 15 Officers, 140 Enlisted

Unit Operating CostAnnual Average

$50,00,000 [source: [FY1996 VAMOSC]

Date Deployed: November 11, 1981 (USS Ohio)

Boat ListBoat Name Build

er BaseFYOrder

LaidDown Launch Commiss

ionStrick

en

SSBN-726 Ohio GD-

EB Bangor 1974 10 Apr76

7 Apr79

11 Nov81 2023

SSBN-727 Michigan GD-

EB Bangor 1975 4 Apr77

26 Apr80 11 Sep 82 2024

SSBN-728 Florida GD-

EB Bangor 1975 9 Jun 77 14 Nov81 18 Jun 83 2025

SSBN-729

Georgia GD-EB Bangor 1976 7 Apr

796 Nov

82 11 Feb 84 2026

SSBN-730

Henry M. Jackson(ex-USS RhodeIsland)

GD-EB

Bangor 1977 19 Jan81

15 Oct83

6 Oct 84 2026

SSBN-731

Alabama GD-EB Bangor 1978 27 Aug

8119 May

8425 May

85 2027

SSBN-732

Alaska GD-EB Bangor 1978 9 Mar

8312 Jan

85 25 Jan 86 2028

SSBN-733 Nevada GD-

EB Bangor 1980 8 Aug83

14 Sep85

16 Aug86 2028

SSBN-734 Tennessee GD-

EBKingsBay 1981 9 Jun 84 13 Dec

86 17 Dec 88 2030

SSBN-735 Pennsylvania GD-

EBKingsBay 1983 10 Jan

8423 Apr

88 9 Sep 89 2031

SSBN-736 West Virginia GD-

EBKingsBay 1984 24 Oct

8714 Oct

89 20 Oct 90 2032

SSBN-737 Kentucky GD-

EBKingsBay 1985 18 Dec

8711 Aug

90 13 Jul 91 2033

SSBN-738 Maryland GD-

EBKingsBay 1986 18 Dec

8915 Jun

91 13 Jun 92 2034

SSBN- Nebraska GD- Kings 1987 26 May 15 Aug 10 Jul 93 2035

739 EB Bay 87 92SSBN-

740 Rhode Island GD-EB

KingsBay 1988 1 Dec

9017 Jul

93 9 Jul 94 2036

SSBN-741 Maine GD-

EBKingsBay 1989 4 Apr

8916 Jul

94 29 Jul 95 2037

SSBN-742 Wyoming GD-

EBKingsBay 1991 27 Jan

9015 Jul

95 13 Jul 96 2038

SSBN-743 Louisiana GD-

EBKingsBay 1992 19 Dec

9027 Jul

96 06 Sep 97 2039

SSBN- #19 GD-EB Bangor 1990 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

SSBN- #20 GD-EB Bangor 1991 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

SSBN- #21 GD-EB ??? 1992 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

SSBN- #22 GD-EB ??? 1993 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

SSBN- #23 GD-EB ??? 1994 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

SSBN- #24 GD-EB ??? 1995 Proposal Cancelled in 1991

AS-19 USS ProteusNaval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Alongwith destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen.

USS Proteus was commissioned as a diesel sub tender in 1944 then overhauled andreconfigured in 1959-60 to service FBM subs. The Chief of Naval Operations deployedSubmarine Squadron 16 to Rota, Spain, on Jan. 28, 1964, and embarked upon USSProteus (AS-19). USS Lafayette (SSBN 616) completed its first FBM deterrent patrolwith the Polaris missile and commenced the first refit and replenishment at Rota. Polarissystem support continued until the last SSBN - the Robert E. Lee, departed Guam in July1981. Subsequently she was retired from FBM service and was fitted as an attacksubmarine tender.

SpecificationsDisplacement 19,200 tons full load

Length 575 feet

Beam 73 feet

Speed 15.4 knots

Aircraft None

Armament Four 20mm guns

Complement Approximately 557

Builders Moore Shipbuilding and Drydock

ShipsName Numbe

r Builder Homeport

Ordered

Commissioned

Decommissioned

Proteus AS-19 Moore SB &

DD Guam 1943 11 Jul 1992

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/usspro~1.jpg

AS-31 Hunley-classNaval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Alongwith destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen. The Hunley class wasconfigured especially to service FBM submarines. The Holland was in Guam from 1993through 1996, prior to decommissioning in May 1996 in Bremerton WA.

Specifications

DisplacementLight Displacement: 12852 tonsFull Displacement: 17640 tonsDead Weight: 4788 tons

Length 599 feet

Beam 83 feet

Speed 19 knots

Power Plant Diesel electric, one shaft

Aircraft none

Armament Four 20mm guns

Complement 603

ShipsName Numbe

r Builder Homeport Ordered Commission

edDecommissioned

Hunley AS-31 Newport

NewsCharleston

16 Nov1959 16 Jun 1962 30 Sep 1994

Holland AS-32 Ingalls Charlesto

n31 Aug1961 30 Aug 1963 30 Sep 1996

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/as-31-dvic029.jpg

AS-33 Simon Lake classNaval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Alongwith destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen. The Simon Lake class shipsare configured especially to service FBM submarines. Submarine tenders such as USSSIMON LAKE (AS-33) are the mobile repair, weapons handling, and supply bases forsubmarines and other ships. They possess all the capabilities required to maintain theNavy's most modern submarines in the highest state of material readiness.A principal function of USS SIMON LAKE is Repair, and here she is most impressive.Highly skilled and trained personnel make ship and submarine repairs in every fieldincluding: pattern making, carpentry, nuclear repair, gyro repair, interiorcommunications, periscope and optical repair, refrigeration and air conditioning, divingand underwater hull repair, fire control repair, torpedo overhaul, instrument repair,electronics repair, chemical analysis and many others. The Supply function of USSSIMON LAKE is equally impressive. USS SIMON LAKE carries approximately 52,000general and technical supply items to meet the needs of the ships she serves. She is afloating general store with a stock inventory in excess of ten million dollars.USS SIMON LAKE also provides fresh water, fuel oil, lube oil, oxygen, nitrogen, anti-submarine weapons, pyrotechnics, distilled battery water, food, electrical power, smallboats and crane services. Other important services include: spiritual (chaplain); medical(doctors, treatment room, operating room, ex-ray facilities); disbursing; barber shops;laundry and dry cleaning plant; soda fountain; uniform shop and self-service ship's store.These services are provided on a daily basis for more than 1,500 officer and enlistedpersonnel on USS Simon Lake and her supported units. USS SIMON LAKE's mobilityenables her, on short notice, to move to any advanced geographical location in responseto strategic situations, bringing with the ship all its capabilities and services.Port Services, a component of the USS SIMON LAKE is responsible for providinglogistic support to USS SIMON LAKE and for transporting personnel to and from SantoStefano Island by means of converted LCM-8 crafts.Commander, Submarine Squadron 16, embarked in USS Simon Lake (AS-33), arrived atKings Bay on July 2, 1979, and moored at the original Army wharf, approximately onehalf mile up-river from what is now Warrior Wharf. Four days later, USS James Monroe(SSBN 622) entered Kings Bay and moored alongside to begin a routine refit inpreparation for another deterrent patrol. Kings Bay has been an operating submarine basesince that time.

Specifications

Displacement

AS-33Light Displacement: 13797 tonsFull Displacement: 20088 tonsDead Weight: 6291 tonsAS-34Light Displacement: 14316 tons

Full Displacement: 20922 tonsDead Weight: 6606 tons

Length Overall Length: 644 ftWaterline Length: 620 ft

Beam Extreme Beam: 85 ftWaterline Beam: 85 ft

Draft Maximum Navigational Draft: 27 ftDraft Limit: 30 ft

Power Plant Two boilers, steam turbines, one shaft

Aircraft none

Armament Four 20mm guns

Complement 601

Builders AS-33, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard;AS-34, Ingalls Shipbuilding

HoemportUSS Simon Lake (AS-33)[ex Holy Loch, Scotland]since 1992 @ Maddalena, ItalyUSS Canopus (AS-34);Kings Bay, Ga.

ShipsName Numb

er Builder Homeport Ordered Commissio

nedDecommissioned

SimonLake AS-33 Puget Sound

NSYMaddalena

08 Aug1962 07 Nov 1964 1999

Canopus AS-34 Ingalls KingsBay

19 Sep1963 04 Nov 1965 30 Nov 1994

AS-35 cancelled in 1964

Honest John M31 / M50The Honest John was a long-range artillery rocket capable of carrying an atomic or highexplosive warhead. It was a free-flight rocket as opposed to a guided missile. The rocketwas 27 feet long, 30 inches in diameter, weighed 5,800 pounds, used a solid propellantand had a range of 12 miles. It was first fired at White Sands in 1951. In the Spring of1954 the Honest John was deployed as an interim system. This was the first US tacticalnuclear weapon. The Basic (M31) HONEST JOHN system was first deployed in 1954. Itwas replaced by the Improved (M50) HONEST JOHN in 1961 which reduced thesystem's weight, shortened its length, and increased its range. Between 1960 and 1965, atotal of 7,089 improved HONEST JOHN rockets, less warheads, were produced anddelivered. In July 1982, all HONEST JOHN rocket motors, launchers, and related groundequipment items were type classified obsolete.

CorporalThe U.S. Army's CORPORAL, the first US ballistic guided missile, was about 45 feetlong with control fins located on the ends of the large stabilizing fins. It weighed aboutfive tons fueled and ready for launching. CORPORAL, with a range of more than 75miles, could be equipped with either an atomic or conventional type warhead. TheCORPORAL was the first surface-to-surface ballistic guided missile to be produced andmade available to the Army Field Forces for tactical use. This missile system, whicheventually demonstrated high performance and accuracy characteristics and goodreliability, was developed as a natural progression of the ORDCIT program, whichstarted with the PRIVATE-A and PRIVATE-F, continued with the WAC CORPORALand CORPORAL-E, and finally became a separate weapon development program. By theend of 1957 approximately 900 CORPORAL missiles had been produced, and at the endof FY 58, there was approximately 190 missiles available for U.S. stockpile. The systemhad a circular probable error of less than 300 meters and an in-flight reliability ofapproximately 75 percent [as compared to less than 50 percent in 1955].

RedstoneThe REDSTONE was a highly accurate, liquid propelled, surface-to-surface missilecapable of transporting nuclear or conventional warheads against targets at ranges up toapproximately 200 miles. The Chrysler Corporation received the first industrial contractfor the REDSTONE missile on 15 June 1955. First deployed in 1958, the REDSTONEwas the forerunner of the JUPITER missile and was also used as the first stage in thelaunch vehicle used by the Army to orbit America's first scientific earth satellite,Explorer 1. With the deployment of the speedier, more mobile PERSHING missilesystem. In 1964, the REDSTONE missile system began being phased out as a tacticalArmy missile system. It was ceremonially retired at Redstone Arsenal on 30 October1964.

Pershing 1Conceived as a replacement for the REDSTONE, the PERSHING I was first deployed inAugust 1963. A second generation system, the PERSHING la began replacing thePERSHING I in 1969. The improved system provided increased reliability andflexibility, additional ease of maintenance, lower mission cost, and enhanced operationaltime.

On 31 October 1956 the Chief of Research and Development Department of the Army(DA), requested that the Ordnance Corps conduct a feasibility study of a ballistic missilewith a required range of 500 nautical miles and a minimum range of 750 nautical miles.The Ordnance Corps forwarded the request for a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)study to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) thus generating the basicrequirement for the system to be known as the PERSHING I missile. The MartinCompany of Orlando, Florida, was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) letter contracton 28 March 1958 for research, development, and initial production of the PERSHING Isystem under the technical supervision and concept control of the Government.

The first PERSHING I launch was conducted on 25 February 1960, and the first batteryof the first U.S. Army PERSHING I tactical missile battalion-the 2d Missile Battalion,44th Artillery-was activated in June 1962.

The Secretary of Defense approved the PERSHING la program on 24 May 1965, andMartin Marietta received the production contract for the PERSHING la in August 1967.The conversion from PERSHING I to PERSHING la for the first U.S. European battalion-- the 4th Battalion, 41st Artillery -- was completed in September 1969 under ProjectSWAP, a program for replacing PERSHING I equipment deployed to Europe withPERSHING la equipment which was completed ahead of schedule on 22 January 1970.

In accordance with INF Treaty provisions all of the U.S. Army's Army's PERSHING lamissiles had to be eliminated within 18 months of the treaty's effective date. A total of169 PERSHING la missiles were covered by the treaty. Army contractors completed thedestruction of the last PERSHING la missiles on July 6, 1989, five months ahead ofschedule.

The majority of PERSHING missile stages were burned (static fired) and then crushed,primarily at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Texas, or at Pueblo Depot Activity,Colorado. Representatives from the Soviet Inspection Team and the U.S. On-SiteInspection Agency were present to witness the elimination process.

Pershing 2An evolutionary improvement of the PERSHING la system, the PERSHING II was firstdeployed in December 1983. Through the use of a terminally guided reentry vehicle witha new warhead, new propulsion sections, and modified PERSHING la ground supportequipment, the PERSHING II provided increased effectiveness covering longer rangeswith reduced collateral damage over the PERSHING la.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to proceed with the advanceddevelopment of the PERSHING II on 7 March 1974, with the first PERSHING II missileadvanced development firing taking place on 18 November 1977.

NATO Ministers formally approved the basing of the PERSHING II missile system inWestern Europe in December 1979. The initial operational capability for the PERSHINGII was achieved when the 56th Field Artillery Brigade received its equipment on 15December 1983, and deployment of the first PERSHING II battalion was completed inEurope on 30 June 1984. And on 13 December 1985 the PERSHING II weapon systemsuccessfully achieved full operational capability in Europe.

The increased range and pinpoint accuracy of the PERSHING II were major factorsinfluencing the Soviet Union's decision to seek the Treaty on Intermediate Range NuclearForces in which the United States and the USSR agreed to eliminate an entire class ofnuclear missiles. The United States and the USSR signed the Intermediate Range NuclearForces (INF)Treaty on 8 December 1987, and the U.S. Senate ratified the INF Treaty on27 May 1988.

In accordance with INF Treaty provisions all of the U.S. Army's tactical PERSHING IImissile stages, launchers, trainers, and deployed reentry vehicles had to be eliminated byMay 31, 1991. A total of 234 PERSHING II missiles were covered by the treaty. Armycontractors completed the destruction of the last PERSHING II in May 1991. Themajority of PERSHING missile stages were burned (static fired) and then crushed,primarily at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Texas, or at Pueblo Depot Activity,Colorado. Representatives from the Soviet Inspection Team and the U.S. On-SiteInspection Agency were present to witness the elimination process.

Each side also had permission to destroy 15 missiles and launchers by disabling, thenpermanently exhibiting them in museums and similar facilities. The 15 U.S. missiles andlaunchers were split between the Army's PERSHING II and the Air Force's GLCMs. APERSHING II missile and launcher were put on display at the Field Artillery Museum,Fort Sill, Oklahoma; White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico; the Eastern Test Range,Cape Canaveral, Florida; and the Alabama Space and Rocket Center, Huntsville,Alabama. A missile only was exhibited also at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton,Virginia. The final two PERSHING II missiles and the last launcher were donated to theSmithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum, which exchanged with the SovietUnion one PERSHING II for an SS-20 missile.

JupiterThe Jupiter, produced for the Army by Chrysler Corporation, was a single-stage, liquid-fueled, rocket-powered (150,000 pounds of thrust) ballistic missile equipped with all-inertial guidance. The Jupiter was stored vertically on tactical, field-deployed launchers.The missile could be fueled and fired to an effective range of 1,500 nautical miles uponapproximately 15 to 20 minutes notice.

On 8 November 1955 Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson assigned jointly to theArmy and Navy the development of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) withboth a shipboard and landbased capability. Despite subsequent techical progress, by 1957the JUPITER program was in a precarious position, following the Navy's withdrawalfrom the program in late 1956 and the Secretary of Defense's November 1956 decision tolimit the Army's responsibility to missiles having ranges of 200 miles or less. In essence,the Army was developing a missile which the Army could not use.

Following the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik I a new IRBM plan was approved byPresident Eisenhower and the National Security Council on 30 January 1958, whichwould deploy four Jupiter IRBM squadrons, each squadron possessing 60 missiles. Thefirst Jupiter squadron would attain operational status by 31 December 1958, and theentire force of 60 IRBMs would be operationally deployed by March 1960.

In contrast to the relatively smooth deployment of Thor IRBM units in the UnitedKingdom, IRBM negotiations between the United States and other NATO nationsproceeded at a slow pace. The entire IRBM program suffered a severe blow in June 1958when Charles De Gaulle, the new French President, refused to accept any Jupitermissiles. This setback was tempered somewhat on 26 March 1959, when the UnitedStates and Italy signed an agreement to deploy two Jupiter squadrons on Italian soil.Seven months later, on 28 October 1959, the United States and Turkey concluded anagreement to deploy one Jupiter squadron on NATO's southern flank.

ThorThe Thor, developed for the Air Force by the Douglas Aircraft was single-stage, liquid-fueled, rocket-powered (150,000 pounds of thrust) ballistic missiles equipped with all-inertial guidance. The Thor was stored horizontally on tactical field-deployed launchers.The missile could be fueled and fired to an effective range of 1,500 nautical miles uponapproximately 15 to 20 minutes notice.

On 22 March 1956, Headquarters USAF assigned responsibility for Thor's initialoperational capability Jointly to the Air Research and Development Command and theStrategic Air Command. Thor IOC would consist of one wing of 120 missiles, situated atthree SAC bases in the United Kingdom. Each base would have four soft, dispersedlaunch complexes containing five launchers. Planning called for the first 10 Thor IRBMsto attain combat status by October 1958, and the entire

120-missile force by 1 July 1959. After a month and a half of negotiations, ARDC andSAC completed a Thor IOC agreement on 7 May 1956. Under terms of the agreement,ARDC's Western Development Division would develop, man, train, and equipoperational Thor units. The Strategic

Air Command would deploy operational units overseas and bring them to combatreadiness.

The Thor development program, like Atlas and Titan, underwent a series of changes. On28 March 1957, President Eisenhower approved a revised Thor IOC plan calling for 60missiles (four squadrons of 15 missiles each). The first of the squadrons was scheduled tobecome operational by July 1959 and the entire force by July 1960. The plan was revisedonce again following the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik I. The new IRBM planapproved by President Eisenhower and the National Security Council on 30 January1958, would deploy four Thor IRBM squadrons, each squadron possessing 60 missiles.The first Thor squadron would attain operational status by 31 December 1958, and theentire force of 60 IRBMs would be operationally deployed by March 1960. Additionalchanges to the plan were made late in FY 1958 and in FY 1959.

The first Western European nation to receive American-made IRBMs was Great Britain.On 25 March 1957, the last day of the Bermuda Conference, President Dwight D.Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan issued a joint communiqueannouncing a broad agreement on the deployment of Thor IRBMs in the UnitedKingdom. Eleven months later, the two governments signed an agreement providing forthe deployment of four Thor IRBM squadrons to England. Headquarters SAC activatedthe 705th Strategic Missile Wing (IRBM-Thor) on 20 February 1958 at LakenheathRoyal Air Force (RAF) Station, United Kingdom, to monitor the Thor IRBM program inthe United Kingdom and provide technical assistance to the four RAF Thor squadrons.Shortly thereafter, the Air Force transferred the 705th SMW to South Ruislip and mergedit with Headquarters 7th Air Division.

Transferred to the Royal Air Force on 22 June 1959, the 77th RAF Strategic MissileSquadron at Feltwell, England became the first British-based Thor IRBM squadron toreach operational status. At the same time, SAC retained control over the squadron'snuclear warheads and assigned a detachment to perform four functions: (1) retain custodyand control over, and provide maintenance for, reentry vehicles and warheads; (2) receiveand initiate U. S. warhead release orders; (3) operate USAF communications facilities;and (4) provide training to the Royal Air Force. On 11 September and 22 December1959, the second and third British-based Thor IRBM squadrons were declaredoperational and assigned to Royal Air Force personnel. When SAC turned over the fourthand final British-based Thor IRBM to the Royal Air Force on 22 April 1960, thedeployment of the Thor IRBM weapon system in the United Kingdom was completed.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara informed British Minister of Defense PeterThorneycroft on 1 May 1962 that the United States would not provide logistical supportto the Thor squadrons in Britain after 31 October 1964. On 24 January 1963, PresidentJohn F. Kennedy confirmed that Jupiter IRBMs would be phased out as announced by theItalian and Turkish Governments.

In response to Secretary McNamara's announcement, the British government decided tophase out the four Royal Air Force Thor IRBM squadrons rather than assume the burdenof maintaining an obsolete weapon system. On 1 August 1962, Minister Thorneycroftannounced in Parliament that Thor would be phased out by the end of 1963. Operationalphaseout was planned for 30 September 1963, while technical and equipmentdeactivation was scheduled for completion no later than 31 December 1963.

The Strategic Air Command's 7th Air Division was the Air Force's single point of contactfor Thor in the United Kingdom. The 7th Air Division planned and carried out thephaseout of the four Royal Air Force Thor squadrons. On 29 November 1962, the firstThor came off alert at the 98th Royal Air Force SMS in Driffield. Nine months later, on15 August 1963, the last 15 Thor IRBMs were declared non-operational. The technicaland equipment portion of the Thor phaseout program was completed on 20 December1963, and SAC ended responsibility for the Thor program in the United Kingdom.

The 4300th Support Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, California, conducted one of SAC'slast Thor launches on 8 February 1967. The following month, SAC transferred itsremaining Thor boosters to Air Defense Command. When the Air Force reorganizedAerospace Defense Command on 1 November 1979, SAC reacquired the Thor boosters.However, SAC transferred the last modified Thor space booster on 4 September 1981from the 394th ICBM Test Maintenance Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California, tostorage facilities at Norton AFB, California.

MatadorIn August 1945, the AAF established a requirement for a 175- to 500-mile range 600 mphsurface-to-surface missile. Martin received a one year contract in March 1946 to studyboth a subsonic and supersonic version, but the military deleted the latter in December.Despite its subsonic speed, the Martin missile survived the 1947 cut. In March 1949,however, the Guided Missile Committee of the Research and Development Boardrecommended its elimination. The Matador continued, although USAF cut it back inAugust 1949. The Air Force rescinded that decision in December 1949 and then inSeptember 1950 gave the missile top priority, no doubt because of the Korean War.

The Matador possessed about the same size and looks as a contemporary jet fighter. Abooster generating 57,000 pounds of thrust for 2.4 seconds got the 12,000-pound missileairborne and up to a flying speed of 200 mph from a zero- length launcher. Powered by a4,600-pound-thrust J33-A-37 engine, the missile (designated TM-61A) carried a 3,000-pound warhead over 650 mph to a maximum range of 620 miles.

Testing of the Matador began at Holloman Air Force Base with the first flight on 19January 1949. Like so many of the missiles, the initial flight ended in a crash. Testingcontinued with 46 prototype missiles until March 1954, then with 84 production modelsbetween December 1952 and spring 1954. Between August 1953 and February 1954,USAF tested a second series of missiles with strengthened tail and wings to alleviatestructural problems.

The Matador's guidance system presented another problem because the guidance radar'srange proved less than the missile's flying range. This guidance system required aground-based operator to track and guide the missile, which, with line- of-sightcommunications, limited guided range to 250 miles. In late 1954, USAF added aguidance system called Shanicle and re-designated the missile TM-61C. In this system,the missile automatically flew a hyperbolic grid. Based upon results of 74 TM-61Cslaunched on the Atlantic missile range between April 1957 and September 1960, USAFcalculated the missile's overall reliability at 71 percent and CEP at 2,700 feet. However,these accuracy figures included student launches; instructors achieved CEPs of 1,600feet. But Shanicle still limited the range of TM-61C to that of line-of-sight transmissions;moreover, this guidance system could be jammed. To break this dependence, the AirForce installed a third guidance system. ATRAN in the TM-61B variant, nicknamedMace.

Like the other guided missile programs, numerous problems beset the Matador project.Production, engines, and most of all, guidance, were especially troublesome. The MartinCompany must bear much of the responsibility for these difficulties. In 1953, the USAFProject officer wrote that the "Martin Matador program was delayed excessively becauseof [Martin's] poor design, inadequate testing, and difficulty in retaining qualified people."Throughout its service, observers criticized the Matador for its low in-flight reliability,high CEPs, and questionable control over long distances. A 1956 study noted that USAF

did not develop Matador according to procedures and military requirements, but ratherdevised the missile around existing components and techniques. Further, at the time theAir Force initially deployed the Martin missile, the weapon had not demonstratedoperationally acceptable performance and required major modifications.

Moreover, the Matador's limited mobility concerned the Air Force. With the prodding ofthe Wright Air Development Center, Goodyear developed a combinationtransporter/launcher. The new equipment cut both launcher weight (from the original 40tons to 17 ), and the number of different type vehicles required to support the missile(from 28 with the Matador to 2 with the Mace).

The Air Force activated the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron in October 1951 for test andtraining purposes. This unit went to Germany with TM-61As (Matadors) in March 1954and became operational in 1955. Eventually, six missile squadrons (comprising the 38thTactical Missile Wing) served in Europe with just under 200 TM-61s and TM-76s. Butthe missile proved less than satisfactory. Missile firings in Florida and Libya dramaticallydemonstrated low reliability and poor accuracy. Nevertheless, the Matador soldiered on.Martin delivered the 1,000th Matador in mid-1957, but in 1959 a phase-out of theMatador began in favor of a more advanced version, the Martin "Mace." The Air Forcedeactivated the last unit, the 71st Tactical Missile Squadron, in April 1969 as the Army'sPershing missiles took over the Quick Reaction Alert Force role.

SpecificationsSpan 27 feet, 11 inches

Length 39 feet, 8 inches

Height 9 feet, 8 inches

Weight 13,593 lbs.

Armament Conventional or nuclear warhead

Engines Allison J-33 with 4,600 lbs. of thrust; Aerojet solid-propellant booster rocket with 57,000 lbs. of thrust

Cost $132,000

Maximum speed 600 mph (level flight; supersonic during final dive)

Range 690 miles

Service Ceiling 44,000 feet

MaceMace was an improved version of the Matador. Like its predecessor, the Matador, theMace was a tactical surface-launched missile designed to destroy ground targets. It wasfirst designed as the TM-76 and later the MGM-13. It was launched from a mobile traileror from a bomb-proof shelter by a solid-fuel rocket booster which dropped away afterlaunch; a J33 jet engine then powered the missile to the target.

The Goodyear Aircraft Corporation developed ATRAN (Automatic Terrain RecognitionAnd Navigation), a radar map-matching system ) in which the return from a radarscanning antenna was matched with a series of "maps" carried on board the missile whichcorrected the flight path if it deviated from the film map. The company began lab tests inMarch 1948, flight tests in October of that year. Martin showed little initial interest, butproblems with the Matador's guidance necessitated a change. In August 1952, AirMateriel Command initiated the mating of the Goodyear ATRAN with the MartinMatador. This mating resulted in a production contract in June 1954. ATRAN could notbe easily jammed and was not range-limited by line-of sight, but its range was restrictedby the availability of radar maps and missile range. Although in time it became possibleto construct radar maps from topographical maps, ATRAN initially performed poorly.

USAF installed ATRAN in the TM-61B variant, nicknamed Mace. The missile differedfrom the "A" and "C" models in more ways than just designation and name. Mace had alonger fuselage, shorter wings, and more weight than the "A" and "C." The Mace alsohad more power, with its 5,200-pound-thrust J33-A-41 turbojet engine and a 97,000-pound-thrust booster. It first flew in 1956 and could reach Mach .7 to .85 over a 540-milerange at low level (as low as 750 feet), and 1,285 miles at high altitude. Because of thesesubstantial differences of configuration and capability, the Air Force redesignated MaceTM-76A. But these improvements did not come cheaply; the TM-76A cost about$250,000, compared to $60,000 for the TM-61C.

The Air Force installed a a jam-proof inertial guidance system aboard the Mace "B"(designated TM-76B) which had a range exceeding 1,300 miles. To enhance mobility,Martin designed the Mace's wings to fold for transport (the Matador's wings weretransported separately and then bolted on for flight).

USAF deployed the Mace in Europe in 1959, and it served alongside the Matador beforethe latter phased out in 1962. Six missile squadrons (comprising the 38th Tactical MissileWing) served in Europe with just under 200 TM-61s and TM-76s. In Korea, the 58thTactical Missile Group became combat ready with 60 TM- 61Cs in January 1959. Itceased operations in March 1962, only a few months after the 498th Tactical MissileGroup in December 1961 took up positions in semi-hardened sites on Okinawa.

Development of the "B" missiles began in 1964 and remained operational in Europe andthe Pacific. The two squadrons of TM-76B/MGM- 13C continued on active duty untilDecember 1969.

Specifications

Span 22 feet, 11 inches

Length 44 feet, 6 inches

Height 9 feet, 7 inches

Weight 18,000 lbs. at launch

Armament Conventional or nuclear warhead

EngineAllison J33 with 5,200 lbs. of thrust and a Thiokolsolid-propellant booster rocket with 100,000 lbs. ofthrust

Cost $452,000

Maximum speed 650 mph in level flight; supersonic in final dive

Range 1,400 miles

Ceiling 40,000 feet

BGM-109 Ground Launched CruiseMissileWhen not deployed in the field the flights would be garrisoned at sites where the vehiclesand missiles were maintained on quick reaction alert (QRA) in hardened blast resistantshelters. When deployed, each flight would travel to a designated dispersal area, mannedby 69 combat trained men who maintained and operated the system while in the field.Once a flight established a launch site, personnel would set up a defensive perimeterwhile the LCC was hooked into the launchers via a fiber optic cable.The LCC could communicate to the command post using HF and VHF satellite links ordirectly to the National Command Authority in the US. On receipt of an authorizedemergency message the operators entered the proper coded sequence through the“Permissive Action Link” allowing the arming and targeting data to be entered into thesystem.The TEL was then raised to an elevation of 45 degrees by a hydraulic ram and thearmored doors at the front and end where opened prior to firing. A solid booster rocketengine would push the missile out of its launch tube before the main engine ( a WilliamsF-107-400 two shaft turbofan) would ignite carrying the missile to its designated target.After launch the missile would travel a predetermined flight path, using an inertialguidance system designed to follow a pre-mapped satellite route to its target.

SpecificationsLength 21 ft with booster

Wing Span 8.6 ft

Cruise speed 550 mph

Range 1400 miles

Warhead W-84

Regulus IIn October 1943, Chance Vought signed a study contract for a 300-mile range pilotlessmissile that carried a 4,000-pound warhead. But little transpired until the soon-to-be-separated AAF provided the impetus for the Navy Program. In May 1947, the Armyairmen awarded Martin a contract for a turbojet-powered subsonic missile which becamethe Matador. The Navy saw this as a threat to its role in guided missiles and, within days,ordered BuAer to start a similar Navy missile that could be launched from a submarine,using the same engine as the Matador (J33) and components on hand. By August 1947,the project had gained both a name (Regulus) and performance requirements. The Navywanted the missile to carry a 3,000-pound warhead to a maximum range of 500 nm atMach .85 with a CEP of .5 percent of the range. The vehicle would be 30 feet in length,10 feet in span, 4 feet in diameter, and would weigh between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds.

Another factor fostering the development of the Regulus program, and which becameincreasingly important, was the Navy's desire to deliver a nuclear weapon. The Navy'sproblem centered on the heavy weight of atomic weapons in the late 1940s (about fivetons), just too heavy for almost all carrier-launched aircraft. The Navy converted twelveP2Vs (twin-propeller-powered patrol bombers) for such a role, but while they could takeoff from carrier decks, they could not land on them. Only the AJ Savage could do both.The Navy converted the North American bombers for nuclear delivery, but they werelimited in range to about 800 miles. Captain Fahrney, of World War II drone fame,proposed a pilotless version of the Al with a range of about 1,400 nm. But the Navycanceled this TAURUS project in 1948. So despite mechanical and tactical limitations,the AJ represented the only carrier aircraft capable of delivering a nuclear weapon in theearly 1950s. New urgency to develop nuclear delivery systems followed the Sovietnuclear test in the summer of 1949. Therefore, the Military Liaison Committee to theAtomic Energy Commission recommended consideration of Regulus along with threeother missiles for this role.

Certainly interservice competition complicated the missile's development. Navy'sRegulus and USAF's Matador not only looked alike; their performance, schedule, andcosts were about the same, and they used the same engine. With pressure to reducedefense spending in 1949, the Department of Defense (DOD) impounded fiscal 1950funds for both missiles. Because most observers considered Matador to be about a yearahead of the Regulus, DOD ordered the Air Force to determine if Matador would indeedwork, and BuAer to slow development of Regulus and fund a study to determine ifMatador could be adapted for Navy use. But the Navy successfully argued that Reguluscould perform the Navy mission better than could Matador. Regulus advocates pointed toits simpler guidance system which required only two stations (submarines) while theMatador required three. Also, the Matador's single booster had to be fitted to the missileafter it was on the launcher while, in contrast, the Regulus was stowed with its twoboosters attached. This meant that in comparison to the Regulus, the Matador wouldrequire more men and machinery and that the submarine had to remain on the surfacelonger, thereby increasing its vulnerability to enemy action. In addition, Chance Vought

built a recoverable version of the missile, which meant that while each Regulus testvehicle cost more than the Martin missile to build, Regulus was cheaper to use thanMatador over the series of tests. While some of the Matador's problems woulddoubtlessly have been resolved, the Navy insisted on a separate program; and in June1950, the joint service Research and Development Board concurred. The Navy programcontinued.

Two 33,000-pound-thrust boosters launched Regulus, which first flew in March 1951.The first submarine launch of Regulus occurred in July 1953 from the deck of the USSTunny. After such a launch, the Navy guided the Regulus toward its target by two othersubmarines and, later, with the Trounce system, one submarine. Regulus could also belaunched from surface ships. Cruisermen were enthusiastic about this weapon whichwould extend both their offensive range and mission. The lack of a capability to passcontrol of the missile from the cruisers and submarines, however, limited the weapon.The Navy also launched the missile from carriers and guided it with a control aircraft.Problems included booster launch (the launcher weighed eleven tons and sometimesspectacularly malfunctioned), control aircraft (which lacked adequate speed and range todo the job), and the entire radio control system. Engineers resolved these problems butnaval aviators, like their Air Force brethren, strongly preferred aircraft and thispreference may well have undermined the Regulus program.

Nevertheless in 1955, Regulus became operational, eventually serving aboard diesel- andnuclear-powered submarines, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. The last versions of themissile could carry a 3.8 megaton warhead 575 miles at Mach .87. Regulus phased out ofproduction in January 1959 with delivery of the 514th missile. The Navy launchedperhaps 1,000, obviously including many of the recoverable versions, before it tookRegulus out of service in August 1964. Admiral Zumwalt calls that decision the "singleworst decision about weapons [the Navy] made during my years of service. " But carefulexamination of Regulus reveals few advantages over the V-l. While the Chance Voughtflew somewhat further and faster, American guidance was not much better than theearlier German missile guidance system. The principal American missile improvementswere the nuclear warhead and increased reliability.

By mid-1958, USS Grayback (SSG-574) and USS Growler (SSG-577) had beencommissioned as the first purpose-built Regulus submarines, each carrying two in a largebow hangar. At that time, the Navy had four SSGs and four missile-carrying cruisers atsea. When USS GRAYBACK (SSG 574) slipped it moors and headed into the PacificOcean in September 1959, it began an era of submarine history that would gounrecognized for almost 40 years. The five REGULUS submarines, USS GRAYBACK(SSG 574), USS TUNNY (SSG 282), USS BARBERO (SSG 317), USS GROWLER(SSG 577) and USS HALIBUT (SSGN 687) deployed on 41 deterrent patrols under theearth's oceans over the course of 5 years.

Regulus IIWith the demise of Rigel, the Regulus successor became another Chance Vought productdesignated Regulus II. In March 1954, the Navy planned to have Regulus II operationalby 1957 and Triton operational in 1965. Vought began design of the supersonic wingedmissile in April 1952, receiving a development contract in June 1953. Thirty-six monthslater, the first Regulus II flew when a 115,000-pound- thrust booster launched the canard-configured missile. Regulus II could carry its 2,920-pound warhead 570 nm at Mach 2,and over 1,150 nm at reduced speeds. One suggestion in 1957 was to fit wing tanks onthe missile to extend its range.

The Navy successfully tested a recoverable Regulus II test vehicle in 30 of 48 tests,achieved partial success in 14, and failed in only 4. The government signed a productioncontract in January 1958. That September the Navy fired a Regulus II from the submarineGrayback, the only such launching. The Navy scheduled one other snorkel submarine tobe equipped with Regulus II, along with four cruisers, and planned in 1956 to eventuallyput Regulus on 23 submarines.

Despite early promise, the Regulus submarines were severely disadvantaged by therequirement to prepare and fire their missiles on the surface and then to stay at periscopedepth to exercise command guidance. These shortcomings were overcome when morecompact nuclear warheads and larger solid-fuel rocket motors became available, and withsubmarine nuclear propulsion, motivated the concept of submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs) as a nuclear deterrent.

The missile's cost (one million dollars each), budget pressures, and the greaterattractiveness of alternative nuclear delivery systems doomed Regulus. The Regulusmissile program was terminated to free funds for the Polaris project. On 19 November1958, the Office of the Secretary of Defense withdrew its support from the program; andon 18 December 1958, Secretary of the Navy Gates canceled the project. At that point,Chance Vought had completed 20 of the missiles with 27 others still on the productionline. SSGNs on order were recast as SSN-593 class attack submarines, though existingRegulus submarines continued operations.

USS Halibut (SSGN-587) was the first nuclear powered submarine specifically designedto carry and launch missiles. Commissioned in January 1960, she could carry fourRegulus II missiles in a hangar integral with the hull. She is also the first submarine tocarry the Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS). In 1964 USS Halibut made the lastRegulus patrol. With Polaris on line, Regulus submarines were phased out.

RigelThe Grumman Rigel was a Navy cruise missile designed to fly 400 to 500 nm at Mach 2.In May 1950, the Navy planned to get the Regulus operational in 1953, Rigel operationalin 1955, and the "ultimate cruise missile," the Triton, operational in 1960. Plans called fora Marquardt ramjet to power Rigel, whose all-up weight was 19,000 pounds with booster.However, because there were no facilities large enough to test the 48-inch ramjet, thetesters used a 28-inch version. This powered a six-tenth's scale test model which firstflew in March 1950. But the program encountered what proved to be insoluble problems.By October 1952, 11 of the flight tests had failed. Therefore, the Navy canceled Rigel inAugust 1953.

TritonThe "ultimate Navy cruise missile," the Triton, was to have a 12,000 nm range, fly atMach 3.5 at 80,000 feet, be guided by radar map-matching, and deliver a 1,500-poundwarhead within 600 yards of its aiming point. It entered full-scale development in 1955,but never got into production.

Tomahawk Cruise MissileThe Tomahawk long range, subsonic cruise missile can attack targets on land(Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)) and at sea (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile(TASM)). The TLAM can be fitted with either conventional unitary warhead (TLAM\C),nuclear warhead (TLAM\N) or submunition dispenser (TLAM\D). On 27 September1991 President Bush announced a number of initiatives affecting the entire spectrum ofUS nuclear weapons. The United States removed all tactical nuclear weapons, includingnuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and attack submarines. The nuclear equipedUGM-109A TLAM-N Tomahawk was withdrawn from service in 1992, thoughconventional versions remain operational.