Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)...Project Number 05.03._ Edition 00.01.00 D101 - Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS) 1 of 343 ©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2015. Created

Project Number 05.03._ Edition 00.01.00 D101 - Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)

1 of 343

©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2015. Created by FINMECCANICA LEONARDO for the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged

Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)

Document information

Project Title Integrated and Pre-Operational Validation & Cross Validation

Project Number 05.03.

Project Manager ENAIRE

Deliverable Name Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS) Deliverable ID D101

Edition 00.02.00

Template Version 03.00.00

Task contributors

ENAV, AIRBUS, FINMECCANICA -LEONARDO

Abstract The present document forms the Validation Report for EXE-805 (Integration of Initial CTA/i4D and ASPA S&M Concept supported by E-AMAN) exercise executed by ENAV, FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO, AIRBUS in the scope of SESAR Release 5. The review process of comments from project 05.06.01 was not fully completed. For ENAV and AIRBUS, all the comments were properly answered, however this review takes a lot of time to agree the answer provided and these comments was accepted only from the line 1 over line 35. 05.06.01 concentrates its effort into preparation of its documents for Sol#6.


2 of 343


Authoring & Approval Prepared By - Authors of the document. Name & Company Position & Title Date Maurizio Romano ENAV /P-ATM Task Leader 31/03/2016 Roberto Silvestrini ENAV /Operational Leader 31/03/2016 Ornella Troise ENAV/Human Performance 31/03/2016 Amelia Schiavone ENAV/Human Performance 31/03/2016 Alberto Lorenzoni ENAV/Human Performance 31/03/2016 Marco Pasciuto ENAV/Safety 31/03/2016 Giuseppe Fraioli ENAV /Safety 31/03/2016 Giuseppe Lannaioli ENAV /Safety 31/03/2016 Giovanni Riccardi ENAV /Environment 31/03/2016 Alessandro Manzo ENAV /Security 31/03/2016 Marco Ivaldi ENAV /Security 31/03/2016 Massimo Corazza FINMECCANICA /Avionics 31/03/2016 Isabelle Lavielle AIRBUS /PoC VP805 31/03/2016 Marie Morel AIRBUS / Human Performance 31/03/2016 Cecile Dumazeau AIRBUS / Human Performance 31/03/2016 Sophie Laperche AIRBUS / Human Performance 31/03/2016

Reviewed By - Reviewers internal to the project. Name & Company Position & Title Date Sophie Laperche / AIRBUS AIRBUS /HF 17/05/2016 Isabelle Lavielle / AIRBUS AIRBUS / PoC VP805 17/05/2016

Reviewed By1 - Other SESAR projects, Airspace Users, staff association, military, Industrial Support, other organisations. Name & Company Position & Title Date

Ludovic Legros /SESAR JU SESAR JU / Programme Manager 04/05/2016

Nico De Gelder /NLR P05.06.06 PjM 12/05/2016 Stefan Kits /NORACON P05.06.01 PjM 12/05/2016 Yvonne Matsson /NORACON P05.06.01 Contribution 12/05/2016 Håkan Fahlgren /NORACON P05.06.01 Contribution 12/05/2016 Paul Conroy /EUROCONTROL P05.06.01 Contribution 12/05/2016 Henrik Ekstrand / NOVAIR Airspace User 12/05/2016 Giuseppe Gangemi / ENAV B.05 17/05/2016

1 P5.6.1 revision partially completed


3 of 343


Approved for submission to the SJU By - Representatives of the company involved in the project.

Name & Company Position & Title Date

Rejected By - Representatives of the company involved in the project. Name & Company Position & Title Date

Rational for rejection None.

Document History Edition Date Status Author Justification

00.00.01 01/03/2016 Draft ENAV Create of the Document

00.00.02 17/03/2016 Draft ENAV /AIRBUS Contribution of the Document

00.00.03 31/03/2016 Draft ENAV /AIRBUS Contribution of the Document

00.00.04 13/04/2016 Draft

ENAV Contribution to Airspace /Airport Capacity Assessment

00.00.05 29/04/2016 Draft ENAV/ AIRBUS Assessment from SJU

00.00.06 12/05/2016 Draft ENAV/AIRBUS Comments by NORACON

00.00.07 13/05/2016 Draft ENAV/AIRBUS Comments by NLR and AUs

00.00.08 17/05/2016 Draft ENAV/AIRBUS Comments by AIRBUS

00.00.09 23/05/2016 Draft ENAV/AIRBUS Assessment AIRBUS Comments

00.00.10 27/05/2016 Draft NLR Assessment by NLR Comments

00.00.11 24/06/2016 Draft NORACON

05.06.01 comments/review not fully completed”, and that 05.06.01 concentrates its effort into preparation of its documents for Sol#6.

00.01.00 27/06/2016 Final ENAV Final version

00.02.00 14/08/2016 Answer Comments by SJU

ENAV Answer comments by SJU. 2nd submission.


4 of 343


Intellectual Property Rights (foreground) This deliverable consists of SJU foreground.


5 of 343


List of Index LIST OF INDEX ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................................ 10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................. 13 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 15

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 15 1.2 INTENDED READERSHIP .................................................................................................................................... 15 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 16 1.4 GLOSSARY OF TERMS ....................................................................................................................................... 16 1.5 ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 21

2 CONTEXT OF THE VALIDATION ...................................................................................................................... 26 2.1 CONCEPT OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................ 26

2.1.1 Background of the Integration Concept .................................................................................. 30 2.2 SUMMARY OF VALIDATION EXERCISE/S CONCEPT OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 35

2.2.1 Summary of Expected Exercise/s outcomes .......................................................................... 35 2.2.2 Benefit and Impact Mechanisms investigated........................................................................ 39

2.2.2.1 Human Performance ........................................................................................................................................... 39 2.2.2.2 Safety .................................................................................................................................................................... 40 2.2.2.3 Environment / Fuel Efficiency ............................................................................................................................ 41 2.2.2.4 Predictability ......................................................................................................................................................... 42

2.2.3 Summary of Validation Objectives and success criteria ....................................................... 42 2.2.3.1 Choice of metrics and indicators ....................................................................................................................... 49

2.2.4 Summary of Validation Scenarios ............................................................................................ 51 2.2.4.1 Reference Organization ..................................................................................................................................... 52 2.2.4.2 CTA Organization ................................................................................................................................................ 52 2.2.4.3 ASPA-IM-S&M Organization .............................................................................................................................. 52 2.2.4.4 CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M Organization ............................................................................................................. 52

2.2.5 Summary of Assumptions ......................................................................................................... 54 2.2.6 Choice of methods and techniques ......................................................................................... 58 2.2.7 Validation Exercises List and dependencies .......................................................................... 59

3 CONDUCT OF VALIDATION EXERCISES ...................................................................................................... 60 3.1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SIMULATED ....................................................................................................... 60

3.1.1.1 Operational Environment Simulated ................................................................................................................. 61 3.1.1.2 Traffic import ........................................................................................................................................................ 62 3.1.1.3 Airspace Information ........................................................................................................................................... 63 3.1.1.4 Controller Positions ............................................................................................................................................. 65


6 of 343


3.1.2 Pseudo-pilot Positions ............................................................................................................... 67 3.1.3 Operational Layout Room Main Room .................................................................................... 68 3.1.4 Operational Layout En-Route sectors ..................................................................................... 69 3.1.5 Airport Information ...................................................................................................................... 70 3.1.6 Working Methods with i4D/CTA and ASPA supported by E-AMAN ................................... 72

3.2 PLATFORM INVOLVED IN THE SIMULATION ....................................................................................................... 91 3.2.1 ENAV IBP .................................................................................................................................... 91 3.2.2 AIRBUS IBP ................................................................................................................................ 94 3.2.3 ALENIA IBP ................................................................................................................................. 97

3.2.3.1 System Breakdown and Interfaces ................................................................................................................... 97 3.2.3.2 Alenia C27 J Visual ............................................................................................................................................. 99 3.2.3.3 Alenia C27 J Data-link ........................................................................................................................................ 99 3.2.3.4 Alenia C27 J Post Flight Analyser ..................................................................................................................... 99 3.2.3.5 Alenia Simulation Framework Architecture ...................................................................................................... 99 3.2.3.6 Alenia Simulation Framework Ncfs2 ................................................................................................................. 99 3.2.3.7 Alenia Simulation Framework Monitor .............................................................................................................. 99 3.2.3.8 Alenia I/O Interface ........................................................................................................................................... 100 3.2.3.9 Alenia Model Scheduler ................................................................................................................................... 100 3.2.3.10 ENAV, Alenia exchange information .......................................................................................................... 100

3.2.1 Simulation Agenda ................................................................................................................... 101 3.2.2 Controllers’ background and roles into VP-805 ................................................................... 105 3.2.3 Simulation facilities................................................................................................................... 109

3.3 DEVIATIONS FROM THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................. 112 3.3.1 Deviations with respect to the Validation Strategy .............................................................. 112 3.3.2 Deviations with respect to the Validation Plan ..................................................................... 112

4 EXERCISES RESULTS ...................................................................................................................................... 115 4.1 SUMMARY OF EXERCISES RESULTS............................................................................................................... 115

4.1.1 Results on concept clarification .............................................................................................. 139 4.1.1.1 P05.06.06 – ASPA-IM-S&M ............................................................................................................................. 139 4.1.1.2 P05.06.01 – i4D ................................................................................................................................................. 143

4.1.2 Results per KPA ....................................................................................................................... 145 4.1.3 Results impacting regulation and standardisation initiatives ............................................. 145

4.2 ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 145 4.2.1 Human Performance Results ................................................................................................. 145

4.2.1.1 CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers’ perspectives ........................................... 145 4.2.1.2 ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers’ perspectives ................................ 155 4.2.1.3 ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability ................................................................................................................ 163 4.2.1.4 Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives......................................................................................................................................................................... 167 4.2.1.5 CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration operational acceptability ............................................................ 186


7 of 343


4.2.1.6 CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities ................................................................................ 197 4.2.1.7 Teamwork and communication ....................................................................................................................... 201 4.2.1.8 Roles and responsibilities ................................................................................................................................ 206 4.2.1.9 Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of communication ...................................................................................... 207 4.2.1.10 Nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage ............................................................................................. 210 4.2.1.11 Non-Nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage .................................................................................... 215 4.2.1.12 TOD Downlink impact ................................................................................................................................... 219 4.2.1.13 RTA MISSED procedures ............................................................................................................................ 220 4.2.1.14 ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedures ........................................................................................................ 221

4.2.2 Environmental sustainability & Fuel efficiency ..................................................................... 229 4.2.2.1 Environmental sustainability & Fuel efficiency Results Assessment ......................................................... 231

4.2.2.1.1 Results .......................................................................................................................................................... 232 4.2.3 Predictability .............................................................................................................................. 238

4.2.3.1 Assessment ........................................................................................................................................................ 238 4.2.3.2 Results ................................................................................................................................................................ 240

4.2.4 Cost-effectiveness .................................................................................................................... 241 4.2.5 Airspace Capacity – TMA........................................................................................................ 241 4.2.6 Airport Capacity ........................................................................................................................ 245 4.2.7 Safety ......................................................................................................................................... 248

4.2.7.1 Situational Awareness ...................................................................................................................................... 252 4.2.7.2 Traffic Separation & Monitoring ....................................................................................................................... 253 4.2.7.3 Conflict resolution .............................................................................................................................................. 256 4.2.7.4 Traffic sequencing ............................................................................................................................................. 259 4.2.7.5 Safety Operational Acceptability ..................................................................................................................... 260 4.2.7.6 Unusual Events.................................................................................................................................................. 264

4.2.7.6.1 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 271 4.2.8 Security ...................................................................................................................................... 272

Controls to be applied and recommendations ................................................................................................................ 283 Network Security ............................................................................................................................................................ 283 System Security .............................................................................................................................................................. 283 Application Security ........................................................................................................................................................ 283 Procedural Security ........................................................................................................................................................ 284 Physical Security ............................................................................................................................................................ 284

4.2.9 Unexpected Behaviours/Results ............................................................................................ 285 4.3 CONFIDENCE IN RESULTS OF VALIDATION EXERCISES ................................................................................. 285

4.3.1 Quality of Validation Exercises Results - Environmental Sustainability & Fuel Efficiency and Predictability .............................................................................................................................................. 285 4.3.2 Statistical significance (ENV sustainability & fuel efficiency) ............................................. 287


8 of 343


5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................... 289 5.1 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 289 5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 294

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................. 297 5.3 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 297 5.4 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 297

APPENDIX A ASSESSMENT REPORT ........................................................................................................... 299 APPENDIX B ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY & FUEL EFFICIENCY: FULL ANALYSIS REPORT 300 APPENDIX C HUMAN PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ............................................ 303

HUMAN PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................................... 303 INVESTIGATED HP AREAS AND RELATED METRICS AND INDICATORS ....................................................................... 304 HP DATA COLLECTION METHODS ............................................................................................................................... 319 HP ANALYSIS PROCESS ............................................................................................................................................. 319

APPENDIX D RESULTS ALENIA PROTOTYPE ............................................................................................ 327


9 of 343


List of tables Table 1: Concept Overview ..............................................................................................................................30 Table 2: Speed and Level Constraints .............................................................................................................34 Table 3: Stakeholders Needs and Identification ...............................................................................................36 Table 4: Stakeholders' expectations .................................................................................................................38 Table 5: Validation Objectives-KPA/TA-OIs Traceability..................................................................................48 Table 6: Metrics and Indicators ........................................................................................................................51 Table 7: Summary of Assumption ....................................................................................................................57 Table 8: Metrics and Indicators ........................................................................................................................58 Table 9: Validaiton Exercise and Dependencies ..............................................................................................59 Table 10: Traffic Sample ..................................................................................................................................62 Table 11: Sector and Vertical Limits .................................................................................................................64 Table 12: OPS Positions Main Simulation Room 137OPS Positions Main Simulation Room 137 ..................65 Table 13: OPS Positions Shadow Room 137 .....................................................................................................66 Table 14: PWP Position .....................................................................................................................................67 Table 15: Airport Information ...........................................................................................................................70 Table 16: Sector Working Methods ...................................................................................................................89 Table 17: Working Methods of The concepts ...................................................................................................90 Table 18: ATCOs’ background .......................................................................................................................106 Table 19: ATCOs’ roles into the Exercise.......................................................................................................108 Table 20: Deviation with Respect the Validation Plan ....................................................................................114 Table 21: Validation Criteria status .................................................................................................................138 Table 22: Initiation conditions of the ASPA manoeuvres rejected during the EXE-805 .................................165 Table 23: Rejected ASPA manoeuvres Distance to merge waypoint VS delta spacing ................................165 Table 24: Instructed Merge Manoeuvres average characteristics .................................................................166 Table 25: ASPA UNABLE analyses ...............................................................................................................167 Table 26: HP Ground Want – Have Matrix .....................................................................................................179 Table 27: ASPA activated manoeuvres characteristics EXE-708 vs EXE-805 ..............................................193 Table 28: Impact of ASPA manoeuvre activation on aircraft behaviour .........................................................194 Table 29: Speed and altitude constraints on TMA waypoints ........................................................................195 Table 30: ASPA-IM-S&M CPDLC Messages .................................................................................................207 Table 31 Predictability KPIs ............................................................................................................................239 Table 32: Predictability Assessment Example ...............................................................................................240 Table 33: Traffic Sample characteristics ........................................................................................................250 Table 34: match between OBJs, Success Criteria, Indicators and Data collection .......................................251 Table 35: measure scale ................................................................................................................................251 Table 36: Unusual events summary ...............................................................................................................264 Table 37: U.E. 1 “Target lateral deviation”......................................................................................................265 Table 38: U.E. 2 “Target speed reduction” .....................................................................................................267 Table 39: U.E. 3 “Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict” ...........................................................................................268 Table 40: U.E. 4 “Wrong CTA” .......................................................................................................................269 Table 41: Initial situation .................................................................................................................................269


10 of 343


Table 42: Situation with error ..........................................................................................................................269 Table 43: U.E. 5 “Merge Point CB” .................................................................................................................269 Table 44: U.E. 6 “Landing rate change” .........................................................................................................270 Table 45: U.E. 7 “Military area activation” ......................................................................................................270 Table 46: U.E. 8 “Missed Approach” ..............................................................................................................271 Table 47: Supporting and Primary Assets ......................................................................................................275 Table 48: Likelihood Scheme .........................................................................................................................276 Table 49: threats and likelihood ......................................................................................................................277 Table 50: HP Data Collection Methods ..........................................................................................................319 Table 51: Sectors’ grouping ............................................................................................................................321 Table 52: Test results table ............................................................................................................................342

List of figures Figure 1: Exercise Context ...............................................................................................................................27 Figure 2: Arrival Sequence ...............................................................................................................................30 Figure 3: Ground System .................................................................................................................................31 Figure 4: ASAS manouvres ..............................................................................................................................32 Figure 5: Sequence with Integrate Concept .....................................................................................................32 Figure 6: STARs Design ...................................................................................................................................34 Figure 7: HP benefit mechanism ......................................................................................................................39 Figure 8: Safety Benefit Mechanism .................................................................................................................40 Figure 9: Environment / Fuel Efficiency Benefit Mechanism ............................................................................41 Figure 10: Predictability Benefit Mechanism ....................................................................................................42 Figure 11: Operational Airspace .......................................................................................................................61 Figure 12: Operational Layout ..........................................................................................................................68 Figure 13: Operational Layout 2 .......................................................................................................................69 Figure 14: ENAV IBP Rome architecture .........................................................................................................91 Figure 15: Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS) ........................................................................93 Figure 16: Virtualisation Data ...........................................................................................................................94 Figure 17: Integration simulator cockpit & architecture ....................................................................................95 Figure 18: Alenia C27 J High Level Hardware Architecture .............................................................................97 Figure 19: Alenia C27 J Simulation Framework High Level Architecture .........................................................98 Figure 20: Alenia C27 J VCD data exchange with ENAV platform ................................................................100 Figure 21: Exercise execution – Training session ..........................................................................................101 Figure 22: Exercise execution – Simulation session – week 2 ....................................................................103 Figure 23: Virtualised Aircraft Simulators (iAIRCRAFT or iA/C) room ...........................................................109 Figure 24: Pseudo-pilots working position (CWP) room .................................................................................109 Figure 25: Alenia C27 Virtual Cockpit Demonstrator ......................................................................................110 Figure 26: Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS) ......................................................................110 Figure 27: Controllers simulation room 1........................................................................................................110 Figure 28: Sequence Manager and ASPA Coordinator CWPs in simulation room 1 .....................................111


11 of 343


Figure 29: Sequence Manager HMI ...............................................................................................................111 Figure 30: Controllers simulation room 2........................................................................................................112 Figure 31:CTA/i4D Controllers’ change of practice ........................................................................................146 Figure 32:CTA/i4D Controllers’ procedure flexibility .......................................................................................147 Figure 33:CTA/i4D Controllers’ workload .......................................................................................................148 Figure 34 Ground i4D events .........................................................................................................................149 Figure 35:CTA/i4D Controllers’ and pseudo pilots’ orders .............................................................................153 Figure 36:CTA/i4D Controllers’ situational awareness ...................................................................................154 Figure 37:CTA/i4D Controllers’ risk of deskilling ............................................................................................155 Figure 38: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ change of practice .............................................................................156 Figure 39: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ procedure flexibility ...........................................................................156 Figure 40: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ workload ............................................................................................157 Figure 41: ASPA-IM_S&M Controllers’ orders ...............................................................................................158 Figure 42: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ and pseudo-pilots’ orders ..................................................................161 Figure 43: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ situational awareness .......................................................................162 Figure 44: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ risk of deskilling .................................................................................163 Figure 45: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ change of practice .......................................................168 Figure 46: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ procedure flexibility ......................................................169 Figure 47: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ workload ......................................................................170 Figure 48: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ and pseudo-plots’ orders .............................................174 Figure 49: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ situational awareness ..................................................175 Figure 50: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ risk of deskilling ...........................................................176 Figure 51: HP Ground Benefit Impact Matrix .................................................................................................181 Figure 52: pilots’ perception of i4D-ASPA transition-related workload ...........................................................183 Figure 53: Information provided for anticipation of i4D-ASPA transition ........................................................185 Figure 54: Ability to analyse and diagnose situation all the time ....................................................................186 Figure 55: ETAmin/max window displayed to the AMAN in EXE-708 vs EXE-805 .......................................187 Figure 56: EXE-805 CTA dispersal on reference window ..............................................................................188 Figure 57: EXE-708 CTA dispersal on reference window ..............................................................................189 Figure 58: ETAmin/max window approximation .............................................................................................192 Figure 59: EXE-805 LIRF TMA proposed design ...........................................................................................195 Figure 60: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ teamwork .....................................................................202 Figure 61: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ shared situational awareness ......................................202 Figure 62: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ effort to share information ...........................................203 Figure 63: Ground – Ground Coordination .....................................................................................................205 Figure 64: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ roles and responsibilities .............................................206 Figure 65: Pilots’ feedbacks on the communication-related workload in nominal situation ...........................213 Figure 66: Acceptability of time spent head down during i4D and ASPA operations .....................................214 Figure 67: Pilots’ feedbacks on acceptability of time spent head down in non-nominal situation ..................218 Figure 68: Controllers’ ASPA-IM-S&M orders ................................................................................................228 Figure 69: ENV Table .....................................................................................................................................229 Figure 70: Performance Assessment .............................................................................................................238 Figure 71: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight .....................................................................................242


12 of 343


Figure 72: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight with ASAS ...................................................................243 Figure 73: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight with all Scneario ..........................................................244 Figure 74: Time Spacing Distribution .............................................................................................................246 Figure 76: List Of Inbound spacing distribution ..............................................................................................248 Figure 77: Situational Awareness Reference .................................................................................................252 Figure 78: Situational Awareness Solution .....................................................................................................252 Figure 79: Traffic Separation and Monitoring .................................................................................................254 Figure 80: Traffic Separation and Monitoring .................................................................................................254 Figure 81: Average Traffic Separation and Monitoring x question .................................................................255 Figure 82: Average Traffic Separation and Monitoring x ATCO .....................................................................255 Figure 83: Separation Resolution ...................................................................................................................256 Figure 84: Separation Resolution 2 ................................................................................................................257 Figure 85: Average Conflict resolution x question ..........................................................................................258 Figure 86: Average Conflict resolution x ATCO .............................................................................................258 Figure 87: Traffic Sequencing ........................................................................................................................260 Figure 88: Traffic Sequencing ........................................................................................................................260 Figure 89: Duty Task / Safety Level ...............................................................................................................261 Figure 90: Duty Task / Safety Level ...............................................................................................................262 Figure 91: Duty Task / Safety Level x question ..............................................................................................262 Figure 92: Duty Task / Safety Level x ATCO .................................................................................................263 Figure 93: Safety Operational acceptability ....................................................................................................263 Figure 94: U.E. 1 “Target lateral deviation” ....................................................................................................266 Figure 95: U.E. 2 “Target speed reduction” ....................................................................................................267 Figure 96: U.E. 3 “Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict” ..........................................................................................268 Figure 97: U.E. 3 “U.E. 7 “Military area activation” .........................................................................................271 Figure 98:Network Architecture for Security Event ........................................................................................279 Figure 99: FMS for Security ............................................................................................................................280 Figure 100:Events for Security ......................................................................................................................282 Figure 101: Initial Conditions ..........................................................................................................................286 Figure 102: Final Conditions ...........................................................................................................................287


13 of 343


Executive summary Finally, it was not feasible to reach an agreement with P05.06.01 about the comments provided by such project to this validation report.

The EXE-805 is conducted by ENAV and AIRBUS and is considered the second integration exercise of P05.03 addressing extended Arrival management system supporting initial 4 Dimension operations and Airborne Separation ASPA Sequencing & Merging on an Extended Operational horizon. It draws from experience gathered during the previous work on elements of the system and developments in terms of system integration from GROUND and AIRBORNE capability of the Operational concepts, most significantly in P05.06.01, P05.06.07, and P05.06.06. In addition to these requirements some recommendations has been covered from the Validation Report 708 regarding the operational and technical requirements as reported below:

Operational: analysis of different operational scenario investigated. o Reference: E-AMAN; o Solution 1:E-AMAN and i4D; o Solution 2:E-AMAN and ASPA o Solution 3:i4D, ASPA supported by E-AMAN

This scenario has been considered in order to analyze among themselves if there are benefits from ATCO and Airspace Users if the integration concepts brings benefit to the ATM community.

The operational scenario fully represent the Rome Area in order to analyze all the flight inbound to LIRF coming from any direction (Northbound, Southbound, East/West directions). Thanks to the feedbacks given from the EXE-708 also the STAR has been designed in order to reflect the ISO-distance from the CTA point over the threshold, thus to have a better trajectory prediction on the IAF point. Thanks to this customization, which helped a lot the ATCOs to manage all the traffic inbound to LIRF with the i4D functionality (sharing trajectory among the Ground-Airborne-Ground). Consequently also the scenario with the ASPA took advantage with the ASPA maneuvers scenario combined with the E-AMAN Advisory. This STAR customization has been considered as a standard FLAS allocation.

Technical: o The appropriate HMI color coding in order to distinguish the different aircraft equipped i4D

and ASPA with respect of all unequipped aircraft . o Within the EXE-805 there have been changes into the HMI, due to an introduction of a new

set of messages, so their integration into the CWP, working methods have been discovered, thus to enabling a new methodology for ATCOs and flight crew. Therefore the ATCO maintained a good situation awareness, being responsible for the separation at any phase of the flight. The functionality of E-AMAN with i4D of visualizing in ”seconds” the ETA max and the ETA min has been another important change.

o The E-AMAN customization in seconds in order to have a better and accurate trajectory over the IAF point.

Airborne: o ALENIA’s Cockpit simulator C-27J has been introduced in order to analyse different

performances of aircraft during ASPA S&M with respect of a commercial aircraft A320 (AIRBUS Cockpit Simulator).

AIRBUS: o Corrections on ASPA airborne prototypes o Management of CPDLC message reception (crew task sharing)

The Operational Focus Areas OFA04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01 play an important role in order to implement all the lessons learned from the previous studies in order to target the Operational concept in a proper way, mainly focused on the integration of the concepts (E-AMAN, i4D and ASPA S&M). Consequently, an


14 of 343


appropriate gap analysis has been performed in this documentation in order to target the integration of the concept in the Maturity Assessment Tool. Most of the KPA have been investigated and for the TS-0105A the Security area has been analysed. In the EXE-805, the operational concepts were explored as a seamless integration and a wide range of associated aspects was investigated. This exercise was defined as a Real-Time simulation based on Rome extended Terminal Maneuvering Area TMA; there have been improvements regarding the construction of the Airspace Design which, increased the realism of EXE708 by including arrivals/departures flows interactions and significant traffic load providing the expected density/complexity; additionally, It is composed of full sector customization of Rome E-TMA sector, thus to be in a more realistic environment Represented in Rome ACC. Also the Milan and Padua sectors are considered. One traffic sample was tested: Medium complex (18 aircraft per 30 minutes, half of them equipped with i4D and ASPA S&M. Therefore, based on different Scenarios (Reference and solution scenarios) several working methods for the ATCO and Airspace Users views has been applied coming from the different OSED for the P05.06.07, P05.06.01 and P05.06.06. The E-AMAN is the tool supporting the Sequence Manager in optimizing the arrival sequence in TMAs providing for each arrival flight the expected landing time and in addition the expected time over specific metering points. In EXE-805 these metering points are located on the IAFs and the eligibility horizon of AMAN is set about 50 minutes before the runway. In the EXE-805 E-AMAN through the Extended Project Profile EPP improved the Initial Approach Fix IAF time-over accuracy and supported the selection of Controlled Time of Arrival in accordance with the Airborne trajectory downloaded by Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract ADS-C. The “Initial 4D operations” allow sharing on-board 4D trajectory data and provide a single time constraint Controlled Time Arrival (CTA) at a specific waypoint during the descent/approach phase including monitoring of the trajectory to the assigned constraint. After the CTA fix, the sequence will need to be fine-tuned, because there is a certain degree of uncertainty that has to be accounted for, thanks to ASPA Sequencing and Merging procedures that enables a/c to automate the achievements and maintaining a given time spacing with designated aircraft

The integration of i4D operations and Airborne Separation ASPA S&M on an Extended Operational horizon was considered an evolution of operational procedures and tools to be used during this simulation. An example is given by the Extended AMAN tool considered as a “ring” to support the controller in the building of the sequence and implementation of CTAs. Even though the down-linked EPP was useful for the ATCO, a dedicated area for ASPA S&M should be better designed, thus to be better balancing the Area of Competence from the i4D trajectory in the pre-sequencing phase, to the Terminal ATCOs that manages the ASAS manoeuvres over the Arrival phase of flight. Another important aspect was related to the phraseology to be used within the combination of i4D and ASPA S&M. This simulation will provide new requirements for the OSEDs, SPRs and INTEROPs of the following projects: , P05.06.01 and P05.06.06 (for i4D and ASAS S&M receptively). This work is done in close collaboration with the OFA coordinators (OFA04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01). The validation process finished in Release 5 with the execution of EXE-805. After the review of the document from P05.06.01, the revision has been partially completed.


15 of 343


1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the document This document provides the Validation Report for the E-AMAN, i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M integration defined by P05.06.07 and P05.06.04 (E-AMAN), P05.06.01 (i4D+CTA), as well as P05.06.06 (ASPA S&M) in the context of the Operational Package PAC04, Operational Focus Area OFA04.01.02 “Enhanced Arrival & Departure Management in TMA and En Route” and OFA03.02.01 “ASPA Spacing”.

Part of this work are within Validation Exercise of VP708, a Release 4 Validation that several recommendation have been considered as an input in order to complement with VP805.

It describes how stakeholder’s needs defined and formalised as a set of requirements in the P05.06.01 and P05.06.06 OSED, INTEROP and SPR are intended to be validated from integration point of view.

The Validation Report conveys the overall series of validation activities with the aim of delivering results that contribute to the successful achievement of E-AMAN, i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M, integration. The VREP is aligned to the 05.02 Step 1 Validation Strategy [20].

This document covers both the detailed and common aspects. It describes the way in which the P05.03 validation exercise has been prepared in order to ensure that all project partner /OFA plans have the necessary information and share the same concepts.

The Operational Scenario to which the concept is applied originates from work undertaken in P05.06.07 (OSED coherency between P05.06.01 and P05.06.04). ENAV is responsible for the exercise and the production of the VALP. The objectives are produced in close cooperation with FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO and AIRBUS.

1.2 Intended readership The document is oriented towards an external and internal audience.

External audience:

04.03 - Integrated and Pre-operational Validation & Cross Validation;

05.06 - Queue Management in TMA and En-Route;

09.49 -Global Interoperability - Airborne Architecture and Avionics Interoperability Roadmap

05.02. Consolidation of Operational Concept Definition and Validation

09.05. ASAS-ASPA, for the technical definition and validation of ASPA S&M.

09.01 Airborne Initial 4D Trajectory Management.

10.03.02. ATC support to ASPA sequencing and merging operations;

10.07.01 Enhanced Data link Features for all phase of flight;

05.06.01 Ground and Airborne Capabilities to implement Sequence;

05.06.06 ASPA S&M

P05.06.07 “Integrated Sequence Building/Optimisation of Queues”

Federating Projects;

05.09 Usability Requirements and Human Factor Aspects for The Controllers Working Position

Transversal project:

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/WP_09/Project_09.49


16 of 343


16.3.x and 16.6 Transversal Areas Support and Coordination

B5 Performance Analysis of ATM target Concept

WP3 Validation infrastructure Adaption and Integration

Internal audience:

The task related to Step 1 validation exercise execution and report will be driving the validation activities execution, including the activities to prepare the platforms (AIRBUS and ENAV IBPs) and to train different actors (controllers, pilots, pseudo-pilots) involved in the exercises.

External audience:

OFA Coordinators OFA04.01.02 Enhanced Arrival & Departure Management in TMA and En-Route) and OFA03.02.01 ASPA spacing

1.3 Structure of the document The document is structured in seven sections and an Appendix.

Section 1 provides an explanation of the purpose and scope of this document.

Section 2 presents the validation approach, enclosing the validation objectives, success criteria, benefit mechanisms and the aims and techniques needed to conduct the validation exercises. It also includes the list and the planning of the intended validation exercises.

Section 3 reports the details of each validation exercise in term of preparation and execution.

Section 4 reports the summary of exercise results and the related level of confidence.

Section 5 provides the conclusions and final recommendations of the whole study.

Section 6 is not applicable for this VALR.

Section 7 reports all the applicable and the reference documents that have been used to support the development of this document.

Appendix A reports the assessment performed for certain KPAs in order to ensure completeness and gap analysis.

Appendix B reports the Environmental sustainability & Fuel Efficiency full analysis report.

Appendix C reports Human Performance assessment methodology.

Appendix D reports the Results collected by Alenia Prototype during the Exercitation.

1.4 Glossary of terms The terms included in the present section have been extracted from OSED, SPR, INTEROP delivered in the scope of P05.06.01, P05.06.04 and P05.06.06.


17 of 343


Term Definition from primary projects

ASPA-IM-S&M application

Instantiation of an IM application (based on the FIM) in line with P5.6.6 context (only arrival, common routes from a Merge Point and only one Target Aircraft)

ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvres

The ASPA-IM-S&M) manoeuvres are limited to the following:

Merge Behind Remain Behind

ASPA-IM-S&M Operation

The combination of ASPA-IM-S&M capabilities and procedures used to perform a specific air traffic management (ATM) task (i.e., an ASPA-IM-S&M instruction)

Assigned Spacing Goal

The time interval between the IM Aircraft and Target Aircraft, assigned by the controller as part of the IM Operation. This Assigned Spacing Goal is only a precise value.

The Assigned Spacing Goal is determined by the controller issuing the IM Instruction and should be developed to achieve the controller’s goal of establishing an efficient flow while maintaining separation from all traffic.

Continuous Descent Operation

An operation, enabled by airspace design, procedure design and ATC facilitation, in which an arriving aircraft descends continuously, to the greatest possible extent, by employing minimum engine thrust, ideally in a low drag configuration, prior to the final approach fix /final approach point

Note 1.— An optimum CDO starts from the top of descent and uses descent profiles that reduce , segments of level flight, noise, fuel burn, emissions and controller/pilot communications, while increasing predictability to pilots and controllers and flight stability.

Note 2.— A CDO initiated from the highest possible level in the enroute or arrival phases of flight will achieve the maximum reduction in fuel burn, noise, and emissions.

(ICAO CDO Manual and B4.2 CONOPS definition).

Controlled Time of Arrival

Controlled Time of Arrival – An ATM imposed time constraint on a defined merging2 point associated to an arrival runway [SESAR lexicon].

CTA may be the original ETA of the aircraft converted to a CTA, or it may be the aircraft’s original ETA with a time-adjustment, used, in either case, to ‘control’ the required time/position for the aircraft in the arrival sequence.

Note: This term is sometimes used interchangeably with CTO.

Controlled Time Over Controlled Time Over – An ATM imposed time constraint over a point [SESAR

2 The CTA definition provided is extracted from the SESAR Lexicon. For practical purposes the CTA is more likely to be used on ‘a defined point’ associated to an arrival runway, rather than specifically being ‘a defined merging point.


18 of 343


Term Definition from primary projects Lexicon]

CTO is an ATM constraint for an aircraft to pass a designated point at a designated time. It may be the original ETO of the aircraft converted to a CTO or it may be the aircraft’s original ETO with a time-adjustment, used, in either case, to ‘control’ the required time for the aircraft to pass a designated point.

Note: This term is sometimes used interchangeably with CTA.

Controller The responsible person traffic and separation manager appointed by the ANSP

E-AMAN Extended- AMAN is an AMAN running with an extended time horizon for sequencing inbound aircraft.

Estimated Time of Arrival

Estimated Time of Arrival - The time computed by the FMS for the flight arriving at a point related to the destination airport [6]

Estimated Time Over Estimated Time Over - The time computed by the FMS for the flight to pass a point on its intended trajectory [P5.6.1 use].

ETA Min/Max Request A request made by ATC ground systems to an A/CAIRCRAFT to provide information on the earliest and the latest ETA for the position the request is made for according to current airborne predictions. I4D equipped A/CAIRCRAFT downlink ‘Reliable RTA Interval’ as ADS-C ETA Min/Max parameter.

E-TMA Extended TMA – a terminal manoeuvring area extending to the aircraft top of descent. The E-TMA usually includes the TMA and nearby feeder sectors.

Extended Project Profile

ADS-C EPP (Extended Projected Profile) report is the ADS-C report containing the sequence of 1 to 128 waypoints or pseudo waypoints with associated constraints or estimates (altitude, time, speed, etc…), Gross Mass and estimate at Top Of Descent, speed schedule, etc. The report may be sent on request from the ground system(s) which also define the content required.

I4D Services I4D service is a generic term used to encompass the use of information that is available from i4D equipped aircraft only, such as the services include ADS-C information, ETA Min/Max information and ADS-C EPP downlink.

IM Aircraft The aircraft that is instructed to perform the IM Operation, also known as the own ship.

The term IM Aircraft is also used to refer to an aircraft, during pre-initiation activities that the controller is expecting to provide with an IM Clearance.

IM Instruction Instructions issued by a controller to a properly equipped IM Aircraft to conduct an IM operation (i.e. achieve or maintain an Assigned Spacing Goal relative to specified Target Aircraft).

IM Speed The speed provided by the FIM Equipment to achieve and / or maintain the Assigned Spacing Goal. The IM Speed may be a precise speed or a speed


19 of 343


Term Definition from primary projects range, presented in a manner and format consistent with other on-board display of speeds to the flight crew.

IM Turn Point The turn point that is calculated by the FIM Equipment when performing a “Follow route then merge” or a “Radar vector then merge” instruction (an IM Turn instruction), where the IM Aircraft should turn direct to the Intercept Point in order to achieve the Assigned Spacing Goal within the FIM Equipment Tolerance at the Achieve-by Point.

Interfering airport An airport within or proximate close to the AMAN eligibility horizon, contributing traffic to the airport being served by the AMAN.

Lock sequence To Lock the sequence provided by the Ground Tool; i.e E-AMAN for the advisory of the CTA/i4D on E-AMAN list.

Merge Point In the context of ASPA the Merge Point is defined as the first common point between Target Aircraft’s route and IM Aircraft’s route. Before the Merge Point the IM Aircraft and Target Aircraft routes are not coincident after this point, the two routes are common.

When a Merge Point is defined, this means that the part of the Target Aircraft’s route before the Merge Point is not coincident with the IM Aircraft’s route.

Planned Termination Point

The Planned Termination Point is:

the clearance limit for the ASPA-IM-S&M instruction, a point on the IM Aircraft’s Intended Flight Path positioned after the Achieve-by Point, or coincident with the Achieve-

by Point, no closer to the runway threshold than the Ultimate Planned

Termination Point, with application priority :

Defined by the controller on a case by case basis and transmitted to the pilot in the ASPA-IM-S&M instruction, or

Defined by published approach procedure, or Set to the default location of the Ultimate Planned Termination

Point (default location).

Pre-sequencing Pre-sequencing is the preparation of the sequence/order of arrivals flights and implementation of appropriate spacing to anticipate the subsequent integration of flows. The pre-sequencing is usually performed by the controller prior the entry into the Approach area.

Reference scenario The scenario against which the solution(s) is compared, i.e. the situation without the proposed solution for SESAR Step 1 (but including other improvements that have been implemented in the meantime) [22]

Reliable RTA Interval Reliable RTA interval is computed by FMS in order to guarantee that any RTA defined within this interval will be satisfied with reliability on a 95% probability


20 of 343


Term Definition from primary projects basis. The interval is defined by reliable ETA Min and reliable ETA Max values.

Reliable ETA Min (respectively reliable ETA Max) is the earliest (respectively latest) ETA at a specific waypoint provided the aircraft flies the 4D trajectory at its maximum allowable speed;

Reliable ETA Max is the latest ETA at the same specific waypoint, provided the aircraft flies the 4D trajectory at its maximum (respectively minimum) allowable speed;

The considered maximum and minimum speeds take into account an average Wind/temperature error.

Required Time of Arrival

Required Time of Arrival - A function of the airborne FMS that allows the flight aircraft to comply with a CTA after the CTA has been transmitted to the aircraft

Route The lateral path ground track between two or more points defined as a sequence of waypoints or by latitudes and longitudes. The lateral path ground track may be part of a defined procedure; e.g., standard terminal arrival routes.

RTA Accuracy RTA accuracy is the targeted maximum discrepancy between RTA value and aircraft actual crossing time on RTA waypoint, associated with the RTA reliability figure. (Taken from P9.1).

RTA Reliability

RTA reliability is the probability (in %) that the aircraft will actually sequence RTA waypoint with the required accuracy (assuming the RTA has been set within the reliable ETA min/ETA max window). (Taken from P9.1).

Note: Airbus define this as, ‘The reliable ETA Min/Max window defines the range of arrival times at a specified lateral fix which are achievable using the RTA function, with a level of confidence of 95% assuming standard meteorological uncertainty’.

Satellite departure A flight departing an Interfering airport for the airport being served by the AMAN.

Selected Traffic A Selected Traffic is a traffic for which additional information is requested by the flight crew. Traffic selection results in display of additional traffic information beyond what is presented in the minimum data tag, and may enable other functions (e.g., coupling)

Solution scenario The scenario with the proposed solution(s) included in SESAR Step 1 and other improvements that have been implemented in the meantime. [22]

Speed Constraint As part of a navigation procedure, a speed limit or speed range for the speed of an aircraft that is applied at a given point. Modern Flight Management Systems (FMSs) typically interpret a Speed Constraint as an “at or below” limitation.


21 of 343


Term Definition from primary projects

Target Aircraft The aircraft against which the IM Aircraft is performing the ASPA-IM-S&M Operations

A Target Aircraft must be ADS-B OUT equipped and transmitting ADS-B data that meets the data quality requirements established in the SPR INTEROP.

Target Aircraft Identification

A group of letters, figures or a combination thereof of alpha numeric which is either identical to, or the coded equivalent of, the Target Aircraft call sign to be used in air-ground communications, and which is used to identify the Target Aircraft in ground-ground air traffic services communications.

Ultimate Planned Termination Point

The Ultimate Planned Termination Point is the point at which the IM aircraft will cease interval management and become subject to normal ATC procedures. This may be at:

The ASPA-IM-S&M instruction default limit A point on the IM Aircraft’s Intended Flight Path

Note: The position of the ultimate Planned Termination Point is not agreed yet (but the choice could be between the FAP and 4 DME)

Unlock sequence To Unlock the sequence provided by the Ground Tool; i.e E-AMAN for the advisory of the CTA/i4D on E-AMAN list.

WTC Wake Turbulence Category

1.5 Acronyms and Terminology

Term Definition

4FF 4 Flight Foundation platform

A/C Aircraft

AC ASAS Coordinator

ACC Area Control Centre

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract

ALDT Actual Landing Time

AOC Area of Control

ANOVA Analysis of Variance

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider


22 of 343


Term Definition

APP Approach control unit

ASAS Airborne Separation Assurance System

ASPA Airborne Spacing Application

ATA Actual Time of Arrival

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATCO Air Traffic Controller

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATO Actual Time Overflying

ATOT Actual Take-Off Time

CDA Continuous Descent Approach

CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information

CPDLC Controller Pilot Data Link Communication

CTA Controlled Time of Arrival

CWP Controller Working Position

DCT Direct To

DOD Detailed Operational Description

E-AMAN Extended Arrival Management

E-OCVM European Operational Concept Validation Methodology

FAP Final Approach Point

FC Flight crew

FEL Flight Estimated Level

FIM Flight Deck Interval Management

FLAS Flight Level Allocation System

FRTM Follow route then merge


23 of 343


Term Definition

GHG Green House Gases.

HF Human Factor

HITL Human In-The-Loop

HMI Human Machine Interface

HP Human Performance

HTM Heading then Merge

IAF Initial Approach Fix

IBP Industrial Based Platform

IM-S&M Interval Management – Sequencing and Merging

INTEROP Interoperability Requirements

IPAS Integrated Preparation and Analysis System

IT Iteration

JSI Java Simulator Interface

MB Merge Behind

OFA Operational Focus Areas

OI Operational Improvement

OSED Operational Service and Environment Description

PEL Planned Entry Level

PF Pilot Flying

PM Pilot Monitoring

PMS Point Merge System

P-RNAV Precision Area Navigation

PWP Pilot Working Position

R&D Research and Development


24 of 343


Term Definition

R/T Radio Telephony

RB Remain Behind

ROC/D Rate of Climb/Descent

RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RTS Real Time Simulation

S&M Sequencing and Merging

SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research Programme

SJU SESAR Joint Undertaking (Agency of the European Commission)

SM Sequence Manager

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPR Safety and Performance Requirements

SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar

STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route

STCA Short Term Conflict Alert

SUT System Under Test

SVS Simulation/Shared Virtual Sky

TBS Time Based Separation

TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area

TOC Transfer of Control

TOF Transfer of Frequency

XFL Exit Level

V&VI Verification and Validation Infrastructure

V&VP Verification and Validation Platform

VALP Validation Plan


25 of 343


Term Definition

VALR Validation Report

VALS Validation Strategy

VO Validation Objective


26 of 343


2 Context of the Validation

2.1 Concept Overview The scope of EXE-805 according the WP5 Validation Strategy for Concept Step 1 - Time Based Operations [19] is to validate the integration of CTA enabled by i4D (CTA/i4D) and ASPA-IM-S&M supported by E-AMAN and to provide evidence to ensure the TS-0103, TS-0105-A OIs V3 closeout and the delivery of SESAR Solution#06 and Solution#16. No specific output is expected to be provided for the E-AMAN maturity assessment that in this exercise supports the controllers in the arrival sequence management and provides the specific information needed for the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operations (i.e. CTA computation and Assigned Time Spacing based on selected runway throughput and WTC).

Expected qualitative and quantitative evidence required for the addressed OIs Maturity Assessment are relevant to the followings KPA/TA:

Environmental Sustainability & Fuel efficiency Predictability Cost-effectiveness Airspace Capacity – TMA Airport Capacity Safety Security Human Performance (the airborne side address only qualitative assessment)

The Operational improvements and relationship with Operational Packages/Sub-Packages, OFA and SESAR solutions are provided in[25].

The exercise is developed getting as input the material produced by former L3 validations, i.e. P05.06.01 (CTA/i4D), P05.06.07 (AMAN), P05.06.06 (ASPA-IM-S&M) and the R4 exercise addressing the same operational validation in a limited complexity/density scenario (EXE-708). The exercise context in terms of relationship with SESAR 1 exercises and temporal evolution is shown in Figure 1 below.


27 of 343


Figure 1: Exercise Context

The validation plan is developed according the work-package validation strategy defined by P05.02 [20] [19]and considering the:

OFA04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01 Maturity Assessment; Findings from previous validation exercises; Close collaboration with the project P09.03 for the validation aspects related the application of

ASPA-IM-S&M by the military a/c Refinement of the Working Methods related the concepts integration according OSEDs provided by

the P05.06.06 and P05.06.01; Recommendation provided by IVT.

The whole scope of the exercises is summarised in the following

Validation Exercise ID and Title EXE-05.03-EXE-805

Advanced Arrival Management supported by i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M

Leading organization ENAV/SELEX-ES

Validation exercise objectives

Perform the operational integrated validation of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M supported by E-AMAN providing qualitative and quantitative elements to ensure the TS-0103 and TS-0105-A OIs V3 closeout enabling the delivery of SESAR Solution#06 and Solution#16.

Update according the validation results the operational and


28 of 343


technical specification data-package formed by: o P05.06.01 OSED,SPR,INTEROP o P05.06.06 OSED,SPR,INTEROP o P09.01 technical Specification o P09.05 Technical Specification o P10.03.02 Technical Specification o P10.10.03 Technical Specification

Rationale

The exercise addresses the validation integration of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M supported by E-AMAN related to the OFA 04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01.

The exercise to support the TS-0103 and TS-0105-A maturity assessment includes specific operational scenario organization enabling the validation of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M in isolation.

Supporting DOD/Operational Scenario/Use Case

SESAR WP05.02 DOD P05.02 D51 VALS SCN-05.02-VALS-0003.0002: Medium

density and complexity TMA, including multiple small-medium airports, airspace constraints, peaks of traffic

OFA addressed OFA03.02.01 “ASAS Spacing” OFA 04.01.02 “Enhanced Arrival & Departure Management

in TMA and En Route”

OI steps addressed

TS-0103 “Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA) in medium density/complexity environment”

TS-0105-A “ASAS Spacing – target direct to merge point (speed/simple geometry)”

Enablers addressed

A/C-11- Flight management to include single time constraint management (CTO, CTA)

A/C-15-Flight management and guidance for ASAS spacing with target aircraft flying direct to metering point

A/C-31a- Exchange of clearances or instructions in step 1 A/C-37a-Downlink of trajectory data according to contract

terms A/C-48a-Air broadcast of aircraft position/vector (ADS-B

OUT) compliant with DO260B A/C-67-Onboard Traffic data processing and display for

ASAS spacing applications, including reception (ADS-B in) APP ATC 144- TMA Controllers are able to issue

instructions to the pilot via CPDLC messages to maintain time- or distance-based separation against other identified aircraft

APP ATC 148- System Support For Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA)

APP ATC 61-System Support for ASPA Sequencing and Merging for Step 1

ER APP ATC 100-4D Trajectory Management in Step 1 -


29 of 343


Synchronization of Air and Ground Trajectories ER APP ATC 149c - Air-Ground Data Link Exchange to

Support i4D - Controlled Time of Arrival/Over flight (CTA/CTO).

Applicable Operational Context En-Route TMA/APP

Expected results per KPA

Human Performance: Positive feedback from controllers complemented with proofs of feasibility based on:

o change of practices acceptability o procedure flexibility o acceptable level of workload for En-Route, E-TMA

and TMA sectors o decrease of workload for the arrival sector; o no negative (or even increase) impact on situational

awareness o Increase of situational awareness for arrival sectors

Predictability: Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability

Environmental sustainability & Fuel Efficiency: expected reduction of fuel burn and related CO2 emission

Airspace Capacity – TMA: Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (volume and time)

Airport Capacity: Net benefit identified in terms of runway throughput (time)

Cost-effectiveness: decrease of ATCO work-load with the confidence in number of movement management

Safety: facilitate traffic sequencing in terms of separation and monitoring as well as conflict resolution enabling the increase of situational awareness;

Security: Impacts on security associated with the primary assets sustaining the operational performance or technical capability of the solution to the concept

Validation Technique Real Time Simulation

Dependent Validation Exercises

ASPA-IM-S&M - EXE-05.06.06-VP-198 - EXE-05.06.06-VP-199 - EXE-05.06.06-VP-708

E-AMAN - EXE 05.06.07-VP-485 - EXE 05.06.07-VP-695

CTA enabled by i4D - EXE 04.03-VP-472 - EXE 04.03-VP-463


30 of 343


- EXE 05.06.01-VP-324 - EXE 05.06.01-VP-326 - EXE 05.06.01-VP-477 - EXE 05.06.01-VP-478

Table 1: Concept Overview

2.1.1 Background of the Integration Concept The following sections describe the operational concepts addressed by the EXE-805 including the operational solution for the CTA/i4D and ASAS-IM-S&M, supported by E-AMAN, the integration in M/M En-route, E-TMA and TMA and Arrival environment.

E-AMAN AMAN is a controller support tool used to optimize the arrival sequence at the runway by providing, for each flight, the expected or scheduled times at the runway and pre-sequencing towards arrival fixes to support more efficient absorption of arrival management delays. In current operations its operational range is relatively limited and serves foremost the terminal area of its airport. Work undertaken in P05.06.04 and P05.06.07 has investigated the extension of this horizon to approximately 200NM/40 minutes of flying time. The exercise scope do not include specific objectives to assess the maturity of this operational concept, indeed E-AMAN plays an important role in validation since it supports the controllers in the management of the arrival sequence for LIRF and LIRA airports and provides the key information supporting the CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M operations (i.e. the CTA, the Sequence Number used to link the ASPA involved a/c and Actual Time Spacing between follower and leader a/c).

Figure 2: Arrival Sequence

Project Number 05.03 Edition 00.02.00 D101 - Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)

31 of 343


CTA and initial 4D Concept In Step 1 the “Initial 4D operations” is expected to support the CTA sharing on-board 4D trajectory data and the provision of a single time constraint at a single specific point during the descent/approach phase including monitoring of its trajectory to the assigned constraint.

It is foreseen that CTA will terminate in the Approach phase and in the case of multiple traffic flows merging operations will take place. The flight will then be conducted following the rules and procedures applicable in the destination TMA.

The spacing over the CTA waypoint is to be achieved by issuing a time constraint over the metering waypoint per flight which will be met by the accurate navigation control airborne capability (i.e. RTA). The time constraint will be assigned by the ATC Centre considering the optimised airborne computed trajectories and related ETA min/max window downlinked information.

The concept has been addressed by P05.06.01 validation exercises using the CTA over a waypoint (Metering Point) to implement arrival sequences, the validation allowed to refine the operational requirements, requirements for trajectory prediction, HMI and procedures that are re-used in the exercise.

Figure 3: Ground System

ASPA-IM-S&M The ASPA Sequencing and Merging application requires the flight crew to achieve and maintain a given spacing with designed aircraft. The spacing is in time and although the flight crew is given new task, separation provision is still the controllers responsibility and applicable separation minima are unchanged.

In step1, the target aircraft will be flying direct to a merge point or the same route than the ASPA IM-S&M equipped aircraft (simple geometry). The EXE-805 makes use of Remain behind and Merge behind ASAS applications.

The ConOps Step 1 proposes the ASPA-IM-S&M solution which envisages the aircraft mimic ATCO- instructions automatically whilst the ATCO remains responsible for separation.

The time spacing application to a particular aircraft allow delivering a precise clearance for an aircraft to follow another aircraft with support of the avionics. The aircraft systems would support the Pilot with the ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvres Merge Behind and Remain Behind. The ATCO would


32 of 343


be responsible to take action if separations were falling below separation or agreed spacing minima.

Figure 4: ASAS manouvres

CTA i4D and ASPA S&M supported by E-AMAN This section describes the integration of concepts addressed by EXE 805. In particular, the explanation can start from what is shown in next figure

Figure 5: Sequence with Integrate Concept

which shows how i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M concepts would be combined together considering that the traffic is initially pre-sequenced by E-AMAN.

E-AMAN sequence


33 of 343


The E-AMAN sets the initial sequence that is shown on and assessed by the controller on the radar screen.

CTA Phase

The CTA/i4D phase of a flight starts at about 250 NM from the destination airport and is expected to deliver pre-sequenced arrival traffics at CTA waypoints with 90sec time spacing with a precision of +/- 10sec. In Rome environment, the CTA waypoints (6 arrival flows from 360 degrees) are located at about 50NM from the runway see in next figure: CTA/i4D and ASPA STAR for Rome below in order to optimize the angle formed by Follower and Target a/c when they are direct to the Merge Point (see Figure 8: CTA waypoint).

It is important to note that the CTA points are coincident with the initial waypoint of STARs and the airborne flight plans includes for this specific waypoints Speed and Level constraints (e.g. 230Kt/110FL). This will allow delivering traffics to the final approach with consistent and homogeneous speeds and levels as required for the ASPA manoeuvres optimization.

In case of not CTA/i4D equipped a/c the time constraint is achieved by TTL/TTG operational mode with less precision w.r.t. +/- 10seconds ensured by on board RTA function and the resulting time spacing between mixed equipped or not equipped a/c might be greater than the expected 90 sec.

ASPA-IM-S&M Phase

The ASPA-IM-S&M phase before end of CTA phase and is performed in two steps (Achievement phase and Manoeuvre Execution).

The Achievement phase is performed by the Pre-sequencing sectors and Terminal Controllers during the last part of CTA phase using the Sequence Number assigned by E-AMAN which is displayed on all the concerned CWP. The controllers by the Track Label knows if a flight is equipped with ASPA-IM-S&M capability and perform the Target Identification of the preceding flight (i.e. preceding Sequence Number) arriving at same airport/runway.

The Manoeuvre Execution is performed shortly after/before the a/c crosses the CTA waypoint it is performed by the controlling sector based on the arrival combination of target a/c. If the target a/c is on the same route of follower the controlling sectors select the Remain Behind, indeed in case the target is on a different route selects Merge Behind.

In both cases the controllers assign the time spacing depending on the arrival runway (90sec for 16L and 150 for 16R of Rome Fiumicino Airport) and the actual time spacing provided by the ground system. In order to avoid abrupt speed changes the assigned time spacing is restricted to +/- 20sec from the actual time space computed by the ground system (regardless of actual time spacing between the two a/c).

α

A/C1

MP

A/C2


34 of 343


In fact as shown in below the length of ASPA-IM-S&M leg is about 20NM which allows recovering about 30sec of difference between Follower-Target time spacing at start of manoeuvre and ASPA “achieve by” point:

Expected IAS at CTA waypoint 230Kt

Expected FL at CTA waypoint 110FL

GS ~245NM/H

ASPA Leg Length 20NM

ASPA Leg Expected Flown Time ~300sec

ASPA time spacing recover i.e. 10% of Leg Expected Flown Time

~30sec

Maximum recover time spacing 20sec

Table 2: Speed and Level Constraints

Based on the above assumption and the CTA maximum time deviation from the assigned time constraints (i.e. +/- 10sec) leading to a maximum deviation between two in trail flights of 20sec the designed concept integration should allow to ensure the required time spacing with the ASPA-IM-S&M precision of 5 sec.

An example of the concept applied in the Rome area is reported below:

Figure 6: STARs Design


35 of 343


2.2 Summary of Validation Exercise/s Concept Overview

2.2.1 Summary of Expected Exercise/s outcomes There are two groups of stakeholders involved: the external ones to SESAR and the internal project participants. The next table shows the main stakeholders and their needs:

Stakeholder Internal/External Involvement Needs

Controllers Internal Air Traffic Controllers participated in the validation exercises, providing feedback to assess the operability and acceptability of the concept (specific topics) under assessment. Also the ATCOs for Airport Side plays an important role for improved predictability in terms of gate allocation and ground processes

Controllers and AUs are the main users of the new procedures. The Controller acceptance is essential for the concept implementation. Needs to have procedures and requirements about outstanding aspects of the concept.

Pilots Internal Pilots participated in the validation exercises, providing feedback to assess the operability and acceptability of the concept (specific topics) under assessment.

Pilots are the other main actors involved in the concept and recipients of its benefits. Their acceptance is essential for the concept implementation. Needs to have procedures and requirements about outstanding aspects of the concept.

ANSP Internal ENAV, directly involved in the project.

Structured and standardised working method. Operational improvements and benefits in terms of predictability with limited costs for implementation whilst maintaining or improving existing safety levels.

Airspace Users/Airlines

External Represented by the pilots involved in the validation exercises.

Structured and standardised working method. Operational improvements and benefits in terms of safety, flight efficiency and predictability with limited costs for implementation.


36 of 343


Stakeholder Internal/External Involvement Needs

Industry Internal AIRBUS, FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO, THALES , ALENIA and HONEYWELL

The availability of stable requirements are required by the industry to provide on-time and appropriate tools.

IVT External To produce an Integrated Validation Team Report for Exercise composed by ATM expert. They were involved as an observer during the execution of the Simulation

EUROCONTROL and SJU

Internal To obtain a consistent and coherent TMA concept description. To demonstrate feasibility, operability and benefits of the integrated TMA concept elements.

Table 3: Stakeholders Needs and Identification

Stakeholder

External / Internal

Involvement Why it matters to stakeholder

Performance expectations

Exercise Identifier

ANSPs Internal Involved in P05.03

To identify complex situations (traffic situations that are not easy to manage for ATC) early enough to allow them to implement minimisation measures before the situation reaches the ATCO.

Improvement in safety due to: o A reduction in the

number of ATCO under-loads and overloads.

o A better anticipation of congestion and better adaptation to real traffic situation.

o An early identification and solution of conflicts within a medium-term time horizon, minimizing tactical interventions.

Reduction in costs due to an optimisation of human (ATCO) resources allocation.

EXE-05.03-VP-805

ATCOs Internal Involved in P05.03

Controllers expect a smooth transition to new ways of working with a full validation of all aspects before deployment. They expect that their

A reduction on the workload per aircraft due to a minimisation of risk/difficulty perception on traffic.

EXE-05.03-VP-805


37 of 343


Stakeholder

External / Internal



Exercise Identifier

working conditions will be enhanced by the deployment of new technologies and new techniques and that safety will never be compromised.

Airlines External Involved in P05.03

Airlines expect to be involved in decision making, whenever possible, and expect that investment in airborne equipment is fully offset by efficiency and predictability gains.

Expect an increase on flexibility due to the improvement of the ATM system to respond to changes in traffic patterns and demand.

EXE-05.03-VP-805

Airspace Users Internal Involved in

P05.03

High ATM costs due to operational inefficiencies. Lack of user preferred routing all leading to inefficient profiles, increased fuel burn and reduction of flexibility with regard to individual airframes.

Reduced ATM costs. Maintained or improved levels of safety while accommodating an increased capacity in the network. Reduced fuel burn and consequently an improved environmental impact. Increased flexibility whilst in the planning and tactical phases, while allowing for increased use of user preferred routing and ultimately trajectories.

EXE-05.03-VP-805

Aviation industry Internal Involved in

P05.03

Due to a lack of coherent and consistent user requirements and system specifications new systems development is at risk of slow development and of potentially very low levels of interoperability.

Coherent and consistent user requirements and system specifications for validation and interoperability.

EXE-05.03-VP-805

EUROCONTROL Internal Involved in

P05.03 Evaluate increase of network performance through the use of

Eurocontrol-MUAC, the same expectations as ANSPs

EXE-05.03-VP-805


38 of 343


Stakeholder

External / Internal



Exercise Identifier

compatible complexity management procedures and tools.

SJU Internal Involved in P05.03

Lack of coherent and precise validation requirements. Lack of integrated validation platforms and high validation costs.

Expect increment of the air transport system operational capacity and safety.

EXE-05.03-VP-805

Table 4: Stakeholders' expectations

Operational Package: PAC04 – End to End Traffic Synchronisation Operational Sub-Package: Traffic Synchronisation

Operational Focus Area: OFA04.01.02 – “Enhanced Arrival & Departure Management in TMA and En Route” OFA03.02.01 - “ASPA Spacing”

Operational Improvement Steps:

TS-0103 “Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA) in medium density/complexity environment”

TS-0105-A “ASPA Spacing – target direct to merge point (speed/simple geometry)”

Initial Maturity level V2-V3 and V3-V4 (i.e. Criteria in V2 and V3 phases will be addressed)

Target Maturity level V3

Reused validation material from past R&D Initiatives

(when this plan was written)

P05.06.01 EXE-203 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-204 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-326 VALR P05.06.04 EXE-187 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-204 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-204 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-326 VALR P05.06.01 EXE-324 VALR P05.06.06 EXE-199 VALR P05.06.04 EXE-244 VALR P05.03 EXE-708 VALR


39 of 343


2.2.2 Benefit and Impact Mechanisms investigated According to the Step 1 P05.02 Validation Strategy the OFA04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01 should focus on providing results for the KPAs: Human Performances, Safety, Predictability, Environmental Sustainability, Efficiency and Security. Benefit and Impact Mechanisms are necessary to identify the expected impacts of the proposed changes and hence to identify validation objectives that will ensure that relevant data are measured so that the benefits can, ideally, be quantified. The Benefit and Impact Mechanisms will be important justifications for the case building and performance assessment processes and should demonstrate logically and clearly how the benefits/impacts are achieved showing how different ATM functions and processes contribute (positively or negatively) to the delivery of benefit.

The BIM is developed following the guidance document "Guidelines for Producing Benefit and Impact Mechanisms" (See reference [8]).

More specifically the Benefit and Impact Mechanisms are specified hereafter per KPA covered by the EXE 805 considering all possible benefit per KPA that should be seen by the integration of the E-AMAN, I4D+CTA and ASPA concepts. In order to test all the KPA involved in this exercise, most of validation objectives were considered as a potential input to fill out the maturity of the Operational concept in a stand-alone way, and the remaining part are considered as a complementary activity in order to test the integration concept (E-AMAN, I4D+CTA and ASPA) in a unique operational scenario.

2.2.2.1 Human Performance

Figure 7: HP benefit mechanism


40 of 343


The integration of E-AMAN, i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M bring benefits regarding the cognitive workload perceived by ATCOs/Pilots that thanks to the support provided by the three new functions and their automation is expected to remain at an acceptable level (2b) and, in addition, the situation awareness perceived remain at acceptable level (or even to increase) (3b) through enhanced information, enhanced predictions and improved monitoring capabilities of the system that will allow to reduce the number of ATCO tactical interventions (5b).

Furthermore, the introduction new tools/functions will allow to reduce the frequency occupancy (4b) since is expected that the most of the communication between air-ground and ground-ground takes place through the CPDLC use.

2.2.2.2 Safety

Figure 8: Safety Benefit Mechanism

The integrated use of Extended AMAN horizon, i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M functionalities is maintained as the same level during the queue management and so to the global level of safety.

The i4D services lead to the synchronisation of plans meaning that air and ground have a common view of what is intended for, or required of, the flight, the trajectory synchronization is a positive safety step, in fact it will lead to fewer unexpected route deviations, increased trajectory adherence, with potential non decreased situation awareness (3a)(3b) for pilot.

Secondly, EPP downlink of trajectory information intent allows the ground system to incorporate airborne data in ground system trajectory calculations, improving ground prediction which is subsequently used, for instance, in decision support tools for controllers. The provision of EPP data improved monitoring on the ground side, where the information received from the aircraft systems can be matched against the ATCO intentions for the flight.


41 of 343


Moreover, with the integration of those functions with ASPA S&M, is contributing the decrease of controller-flight crew communication due to the cockpit assistance/automation and delegation of merging and spacing functions with less tactical instructions and number of STCA (2d).

Improved information, improved predictions, improved tools and improved monitoring capability are expected to maintain at the same level the workload for both controllers (3c) and pilots (3d) and, to increase and to not decrease situation awareness respectively for controllers(3b) and for pilots (3a) with a positive impact on the global level of safety.

2.2.2.3 Environment / Fuel Efficiency

Figure 9: Environment / Fuel Efficiency Benefit Mechanism

The joint use of the three concepts are expected to not increase Fuel Burn and CO2 Emission (2a) and flight distance (3a) in particular some reductions could be verified due to fewer route deviation overall against reference scenario. The figure will allow closer adherence to the planned trajectory and more efficient fight trajectories within the TMA with less radar vectoring and holding. The expected results are a not increase off fuel burn and CO2 emission (2b) and no increase of flight distance.


42 of 343


2.2.2.4 Predictability

Figure 10: Predictability Benefit Mechanism

The joint use of the three concepts will bring benefits in terms of time variability (2a). A reduction of flight times compared with the planned times is expected due to a better management of arrival flights (2b).

2.2.3 Summary of Validation Objectives and success criteria The Validation Objectives related to the validation of stand-alone operational concepts (i.e. Organisation 1 and Organisation 2) which are tagged as BINDING with relevant OFA shall be mandatory addressed by the exercise. The not tagged will be addressed compatibly with the RTS complexity. The Validation Objectives related to the validation of integrated concepts are all mandatory to be addressed. The above disclaimer derives from the agreement reached by the exercise stakeholders in the F2F Meeting held in Brussels the 8th of October 2015. [OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001

Objective

To confirm CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions. -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives Status <In Progress>


43 of 343


[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002

Objective

To confirm ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions. -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives Status <In Progress>


Objective

To confirm integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

Title Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives

Status <In Progress> [OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0004

Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of Predictability (i.e. Flight Duration Variability)

Title CTA/i4D Predictability Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of Predictability (i.e. Flight Duration Variability)

Title ASPA-IM-S&M Predictability Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M concepts integration solution in terms of Predictability (i.e. Flight Duration Variability)

Title Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Predictability Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (i.e. Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission) -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title CTA/i4D Environmental Sustainability Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission) -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title ASPA-IM-S&M Environmental Sustainability Status <In Progress>

[OBJ]


44 of 343


Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0009

Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission)

Title Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Sustainability Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of TMA Airspace Capacity i.e. throughput (volumes time) -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title CTA/i4D TMA Airspace Capacity Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of TMA Airspace Capacity i.e. throughput (volumes time)

Title ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of TMA Airspace Capacity i.e. throughput (volumes time)

Title CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0013 Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of Airport Capacity Title CTA/i4D solution Airport Capacity Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of Airport Capacity -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integrated solution in terms of Airport Capacity

Title Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0016 Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of cost efficiency Title CTA/i4D cost efficiency Status <In Progress>


Objective To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of cost efficiency -BINDING WITH RELEVANT OFA -

Title ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency


45 of 343


Status <In Progress> [OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0018

Objective To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of cost efficiency

Title CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency Status <In Progress>


Objective Assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities that controllers deploy to achieve their task goals including perception, decision making, planning, and memory and task execution.

Title CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities Status <In Progress>


Objective To assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M procedures and HMI allow controllers efficient teamwork & communication

Title HMI controller teamwork & communication Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021 Objective To assess that roles and responsibilities of controllers are clear and exhaustive. Title Roles and responsibilities Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0022 Objective To analyse controller’s operation in terms of Safety (nominal and non-nominal events) Title Safety impacts Status <In Progress>


Objective To assess the impacts on security associated to the primary and supporting assets sustaining the operational performance or technical capability of the solution to the concept, notably the elements that are part of the ATM collaborative support function.

Title Security Assessment Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0024 Objective Assess CTA/i4D operation performances regarding reliability and precision. Title CTA/i4D reliability and precision Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0025 Objective Assess ASPA-IM-S&M operation performances regarding reliability and precision. Title ASPA-IM-S&M reliability and precision Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026 Objective Evaluate CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operational integration acceptability Title CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operational integration acceptability Status <In Progress>


46 of 343



Objective Assess the effects of the proposed task sharing for CPDLC usage on pilot tasks in descent and approach in nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M

Title Nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage Status <In Progress>


Objective Assess the effect of proposed task sharing for CPDLC usage in descent and approach in non-nominal situation for CTA/ i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operations.

Title Non-nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage Status <In Progress>


Objective Assess the impact of CPDLC usage in descent and approach phases on timeliness of communications between pilot and ATCOs.

Title Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of communication Status <In Progress>


Objective Assess the impact on flight optimization of sending the airborne computed Top of Descent information to the ground on the descent initiation

Title TOD Downlink impact Status <In Progress>

The Start Descent Clearance to be performed at the optimized pseudo waypoint (ToD) might be anticipated by the controller. When performed, pilots feedback regarding descent management is positive


Objective

Assess if the defined procedure in case of RTA MISSED occurrence can be efficiently followed by controller and pilots Note: On airborne side this objective will be covered only on opportunity if an RTA MISSED event would be to occur while performing the sessions

Title RTA Missed procedure Status <In Progress>

[OBJ] Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0032 Objective Evaluate ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability. Title ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability. Status <In Progress>


Objective Evaluate if the defined procedure in case of ASPA UNABLE occurrence can be easily and efficiently followed by controllers and pilots.

Title ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedure Status <In Progress>

The following table provides the traceability among the Validation Objectives related addressed KPA/TA and the Operational Improvements.


47 of 343


VALIDATION OBJECTIVE ID Air/Ground TITLE KPA/TA TS-

0103 TS-0105-A

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001 G

CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives

HP X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002 G

ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives

HP X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 B

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives

HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0004 G CTA/i4D Predictability PRED X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0005 G ASPA-IM-S&M Predictability PRED X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0006 G Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M

Predictability PRED X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0007 G CTA/i4D Environmental Sustainability ENV X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0008 G ASPA-IM-S&M Environmental

Sustainability ENV X


Sustainability ENV X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0010 G CTA/i4D TMA Airspace Capacity CAP-

TMA X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0011 G ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity CAP-

TMA X


TMA Airspace Capacity CAP-TMA X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0013 G CTA/i4D solution Airport Capacity CAP-

APT X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0014 G ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity CAP-

APT X


Airport Capacity CAP-APT X X


48 of 343


VALIDATION OBJECTIVE ID Air/Ground TITLE KPA/TA TS-

0103 TS-0105-A

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0016 G CTA/i4D cost efficiency CEF X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0017 G ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency CEF X


cost efficiency CEF X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0019 G CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support

capabilities HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0020 G HMI controller teamwork &

communication HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021 G Roles and responsibilities HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0022 G Safety impacts SAF X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0023 G Security Assessment SEC X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0024 G CTA/i4D performance assessment PERF X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0025 G ASPA-IM-S&M performance assessment PERF X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026 B CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration

operational acceptability HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0027 A Nominal pilot CPDLC Task Sharing HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0028 A Non-Nominal pilot CPDLC Task Sharing HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029 B Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of

communication HP X X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0030 A TOD Downlink impact HP X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031 B RTA Missed procedure HP X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0032 A ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability. HP X

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0033 B ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedure HP X

Table 5: Validation Objectives-KPA/TA-OIs Traceability


49 of 343


2.2.3.1 Choice of metrics and indicators Selected indicators and metrics are listed in the following table.

KPA/TA KPI Purpose Required Data Type

Human Performance

Controller workload

To gather information needed to assess the degree of processing capacity that is expended during task performance

Perceived subjective cognitive workload

Situational awareness

To gather information needed to assess the level of perception, comprehension and anticipation of traffic situation

Perceived subjective situational awareness


50 of 343



Usability

To gather information needed to assess the level of efficiency, effectiveness and satisfaction in performing tasks

Controllers’ and experts’ feedback

Predictability Time Variability

Variation of the distribution of actual flight duration vs. planned flight duration To assess the dispersion among arrival aircraft trajectories

ATOT ATO ALDT/ATA

Environment Sustainability/Fuel Efficiency

∆Fuel burn/∆CO2

To gather the information needed to assess the fuel burn/CO2

distance and time flown

Aircraft type, call sign, 4D position (Latitude, Longitude, FL, Time) A/C Ground Speed

ROC/D


51 of 343



Human Performance

To gather the information concerning ASPA S&M and i4D instructions ( CDPLC)

i4D and ASPA-S&M instructions received by flight crew of AIS Toulouse simulator

Safety Safety indicators

To gather information on safety from controller perspective: controllers' workload

Controller Workload (frequency occupation time, Coordination Time)

Security Security indicators

The list of primary assets is consistent, complete and up to date.

It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASAS messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Safety point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures

Table 6: Metrics and Indicators

2.2.4 Summary of Validation Scenarios The scenario allows matching the target environment complexity/density required for the validation of concerned OIs. The validation includes four different “organization” allowing addressing the set of defined validation objectives:


52 of 343


Reference, including the use of E-AMAN; Solution 1, including E-AMAN and CTA/i4D allowing to validate the CTA enabled by i4D and to

provide the evidence for the TS-0103 V3 close-out; Solution 2, including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M allowing to validate the ASPA-IM-S&M and to

provide the evidence for the TS-0105-A V3 close-out Solution 3, including E-AMAN, CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M allowing to validate the integration of CTA

enabled by i4D with ASPA-IM-S&M and to provide the evidence for the assessment of proposed integration solution.

2.2.4.1 Reference Organization This scenario has been used as reference for the quantitative and qualitative Operational Improvement performances, it include E-AMAN. The CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M airborne capabilities are not used.

[SCN] Identifier SCN-05.03-VALP-00805-0001 Scenario

Reference baseline scenario including E-AMAN Status <In Progress>

2.2.4.2 CTA Organization This scenario is used to support the CTA/i4D Operational Improvement performance assessment, it includes E-AMAN and the 50% of arrival flights equipped with CTA/i4D capabilities.

[SCN] Identifier SCN-05.03-VALP-00805-0002 Scenario Scenario organization including E-AMAN and CTA enabled i4D flights. Status <In Progress>

2.2.4.3 ASPA-IM-S&M Organization This scenario is used to support the ASPA-IM-S&M Operational Improvement performance assessment, it includes E-AMAN and the 50% of arrival flights equipped with ASPA-IM-S&M capabilities.

[SCN] Identifier SCN-05.03-VALP-00805-0003 Scenario Scenario organization including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M flights Status <In Progress>

2.2.4.4 CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M Organization This scenario is used to support both the CTA enabled by I4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Operational Improvement performance assessment, it include E-AMAN and the 50% of arrival flights equipped with CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M capabilities.

[SCN] Identifier SCN-05.03-VALP-00805-0004 Scenario Scenario organization including E-AMAN and CTA enabled i4D and ASPA-IM-

S&M flights Status <In Progress>


53 of 343



54 of 343


2.2.5 Summary of Assumptions

iden

tifie

r

Title

Type

of

Ass

umpt

ion

Des

crip

tion

Just

ifica

tion

Flig

ht P

hase

KPA

Impa

cted

Sour

ce

Valu

e(s)

Ow

ner

Impa

ct o

n A

sses

smen

t

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0001

CTA/i4D Equipped Flights

Mixed Equipped Environment

Simulation mixed equipped environment shall include 50% of arrival flights CTA/i4D equipped

Concept validation consistence

En-Route

E-TMA TMA

ALL P05.03 N/A P05.03 High

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0002

ASPA-IM-S&M Equipped Flights

Mixed Equipped Environment

Simulation mixed equipped environment shall include 50% of arrival flights ASPA-IM-S&M equipped (Remain Behind, Merge Behind)

Concept validation consistence

TMA APP

ALL P05.03 N/A P05.03 High

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0003

Simulation set-up Flights separated

In SESAR flights are pre-de-conflicted that is not the case in the current way of operation. To be able to compare a SESAR solution all traffic should be realistically separated

Simulation organization

ALL ALL P05.03 N/A P05.03 Low

ASS- V&VP Integration Operational The V&VP shall provide the Simulation ALL ALL P05.03 N/A WP03 Low


55 of 343


iden

tifie

r

Title

Type

of

Ass

umpt

ion

Des

crip

tion

Just

ifica

tion

Flig

ht P

hase

KPA

Impa

cted

Sour

ce

Valu

e(s)

Ow

ner

Impa

ct o

n A

sses

smen

t

05.03-VALP-0805-0004

Acceptance expected operational capabilities required for the RTS

organization

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0005

CPDLC Operational Acceptance

Clearances related to CTA/i4D and ASPS-IM-S&M are performed using CPDLC as the preferred delivery method, but R/T is always available/option


ALL ALL P05.03 N/A P05.03 Low

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0006

CO2 Coefficient Aircraft Performance

Kg CO2 emitted per Kg fuel burnt to compute CO2 emissions

All ENV/.FLIGHT EFFICIENCY:

Many in literature Forecasting Civil Aviation Fuel Burn and Emissions in Europe, Interim, EEC Note No.8/2011 EUROCONT

3.149 Kg of CO2/Kg fuel

05.03 High


56 of 343


iden

tifie

r

Title

Type

of

Ass

umpt

ion

Des

crip

tion

Just

ifica

tion

Flig

ht P

hase

KPA

Impa

cted

Sour

ce

Valu

e(s)

Ow

ner

Impa

ct o

n A

sses

smen

t

ROL Experimental Centre, May 2001

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0007

Aircraft Performance Aircraft general characteristics

Aircraft characteristics are the nominal ones

N/A All FUEL EFF. / ENV. SUST.

BADA Version 3.10

Refer to the indicated source.

05.03 High

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0008

A/C Equipment Validation All the equipped a/c are equipped with both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M


All ALL P05.03 NA P05.03 High

ASS-05.03-VALP-0805-0009

Military A/C Validation The military prototype provides only ASPA-IM-S&M Capabilities (V2) based on same operational ad technical requirements, therefore the all the relevant VO will be applied. Any difference w.r.t. V3 prototype will be highlighted in a dedicated Report Annex.

Simulation Scope

All ALL P05.03 NA P05.03 Low

No CPDLC latency time for CPDLC transmission messages was


57 of 343


iden

tifie

r

Title

Type

of

Ass

umpt

ion

Des

crip

tion

Just

ifica

tion

Flig

ht P

hase

KPA

Impa

cted

Sour

ce

Valu

e(s)

Ow

ner

Impa

ct o

n A

sses

smen

t

introduced, based on the measurement performed during the preparation sessions for the RTS.Indeed, the mean transmission time for CPDLC messages measured during the simulated session was about 1 sec (uplink CPDLC messages).Data obtained during CPDLC flight trials through ATN real network show the same order of magnitude for this transmission time. A report from the AFD (ATC Full Datalink) project gives a mean of 0.96 sec. So it was considered that real time simulation mean time of CPDLC exchanges is representative of flight trial ones and allow to perform analysis without bias compared to real operations.

Table 7: Summary of Assumption

58


58 of 343

©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2015. Created by ENAV, FINMECCANICA LEONARDOand AIRBUS for the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged

2.2.6 Choice of methods and techniques This section briefly describes all methods and techniques used in the experiment to obtain the metrics and indicators.

Supported Metric / Indicator Platform / Tool Method or Technique

ATCOs Working methods Teamwork ATCOs/pilots User acceptability

Direct Over-the-shoulder not intrusive observation User feedback collection

Over the shoulder observations

Debriefing

ATCOs/Pilots’ perceived Situation Awareness ATCOs/Pilot’s perceived mental workload Task achievement

Direct Over-the-shoulder

Questionnaires


Debriefing

HMI & usability

User feedback collection Direct Over-the-shoulder not intrusive observation

Debriefing


CO2 emissions Fuel Burnt

System feedback collection

Recording system data logs: comparative analysis in all the sectors of the extended TMA

Tactical management I4D and ASPA-IM-S&M interaction data CPDLC interaction data

Operator-System Interaction and system feedback collection

Recording system data logs

Table 8: Metrics and Indicators

59


59 of 343


2.2.7 Validation Exercises List and dependencies The following schema shows the main relationships between this exercise and other validation activities.

Table 9: Validaiton Exercise and Dependencies

60


60 of 343


3 Conduct of Validation Exercises This section summarizes the preparation activities performed for the VP-805

3.1 Operational Environment Simulated Based on the experience of the EXE708, the EXE 805 is composed of Realistic environment represented in Rome ACC Area, with flows interactions and significant traffic load providing the expected density/complexity. Additionally, It is composed of full sector customization of Rome E-TMA sector, thus to be in a more realistic environment Represented in Rome ACC. Also the Milan and Padua sectors are considered.

The airspace used for the simulation consists of an entire Area of Rome, and the en-route sectors of Milan, Rome and Padua ACC. It is specifically composed of three En-Route sectors of Rome (MI1), (ESE,EW) and Padua (PAD). According last AIRAC November 2014 cycle, named RISA (Ristrutturazione Spazi Aerei) Milan and Padua are considered as real sectors. Milan and Padua Sectors are customized in order to reflect the horizon in line of the AMAN circle.

In addition to them three extended TMA are also considered. They are NE, NW and TS. The Rome approach sector has been simulated and it is composed of TNE, TNW and ARR1 and ARR2 sectors. For this particular configuration, the independent parallel approaches are considered for LIRF arrival.

The basis for the validation scenario is the combination of the E-AMAN, Initial 4D operations + CTA and ASPA S&M operation. The i4D is limited to the sharing of on-board 4D trajectory data and to provide a single time constraint at a specific point during the descent/approach phase, and the following concept elements:

3 Air Traffic Service Units (Rome, Milan and Padua) Two airports of destination – Rome Fiumicino (with segregated runways for arrival and

departures) and Rome Ciampino (runway for Departure and Arrival). Three En-Route Sectors of Rome named MI, ESE/EW, PAD Four Extended TMA sectors, NE, NW, OV/DEP (responsible also for the Departure) and TS Terminal approach sector TNE, TNW with three IAFs considered (POPOV, SORES and

KOLEV for RWY 16R) and (SONTI, KOMEN and BUKOV for RWY 16L) Two Arrivals ARR Sectors (ARR1 and ARR2) considered with IPA (Independent Parallel

Approach) The spacing criteria at the CTA point is set to 90 seconds for RWY 16L and 150 seconds for

RWY 16R, The process is supported by ETA min - ETA max range indication for i4D negotiation; The ASPA S&M (remain and merge behind) manoeuvres will start at the IAF point by the

Terminal sectors. They are located in an arc distance about 50 NM form the touchdown of LIRF airport that the 16L and 16R for LIRF runways have been considered.

The Simulated Environment is composed in the following picture:

61


61 of 343


Figure 11: Operational Airspace

3.1.1.1 Operational Environment Simulated Based on the experience of the previous validation (EXE 708), in order to Balance the ASPA area, an appropriate modification of the STARs has been considered for LIRF airport, they are considered approximately 50NM form the touch down of LIRF airport. This new airspace is designed on the basis of ASPA principle concept, to apply the initiation of the manoeuvres after passing the IAF point and it will terminate of the FAF point. The new position of the 6 IAFs points are used for the pre-sequencing of landing traffic by mean of issuing and agreeing appropriate CTAs on such fix which are to be subsequently implemented by the landing aircraft as RTAs. Although the precise logic to be considered for sequencing the landing traffic, the pre-sequencing will be built under the assumption that after CTA fix crossing, they will be managed using ASPA S&M Spacing (ASPA S&M) techniques during the remaining part of the approach phase. The simulated operational environment is described and the way in which the airspace design has been adapted to the needs of the simulation. Within this environment controller roles have been designed to take advantage of the support provided by the AMAN tool which will act on all Rome inbound traffic from as far out as.

62


62 of 343


3.1.1.2 Traffic import The traffic sample has been chosen according to the Scenario 1b and 1c defined by P05.02 to create a Mid Complexity/Mid Density environment. The key elements of traffic sample are reported in the following table:

Flight Type Number

Arrival Flights LIRF 16L per Hour 38

Arrival Flights LIRF 16R per Hour 16

Arrival Flight LIRA 15 per hour 7

Departure Flights from LIRF 25 16

Departure from LIRA 15 6

Arrivals to LIRF from domestic Airports 10

Pop-up flights 4

Transit Flights >100

Total arrival flights to Rome TMA 61

Total departures from Rome TMA 22

Total Number of Flights 160

RTS session duration (hh.mm) >01.40

Table 10: Traffic Sample

A unique Traffic Sample is used for the exercise; it is an extract of real flown traffic from NEVAC-Tool (Eurocontrol) according Dec/2014 AIRAC-Cycle The traffic sample complies with expected Medium Complexity/Medium Density operational environment as envisaged by the validation strategy set by P05.02 and is used in all the scenario organization described in this section.

63


63 of 343


250NM from touchdown. Specific functionality enables the Sequence Manager to oversee the allocation and co-ordination of CTA‟s and sector controllers are provided with tools supporting ground-ground co-ordination and also CPDLC with which the CTA is transferred to the flight crew.

3.1.1.3 Airspace Information The validation activities have been performed using the Rome, Milan and Padua ACC sectors

MI (Rome En-Route) PAD (Padua En-Route) ESE/EW (Roma En-Route) NE (E-TMA Pre-Sequencing in Rome) NW (E-TMA Pre-Sequencing in Rome) TS (E-TMA Pre-Sequencing in Rome) OV/DEP (E-TMA Pre-Sequencing in Rome and Responsible for the Departure for LIRA

and LIRF) TNW (TMA approach in Rome) TNE (TMA approach in Rome) ARR1 (ARR sector of Rome) (independent parallel Approaches are considered) ARR2 (ARR sector of Rome) (independent parallel Approaches are considered)

Those sectors have been customized in order to include a P-RNAV structure.

One hybrid sector, named FEEDER, has been set as feeder sectors to the measured ones.

64


64 of 343


Sector Vertical limits Operational Scenario

TNE/TNW

GND-FL245

PRE/DEP GND-UNL

AR1 and AR2

GND-FL115

NE

GND-UNL

NW

GND-UNL

OV/DEP

GND-UNL

PD

GND-UNL

MI

GND-UNL

ESE/EW/SU

GND-UNL

FEEDER GND-UNL

Table 11: Sector and Vertical Limits

65


65 of 343


3.1.1.4 Controller Positions Two Operational Rooms have been considered for the Simulation purposes:

Room 113: for the “En-Route” sectors

Room 133 for the E-TMA and TMA sectors For Pilots and pseudo pilots room

Room 121: for i/ACS flight

Room 138: for ATG flight

Room120: ENAV A320 Cockpit

Room123: Alenia C27J Cockpit

Toulouse Cockpit SImulator

OPS Positions Main Simulation Room 137 CWP Role Equipment Frequency Manned By 1 Rome NE/NN EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 124.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller

2 Rome NE/NN PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 124.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller 3 Rome NW EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 124.800 Mhz E-TMA Controller 4 Rome NW PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 124.800 Mhz E-TMA Controller 5 Rome OV/DEP EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 130.900 Mhz E-TMA Controller 6 Rome OV/DEP PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 130.900 Mhz E-TMA Controller 7 Supervision Manager /FEEDER N/A Feeder Sector 8 Rome ARR2 EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 119.200 Mhz TMA Controller 9 Rome ARR1 EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 131.200 Mhz TMA Controller 10 Rome TNW EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 125.500 Mhz TMA Controller 11 Rome ARR (ASPA Coord) CWP, R/T, Telephone 125.500 Mhz E-TMA Controller 12 Rome SEQ Manager CWP, R/T, Telephone 125.500 Mhz APP Controller 13 Rome TNE EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 127.900 Mhz TMA Controller

Table 12: OPS Positions Main Simulation Room 137OPS Positions Main Simulation Room 137

OPS Positions Shadow Room 137 CWP Role Equipment Frequency Manned By 14 Milan EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 135.400 Mhz ENR Controller

15 Milan PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 135.400 Mhz ENR Controller 16 Padua EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 135.700 Mhz ENR Controller

66


66 of 343


17 Padua PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 135.700 Mhz ENR Controller 18 Rome TS/US EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 134.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller 19 Rome TS/US PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 134.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller 20 Rome EW/ESE/SU EXE CWP, R/T, Telephone 136.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller 21 Rome EW/ESE/SU PLN CWP, R/T, Telephone 136.200 Mhz E-TMA Controller

Table 13: OPS Positions Shadow Room 137

67


67 of 343


3.1.2 Pseudo-pilot Positions

Scenario for ATG flight PWP Role Equipment Frequency Manned By 1 Rome TS/US PWP, Telephone, R/T 134.200 Mhz Pilot

2 Rome NE/NN PWP, Telephone, R/T 124.200 Mhz Pilot 3 Rome PAD PWP, Telephone, R/T 136.465 Mhz Pilot 4 Rome MI PWP, Telephone, R/T 135.455 Mhz Pilot 5 Rome AEM PWP, Telephone, R/T 131.250 Mhz Pilot 6 Rome AET PWP, Telephone, R/T 127.950 Mhz Pilot 7 Rome TW1 PWP, Telephone, R/T 125.500 Mhz Pilot 8 Rome AWL PWP, Telephone, R/T 119.200 Mhz Pilot 9 Rome OV/DEP/NW PWP, Telephone, R/T 130.900 Mhz Pilot 10 Rome Feeder PWP, Telephone, R/T 131.000 Mhz Pilot

Scenario for i4D and ASPA flight 1 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 2 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 3 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 4 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot

5 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot

6 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 7 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 8 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 9 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 10 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 11 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 12 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 13 iACS PWP, R/T All Pseudo - Pilot 14 ENAV cockpit Simulator Cockpit Simulator,

R/T, Telephone All IDS Real Pilot

15 AIRBUS Cockpit Simulator Cockpit Simulator, R/T, Telephone

All AIRBUS Real Pilot

16 Alenia Cockpit Simulator Cockpit Simulator, R/T, Telephone

All Alenia Real Pilot

Table 14: PWP Position

68

Project Number 05.03 Edition 00.02.00D101 - Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)

68 of 343


3.1.3 Operational Layout Room Main Room

Figure 12: Operational Layout

69

Project Number 05.03 Edition 00.02.00D101 - Validation Report EXE-05.03-VP-805 (RTS)

69 of 343


3.1.4 Operational Layout En-Route sectors

Figure 13: Operational Layout 2


70 of 343


3.1.5 Airport Information The airports considered for the simulation is:

LIRF (Rome Fiumicino “Leonardo Da Vinci”)

LIRA (Roma Ciampino “Giovanbattista Pastine”)

Table 15: Airport Information

The airspace is designed on the basis of today’s layout. Two fixes are used for the pre-sequencing of landing traffic by mean of issuing and agreeing appropriate CTAs on such fix which are to be subsequently implemented by the landing aircraft as RTAs. Although the precise logic to be considered for sequencing the landing traffic, the pre-sequencing has been built under the assumption that after CTA fix crossing, they have been managed using ASPA S&M Spacing (ASPA S&M) techniques during the remaining part of the approach phase. For simplicity, the flow towards a single landing runway (16L at LIRF) has been considered. The simulated operational environment is described and the way in which the airspace design has been adapted to the needs of the simulation. Within this environment controller roles have been designed to take advantage of the support provided by the AMAN tool which acted on all Rome inbound traffic from as far out as 200nm from touchdown. Specific functionality enables the Sequence Manager to oversee the allocation and co-ordination of CTA’s and sector controllers are provided with tools supporting ground-ground co-ordination and also CPDLC with which the CTA is transferred to the flight crew.

Airport Simulated

LIRF

LIRF: 41° 48‟ 01‟‟ N 012° 14‟ 20‟‟ E

THR16L: 41° 50‟ 49‟‟ N 012° 15‟ 41‟‟ E (used for Arrival)

THR16R : 41° 48‟ 55.86” N 012° 13‟ 34.91”E (used for Arrival)

THR25: 41° 48‟ 34.66” N 012° 16‟ 10.11” E (used for Departure)

N/A

Airport Simulated

LIRA

LIRA: 41° 47‟ 58” N 012° 35‟ 50” E

THR15: 41° 48‟ 28.95” N 012° 35‟ 19.81” E (used for Departure and Arrival)

THR33: 41° 47‟ 25.49” N 012° 36‟ 03.58” E

N/A


71 of 343



72 of 343


3.1.6 Working Methods with i4D/CTA and ASPA supported by E-AMAN

MI sector

ATCOs EXE PLN

The MI Executive Controller:

compliance with MI planner is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area

notifies TMA any modification to the frozen landing order; The MI EXE Controller shall be responsible for the safe,

orderly and efficient management of air traffic within his area of responsibility.

In co-ordination with the MI Planning Controller the En- Route EXE Controller was responsible for the coordination of CTAs with the SEQ_MAN. When the CTA has been notified, the MI_EXE is responsible for up-linking the CTA to the aircraft using CPDLC. In the event that the flight crew reject the CTA he is responsible for ensuring that ENR- PLN and SEQ_MAN are aware.

The MI Planner Controller:

is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, NE, NW, PD planner and FEED;

(Such coordination is carried out in silent procedure by using the link route system coupled with spacing, i4D levels and speed restrictions);

This ATCO provides support to the Tactical Controllers to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within the respective areas of responsibility.

60


73 of 343


PAD sector

ATCOs

EXE PLN The PAD Executive Controller

compliance with PAD planner is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area

notifies TMA any modification to the frozen landing order;

The En-route EXE Controller shall be responsible for the safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within his area of responsibility.

In co-ordination with the En-route Planning Controller the En-Route EXE Controller was responsible for the co-ordination of CTAs with the SEQ_MAN. When the CTA has been accepted the ENR_EXE is responsible for up-linking the CTA to the aircraft using CPDLC. In the event that the flight crew reject the CTA he is responsible for ensuring that ENR_PLN and SEQ_MAN are aware.

The PAD planning controller:

is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, NE, MI planner and FEEDER;


This ATCO provides support to the Tactical Controllers to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within the respective areas of responsibility.


74 of 343


ESE sector

ATCOs

EXE PLN The ESE Executive Controller

compliance with ESE planner is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area


The ESE EXE Controller shall be responsible for the safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within his area of responsibility.

In co-ordination with the En-route Planning Controller the En-Route EXE Controller was responsible for the coordination of CTAs with the SEQ_MAN. When the CTA has been accepted the ENR_EXE is responsible for up-linking the CTA to the aircraft using CPDLC. In the event that the flight crew reject the CTA he is responsible for ensuring that ENR_PLN and SEQ_MAN are aware.

The ESE planning controller:

is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, TS, OV planner and FEEDER;


This ATCO provides support to the Tactical Controllers to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within the respective areas of responsibility


75 of 343


NE sector

ATCOs

EXE PLN The NE Executive Controller

shall be responsible for the safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within his area of responsibility.

The E-TMA_EXE shall endeavour to allow the flight crew of i4D aircraft issued with CTAs to manage speed at their discretion to enable the CTA to be respected. In addition, controllers should be aware that trajectory changes (both lateral and vertical) may impact the aircrafts ability to respect the CTA.

In compliance with NE planner is responsible to obtain the arrival pre-sequence at LIRF on the associated approach FIX (SONTI and KOMEN), and LIRA on GITOD. This sector builds up the inbound sequence running towards SONTI, KOMEN and URB IAF, managing traffic coming from PAD and MI sectors.

in compliance with NE planner shall endeavour to allow the flight crew of i4D aircraft issued with CTAs to manage speed at their discretion to enable the CTA to be respected. In addition, controllers should be aware that trajectory changes (both lateral and vertical) may impact the aircrafts ability to respect the CTA. is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area

The NE planning controller:

provides support to the Tactical Controllers to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within the respective areas of responsibility;

is responsible for the traffic coordination with

TMA Seq. Manager, ARR coordinator,

PAD,MI, NW and FEED planner.(Such coordination is carried out in silent procedure by using the link route system coupled with spacing, i4D

levels and speed restrictions);


76 of 343


notifies TMA any modification to the frozen landing

order;

is responsible to manage ASPA-IM-S&M procedures by performing target identification to IM traffic,

merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate, also in coordination with ARR Manager,

manoeuvre termination,

(ASPA-IM-S&M can be managed via CPDLC).

77


77 of 343

©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2015. Created by FINMECCANICA LEONARDOfor the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged

NW sector

ATCOs

EXE PLN The NW Executive Controller



In compliance with NW planner is responsible to obtain the arrival pre-sequence at on the associated approach FIX (KOLEV, SORES and POPOV).This sector builds up the inbound sequence running towards KOLEV, SORES and POPOV IAF, managing traffic coming from previous MI and FEED sectors.

In compliance with NW planner shall endeavour to allow the flight crew of i4D aircraft issued with CTAs to manage speed at their discretion to enable the CTA to be respected. In addition, controllers should be aware that trajectory changes (both lateral and vertical) may impact the aircrafts ability to respect the CTA. is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area


is responsible to manage ASPA-IM-S&M procedures by

The NW planning controller:


is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, ARR coordinator, NE,MI and FEED planner


78


78 of 343


performing

target identification to IM traffic,

merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate, also in coordination with ARR Manager, manoeuvre termination,

(ASPA-IM-S&M can be managed via CPDLC)

79


79 of 343


OV sector

ATCOs EXE PLN

The OV Executive Controller



In compliance with OV planner is responsible to obtain the arrival pre-sequence at LIRF on the associated approach FIX (POPOV) and LIRA on OST VOR, This sector builds up the inbound sequence running towards POPOV and URB IAF, managing traffic coming from previous ESE sector.

in compliance with OV planner shall handover to allow the flight crew of i4D aircraft issued with CTAs to manage speed at their discretion to enable the CTA to be respected. In addition, controllers should be aware that trajectory changes (both lateral and vertical) may impact the aircrafts ability to respect the CTA. Is responsible for the management of traffic overflying his area


The OV planning controller:


is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, ARR coordinator, NW, NE, ESE, and TS planner


80


80 of 343


is responsible to manage ASPA-IM-S&M procedures by performing





TS sector

ATCOs

EXE PLN

81


81 of 343


The TS Executive Controller shall be responsible for the safe, orderly and efficient management of air traffic within his area of responsibility.


In compliance with TS planner is responsible to obtain the arrival pre-sequence at LIRF on the associated approach FIX (BUKOV) and LIRA on PEMAR FIX. This sector builds up the inbound sequence running towards BUKOV and URB IAF, managing traffic coming from previous ESE and FEED sectors.

In compliance with TS planner shall handover to allow the flight crew of i4D aircraft issued with CTAs to manage speed at their discretion to enable the CTA to be respected. In addition, controllers should be aware that trajectory changes (both lateral and vertical) may impact the aircrafts ability to respect the CTA. Is responsible for the management of traffic over flying his area



The TS planning controller:


is responsible for the traffic coordination with TMA Seq. Manager, ARR coordinator, NW, NE, ESE, and TS planner

(Such coordination is carried out in silent

procedure by using the link route system

coupled with spacing, i4D levels and

speed restrictions);

82


82 of 343






83


83 of 343


TNW sector

ATCOs EXE

The TNW Executive Controller

in compliance with TMA planning and ARR coordinator is responsible to obtain the arrival sequence at LIRF on 16R

on the associated approach FIX (KOLEV, SORES, POPOV), or

with appropriate radar vectors along the approach to FN16R, in coordination with ARR,




merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate, also in coordination with ARR,



.

84


84 of 343


TNE sector

ATCOs

EXE

85


85 of 343


The TNE Executive Controller

in compliance with Sequence manager and the ARR coordinator is responsible to obtain the arrival sequence at LIRF on 16L:

on the associated approach FIX (SONTI, KOMEN, BAXON), or

with appropriate radar vectors along the approach to FN16L, in coordination with AR1,

in compliance with Sequence manager and the ARR coordinator is responsible to obtain the arrival sequence at LIRA :

on the associated approach FIX (URB)

notifies ARR coordinator any modification to the frozen landing order;



merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate, also in coordination with ARR,



.

86


86 of 343


ARR2 sector

ATCOs

EXE

The ARR2 Executive Controller

refines arrival sequence at LIRF on 16R in compliance with Sequence manager , ARR coordinator and TNW, through the use of radar vectors and/or speed regulations as appropriate,

applies to the arrival sequence at LIRF 16R the requested landing rate,

manages traffic after missed approach,

notifies ARR coordinator any modification to the frozen landing order,



merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate,



87


87 of 343


ARR1 sector

ATCOs

EXE The ARR1 Executive Controller

refines arrival sequence at LIRF on 16L in compliance with Sequence manager , ARR coordinator and TNE, through the use of radar vectors and/or speed regulations as appropriate,

applies to the arrival sequence at LIRF 16L the requested landing rate,

manages traffic after missed approach,

notifies ARR coordinator any modification to the frozen landing order,



merge and/or remain behind manoeuvres as appropriate,



Table 41: ARR1 Sector


88 of 343


TMA sector

Roles TN COO ARR COO


89 of 343


The Sequence Manager controller is responsible for the establishing the arrival sequence to LIRF&LIRA aerodromes with support of E-AMAN. His responsibilities includes:

To provide support to executive ATCO‟s to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of traffic

To refine the arrival sequence proposed by E-AMAN based on the current operational situation (e.g. change flight arrival runway, change sequence in case of bunch of arrival flights)

To perform a silent coordination to advice the En-route sector controlling the flight that the CTA can be uplinked to the airborne

To Request the ETA min /ETA max to the aircraft via ADS-C in case of route modification.

The Arrival Manager controller:

provides support to executive ATCO‟s to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of traffic.

notifies TNE/TNW/AR1/AR2 Executives Controllers the landing rate requested by TWRs

Coordinates with E-TMA and ARR sectors ASPA manoeuvres

Improvement in runway throughput (better adherence to maximum runway throughput) (Airport Capacity) by optimizing the Arrival Sequence.

provides tactical support to E-TMA and TMA executive ATCO‟s to ensure safe, orderly and efficient management of traffic

to supervise the final approach phase coordinating with E-TMA, TMA sectors

to support E-TMA and TMA sectors in preparing and performing the ASPA-IM- S&M manoeuvres.

To verify that the airborne trajectory (i.e. EPP trajectory) is compliant with the altitude constraints on STARs

Table 16: Sector Working Methods


90 of 343


Situation

Controllers

Pilots

RTA Missed Manage the speed if needed

Give another RTA only if necessary

Communicate RTA missed via CPDLC and voice (specify the reason if possible) and report speed

RTA unable Give another RTA only if necessary

Communicate RTA unable via CPDLC and voice (specify the reason if possible)

ASPA manoeuvre Unable in the acquisition phase

Give another manoeuvre only if necessary.

Manage the speed if needed

Communicate unable via CPDLC (specify via voice the reason if possible) and manage the speed as instructed or as foreseen

ASPA Unable during the manoeuvre

Manage the speed if needed Give another manoeuvre only if necessary.

Communicate unable via CPDLC and voice (specify the reason if possible) and report speed

Approaching TOD When it’s possible “4Y1171, descent FLxxx at computed Top of Descent”

If no instruction received by controller report approaching TOD (5-10 nm before)

RTA MISSED AT [WPT]” Wait for ATCo instruction while RTA remain active Cancel RTA only on ATC request

For exe 805 retain function is not used

Table 17: Working Methods of The concepts


91 of 343


3.2 Platform Involved in the Simulation

3.2.1 ENAV IBP The ‘ENAV Rome IBP’ is composed of two industrial based platforms:

The “En-Route” TMA/APP platform i.e. the “4 Flight Foundation” (4FF); An Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator i.e. the “AACS” and iAIRCRAFT;

All of these platforms are located at the ENAV Rome premises (Rome Ciampino ACC).

The ENAV IBP Rome architecture, modified for the exercise EXE-05.03-VP-805, is described in the following high level block diagram:

Figure 14: ENAV IBP Rome architecture The ENAV IBP “4 Flight Foundation” is owned and operated by the ENAV personnel and provided by FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO. The 4FF ATM system provides the full set of capabilities allowing to operate in Real Time Simulations as well as in Shadow Mode, including Flight Data Processing, AMAN, Air Ground Data-Link (i.e. ADS-C and CPDLC), Multi Radar Tracking (including SSR, Mode-S and ADS-B), Medium Term Conflict Detection, Safety Nets (STCA, MSAW, APW), Air Traffic Generator (SSR, Mode-S and ADS-B), Data Preparation, Data Logging and Post Analysis tools.

The JSI (Java Simulator Interface) tool will be used to prepare data (scenario and traffic sample) for the real time simulation. It is related to the V&V Infrastructure tools which are aimed at the preparation of the V&V Exercises. In order to support VP-805 exercise, the FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO i4D prototype integrated in the ENAV IBP Rome, to support the validation campaign of the EXE-05.05.01-VP-212 (Release 1), has been enhanced with the following capabilities:

Downlink of the aircraft 4D trajectory;

Trajectory Synchronization between ground and air;


92 of 343


Downlink the ETA Min/Max on selected waypoint;

The ASPA S&M capability has been ensured by the relevant ground prototype (4 manoeuvres) developed by FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO in the framework of P10.03.02 and validated during the execution of EXE-05.06.06-VP-199.

The FINMECCANICA-LEONARDO AMAN extended horizon used to support the validation campaign of the EXE-05.06.04-VP-244 (Release 2) and the i4D prototypes have been integrated to support the CTA G-G negotiation.

HMI HMI comprises the following components:

Controller Working Position (CWP) Pseudo-Pilot Working Position (PWP) Pseudo Pilot (iAIRCRAFT )

CWP The purpose of the CWP subsystem is to simulate an air traffic controller working position during the execution of an exercise. The information available on the CWP is described as follows:

Traffic Data constituted by: o Plots and radar tracks; o Flight plan data on electronic strips and lists;

Airspace Data represented by geographic maps and range and bearing vectors re-called by the controller through dedicated orders;

Weather Data; Supervisor Data.

On the CWP the windows show the ATC information in dedicated zones on the display. These windows can be moved, reduce to icon and eventually closed. They can also be transparent or opaque.

PWP The purpose of the Pilot Working Position subsystem is to simulate a pseudo-pilot position during the execution of an exercise to simulate the normal navigation behaviour of involved flights. Each Pseudo-Pilot can:

Display the list of the inactive flights; Display the list of the active flights with the indication of the Owner Pilot; Select any flight under his responsibility; Display all data of a selected flight including predicted trajectory; Switch the status of any active flight to Automatic/Manual Navigation mode; Issue a piloting order to the selected flight; Issue the appropriate orders to the simulator in order to modify the trajectory of the targets

under his control, according to the Controller’s directives; Assume pilot control of up to 20 flights contemporaneously.

The Pseudo-Pilot is able to control all configured flights that are managed by the Exercise Supervisor with the exception of the background target. The Exercise Supervisor can assign a background flight to the Pseudo Pilots (in this way the flight becomes controlled). The Pilot involved in the Simulation Exercise shall be able to execute the PILOT orders for an owned flight previously hooked (i.e. in the Navigated Flight List or in the GRP) only during the Exercise run.


93 of 343


The Pseudo-pilots receives from the Simulator some diagnostic messages when some situation happened (e.g. aircraft activation, fix overfly, aircraft landing, arrival to a predetermined Flight Level etc.).

The Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS) is owned and operated by the ENAV personnel and provided by IDS Ingegneria Dei Sistemi. The AACS provides aircraft research simulators equipped with an enhanced FMS and full interoperability with the ground segment

based on the standards. In order to support the activities of the VP-805, the AACS (and iAIRCRAFT) has been

enhanced with i4D and ASPA capabilities based on the requirements provided by P09.01. The figures below show the AACS cockpit simulator and its Logic Architecture respectively:

Figure 15: Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS)


94 of 343


Computer System COCKPIT

INTERFACE SYSTEMSSOC

EXTERNAL SYSTEMSDESIGN AND ANALYSIS

OUT THE WINDOWVisualisation data

Trajectory anddynamics

Commands

SimulatedTraffic

SimulatedTrajectory

SimulatedTraffic

SimulatedTrajectory

FlyghtProcedure

FlyghtProcedure Trajectory

Figure 16: Virtualisation Data

3.2.2 AIRBUS IBP The Airbus Integration Simulator is used for Real Time Simulation based on real aircraft prototypes, located at ground with representative flight dynamic simulation and capacities.

The Integration Simulator is dedicated to a specific AIRBUS program. The A320 Integration Simulator is the one used for EXE-805 Validation exercises. Main Validation Objectives are:

Global system integration at aircraft level of real component of various aircraft systems to alleviate the need for validation on test aircraft at ground and in flight, to perform aircraft tests in operational conditions and to participate to the certification and qualification process

Operational validation with Airbus flight test, training and airlines pilots “Virtual First Flight” and verification of standard systems before implementation on flying test

aircraft Optimization of live trials campaign Contribution to the reduction of development cycles and costs Increase of the maturity of the systems for the Entry Into Service Validation of the evolution or modification of the systems


95 of 343


Figure 17: Integration simulator cockpit & architecture

The Integration Simulator was used to prepare & perform validation exercises with ENAV. This platform is also used for all AIRBUS other validation activities with no link to SESAR and its availability for SESAR validation should be managed according to these other activities.

It should also be noted that the simulator is not only representative of an aircraft behaviour but it allows also to go further in the validation by providing capacities to test systems and functions in degraded situation and environment (that could not be done in real aircraft).

The simulator is composed of:

All real Aircraft certified systems including among others for A320 simulator: AMU (Audio Management Unit), ATSU (Air Traffic Service Unit), CFDIU (Centralized Fault Data Interface Unit), CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) DCDU(Data-link Control and Display Unit) EIS (Electronic Instruments System), ELAC (Elevator Aileron Computer), FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control), FG (Flight Guidance),


96 of 343


FMS (Flight Management System), FWS (Flight Warning System), MCDU (Multipurpose Control and Display Unit), PA (Pilot Automatic), RMP (Radio Management Panel), TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System), VDR (VHF Data Radio), XPDR (Transponder),

Dedicated tools AIRBUS traffic generator: it allows the creation of aircraft and vehicles intruders and trajectory

management that could be generated to the TCAS system allowing the simulation of a dense traffic surrounded AIRBUS aircraft (ownership). It could also convert data provided by a Ground traffic generator through SVS to real RF (radio frequency) format understandable by the TCAS system

AIRBUS Cockpit visual: it allows the display of a simulated and representative environment surrounded the Integration Simulator

AIRBUS data-link ground simulation: for the simulation of ground data-link centres that could communicate with AIRBUS Integration Simulator

AIRBUS Avionics In-Flight Instrumentation: it gives the possibility to record on Integration Simulator the different communication protocols and exchanged data between the different avionic systems

AIRBUS Avionics Interface Analyser for the observation of data and communication protocol exchanged between all avionic systems in real and differed time including all the data received or emitted to the outside (e.g. data-link messages and surveillance data coming from the operational networks)

AIRBUS SVS connectors for any data exchange (voice, data-link, surveillance,...) with ground partners through SVS federative site connexion

The Integration Simulator could be connected to ATM networks: ARINC & SITA ACARS operational data-link network through VDL A / 2, Satellite and HFDL

capacities, ARINC & SITA ATN operational data-link network through VDL 2 capacities, Surveillance data: Mode C / Mode S, ADS-B of real traffic around Toulouse airport,

Transponder emissions capability, Connection with ANSPs and Industrial Partners (DSNA, Thales Avionics, ENAV, Eurocontrol,

...) through SVS facility. -

Air – Ground voice communication capacities are: Voice communication using real VHF, Satellite and HF aircraft systems and real

communication network, Voice communication using real VHF, Satellite and HF aircraft systems and simulated

communication network, through SVS facility.

Here are the supported measurements by the simulator: HMI interaction measurement (e.g. measurement of human machine interactions) Video Analysis (Cameras for work analysis and for training material available) Prototypes input / output recordings and replay management Data-link Communication recordings Voice Communication recordings

The integration simulator slots are daily:

7h30 – 10h30 10h30 – 13h 13h – 16h 16h – 19h


97 of 343


3.2.3 ALENIA IBP

3.2.3.1 System Breakdown and Interfaces

Figure 18: Alenia C27 J High Level Hardware Architecture

Alenia framework Client ENAV Audioset Client

ENAV


98 of 343


Figure 19: Alenia C27 J Simulation Framework High Level Architecture


99 of 343


3.2.3.2 Alenia C27 J Visual This tool allows the display of a simulated and representative environment surrounding the Alenia C27 J Integration Simulator.

3.2.3.3 Alenia C27 J Data-link The Alenia C27 J allows integration with other simulators by using Alenia framework, Asterix Cat 21, HLA, DIS.

3.2.3.4 Alenia C27 J Post Flight Analyser This tool allows extraction of data and its observation and analysis after the exercise execution.

3.2.3.5 Alenia Simulation Framework Architecture The Simulation Framework is Alenia proprietary control software which lays the backbone of the flight simulator.

The Simulation Framework is centred on the "data model" which is also called the ICD of the training device. At the very centre of a simulator there is the "data model" (also called ICD, Interface Control Document, or Data). Correctly defining the data model is the key to an efficient and effective implementation of the simulator. ICD and "data model" are equal synonyms in the Simulation Framework context. The "data model", called ICD, is the key to the Simulation Framework. It is critically important that the ICD is properly defined as much as possible before the Simulator Framework is deployed.

It is important to understand the difference between ICD "data" and "metadata": the ICD is composed of "data" which is defined by "metadata". For example, consider a memory area which is composed of three data: longitude, latitude and altitude. The "data" itself will be, for example 44.5N, 7.9E, 348feet, while the "metadata" will be "latitude in decimal degrees between -90.0 and 90.0 using a 32bit float, longitude in decimal degrees between -180.0 and +180.0 using 32bit float and an altitude expressed in feet between -10.000 and +60.000 using a 32bit signed integer. The "data" by itself is the important information, of course, but the "metadata" is needed both at runtime (to plot, test and verify) and offline (to simplify development, reduce bugs and improve efficiency).

3.2.3.6 Alenia Simulation Framework Ncfs2 The Ncfs2 is the “core” which acts as the main centre of the Framework. Think of the Framework as a star with the master node at the centre and a slave node at each tip of the star. The Master is smart, while the slaves just relay any command or request to the master. Of course, caching and other techniques are used to improve speed and reduce network load. The Ncfs2 Master is the coordinator, while the Ncfs2 Slaves take care of communicating with all the processes which are part of the training device. You always need exactly one Master process in the entire Simulator Framework. You need one Slave process for each different node. The framework topology (the list of slave nodes) is defined in the topology file. This file defines the complete list of all the nodes which are part of the Framework and, for each node, the complete list of all the processes that can be executed on the node. Each node must have its hostname specified in the topology file: nodes with different hostname will not be authorized to connect to the master node. The slave will fetch the system hostname and send it to the master; this is the hostname which must be indicated in the topology file.

3.2.3.7 Alenia Simulation Framework Monitor The Framework Monitor is the GUI interface for the Simulation Framework. It is modular and is composed of plugins which can be activated from the configuration file. Each plugin is a dynamic library which is loaded trough the Simulation Framework plugin mechanism. The Framework Monitor shall run on any node, either master or slave. It requires a direct connection to the master over the control port to operate properly on task management. Each plugin might have other requirements.


100 of 343


3.2.3.8 Alenia I/O Interface The I/O Interface can be used to interface easily with I/O like CAN Aero, USB, serial ports and more. Its purpose is to connect various "inputs" and "outputs" (elements) to the main simulation core. By leveraging some of the most advanced features of the Simulation Framework, it allows the integration of various types of input/output devices and panels quite easily into the Framework topology. At the base of the I/O Controls is plus a flexible plugin system which allows the user to extend the number of supported devices within the same infrastructure.

3.2.3.9 Alenia Model Scheduler The Model Scheduler is capable of scheduling models, also when distributed on more than one node. The Legacy Wrapper is a Model Scheduler plugin capable of running legacy Fortran-style PFS models.

3.2.3.10 ENAV, Alenia exchange information The Alenia VCD simulator is connected in the ENAV network; the networking is established connecting the Alenia VCD simulator switch with the ENAV switch. A workstation named “host” with two Ethernet interface uses the IP address of the ENAV LAN.

In detail, the data exchanged by Alenia VCD and ENAV is also by mean of a third computer named TCA (Trajectory Computer Algorithm) with the FMS functions required to support ASPA&IM.

The Alenia VCD sends its data to ENAV node in Asterix protocol using the ADS-B OUT interface while the TCA receives the ADS-B data by using the ADS-B IN from the ENAV node.

The following scheme summaries the data flow:

Figure 20: Alenia C27 J VCD data exchange with ENAV platform


101 of 343


3.2.1 Simulation Agenda

Figure 21: Exercise execution – Training session

Start time End time

08:00 08:15

08:15 08:30

08:30 08:45

08:45 09:00

09:00 09:15

09:15 09:30

09:30 09:45

09:45 10:00

10:00 10:15

10:15 10:30

10:30 10:45

10:45 11:00

11:00 11:15

11:15 11:30

11:30 11:45

11:45 12:00

12:00 12:15

12:15 12:30

12:30 12:45

12:45 13:00

13:00 13:15

13:15 13:30

13:30 13:45

13:45 14:00

14:00 14:15

14:15 14:30

14:30 14:45

14:45 15:00

15:00 15:15

15:15 15:30

15:30 15:45

15:45 16:00

LUNCH

DEBRIEFINGroom 125

Training_09T03DL

LUNCH

DEBRIEFINGmain simulation room

LUNCHLUNCH

Training_03T04B

Hands on PlatformT01D

DEBRIEFINGroom 125

Training_08T04DL

Training_05T04C

VP-805 Airborne IntroductionSophie Laperche

main simulation room

DEBRIEFINGmain simulation room

Training_06T03CL

Training_11T02DL

BREAK

LUNCH

Training_12T02DL

DEBRIEFINGroom 125

27/11/2015

BREAK

BRIEFIENGmain simulation room



Training_07T02DL

BREAK

Training_10T03DL

Training_02T02A

BREAK


VP-805 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONLuigi Mazzucchelli

ACC Meeting Room

VP-805 Operational Scenario and conceptsRoberto Silvestrini / Maurizio Romano

ACC Meeting Room

VP-805 Validation Plan and Assessment Methodology

Enzo Amadio / Ornella TroiseACC Meeting Room

VP-805 Platform and Prototypes Introduction

Roberta Pigliacampo / Giuseppe PiazzollaACC Meeting Room

23/11/2015

Training_04T03B

24/11/2015 25/11/2015 26/11/2015

Training_01T01A


102 of 343


Exercise execution – Simulation session – week 1

Start time End time

08:00 08:15

08:15 08:30

08:30 08:45

08:45 09:00

09:00 09:15

09:15 09:30

09:30 09:45

09:45 10:00

10:00 10:15

10:15 10:30

10:30 10:45

10:45 11:00

11:00 11:15

11:15 11:30

11:30 11:45

11:45 12:00

12:00 12:15

12:15 12:30

12:30 12:45

12:45 13:00

13:00 13:15

13:15 13:30

13:30 13:45

13:45 14:00

14:00 14:15

14:15 14:30

14:30 14:45

14:45 15:00

15:00 15:15

15:15 15:30

15:30 15:45

15:45 16:00

16:00 16.15

16.15 16.30

16.30 16:45

16:45 17:00

DEBRIEFING main simulation room

DEBRIEFINGMain simulation room

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_10M01E

RUN_01M01A

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_03M01E

RUN_05M01DS

RUN_07M01DS

DEBRIEFING Main simulation room

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_09M01C

30/11/2015 01/12/2015 02/12/2015 03/12/2015 04/12/2015

BRIEFINGMain simulation room




HP Impact MatrixMain simulation room


PRQsimulation rooms


SPARE

RUN_09M01C

PRQsimulation rooms

SPARE

RUN_02M01B

LUNCH

RUN_04M01A

LUNCH

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_08M01D

PRQsimulation rooms

LUNCH

DEBRIEFING room 125 (webex)


RUN_06M01DS

RUN_08M01DS

LUNCH LUNCH


103 of 343


Figure 22: Exercise execution – Simulation session – week 2

29 runs were executed. Particularly, one traffic samples was executed in three different scenarios as follows:

2 training runs Reference including only E-AMAN 2 training runs Solution 1 including E-AMAN and CTA/i4D 2 training runs Solution 2 including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M 8 training runs Solution 3 including E-AMAN, CTA/i4D and ASPA-

IM-S&M 3 measured runs Reference including only E-AMAN 3 measured runs Solution 1 including E-AMAN and CTA/i4D 3 measured runs Solution 2 including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M 6 measured runs Solution 3 including E-AMAN, CTA/i4D and ASPA-

Start time End time

08:00 08:15

08:15 08:30

08:30 08:45

08:45 09:00

09:00 09:15

09:15 09:30

09:30 09:45

09:45 10:00

10:00 10:15

10:15 10:30

10:30 10:45

10:45 11:00

11:00 11:15

11:15 11:30

11:30 11:45

11:45 12:00

12:00 12:15

12:15 12:30

12:30 12:45

12:45 13:00

13:00 13:15

13:15 13:30

13:30 13:45

13:45 14:00

14:00 14:15

14:15 14:30

14:30 14:45

14:45 15:00

15:00 15:15

15:15 15:30

15:30 15:45

15:45 16:00

16:00 16.15

16.15 16.30

16.30 16:45

16:45 17:00

SPARESPARE

LUNCH

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

LUNCH

RUN_18_bisM01ELS

RUN12T02D

RUN_16M01AL

PRQsimulation rooms



RUN_13M01CL

PRQsimulation rooms

DEBRIEFING room 125

SPARE

SPARE

RUN_18M01ELS

PRQsimulation rooms

LUNCH

LUNCH

RUN_15M01DLS

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_11M01B

RUN_14M01ELS

RUN_17M01DLS

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

PRQsimulation rooms

BRIEFINGmain simulation room

14/12/2015 15/12/2015 16/12/2015 17/12/2015 18/12/2015





Open DayACC Meeting room + Simulation

rooms

LUNCH

DEBRIEFING room 125

PRQsimulation rooms

RUN_21M01B

WANT HAVE MATRIX room 125

RUN_19M01CL


104 of 343


IM-S&M 4 measured runs Solution 3 including E-AMAN, CTA/i4D and ASPA-

IM-S&M with unusual events (RUN_03, RUN_10, RUN_12, RUN_14)

This experimental design was arranged in order to guarantee a direct comparability of the results, according to the following scheme:

Reference vs. Solution 1 Reference vs. Solution 2 Reference vs. Solution 1 vs. Solution 2 vs. Solution 3

During each simulation day, the measured runs were rotated according to the schedule presented above, balancing scenarios. Each run was followed by a Post Run Questionnaire (PRQ), intended to collect information on the workload, situational awareness, usability and teamwork perceived by the controllers during the run. Each RTS day was concluded by a collective debriefing. Furthermore, runs with AIRBUS cockpit attendance were followed by debriefing sessions (via phone calls) aimed to allow controllers and cockpit crews to match their opinions.

The runs were observed by Human Performance, Subject Matter Experts and Safety Analysts.

Team exercise and final debriefing were organised at the end of the experiment. They were both intended to collect the final opinion of the controllers on investigate concepts at the end of the validation session.


105 of 343


3.2.2 Controllers’ background and roles into VP-805

ATCO Years as qualified controller

Current operative site

Current qualified control position

Years in the current operative site

Previous operative site Years in the previous operative site

Participation in other validation activities

Attended other validation activities

ATCO#1 25 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 11 Years Fiumicino TWR 9 Years NO - ATCO#2 17 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 8 Years Milano ACC 8 Years NO - ATCO#3 4 Years Milano ACC ACS/RAD 4 Years - - NO - ATCO#4 4 Years Milano ACC ACS/RAD 2 Years Padua ACC 2 Years NO - ATCO#5 21 Years Padua ACC ACS/RAD 18 Years Rimini TWR 2 Years YES EXE-05.03.VP-708 ATCO#6 23 Years Padua ACC ACS/RAD 13 Years Forli TWR/APP 8 Years YES EXE-05.03.VP-708 ATCO#7 12 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 5 Years Milano ACC 8 Years NO - ATCO#8 23 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 8 Years Olbia 10 Years NO -

ATCO#9 17 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 5 Years Malpensa

TWR/APP Malpensa ACC

6 Years YES

SMGCS (GROUND RADAR) FOR MXP TOWER

ATCO#10 12 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 4 Years Milano ACC 8 Years NO - ATCO#11 17 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 8 Years TORINO TWR & APP 9 Years - ATCO#12 20 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 4 Years Milano 12 Years NO -

ATCO#13 20 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD - TCL 15 Years Bologna TWR

1 year and 6 months YES

MFF (2003 - 2008)

Brindisi TWR/APP FDP FOR VFR (2013)

ATCO#14 15 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 10 Years Milano ACC 5 Years YES EXE-05.03.VP-708 ATCO#15 35 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD 15 Years Ciampino TWR 3 Years NO -

ATCO#16 35 Years Roma ACC SUPERVISOR ACS/RAD - TCL 25 Years Pisa Airport 9 Years YES

EXE-05.06.06.VP-198 EXE-05.06.06.VP-

41


106 of 343


ATCO Years as qualified controller

Current operative site

Current qualified control position

Years in the current operative site

Previous operative site Years in the previous operative site

Participation in other validation activities

Attended other validation activities

199 EXE-05.03.VP-708

ATCO#17 25 Years Roma ACC SUPERVISOR ACS/RAD - TCL 20 Years Torino TWR/APP 4 Years YES EXE-05.03.VP-708

ATCO#18 29 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD - TCL 14 Years DECIMOMANNU AFB 3 Years YES

ASAS SPACING 2001/02/03 EVP AMAN MFF EXE-05.06.06.VP-199 EXE-05.07.02.VP-738

ATCO#19 33 Years Roma ACC SUPERVISOR ACS/RAD - TCL 29 Years Milano ACC 9 Years NO -

ATCO#20 35 Years Roma ACC SUPERVISOR ACS/RAD - TCL 4 Years Ciampino TWR 9 Years YES

TMA 2010 PLUS EXE-05.03.VP-708 EXE-05.07.02.VP-738

ATCO#21 22 Years Roma ACC ACS/RAD - TCL 5 Years Padua ACC 3 Years YES

EXE-05.06.06.VP-199 EXE-05.06.06.VP-198 EXE-05.07.02.VP-738 EXE-05.03.VP-708

Table 18: ATCOs’ background The seating plan was arranged according to the following criteria:

41


107 of 343


Respect of the ATCOs licence for the specific simulated sectors; ATCOs had a balanced rotation across the sectors for which they were qualified; ATCOs had a balanced rotation across the whole of the simulation session.

TYPE En-route E-TMA TMA ARR DEP SM AC

SECTOR MI1 PAD ESE US/TS NE NW TNE TNW ARR1 ARR2 OV SM AC

ATCO#1 X

ATCO#2 X

ATCO#3 X

ATCO#4 X

ATCO#5 X

ATCO#6 X

ATCO#7 X

ATCO#8 X X

ATCO#9 X X

ATCO#10 X X

ATCO#11 X X

ATCO#12 X X

ATCO#13 X X

ATCO#14 X X

ATCO#15 X X X

ATCO#16 X X X

ATCO#17 X X X

ATCO#18 X X X

ATCO#19 X X X

41


108 of 343


TYPE En-route E-TMA TMA ARR DEP SM AC

SECTOR MI1 PAD ESE US/TS NE NW TNE TNW ARR1 ARR2 OV SM AC

ATCO#20 X X X

ATCO#21 X X X X X

Table 19: ATCOs’ roles into the Exercise For each runs two ATCOs played the role of SME (Subject Matter Expert) supporting the Human Factors team in collecting evidence and observations during the exercises.


109 of 343


3.2.3 Simulation facilities Hereafter some pictures related to ENAV VP-805 simulation facilities at Rome Ciampino ACC. During the simulation session the Alenia C27 Virtual Cockpit Demonstrator was hosted at ENAV Rome premises as well, so its picture is included in this section.

Virtualised Aircraft Simulators (iAIRCRAFT or iA/C) room

Figure 23: Virtualised Aircraft Simulators (iAIRCRAFT or iA/C) room

Pseudo-pilots working position (CWP) room

Figure 24: Pseudo-pilots working position (CWP) room

Alenia C27 Virtual Cockpit Demonstrator


110 of 343


Figure 25: Alenia C27 Virtual Cockpit Demonstrator

Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS)

Figure 26: Autonomous Advanced Cockpit Simulator (AACS)

Controllers simulation room 1 (NE – NW – TNE – TNW - ARR1 - ARR2 – OV – SM – AC)

Figure 27: Controllers simulation room 1


111 of 343


Figure 28: Sequence Manager and ASPA Coordinator CWPs in simulation room 1

Figure 29: Sequence Manager HMI

Controllers simulation room 2 (MI1 – PAD – ESE –TS/US)


112 of 343


Figure 30: Controllers simulation room 2

The runs were observed by Human Performance, Security Expert. Subject Matter Experts and Safety Analysts

3.3 Deviations from the planned activities N/A

3.3.1 Deviations with respect to the Validation Strategy Results in Airport capacity does not improve the runway throughput as expected in ASAS S&M organization. This is a deviation by the performance target of ASAS concept.

3.3.2 Deviations with respect to the Validation Plan With Respect of what has been declared in the VPLAN of the VP805 the following success criteria were not addressed:

VALID

ATIO N OBJE

CTIV

E ID

VALID

ATIO N OBJE

CTIV

E TI

TLE

SUCC

ESS

CRIT

ERI

ON

ID

SUCC

ESS

CRIT

ERI

ON

RATI

ONAL ES

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0016

CTA/i4D cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0016.001

The number of clearances provided by ATCO compared with the number of movement managed should be acceptable with current today operations

Not Addressed Rationale: even though cost-effectiveness-related objectives have not been assessed due to lack of resources, these are directly related to the assessment of the impact of the concepts on workload, which has been reported together with OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 (Human Performances) related objectives.


113 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0017

ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0017.001


Not Addressed Rationale: even though cost-effectiveness-related objectives have not been assessed due to lack of resources, these are directly related to the assessment of the impact of the concepts on workload, which has been reported together with OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 (Human Performances) related objectives.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0018

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0018.001


Not Addressed Rationale: Rationale: even though cost-effectiveness-related objectives have not been assessed due to lack of resources, these are directly related to the assessment of the impact of the concepts on workload, which has been reported together with OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 (Human Performances) related objectives.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0024

CTA/i4D performance assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0024.001

The CTA missed shall not be raised in case the a/c profile is not modified by the controller

Not Addressed Rationale: Recorded logs did not allow to perform this kind of analysis

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0024.002

The CTA precision shall be according the performance requirements and operational expectations (i.e. +/- 10 sec).


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0025

ASPA-IM-S&M performance assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0025.001

The ASPA Unable shall be raised only in case of the absolute value of actual time spacing-required time spacing is greater than 5 sec.


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0025.002

The ASPA precision shall be according the performance requirements and operational expectations (i.e. +/- 5 sec).



114 of 343


Table 20: Deviation with Respect the Validation Plan

Some of these Validation objective were not addressed for many time spending analysing logs.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026

CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration operational acceptability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.001

Displaying the CTA/i4D information (i.e. E-AMAN CTA and ETA min/max) with a 10sec of resolution on the ground prevents the ATC to uplink E-AMAN-CTA not comprised within the ETA Min/Max window provided by the aircraft.

Not Addressed Rationale: : recorded logs did not allow to perform this kind of analysis.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0030

TOD Downlink impact

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0030.001

The Start Descent Clearance to be performed at the optimized pseudo waypoint (ToD) might be anticipated by the controller. When performed, pilots feedback regarding descent management is positive.

Not addressed Rationale: The controllers involved in the exercise refused to anticipate the aircraft descent clearance, arguing that it would be quite difficult to ensure that the aircraft trajectory is clear of traffic if a tactical instruction is not almost immediately followed by the corresponding crew action in the medium density airspace considered.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031

RTA Missed procedure

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.001

The procedure defined in case of RTA MISSED is correctly applied by the flight crew

Not addressed Rationale : no RTA MISSED occurred, so the success criteria has not been assessed.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.002

The procedure defined in case of RTA MISSED is correctly applied by the controllers.

Not addressed Rationale: : no RTA MISSED occurred, so the success criteria has not been assessed.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.003

The workload associated to RTA MISSED management does not prevent the flight crew from activating the ASPA manoeuvre.

Not addressed Rationale: : no RTA MISSED occurred, so the success criteria has not been assessed.


115 of 343


4 Exercises Results

4.1 Summary of Exercises Results The table below summarizes the exercise results for each success criteria as defined in the Validation Plan. One of the following status has been attributed to each success criteria depending on the exercise outcome:

- OK: Validation objective achieves the expectations (exercise results achieve success criteria) - NOK: Validation objective does not achieve the expectations (exercise results do not achieve success criteria) - Not Addressed: Validation objective could not be analysed (mostly when the event to consider did not occur or when no data was recorded)

EXER

CISE

ID

VALI

DATI

ON

OBJE

CTIV

E ID

VALI

DATI

ON

OBJE

CTIV

E TI

TLE

SUCC

ESS

CRIT

ERIO

N ID

SUCC

ESS

CRIT

ERIO

N

EXER

CISE

RE

SULT

VALI

DATI

ON

OBJE

CTIV

E ST

ATUS

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001

CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.001

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on change of practices acceptability.

CTA/i4D concept requires an acceptable change of practice for all type of sectors experimented during VP-805.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.002

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on procedure flexibility.

Controllers took advantage of CTA/i4D introduction that supported them in effectively coordinate in advance arrival sequence with upper sectors.

OK

41


116 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.003

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload qualitative assessment.

Workload is always maintained at very low level in case of CTA/i4D introduction. Except for TMA and SM sector/position it slightly increases respect to reference scenario.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.004

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload quantitative assessment.

Reduction of PEL (Planned Entry Level) for departure sectors in CTA/i4D scenario.

Increase of flight assumed (AOC) and transferred (TOC) per hour by En-Route sectors in CTA/i4D scenario.

Increase of DCT(Direct To) per hour by En-Route and E-TMA sectors in CTA/i4D scenario.

Reduction of rerouting per hour in TMA sector in CTA/i4D scenario.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.005

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on situational awareness.

Situational awareness is always maintened at high level. It is interesting that for Sequence Manager figure it is really improved respect to Reference scenario. It is due to the fact the CTA/i4D allows to improve and anticipate coordination among

OK

41


117 of 343


lower and upper sectors, having as consequence an increase in shared situational awareness. Sequence Manager obviously played a central role in this kind of coordination.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.006

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable risk of deskilling

According to controllers’ opinion CTA/i4D concept doesn’t have relevant impact on their risk of deskilling.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002

ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.001


According to involved controllers the change of practice due to ASPA-IM-S&M concept introduction is acceptable. All feedback are included between 3 (neutral) and 5 (almost always) values.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.002


ASPA-IM-S&M related procedures in comparison with the ones inherent to reference scenario are considered often flexible.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.003

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable

Perceived controllers’ wokload related to ASPA-IM-S&M scenario runs was always maintened at very low levels

OK

41


118 of 343


level of workload qualitative assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.004

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload quantitative assessment

All manouvres undertaken in E-TMA and ARR sectors were succesfully performed, meanwhile in TMA sectors, characterized by an higher number of undertaken manouvres, a minimum percentage of them failed. Controllers asserted that it happened rarely when separation coditions were not satisfied anymore. In case of unable, there line between target and follower was shown in red colour on the HMI. In order to erase from the HMI such notification, they choose “cancel spacing” or “deselect target”.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.005

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: situational awareness

Siuational awareness was always maintained at very high level introducing ASPA-IM-S&M concept.

OK

41


119 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.006


Controllers asserted that ASPA-IM-S&M concept introduction in operations could have negative impact on controllers’ skills and abilities.

NOK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.001

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on change of practices acceptability

CTA/i4D concept requires an acceptable change of practice for all type of sectors experimented during VP-805.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.002

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: procedure flexibility.

En-Route sectors were mainly impacted by CTA/i4D and in this specific scenario so they suffered a slight decrease in procedure flexibility. . It is due to the fact that CTA/i4D induces a limitation in ATCOs’ tactical interventions especially as regards the respect of TOD.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.003

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload

Workload is always maintained at very low level in case of CTA/i4D introduction. Except for TMA and SM sector/position it slightly increases respect to reference scenario.

OK

41


120 of 343


qualitative assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.004

Positive feedback from pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload qualitative assessment

The workload induced by Initial4D and ASPA functions on board management is acceptable. It has to be noted that in order to be able to manage these new functions in an efficient way and to maintain the additional workload at an acceptable level, the pilots shall have adapted competence to use the new system on board (dedicated training).

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.005

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload quantitative assessment

Decrease of PEL per hour in DEP sectors.

Reduction of flight managed and DCT per hour in E-TMA sectors.

Reduction of rerouting per hour in TMA sectors.

Furthermore analysing results related i4D events, it has been recorded a very slight decrease of events per hour in case of integration of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M.

OK

41


121 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.006

Positive feedback from controllers and pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: situational awareness

Very positive feedback has been recorded as regards Situational awareness, both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M, according to controllers ‘opinion, allow to maintain or even to improve their situational awareness.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.007

Positive feedback from pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: situational awareness

Globally, pilots have good situation awareness during i4D-ASPA operations. Identifying the target early (while Initial 4D function was still active) allowed pilots to analyse the traffic situation and to anticipate the transition to the ASPA manoeuvre.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.008


According to controllers’ opinion CTA/i4D concept doesn’t have relevant impact on their risk of deskilling.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0004

CTA/i4D Predictability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0004.001

Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability (the expected benefits contributes to OFA04.01.02 target performance i.e. about -4%)

Results show a standard deviation of difference between planned time and actual time for scenario with i4d/CTA of 2min and 47 sec

OK

41


122 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0005

ASPA-IM-S&M Predictability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0005.001

Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability (the expected benefits shall be about -1%)

Results show a standard deviation of difference between planned time and actual time for scenario with ASPA-IM S&M of 1min and 55 sec

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0006

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Predictability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0006.001

Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability (benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4D- ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization should be equivalent to the CTA/i4D solution organization)

Results show a standard deviation of difference between planned time and actual time for scenario with i4d/CTA+ ASPA-IM S&M of 2min and 37sec

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0007

CTA/i4D Environmental Sustainability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0007.001

Net benefit identified in terms of fuel burn per flight (the expected benefits contributes to OFA04.01.02 target performance i.e about -0.25%)

Results show a reduction of fuel burn and related CO2 emission of 5% (org with overflight) and 3,8% (org. arrivals on LIRF without overflights) in scenario with use of i4D/CTA concept compared with reference scenario

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0008

ASPA-IM-S&M Environmental Sustainability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0008.001

Net benefit identified in terms of fuel burn (difference among baseline and ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization shall be about -0,05%)

Results show a slight increase of fuel burn and CO2 emission of 2,4% (org with overflight) and 0,6% (org. arrivals on LIRF without overflights) with use of ASPA-IM-S&M concept compared with reference

NOK

41


123 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0009

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Sustainability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0009.001

Net Benefit identified in terms of fuel burn (benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4d-ASPA-IM S&M

Results show a reduction of fuel burn and CO2 emission of 1,8% (org with overflight) and 1,4% (org. arrivals on LIRF without overflights) with joined use of I4D/CTA+ ASPA-S&M concept compared with reference

OK

EX-05.03-VP-805 OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0010

CTA/i4D TMA Airspace Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0010.00110CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0010.011

CTA/I4D does not produce a negative impact on TMA Capacity

Thanks on the up-stream sector over the TMA sector withi4D aircraft the traffic was well sequenced to not produce negative impact on the capacity

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0011

ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0011.001

Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (volume and time) i.e. difference among baseline and APSA-IM-S&M solution organization shall be about +1%

Evidence of benefits on the runway throughput, from the integration of ASPA-IM-S&M in operations where only a proportion of the aircraft fleet is ASPA-IM-S&M capable

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0012

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0012.001

Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (volume and time) i.e. benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4D- ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization should be equivalent at least to the ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization

With respect to the Stand alone scenario with ASAS and the other with i4D, the integration of the concept noes not produce negative impact in the Airspace Capacity

OK

41


124 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0013

CTA/i4D solution Airport Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0013.001


Minor benefit Thanks for the Accurancy of the Trajectory over the CTA is predictabile, thus to better sequence th Traffic

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0014

ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0014.001

No benefit identified in terms of throughput in time

Results in Airport capacity does not improve the runway throughput as expected in ASAS S&M organization. This is a deviation by the performance target of ASAS concept.

NOK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0015

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0015.001

Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (time) i.e. benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4D- ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization should be at least equivalent to the ASPA-IM_S&M solution organization

The Solution Scenario have a better Runway throughput compared to the ASAS S&M organization

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0016

CTA/i4D cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0016.001


NOT ADDRESSED

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0017

ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0017.001


NOT

ADDRESSED

41


125 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0018

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M cost efficiency

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0018.001


NOT

ADDRESSED

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0019

CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.001

Positive feedback from the user (ATCO)

Different color coding of ASAS aircraft (for the IDENTIFICATION, enabling, and unable) gives an easly understand of HMI)

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.002

To confirm that HMI support the controllers by to achieve their tasks

Ther support of HMI (different ocding represent a clear understanding regarding their role. (EXE and PLN)

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.003

Perceived cognitive workload in managing HMI is acceptable according to controllers.

From the above graphs it is possible to conclude that: ASPA-IM-S&M HMI impacted negatively on TMA controllers workload. CTA/i4D HMI impacted negatively on DEP controllers workload. ASPA-IM-S&M HMI impacted positively on Sequence Manager workload.

OK

41


126 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.004

Controllers confirm that HMI allows gaining and retaining the appropriate level of situation awareness.

The effort to gather and interpret information, to anticipate the future traffic situation and to identify potential conflict, was always maintened at low level for all type of sectors/roles, by exception of Sequence Managers, who declared to have spent much effort to gather and interpret information in both ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenarios and, to anticipate the future traffic situation in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0020

HMI controller teamwork & communication

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.001

Positive feedback from the controllers.

Related to Teamwork & Communication, controllers affirmed that the new proposed ATM system, in terms of concepts, solicit controllers to communicate and share information each other, i4D/CTA mainly with upper secotrs and ASPA-IM-S&M with lower sectors, which results in an improvement of the shared situational awareness.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.002

Perceived situation awareness related to the interaction between controllers is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective

ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts allowed to increase teamwork and to improve shared situational awareness. Information sharing was improved or maintained

OK

41


127 of 343


unaltered in all solution scenarios in comparison with reference one. Very positive feedback has been provided by Sequence managers who appreciated both ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts, that allowed to better coordinate arrival sequence with all other interested actors

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.003

Perceived cognitive workload related to the interaction between ATCOs is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective

For TMA sectors it slighly increased introducing ASPA-IM-S&M, due to the fact they were some of the main actors operating with ASPA-IM-S&M and so involved in the needed coordinations with other involved colleagues

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.004

Quantitative workload assessment related to the interaction between ATCOs is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective

As already explained in the previous sections the very low values reported for ground-ground communications are due to the fact that the majority of controllers, being in the same room, preferred to do not use telephone to communicate one each other (as currently used in Italian operative sites).

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021

Roles and responsibilities

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0021.001

Controllers confirm that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, compatible and complete

Prescribed roles and responsabilities were always considered clear and exhaustive and however very similar as considered for reference scenario.

OK

41


128 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0022 Safety impacts CRT-05.03-VALP-

0100.0022.001

The integration of i4D (CTA) and ASPA-IM-S&M is acceptable from ATCO perspectives in terms of Safety (Conflict resolution, Traffic Separation & Monitoring, Traffic sequencing and Situational Awareness)

Positive Aspects on the Safety Assessment OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0023

Security Assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0023.001

The list of primary assets is consistent, complete and up to date.

It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASAS messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Safety point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0023.002

The list of threat scenarios is consistent, complete and up to date

It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASAS messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Safety point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the

OK

41


129 of 343


controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0023.003

The assessment on how performance could be affected given an attack is complete and up to date

It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASAS messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Safety point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0024

CTA/i4D performance assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0024.001

The CTA missed shall not be raised in case the a/c profile is not modified by the controller

NOT ADDRESSED

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0024.002

The CTA precision shall be according the performance requirements and operational expectations (i.e. +/- 10 sec).

NOT ADDRESSED

41


130 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0025

ASPA-IM-S&M performance assessment

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0025.001

The ASPA Unable shall be raised only in case of the absolute value of actual time spacing-required time spacing is greater than 5 sec.

NOT ADRESSED

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0025.002

The ASPA precision shall be according the performance requirements and operational expectations (i.e. +/- 5 sec).

NOT ADDRESSED

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026

CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration operational acceptability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.001


NOT ADDRESSED

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.002

On airborne side, the received CTA is compatible with the ETA Min/Max window provided by the aircraft

The 10 seconds accuracy for ETA min/max window displayed to the AMAN is much more appropriate than 1-minute truncation applied in the EXE-708 as the displayed window is more representative of aircraft capabilities when the airborne systems compute the ETA min/max.

OK

41


131 of 343


Received CTA is thus compatible with the window provided by the aircraft in most cases.

The following approximation has been proposed:

If it is not possible to display the AMAN window with a one second precision, the following approximation for the ETAmin/max considered by the AMAN shall be applied to avoid instructing CTA outside the RTA reliable window.

- AMAN displayed ETA min is rounded up to the nearest 10-sec

- AMAN displayed ETA max is rounded down to the nearest 10-sec.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.003

ASPA initiation conditions (spacing and speed adjustment) are within operational limits in approach phase.

The activated ASPA manoeuvres stability need to be improved and the existing recommendation to limit the aircraft speed below FL100 to 250kts even when activating an ASPA manoeuvre has been confirmed.

NOK

41


132 of 343


Considering the specific environment in which the validation exercise took place, it does not seem relevant as a conclusion of the EXE-805 to provide another recommendation on the ASPA initiation condition.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.004

Positive pilots’ feedback while flying integrated i4D and ASPA operations.

Not-applicable speed constraints while flying an ASPA manoeuvre are considered as disturbing by the crews and further work on the information displayed on board might be undertaken.

NOK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0027

Nominal pilot CPDLC Task Sharing

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.001

The expected tasks (new and conventional) are effectively achieved by the crew in nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA operations.

Once a strategy to manage the datalink messages was established within the crew, the task sharing was smooth and efficient and the pilots successfully achieved all expected tasks, new and conventional, including the crosschecking.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.002

The consequences of observed errors are within tolerable limits.

The observed error should not occur in real situation, with a usual call sign and, consequences on traffic, tasks efficiency and workload were

OK

41


133 of 343


negligible.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.003

The workload between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring is well-balanced in nominal situation.

The workload related to CPDLC management remains at an acceptable level for both pilots. In addition, even if it is a little tricky for ASPA in approach phase, the time spent head-down by the crews remained compatible with the task accomplishment.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0028

Non-Nominal pilot CPDLC Task Sharing

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.001

The expected tasks (new and conventional) are effectively achieved by the crew in non-nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA operations.

In all situations, all the flight crew successfully achieved to manage the failure, the conventional tasks for descent and approach management and the new tasks related to CTA and ASPA operations.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.002

The consequences of observed errors are within tolerable limits.

The flight crew adapted the procedure according to the situation: each times, procedure deviation allowed to efficiently manage the flight and had no critical impact on ATM operations. These results confirm that it is more efficient to let the possibility to adapt the

OK

41


134 of 343


task sharing according to the context than to impose a strict task sharing which cannot fit with all circumstances

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.003

The workload between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring is well-balanced in non-nominal situation.

The workload and time spent head down slightly increased in non-nominal situation, but overall remained acceptable and well balanced between Pilot Flying and Pilots Monitoring.

The current Airbus high level task sharing recommendations related to CPDLC is sufficient for managing non-nominal situation: it is at the pilot’s discretion to decide the priority between the tasks according to the situation.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029

Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of communication

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0029.001

No negative impact of CPDLC on controller capability to communicate efficiently with the crew in descent and approach phase.

Controllers really appreciated the possibility to have at any time two available mean of communications. Controllers working at TMA and ARR sectors adopted always CPDLC as prescribed to perform ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvres.

OK

41


135 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0029.002

No negative impact of CPDLC on crew capability to communicate efficiently with the controller in descent and approach phase

When considered as a complementary communication mean, the CPDLC is overall considered as helpful and useful. For the time being, no significant issues or difficulties have been raised by crews and controllers regarding the management of mixed-mode communication and the CPDLC impact on their capability to communicate efficiently.

OK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0030

TOD Downlink impact

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0030.001


This objective could not be assessed (controllers did not use the EPP information to anticipate the descent clearance).

Complementary work on the EPP data exploitation by the ground systems to facilitate the aircraft optimized trajectory when compatible with the surrounding traffic and the traffic flow medium term management may be performed in the next related research projects.

NOT ADDRESSED

41


136 of 343


EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031

RTA Missed procedure

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.001

The procedure defined in case of RTA MISSED is correctly applied by the flight crew

No RTA MISSED occurrence in coupled sessions.

NOT ADDRESSED

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.002

The procedure defined in case of RTA MISSED is correctly applied by the controllers."

NOT ADDRESSED

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0031.003

The workload associated to RTA MISSED management does not prevent the flight crew from activating the ASPA manoeuvre."

No RTA MISSED occurrence in coupled sessions.

NOT ADDRESSED

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0032

ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.001

ASPA initiation conditions remain within defined limits to start the manoeuvre: - Current spacing with the target < 30s - Speed difference with the target < 30kt - Altitude difference with the target < 3000ft

The “feasible entry conditions” as defined in P05.06.06 SPR, REQ-05.06.06-SPR-OPA2.1052 need to be refined, as well as the initiation conditions proposed in this success criterion. In the case of a merge manoeuvre, it seems necessary to add a condition on the distance to the merge waypoint to limit the number of rejected manoeuvres caused by the aircraft inability to reach the instructed spacing in the remaining distance.

NOK

41


137 of 343


But the integrated environment in which the EXE-805 has been conducted does not allow providing precise values and further validation activities need to be conducted before concluding on this topic.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.002

Maintain phase: With acceptable initiation conditions, no ASPA UNABLE alert is sent by the airborne equipment to the crew either: - 5min after the manoeuvre activation in case of Remain behind manoeuvre or - After sequencing the Merge waypoint in case of Merge then Remain behind manoeuvre

ASPA manoeuvre stability has been significantly improved between the EXE-708 and the EXE-805. The analysis of the few UNABLE encountered after activating the manoeuvre demonstrates that some areas of improvement remain.

NOK

EXE-05.03-VP-805

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0033

ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedure

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.001

The procedure defined in case of ASPA UNABLE is correctly applied by the crew.

In the EXE-805, pilots have been briefed to keep the ASPA manoeuvre active in case of UNABLE situation while waiting for the controller instruction. In fact, the ASPA manoeuvre is an ATC instruction and except if deemed absolutely necessary by the crew, pilots do not take

OK

41


138 of 343


Table 21: Validation Criteria status

the initiative to cancel an ATC instruction if not instructed to do so.

Controllers were expecting the manoeuvre to be automatically disengaged when the unable alert is raised by the system. Further discussions on this topic are necessary, but with appropriate training, no significant difficulties are foreseen to apply the defined procedures.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.002

The procedure defined in case of ASPA UNABLE is correctly applied by the controllers

Controllers performed correctly prescribed task in those cases, sometimes they preferred to contact via R/T the interested pilot in order to provide related rationale even if it as not requested.

OK

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.003

The workload associated to ASPA UNABLE management does not prevent the flight crew to perform stabilized approach and landing.

The defined procedure, when correctly performed by the crews and controllers, allowed performing steady approaches and landings while keeping the crew workload in acceptable limits.

OK


139 of 343


4.1.1 Results on concept clarification This section presents a summary of the discussions on the concept regarding some of the scenarios and associated requirements described in the following OSED documents:

- P05.06.01 OSED, iteration 3 [17] - P05.06.06 consolidation OSED, stream 1 [18]

The detailed analyses provided in the section [17][18]of this document allowed identifying several topics which may lead to update the P05.06.01 and P05.06.06 documents. For each topic, the impacted requirements or sections are listed with the associated modification proposal.

4.1.1.1 P05.06.06 – ASPA-IM-S&M Reason for rejecting or cancelling an ASPA manoeuvre

Throughout the P05.06.06 OSED [18] , the crew is expected to provide the controller with the reason for rejecting or cancelling an ASPA manoeuvre. Since there are numerous reasons for pilots to reject or cancel a manoeuvre (when the ASPA system is raising an UNABLE alert, the cause is not even known by the crew), it has been discussed and agreed that the reason would remain optional in the procedures and at pilots’ discretion depending on their assessment of the situation. Thus the following modifications are proposed in the P05.06.06 OSED [18]

- Section 3.2.1.8.1.3 Initiation phase – Instruction Sub-Phase

OSED extract

If one or more of the above conditions fails to succeed, the flight crew of the IM Aircraft reports the situation to the controller; it is expected that the flight crew of the IM Aircraft states the reason for rejecting the ASPA-IM-S&M instruction (e.g. due to aircraft speed envelope).

Proposed modification

If one or more of the above conditions fails to succeed, the flight crew of the IM Aircraft reports the situation to the controller; the flight crew of the IM Aircraft may state the reason for rejecting the ASPA-IM-S&M instruction (e.g. due to aircraft speed envelope).

- Section 3.2.1.8.4.2 Termination on the flight crew of the IM Aircraft’s initiative

OSED extract

When the flight crew of the IM Aircraft initiates the termination, the flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall:

terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre; inform the controller regarding the non-nominal termination of the

procedure which should include the reason for termination (e.g., aircraft envelope, manoeuvre not feasible) (see. REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0034); […]


When the flight crew of the IM Aircraft initiates the termination, the flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall:

terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre; inform the controller regarding the non-nominal termination of the

procedure which may include the reason for termination (e.g., aircraft envelope, manoeuvre not feasible) (see. REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0034); […]

- Section 3.2.1.8.4.2: REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0002.0114

OSED extract

Prior the Planned Termination Point, The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall: […] inform the controller regarding the non-nominal termination of the

procedure which should include the reason for termination (e.g., aircraft envelope, manoeuvre not feasible (see. REQ-05.06.06-OSED-


140 of 343


0001.0034); […]


Prior the Planned Termination Point, The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall: […] inform the controller regarding the non-nominal termination of the

procedure which may include the reason for termination (e.g., aircraft envelope, manoeuvre not feasible (see. REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0034);

[…]

- Section 3.2.3 Procedural flow and Phases diagrams

OSED extract

The flight crew accepts or rejects the instruction as appropriate (including the reason for rejection), after assessing that all requirements for the execution are met (applicability conditions).


The flight crew accepts or rejects the instruction as appropriate (possibly including the reason for rejection), after assessing that all requirements for the execution are met (applicability conditions).

- Section 4.2.2 Roles and responsibilities of the IM Aircraft Flight Crew

OSED extract

Footnote 31: Reminder of REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0002.0104:”The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall inform the controller immediately after having terminating the manoeuvre and state the reason.”


Footnote 31: Reminder of REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0002.0104:”The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall inform the controller immediately after having terminating the manoeuvre and may state the reason.”

- Section 5.4 and Appendix D

OSED extract

Operational scenario 3a and 3b – Operating method step 5 Flight crew of IM02 send DM1 “Unable”. Flight crew gives the reason either in a message combined with DM1 or by R/T.


Operational scenario 3a and 3b – Operating method step 5 Flight crew of IM02 send DM1 “Unable”. Flight crew may give the reason either in a message combined with DM1 or by R/T.

ASPA Manoeuvre interruption on crew initiative In P05.06.06 OSED [18], a complete section is dedicated to the ASPA manoeuvre interruption on crew initiative (section 3.2.1.8.4.2). For the pilots, an ASPA manoeuvre is an ATC instruction and as such remains applicable until explicitly cancelled by the controller or superseded by another instruction of the same type (here, a speed instruction). In this condition, pilots shall not take the initiative to cancel an ATC instruction before informing the controller except in case of necessity. It is proposed to limit the cases of UNABLE for which the crew would have to initiate the interruption of the ASPA manoeuvre and to update the following P05.06.06 OSED [18] extract accordingly:

- Section 3.2.1.8.4.2 Termination on the flight crew of the IM Aircraft’s initiative

OSED extract

At any time during the ASPA-IM-S&M execution the flight crew of the IM Aircraft can terminate if:

The IM flight crew ascertains that the operation cannot be continued, e.g. spacing goal non feasible, or in case of failure (data reception or integrity problem, data accuracy, system failures) (see REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0044).

The IM flight crew determines the need for resumption of non-ASPA-IM-S&M Operations for other reasons (e.g. bad weather, safety-of-flight (see REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0038))


141 of 343



Apart from safety or emergency reasons, if the Flight Crew of the IM aircraft considers that the IM Operation can no longer be continued, they must inform the controller that they are unable to continue the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation and wait for the controller instructions. In the meantime, they must keep on following the IM speed commands, if available

The only exception to this Flight Crew procedure is in case of emergency or for safety reasons: the Flight Crew first ensures the aircraft flight safety by terminating or suspending the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation, and then informs the controller

REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0044

OSED extract

Requirement: The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation prior to the Planned Termination Point if:

o the data quality for the IM Aircraft does no more meet the Safety, Performance and Interoperability requirements required to be an IM Aircraft;

o the data quality for the Target Aircraft does no more meet the Safety, Performance and Interoperability requirements required to be a Target Aircraft;

o the spacing is out of the required IM Tolerance; or o if the FIM Equipment is no longer able to provide IM Speed or IM Turn

guidance.


Requirement: The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation prior to the Planned Termination Point if the FIM Equipment is no longer able to provide IM Speed or IM Turn guidance (e.g. if the data quality does no more meet the Safety, Performance and Interoperability requirement).

REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.004

OSED extract

Rationale When the applicability conditions are no more met, the ASPA-IM-S&M operation can no longer be performed. In that case, the flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M operation.


Rationale

Under specific conditions, the ASPA-IM-S&M operation can no longer be performed and the flight crew might decide to terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M operation before informing the controller.

- Section 4.2.2 Roles and responsibilities of the IM Aircraft Flight Crew

OSED extract

Footnote 30 (Reminder of REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0034) If the flight crew of the IM Aircraft determines that the execution of the ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre is no more feasible, they shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M operation.


Footnote 30 (Reminder of REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0001.0034) If the flight crew of the IM Aircraft determines that the execution of the ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre is not feasible, they shall reject the ASPA-IM-S&M operation.

- Section 6.2.2.4 Termination phase

OSED extract

Termination of ASPA-IM-S&M operation on the IM flight crew’s initiative: The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation prior to the Planned Termination Point if:

o the data quality for the IM Aircraft does no more meet the Safety,


142 of 343


Performance and Interoperability requirements required to be an IM Aircraft;

o the data quality for the Target Aircraft does no more meet the Safety, Performance and Interoperability requirements required to be a Target Aircraft;

o the spacing is out of the required IM Tolerance; or o if the FIM Equipment is no longer able to provide IM Speed or IM Turn

guidance.


Termination of ASPA-IM-S&M operation on the IM flight crew’s initiative: The flight crew of the IM Aircraft shall terminate the ASPA-IM-S&M Operation prior to the Planned Termination Point if the FIM Equipment is no longer able to provide IM Speed or IM Turn guidance (e.g. if the data quality does no more meet the Safety, Performance and Interoperability requirement).

Procedure in case of ASPA UNABLE In the EXE-805, both voice and CPDLC have been used as communication means between the crew and the controller. The following repartition was decided as baseline in the exercise:

- the target selection and ASPA manoeuvre instructions were sent through datalink, - in case of ASPA UNABLE, the crews were instructed to contact the controller by voice only.

The need for two different procedures depending if the crew is rejecting the manoeuvre or informing the controller of an unable situation after the manoeuvre activation has been highlighted. When rejecting the manoeuvre, a single CPDLC message “UNABLE” (DM2) is sufficient to inform the controller of the manoeuvre rejection by the crew. When informing the controller of the impossibility to continue an activated ASPA manoeuvre (whichever the cause, either when an ASPA UNABLE alert is raised by the FIM equipment or when the crew considers necessary to come back to non ASPA-IM-S&M control), the flight crew shall only use R/T. Indeed, it is consider as time critical communication and states the aircraft current speed to allow the controller resuming conventional control. Except if cancelling the ASPA operation is deemed necessary by the crew, the manoeuvre will remain active while waiting for further speed instruction and explicit manoeuvre status from the controller. The following update is proposed in the P05.06.06 OSED [18] to reflect these evolutions:

- Section 3.2.4.3 Termination

OSED extract

In the event of the flight crew of the IM Aircraft being unable to continue respecting a Spacing instruction:

Flight Crew of IM Aircraft: UNABLE SPACING [IM Aircraft Flight ID]

“UNABLE SPACING, AZA123”


In the event of the flight crew of the IM Aircraft being unable to continue respecting a Spacing instruction:

Flight Crew of IM Aircraft: UNABLE SPACING, Speed [XXX]kts, [IM Aircraft Flight ID] “UNABLE SPACING, Speed 210kts, AZA123” Controller: [IM Aircraft Flight ID] Cancel Spacing, [speed instruction] “AZA123, CANCEL SPACING, Maintain current speed”

Crew Awareness while flying an ASPA manoeuvre In the current Airbus implementation of the ASPA function on-board, pilots have a direct access to the current spacing and the instructed spacing information (both are displayed on the Primary Flight Display as soon as the manoeuvre is activated). This information has been considered as sufficient to monitor the ASPA manoeuvre in the last validation exercises. Thus, it is proposed to delete the


143 of 343


following requirement REQ-05.06.06-OSED-0002.0202 (Speed guidance computation during Achieve Stage) from the P05.06.06 OSED [18] . Integration of Initial 4D and ASPA functions The EXE-805 is the second exercise representative real time simulation integrating Initial 4D and ASPA functions. Several findings related to ASPA are impacted by this specific implementation and its associated environment (dedicated TMA design, operational values to avoid important speed variations at low altitude). Considering the remaining limitation and work to do on both ground and airborne system, it seems too early to propose important OSED modification based only on the EXE-805 findings. However, since some elements are quite interesting, it is proposed to add a dedicated scenario to an ASPA operation following a sequence organisation tool (here initial 4D) to the section 5.6 Operational scenarios with foreseen route structures:

Proposed insertion

5.6.3 Operational scenario 6: ASPA-IM-S&M integrated with a sequence organisation tool. The integration of the ASAS S/M concept with the i4D will require an appropriate STAR Designed for all a/c inbound to the Airport. By the Operational assumptions, the TMA STARs allocation is considered an ISO-Distances, between the IAF and FAF point. . Consequently the Traffic should be well sequenced thanks of the accuracy of the Trajectory of 95% +- 10s over the IAF, where after the ASAS S&M further refine the time spacing between the aircraft selected. By the Concept described in the P05.06.06 OSED the sequence start form the IAF and should terminate at the FAF. A Proper airspace design in TMA should be considered for the ANSP. This Operational Requirements is also useful for the E-AMAN system for the calculation of the I4D a/c, with a consequence to help the ASAS S/M prediction. In this case, considering that the ASPA manoeuvre will be instructed to the aircraft quite late, it is recommended to limit the range of delta spacing values to -10s < delta spacing < +20s if the manoeuvre is instructed below the FL100. Where the delta spacing is defined as the difference between the current spacing computed on board the IM aircraft and the instructed spacing.

4.1.1.2 P05.06.01 – i4D In the EXE-805, the ground system was considering the ETA min/max window transmitted by the aircraft with a 10 seconds approximation (against a 1 minute truncation in the EXE-708). The consequences of this improvement have been analysed and the following proposition to update the P05.06.01 OSED [17] is performed: Section 2.2.1 Operational Scenario Segment 5a – Use of Reliable RTA Information in CTA Determination

OSED extract

REQ-05.06.01-OSED-SG5a.0500: For i4D aircraft, ground computed constraints shall only be proposed as a CTA when the CTA lies within the received Reliable RTA Interval. Note: Depending on the length of time to calculate the constraint and the time for the CTA uplink to occur and be agreed, there are cases where the Reliable RTA Interval may no longer be valid when the CTA is received on board and the CTA may not be accepted by the crew.

Proposed insertion

REQ-05.06.01-OSED-SG5a.0500: For i4D aircraft, ground computed constraints shall only be proposed as a CTA when the CTA lies within the received Reliable RTA Interval. Note 1: Depending on the length of time to calculate the constraint and the time for the CTA uplink to occur and be agreed, there are cases where the Reliable RTA Interval may no longer be valid when the CTA is received on board and the CTA may not be accepted by the crew.


144 of 343


Note 2: If the AMAN is not capable to consider an ETA min/max window with a one second precision, the following approximation shall be applied to avoid instructing CTA outside the RTA reliable window:


- AMAN displayed ETA max is rounded down to the nearest 10-sec


145 of 343


4.1.2 Results per KPA

4.1.3 Results impacting regulation and standardisation initiatives Among the EXE-805 results, it would be interesting to share with RTCA SC-214/EUROCEA WG-78 the following recommendation: REC-12 RECOM-708-Design-k: Descent Request message. It is recommended to review the adequateness of voice as communication mean for the descent request in order to avoid losing time at loaded frequencies and allow anticipation of action with the optimal timing. A discussion at standardization level for adding the Request Descent Clearance message shall be launched.

4.2 Analysis of Exercise Results

4.2.1 Human Performance Results This section provides Human Performance results.

Each objective addressed by HP Assessment has been analysed providing evidences for all addressed success criteria. Results are supported by graphs elaborated with data coming from Post Run Questionnaire and system data recordings.

4.2.1.1 CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers’ perspectives

This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001 - To confirm CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

It is divided in several success criteria, analysed independently in the following section and identified in a table.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.001


Outputs and Analysis:


146 of 343


Figure 31:CTA/i4D Controllers’ change of practice

CTA/i4D concept requires an acceptable change of practice for all type of sectors experimented during VP-805. All provided feedback are above the mean value of possible answers (3=neutral), at any rate controllers affirmed that a change of their practice is required in order to satisfy requested CTA. Controllers, especially, at upstream sectors are used to anticipate as soon as possible the flight descent. With the introduction of CTA/i4D concept, have, instead to wait TOD to do that.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.002



Never Almost Never Rarely Neutral Often Almost Always Always

0 1 2 3 4 5 6


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


147 of 343


Figure 32:CTA/i4D Controllers’ procedure flexibility Prescribed procedures, to be adopted in case of CTA/i4D, were considered for the majority of the simulated type of sectors/positions often flexible. Notwithstanding that it was recorded for En-route, ARR, DEP a slight decrease in procedure flexibility in comparison with Reference scenario. It is due to the fact that CTA/i4D induces a limitation in ATCOs’ tactical interventions especially as regards the anticipation of the ToD. Moreover En-route sectors would have had CTA sending timing less binding. Meanwhile E-TMA sectors would have had the opportunity to evaluate and eventually to re-assign the CTA. Different feedback has been provided by controllers who acted as Sequence Manager. They really took advantage of CTA/i4D introduction that supported them in effectively coordinate in advance arrival sequence with upper sectors. En-route sectors took advantage of i4D/CTA: they affirmed to have received, in i4D/CTA scenario, in due time CTAs request and that subsequently related flights followed correctly the vertical profile. E-TMA sectors didn’t have consequences due to the introduction of i4D/CTA. Controllers in charge of those sectors had exclusively to monitor flights already pre-sequenced and instructed from En-Route sectors. Controllers at TMA sectors, as well, asserted that in case of i4D/CTA scenario, they received for previous sectors flights already sequenced. Their works was mainly addressed to fine tune and further optimize arrival sequence. Controllers at TMA and departure sectors asserted that fact the introduction of i4D/CTA could provoke penalization for departing flights and no equipped arriving flights. In specific cases, controllers at TMA sectors had to instruct pilots to a speed decrease, that cause the loss of CTA for those flights. En-Route sectors required that specific working methods and procedure should be defined in order to correctly work with the new system. Specifically Teamwork between En-route, E-TMA and Sequence Manager should be tuned and adequately synchronized in order to be aligned to own expectations based on information that HMI provides. Another recommendation provided by controllers was to concretely consider an update of ATS geography and related procedures (sectors, routes, LoAs, etc.) in order to better fit with i4D/CTA solution.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.003



148 of 343


Figure 33:CTA/i4D Controllers’ workload

Outputs and Analysis: Workload is always maintained at very low level in case of CTA/i4D introduction. Except for TMA and SM sector/position it slightly increased respect to reference scenario. TM, in the majority of cases they underwent CTA/i4D events already initiated by previous sectors (En-Route and E-TMA). Even if TMA sectors received flights already sequenced and so there was a rerouting reduction (ref. to Figure 35), controllers ‘perceived workload increased due the effort required to make compatible equipped arrival traffic with not equipped one. TMA and SM controllers affirmed that increase in their workload has been experienced especially in case one of first flights in the arrival sequence was unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really have to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence. It happened in case a flight was unable to reach the CTA and shall be shifted in the sequence, it is quite stressing for controllers that in order to do not compromise other flights with CTA already assigned has no enough room to re-insert the flight. Controllers at TMA and departure sectors asserted that fact the introduction of i4D/CTA could provoke penalization for departing flights and no equipped arriving flights. In specific cases, controllers at TMA sectors had to instruct pilots to a speed decrease, that cause the loss of CTA for those flights. E-TMA controllers as well had to finalize pre-sequencing already initiated by previous sectors and, in order to allow that assigned CTAs were satisfied, they had to carefully monitor that TOD was respected. Really controllers affirmed that the simulated operational ATM environment is quite complex, it is really characterized by segregated areas, prescribed radar minima, etc.. Furthermore controllers, in case of very high traffic density, do not take care of TOD. So that explains the fact that CTA/i4D introduction is interpreted by controllers as a new task to be executed, such as to satisfy airborne needs. That caused, sometimes, an increase in perceived cognitive workload and stress by controllers.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.004


Very Low Very High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


149 of 343



Figure 34 Ground i4D events

Within CTA/i4D scenario seven CTA instructions per hour have been initiated by En-route sectors and two by E-TMA. Meanwhile in the lower sectors CTA instructions have been disabled (three in TMA and five in ARR).


150 of 343



151 of 343



152 of 343



153 of 343


Figure 35:CTA/i4D Controllers’ and pseudo pilots’ orders Analysing the above graphs related to CWP orders, i4D events, AMAN orders, PWP orders it is possible to deduce that not significative varitations have been recorderd for CTA/i4D scenario in comparison with Reference one, by exception of:

Reduction of PEL (Planned Entry Level) for departure sectors in CTA/i4D scenario. Increase of flight assumed (AOC) and transferred (TOC) per hour by En-Route sectors in

CTA/i4D scenario. Increase of DCT(Direct To) per hour by En-Route and E-TMA sectors in CTA/i4D scenario. Reduction of rerouting per hour in TMA sector in CTA/i4D scenario.

A reasonable assumption for the increasing number of direct routings in i4D scenario is due to the fact that the traffic amount is composed only the 50% of i4D equipage; in order to have a better prediction of the trajectory, it will induce with the other 50% that are not equipped more DCT orders. This constraint implies a better sequencing with a potential tactical instruction in a plan view (more DCT), that influences a TTL or TTG provided by the E-AMAN Tool. Furthermore it is interesting to have a look at PWP orders to complete the view as regards controllers’ operations. Speed orders were provided via voice by controllers and so it is possible to analyse those data trought pseudo pilot positions’ recordeded logs. It has been recorded an increase of speed variation exclusively for TMA sectors. It is probably not caused only by CTA/i4D introduction, due to the fact that similar increase has been recorded for ASPA-IM-S&M scenario and integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Speed orders are provided in order to increase/decrease flight speed. It has been recorded an increase of speed orders and so of speed variations in all simulated solution scenarios. Even if when a/c are under CTA no speed order should be delivered to the a/c, controllers provided speed orders to not equipped flight also to assure that CTA of equipped flights were respected. Finally analysing the results related to communication where the overall time per hour of R/T and frequency communications per sectors’ category are presented, it is obtained a decrease in time spent for communications both ground – air and ground – ground in case of CTA/i4D scenario. Specifically for each sectors’ group the overall time per hour is reported for:

Radio called . ground –air communications, Radio received: air – ground communications, Telecom – ground – ground communications.

Take into account that the very low values reported for ground-ground communications are due to the fact that the majority of controllers, being in the same room, preferred to do not use telephone to communicate one each other (as currently used in Italian operative sites).

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.005



154 of 343



Figure 36:CTA/i4D Controllers’ situational awareness

Situational awareness is always maintened at high level. It is interesting that for Sequence Manager figure it is really improved respect to Reference scenario. It is due to the fact the CTA/i4D allows to improve and anticipate coordination among lower and upper sectors, having as consequence an increase in shared situational awareness. Sequence Manager obviously played a central role in this kind of coordination.

Controllers suggested that a potential improvement aimed to further increase their situational awareness could be to have an alert (audio or visual) in case of reached TOD. Otherwise

the monitoring of TOD achievement could become a task of planner, who has to communicate to executive controller of that.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.006

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable risk of deskilling.



0 1 2 3 4 5 6


155 of 343


Figure 37:CTA/i4D Controllers’ risk of deskilling

According to controllers’ opinion CTA/i4D concept doesn’t have relevant impact on their risk of deskilling. CTA/i4D should induce changes on working methods, practices and task sharing, but notwithstanding that it does not imply introduction of any kind of automation in respect to current operations. Controllers really consider that the risk of deskilling could occur just in case of introduction of partial/complete automation of task and/or activities those usually are performed by controllers without support of any tool. In those specific cases, the partial or total unavailability of the supportive tool could have impact on controllers activities, who used to be supported by the tool could have been deskilled.

4.2.1.2 ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers’ perspectives


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002 - To confirm ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

Sequence Manager is a new role not operative in current italian operative sites and obviously, being a new role, it is characterized by a considerable change of practice respect to the current operations.


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.001



0 1 2 3 4 5 6


156 of 343



Figure 38: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ change of practice

According to involved controllers the change of practice due to ASPA-IM-S&M concept introduction is acceptable. All feedback are included between 3 (neutral) and 5 (almost always) values. The lower value has been recorded for Sequence Manager role.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.002



Figure 39: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ procedure flexibility


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


157 of 343


ASPA-IM-S&M related procedures in comparison with the ones inherent to reference scenario are considered often flexible. Specifically procedures’ flexibility improves according to Sequence Manager and Arrival Coordinator control positions. In ASPA-IM-S&M scenario, both control positions took advantage of the new system features under test. Discordant opnion, on the other hand, has been provided by DEP sector, that considered introduced procedures not flexible enough due to the fact that they penalize departing and/or not equipped inbound flights. Finally it is really interesting to report the controllers’ positive feedback related to sperimented STARs into VP-805. The solution to consider iso-distant IAF allowed terminal controller to effectively manage and fine tune arrival sequence taking also advantage of ASPA-IM-S&M available manouvres.The Traffic should be well sequenced thanks of the accuracy of the Trajectory of 95% +- 10s over the ToD, where the ASAS S&M will tune the sequence with a precise time spacing of the aircraft. A Proper airspace design of the STAR help at the beginning of the sequence the proposed separation by the up-stream sector and the maintaining separation in the TMA (for ASAS S&M) It is a really significative result, that testifies that an adequate ATS geography and related procedures areoften mandatory in order to allow that an innovative solution could provide the expected benefits.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.003



Figure 40: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ workload

Perceived controllers’ wokload related to ASPA-IM-S&M scenario runs was always maintened at very low levels. A slight increase in perceived workload in comparison with reference scenario has been recorded for TMA controllers and Arrival Coordinator. An other interesting observation is the trend of perceived wokload from upper sectors to lower ones: analysing both reference and ASPA-IM-S&M data, the workload increase moving from upper to lower sectors/postions. The positions characterized by higher values of workload are Sequence Manager and Arrival Coordinator. Meanwhile Sequence Manager perceived workload decreased moving from reference to ASPA-IM-S&M scenario,

Very Low Very High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


158 of 343


Sequence Mangers appreciated the introduction of ASPA-IM-S&M as a valid support to fine-tune the arrival sequence previously built up with the support of E-AMAN. Arrival Coordinator perceived workload slightly increased. It is obviously due to the fact that in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario Arrival Coordinator has a new task of arranging and coordinating with TMA and ARR controllers the identified ASAS manouvres, meanwhile in reference scenario he/she has esclusively to support Sequence Manager in arringing arrival sequence with the exclusive support of E-AMAN.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.004



Figure 41: ASPA-IM_S&M Controllers’ orders

The above graph shows the overall pictures of ASPA-IM-S&M instructions for each simulated type of sector within ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Sectors mainly interested by ASPA-IM-S&M operations were the ones related to E-TMA, TMA and ARR. All manouvres undertaken in E-TMA and ARR sectors were succesfully performed, meanwhile in TMA sectors, characterized by an higher number of undertaken manouvres, a minimum percentage of them failed. Controllers asserted that it happened rarely when separation coditions were not satisfied anymore. In case of unable, the line between target and follower was shown in red colour on the HMI. In order to erase from the HMI such notification, they choose “cancel spacing” or “deselect target”.


159 of 343



160 of 343



161 of 343


Figure 42: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ and pseudo-pilots’ orders Analysing the above graphs related to CWP orders, ASPA-IM-S&M orders, AMAN orders, PWP orders it is possible to deduce that not significative varitations have been recorderd for ASPA-IM-S&M scenario in comparison with Reference one, by exception of:

Increase of DCT and PEL per hour in DEP sectors in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Reduction of flight managed and DCT per hour in E-TMA sectors in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Reduction of rerouting per hour in TMA sector in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario.

Furthermore it is interesting to have a look at PWP orders to complete the view as regards controllers’ operations. Speed orders were provided via voice by controllers and so it is possible to analyse those data trought pseudo pilot positions’ recordeded logs. It has been recorded an increase of speed variation exclusively for TMA sectors. It is probably not caused only by ASPA-IM-S&M introduction, due to the fact that similar increase has been recorded for CTA/i4D scenario and integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Speed instructions, on the other hand, decreased in case of ASPA-IM-S&M scenario for E-TMA and ARR sectors. Finally analysing the results related to communication where the overall time per hour of R/T and frequency communications per sectors’ category are presented, it is obtained an increase in time spent for communications both ground – air and ground – ground for Departure sector and TMA in case of ASPA-IM-S&M scenario. Departure sector probably experienced an increase in communications in order to mitigate the negative impact on no equipped and departing flights. TMA sectors had instead to communicate about the ASPA-IM-S&M, it explains the increase of communications and the perceived workload. Specifically for each sectors’ group the overall time per hour is reported for:



Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.005




162 of 343


Figure 43: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ situational awareness

Situational awareness was always maintained at very high level introducing ASPA-IM-S&M concept. Specifically it increased in comparison with reference scenario for en-route, E-TMA, DEP, Sequence Manager. For Arrival Coordinator and ARR it is pratically maintened unaltered respect to reference scenario. ASPA-IM-S&M, according to controllers ‘opinion, allow to maintain or even to improve their situational awareness. Controllers asserted that ASPA-IM-S&M improving shared situational awareness among the team. Finally it slighlty decreased according to controllers working at TMA sectors (TNE and TNW), they asserted that they had to focus on specific area of their sectors. Thanks to the Indication of actual current spacing through ASPA S&M tool, when the ATCOs have already selected the Target and the Follower ones improved the situational awareness as well.

According the correct usage of the E-AMAN in the beginning of the Sequence, if this work has been properly planned only minor adjustment have to be made by the arrival sectors, thus to enabling a good balancing process of the workload and situational awareness as well.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.006




0 1 2 3 4 5 6


163 of 343


Figure 44: ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ risk of deskilling

Controllers asserted that ASPA-IM-S&M concept introduction in operations could have negative impact on controllers’ skills and abilities. Especially controllors at TMA and ARR sectors are used to fine tune the arrival sequence adopting, when needed, vectoring instructions. The application of ASPA-IM-S&M should reduce tactical intervantions by controllers as it delegates to the aircraft crew the task of self-spacing off a preceding traffic.Controllers are worried that after long application of ASPA-IM-S&M they could lose their abilities to tactically act on the arrival sequence due to due to lack of regular use. Controllers suggested that continous training sould be provided in order to maintein their ability to act without the support of innovative tools, such as ASPA-IM-S&M.

4.2.1.3 ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0032: Evaluate ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvre stability.


Context One of the main feedbacks from the EXE-708, on the airborne side, was the difficulty to initiate stable ASPA manoeuvre. Several manoeuvres were rejected and important aircraft speed variation when the manoeuvre was activated was reported as quite disturbing by the crews., The principal cause for this instability was identified to be a too important delta spacing (defined as the difference between the current spacing computed on board and the instructed spacing). Thus a new tool was implemented in the ground system for the EXE-805, allowing the controller to display the current spacing between the two aircraft before instructing the ASPA manoeuvre.

The second major evolution developed for the EXE-805 was the ETAmin/max window displayed and the CTA instructed with a 10-sec approximation to the AMAN compare to a 1-min truncation in the EXE-708. The detailed impact of this evolution is analysed in the section 4.2.1.5.

In order to assess the impact of these evolutions on the ASPA manoeuvres initiation and then on the aircraft capability to acquire and maintain the spacing, it was decided to dedicate an objective to the ASPA manoeuvre stability from on-board perspective. It has been split in two success criteria and the associated outputs and analyses are detailed in this section.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


164 of 343


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.001

ASPA initiation conditions remain within defined limits to start the manoeuvre:

- Current spacing with the target3 < 30s - Speed difference with the target < 30kt - Altitude difference with the target < 3000ft

Outputs and Analysis: In the 4 coupled validation sessions, the AIRBUS aircraft performed 15 flights, 16 ASPA manoeuvres were instructed with the following repartition:

- 7 manoeuvres were performed with equipped target aircraft which had to follow CTA and the average delta spacing at the manoeuvre activation is 10 seconds.

- 7 manoeuvres were performed with not equipped target aircraft and the average delta spacing at the manoeuvre activation is 21 seconds.

- 1 manoeuvre was rejected due to a FMS initialisation issue encountered with the simulator and no data was computed by the algorithm. This failure has been analysed and identified to be linked to the simulation environment and will not happen in operations.

- For 1 manoeuvre, there is no information available regarding the target aircraft.

- As a first general analysis, it seems that target equipped with the Initial 4D function, has positive consequence on the ASPA manoeuvre initiation conditions. Indeed, over these 16 manoeuvres, 4 were rejected by the crews after the initial system feedback (before the manoeuvre activation) and were never activated. These 4 rejected manoeuvres were expected to be performed with a target not equipped with the Initial 4D function.

In the EXE-708, 8 ASPA manoeuvres were instructed and 2 manoeuvres were rejected before the manoeuvre activation. Several similarities between the EXE-708 and the EXE-805 rejected manoeuvres have to be highlighted:

- All manoeuvres were of the same type: MERGE BEHIND.

- None of the selected target was equipped with Initial 4D capability.

The ratio of rejected manoeuvres before activation remained constant between the two exercises (25%). Thus, further analysis on the manoeuvres initiation conditions (as proposed in the EXE-805 as potential criteria) has been performed to determine the precise cause for their rejection, as detailed in the table below where the observed initiation conditions are compared to the operational limits defined in this success criterion. These conditions have been determined based on the P05.06.06 SPR[29] Appendix D (“Study of ASPA S&M Performances”).

The conditions compliant with the proposed definition are highlighted in bold green while the not compliant conditions are highlighted in bold red:

a) b) c) d)

Manoeuvre Type MERGE BEHIND

MERGE BEHIND

MERGE BEHIND

MERGE BEHIND

3 This criteria has evolved since the redaction of the Validation Plan and the “current spacing with the target” condition is defined as the “delta spacing” (difference between the instructed spacing and the current spacing) in this Validation Report.


165 of 343


Delta spacing 27sec Not computed 16sec 27sec

Ground speed difference -58,25kts -36,25kts -1kt -9,5kts

Altitude difference -740fts 484fts 1504fts -64fts

Table 22: Initiation conditions of the ASPA manoeuvres rejected during the EXE-805

In one case (b) in the table above), the crew could not activate the manoeuvre due to a simulator issue. But in the three other cases, it was impossible to activate the manoeuvres for the same reason: the distance to the merge waypoint was too short to recover the delta spacing as illustrated in the table below:

a) c) d)

Distance to merge waypoint 12,6NM 9,38NM 11,5NM

Delta spacing 27sec 16sec 27sec

Table 23: Rejected ASPA manoeuvres Distance to merge waypoint VS delta spacing

In these three cases, the aircraft did not have enough deceleration capability to reach the instructed spacing before sequencing the merge waypoint. The system supplier feedback states that below the FL100, a distance of 20NM to the merge waypoint allows recovering around 30sec maximum. Then, the fact that the algorithm considered the manoeuvres as not achievable before activating them can be considered as a nominal system behaviour.

The following P05.06.06 OSED and SPR information can be used to complete this analysis:

OSED [18] ASSUMP-OSED4: “For the “Merge”, “Follow route then merge” and “Radar vector then merge” manoeuvres, the Achieve by Point is positioned at the Merge Point. For the “Remain” manoeuvre, the Achieve-by point is determined by a default time from the start of the execution.”

SPR [29] REQ-05.06.06-SPR-OPA2.1052 where the notion of “feasible entry conditions” is defined as follow: “Initial position and speeds of the two aircraft are such that the desired time spacing at the Achieve by Point could be attainable by using the ASPA-IM-S&M equipment (i.e. the resulting initial time spacing error could be minimised by the ASPA-IM-S&M equipment within the aircraft performance envelope)”

In the prototype used for the ASPA validation exercise, the “default time” defined for the Remain manoeuvre is 5min. At 230kts (speed constraint on the RTA waypoint in the scenario), it corresponds to 19NM and would have allowed the aircraft to recover a delta spacing of around 30sec.

It is significantly higher than the remaining distance to the merge waypoint when the rejected manoeuvres were received. Thus, it is confirmed that the initiation conditions were not “feasible entry conditions” for these manoeuvres.

Two different cases have been observed:

- When the target is equipped with Initial 4D function, the average delta spacing observed is 10sec. At 230kts (speed constraint on the RTA waypoint), the aircraft would have recovered this spacing in around 6NM or 1min30sec. Both values can be considered as “feasible entry conditions” for either a merge or a remain manoeuvre.

- When the target is not equipped with Initial 4D function, the average delta spacing observed is 21sec. At 230kts (speed constraint on the RTA waypoint), the aircraft would have recovered this spacing in around 13NM or 3min30sec. For a remain manoeuvre, 3min30sec can be considered as “feasible entry condition” with a default time of 5min. However, in the case of a merge manoeuvre, it may happen that the “feasible entry condition” criteria would not be met if the manoeuvre was to be instructed close to the merge waypoint.


166 of 343


The following average values regarding the instructed merge manoeuvres have been observed:

Average distance to the merge waypoint Average delta spacing

Rejected manoeuvres (3 manoeuvres) 11,2NM 23,3s

Activated manoeuvres (3 manoeuvres) 13,4NM 5,7s

Table 24: Instructed Merge Manoeuvres average characteristics

Conclusion The “feasible entry conditions” as defined in P05.06.06 SPR [29]REQ-05.06.06-SPR-OPA2.1052 need to be refined, as well as the initiation conditions proposed in this success criterion. In the case of a merge manoeuvre, it seems necessary to add a condition on the distance to the merge waypoint to limit the number of rejected manoeuvres caused by the aircraft inability to reach the instructed spacing in the remaining distance.

But the integrated environment in which the EXE-805 has been conducted does not allow providing precise values and further validation activities need to be conducted before concluding on this topic.

The success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.001 is considered as not achieved.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.002

Maintain phase: With acceptable initiation conditions, no ASPA UNABLE alert is sent by the airborne equipment to the crew either:

- 5min after the manoeuvre activation in case of Remain behind manoeuvre or

- After sequencing the Merge waypoint in case of Merge then Remain behind manoeuvre

Outputs and analysis Over the 12 activated manoeuvres, 3 ASPA UNABLE alerts have been raised to the crews and announced to the ATC, leading to cancel the manoeuvre. It is a major improvement (for detailed information regarding the airborne system, refer to the white paper issued after the EXE-708) compared to the EXE-708, where 5 over 8 manoeuvres were interrupted by UNABLE situations.

These three cases have been analysed, and the conclusions are available below:

Case 1 Different data transmission frequency through SVS4 between Airbus and ENAV

Analysis The frequency of the data transmitted by ENAV through SVS was different from Airbus system’s data acquisition frequency. A solution has been developed to limit the impact on the Real Time Simulation but in this single case, it was not enough and the target incomplete data transmitted to the aircraft led to the UNABLE.

Conclusion This UNABLE has been caused by the simulation environment and cannot happen in real life where ADS-B Out and ADS-B In applications have been designed to be compatible with the airborne systems characteristics.

4 Shared Virtual Sky, technical solution developed in the frame of SESAR to allow connecting in real time several partners’ facilities located outside the range of surveillance and communication systems. It has been used to perform the Real Time Simulation.


167 of 343


Case 2 Aircraft configuration change not anticipated by ASPA algorithm

Analysis In order to evaluate the aircraft capability to respect the instructing spacing while flying an ASPA manoeuvre, the algorithm takes into account maximum (Vmax) and minimum (Vmin) speed values.

These values depend on several factors, including the speed envelope and the aircraft configuration (i.e Clean, FLAP1 or FLAP2). The algorithm adapts the acceptable speed range to the aircraft maximum and minimum speeds in the current situation.

In the evaluated prototype version, the algorithm does not anticipate the aircraft configuration change, then at some point, when the target is extending its own configurations and starts to decelerate, the algorithm will detect that the necessary speed to maintain the instructed spacing is lower than the considered Vmin. If the own-ship configurations are not extended, it might lead the system to consider that the aircraft will not be able to maintain the instructed spacing and raise an UNABLE alert.

Conclusion This UNABLE was generated because the current ASPA algorithm prototype is not able to anticipate the own-ship configuration changes when approaching low altitudes. It is the first time that this issue is reported in a validation exercise and now that it is identified, it shall be corrected if further work on the ASPA function would be performed.

Case 3 Engines thrust adjustment due to delayed descent clearance and target deceleration

Analysis In this case, the aircraft was reaching the selected altitude on the FCU (FL90) and started to decrease its descent rate to respect the last descent clearance received by the crew. In order to compensate the deceleration induced by the level off, the engines thrust increased. However, the target aircraft had already started to decelerate toward its approach speed. When the clearance for further descent was provided to the crew, the engines reduction, managed by auto-thrust, was not sufficiently fast-acting to remain within the +/-5-second tolerance and the ASPA UNABLE alert was raised by the system.

Conclusion It is the first time that engines latency, when managed by auto-thrust, is identified as cause for an ASPA unable in a representative validation exercise. This is a very interesting case that should be further investigated and confirmed if further work on the ASPA function would be performed.

Table 25: ASPA UNABLE analyses

Conclusion Overall, the ASPA manoeuvre stability has been significantly improved between the EXE-708 and the EXE-805. The analysis of the few UNABLE encountered after activating the manoeuvre demonstrates that remaining areas of improvement should be considered if further work on the ASPA airborne system is envisioned.

The success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0032.002 is considered as partially achieved.

4.2.1.4 Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives



168 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 - To confirm integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.001


Figure 45: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ change of practice

Majority of controllers asserted that CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M both in stand-alone and in integration modes require an acceptable change of practice. The recommendation, at any rate, is to clearly define roles, responsibilities and task sharing and moreover to provide adequate training before introducing CTA/i4D and/or ASPA-IM-S&M.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.002



0 1 2 3 4 5 6


169 of 343


Figure 46: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ procedure flexibility

En-Route sectors were mainly impacted by CTA/i4D and in this specific scenario so they suffered a slight decrease in procedure flexibility. It is due to the fact that CTA/i4D induces a limitation in ATCOs’ tactical interventions especially as regards the respect of TOD. Generally, controllers affirmed that the simulated operational ATM environment is quite complex, it is really characterized by segregated areas, prescribed radar minima, etc.. Furthermore controllers, in case of very high traffic density, do not take care of TOD. So that explains the fact that CTA/i4D introduction is interpreted by controllers as a new task to be executed, such as to satisfy airborne needs. That caused, sometimes, an increase in perceived cognitive workload and stress by controllers. For E-TMA sectors procedure flexibility seems to be maintained unaltered in solution scenario respect to reference scenario. TMA controllers complained with a decrease of procedure flexibility caused by ASPA-IM-S&M introduction both in stand-alone and integrated with CTA/i4D. Also for ARR sectors a slight decrease in procedure flexibility in comparison with Reference scenario has been recorded in case of CTA/i4D in stand-alone mode. DEP sector, considered introduced procedures not flexible enough due to the fact that they penalize departing and/or not equipped inbound flights. Sequence Managers, on the other hand, really took advantage of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M introduction that supported them in effectively coordinate in advance arrival sequence with upper sectors, on one side, and to fine tune it with lower sector on the other side. Procedures’ flexibility improved according Arrival Coordinator control positions.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.003



0 1 2 3 4 5 6


170 of 343


Figure 47: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ workload

In case of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integrated concepts percieved workload decreased in respect to reference for En-Route, E-TMA, ARR, DEP sectors. It was maintened unaltered for Arrival Coordinator and on the other hand slighhtly increased for TMA and SM. Analysing obtaining results taking into account the ones related to CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenario, it seems that the presence of CTA/i4D operational concept impacted negatively on TMA and SM preceived workload. Probably it is due to the fact that controllers approached to CTA/i4D concept, as a request coming from the aircraft to be satisfied as much as possible. In other words CTA/i4D, even if considered as an improvement, was experienced as a constraint, so requiring an increase in controllers’ perceived mental workload. Furthermore TMA and SM controllers affirmed that increase in their workload has been experienced especially in case one of first flights in the arrival sequence was unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really have to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence. It happened in case a flight was unable to reach the CTA and shall be shifted in the sequence, it is quite stressing for controllers that in order to do not compromise other flights with CTA already assigned has no enough room to re-insert the flight. They asked for specific working methods and procedures to be adopted in those cases in order to reduce at minimum the impact on arrival sequence and related mean delay. This procedures happened in case a flight was unable to reach the CTA and shall be shifted in the sequence, it is quite stressing for controllers that in order to do not compromise other flights with CTA already assigned has no enough room to re-insert the flight. At any rate controllers affirmed that the simulated operational ATM environment is quite complex, it is really characterized by segregated areas, prescribed radar minima, etc.. Furthermore, in Rome current operations, controllers, in case of very high traffic density, do not take care of TOD. So that explains the fact that CTA/i4D introduction is interpreted by controllers as a new task to be executed, such as to satisfy airborne needs. That caused, sometimes, an increase in perceived cognitive workload and stress by controllers. In a situation of high traffic density, several tactical intervention are foreseen, however is quite difficult to manage the TOD because in the last phase of flight the ATCOs have much freedom to vector the aircraft properly as they think is more suitable according to a situation with high complexity traffic.

Very Low Very High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


171 of 343


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.005



172 of 343



173 of 343



174 of 343


Figure 48: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ and pseudo-plots’ orders Significative variations have been highligted with background colours associated to solution scenarios. The results related CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M stand-alone have been deascribed above respectively in OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001 and OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002. As regards CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenario the relevant variations respect to reference scenario are:

Decrease of PEL per hour in DEP sectors. Reduction of flight managed and DCT per hour in E-TMA sectors. Reduction of rerouting per hour in TMA sectors.

Furthermore analysing results related i4D events, it has been recorded a very slight decrease of events per hour in case of integration of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M. Similarly analysing results related ASPA-IM-S&M orders, it has been recorded a very slight decrease of orders per hour in TMA sectors in case of integration of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M. It is due to the fact that in case of ASPA-IM-S&M in stand-alone mode controllers experienced an higher procedures’ flexibility due to the fact that they had more freedom in operating without take care to CTA satisfaction and TOD respect. Moreover it is interesting to have a look at PWP orders to complete the view as regards controllers’ operations. Speed orders were provided via voice by controllers and so it is possible to analyse those data trought pseudo pilot positions’ recordeded logs. It has been recorded an increase of speed variation exclusively for TMA sectors, due to the fact that similar increase has been recorded also for CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M standalone scenario, it seems that both investigate solutions had impact on that result. Similarly to ASPA-IM-S&M scenario speed instructions, on the other hand, decreased in case of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenario for E-TMA and ARR sectors. So the benefit is probably due to ASPA-IM-S&M solution. Finally analysing the results related to communication where the overall time per hour of R/T and frequency communications per sectors’ category are presented, it is obtained:


175 of 343


decrease of RT occupancy period for En-Route sectors both in case CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M were in standalone mode and in integrated mode, testifing that both investigated concepts allowed to optimize communications in En-Route sectors;

decrease of RT occupancy period for E-TMA sectors in case of CTA/i4D scenario, testifing that mainly CTA/i4D allowed to optimize communications in E-TMA sectors;

increase of RT occupancy period for Departure sector just in case of ASPA-IM-S&M, testifing that the main benefits in terms of communication optimization has been provided by CTA/i4D concept;

increase of RT occupancy period for TMA sectors in case of ASPA-IM-S&M, both in stand alone mode and integrated with CTA/i4D, as reported above controllers even if appreciated ASPA-IM-S&M complained with an increase in communications/ccordinations provoking an increase in their perceived workload as well.

Specifically for each sectors’ group the overall time per hour is reported for:



Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.006

Positive feedback from controllers and pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on situational awareness.

Figure 49: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ situational awareness

Very positive feedback has been recorded as regards Situational awareness, both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M, according to controllers ‘opinion, allow to maintain or even to improve their situational awareness. Controllers asserted that both tools allowed to improve shared situational awareness


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


176 of 343


among the team.Situational awareness is always maintened at high level. It is interesting that for Sequence Manager figure it is really improved respect to Reference scenario. It is due to the fact the CTA/i4D allows to improve and anticipate coordination among lower and upper sectors, having as consequence an increase in shared situational awareness. Sequence Manager obviously played a central role in this kind of coordination. Controllers suggested that a potential improvement aimed to further increase their situational awareness could be to have an alert (audio or visual) in case of reached TOD. Otherwise the monitoring of TOD achievement could become a task of planner, who has to communicate to executive controller of that. Situational awareness was always maintained at very high level introducing ASPA-IM-S&M concept. Specifically it increased in comparison with reference scenario for en-route, E-TMA, DEP, Sequence Manager. For Arrival Coordinator and ARR it is pratically maintened unaltered respect to reference scenario. Finally it slighlty decreased according to controllers working at TMA sectors (TNE and TNW), they asserted that they had to focus on specific area of their sectors.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.008


Figure 50: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ risk of deskilling

According to controllers’ opinion CTA/i4D concept doesn’t have relevant impact on their risk of deskilling. CTA/i4D should induce changes on working methods, practices and task sharing, but notwithstanding that it does not imply introduction of any kind of automation in respect to current operations. Controllers really consider that the risk of deskilling could occur just in case of introduction of partial/complete automation of task and/or activities those usually are performed by controllers without support of any tool. In those specific cases, the partial or total unavailability of the supportive tool could have impact on controllers activities, who used to be supported by the tool could have been deskilled.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


177 of 343


Controllers asserted that ASPA-IM-S&M concept introduction in operations could have negative impact on controllers’ skills and abilities. Especially controllors at TMA and ARR sectors are used to fine tune the arrival sequence adopting, when needed, vectoring instructions. The application of ASPA-IM-S&M should reduce tactical intervantions by controllers and even partially delegate to the aircraft crew the task of self-separating form previous traffic. Controllers are worried that after long application of ASPA-IM-S&M they could lose their abilities to tactically act on the arrival sequence due to due to lack of regular use. Controllers suggested that continous training sould be provided in order to maintein their ability to act without the support of innovative tools, such as ASPA-IM-S&M.

Overall results related to OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 This subsection provides overall conclusive results related to OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 collected by means the filling in of Want-Have and Benefit Impact Matrixes.

Please refer also to §4.2.1.6, 4.2.1.7 and 4.2.1.8 for further details related to teamwork, usability and roles and responsibilities.

Want Have Matrix

Table 26 recaps feedback provided by controllers during the final debriefing. Controllers was asked to provide answers to the following questions, taking into account what experienced during the simulation session and, above all, focussing on the investigated concepts (integrated E-AMAN, i4D+CTA and ASPA S&M).

The controller was asked to answer the following questions:

What would you like the future system will achieve (you did not have during the simulation experience)?

What would you like the future system will preserve (you did have during the simulation experience)?

What would you like the future system will avoid (you did not have during the simulation experience)?

What would you like the future system will remove (you did have during the simulation experience)?

Do you have it?

No Yes

Do

you

wan

t it?

Yes Achieve EN-ROUTE CTA Sending timing less binding for

En-route sectors. Procedures (Geography ATS, LOAs

and FLAS) suitable to satisfy needs and expectations.

E-TMA In order to mitigate the low procedure

flexibility about which controllers complained, they would have the opportunity to evaluate and eventually to re-assign the CTA.

To respect the ISO-Distance (dedicated STAR) in order to assure (as much as possible) the respect of

Preserve EN-ROUTE CTA concept and

sequence management allow having major awareness for en-route sectors.

E-TMA Skip for selecting directs

from a sector to another. Drop-down list for

rerouting. Elastic vector and

prediction vector smashed into pieces at 15’.

DEP


178 of 343


CTA. The opportunity and Additional monitor

to the PLN/CWP, to see the Diagnostic for each message for the concept applied

On the Label, the visualization on sequence number exclusively for the flights already evaluated by the sequence manager.

Clear tasks’ definition and sharing PLN/EXE in managing information and orders (e.g. target identification, CTA send, etc.).

Define an Operational criteria according the FLAS to insert departures for neighbour airport in the arrival sequence (e.g. inserting the flight in sequence when it is still at the departing airport calculating the ETA considering mean taxi-time at the departure).

DEP Roles and responsibilities for:

o Assigning/negotiating CTA EXE or PLN Sector or SM

o Target selection: Sector or SM.

TMA - ARR – ASAS COO 100% equipped flights: controllers

complained with the complexity to manage at the same time both equipped and no equipped flights with the main aim to make them compatible. In case of all equipped flights their workload could really decrease.

Further training related roles and responsibilities and task sharing among actors involved in arrival sequence management (E-TMA, TMA, SM, and AC).

To consider certified Operational Personnel qualified to operate with new concepts.

Opportunity to manually highlight flights already evaluated by SM/AC and for which the sequence position is confirmed.

On the HMI a FLAG that automatically displays unable ASPA.

SM i4D integrated with Point Merge

System. Working Methods in case of

recovery/Contingency.

E-AMAN and i4D horizons extensions.

Redundancy of R/T and DL communication systems Answer: controllers recommended to always maintain operative both communication channel for safety reasons.)

TMA - ARR – ASAS COO Actual spacing information. ATS geography and arrival

procedures improved in order to support manoeuvres (iso-distance and radar minima).

SM role dedicated for AMAN management.

SM Data link. i4D. STARs (iso-distance IAF).


179 of 343


Mode S. CTA modification according the Arrival

Sequencing. ATS geography suitable for CTA

compliancy (re-organization airspace structure).

No Avoid

E-TMA STCA between flights at same level. Poor R&B usability. DEP Pilot authority to remain in CTA if it is

retained necessary o to cancel it. TMA - ARR – ASAS COO Autonomous descent at top of

descent.

Remove EN-ROUTE ASAS target identification

graphic objects (yellow link and then grey link) too invasive.

E-TMA Useless information in

macro-label (that should not be opened automatically, but on request).

Time to lose/to gain not certain and/or still variable, not requiring ATCOs intervention.

Pop up window on radar screen related to data link messages.

DEP i4D/ASPA Diagnostic

windows. TMA - ARR – ASAS COO System rigidity. SM Poor flexibility in managing

contingencies. Conventional Radar

screen.

Table 26: HP Ground Want – Have Matrix

Benefit Impact Matrix

At the end of the whole simulation session controllers were asked to fill in the benefit mechanism, so to provide their feedback related the impact of the investigated concepts:

CTA/i4D stand alone,

ASPA-IM-S&M stand alone,

CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M in integrated mode;

On the following areas relevant to the Human Performance Assessment:

Risk of deskilling, Change of Practice acceptability, Procedure flexibility, Teamwork & Communication, Situational awareness,


180 of 343


Usability, Workload.

Specifically all participant controllers (21 acting as ATCOs and 2 as subject matter experts) indicated the impact of the investigated concepts on the listed areas with one of the following symbols:

= Remain unaltered respect to current operations, Increase respect to current operations, Decrease respect to current operations.

Figure 51 recaps the collected feedback, boxes are coloured with green, blue or red background in case of majority of positive, neutral and negative feedback respectively.


181 of 343


Figure 51: HP Ground Benefit Impact Matrix


182 of 343


Risk of deskilling: having a look at the above Benefit Impact Matrix picture, it is clear that according to the involved controllers CTA/i4D is not considered as impacting on eventual future risk of deskilling. On the other hand controllers consider that, with long and consolidate usage in operations of ASPA-IM-S&M, the risk of deskilling could occur. It is due to the fact that differently from CTA/i4D, ASPA-IM-S&M has a major impact on change of practice, working methods and interaction with the system for controllers. Controllers are worried that after long period with ASPA-IM-S&M fully operative, they could not be so prompt in operating without its support in case of partial or total unavailability. For this reason controllers suggested to Air navigation Service Providers training departments to plan periodic training sessions in order to maintain controllers practiced to work without the support of tools such as ASPA-IM-S&M. Majority of controllers asserted that CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M both in stand-alone and in integration modes require an acceptable Change of practice. The recommendation, at any rate, is to clearly define roles, responsibilities and task sharing and moreover to provide adequate training before introducing CTA/i4D and/or ASPA-IM-S&M. Controllers asserted that CTA/i4D, ASPA-IM-S&M, both in stand-alone and in integration modes, provoke a decrease in Procedure flexibility in respect to their current operations. It is due to the fact that the introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M requires that prescribed working methods should be followed precisely in order to fully take advantage of their introduction. That causes a slight decrease of possibility to apply tactical interventions by controllers. Controllers working at the simulated sectors and positions are used to optimize traffic flows, especially in the terminal areas, by vectoring; the introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M partially limited the opportunities to adopt this kind of intervention. Related to Teamwork & Communication, controllers affirmed that the new proposed ATM system solicit controllers to communicate and share information each other, which results in an improvement of the shared situational awareness. Within the new proposed ATM system the Sequence Manager has a central role, he/she has to mandatory monitor the whole system and to maintain continuously updated the other members of the team. Positive feedbacks have been recorded especially in case of CTA/i4D and CTA/i4D in integration with ASPA-IM-S&M, it is clear that CTA/i4D seems to provide benefit in terms of Teamwork & Communication according to controllers’ opinion. CTA/i4D is the tool that allows lower sectors to cooperate with upper sectors well in advance on arriving traffic in order to optimize the related sequence. Very positive feedback has been recorded as regards Situational awareness, both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M, according to controllers ‘opinion, allow to maintain or even to improve their situational awareness. As reported above for Teamwork & Communication, controllers asserted that both tools allowed improving shared situational awareness among the team. Both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M do not impact negatively impact on Usability, especially after adequate training and familiarization the whole system under test is considered as usable. Discordant feedback has been provided in relation to Workload. It seems that workload is considered by controllers to increase in case of introducing CTA/i4D, both in stand-alone and integrated with ASPA-IM-S&M. Probably it is due to the fact that controllers approached to CTA/i4D concept, as a request coming from the aircraft to be satisfied as much as possible. In other words CTA/i4D, even if considered as an improvement, was experienced as a constraint, so requiring an increase in controllers’ perceived mental workload.


183 of 343


Controllers affirmed that increase in their workload has been experienced especially in case one of first flights in the arrival sequence was unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really have to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence. They asked for specific working methods and procedures to be adopted in those cases in order to reduce at minimum the impact on arrival sequence and related mean delay.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.004 Positive feedback from pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload qualitative assessment

Outputs:

Figure 52: pilots’ perception of i4D-ASPA transition-related workload

Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each scenario)

According to the questionnaire (see Appendix Aabove), the pilots found the workload related to i4D and ASPA operations slightly low, both in nominal and non-nominal situation (scenario with on-board system failure during i4D-ASPA transition).

Pilots explained during debriefing that i4D and ASPA operations slightly increase the workload comparatively to today operations. In particular, the following items slightly impacted the workload in nominal situation:

- Speed and energy increases due to ASPA (when the manoeuvres require to accelerate) impact the approach,

- Analyse and understanding of calculation methods of the speed management by ASPA and RTA algorithms,

- Need for more cross-crew communication,

- Need to handle two different displays in short time for analysing the CTA and ASPA instruction,


184 of 343


- Some difficulty to read requested RTA on CPDLC message (6 digits with no separator) and the RTA reliable interval on cockpit display (12 digits).

- .

Nevertheless, it remained acceptable: “We have just to follow instructions, transition is smooth”.

Overall, we observed that pilots successfully achieved to perform expected tasks (new and conventional).

Pilots also added that the workload slightly increased in non-nominal situations, mainly in case of failure management (see Appendix A), and for some pilots also in case of ASPA UNABLE to manage. Analysis: i4D and ASPA functions generate new tasks that require managing coordination with ATC, evaluating the operational impact of the behaviour of the aircraft system and interacting with different cockpit displays.

Most difficulties to understand the system and need for cross-crew communication may be solved with more experience related to system functioning and task sharing related to CPDLC (see section Appendix C)

The difficulties related to RTA function’s HMI may be explained by the simulator limitations: all difficulties mentioned were already considered and will be corrected in the i4D/CTA industrial product.

In any case, these additional tasks were manageable and compatible with conventional tasks.

Conclusion: The workload induced by Initial4D and ASPA functions on board management is acceptable and then the success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.004 “Positive feedback from pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload qualitative assessment” is considered as met.

Nevertheless, in order to be able to manage these new functions in an efficient way and to maintain the additional workload at an acceptable level, the pilots shall have adapted competence to use the new system on board (dedicated training)

The following recommendations from previous exercises are reconfirmed:

I4DInternalStepC_Aug13_01: Speed and vertical management understanding. To reduce the gap between actual FMS strategy for simultaneous management of both speed and vertical profile, and pilots' mental representation of this strategy, it is recommended to provide pilots with simple but correct knowledge of FMS guidance strategy for RTA achievement (mainly on priority between constraints).

I4DInternalStepC_Aug13_02: Energy management understanding. To reduce the gap between actual FMS guidance strategy for energy management and pilots' mental representation of it, it is recommended to provide pilots with simple but correct knowledge of FMS guidance strategy for RTA achievement.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.007 Positive feedback from pilots, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: situational awareness

Outputs: According to the questionnaire (see Figure 53), on the average the pilots agree that all information needed to anticipate i4D-ASPA transition was provided, in either nominal or non-nominal situation.


185 of 343


We observed that most pilots tried to guess which will be the target aircraft for ASPA while they were flying under RTA. One pilot noted that very few traffic was displayed on cockpit display: it was not representative of actual Roma traffic.

Two pilots would want additional information in order to improve situational awareness:

- One pilot would have wanted to know where their A/C is located into the arrival sequence: know more in advance the controller's intention would allow to be more active and to try to improve the initiation conditions for ASPA manoeuvre.

- One pilot would have wanted to be provided with information on current spacing of any selected aircraft, before receiving the ASPA manoeuvre instruction to anticipate if an ASPA manoeuvre is feasible and to anticipate/understand ATCO instructions.

Figure 53: Information provided for anticipation of i4D-ASPA transition

Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each scenario); 1=fully disagree; 6=fully agree

According to the questionnaire (see Figure 54), on the average the pilots agree that they were able to analyse and diagnose situation all the time, whatever in nominal or non-nominal situation.

In case RTA was automatically deleted by the system at ASPA activation, pilots well understood the situation. Pilots also were aware when ASPA was UNABLE or automatically stopped by the system.


186 of 343


Figure 54: Ability to analyse and diagnose situation all the time Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each

scenario); 1=fully disagree; 6=fully agree

Analysis: The end of cruise/beginning of descent, once the arrival preparation and the CTA negotiation are finished, is a low workload phase which allowed pilots to analyse the traffic situation and therefore to anticipate transition to ASPA manoeuvre.

Sometimes there was not enough traffic to allow ASPA manoeuvre, in particular for the second flight of a run which arrived at the end of the simulation. For evaluation needs, controllers and pilots tried to do ASPA manoeuvre at any price, when in real situation controllers certainly would have not instructed ASPA manoeuvre. This may explain that some pilots expressed the need to have additional information to anticipate which ASPA manoeuvre is feasible. Participants to the evaluation eventually agreed that the analysis of the arrival sequence and of the ASPA manoeuvers' feasibility is not the pilot's role, but controller’s role. In usual operation, we can expect that pilots will be enough occupied by flight management and will wait for controller instruction.

Conclusion: , the pilots have good situation awareness during i4D-ASPA operations.

Consequently, the success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.007 is considered as met.

4.2.1.5 CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration operational acceptability This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026: Assess CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operational integration acceptability.


Success Criterion


187 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.001


Not Addressed

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.002 On airborne side, the received CTA is compatible with the ETAmin/max window provided by the aircraft

Context: During EXE-708 conducted by ENAV and AIRBUS beginning of 2015, the aircraft was transmitting the ETA min/max window with a 1-sec accuracy whereas the AMAN was displaying this window with a 1-min truncation, which led to erroneous view of aircraft capabilities at AMAN level.

As a result of the EXE-708 (described in detail in the corresponding VALR document (D92)) it has been proposed to display the ETA min/max window at AMAN level with a 10 sec accuracy.

Hereunder is an example of an AMAN displayed window in EXE-708 (truncation to 1-min) and EXE-805 (10-sec accuracy) for a given transmitted window. Due to difference between the transmitted window and the AMAN displayed window, some intervals out of window computed by the aircraft are displayed as achievable ETA for AMAN. These intervals are represented with hatching on the figure. CTA instructed into these intervals may trigger an ‘UNABLE’ answer from flight crew.

In the opposite situation, some intervals inside transmitted window may not be displayed on the AMAN tool due to the truncation of ETA max. This would deprive the controller of an up to 59 s interval to instruct the CTA. This interval is represented with dots on the figure below:

Figure 55: ETAmin/max window displayed to the AMAN in EXE-708 vs EXE-805

11:52:50 11:49:50

EXE-805

AMAN displayed window

11:52:00 11:49:00

EXE-708


11:52:45 11:49:54

Transmitted window

Transmitted window

Interval from EXE-708 AMAN displayed window out of transmitted window

Intervals from transmitted window out of EXE-708 AMAN displayed

Intervals from EXE-805 AMAN displayed window out of transmitted window


188 of 343


In the 4 coupled validation sessions, the AIRBUS aircraft performed 15 flights and 185 initial 4D manoeuvres were instructed:

- 17 manoeuvres were activated and were either completed until reaching the RTA waypoint or cancelled by another i4D instruction or the ASPA manoeuvre activation.

- 1 manoeuvre was refused by the flight crew. The ATCO sent a CTA outside the transmitted ETA min/max window because of the gap between the window provided by the aircraft and the window displayed to the AMAN. Thanks to the ETA min/max window considered by the AMAN, this gap cannot exceed 5 seconds.

- No RTA missed was observed, whereas one RTA missed occurred for EXE-708.

For all of these 18 manoeuvers, instructed CTA was inside the ETA min/max window displayed to the AMAN.

5 topics have been identified to be further investigated in this EXE-805 validation report:

- CTA dispersal comparison for EXE-708 and EXE-805 scenarios

- Potential consequences of the accuracy of the ETA min/max window displayed at AMAN level

- Manoeuver refused by Flight Crew due to an instructed CTA out of reliable window

- Shift of the ETA min/max computed by the FMS during the manoeuver negotiation process

CTA dispersal

Output and analysis Hereunder is the CTA dispersal6 for all the manoeuvers. They are represented on the same transmitted ETA min/max window. The larger window has been selected as a reference interval.

Figure 56: EXE-805 CTA dispersal on reference window

Therefore, during EXE-805, the capabilities offered by the transmitted ETA min/max window have been exploited by the AMAN.

EXE-708 CTA dispersal is displayed in the following graph. The same method has been used for calculation.

5 In some runs several CTAs have been sent by the ATCO on the same waypoint and for the same flight, each instructed CTA was replacing the previous one. 6 For each CTA sent to the flight crew, the equivalent CTA on the selected reference window has been calculated and displayed. For example if the transmitted ETA min/max is [8:15:00;8:18:59] and the instructed CTA is 8:16:00, the equivalent CTA for a reference transmitted ETA min/max [10:57:44;11:02:29] is 10:58:56. The proportions of the interval between ETA min and CTA (or CTA and ETA max) remain stable and it allows comparing the different manoeuvers.


189 of 343


Figure 57: EXE-708 CTA dispersal on reference window

This graph shows that the transmitted window capabilities have been exploited differently in EXE-708 compared to the EXE-805.

According to controllers’ feedback, several factors can explain this evolution

- The improvement of the AMAN window precision for the EXE-805 with a 10-sec approximation (against 1-min precision in the EXE-708) increased the controllers trust in the system.

- The controllers were more familiar with the concept and the tools (half of the controllers participated to both exercises).

- The proportion of equipped/not-equipped aircraft and the scenario played were different between the two exercises.

AMAN display effect on the accuracy of the window considered by the ground system

Outputs and analysis During the EXE-708 the window was displayed to the AMAN with a 1 minute truncation, which lead to 1 instructed CTA out of transmitted window over 8 initial 4D manoeuvers.

Moreover, in the EXE-805 a 1 minute precision in the ETA min/max window displayed to the AMAN would have prevented the ATCO to set the instructed CTA chosen during the considered scenario:

In this scenario, the instructed CTA in the EXE-805 is outside the window which would have been displayed to the AMAN in the EXE-708.

Thus, for instructed CTA closed to ETA max, this 10-sec new accuracy increases the range of CTA that the controller can instruct within the aircraft capabilities.

On the other side of the window, the opposite situation can be observed. The 10-sec accuracy decreases the range of CTA that the controller can instruct close to the ETAmin (in the example above there is a 40-sec difference between the ETAmin displayed in the EXE-805 and the one which


190 of 343


would have been displayed in the EXE-708) but increases the probability to instruct a CTA within the aircraft capabilities.

Overall, the 10-sec approximation when displaying the ETAmin/max window shifts the range of CTA that the controller can instruct to the aircraft closer to the ETAmax but further apart from the ETAmin compare to the EXE-708. Nevertheless, it is more in line with the aircraft capabilities and reduces the probability for the controller to instruct CTA outside the RTA reliable interval.

However the following study shows that a remaining up to 5 seconds margin between the transmitted window and the AMAN displayed window which may cause flight crew rejection of instructed CTA.

Manoeuvre refused by Flight Crew

In one scenario, the instructed CTA led to an UNABLE answer from Flight Crew:

Outputs Analysis

Legend

7

In this case instructed CTA was into the ETA min/max window considered by the AMAN and very close to ETA min (1 sec). However instructed CTA was not into transmitted ETA min/max window. It was only inside the available CTA range due to the 10-sec round down. In addition, ETA min/max window computed by FMS did not catch up this 1 sec gap thus Flight Crew had to answer UNABLE. Moreover, if the AMAN had considered a window with EXE-708 1-minute truncation, the ETA min displayed to the controller would have been 8:19:00. It seems that the AMAN needed the aircraft to arrive as early as possible during this manoeuver as the selected CTA was in the extreme bottom of the window. For this reason we can assume that with the 1-minute truncation rule, the AMAN would have selected a CTA as close as possible to the ETA min (close to 8:19:00) which would have been much further from the transmitted ETA min/max.

The 10 seconds accuracy prevents ATCO to instruct CTA far from transmitted ETA min/max window boundaries. However, instructed CTA too close to these boundaries has chances to be refused by Flight Crew like in previous example.

Shift of the ETA min/max computed by the FMS during the manoeuver negotiation process

In one scenario, an important shift of the ETA min/max window computed by the FMS has been observed.

Outputs Analysis

7 The RTA reliability interval is the ETAmin/max window displayed to the crew. It is dynamically computed and some variations between the ETAmin/max window transmitted to the ground and the one displayed on board the aircraft might be observed.


191 of 343


Legend

The difference between the ETAmin value sent to the ground and the ETAmin value displayed to the flight crew at CTA reception is 2 min 23 sec.

The difference between the ETAmax value sent to the ground and the ETAmax value displayed to the flight crew at CTA reception is 3 minutes.

After investigation, it has been confirmed that a DIRECT TO instruction was sent to the aircraft between the window transmission and the time constraint instruction. The controller in contact modified the aircraft trajectory without requesting an update of the ETAmin/max.

When he received the window downlinked by the aircraft, the AMAN instructed a CTA close to the ETA min. If the aim was to make the aircraft arrive earlier on the CTA waypoint, it is consistent with the DIRECT TO instruction. After this instruction, the controller would have had the possibility to issue an even earlier CTA to the aircraft but he did not take it.

Conclusion From airborne perspective, the best solution would be for the AMAN to display the ETAmin/max window with a 1-sec accuracy. However, after discussing with the ground partner, it seems that this level of precision would be quite difficult to handle for the controllers.

Thus, the following approximation has been discussed and will be proposed as an update in P05.06.01 OSED (see section [17]Error! Reference source not found.): If it is not possible to display the AMAN window with a one second precision, the following approximation for the ETAmin/max considered by the AMAN shall be applied to avoid instructing CTA outside the RTA reliable window.


- AMAN displayed ETA max is rounded down to the nearest 10-sec


192 of 343


Figure 58: ETAmin/max window approximation

As a conclusion, the 10 seconds accuracy for ETA min/max window displayed to the AMAN is much more appropriate than 1-minute truncation applied in the EXE-708 as the displayed window is more representative of aircraft capabilities when the airborne systems compute the ETA min/max. Received CTA is thus compatible with the window provided by the aircraft in most cases and the success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.002 can be considered as achieved.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.003 ASPA initiation conditions (spacing and speed adjustment) are within operational limits in approach phase.

Context After the EXE-708, important speed variations to reach the instructed spacing at the manoeuvre activation have been reported by pilots as not acceptable. It was particularly highlighted in an i4D and ASPA environment where the ASPA manoeuvre is instructed when the aircraft is already quite close to the ground. It was finally agreed that considering the level of representativeness in the EXE-708 and the expected ground system evolutions for the EXE-805, further work and analysis would be necessary before providing a conclusion on this topic.

Outputs and Analysis: In the 4 coupled validation sessions, the AIRBUS aircraft performed 15 flights, 16 ASPA manoeuvres were instructed and 12 manoeuvres were activated by the crews.

The following table compares some results between the EXE-708 and the EXE-805:

EXE-708 EXE-805

11:52:50 11:49:50

EXE-805


11:52:40 11:50:00

Proposal


11:52:49 11:49:51

Transmitted window

Transmitted window

Intervals from transmitted window out of AMAN displayed

Intervals from EXE-805 AMAN displayed window out of transmitted window


193 of 343


Number of manoeuvres activated 6 manoeuvres 12 manoeuvres

Average ΔSpacing (current spacing – instructed spacing) 31,7 seconds 14,1 seconds

Average aircraft speed variation (CAS: Computed Air Speed) 25,4 kts 15,3 kts

Table 27: ASPA activated manoeuvres characteristics EXE-708 vs EXE-805

Overall, an improvement can be seen in the EXE-805 compared to the EXE-708. However, in some cases, the pilots also reported important speed variation at the manoeuvre activation.The 12 manoeuvres activated in the EXE-805 can be divided depending on the aircraft altitude at the manoeuvre activation:

- 6 manoeuvres have been activated above FL100 when the Initial 4D operation was still on-going. In such cases, the RTA was cancelled at ASPA manoeuvre activation.

- 6 manoeuvres have been activated below FL100, after the end of the Initial 4D operation.

Pilots feedbacks on the speed variation were focused on the 6 manoeuvres activated below the FL100. Several problems have been highlighted:

- In 3 cases, the required acceleration to reach the instructed spacing led the aircraft to exceed the 250kts speed limit below the FL100 that all they aircraft should have to comply with. This issue has already been reported in previous ASAS evaluations and an operational assumption exists in P05.06.06 Stream 1 OSED (D28), ASSUMP-OSED 12: The IM Speed is equivalent to the controller’s speed instruction and supersedes any Speed Constraints from a navigation clearance however, Speed Restrictions, as exemplified by the 250kts below 10,000 feet restriction, are still to be respected. It was not implemented in the current version of the algorithm, but it should be done in the next prototype if further work on ASPA is going to be performed. However, the main consequence of this limitation will be an increase in the number of manoeuvres’ rejection. In this exercise for example, at least 2 of the manoeuvres performed would not have been possible (manoeuvres b) and e) in the summary table below).

- Even if it is quite difficult for pilots to conclude afterwards on the observed accelerations acceptability, their global feedback is that accelerating at low altitude in descent (more particularly when the acceleration is more than 20kts) is not comfortable. Pilots are in charge of managing the aircraft energy throughout the descent and every acceleration means more energy to lose before being stabilized for the approach.

These two feedbacks have to be put into perspective considering that the approaches which followed the impacted manoeuvres were stabilized and pilots had no difficulty to handle the aircraft down to the landing. However, the fact that all pilots who participated in the session were quite experienced and they highlighted that less experienced pilots might have difficulties to handle the manoeuvre and understand the aircraft behaviour.

The table below presents the speed variations observed on board when the manoeuvres below the FL100 were activated (note that numerous parameters are considered by the ASPA algorithm to determine the required ASPA CAS to reach the instructed spacing in the available time or distance. It is based on an historic of the target speed (sometimes not consistent with published procedures) and position data collected as soon as it is selected, the required spacing and the ownship speed and position)

a) b) c) d) e) f)

ΔSpacing (sec) -10 sec -26 sec 25 sec -4 sec -4 sec 0 sec


194 of 343


ΔGround Speed (kts) -4,75kts -35,5kts -37kts -21kts -26,75kts -18,75kts

Manoeuvre REMAIN REMAIN REMAIN MERGE REMAIN MERGE

Altitude (fts) 9709fts 9426fts 9058fts 8191fts 7948fts 7441fts

Current CAS (kts) 232kts 219kts 230kts 215kts 230kts 209kts

Required ASPA CAS (kts) 254kts 260kts 216kts 222kts 264kts 212kts

ΔCAS (kts) +22kts +41kts -14kts +7kts +34kts +3kts

Table 28: Impact of ASPA manoeuvre activation on aircraft behaviour

While working on the EXE-708 and the EXE-805, the hypothesis to limit the delta spacing to 30sec maximum has been taken. With the experimented airspace design, it is in line with the aircraft capability to reach the required spacing either at the Merge Point or at the latest 5min after the manoeuvre activation (as detailed in the analysis of the previous success criterion). However, after facing important speed variations while preparing the exercise, it was discussed to try limiting the delta spacing between -10sec and +20sec to avoid important speed variations at low altitudes.

It can be observed that if this recommendation would have been respected in the EXE-805, 3 of the performed manoeuvres below the FL100 would not have been instructed, or would have been rejected by the crews, (manoeuvres a), b) and c) in the table above) which would have decreased the number of manoeuvres which led to exceed the 250kts speed limit.

Moreover, considering the average delta spacing of 10s when the target is equipped with Initial 4D function, this new criteria would not significantly jeopardize the controller capability to issue ASPA manoeuvres between equipped aircraft.

The combination of both recommendations discussed in this analysis would have decreased the number of instructed manoeuvres (for example manoeuvre c) in the table above) in the EXE-805 but would have significantly stabilized the activated manoeuvres.

Conclusion: The P05.06.06 OSED assumption (ASSUMP-OSED-12) to limit the aircraft speed at 250kts below FL100 while flying an ASPA operation is confirmed and remains applicable.

A recommendation on this topic has already been emitted after the EXE-199 conducted by Airbus and ENAV in 2014. It is available in the Validation Report (05.06.06-D27-STREAM1-VREP 00.01.00) and recalled here below:

It is recommended to take into account applicable airspace speed restriction (e.g. 250kt below FL100 defined for a specific airspace) in ASPA-IM-S&M functionConsidering the specific environment in which the validation exercise took place, it does not seem relevant as a conclusion of the EXE-805 to provide anther recommendation on the ASPA initiation condition. But, in order to keep a record of these findings, a proposition to update the P05.06.06 OSED [18] is performed in the section [18]

The success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.003 is considered as partially achieved.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.004

Positive pilots’ feedback while flying integrated i4D and ASPA operations.

Context:


195 of 343


Compared to the EXE-708, the EXE-805 was much more representative of Rome (LIRF) airspace in term of operational context (sector involved, traffic density, runway use…). Following the EXE-708 feedback, a new TMA design was proposed, expecting that it would be more adapted to the integration of Initial 4D and ASPA functions. The following TMA design was then proposed by ENAV, including:

- 6 CTA waypoints equidistant from the runway and located around 40NM from the runways thresholds (3 for the approaches on runway 16L and 3 for the approaches on runway 16R) with altitude and speed constraints.

- 2 ASPA merge waypoints, each one dedicated to one runway flow and located around 20NM after the CTA waypoint and 20NM from the runway threshold with speed constraints.

Figure 59: EXE-805 LIRF TMA proposed design

In all the flights performed by the Airbus simulator, two different approaches have been flown, either SONTI-BABLA-FN16L-MIKSO-ILS16L or BUKOV-BABLA-FN16L-MIKSO-ILS16L.

The following speed and altitude constraints were defined on the different waypoints, as summarized below:

Waypoints Altitude constraints Speed constraints

SONTI (RTA) FL100 230kts

BUKOV (RTA) FL100 230kts

BABLA (Merge waypoint) 4000ft 210kts

FN16L 3000ft 210kts

Table 29: Speed and altitude constraints on TMA waypoints

On-board, the Initial 4D function takes into account the applicable speed constraints to compute the ETAmin/max and once the RTA activated. On the other hand, the ASAS algorithm disregards the


196 of 343


speed constraints as soon as the manoeuvre is activated by the crew. This behaviour is in line with the controllers understanding and was taken into consideration in the TMA design.

Outputs: As explained above, the observed speed variations upon the ASPA manoeuvre activation have been considered as not acceptable by pilots, more particularly when they led to exceed the 250kts speed limit. But the same problem was reported with regards to the published speed constraints. In several scenarios, crews informed the controller that they would not respect the speed constraints due to ASPA. The controllers answer (“Free Speed”) has been considered as very surprising, more particularly if Rome airport usual traffic density is considered.

Thus the interest of having speed constraints in a procedure designed to fly Initial 4D and ASPA operations has been widely questioned by the crews.

Analysis: Both Initial 4D and ASPA functions specificities have to be taken into account in this analysis.

While flying to a RTA, the aircraft navigation system will adjust the speed to reach the constrained waypoint at the instructed time. As it is already explained in this document, several parameters will impact the aircraft speed while flying to a CTA: the CTA value compared to the predicted ETA, the aircraft performances and its speed when the manoeuvre was instructed as well as the forecasted weather data accuracy. Thus two aircraft might reach the same CTA waypoint with quite different speeds. Thus it seems logic to add a speed constraint on the RTA waypoint in order to stabilize the traffic flow once the CTA waypoints sequenced.

This need has been confirmed by the ground partners and the speed constraint on the CTA waypoint is considered as one of the major improvement in the procedure design, along with the iso-distance from the merge waypoint for the location of the CTA waypoint.

On the contrary, while flying an ASPA manoeuvre, the aircraft speed is adapted to maintain a precise spacing with the preceding aircraft and adding the existing speed constraint as another parameter to be taken into account by the algorithm might impact the aircraft capability to maintain the instructed spacing. This aircraft behaviour is well known and added to the controller “Free speed” instruction, the interest of having speed constraint while flying an ASPA operation is not really obvious.

These speed constraints are considered as necessary by the controllers for the following main reasons:

- It allows managing the flow of unequipped traffic with the same published procedure,

- If the first target aircraft of the sequence is following the speed target, all the other aircraft will adjust their speed as soon as they will have acquired the spacing,

- In case of ASPA UNABLE situation, the controller is expecting the crew to resume conventional procedure and to comply with the published speed constraints.

Conclusion: Since removing the speed constraints from the procedure when an ASPA manoeuvre is expected to be performed is not envisioned, the possibility to modify the information displayed by the airborne ASPA function shall be considered if further work would be performed on this function. Thus, t following recommendation is proposed:

TMA_805_Design_Recomm_01:Under ASPA maneuverer, in order to give information compatible with the expected tasks and to improve pilots’ understanding, it is recommended to display information, in a way to indicate that speed constraints are no more applicable.


197 of 343


Overall, pilots feedback regarding the integration of Initial 4D and ASPA functions are quite positive but further work would be necessary to implement a stable sequence based on this concept. The success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0026.004 is considered as partially achieved.

Several findings regarding the procedure to implement an integration of Initial 4D and ASPA functions, as well as some findings related to ASPA function in this specific environment will be proposed for the P05.06.06 OSED, as described in section Error! Reference source not found..

4.2.1.6 CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0019 – To assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities that controllers deploy to achieve their task goals including perception, decision making, planning, and memory and task execution. It is divided in several success criteria, analysed independently in the following section and identified in a table.

Success Criteria

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.001 Positive feedback from the user.

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.002 To confirm that HMI support the controllers by to achieve their tasks.


CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ HMI supportiveness

Both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M do not impact negatively impact on usability, especially after adequate training and familiarization the whole system under test is considered as usable.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


198 of 343


As it is possible to extrapolate from the above graph, for all type type of sectors/role the HMI supportiveness is always maintened at similar level of reference scenario. At any rate, controllers suggested some improvements to futher increase HMI usability, even as regars reference scenario: To have added lateral monitor for notifications/diagnostic messages, in order to avoid to

overcrowd the main monitor providing GRP. To have visible sequence number exclusively for the flights already evaluated by the sequence

manager. To have opportunity to manually highlight flights already evaluated by SM/AC and for which the

sequence position is confirmed. FLAG that automatically displays unable ASPA (system automation). To avoid presentation of STCA between levelled flights. To improve R&B usability. To improve ASAS target identification graphic objects (yellow link and then grey link have been

considered too invasive). On the other hand they really appreciated some features, such as: Skip for selecting directs from a sector to another. Drop-down list for rerouting. Elastic vector and prediction vector smashed into pieces at 15’.

Regarding the last two bullets these features are related for HMI point of view, that will help the Sequence manager and the ASAS Co-ordinator with functionalities to better organize the sequence.

Specifically Sequence Managers appreciated the support provided by the HMI in relation to the new investigated features, so that they to prefer the new proposed HMI in respect to the conventional radar screen. . In case of unable, there line between target and follower was shown in red colour on the HMI. In order to erase from the HMI such notification, they choose “cancel spacing” or “deselect target”.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.003




199 of 343


CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ impact of automation

From the above graphs it is possible to conclude that: ASPA-IM-S&M HMI impacted negatively on TMA controllers workload. CTA/i4D HMI impacted negatively on DEP controllers workload. ASPA-IM-S&M HMI impacted positively on Sequence Manager workload.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.004

Controllers confirm that HMI allows gaining and retaining the appropriate level of situation awareness.


None Very Little Little Neutral Much Very Much Extreme

0 1 2 3 4 5 6


200 of 343


CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ HMI usability

As reported in the ground results related to OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001, OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002 and OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003, situational awareness was always maintened at high level for all type of simulated sectors/roles and scenarios. Equally HMI usability was maintened quite unaltered comparing reference and solution scenarios. The above graph allow to link the fundamental areas incvestigated within the Human Performance Assessment, such as:


0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Neu

tral


201 of 343


Situational awarenes, Usabilityand Workload.

The graph, rellay provides, feedback related to the effort spent by controllers to create their own situational awareness by means of the provided system. The effort to gather and interpret information, to anticipate the future traffic situation and to identify potential conflict, was always maintened at low level for all type of sectors/roles, by exception of Sequence Managers, who declared to have spent much effort to gather and interpret information in both ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M scenarios and, to anticipate the future traffic situation in ASPA-IM-S&M scenario.

4.2.1.7 Teamwork and communication This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0020 - To assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M procedures and HMI allow controllers efficient teamwork & communication. It is divided in several success criteria, analysed independently in the following section and identified in a table.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.001 Positive feedback from the controllers.



0 1 2 3 4 5 6


202 of 343


Figure 60: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ teamwork

Related to Teamwork & Communication, controllers affirmed that the new proposed ATM system, in terms of concepts, solicit controllers to communicate and share information each other, i4D/CTA mainly with upper secotrs and ASPA-IM-S&M with lower sectors, which results in an improvement of the shared situational awareness. Within the new proposed ATM system the Sequence Manager has a central role, he/she has to mandatory monitor the whole system and to maintain continuously updated the other members of the team. Positive feedback have been recorded especially in case of CTA/i4D and CTA/i4D in integration with ASPA-IM-S&M, it is clear that CTA/i4D seems to provide benefit in terms of Teamwork & Communication according to controllers’ opinion. CTA/i4D is the tool that allows lower sectors to cooperate with upper sectors well in advance on arriving traffic in order to optimize the related sequence.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.002

Perceived situation awareness related to the interaction between controllers is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective.


Figure 61: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ shared situational awareness

ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts allowed to increase teamwork and to improve shared situational awareness. Information sharing was improved or maintained unaltered in all solution scenarios in comparison with reference one. Very positive feedback has been provided by Sequence managers who appreciated both ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts, that allowed to better coordinate arrival sequence with all other interested actors. On the other hand Departure sectors confirmed their disappointment due to the fact that investigated solutions could penalize, in their


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


203 of 343


sectors, departing and non equipped incomnig flights. At this purpose they suggested to re-design sectors and routes in order to avoid that (e.g. considering segregated routes to mainten adequately separated and non intereferring equipped and non equipped flights).

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.003

Perceived cognitive workload related to the interaction between ATCOs is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective.


Figure 62: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ effort to share information

Effort to share information with other team members was mantained under the value corresponding to “Much” (4). For TMA sectors it slighly increased introducing ASPA-IM-S&M, due to the fact they were some of the main actors operating with ASPA-IM-S&M and so involved in the needed coordinations with other involved colleagues. In fact in phase of the identification of the a/c involved in the manouvres, the TMA and ARR sectors, requires a specific interaction with the Radar screen, this require an appropriate attention of the exacly spacing to maintain ,thus to introduce an increase of workload. For ARR sectors it slighly increased introducing both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M stand-alone, meanwhile it was maintained ulaltered respect to reference scenario whent the investigated concepts were integrrated. For Sequence Managers it decreased introducing both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M (stand-alone and integrated); it is due to the fact that Sequence Managers appreciated both concepts as support and trigger in coordinating with other relavant figures interested by the arrival sequence management. For Arrival Coordinators it decreased introducing both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M stand-alone, meanwhile it was maintained ulaltered respect to reference scenario whent the investigated concepts were integrrated.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


204 of 343


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.004

Quantitative workload assessment related to the interaction between ATCOs is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective.

Outputs and Analysis: Figure 63 presents obtained results related to telephonic coordination among controllers.

As already explained in the previous sections the very low values reported for ground-ground communications are due to the fact that the majority of controllers, being in the same room, preferred to do not use telephone to communicate one each other (as currently used in Italian operative sites). Controllers used telephone especially to communicate with colleagues situated in a different simulation room. As reported in § 3.1.3 and §3.1.4 the two simulation rooms contained the simulated sectors/positions as follows:

Room 1: NE – NW – TNE – TNW - ARR1 - ARR2 – OV – SM – AC;

Room 2 MI1 – PAD – ESE –TS/US. From Figure 63 it is evident that:

The introduction of CTA/i4D both in stand-alone mode and integrated with ASPA-IM-S&M allowed to reduce needed coordination of Sequence Managers with upper sectors;

Arrival sectors coordinated exclusively via voice (without using telephone) with other sectors situated in the same simulation room;

Introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M allowed to reduce coordination in En-Route and departure sectors;

Introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M in stand-alone mode allowed to reduce coordination in E-TMA sectors, meanwhile corrdination activities were mainteined unalterated in case of integrated concepts in comparison with Reference scenario.


205 of 343


Figure 63: Ground – Ground Coordination


206 of 343


4.2.1.8 Roles and responsibilities This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021 - To assess that roles and responsibilities of controllers are clear and exhaustive.


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0021.001

Controllers confirm that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, compatible and complete.


Figure 64: CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Controllers’ roles and responsibilities

Prescribed roles and responsabilities were always considered clear and exhaustive and however very similar as considered for reference scenario. Notwithstanding that all controllers required that specific working methods and procedure should be defined in order to correctly work with the new system. Specifically, a proper teamwork between En-route, E-TMA and Sequence Manager should be synchronized in order to be align to own expectations based on information that HMI provides. In other words, the shared working methods should take into account that specific phase managed by each involved actors, their needs and the information they require from the system/HMI.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6


207 of 343


Furthermore they asserted it is the need of clear tasks’ definition and sharing PLN/EXE in managing information and orders, e.g. for:

Assigning/negotiating CTA o EXE or PLN o Sector or SM

Target selection o Sector or SM.

Working Methods in case of contingency and or in case of partial/total unavailability of the integrated investigated concepts should be defined as well. Furthermore controllers affirmed that is mandatory an adequate training related roles and responsibilities and task sharing among actors involved in arrival sequence management (E-TMA, TMA, SM, and AC). Finally they suggested that, when new integrated concepts will introduced into operations, exclusively specialized personal would be qualified to operate with new concepts.

4.2.1.9 Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of communication This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029: Assess the impact of CPDLC usage in descent and approach phases on timeliness of communications between pilot and ATCOs.


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0029.001 No negative impact of CPDLC on controller capability to communicate efficiently with the crew in descent and approach phase.

Outputs and analysis: Controllers really appreciated the possibility to have at any time two available mean of communications. Controllers working at TMA and ARR sectors adopted always CPDLC as prescribed to perform ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvres.

Table 30 recaps ASPA-IM-S&M CPDLC Messages characteristics.

MSG DIR DOWNLINK, UPLINK

MSG TYPE Wilco,

Unable, For Spacing Merge At Then Remain Behind

MSG e.g. For Spacing merge at BABLA then remain 90 behind target RYR69HJ

Table 30: ASPA-IM-S&M CPDLC Messages On the other hand in case the communication was considered time critical, or after an unable, controllers preferred to switch to R/T communication to manage the communication promptly or to provide explanations to the interested pilots.


208 of 343


Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0029.002 No negative impact of CPDLC on crew capability to communicate efficiently with the controller in descent and approach phase

Context: At the end of the EXE-708, the objective OBJ-05.03-VALP-0091.0001 (Assess the impact of E-AMAN, i4D+CTA, ASPA S&M on communication between ATCOs and pilots) was considered as partially achieved on airborne side. When working on the EXE-805 objectives, it was decided to reorganize the unachieved success criteria and to analyse independently the one related to the impact of the CPDLC on timeliness of communication. It is adapted from success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0091.0001.006: No negative impact on timeliness of communication between ATCOs and pilots working with E-AMAN, i4D+CTA, ASPA S&M from pilots perspective.

The conclusion provided by the EXE-708 required to further work on this topic: “Controllers shall have in mind that while pilots didn’t send the final answer to a CPDLC message (WILCO or UNABLE), they are still managing this message and so controller should avoid sending another voice or CPDLC message in the meantime.”

In the EXE-708, some analyses were impacted because the crews were not using CPDLC in their daily operations. In order to limit this impact, two of the crews who participated in the EXE-805 (the Airspace Users) were briefed the day before the sessions, including hands-on in the simulator to manipulate the airborne interfaces involved in datalink communications.

Outputs and analysis: In the EXE-805, the same datalink message set as in the EXE-708 was implemented in the ground system. Thus the only instructions sent by CPDLC were for Initial 4D and ASPA manoeuvres instruction.

Two main situations involving CPDLC communications have been observed:

Output 1

CPDLC messages received while pilots are performing the approach checklist.

In the two observed cases, pilots completed the checklist and handled the CPDLC message afterwards. In this case, the CPDLC was considered as an advantage to organize the tasks in the cockpit and limit the interruptions.

However, pilots highlighted the current tendency to prioritize CPDLC messages over all their other tasks, mainly due to CPDLC remote usage in the European continental airspace.

Analysis 1

Overall, the CPDLC as communication mean for not time critical instruction is widely appreciated by pilots who can decide to complete the on-going task when receiving the message.

When they deem it necessary, they can inform the ATC that the message has been received on-board by sending a STBY message.

STBY messages were sent by the crews for each manoeuvre instructed by datalink as detailed below:

- RTA instruction: 9 STBY messages over 16 manoeuvres instructed. The STBY messages were sent by the crews with an average delay of 28s after receiving the RTA manoeuvre instruction.

- Select target: 2 STBY messages over 17 target selection instructions received by datalink. The STBY messages were sent by the crews with an average delay of


209 of 343


31s after receiving the target selection message.

- ASPA manoeuvre: 7 STBY messages over 15 manoeuvres instructed. The STBY messages were sent by the crew with an average delay of 56s after receiving the ASPA manoeuvre instruction.

For Airbus a/cflights, controllers never contacted the crew by voice to confirm if they received the CPDLC message. Except if reported otherwise by the controllers, it seems that the crew response time to CPDLC instructions was acceptable and the observed tendency to prioritize other tasks on board is not a problem.

Output 2

R/T contact when crew is already assessing a CPDLC instruction.

In two flights, the controller provided an instruction through voice while a CPDLC communication was still pending between the controller and the crews.

In one case, pilots interrupted their assessment of the CPDLC message, answered the radio call (frequency change), executed the instruction and then, completed the CPDLC instruction analysis and activated the manoeuvre.

In the other case, both pilots were focused on the ASPA manoeuvre assessment and did not realize that the controller was calling them on the frequency to give them a descent clearance. After 3 attempts, the controller finally asked if the Airbus aircraft was on the frequency. Having finished to assess the instruction, and with the manoeuvre activated, both pilots reacted and finally answered to the controller call.

Analysis 2

Long haul pilots are already used to manage both CPDLC and voice communication for different instructions and being interrupted by a voice call is not a problem. However, in the context of continental airspace, more demanding for pilots, it might be more challenging to handle both CPDLC and voice instruction at the same time.

Today the voice remains the primary means of communication in continental airspace and the CPDLC is used for not time critical instructions. Thus it seems natural to interrupt a CPDLC instruction assessment to prioritize the voice call. All pilots’ feedback on this topic confirmed this hypothesis.

But since the same controller is in charge of both communication means, he should be aware that:

- If the crew prioritizes the voice call over the CPDLC message, the CPDLC instruction will be activated or refused later than it could have been without interruption. It was observed in the first case but without significant impact on the timeliness of communication.

- If the crew prioritizes the CPDLC message, the controller will call back until receiving an answer which will increase the radio load and may have an impact on the surrounding traffic. It was observed in the second case where both pilots were focused on the manoeuvre assessment and did not hear the voice call. The main cause has been identified to be the aircraft call sign, very unusual for airlines pilots.

Conclusion:


210 of 343


CPDLC is not yet widely used in continental and dense airspace and the crews and controllers management of this communication mean will significantly evolve in the coming years if it starts to be used on daily basis.

When considered as a complementary communication mean, the CPDLC is overall considered as helpful and useful. For the time being, no significant issues or difficulties have been raised by crews and controllers regarding the management of mixed-mode communication and the CPDLC impact on their capability to communicate efficiently.

The objective OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029 is considered as met.

However, the CPDLC is used quite differently by pilots and controllers and a different impact of pending CPDLC dialog has been observed. The EXE-805 was not representative enough of the foreseen CPDLC use and it remains necessary to further study the procedures and working method in mixed-mode communication environment.

4.2.1.10 Nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0027: Assess the effects of the proposed task sharing for CPDLC usage on pilot tasks in descent and approach in nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M.

It is divided in several success criteria, analysed independently in the following section.

Reminder: During EXE 767 (Multi-function evaluations - Cockpit integration (EXE 09.49-VP-767) - Lot 1 - Validation Report- D21-002), some Pilot Flying spontaneously loaded and activated RTA and ASPA CPDLC messages as these messages impact navigation. Consequently, both pilots remained too long time head down in descent/approach.

During EXE 708, to avoid this, it was proposed the following tasks sharing:

PF Must remain head-up as

much as possible

PM Make PF aware of the content of the messages received

(read-out loud) and messages to be sent (ask confirmation)

Monitors MCDU for F-PLN Manages communication by R/T and also by D/L (manipulation of MCDU + DCDU)

LOAD from DCDU to MCDU

Assess ATC instruction feasibility In RTA page for i4D In ASAS MANOEUVER page for ASPA

Activate the systems • Insert TMPY FPLN to activate RTA • Activate ASPA

Reply WILCO or UNABLE to ATC, close the message

Check if the systems are activated correctly (PFD + ND + MCDU)

However, some pilots explained that it was not compatible with their airlines policy: PM cannot activate data with impact on FPLN or speed, and it was noticed that workload between PM and PF was not well balanced: PM was very absorbed by CPDLC.


211 of 343


Consequently, for the EXE 805, the general principle on task sharing in cockpit was recalled:

- The Pilot Flying (PF): Flies and navigates

- The Pilot Monitoring (PM): Communicates

It was also highlighted that in case a CPDLC message has an impact on the navigation, the PF has to be aware of the modification on the flight prior to any activation. Otherwise, the PM can handle the message.

Outside those high level principles, pilots decide how to manage the tasks sharing according to their airline policy and according to the situation and the perceived workload, as per today.

Note that during EXE 805, the CPDLC was used only for i4D and ASPA, the voice was used for all other communications.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.001 The expected tasks (new and conventional) are effectively achieved by the crew in nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA operations.

Outputs: Several flight crews discussed during the first scenario to decide who is in charge of loading and of data activation.

Eventually, we observed that for most of flight crews (2 airline flight crews and 1 Airbus flight crew) the following task sharing was applied concerning the CDPCL management:

- The Pilot Monitoring (PM) ensured all the actions related to CPDLC including activation of data;

- The Pilot Flying (PF) crosschecked most of PM actions, most of time visually.

In one flight crew (Airbus pilots), the PF loaded and activated the CPDLC messages while the PM read aloud the message, analysed it with PF and after decision, answered WILCO or UNABLE to controller and closed the message.

Overall, we observed that flight crew successfully achieved expected tasks related to management of CTA and ASPA instructions through CPDLC: they detected all the messages, they appropriately analysed them, they inserted the instructions into aircraft system, they answered to controller and above all they crosschecked any decision and any modification of flight management by system.

One flight crew explained that CPDLC is already used today, is not new.

It was observed also that flight crew achieved conventional tasks, related to arrival preparation (ATIS, briefing…), descent and approach monitoring and execution (descent request, descent clearance, speed, vertical profile and energy management).

Analysis: Pilots had to adapt task sharing according to situation and to their airline policy.

For all pilots, reading aloud the message and answering WILCO/UNABLE/STBY are tasks related to communication and therefore are under the PM responsibility. However, the insertion and activation of RTA and ASPA having impact on navigation, the interpretation of the rule “The PF flies and navigates and PM Communicates” is not obvious and may induces additional coordination between the flight crew.

The airline policies of pilots who participated to the evaluation seem allowing the Pilot Monitoring to modify the flight plan and the speed when it is an ATC request, thus they decided to let all actions


212 of 343


related to CPDLC messages, including the message loading and activation, to the PM, since PM in traditional way manages communication.

The Airbus pilots did not have any airline policy to apply. One Airbus flight crew interpreted that PM is in charge of all CPDLC tasks, as the airline flight crews. The other Airbus flight crew preferred let the PF to load and activate CTA and ASPA messages into FMS as those tasks impact flying and navigation domains.

Whatever the solution chosen by the crews, to let the PM to manage all CPDLC actions or let PF to load and activate the message, once a strategy was established within the crew, the task sharing was smooth and efficient and the pilots successfully achieved all expected tasks, new and conventional, including the crosschecking.

Conclusion: The success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.001 is considered as met.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.002 The consequences of observed errors are within tolerable limits.

As already explained in section before, in one case, both pilots were focused on the CPDLC assessment and did not immediatly answer to the controller radio call (clearance to continue the descent). The controller called the crew 3 times with no reaction from the flight crew. The controller asked the crew if they were on the frequency and they finally reacted. During the debriefing, the pilots said that the unusual call sign (4Y1171) caused this error.

Otherwise, no other error related to CPDLC task sharing was observed during the exercise, in nominal situation.

Analysis: The overhearing of the radio relies on automatic cognitive processes (also named skills-based behaviour) consisting in immediately reacting to some well-known key words. In real life, the pilots all days fly on aircraft of the same company and the call sign always begins with the same letters, corresponding to their airline. This group of letters acts as a trigger to capture the PM attention. During the simulation, the call sign was unusual and referred to no airline, which prevent pilots to use their skills and obliged them to be more attentive than usual: they have to make conscious effort to recognize the call sign. In case of other activities requiring cognitive efforts, as for example the analysis of CPDLC instructions, this additional effort can be not compatible. In addition, the fact that the Pilot Flying was also focalized on CPDLC message, for crosschecking actions of Pilot Monitoring, may have prevented PF to recover the PM's error. This error led to slightly congest the voice frequency and to very slightly delay the descent.

Conclusion: The observed error should not occur in real situation, with a usual call sign and, consequences on traffic, tasks efficiency and workload were negligible.

Consequently, the success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.002 is considered as met.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.003 The workload between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring is well-balanced in nominal situation.

Outputs:


213 of 343


According to the questionnaire, on average, the pilots found the workload related to communication management slightly low both for Pilots Monitoring and Pilot Flying in nominal situation (see Figure below).

Figure 65: Pilots’ feedbacks on the communication-related workload in nominal situation

Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each scenario); 1=very low; 6=very high

Besides, according to the questionnaire, on average, the pilots agree that time spent head down is compatible with task accomplishment during i4D operations (see Appendix AError! Reference source not found.), nevertheless they partially agree that time spent head down is compatible with task accomplishment during ASPA operations (see Error! Reference source not found.).

Figure 66: Acceptability of time spent head down during i4D and ASPA operations


214 of 343


Note: N=7 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role but 1 PF did not answer; counterbalanced at positions between each scenario); 1=fully disagree; 6=fully agree

Pilots explained that airlines have different procedures related to the crosschecking of PM actions following CPDLC messages. One pilot said that its airline is very exigent and requires that the PF systematically crosschecks all PM actions. He explained that as Pilot flying, he feels the need to read information on screen, hearing is not sufficient for the crosschecking. Indeed, it is difficult to analyse numbers in mind without visual support (e.g. RTA feasibility). This pilot added that due to HMI complexity, the PM may make errors when entering data into the aircraft, for example for the aircraft target selection or the entry of the time spacing, so a simple oral crosscheck is not sufficient, the PF has to watch HMI. However, this leads the pilot flying to be too long-time head down, which was perceived as annoying at those altitudes.

We observed that in most flight crews, both pilots read the messages and checked results of loading and activation of data on cockpit displays. In both airline flight crews, most of times, the PM asked or informed the PF of its intention (for e.g. to accept the instruction or to activate the instruction). This increased the crew coordination in the cockpit. Analysis: PF visually monitors the PM when he analyses the RTA or ASPA manoeuvre feasibility and when he manually inserts data into aircraft system since the HMI may induce errors with consequence on navigation, leading both pilots being head down and too focalized on this task. Airline flight crews half the time chosen to manually enter the ASPA manoeuver into the aircraft system while they intensively use the loading function for entering the RTA into aircraft system. This may be explained by the fact that the loading function for ASPA instruction is not also efficient than for RTA instruction, requiring many actions on HMI.

In addition, the ASPA manoeuvre occurs at low altitude, in approach, a very demanding flight phase, which explained that pilots are less comfortable when CPDLC requires being head down too long time than for CTA operations which occurs in cruise phase.

Nevertheless, we did not observe any consequence on task accomplishment (see section on task achievement) and the consequences of the error observed were acceptable (see section on error consequences). With more experience of ASPA, we may assume that pilots will use the loading function more often, mainly in approach phase, reducing possibility of error and the time spend head down for both pilots.

Conclusion: Overall, the workload related to CPDLC management remains at an acceptable level both for PM and PF. In addition, even if it is a little tricky for A SPA in approach phase, the time spent head-down for both PM and PF remains compatible with the task accomplishment.

Consequently the success criteria CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0027.003 is considered as met.

Objective conclusion: The current Airbus high level task sharing recommendations sufficiently support flight crew for the CPDLC management during descent and approach phases. As it is already the case today, airline may refine their own procedures according to their policies. More particularly, when it is not yet the case, it would be preferable that the airline clarifies who is in charge of the insertion and activation of CPDLC data into aircraft system when it impact navigation in order to reduce the need of coordination between the pilots. In addition, some adaptations of the procedures for the crosschecking and the use of loading function would be necessary in some airlines in order to reduce the time spent head down: in descent and approach context, the current airlines procedures designed for cruise and, in particular for oceanic context may be insufficient..


215 of 343


Finally, considering that all the success criteria are met, the objective OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0027 “Assess the effects of the proposed task sharing for CPDLC usage on pilot tasks in descent and approach in nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M” is closed.

Nevertheless, in order to ensure an efficient task sharing, the following recommendation from previous exercise is confirmed:

I4DMUACStepC_Oct-Dec13_09: Task sharing related to CPDLC. To avoid that both pilots spend too much time head-down and to remove uncertainties related to CPDLC messages management by the flight crew, in particular concerning the loading of messages into flight management system, it is recommended to provide pilots with a clear procedure on task sharing related to CDPLC management.(9.1-D53)

4.2.1.11 Non-Nominal pilot task sharing in CPDLC usage This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0028: Assess the effects of the proposed task sharing for CPDLC usage on pilot tasks in descent and approach in non-nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M.

It is divided in several success criteria, analysed independently in the following section.

Reminder The pilots did not receive any specific briefing related to task sharing in case of failure on-board. The rules for CPDLC task sharing presented before were applicable.

In addition, the pilots had to apply the current rules in case of failure (ECAM alert):

- The priority of the pilot tasks is the following: Fly – Navigate – Communicate – Manage System. It shall be noted that the communication is a priority over system management which consists in managing the procedure and related actions to handle the failure described on a dedicated display, named ECAM.

- PF Call “ECAM action”, the PM performs the ECAM actions. When necessary, the PF can call “Stop ECAM action”, and ask PM to do other tasks with higher priority. Once finished, the PF call “Continue ECAM action”, the PM does the ECAM actions and the PM calls “ECAM action completed”.

- In an abnormal phase, the communication becomes PF task but only during the ECAM actions by PM. This serves to relieve the PM. If no ECAM actions have to be performed, normal task sharing applies.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.001 The expected tasks (new and conventional) are effectively achieved by the crew in non-nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA operations.

Outputs: All flight crews decided to accept and/or continue the CTA and ASPA operations even having a failure to manage (altitude depressurisation).

In most cases, the CPDLC messages related to CTA or ASPA arrived once ECAM actions were finished and then the CPDLC task sharing remains unchanged comparatively to nominal situations:

- For most of flight crews, the PM ensured all actions related to CPDLC;

- In one flight crew, the PF continued to load and PM to answer the message.

In two occasions a CPDLC message arrived during failure management (ECAM actions).


216 of 343


In all situations, we observed that all the flight crew successfully achieved to manage the failure, the conventional tasks for descent and approach management and the new tasks related to CTA and ASPA operations. Conclusion: The success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.001 “the expected tasks (new and conventional) are effectively achieved by the crew in non-nominal situation for CTA/i4D and ASPA operations” is considered as met.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.002 The consequences of observed errors are within tolerable limits.

Outputs: Overall, the pilots applied the task sharing as expected; nevertheless, we observed a slight deviation from the procedures in two occasions.

In one case, a CPDLC message (CTA instruction) arrived during the failure management. The PF asked the PM to answer "standby" and to finish the ECAM actions first and, once the ECAM actions were finished, the PM handled the CTA instruction. Since communication is a priority over ECAM actions, we would have expected that in this situation the PF calls “Stop ECAM”, the PM handles the CTA instruction, and once finished, the PM continues the ECAM actions.

In the other case, all along the flight, the PF handled ECAM actions and PM kept managing communication while the procedure requires that PM does ECAM actions and PF manages communication during this time to rely the PM. The pilots explained during the debriefing, that they decided this task sharing because the PF knew how to manage the failure and it was possible because the crew knew each other very well.

Analysis: Concerning the first procedure deviation, the fact that CPLDC is used for non-time critical communications and voice for time critical communication may lead the pilots to consider that ECAM actions are a priority above CPDLC in this situation. We can expect that voice communications remain a priority above ECAM actions. The only consequence was that it has induced a short delay for answering CDPLC message: it may have affected controllers’ tasks and reduced the time available for managing the situation, but it is not critical considering that non-nominal situations are infrequent and that CPDLC is used when the instructions are non-time critical. The pilot has the responsibility to decide the priority of tasks between failure management on-board and CPDLC.

Concerning the second procedure deviance, the PF deliberately decided to adapt the golden rules to the context, as recommended. In this situation, it was more efficient that the PF manages the ECAM actions as he already experienced this kind of failure and therefore he was more familiar with the tasks to perform than the PM. This task sharing change did not have any negative consequences; the flight crew successfully achieved all requested tasks, new and conventional.

Conclusion: The flight crew adapted the procedure according to the situation: each times, procedure deviation allowed to efficiently manage the flight and had no critical impact on ATM operations. These results confirm that it is more efficient to let the possibility to adapt the task sharing according to the context than to impose a strict task sharing which cannot fit with all circumstances.

Consequently, the success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.002 is considered as met.

Success Criterion


217 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.003 The workload between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring is well-balanced in non-nominal situation.

Outputs: On average, the pilots found the workload related to communication slightly low for both PM and PF (see Figure61 below). There is no significant difference from the nominal situation (see in previous section).

Figure61: Pilots’ feedbacks on the communication-related workload in non-nominal situation

Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each scenario); 1= Very low; 6= Very high

On average, during i4D operation the pilots agreed that the time spend head down is compatible with tasks while they were in non-nominal situation, but during ASPA operation they only partially agreed that he time spend head down is compatible with tasks while they were in non-nominal situation (see Figure 67 below). We also observed the pilot’s feedbacks related to the time spent head down are slightly less positive comparatively to nominal situation both i4D and ASPA operations (see below).


218 of 343


Figure 67: Pilots’ feedbacks on acceptability of time spent head down in non-nominal

situation Note: N=8 participants (4 crews consisting of PM and PF role; counterbalanced at positions between each

scenario); 1=fully disagree; 6=fully agree

One flight crew explained during the debriefing, that when the PM was handling the ECAM actions, it would have been complicated for the PF to handle the radio and the CPDLC in same time and, split the radio and the CPDLC would not have made any sense. This crew added that “in the future we may have to challenge the old rules”.

They also explained that in some non-nominal situations, it could be necessary to inform ATC that CPDLC cannot be used because pilots have a failure on board to manage. In another flight crew, during the scenario with the failure on-board, the Pilot Flying said to the PM: “at any moment, if the workload becomes too high, we cancel ASPA manoeuvre.”

Analysis: The ECAM actions are additional tasks requiring managing system, consequently the workload and the time spent head-down necessarily slightly increases comparatively to nominal situation. However, in the scenario ran during the evaluation, the system failure had no impact on i4D and ASPA operations feasibility and the requested tasks were not too complex. Consequently, the workload remained acceptable and did not prevent pilots from efficiently managing CPDLC messages and i4D and ASPA operations.

Nevertheless, with more demanding failures, the use of CPDLC may be not compatible with all other tasks of the PF (FLY, NAV, COM radio and CPDLC) and may lead to have pilots both head-down too long time. The workload sometimes may also be not compatible with ASPA manoeuvre, especially during approach which is already a demanding flight phase.

Conclusion: The workload and time spent head down slightly increased in non-nominal situation, but overall remained acceptable and well balanced between Pilot Flying and Pilots Monitoring. Consequently, the success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0028.003 is considered as met.

However, in case of too demanding non-nominal situation, it could be interesting to study need for air/ground procedure and phraseology to refuse ASPA operation.


219 of 343


Overall, the current Airbus high level task sharing recommendations related to CPDLC may be sufficient for managing non-nominal situation: it is at the pilot’s discretion to decide the priority between the tasks according to the situation.

The following recommendation, coming from exercise 708 is confirmed:

RECOM-708-OPS-n: Refusal of operation. It is recommended to define a procedure that allows the pilot to refuse and/or cancel i4D and ASPA operation, whichever the cause, if he feels the need to, in order to avoid that ASPA manoeuvres are sent unnecessarily.

4.2.1.12 TOD Downlink impact This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0030: Assess the impact on flight optimization of sending the airborne computed Top of Descent information to the ground.

Reminder In descent, the aircraft theoretical vertical profile computation is optimized considering numerous parameters (including weather forecast, airline cost index,…). When the crew receives a CTA instruction, inserts the RTA into the Flight Management System and activates the manoeuvre, the vertical profile is recomputed, from the Top of Descent, taking into account the new constraint (here a time over a waypoint).

The Top of Descent is a pseudo waypoint (virtual point created by the Flight Management System and displayed to the crew to facilitate the management of the flight and the understanding of the aircraft behaviour). It is located to optimize the aircraft energy management from the beginning of the descent, taking into account all the data available to the Flight Management System.

Success criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0030.001


Context In most of the coupled validation activities already performed, as soon as a medium density airspace is considered, several issues related to delayed descent clearance request due to loaded voice frequency have already been reported.

The airborne prototypes developed in the frame SESAR P9.01 and used in the EXE-805 are implementing the following functionalities, as part of the Initial 4D function:

- Extended Projected Profile (EPP)

- Required Time of Arrival (RTA)

- Enhanced Weather data model

Some pseudo-waypoints computed by the FMS are transmitted to the ground in the EPP and the Top of Descent is one of them. Since the EPP was transmitted to the ground in the EXE-805, the possibility to use the Top of Descent information to limit the delayed descent initiation was envisioned in the exercise preparation as potential alternative to the existing recommendations on this topic. However, after discussion, the controllers involved in the exercise refused to anticipate the aircraft descent clearance, arguing that it would be quite difficult to ensure that the aircraft trajectory is clear of traffic if a tactical instruction is not almost immediately followed by the corresponding crew action in the medium density airspace considered.


220 of 343


Controllers have been sensitised to the problematic linked to the aircraft energy management in descent and to the impact of a delayed descent initiation. Thus it was agreed that controllers would try to facilitate the aircraft descent and anticipate the descent clearance as much as possible.

Outputs: Over the 15 flights performed by the Airbus aircraft, 12 descents have been anticipated, 10 on crew request performed by voice and 2 by the controllers when they contacted the crew by voice: “Call back when ready for descent”.

However, 3 descents were initiated with delay, 1 on the crew initiative and 2 because the frequency was loaded when the crew wanted to ask for the descent clearance.

Analysis: Delays in descent initiation have been confirmed in the EXE-805 and in most of the cases for the same reason than the one observed in current operations and in previous validation exercises: a loaded frequency when pilots want to ask for the descent clearance.

The only case of delayed descent initiation on the crew initiative was for the last flight performed by Airbus test pilots (4th flight) out of curiosity and is not representative of what an airline crew would have done. Thus it is very unlikely to happen in regular operations.

Conclusion: Considering that the airborne computed trajectory transmitted through the EPP was not used in the EXE-805, it is not possible to further assess this objective. The delayed descent causes are not linked to the aircraft trajectory and the same issue than in the previous exercises has been encountered (i.e. loaded frequency).

However, when the descent clearance was anticipated, no difficulties have been highlighted by pilots to efficiently manage the descent. Thus the objective CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0030.001 is considered as not addressed in this validation exercise.

A recommendation on this topic has already been issued in the EXE-708:

RECOM-708-Design-k: Descent Request message: It is recommended to review the adequateness of voice as communication mean for the descent request in order to avoid losing time at loaded frequencies and allow anticipation of action with the optimal timing. A discussion at standardization level (Eurocae WG78) for adding the Request Descent Clearance message shall be launched.

When the discussions about this new message were initiated at the Eurocae WG78 level, the datalink standard ED-228 Rev A was already closed with no possibility to add new standardized datalink messages until the next revision. However the discussions around potential solutions have started with the ground partners.

Complementary work on the EPP data exploitation by the ground systems to facilitate the aircraft optimized trajectory when compatible with the surrounding traffic and the traffic flow medium term management may be performed in the next related research projects.

4.2.1.13 RTA MISSED procedures This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031: Assess if the defined procedure in case of RTA MISSED occurrence can be efficiently followed by controller and pilots.

On Airbus side, 18 RTA were instructed and no RTA MISSED occurred and the objective OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031 is considered as not assessed.. It has to be noted that in the EXE-805 Validation Plan , it was clearly stated that this objective would be assessed only on opportunity.


221 of 343


4.2.1.14 ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedures This section addresses the following objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0033: Evaluate if the defined procedure in case of ASPA UNABLE occurrence can be easily and efficiently followed by controllers and pilots.


Procedure evaluated: When starting an ASPA operation, two different types of “ASPA UNABLE” have to be considered:

- ASPA UNABLE before activation: it occurs when the initiation conditions do not allow the aircraft to engage the manoeuvre. The system considers that the required spacing will not be acquired in the remaining distance and/or time or the crew doesn’t want to activate the manoeuvre, whichever the reason.

- ASPA UNABLE after activating the manoeuvre: it can occur either in the acquisition phase (when the aircraft is adjusting its speed to reach the instructed spacing) or in maintain phase (once the required spacing has been reached and the aircraft speed is adapted to maintain this spacing with a +/-5s tolerance.) when the ASPA algorithm detects that the spacing is outside the +/-5s tolerance.

These operational situations are quite different from each other and different procedures have been defined based on the previous exercises results and provided to controllers and pilots who participated to the exercise:

- Refuse ASPA Manoeuvre8

Controller Pilot Communication mean

REMAIN [Time_Interval]s BEHIND TARGET [TGT-ID]

OR FOR SPACING MERGE AT [WPT], THEN REMAIN [Time_Interval]s BEHIND TARGET [TGT-ID]

CPDLC

UNABLE [A/C-ID], remain [Time_Interval] seconds behind target

OR [A/C-ID], merge at [WPT], then remain [Time_Interval] seconds behind target

Voice

Unable spacing [A/C-ID]

- Announce ASPA UNABLE during manoeuvre execution


8 Information in italic is optional


222 of 343


Unable ASPA, speed [XXX]kts, [A/C-ID] Wait for ATCO instruction while ASPA remain active

Voice [A/C-ID], cancel ASPA, proceed as cleared If needed, gives speed instruction

Cancelling ASPA, proceeding as cleared [A/C-ID]

Several requirements from P05.06.06 Stream 1 OSED [18] have been used in the air/ground discussions to establish the procedure evaluated in the exercise. However, after coordination between ENAV and AIRBUS operational teams and using feedbacks from previous validation exercises, two novelties compared to the OSED requirements have been introduced:

- The crew should not take the initiative to terminate the ASPA manoeuvre, except if pilots consider that the manoeuvre is no more feasible. In most of the case, the crew shall first inform the controller of the UNABLE situation. Once the controller informed, crews were instructed to wait for cancel instruction before cancelling the manoeuvre.

- The crew should add the aircraft current speed in the message announcing the ASPA UNABLE during the manoeuvre execution in order for the controller to provide a speed instruction if needed.

In the 4 coupled validation sessions, the AIRBUS aircraft performed 15 flights and 16 ASPA manoeuvres were instructed.

Success Criterion:

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.001 The procedure defined in case of ASPA UNABLE is correctly applied by the crew.

1. ASPA UNABLE before manoeuvre activation Outputs and analysis: Over the 16 ASPA manoeuvres executed, 4 manoeuvres were refused by the crews and the following situations were observed and are analysed below:

1.a. Frequency change after refusing the manoeuvre (1 scenario).

1.b. Current spacing asked by voice by the controller after refusing the manoeuvre (2 scenarios).

1.c. Speed instructed by voice by the controller after refusing the manoeuvre (1 scenario).

Output 1.a

In this case, the manoeuvre was received by datalink and after assessing its feasibility, the crew answered UNABLE directly through CPDLC.

A new frequency was instructed by voice to the crew, right after sending the UNABLE message. Pilots contacted the new sector, using the following phraseology: “Unable ASPA, speed 210kts”. The controller answered with a speed instruction. Afterwards, the following datalink message was received: “CANCEL SPACING BUT RETAIN TARGET” but no more instruction related to any ASPA manoeuvre was received.

Analysis 1.a

In the current use of mixed mode communication, it has been widely agreed that when a message is sent through datalink, it is not necessary to double the information with a voice communication. However the fact that the crew felt the need to inform by voice the new


223 of 343


controller in contact that they were unable to comply with the instructed manoeuvre might be explained by a lack of knowledge about the ATC coordination tools. Pilots might not be sure that the new controller was aware of the status of the negotiation. Considering that the ground systems can be very different from one country to another, it seems impossible for pilots to remember each system’s specificities and adapt their behaviour accordingly.

The phraseology followed by both the crew and the controller was the one defined in case of ASPA UNABLE after the manoeuvre activation. The controller provided a speed instruction to the crew who applied it without hesitation or further questions about the manoeuvre until the reception of the datalink message which led them to expect another manoeuvre instruction.

Moreover, the implemented datalink message “CANCEL SPACING…” is not adapted in this situation. Indeed, the crew rejected the manoeuvre which was never activated and it does not make sense to cancel a manoeuvre never activated.

In the current implementation of the ASPA manoeuvre by the ground system, the controller has only two possibilities to reset an ASPA manoeuvre, either send the CPDLC message “CANCEL SPACING BUT RETAIN TARGET” or send the CPDLC message “CANCEL SPACING AND DESELECT TARGET”. It is the reason why CPDLC messages, considered as spurious messages by the crews, were received. After discussion with ground partners it has been agreed that an evolution in the ground platform HMI for this specific point would be necessary to allow the controller resetting the refused manoeuvres without having to send a CANCEL message to the crew.

Output 1.b

In these two cases, the manoeuvre was received by datalink and after assessing the manoeuvre feasibility, the crew answered UNABLE directly through CPDLC.

The controller contacted the crew by voice right after the UNABLE message was sent, asking for the current spacing, which in one case led to several voice exchanges as detailed (extracted from logs) below9:

Crew [D/L]: ATC (R/T):

Crew (R/T):

ATC (R/T): Crew (R/T):

ATC (R/T): Crew (R/T)

UNABLE “4Y11272, which was your… which is your actual spacing?” “Confirm speed reporting for 4Y1172” “No, report spacing 4Y1172” “Confirm question for 4Y1172” “Report actual spacing” “Actual spacing 68s”

Crew [D/L]: ATC (R/T):

Crew (R/T):

ATC (R/T):

UNABLE “4Y1172, kindly may I have the actual spacing with the target?” “For the time being, we have current spacing 67… 68s with target AZA1472 for 4Y1172” “Thank you”

No more instruction related to any ASPA manoeuvre was then received. However, in the second case, the crew tried to “help” the controller and they selected the aircraft speed to slow down and increase the current spacing: “Speed selected 202kts, If he wants a bit more distance, we can give him more distance”.

9 [D/L]: Datalink message (R/T): Radio communication


224 of 343


Analysis 1.b

It generated a slight increase in crew workload when they wondered if another ASPA manoeuvre would be instructed or while trying to “help” the controller (i.e. decreasing the aircraft speed to increase the spacing with the target). The fact that the crews were expecting another ASPA manoeuvre might be due to the simulation (they knew that they were participating in an evaluation focusing, among others, on ASPA function). However, the controller asking the current spacing after the manoeuvre rejection was quite misleading and was probably one of the causes of the second crew’s behaviour. We should also consider that pilots might decide to refuse the ASPA manoeuvre for other reasons than an UNABLE raised by the system such as an important workload, or non-critical failure... In this case, providing the controller with the aircraft current spacing would not help him to prepare another manoeuvre.

Output 1.c

In this case, the manoeuvre was received by datalink and after assessing the manoeuvre feasibility, the crew answered UNABLE directly through CPDLC.

The controller provided the crew with a speed instruction through voice.

Analysis 1.c

When the crew refuses the ASPA manoeuvre (whichever the reason), no further air/ground coordination has been defined after the “UNABLE” datalink message. However, in this scenario, the controller provided the crew with a speed instruction. It didn’t generate supplementary workload and the pilots selected the speed.

Conclusion:

The defined procedure to refuse an ASPA manoeuvre was correctly applied by the crews, which was not the case of controllers, leading to an increase in pilots’ workload and additional voice coordination.

The need for global and homogenous procedures has been highlighted by pilots who cannot take into account each ground system specificity when flying ASPA procedures.

It is confirmed that the crew is not expected to provide the current spacing information to the controller and thus the controller should not ask this information by voice. Since controllers have at their disposal a dedicated tool to compute the spacing value, they should not need to ask the information.

The defined procedure has been correctly applied by the crew but the procedure shall be refined as follow (novelties identified in bold green):


REMAIN [Time_Interval]s BEHIND TARGET [TGT-ID]

OR FOR SPACING MERGE AT [WPT], THEN REMAIN [Time_Interval]s BEHIND TARGET [TGT-ID]

CPDLC

UNABLE If needed provide speed instruction Voice [A/C-ID], remain [Time_Interval] seconds behind target

OR [A/C-ID], merge at [WPT], then remain

Voice


225 of 343


[Time_Interval] seconds behind target Unable spacing [A/C-ID] If needed provide speed instruction If no speed instruction is provided by the controller, the crew is expected to follow the published procedure and the existing speed constraints.

2. ASPA UNABLE while in maintain phase Outputs and Analysis Pilots were instructed to inform the ATC by voice as soon as an ASPA UNABLE alert was raised by the aircraft systems after the manoeuvre activation and for the 3 situations encountered they all followed this procedure. The following situations were observed and are analysed below:

2.a. A speed was instructed to the crew after announcing the ASPA UNABLE (1 scenario).

2.b. An information related to the speed was provided to the crew after announcing the ASPA UNABLE but it was not considered as a speed instruction by the crew (1 scenario).

2.c. The crew announced the current spacing instead of the aircraft speed when announcing the UNABLE ASPA (1 scenario).

Pilots were also instructed to specify in the same message the current aircraft speed and they complied with this procedure in two cases:

Output 2.a

In one case the controller instructed another speed than the one announced by the crew, but did not request to cancel the ASPA manoeuvre explicitly.

Analysis 2.a

It did not surprise the flight crew when they received the new speed instruction because they have well understood that ASPA manoeuver and speed instruction are exclusive and, the last ATC instruction (here the selected speed) implicitly supersizes the previous one (here the ASPA manoeuver). In addition, this oblivion did not have any consequence as the ASPA manoeuvre was nevertheless cancelled as requested by the procedure when the pilots selected the speed. The flight was then smoothly managed through conventional controls down to landing.

Output 2.b

In the other case the controller deemed the speed as appropriate at this stage of flight and answered “Current speed is good, continue approach”. The crew did not select any speed and the manoeuvre remained engaged while still unable. Later on, a CPDLC message “CANCEL SPACING, DESELECT TARGET” was received and the manoeuvre was stopped.

Analysis 2.b

By the time the ASPA operation was terminated, the spacing between the two aircraft had decreased, which may have had an impact on the separation. Even though the controller provided the pilots with an information related to the aircraft speed, he did not comply with the defined procedure and did not clearly state the ASPA manoeuvre status. As a consequence, the ASPA manoeuvre remained engaged while still unable until reception of the CPDLC message.

It tends to confirm that it is necessary for the controller to clearly announce the manoeuvre status as well as providing a regular speed instruction.


226 of 343


Output 2.c

In the last case, pilots announced their current spacing (instead of the speed): “UNABLE ASAS 84s behind target”. It led to a misunderstanding from the controller who asked them to confirm the unable (he understood 89s for an instructed spacing of 90s and did not get why the crew was announcing an unable).

Analysis 2.c

Air/ground coordination was necessary before reaching a common understanding of the situation. While this coordination was on-going, the spacing between the aircraft and the target was decreasing with the controller still thinking that the aircraft was complying with its ASPA instruction, which may have had an impact on the separation margins under controller responsibility. Once the situation clarified, the controller provided a speed instruction which automatically terminated the manoeuvre when the pilots selected the speed. Controllers need information on the aircraft current speed in order to revert to conventional control and assess if a speed instruction is necessary to maintain separation with previous aircraft, as it has been automatically managed by the ASPA algorithm and may have varied significantly since the last speed instruction or constraint.

However, this error should be mitigated with appropriate training and frequent use of the manoeuvre. As some crews pointed out, they would need dedicated training before being familiar enough with the new phraseology, especially in case of ASPA UNABLE at low altitude.

Conclusion: Even though an ASPA manoeuvre can be considered as a speed instruction by the controllers, on airborne side, it is necessary to be clearly informed of the manoeuvre status, either RETAIN ASPA or CANCEL ASPA information shall be stated by the controller, after announcing an ASPA UNABLE by voice. To avoid any misunderstanding, a speed instruction in case of ASPA cancellation shall be precisely defined and agreed between all stakeholders. The following instructions have been proposed:

- “Select speed XXXkts”

- “Maintain current speed”

The wording “Proceed as cleared” defined in the procedure provided to the pilots has been considered as not appropriate in this case.

It is proposed, to modify the procedure as follows (novelties identified in bold green):


Unable ASPA, speed [XXX]kts, [A/C-ID]

Voice [A/C-ID], cancel ASPA, maintain current speed If needed, manage speed

Cancelling ASPA, maintaining current speed [A/C-ID]

In the EXE-805, pilots have been briefed to keep the ASPA manoeuvre active in case of UNABLE situation while waiting for the controller instruction. In fact, the ASPA manoeuvre is an ATC instruction and except if deemed absolutely necessary by the crew, pilots do not take the initiative to cancel an ATC instruction if not instructed to do so.


227 of 343


However, after discussing with the ground partners it appears that the controllers were expecting the manoeuvre to be automatically disengaged when the unable alert is raised by the system. Further discussions on this topic are necessary before providing a conclusion and a proposition to modify the P05.06.06 OSED [18] as [18]

Furthermore, correctly applying this procedure would require for both pilots and controllers to be trained, otherwise unable ASPA manoeuvres might remain engaged which may impact the aircraft separation margins under the responsibility of the controller. With appropriate training (as already defined as requirement in the P05.06.06 OSED [18] foreseen to apply the defined procedures.

The success criterion CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.001 is considered as met.

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.002 The procedure defined in case of ASPA UNABLE is correctly applied by the controllers



228 of 343


Figure 68: Controllers’ ASPA-IM-S&M orders Figure 68 shows that ASPA-IM-S&M performed by each group of simulated sectors per hour. Very low occurrences of ASPA-IM-S&M unable happened.

Controllers performed correctly prescribed task in those cases, sometimes they preferred to contact via R/T the interested pilot in order to provide related rationale even if it as not requested.

Sectors mainly interested by ASPA-IM-S&M operations were the ones related to E-TMA, TMA and ARR. All manouvres undertaken in E-TMA and ARR sectors were succesfully performed, meanwhile in TMA sectors, characterized by an higher number of undertaken manouvres, a minimum percentage of them failed. Controllers asserted that it happened rarely when separation coditions were not satisfied anymoreFurthermore

Success Criterion

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.003 The workload associated to ASPA UNABLE management does not prevent the flight crew to perform stabilized approach and landing.


Output Upon the 7 ASPA UNABLE situation occurrence (4 manoeuvres were refused by the crew and 3 manoeuvres were interrupted while in maintain phase), no negative feedback from the crews regarding their capability to managed the flight through the approach and landing was collected.

Analysis

In the case of the refused manoeuvres, a slight increase in crew workload was observed when pilots did not know if they had to expect another manoeuvre (when the controller asked for the current spacing or instructed to retain the target) or not. But this situation occurred early enough before starting the approach and did not jeopardize the aircraft landing.

Reverting to conventional controls and being managed through speed instructions after the interruption of the ASPA manoeuvre was perfectly acceptable either operationally or from crews’ workload point of view.

Conclusion: The defined procedure, when correctly performed by the crews and controllers, allowed performing steady approaches and landings while keeping the crew workload in acceptable limits. The envisioned modifications proposed above should not negatively impact this conclusion.


229 of 343


The success criterionCRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0033.003 is considered as met.

4.2.2 Environmental sustainability & Fuel efficiency The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Environment sustainability and Fuel Efficiency –has been performed according to the guidelines - developed by P16.6.3 - which forms a parts of the Environment Reference Material (ERM).

Fuel Burnt and CO2 Emissions are the selected metrics to showcase the outcomes:

The Fuel Burnt is the main indicator related to the efficiency of flight and it is linked to pollutant emissions. Also it has a direct proportionality to CO2 which can be considered the main GHG.

These metrics have been calculated through the software AEM Kernel (Advanced Emission Model) which is a stand-alone tool developed by EUROCONTROL used for estimating fuel burn and related gaseous emissions (CO2, H2O, SOx, NOx, HC, CO, Benzene, VOC, and TOG, etc.). It has the capability to analyse flight profile data on a flight-by-flight basis and for air traffic scenarios from local studies around airports to global emissions from air traffic.

The AEM use several underlying system databases, including aircraft, aircraft engines, fuel burn rates and emission indices, provided by external data agencies (BADA, ICAO emission Databank) in order to assure the quality of the information provided. This system information is combined with dynamic input data, represented by the air traffic flight profiles, that, in this case, have been gathered from RTS output.

According to the ERM, changes in operations have been compared between reference scenario and solution scenarios as following:

SCENARIO

REFERENCE (1A) I4D/CTA (1B) ASPA-IM-S&M (1C) ASPA-IM-S&M+I4D/CTA (1D)

Figure 69: ENV Table

The Environmental impact Assessment has been conducted considering a double approach.

The first, regards complete trajectory of all flights (included over flights), from start in the feeder until the end on arrival airport.

The second one is focused on the complete trajectory of all arrival inbound/outbound flights for LIRF.

The calculation has been done taking into account the medium value of the outputs related to all runs used for the assessment10.

10 Several runs were executed for the various scenarios, the medium values for fuel burn/co2 emission and distance flown have been calculated for each scenario and used for the comparison 10 For calculation of emission, AEM uses thethe Boeing Fuel Flow Method 2 (BFFM2). BFFM2 involves the use of the ICAO or other suitable certification-type emissions databank to model


230 of 343


In the current version of IMPACT, fuel burn is calculated by the Advanced Emission Model (AEM), exactly in the same way as in the standalone version of AEM. The modelling principle of AEM relies on the use of tabulated default (standard) Fuel Flow values derived from BADA, provided for different aircraft attitudes (climb, cruise, descent) and altitude layers. These tabulated data correspond to nominal/standard speed conditions (obtained from BADA). The speed information provided in the user-defined input data is only used by AEM to calculate the duration of each flight segment, which is further multiplied by the above-mentioned tabulated fuel flow values to determine the fuel burn on each segment. In particular, AEM does not adjust the tabulated default/standard fuel flow values to account for the actual speed of the aircraft on each flight segment, whereas fuel flow is directly influenced by this factor, among other flight parameters. This constitutes a major modelling limitation when assessing fuel burn/CO2 for concepts involving speed changes, with a risk to introduce potentially large errors in fuel burn results when speeds associated to particular concepts significantly differ from the nominal BADA speed conditions implicitly assumed in the AEM Fuel Burn calculation method. The fuel consumption and emission data output have been obtained through AEM. This software is based on BADA 3.11 database and ICAO EED data (in our VAL exercise with A/C at nominal condition). According to these database for example an A320 during cruise at FL390 and speed of 447kts, burns more or less 35.6 kg of fuel/min, ~5kg/NM, at FL 350 the consumption is ~6kg. Consider that per each flight has been evaluated the entire flight track, from the start to the end, considering all the phase of flights (climb/cruise/descent included change of FL and speed) and divided into flight leg with a buffer of ~ 3 sec. For each flight leg, we have an associated fuel burn rate and the sum of all legs give the total of fuel burn for each flight. In the following table is reported an example of flight leg for two different flights taken directly from data log output Example: Scenario 9 CALLSIGN TYPE FROM/TO FL SPEED FUEL

CONSUMPTION/SEC

FUEL CONSUMPTION/MIN

BAW2542 A3

20 EG

KK-LIRF

390

447KTS

0.61 KG/SEC

37KG/MIN

GWI57P

A320

EDDV-LIRF

370

448KTS

0.63 KG/SEC

38KG/MIN

emissions indices. The key components of the method are semi-empirical methods to adjust for atmospheric effects and the development of a relationship between EI and fuel flow. This allows a predicted fuel flow (i.e., for a flight segment) computed from a model or from measurements to be used to predict emissions. The power settings of thrust is related to Phase of flight according the following: Take Off (Power setting at 100% of thrust), Climb out (85%), approach (30%), Taxi ground idle (7%). For the full information about methodology ref to Appendix B of AEM 3 User Guide March 2010


231 of 343


Just for clearance AEM accepts in input the following data for each flight: CALL SIGN, FLIGHT PHASE, SPEED, ROC/ROD, LAT/LONG, FL,A/C MODEL and according to BADA gives as output the fuel burn and CO2 emission

4.2.2.1 Environmental sustainability & Fuel efficiency Results Assessment

The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Environment sustainability and Fuel Efficiency –has been performed according to the guidelines - developed by P16.6.3 - which forms a parts of the Environment Reference Material (ERM).

Fuel Burnt and CO2 Emissions are the selected metrics to showcase the outcomes:

The Fuel Burnt is the main indicator related to the efficiency of flight and it is linked to pollutant emissions. Also it has a direct proportionality to CO2 which can be considered the main GHG.

These metrics have been calculated through the software AEM Kernel (Advanced Emission Model) which is a stand-alone tool developed by EUROCONTROL used for estimating fuel burn and related gaseous emissions (CO2, H2O, SOx, NOx, HC, CO, Benzene, VOC, and TOG, etc.). It has the capability to analyse flight profile data on a flight-by-flight basis and for air traffic scenarios from local studies around airports to global emissions from air traffic.

The AEM use several underlying system databases, including aircraft, aircraft engines, fuel burn rates and emission indices, provided by external data agencies (BASA, ICAO emission Databank) in order to assure the quality of the information provided. This system information is combined with dynamic input data, represented by the air traffic flight profiles, that, in this case, have been gathered from RTS output.

According to the ERM, changes in operations have been compared between reference scenario and solution scenarios as following:

SCENARIO

REFERENCE (1A) I4D/CTA (1B) ASPA-IM-S&M (1C) ASPA-IM-S&M+I4D/CTA (1D)

The Environmental impact Assessment has been conducted considering a double approach.

The first, regards complete trajectory of all flights (included overflights), from start in the feeder until the end on arrival airport.

The second one is focused on the complete trajectory of all arrival inbound flights on LIRF.


232 of 343


The calculation has been done taking into account the average value of the outputs related to all runs used for the assessment11.

4.2.2.1.1 Results The validation objectives addressed by Environmental assessment and Fuel Efficiency within Exercise 805, were:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0007

To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (i.e. Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission)

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0008

To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission)

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0009

To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M integration solution in terms of Environmental Sustainability (Fuel burn per flight and CO2 emission)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0007.001

Net benefit identified in terms of fuel burn per flight (the expected benefits contributes to OFA04.01.02 target performance i.e about -0.25%)Net benefit identified in terms of fuel burn (the expected benefits contributes to OFA04.01.02target performance i.e. about -0,25%)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0008.001

Net benefit identified in terms of fuel burn (difference among reference and ASPA-IM S&M solution organization shall be about 0,05%)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0009.001

Net Benefit identified in terms of fuel burn (benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4d-ASPA-IM S&M solution organization should be equivalent to the CTA/i4D solution organization)

Metrics/Indicators

Average fuel burnt (Kg per flight) Average CO2 (Kg per flight) Average Fuel burn variation between

reference and solution scenario (Kg per flight)

Average CO2 variation between reference and solution scenario (Kg per flight)

Average Flight Distance (NM per flight) Average distance variation between

reference and solution scenarios (NM per flight)

11 Several runs were executed for the various scenarios, the average values for fuel burn/co2 emission and distance flown have been calculated for each scenario and used for the comparison


233 of 343


The output of EIA and related data concerning the Fuel Burn and CO2 Emission are reported in the following table along with data related to Flight Distance:

I4D/CTA Vs Reference

I4D/CTA VS REFERENCE

(With Overflights)

DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL

DIFFERENCE (KG) DISTANCE DIFFERENCE

%

FUEL DIFFERENCE

%

-2661,2 -7547,8 -5,4 % -5,0 %


(Arrival flights on LIRF without Overflights)

DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL


%

FUEL DIFFERENCE

%

-476,3 -1603,2 -2,8 % -3,5 %

The output data related to the fuel burn and CO2 in the previous table show a reduction of fuel burn and CO2 emission and distance flown for the scenario with i4D+CTA compared with Reference Scenario in both configuration with and without overflights).

The main difference in terms of fuel burn reduction is shown by the more prediction of the trajectory meaning a less tactical intervention and, to delegate to the aircraft for the TOD in order to gain as much as possible the continuous descent operation. Another potential impact was analysed during the run and consists of less tactical intervention induced to maintain the original trajectory as it is without any additional NMs to navigate.

ASPA-IM-S&M Vs Reference

ASPA-IM-S&M VS REFERENCE

(With Overflights)

DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL


% FUEL DIFFERENCE


234 of 343


%

1253,4 3851,5 + 2,3 % + 2,4 %

ASPA-IM-S&M VS REFERENCE


DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL

DIFFERENCE (KG) DISTANCE DIFFERENCE %

FUEL DIFFERENCE

%

141,6 +282,4 +0,8 % +0,6 %

The output data related to the fuel burn and CO2 in the previous table show a slight increase of fuel burn and CO2 emission for the scenario with ASPA-IM-S&M compared with Reference Scenario in both configurations with and without overflights. The increase is linked to a slight increment of distance flown.

The scenario which implies the ASAS S&M influences in a negative way the fuel efficiency consumption compared with the Reference to induce a bit of distance flown for the following reasons: in many cases when the ATCOs initiate the manoeuvres in TMA (especially for the follower a/c) it implies a minor tactical instruction in order to engage the exactly spacing chosen by the ATCO. Of course, this analysis is an average on flights and depends on the tactical instruction and on a specific traffic evolution on the radar screen, however an overall picture comparing the ASAS with the reference one thus not to bring a benefit in fuel efficiency in extended way (without CTA/i4D). Therefore the AEM tool does not calculate the “trust idle” to see the variance of speed for the analysis, consequently, it measures only the distance flown that has confirmed a bit of fuel efficiency with the ASAS as foreseen.

I4D/CTA + ASPA-IM-S&M Vs Reference

The most interesting results in terms of environmental sustainability have been assessed in the comparison between Reference scenario and scenario with integrated use of I4D+ASPA-IM-S&M

I4D/CTA + ASPA-IM-S&M VS REFERENCE

(With Overflights)

DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL


%

FUEL DIFFERENCE

%


235 of 343


-558,4 -2859,2 -1,1 % -1,8 %

I4D/CTA + ASPA-IM-S&M VS REFERENCE


DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE (NM)

FUEL


%

FUEL DIFFERENCE

%

-329,3 -662,1 -1,9 % -1,4 %

The output data related to the fuel burn and CO2 in the previous table show a reduction of fuel burn and CO2 emission and distance flown for the scenario with integrated use of i4D+CTA and ASPA-IM S&M compared with Reference Scenario in both configuration with and without overflights)

Average fuel burn and distance flown per flight

The following histograms and tables report the average results per flight of fuel burn and distance flown for all scenario configurations with and without overflights:


236 of 343



ASPA IM S&M VS REFERENCE

I4D/CTA +ASPA IMS&M VS

REFERENCE

AVG. DISTANCE PER FLIGHT (NM)

-23 NM +11 NM -5 NM

AVG.FUEL PER FLIGHT (KG)

-64 KG +32 KG -25 KG


237 of 343



ASPA IM S&M VS REFERENCE

I4D/CTA +ASPA IMS&M VS REFERENCE

AVG. DISTANCE PER FLIGHT (NM)

-12 NM +3 NM -8 NM

AVG.FUEL PER FLIGHT (KG)

-39 KG +7 KG -16 KG

The average results per flight reflect the result reported in the total results. Is clear that the use of I4D/CTA gives a good contribution in the reduction of Fuel burn/Co2 emission and distance flown

A discrepancy was identified by 16.06.03 in the proposed method of evaluation of environmental impact (IMPACT Tool):

“In the current version of IMPACT, fuel burn is calculated by the Advanced Emission Model (AEM), exactly in the same way as in the standalone version of AEM. The modelling principle of AEM relies on the use of tabulated default (standard) Fuel Flow values derived from BADA, provided for different aircraft attitudes (climb, cruise, descent) and altitude layers. These tabulated data correspond to nominal/standard speed conditions (obtained from BADA). The speed information provided in the user-defined input data is only used by AEM to calculate the duration of each flight segment, which is further multiplied by the above-mentioned tabulated fuel flow values to determine the fuel burn on each segment. In particular, AEM does not adjust the tabulated default/standard fuel flow values to account for the actual speed of the aircraft on each flight segment, whereas fuel flow is directly


238 of 343


influenced by this factor, among other flight parameters. This constitutes a major modelling limitation when assessing fuel burn/CO2 for concepts involving speed changes, with a risk to introduce potentially large errors in fuel burn results when speeds associated to particular concepts significantly differ from the nominal BADA speed conditions implicitly assumed in the AEM Fuel Burn calculation method.

4.2.3 Predictability According to SESAR Projects B05 and B04.01 the official KPI for Predictability KPA are Variance and Standard deviation, the average is not an official SESAR indicator.

4.2.3.1 Assessment The Predictability Analysis has been performed according to the SESAR B04.01 and B05 material i.e. SESAR Performance Framework and Validation report EXE-05-03-VP-805: the influence diagram and the table here below – extracted from Project Number B.05 D85 Guidance on KPIs and Data Collection Version 1 (2014) Edition 00.01.00 - explain KPIs and PIs relevant to EXE VP-805:

Figure 70: Performance Assessment

KPIs / PIs Unit Calculation

PRD1

Variance of Difference in actual & Flight Plan or RBT durations

Minutes2 Variance of Difference in actual & Flight Plan or RBT durations

TMA arrival variability Minutes Standard Deviation of the distribution of actual TMA (arrival) duration vs. planned TMA (arrival)


239 of 343


KPIs / PIs Unit Calculation

duration

Table 31 Predictability KPIs

“TMA Arrival Variability” is the indicator selected for the assessment:

Variance, whose common statistical symbol is σ2, is defined as:

Standard Deviation, whose common statistical symbol is σ , is defined as:

Where, for both of them, x is the average (also named mean value) of samples “x” (x in literature is also represented with μ)

The use of Variance reflects the need established in the framework of B04.01 and B05 activities to decompose the KPI for target allocation purposes, while Standard Deviation is a more intuitive parameter.

For each of three scenario analysed a total of 41 arrival flight on LIRF was considered.

In order to calculate the samples for the formulas (i.e. x1, x2, …, xn ), per each flight in the simulated scenarios the differences between the actual flight duration and the corresponding planned flight duration have been computed as well as the Average Difference per each scenario. The duration, both for the Planned and for the Actual flights, has been evaluated from the first Feeder Point to the Landing Point.

The following table reports an illustration of data that has been used for Predictability Assessment:


240 of 343


Flight Call sign

Actual duration (hh:mm:ss)

Planned duration (hh:mm:ss)

Difference x (mm:ss)

4Y8069 00:24:50 00:25:52 - 01:02

AZA662 00:27:06 00:27:26 - 00:20

BER442 00:28:00 00:27:26 +00:34

…. …. …. …

Table 32: Predictability Assessment Example

The samples in the formulas have their own algebraic sign: plus means actual time greater than planned, i.e. a delay in ATA in respect of ETA; on the contrary minus means actual time less than planned, i.e. an advance in ATA in respect of ETA.

4.2.3.2 Results The validation objectives addressed by Predictability assessment within Exercise 805, were:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0004 CRT-05.03-VALP-01.00.004.001

To measure the benefit provided by the CTA/i4d solution in terms of Predictability (i.e flight duration variability)

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0005

To measure the benefits provided by the ASPA-IM-S&M solution in terms of Predictability (i.e. Flight Duration Variability)

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0006

To measure the benefits provided by the CTA/i4d ans ASPA IM S&M concepts integration solution in terms of Predictability (i.e Flight duration Variability)

Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability (the expected benefit contributes to OFA04.01.02 target performance i.e about -4%)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.005.001

Net Benefit in terms of flight duration variability (the expected benefit shall be about -1%)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.006.001

Net benefit identified in terms of flight duration variability (benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4d- ASPA IM S&M solution organization should be equivalent to the CTA/i4D solution organization)

Metrics/Indicators

Average Flight Time variation between Planned FT and Actual FT (minutes per flight)

TMA arrival variability (Variance of Differences in


241 of 343


Actual & Flight Plan or RBT durations (minutes))

TMA Arrival Variability - Arrival Flights, difference between planned time and actual time Statistics

SCENARIO COMPARISON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLANNED TIME AND ACTUAL TIME

VARIANCE

σ2 (mm.00) 2

STANDARD DEVIATION

σ (mm:ss)

AVERAGE

𝐱 (mm:ss)

I4D/CTA VS PLANNED 7.8 02:47 -01:13

ASPA-IM-S&M VS PLANNED 3.7 01:55 +00:55

I4D/CTA + ASPA-IM-S&M VS PLANNED

6.8 02:37 -00:37

The figures showed in the table put in evidence different results for the three scenarios.

The ASPA IM – S&M solution seems to bring less variability than the other two, σ = 01:55, with an average delay of 55 seconds per flight. The I4D/CTA shows the greater variability among the three solutions with a σ = 02:47 and average of 01:13 ahead the scheduled.

The I4D/CTA + ASPA-IM-S&M has a σ just 10 seconds smaller than I4D/CTA, with an average of 37 seconds ahead the schedule.

4.2.4 Cost-effectiveness Cost effectiveness objectives have not been assessed due to lack of resources, despite this the objectives are directly related to the assessment of the impact concepts on workload, which have been reported together with other HP-related objectives.

4.2.5 Airspace Capacity – TMA The validation objectives addressed by Airspace Capacity within Exercise 805, were:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0010


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0011

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0010.001

Benefit of Sector Capacity for the E-AMAN – I4D and ASAS S&M

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0011.001


242 of 343


ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0012

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity

Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (volume and time) i.e. difference among baseline and APSA-IM-S&M solution organization shall be about +1%

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0012.001

Net benefit identified in terms of throughput (volume and time) i.e. benefits provided by integrated CTA/i4D- ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization should be equivalent at least to the ASPA-IM-S&M solution organization

Metrics/Indicators

- Sector Capacity -

CTA/I4D does not produce a negative impact on TMA Capacity The En-Route controllers reported they were able to maintain current capacity with i4D procedures applied for one TMA.

actually The Airspace capacity for I4D Scenario create some small improvement in it (depending on the extent of the integration and use, and its impact on workload) remains at the same level in the En-Route Phase. A reduction is visible in the pre-sequencing Sector with the introduction of precise airborne trajectory information should lead to improved prediction, and to improved ground tools, with an associated possible reduction of controller workload.

Below is reported a comparison between the Reference Compared with i4D Scenario

Figure 71: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

AR1 AR2 ESE FEED MI NE NW OV PAD TNE TNW

Sectors OccupancyAverage Num of Flights per Hour

Reference

ANANi4D


243 of 343


ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity The graph below shows the comparison between the BLN, BLN+i4D and BLN+i4D+ASAS-IM-S&M.

In the ref. scenario the Capacity exceed for number of aircraft and this means that specific route for the i4D and the ASAS should be designed properly. In the upstream sectors the ASAS manoeuvres application is null, consequently a significant improvement is noted in the pre-sequencing sectors. With respect of the 708 the platform is improved a lot because the ATCOs had much freedom to apply the ASAS concept starting from the pre-sequencing sectors ( identification and selection of the target) but in some cases from the aircraft point of view implies an auto-adjustment of the auto-throttle in order to maintain the spacing requested by the ATCO.

Also In the TMA phase there is a reduction of the Airspace Capacity compared with the i4D Scenario.

Figure 72: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight with ASAS

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0012Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M TMA Airspace Capacity In the Graph below is reported the analysis for the Airspace capacity with a comparison of the E-AMAN, E-AMAN - i4D, E-AMAN - ASAS S&M and the Solution Scenario where the E-AMAN, i4D and ASAS S&M coexist. The benefit of Airspace Capacity is shown from the upstream sectors (PAD, MI, ESE) that in the beginning of the sequence, the traffic is synchronized with the ground systems (through ETA/MIN /MAX process) and in some cases the i4D require an additional workload from the

0

10

20

30

40

50

60



Reference

ASAS


244 of 343


upstream sector in order to process the contract. When the trajectories are crossing the pre-sequencing sectors (NW, NE, OV, TS) the routes (for all the inbounds to LIRF) are all in the pre-sequencing phase, this means that the aircraft are already separated through the i4D, that has already been established by the en-route sectors. Consequently the pre-sequencing sectors needs only to monitor the trajectory in case of deviations, however only few tactical interventions has given to the i4D aircraft but a potential impact for a renegotiation has been shown.

Thanks to the previous work done from the pre-sequencing sectors all the traffic inbound to LIRF have been analysed in order to fully respect the CTA point as suggested by E-AMAN and i4D. In these particular sectors they are also able to initiate the ASAS manoeuvres in case of tuning of the Sequencing form the CTA point over the FAF.

The analysis comparison between scenario of the ASAS S&M and the solution scenario (all Scenario) shows that the integration of the concept implies a benefit for the accuracy of the trajectory from the 250NM over the FAF, consequently the ASAS during the last phase of flight improve the Airspace Capacity, thanks to the work that has been done in the pre-sequencing phase.

A special focus on the TMA sectors for the TNW and the ARR2 sectors induce a separation of 90 seconds for the target and the follower aircraft when is engaged the ASAS manoeuvres because in ROME TMA scenario there are no constrains for the departure from the RWY 25 of LIRF and it means that if one RWY is used only for arrivals.

In the meanwhile the difference for the RWY 16L, is that the capacity is a bit high compared with the 16R due to the fact that the separation is set to 120 seconds due to departing traffic from the RWY 25 which interferes with the inbound traffic.

Figure 73: Sector Occupancy Average nu per Flight with all Scneario

0

10

20

30

40

50

60



Reference

ASAS

ANANi4D

ASAS + I4d


245 of 343


4.2.6 Airport Capacity OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0013


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0014

ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0015

Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0013.001

Minor benefit Thanks for the Accuracy of the Trajectory over the CTA is predictable, thus to better sequence the Traffic

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0014.001

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0015.001

Metrics/Indicators

- Sector Capacity - Runway Throughput

Analysis of capacity has been broken down into two major and complementary components: spacing analysis and throughput analysis. This section gives a brief explanation of the concepts at base of the analyses, it shows the results for each component along with a local interpretation and it finally discusses the general results.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0013CTA/i4D solution Airport Capacity The investigation of the analysis is set only for Rome TMA, more precisely from FAF point to the RWY. In order to obtain comparable results from the different kind of experimental condition, a normalization process has been applied to the data coming from the reference scenarios compared with the i4D one, ATCOs use a distance based rule with E-AMAN to keep the aircraft separated while under the solution conditions with i4D time-based principles and targets are applied.


246 of 343


Figure 74: Time Spacing Distribution

4439

17

75

1510

60

28

12

81

14

5

< 100 100 - 110 > 110

Time Spacing DistributionBLN AMANASPA AMANi4D AMANASPAi4D

seconds


247 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0014 ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity The spacing detailed analysis provides a view of the separation times used by the ATCOs. It consists in a frequency distribution of the observed separation times over the FAF located at 6 nautical miles from the runway, in the direction of the aircraft flow.

- For each aircraft, the record referring to the closest position to P is identified - The callsign, the time at P and the information about the experimental condition and the traffic

sample are then recorded in a separated table called “sequences”. - For each experimental condition and traffic sample, the sequences are analysed ordered by

time-at-P and the time differences between each adjacent callsign are computed. The time differences are then recorded in a final table called “separation times” along with the two callsigns that generated the separation and the information of the experimental condition and traffic sample.

- Finally the absolute frequency of the separation times are computed for each experimental condition and traffic sample

The following histograms show the distribution of the separation times for E-AMAN with i4D configuration contrasting E-AMAN. Under these circumstances the ASPA with E-AMAN seems to perform closer to i4D organization, preserving the peak of 15 aircraft. In general, in the E-AMAN with ASPA conditions seem to give a valid support in targeting a precise separation time. The results present some fluctuations that are likely to be attributed to singularity in the runs due to a restricted number of exercises.

94

91

87

85

seconds

Average Time Spacing at the FAFBLN AMANASPA AMANi4D AMANASPAi4D


248 of 343


Figure 75: List Of Inbound spacing distribution

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0015Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M Airport Capacity With the Integration of the Operational concept Scenario Solution 3, in some cases this integration seems will satisfy the Separation Criteria applied. The results of the high level analysis confirm the variability of the results due the limited statistical samples. The comparison should be performed with a difference of Traffic in terms of Complexity with a different pick to evaluate the Analysis.

Thanks to the trajectory shared between airborne and ground system the spacing precision in the different phase of flight are the following one: E-AMAN /CTA : +-30s (En-Route & Pre-sequencing)

I-4D: +-10s (Pre-sequencing) ASAS: +-5s (TMA and Approach)

This results in a more efficient spacing between the aircraft in particular during the approach phase until the FAF. The possible impact of the use of i4D/ CTA and ASAS S&M supported by E-AMAN, capacity was also evaluated in terms of effective use of runway throughput. According to the log statistics collected from the platform (airborne and ground) during the ASAS S&M the runway throughput resulted increased.

4.2.7 Safety Real Time Simulation techniques are important in providing human-in-the-loop experience of a proposed concept in a relatively controlled and repeatable environment. Extensive training of

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

ANANi4D

ASPA S&M


249 of 343


participants was performed to reach levels of expertise and familiarity with the proposed concept and simulation tools. sWP5.3 EXE-VP-805 validation campaign was performed using Air Traffic Controller platform known as “ENAV Rome IBP (Industrial Based Platform)”. Platform has been configured in order to have 20 Controller Working Positions managing several sectors related to Rome FIR. In order to express the CWPs / sectors that will be involved in Safety analysis, hereafter will be described a flight workflow. Sequence Manager (SM), supported by AMAN, organizes the sequence providing the CTA to all aircrafts. So SM communicates the sequence to the pre-sequencing sectors represented by :

a) NE –pre-sequencing traffic coming from North – East; b) NW – pre-sequencing traffic coming from North – West; c) OV –pre-sequencing traffic coming from West; d) TS –pre-sequencing traffic coming from South / South – East;

Taking into account traffic sample building, 70% of traffic was managed by NE and TS sectors, so Safety analysis will be focused on those sectors. Ne and TS sectors in order to perform traffic pre-sequencing using i4D technology, in other words NE and TS ensure compliance with CTA previously coordinated with SM. Both sectors transfer traffic to the sequence sector known as TNE. TNE controller performs traffic sequence on IAF (KAMEN, BUCOV, SANTI). So traffic is transferred to the arrival sector known as ARR1. ARR1 controller provides runway 16L landing clearance. ARR1 controller uses ASAS concept, particularly Merge Behind and Remain Behind maneuvers. In the same time runway 16R is managed by ARR2 controller that uses also ASAS concept. It is important to highlight that the main CWP impacted by ASAS and i4D concepts are represented by SM, TNE, NE, TS, ARR1 and ARR2. Consequently Safety analysis will be focused on SM, TNE, NE, TS, ARR1 and ARR2 controllers. Consequently 8 controllers (5 executive and 3 planner) have been analyzed for each run. Particularly several different ATCOs took turns during tests. Furthermore traffic sample used during RTS complies with Scenario 1b and 1c defined by P05.02 in order to create a Mid Complexity/Mid Density environment. Traffic sample has been analyzed by the operational experts and considered suitable to each scenario as well as non-nominal situations. The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the traffic samples:

Flight Type Number

Arrival Flights LIRF RWY 16L per Hour 38

Arrival Flights LIRF RWY 16R per Hour 16

Arrival Flight LIRA RWY 15 per hour 7

Departure Flights from LIRF RWY 25 16

Departure from LIRA RWY 15 6

Arrivals to LIRF from domestic Airports 10

Pop-up flights 4


250 of 343


Transit Flights >100

Total arrival flights to Rome TMA 61

Total departures from Rome TMA 22

Total Number of Flights 160

RTS session duration (hh.mm) >01.40

Table 33: Traffic Sample characteristics

Considering project objectives as well as Safety objectives, Safety analysis will be focused on the comparison between Reference scenario and solution 3 scenario that includes ASAS and i4D integration in a context where AMAN is assumed. Consequently, AMAN is considered out of scope of this analysis. Furthermore Safety analysis will also cover several Non nominal events. In the analysis a specific section will be dedicated to the unusual situation in order to report ATCOs feedback. Safety analysis conducted by SICTA / ENAV will only be focused on ATCO side. Safety KPA foresees the following validation objective:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0022 - To analyse controller’s operation in terms of Safety (nominal and non-nominal events)

This objective will be analysed taking into account several indicators (KPI):

Conflict resolution Traffic Separation &Monitoring Traffic sequencing Situational Awareness

Results will be obtained through the analysis and integration of data collected. Data gathering was carried out through questionnaires. They were submitted to the ATCOs after each run. Considering all the previous factors, the KPI will be evaluated taking into account qualitative and quantitative data compared with information collected during de-briefings as well as controllers’ behaviour observed in the validation. It is important to highlight that the analysis provided in the following sections are related to the assumptions considered during RTS. So the results can not be generalized and can not be applied to other different situations. Table below shows the match among safety validation Objectives, Success Criteria, Indicators / Metrics and Data Collection Methods in order to provide a clear view to the reader:


251 of 343


High level Objectives Identifier

High level Objectives description

Success criteria Identifier

Success Criteria description

KPA / TA

Indicators / Metrics

Data Collection Methods

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0022

To analyse controller’s operation in terms of Safety (nominal and non-nominal events)

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0022.001

The integration of i4D (CTA) and ASPA-IM-S&M is acceptable from ATCO perspectives in terms of Safety (Conflict resolution, Traffic Separation & Monitoring, Traffic sequencing and Situational Awareness)

SAF

Conflict resolution

Traffic Separation &Monitoring

Traffic sequencing

Situational Awareness

Observation

Questionnaires

Checklist

Debriefings

Table 34: match between OBJs, Success Criteria, Indicators and Data collection

Except for “Situational Awareness” (standard SASHA questionnaire used), two different diagrams have been reported during the following Safety analysis. The first one shows the run on the horizontal axis and the range scores on the vertical one. The second one displays the achieved scores on vertical axis and the questions / ATCOs on the horizontal axis. For each question the score is made up of different contributions (i.e. different answers) provided by ATCOs, stacked one over the other one to make the total value of 100%. In order to develop these type of graphics only answers obtained during Solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17) have been considered. The colour scale and related meaning is reported on the right of the figure. Only runs representing nominal event (1,4,5,6,7,8,15,16,17) have been included in the nominal analysis. All other runs related to unusual event (3,10,14,18) have been considered to perform Non-nominal event analysis. Furthermore the range is between 0 (Never) and 6 (Always) as showed through figure below.

Table 35: measure scale

For specific questions and for specific Sectors, a high number of “No answer” can be observed. In most cases this could be due to the perception of ATCOs working in those sectors not to be involved in the specific indicator/question.

0 = Never 1 = Almost Never 2 = Rarely 3= Neutral 4 = Often

5 = Almost Always

6 = Always

Scale


252 of 343


4.2.7.1 Situational Awareness Situational Awareness represents the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. During simulation this indicator has been assessed in a quantitative way using standard “SASHA” questionnaire.

Figure 76: Situational Awareness Reference

and Figure 77: Situational Awareness Solution

show situational awareness related to reference and solution scenarios respectively.

Figure 76: Situational Awareness Reference

Figure 77: Situational Awareness Solution

Situational Awareness values are spread over between 3 (neutral) and 6 (always), for both Reference and Solution scenarios. ATCOs Situational awareness average value for both Reference and Solution scenarios are about 4.8 which correspond to a medium to high value of the scale. Negative values are never noticeable. So it is possible to assert that Reference and Solution scenarios are comparable and equally distributed. This aspect allows to highlight that the use of


253 of 343


ASAS and i4D doesn’t impact negatively on ATCOs Situational Awareness. Some controllers highlighted that in case of high traffic it is hard to have a satisfactory situational awareness due to not optimal HMI

4.2.7.2 Traffic Separation & Monitoring Figure 78: Traffic Separation and Monitoring

, Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. display ATCOs’ answers during several runs in order evaluate if the Traffic Separation & Monitoring is Safe using ASAS and i4D concepts. Some questionnaire questions related to Traffic Separation & Monitoring have been selected:

2.1 Losses of separation occurred as a consequence of incorrect/unexpected aircraft behaviour;

2.2 Losses of separation occurred as a consequence of insufficient approach spacing provided by new concepts ASAS and/or i4D;

2.3 Losses of separation occurred around Merge Point; 2.4 Losses of separation occurred around CTA Fix; 2.5 Providing traffic monitoring using new concepts (ASAS and/or i4D), I experienced

an increased, unexpected compexity level; 2.6 Providing traffic separation using new concepts (ASAS and/or i4D), I experienced

an increased, unexpected compexity level

These questions have been selected because they provide evidences related to Traffic Separation & Monitoring.

Both Figure 78: Traffic Separation and Monitoring

and Error! Reference source not found. represent the same data, explained with different graphics. Particularly, these graphics represent the answer provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and TS) for each questions during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). Figure 78:

Traffic Separation and Monitoring

and Error! Reference source not found. show that the highest percentages of the answers provided by controllers are “never” or “almost never”. “Never” and “almost never” answers are spread between 70% and 100%. Only questions 2.5 and 2.6 report some “often” values, mainly related to SM and TNE controllers. It means that ASAS and i4D ensure to have Traffic Separation and Monitoring comparable with current operation. ATCOs assert that the use of ASAS and i4D concepts increase their monitoring , decreasing, at the same time, the number of task to perform.


254 of 343


Figure 78: Traffic Separation and Monitoring

Figure 79: Traffic Separation and Monitoring

Error! Reference source not found. represents the average of the answers provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and TS) for each questions during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It confirms that the highest percentages of the answers provided by controllers are “never” or “almost never”. Questions 2.5 and 2.6 report some “often” values.


255 of 343


Figure 80: Average Traffic Separation and Monitoring x question

Error! Reference source not found. represents the average of the answers provided to different questions for each ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It shows that the highest percentages of the answers provided by controllers are “never” or “almost never” for all controller / sector.

Figure 81: Average Traffic Separation and Monitoring x ATCO


256 of 343


4.2.7.3 Conflict resolution Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found., Figure 84: Average

Conflict resolution x question

and Error! Reference source not found.The following figures display ATCOs’ answers during several runs in order evaluate if the separation are safely assured using ASAS and i4D concepts. Some questions of the related questionnaire have been selected:

2.7 Tactical conflicts occurred as a consequence of inadequate traffic management instructions;

2.8 Tactical conflicts occurred as a consequence of unexpected aircraft speed variation;

2.9 Tactical conflicts occurred as a consequence of an ineffective traffic planning and coordination;

These questions have been selected because they provide evidences related to Separation resolution.

Next figure represent the same data, explained through different graphic. These graphics represent the answer provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) for each questions during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. show that the highest percentages of answers provided by controllers are “never” or “almost never”. “Never” and “almost never” answers are spread between 60% and 100%. It means that ASAS and i4D seems not to impact the safety level in solving potential conflicts. ATCOs assert that ASAS and i4D use doesn’t impact traffic management, aircraft speed nor planning and coordination. It is important to highlight how transition from new technologies to traditional vectoring has been performed without problem by ATCOs because they currently use vectors

Figure 82: Separation Resolution


257 of 343


Figure 83: Separation Resolution 2

Figure 84: Average Conflict resolution x question

represents the average of the answers provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) for each question during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It confirms that the answer provided by ATCOs with the highest percentage is “never” for all questions.


258 of 343


Figure 84: Average Conflict resolution x question

Error! Reference source not found. represents the average of the answers provided to the different questions for each ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and TS) during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It shows that the answer provided by ATCOs with the highest percentage is “never” for all controller / sector.

Figure 85: Average Conflict resolution x ATCO

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

TNE ARR1 ARR2 SEQMAN

NE(EXE)

NE(PLN)

TS(EXE)

TS(PLN)

27,78%5,56% 16,67%

33,33%11,11%

5,56%5,56%

5,56% 5,56%

27,78%

5,56%11,11%

5,56%

5,56%16,67%

83,33%100,00% 94,44%

33,33%

77,78%94,44%

61,11% 66,67%Scale

ATCOs

Average Conflict resolution x ATCO

Never

Almost Never

Rarely

Neutral

Often

Almost Always

Always

No answer


259 of 343


In the end currently ASAS maneuver is represented by a stretchy line between aircrafts selected. The color of this stretchy line is based on the maneuver status:

a) Yellow –ASAS maneuver has not been accepted; b) Blue –ASAS maneuver has been accepted;

As lesson learn, ATCOs suggested to add a third color, represented by “Red” when two aircrafts involved in ASAS maneuver are going to lose separation.

4.2.7.4 Traffic sequencing Next figures display ATCOs’ answers during several runs in order to feel if traffic sequencing is safe using ASAS and i4D concepts. Some questions of questionnaire related to Conflict resolution have been selected:

2.10 In the sequence building phase I experienced an increased, unexpected complexity level due to new concepts (ASAS and/or i4D);

2.11 CTA manual changes (respect to CTA proposed by AMAN) were needed; 2.12 CTA manual changes (respect to CTA proposed by AMAN) introduced an

increased, unexpected complexity level; 2.13 CTA negotiations between ATCO and Pilot were needed; 2.14 CTA negotiations between ATCO and Pilot introduced an increased,

unexpected complexity level;

These questions have been selected because they provide evidences related to traffic sequencing.

Next figure represent the same data, explained through different graphics. Particularly these graphics represent answers provided by different ATCOs (SM and NE) for each question

during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17).

show that NE positions (Executive and Planner) consider a good level of acceptability to most of the questions, represented by “Never”. “Never” answers are spread between 60% and 70%. SM position consider a mix of values to all questions represented by “neutral” and “often”. Analysing graphics below, we may state that CTA doesn’t introduce an increased unexpected complexity level, while SM has an increase of complexity. Furthermore, it is possible to note how ASAS and i4D negatively impact on sequence building for different controllers, mainly -for SM controller.

It is important to highlight that ASAS and i4D technologies are mainly usable during En-route phase when ATCO’s have usually time to plan avoiding potential issues.


260 of 343


Figure 86: Traffic Sequencing

Figure 87: Traffic Sequencing

4.2.7.5 Safety Operational Acceptability Next figure display ATCOs’ answers during several runs, in order evaluate if ASAS and i4D concepts are acceptable from Safety point of view. Some questions of questionnaire related to Conflict resolution have been selected:


261 of 343


2.15 I experienced an increased number of duty tasks due to new concepts introduced (ASAS and/or i4D), compared to current operations;

2.16 I had the perception not to be able to provide or maintain the same safety level in the provision of ATS compared to current operations;

These questions have been selected because they provide evidences related to Conflict resolution.

Both Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. represent the same data, explained through different graphics. These graphics represent the answer provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) for each question during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). Next figure show how answers to 2.15 question describe a mix of values for all ATCOS, while answers to 2.16 question describe a good level of Safety for most of the ATCO’s. Analysing graphics below, it could be stated that new ASAS and i4D concepts sometimes introduce a duty task increase, mainly related to SM and NE controllers. Furthermore it is possible to note how the use of ASAS and i4D seems not to impact the safety of ATS. Anyway, as reported by ATCOs, it’s important to highlight how ASAS is a specific maneuver including many stringent conditions. According this, ASAS maneuver should be applied only when traffic permitting and during good weather conditions.

Figure 88: Duty Task / Safety Level

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

TNE

ARR1

ARR2

SEQ

MAN

NE (E

XE)

NE (P

LN)

TS (E

XE)

TS (P

LN)

TNE

ARR1

ARR2

SEQ

MAN

NE (E

XE)

NE (P

LN)

TS (E

XE)

TS (P

LN)

2.15 I experienced an increasednumber of duty tasks due to new

concepts introduced (ASAS and/ori4D), compared to current

operations

2.16 I had the perception not to beable to provide or maintain the

same safety level in the provision ofATS compared to current operations

Scale

Questions / ATCOs

Duty task / Safety level

Never

Almost Never

Rarely

Neutral

Often

Almost Always

Always

No answer


262 of 343


Figure 89: Duty Task / Safety Level

Error! Reference source not found. represents the average of the answers provided by different ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) for each question during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It confirms what previously described.

Figure 90: Duty Task / Safety Level x question

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

TNE

ARR1

ARR2

SEQ

MAN

NE (E

XE)

NE (P

LN)

TS (E

XE)

TS (P

LN)

TNE

ARR1

ARR2

SEQ

MAN

NE (E

XE)

NE (P

LN)

TS (E

XE)

TS (P

LN)

2.15 I experienced an increasednumber of duty tasks due to new

concepts introduced (ASAS and/ori4D), compared to current

operations

2.16 I had the perception not to beable to provide or maintain the

same safety level in the provision ofATS compared to current operations

Scale

Questions / ATCOs

Duty task / Safety level

Never

Almost Never

Rarely

Neutral

Often

Almost Always

Always

No answer


263 of 343


Error! Reference source not found. represents the average of the answers provided to the different questions for each ATCOs (TNE, ARR1, ARR2, SM, NE and US) during solution 3 scenario (run 5,6,7,8,15,17). It shows that the highest percentage of answers provided by controllers are spread between “never” and “rarely” for all controller / sector.

Figure 91: Duty Task / Safety Level x ATCO

Controllers were requested to state if ASAS and i4D concepts (i.e. practices, working methods, procedures) were operationally acceptable from safety point of view. Error! Reference source not found. shows answers provided by different controllers. Most of them, provided by different controller, are positive. Anyway controllers reported how ASAS and I4D concepts need a more complex level of examination.

Figure 92: Safety Operational acceptability


264 of 343


4.2.7.6 Unusual Events During RTS and Solution 3 scenario, several unusual events have been performed represented in the next table:

Table 36: Unusual events summary

Hereinafter more details for each unusual event described in the table 1 will be provided.

Event ID Event title Event description Operational Concept impacted Expected Impact Run / Scenario Aircraft Callsign Sector Interested

UE01 Target lateral deviation

Both aa/cc involved are i4D and ASAS S&M equipped.

The first one, already identified for a Merge Behind ASAS maneuver as a target,

deviates laterally before Merge Point in the direction

of the following traffic.

ASAS Minor Run 13 / Solution 3

TAP836 (Target)

TAR752 (aircraft that performe Merge Behind maneuver)

ARR2

UE02 Target speed redution


The first one, already identified for an Remain

Behind ASAS maneuver as a target, suddenly slows down before Merge Point.

ASAS Major Run 3 / Solution 3

SWR176X (target)

AEA1043 (aircraft that performe

Remain Behind maneuver)

ARR2

UE03 Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict

The first a/c (not i4D equipped) execute an unexpected slowdown

before CTA fix. The following a/c is i4D

equipped.

.

I4D Minor Run 10 / Solution 3

DLH2025 (Target not i4D equipped)

EZY96TL (i4D equipped)

ARR1

UE04 Wrong CTA

Both aa/cc involved are i4D equipped. The same CTA

for two aircrafts is proposed by sequence manager in order to create potentially

conflict near CTA fix.


AEA1043

SWR176X

Sequence Manager

ARR2

UE05 Merge Point CB

Cumulonimbus cloud reported in proximity of Merge Point during a

complex traffic sequence in order to induce Merge Point

closure

ASAS & i4D Major Run 3 / Solution 3

KLM 7729 (target aircraft)

4Y1171 (aircraft remain behind

maneuver)

ARR1

UE06 Landing rate change

Sudden change (reduction) of LIRF landing rate due to

runway inspection. Consequently on RWY 16L

the landing rate change from 90 sec. to 120 sec.

ASAS & i4D Major Run 13 / Solution 3range between NOS435 and

ELY383

Sequnce Manager

TNE

ARR1

UE07 Military area activation

Sudden activation of military area "R51" that impact

traffic flowASAS & i4D Major Run 10 / Solution 3 All aircraft involved

in R51 military area

Sequnce ManagerNETS

TNE

UE08 Missed approach

Missed approach performed by an ASAS and i4D

equipped aircraft direct to LIRF

ASAS & i4D Major Run 17 / Solution 3 RYR69HJ ARR1

Unusual Events


265 of 343


U.E. 1 “Target lateral deviation”

Table 37: U.E. 1 “Target lateral deviation”

Aircraft involved in U.E.1 are TAR752, performing ASAS Merge Behind maneuver, and TAP836 as Target aircraft. TAP836 suddenly deviates from assigned route by 30° on the right. ARR2 instructs TAP836 to BALAV (i.e. with a resulting heading of 070°) and consequently gives TAR752 a 070° heading clearance, deviating its routing in order to separate them. In this way ARR2 assigned the two aircraft a near parallel track. Consequently, it’s no more possible to execute ASAS maneuver. So it is canceled by ATCO and aircrafts are managed tactically. Here below some unusual event pictures:


UE01 Target lateral deviation


The first one, already identified for a Merge Behind ASAS maneuver as a target,

deviates laterally before Merge Point in the direction

of the following traffic.

ASAS Minor Run 13 / Solution 3

TAP836 (Target)

TAR752 (aircraft that performe Merge Behind maneuver)

ARR2


266 of 343


Figure 93: U.E. 1 “Target lateral deviation”

U.E. 2 “Target speed reduction”


UE02 Target speed redution


The first one, already identified for an Remain

Behind ASAS maneuver as a target, suddenly slows down before Merge Point.

ASAS Major Run 3 / Solution 3

SWR176X (target)

AEA1043 (aircraft that performe

Remain Behind maneuver)

ARR2


267 of 343


Table 38: U.E. 2 “Target speed reduction”

Aircraft involved in U.E.2 are AEA1043, that is performing ASAS Remain Behind maneuver, and SWR176X that is Target aircraft. For engine problems SWR176X is forced to slow down. ARR2 controller, which is handling both aircrafts, instructs AEA1043 aircraft to slow down. AEA1043 is not able to comply, thus ATCO is forced to interrupt ASAS maneuver and provide a 90° heading clearance in order to separate involved aircrafts. Here below some unusual event pictures:

Figure 94: U.E. 2 “Target speed reduction”

U.E. 3 “Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict”


268 of 343


Table 39: U.E. 3 “Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict”

Aircraft involved in U.E.3 are DLH2025 (not i4D equipped) and EZY96TL (i4D equipped). For FMS problems DLH2025 is forced to slow down unexpectedly before the CTA FIX “SONTI”, so a separation minima infringement occurred between the involved aircraft. Consequently, to regain minima separation, ARR1 controller provides 140° heading clearance to the right and a descent rate of 2000 ft. EZY96TL aircraft lost the assigned CTA and aircrafts are managed tactically. Currently ASAS maneuver is represented by a stretchy line between aircrafts selected. The stretchy line has a different color, based on the maneuver status:

a) Yellow – when ASAS maneuver has not been accepted; b) Blue – when ASAS maneuver has been accepted;

As lesson learn, ATCOs suggested to add a third color, represented by “Red” when two aircrafts involved in ASAS maneuver are going to lose separation. Here below some unusual event pictures:

Figure 95: U.E. 3 “Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict”

U.E. 4 “Wrong CTA”


UE03 Mixed equipped aa/cc conflict

The first a/c (not i4D equipped) execute an unexpected slowdown

before CTA fix. The following a/c is i4D

equipped.

.


DLH2025 (Target not i4D equipped)

EZY96TL (i4D equipped)

ARR1


269 of 343


Table 40: U.E. 4 “Wrong CTA”

Aircraft involved in U.E.4 were AEA1043 and SWR176X both i4D equipped. The first situation showed to the ATCO was:

CALLSIGN CTA CTA FIX AEA1043 10:54.00 SORES SWR176X 10:56.30 KOLEV

Table 41: Initial situation

With the complicity of SM, it was introduced an error in the SWR176X CTA, obtaining a new situation:

CALLSIGN CTA CTA FIX AEA1043 10:54.00 SORES SWR176X 10:54.00 KOLEV

Table 42: Situation with error

TNW and ARR2 controller started monitoring the situation noticing something unusual. TNW perceived that SWR176X was too fast, so provided a speed reduction instruction. Both flights were transferred from TNW to ARR2 controller. ARR2 monitored the aircrafts, realizing that a possible separation minima infringement could have occurred around Merge point fix, known as “BALAV” . So he cancelled the SWR176X CTA and provide a 90° heading clearance to the left in order to maintain adequate separation . Consequently the CTA field related to SWR176X turned to red. ARR2 controller provided a direct routing to “SORES” to the SWR176X in order to sequence it with AEA1043. It is possible to highlight that if wrong CTA is provided, ATCOs will be able to understand the situation and manage the situation tactically. U.E. 5 “Merge Point CB”

Table 43: U.E. 5 “Merge Point CB”

Run 3 scope is to simulate a cumulonimbus cloud around Merge point fix known as “BABLA” related to runway 16L. Particularly ARG1140 on route to BABLA reported a cumulonimbus cloud to the


UE04 Wrong CTA

Both aa/cc involved are i4D equipped. The same CTA

for two aircrafts is proposed by sequence manager in order to create potentially

conflict near CTA fix.


AEA1043

SWR176X

Sequence Manager

ARR2


UE05 Merge Point CB

Cumulonimbus cloud reported in proximity of Merge Point during a

complex traffic sequence in order to induce Merge Point

closure

ASAS & i4D Major Run 3 / Solution 3

KLM 7729 (target aircraft)

4Y1171 (aircraft remain behind

maneuver)

ARR1


270 of 343


ARR1 controller and consequently required to fly on 120° heading. ARR1 controller confirmed 120° heading and required Pilot how long he needed to keep that heading. Pilot could not determine it, forcing ARR1 controller to give instructions to other aircrafts, in order to maintain safe operations. The following aircraft on route to BABLA were KLM7729 and 4Y1171. Aircraft 4Y1171 performed ASAS Remain Behind maneuver, and KLM7729 was Target aircraft. As mentioned before ARR1 controller was forced to provide a 120° heading clearance to both KLM7729 and 4Y1171 aircrafts, interrupting ASAS maneuver. TNE controller, becoming aware of the situation, provided delay actions for incoming traffic in order to support ARR1 controller. ATCOs assert that during the conditions explicated above ASAS and i4D technologies are not useful. ASAS and i4D concepts can be re-activated only when the situation is stable again. ASAS and i4D are considered helpful only during good weather conditions. U.E. 6 “Landing rate change”

Table 44: U.E. 6 “Landing rate change”

In order to perform a runway inspection, the RWY 16L landing rate was modified by supervisor on TWR request, passing from 90 sec. up to 120 sec. The first aircraft involved by separation increase was NOS435 while the last one was ELY383. The event lasted about 15 minutes: Sequence Manager, TNE and ARR1 provided traffic re-arrangement. ATCOs asserted that the change of landing rate caused no particular problems.. ATCO’s re-arranged the sequence assigning specific speed and giving priority to aircrafts i4D equipped. Furthermore ATCOs highlighted that AMAN had been successfully updated. U.E. 7 “Military area activation”

Table 45: U.E. 7 “Military area activation”

During Run 10, Supervisor, taking into account ASM (Air Space Management) concept, informed ATCOs about activation of military area “R51” (see figure below). Following R51 activation, all CTA were cancelled, so ATCOs tactically managed the situation in order to permit aircrafts involved to avoid the military area proceding via “GAVRA”. Thus Sequence Manager reorganized the sequence. From “FAVA” fix, AMAN provided again the CTO and CTA for each aircraft. During this reorganization ATCOs preferred not to use ASAS concept.


UE06 Landing rate change

Sudden change (reduction) of LIRF landing rate due to

runway inspection. Consequently on RWY 16L

the landing rate change from 90 sec. to 120 sec.

ASAS & i4D Major Run 13 / Solution 3range between NOS435 and

ELY383

Sequnce Manager

TNE

ARR1


UE07 Military area activation

Sudden activation of military area "R51" that impact

traffic flowASAS & i4D Major Run 10 / Solution 3 All aircraft involved

in R51 military area

Sequnce ManagerNETS

TNE


271 of 343


Figure 96: U.E. 3 “U.E. 7 “Military area activation”

U.E. 8 “Missed Approach”

Table 46: U.E. 8 “Missed Approach”

Due to problems with aircraft, RYR69HJ flying direct to LIRF runway 16L, performed a missed approach. Consequently, ARR1 controller instructed RYR69HJ to a 090° heading and a climb clearance to 6000 ft. Once the problem was solved, ARR1 vectored RYR69HJ after AZA4L1 . ATCOs reported they would not used an ASAS maneuver with an aircraft reporting problems.

4.2.7.6.1 Conclusions and Recommendations RTS allowed to positively assess the validation objectives and related success criteria defined in the Demo Plan. Identified Validation Objective has been successfully met. Qualitative and quantitative data allowed to assess very important results. According to the feedback provided by ATCOs involved in the validation and confirmed by the analysis performed, validation leads to the conclusion that:

the use of ASAS and i4D doesn’t impact negatively ATCOs Situational Awareness even if some controllers highlighted that in case of high traffic it is hard to have an high situational awareness due to not optimal HMI;


UE08 Missed approach

Missed approach performed by an ASAS and i4D

equipped aircraft direct to LIRF

ASAS & i4D Major Run 17 / Solution 3 RYR69HJ ARR1


272 of 343


ATCOs assert that ASAS and i4D use increases their monitoring but decreases the number of tasks to be performed;

It is important to highlight that the transition from new technologies to the traditional vectoring has been performed without problems by ATCOs because they currently use vectors to manage traffic;

ATCOs assert that ASAS and i4D use allow to standardize flow of traffic during sequences..

Despite the positive end-user feedback and concept acceptability (even if need to be tested in other validation) some general recommendations were provided:

ATCOs suggested to add a third “Red”color, when two aircraft involved in the ASAS maneuver are going to lose their separation;

i4D technology is mainly useful during pre-sequencing phase when ATCO has usually time to plan and avoid potential issues;

. ATCO’s reported, ASAS is a specific maneuver including many stringent conditions. According this, ASAS maneuver should be applied only when traffic permitting and during good weather conditions

ATCOs requested that ASAS and i4D new procedures are build based on the consolidate one, in order to minimize the change of practices. Furthermore, ATCOs required the publication of dedicated procedures in order to apply ASAS and I4D concepts.

4.2.8 Security Expected result Impacts on security associated with the primary assets sustaining the operational performance or technical capability of the solution to the concept (from Validation Plan)

Validation Objective

Identifier OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0023

Objective To assess the impacts on security associated to the primary and supporting

assets sustaining the operational performance or technical capability of the solution to the concept, notably the elements that are part of the ATM collaborative support function.

Title Security Assessment. Status <In Progress>

Security KPA has been addressed via a two-step approach. The first analysis was realized through a Security Risk Assessment based on the SESAR SecRAM methodology. The Security Risk Assessment allowed highlighting the Primary and Supporting assets related to the OFA involved in this exercise, which are summarized in Table 47.


273 of 343


The first step is the determination of the impact on the Primary Assets through an expert assessment realized with the support of the OFA team. A summary of the impact on the main Primary Assets is reported hereafter:


274 of 343


The second step is the definition of the cross matrix between primary and supporting assets which is summarized hereafter:

Primary Assets

Supporting Assets

PA#1 PA#2 PA#3 PA#4 PA#5

Flight data Management for i4D (CTA)

Arrival Management

Controller working position ASPA services

Surveillance Management

ASPA S&M

Messages management

Flight Data Processor (FDP)

X

X


275 of 343


FMS X

X

Controller Working Position

X

Surveillance

X

Monitoring AIDS

X

Air Ground Data Link

X X

X

LAN (in RTS)

X X X X X

AGDL network (only in live trial)*

X

X X

Executive controller

X

X X X

Planner controller

X X X

Pilot X

X

Table 47: Supporting and Primary Assets

The analysis has highlighted the threats affecting the supporting assets and their respective likelihood and impact.

The likelihood that an attack is successful (i.e. the unwanted impact is achieved) has been estimated considering any existing or proposed controls identified in the OSED. The likelihood of each threat


276 of 343


scenario has been assessed, and qualified and quantified according to the following table (see SESAR 16.06.02 Security Reference Material):

Likelihood Qualitative interpretation

5. Certain There is a high chance that the scenario successfully occurs in the short term.

4. Very likely There is a high chance that the scenario successfully occurs in the medium term.

3. Likely There is a high chance that the scenario successfully occurs during the lifetime of the project.

2. Unlikely There is a low chance that the scenario successfully occurs during the lifetime of the project.

1. Very Unlikely There is very little or no chance that the scenario successfully occurs during the lifetime of the project.

Table 48: Likelihood Scheme

The analysis has highlighted the threats affecting the supporting assets and their respective likelihood and impact. The main results are reported in Table 49: threats and likelihood.

Supporting Assets Type Reference Threat Likelihood

Air Ground Data Link

Compromise of functions Th_C_Fun02 Denial of

Service 3

Unauthorized action Th_C_Act01 Corruption of

data 2

Unauthorized action Th_C_Act02 Cyber

intrusion 2

LAN (in RTS)

Compromise of functions Th_C_Fun02 Denial of

service 3

Compromise of functions Th_C_Inf02 Network

eavesdropping 3

Unauthorized action Th_C_Act01 Corruption of

data 2

Executive controller

Attack through Internal

perpetrators Th_P_Int01 Internal

perpetrator 1


277 of 343


Planner controller

Abuse of rights Th_P_Abu01

illicit use of equipment or

personal access rights

2

Compromise of information Th_C_Inf01

Disclosure of confidential

information via electronic

means

1

Pilot

Attack through Internal

perpetrators Th_P_Int01 Internal

perpetrator 1

Abuse of rights Th_P_Abu01

illicit use of equipment or

personal access rights

1

Table 49: threats and likelihood

The main results are reported in Table 49: threats and likelihood.

The study has shown that a compromise of the function of the Air Ground Data Link which has an impact on the main Primary Assets of the concept (specifically Flight Data Management for i4D, Arrival Management, and ASPA S&M Messages Management) is the riskiest for this OFA. The risk is reported in the following table which highlight the threats that are at a high level of risk and shall be the subject of the proposed security test execution.

“The Security Risk Assessment did not include the “air to air” segment because it was dedicated to the ground-ground and air-ground communication channel due to the focus of the validation exercise tests. Next improvements and studies could include the “air to air” aspects.”


278 of 343



279 of 343


The Security support team has proposed to evaluate in a lab environment the threats on integrity and availability of ASPA messages and in general of the CPDLC dialogue. Using the SRA as an input, the main vulnerabilities and potential impacted assets have been used as a reference to be tested during the VP-805 simulation within a dedicated security testing session.

In particular, a “cyber-attack” on both the technical and operational scenario during RUN 18-b was performed. The objective was the Intentional Modification of ASPA messages in the Pilot/Controller dialogue:

Precondition for the attack: o The attacker has physical access to the network infrastructure (low likelihood)

o The attacker is able to act as the controller and modify datalink messages, by exploiting weakness in the communication protocols (Man in The Middle Attack)

Figure 97:Network Architecture for Security Event

The exercise scenario is detailed below:

1. Step 1/5

CONTROLLER: The controller sends an order to VLG5192 to select as target the flight EZY47HC (ASAS «SELECT TARGET» message).


280 of 343


ATTACKER: Via a Man in The Middle (MITM) attack, the Datalink message is modified by replacing the EZY47HC flight with another nearby flight, DLH2025 (see picture)

PILOT: accepts the order is sent via Datalink command (he starts the alignment with the DLH2025 flight)

Figure 98: FMS for Security

2. Step 2/5

The controller visualizes the ASAS command as he inserted it into the tool (Target EZY47HC)

Note that in this phase, the controller has no visibility of the actual message received by the pilot

3. Step 3/5

CONTROLLER

After a few minutes, at arrival phase, the controller sends the flight VLG5192 a «remain behind EZY47HC» message.

ATTACKER

The MITM attack is still active: the Datalink message related to the remain behind is modified as the previous one and the target is replaced with DLH2025

PILOT

The pseudo-pilot accepts the «remain behind» with the DLH2025 and consequently increases the speed to reach the target

4. Step 4/5


281 of 343


CONTROLLER: After a few seconds that the command has been sent, the controller observes an unusual (and potentially dangerous) behaviour of flight VLG5192: an unexpected speed increase and a reduction of the longitudinal separation from flight EZY47HC is observed .

Note of the interviewed controller on the questionnaire: no separation infringement is observed due to the different flight level - “vertical separation”

5. Step 4/5

CONTROLLER

After a few seconds that the command has been sent, the controller observes an unusual (and potentially dangerous) behaviour of flight VLG5192: an unexpected speed increase and a reduction of the longitudinal separation from flight EZY47HC is observed .

Note: no separation infringement is observed due to the different flight level - “vertical separation”

Step 5/5

CONTROLLER

Due to the unexpected manoeuvre by the pseudo-pilot caused by the “remain behind” command, the controller cancels the ASAS manoeuvre via radio as reported in the questionnaire filled after the exercise run.

The approach controller’s comment was:

“Due to a sudden and unexpected speed increase during an ASPA manoeuvre between EXY47HC and VLG5152, the manoeuvre has been interrupted and the VLG5152 has been positioned in sequence”


282 of 343


Figure 99:Events for Security

Conclusions about the KPA security It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASAS messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Safety point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures. In theory, with the right prerequisites (i.e. local network access) it would be feasible for an attacker to execute a larger-scale Man In The Middle attack in order to perform multiple modifications at the same time in the same area.

Nevertheless, some loss of confidence has happened and before the controller recognized the anomaly, two flights had reduced their longitudinal separation (of course, they were vertically separated).

Finally it is possible to conclude that the intentional modification of ASPA messages may impact multiple aspects, which include:

Safety

Performance

This attack demonstrates some weaknesses of communications protocols against threats affecting Integrity. Security tests may highlight weaknesses and provide guidance for security controls to be taken into account. It is strongly recommended to apply all security recommendations as described in SESAR 16.06.02 Security Reference Material from the initial phases of the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).


283 of 343


Controls to be applied and recommendations This section summarizes recommendations based on the results of both the SRA and the Vulnerability Test.

In general, all recommendations described in SESAR P16.06.02 Security Reference Material should be applied since the initial phases of the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC). Many of the proposed controls are derived from the P16.06.02 Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC)

Network Security The following Network Security recommendations (related to network architecture and configuration of switches, routers, firewalls, etc.) have been identified in order to improve the overall security level of network communications:

NS-001: Implement robust security measures at the perimeter, in order to prevent unauthorized access to network segments that carry sensitive data over insecure protocols. This recommendation maps to control 9.1 “Network Security Management” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “ATM Networks shall be adequately managed and controlled, in order to be protected from threats, and to maintain security for the ATM systems and applications using the network, including information in transit”.

Specifically, robust physical and logical network protection mechanisms (such as firewalls and NAC solutions) should be implemented, in order to mitigate application attacks that leverage the lack of authentication and encryption of network protocols.

System Security The following System Security recommendations (related to system hardening and to the periodic application of security patches) have been identified in order to improve the overall security level of base software:

SS-001: Ensure that all unneeded network services and features are disabled on systems. This recommendation maps to control 10.2 “System Planning and Acceptance” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “Acceptance criteria for new ATM information systems or services, upgrades, and new versions shall be established, and suitable security tests of the ATM system(s) carried out during development and prior to acceptance”.

Specifically, appropriate hardening (disable unneeded services and features, use strong authentication and encryption, change default access credentials) and maintenance (patch management policy, accounting, integrity checks, backups, secure withdrawal, etc.) procedures should be followed to ensure secure administration of systems.

Application Security The following Application Security recommendations (related to input validation mechanisms, design and implementation of applications) have been identified in order to improve the overall security level of application software:

AS-001: Use only protocols that provide encryption, integrity, and authentication capabilities for transmitting sensitive data (such as access credentials and service data). This recommendation maps to control 9.2 “Information Transfer” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “Formal exchange policies, procedures,


284 of 343


and controls shall be in place to protect the exchange of ATM services and information through the use of all types of communication facilities. Agreements shall be established for the exchange of ATM services and information and software between the Responsible Organization and external parties. Information conveyed by electronic messaging shall be appropriately protected”.

Specifically, authentication, integrity, and encryption mechanisms should be evaluated in the protocol standardization community in order to preserve confidentiality, integrity, and availability of G/G and A/G radio transmissions.

Procedural Security The following Procedural Security recommendations (related to access credential management policies, antivirus deployment, procedures to detect and handle security incidents, etc.) have been identified in order to improve overall security management:

PS-001: Implement robust logging mechanisms in order to detect attacks and perform post-mortem reviews. This recommendation maps to control 8.4 “Logging and Monitoring” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “Procedures for monitoring the use of ATM services and information processing facilities shall be established and the results of the monitoring activities reviewed regularly. ATM logging facilities and log information shall be protected against tampering and unauthorized access. Faults shall be logged, analysed, and appropriate action taken”.

PS-002: Implement effective incident management procedures in order to detect attacks and take appropriate countermeasures in a timely manner. This recommendation maps to control 11 “Information Security Incident Management” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “ATM service and Information security events shall be reported through appropriate management channels as quickly as possible. All employees, contractors and third party users of information systems and services shall be required to note and report any observed or suspected security weaknesses or malfunctions in ATM systems or services. Management responsibilities and procedures shall be established to ensure an effective and orderly response to ATM service and information security incidents. Where a follow-up action against a person or organization after an ATM service or information security incident involves legal action (either civil or criminal), pieces of evidence shall be collected, retained, and presented to the relevant jurisdiction(s). The Responsible Organization shall have procedures in place that specify when and by whom external authorities (e.g. law enforcement, fire department, supervisory authorities) shall be contacted in the event of a security incident”.

PS-003: Regularly perform security audits on deployed systems in order to detect insecure configurations. This recommendation maps to control 10.1 “Security Requirements of Information Systems” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “Every specification for new or updated facilities includes security requirements. An operational process which controls how system changes are approved and implemented, and how security considerations are incorporated in the change process shall be enacted. Security testing shall be performed whenever a system is updated”.

Physical Security In addition to the Network, System, Application, and Procedural security controls outlined above, the following Physical Security recommendations have been identified in order to improve the overall security level of physical access controls and monitoring mechanisms:


285 of 343


HS-001: Implement physical access controls in order to prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and network equipment (e.g. restricted area with badge readers, fences, security guards, etc.).

HS-002: Implement physical access monitoring mechanisms in order to detect unauthorized access to critical systems and network equipment (e.g. physical intrusion detection systems).

Both these recommendations map to control 7 “Physical and Environmental Security” defined in the Minimum Set of Security Controls (MSSC) developed by P16.06.02: “Security perimeters shall be used to protect ATM sensitive areas and ATM processing facilities. ATM secure areas shall be protected by appropriate entry controls which allow access only to authorized personnel and which detect unauthorized access. ATM equipment shall be provided with auxiliary means to compensate for deliberate compromising of power supply, overheating and fire. ATM cabling shall be protected from deliberate damage, eavesdropping or interference. ATM equipment shall be maintained and serviced to ensure their availability and integrity”.

4.2.9 Unexpected Behaviours/Results N/A

4.3 Confidence in Results of Validation Exercises

4.3.1 Quality of Validation Exercises Results - Environmental Sustainability & Fuel Efficiency and Predictability

According to the official guidelines of P16.6.3 in the Environmental Reference Material and as reported in the Appendix B of D91 Validation Plan, the Environmental Impact Assessment has been performed paying particular attention to the integrity of data.

The integrity of the data that have been used in impact estimation has been carefully checked prior to modelling. All input data have been structured as expected without containing anomalies.

In order to be confident that the comparison between Reference and Solutions complies with the quality criteria, for each scenario all flight tracks have been checked one by one. For example, relating to the start and end conditions, it has been checked that all flight tracks (in Reference and related Solutions), began and ended at the same point as showed in the following pictures:


286 of 343


Figure 100: Initial Conditions


287 of 343


Figure 101: Final Conditions

4.3.2 Statistical significance (ENV sustainability & fuel efficiency) An assessment of the significance of the results from a statistical viewpoint has been performed.

With respect to the statistical significance it should be noted that there were 21 different runs executed for the 805 exercise with about 120 flights per run, so for each scenario was calculated the mean and standard deviation of fuel burn and distance flown.

Two kind of statistical tests were used to assess the statistical significance: Wilcoxon and T-Student The confidence level chosen was 95% and was obtained a p-value of 0.047 (< 0.05)

Consequently, the results can be considered as statistically significant at a 95% and the p-values obtained are < 0.05. as reported in the table below that shows the p-values per scenario comparison:

P-Values per Scenario Comparison (Wilcoxon Test)

REFERENCE I4D/CTA ASPA-IM-S&M

I4D/CTA 0.04

ASPA-IM-S&M 0.01 0.03

ASPA-IM-S&M+I4D/CTA 0.01 0.03 0.04


288 of 343


All p-values obtained are < 0.05 Consequently, the results can be considered as statistically significant at a 95% level.


289 of 343


5 Conclusions and recommendations This section provides a synthesis of the validation exercise EXE-05.03-VP-805 executed in the context of Operational Focus Area 04.01.02 and OFA03.02.01. Based on this Experience with the comments discussed with SJU, reported in the VREP of the VP708, below are reported some conclusion for this RTS.

5.1 Conclusions Based on the Experience of the VP708, where some ATCOs participated, this RTS represents the evolution in terms of the Realism of the Airspace design as applied in Rome ACC. They appreciated a lot regarding the new Working Method applied in order to Operate in a Time Based operation from the En-Route sector over the Threshold.

Regarding the evolution of the E-AMAN system, that the Trajectory was based with the accuracy of the 1 second, thus induced in a predictable trajectory over the CTA point. This improvement helped a lot in the TMA phase where the ASPA plays an important role in the Sequence. In addition the ATCOs appreciated the new customization of the STARs, to respect an Iso –Distances criteria, as well the better functionality of the i4D, E-AMAN and ASPA concept applied in to the System.

Regarding the last sentences, the Avionics part is a crucial point, the FMS with the functionality of I4D and ASPA works properly in the RTS.

Below Are reported some Results divided per Human performance (Ground and Airborne), Safety, Security, Environment, Predictability, Airspace Capacity and Airport Capacity.

Solution #16 General Feedback: The results from SESAR1 do not give confidence in the expected benefits of ASAS S&M: workload is potentially increased, and there is a slight increase in fuel consumption and distance flown. The concept has only been tested in an M/M environment; whereas the related OI Step should also include H/H. There appear to be too many major blocking issues to propose that the Solution exits V3. The results could be used in future R&D on Airborne Separation. Since the complex geometries will certainly not solve the lack of performance in the simple geometries, TS-0108 definition would require an update since TS-0105-A will be closed. The work that will be undertaken on PJ.01-05 will be based on 05.06.06 Stream 2, where they did not only look at complex geometries, but also considered an alternative version of TS-0105-A. The main evolutions that are envisaged are:

The simple geometry manoeuvre is done with the achieve-by-point after the merge point, thereby allowing more time for the manoeuvre to be executed and potentially mitigating the large number of airborne UNABLES and the strict requirements to traffic pre-sequencing due to the original TS-0105-A;

Starting the manoeuvre higher than it was done in SESAR 1. This is closer to the FAA concept, and supports the same concept of allowing more time for the manoeuvre to take place;

Focus on the use of R/T versus D/L (as VP-805 shows, the use of D/L in this environment is very challenging);

Considering the use of the target’s transmitted ETA;

Considering the use of “at or greater” spacing;

Use of new time-to-go (TTG) algorithms (rather than the previous time-history algorithms).


290 of 343


Airborne (AIRBUS)

Overall, pilots’ feedback regarding the integration of Initial 4D and ASPA functions is quite positive.

The workload induced by Initial4D and ASPA functions on board management is acceptable, pilots have good situation awareness during i4D-ASPA operations.

Compared to previous EXE708 exercise, some evolutions were performed either on airborne prototypes for ASPA function or on ground for both i4D and ASPA function.

The 10 seconds accuracy for ETA min/max window displayed to the AMAN is much more appropriate than 1-minute truncation applied in the EXE-708, as the displayed window is more representative of aircraft capabilities when the airborne systems compute the ETA min/max.

The ASPA manoeuvre stability has been significantly improved thanks to ASPA airborne prototypes corrections. The analysis of UNABLE encountered after activating the manoeuvre demonstrates that remaining areas of improvement should be considered if further work on the ASPA airborne system is envisioned. In addition, some previous recommendations for improvement still were confirmed.

Another area for improvement, to be considered if further work on the ASPA airborne system is envisioned, has been identified: in case there are speed constraints in the procedure while an ASPA manoeuvre is activated (needed for mixed fleet), the way these constraints are presented to the pilot should be further investigated.

Finally, concerning CPDLC use and associated pilots’ task sharing, in particular during descent and approach phase for i4D and ASPA functions, pilots’ feedback is the following one: The current Airbus high level task sharing recommendations sufficiently support flight crew for the CPDLC management. As it is already the case today, airline may refine their own procedures according to their policies.

Airborne (iA/C)

All the iA/C simulated were Airbus A320 with the functionalities of i4D and ASPA capabilities (based on the requirements provided by P09.01.and P09.05). With Respect of VP708, the iA/Cs were tuned to take into account all the AIRBUS suggestions in order to respect as much as possible the ToD when an RTA is engaged, in particular has been applied a specific setting of the TAS, CAS, Mach number and rate of descent for any layer of the FL over 3000ft,where the ASAS was terminated. Considering that the iA/C is a research and development airborne platform, and not an IBP, the realism of this simulator is not classified as an industrial product. However, in the TMA area there were performed an high number of ASAS manoeuvres but a minimum percentage were UNABLE. In these few situation happened due to the fact that the two selected aircrafts does not satisfied the separation condition. This imply an increase of WKL. In other cases the consequence of the ASAS unable was observed for the first flights in the arrival sequence which were unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really had to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence, with a consequence of ASAS unable also in the TMA phases.

Airborne (Alenia)

As the first time that Alenia participate in this RTS, in order to evaluate the performance of the C27J in the ASPA scenario, some positive results are obtained from the Flight Crew.

Considering the very light integration of the TCA system with the A/C, the cockpit verified the use of ADS-B IN/OUT as enabler for ASPA and the correct implementation of ASPA requirements in the TCA.

The successful integration of the cockpit on the ground platform results demonstrated the capacity of the overall system to cover the ASPA requirements. A more deep integration of the TCA solution


291 of 343


could improve the military A/C capacity to interoperate in civil airspace. In particular the Alenia cockpit demonstrated the possibility to improve the military A/C operability without the necessity to modify the A/C MMS.

Human Performance Ground

Ground Human Performance Assessment addressed the evaluation of CTA/i4D stand alone, ASPA-IM-S&M stand alone and CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M in integrated mode; in terms of: Risk of deskilling, Change of Practice acceptability, Procedure flexibility, Teamwork & Communication, Situational awareness, Usability, Workload.

Risk of deskilling: involved controllers did not considered CTA/i4D operational concept as impacting on eventual future risk of deskilling. On the other hand controllers consider that, with long and consolidate usage in operations of ASPA-IM-S&M, the risk of deskilling could occur. It is due to the fact that differently from CTA/i4D, ASPA-IM-S&M has a major impact on change of practice, working methods and interaction with the system for controllers. Controllers are worried that after long period with ASPA-IM-S&M fully operative, they could not be so prompt in operating without its support in case of partial or total unavailability. For this reason controllers suggested to Air navigation Service Providers training departments to plan periodic training sessions in order to maintain controllers practiced to work without the support of tools such as ASPA-IM-S&M. Majority of controllers asserted that CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M both in stand-alone and in integrated mode require an acceptable Change of practice. The recommendation, at any rate, is to clearly define roles, responsibilities and task sharing and moreover to provide adequate training before introducing CTA/i4D and/or ASPA-IM-S&M. Controllers asserted that CTA/i4D, ASPA-IM-S&M, both in stand-alone and in integrated mode, provoke a decrease in Procedure flexibility in respect to their current operations. It is due to the fact that the introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M requires that prescribed working methods should be followed precisely in order to fully take advantage of their introduction. That causes a slight decrease of possibility to apply tactical interventions by controllers. Controllers working at the simulated sectors and positions are used to optimize traffic flows, especially in the terminal areas, by vectoring; the introduction of both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M partially limited the opportunities to adopt this kind of intervention. Related to Teamwork & Communication, controllers affirmed that the new proposed ATM system solicit controllers to communicate and share information each other, which results in an improvement of the shared situational awareness. Within the new proposed ATM system the Sequence Manager has a central role, he/she has to mandatory monitor the whole system and to maintain continuously updated the other members of the team. Positive feedbacks have been recorded especially in case of CTA/i4D and CTA/i4D in integration with ASPA-IM-S&M, it is clear that CTA/i4D seems to provide benefit in terms of Teamwork & Communication according to controllers’ opinion. CTA/i4D is the tool that allows lower sectors to cooperate with upper sectors well in advance on arriving traffic in order to optimize the related sequence. Very positive feedback has been recorded as regards Situational awareness, both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M, according to controllers ‘opinion, allow to maintain or even to improve their situational awareness. As reported above for Teamwork & Communication, controllers asserted that both tools allowed improving shared situational awareness among the team. Both CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M do not impact negatively impact on Usability, especially after adequate training and familiarization the whole system under test is considered as usable.


292 of 343


Discordant feedback has been provided in relation to Workload. Even if workload was always maintained at an acceptable level both in case of CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M in stand-alone mode and in integrated mode, for TMA, Departure and Sequence Manager workload is considered by controllers to increase. That was recorded in case of introducing CTA/i4D, both in stand-alone and integrated with ASPA-IM-S&M. Probably it is due to the fact that controllers approached to CTA/i4D concept, as a request coming from the aircraft to be satisfied as much as possible. In other words CTA/i4D, even if considered as an improvement, was experienced as a constraint, so requiring an increase in controllers’ perceived mental workload. Controllers affirmed that increase in their workload has been experienced especially in case one of first flights in the arrival sequence was unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really have to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence. They asked for specific working methods and procedures to be adopted in those cases in order to reduce at minimum the impact on arrival sequence and related mean delay. On the other hand they had a different perception of ASPA-IM-S&M that was considered as an effective tool supporting their operations.

Safety

RTS allowed to positively assess the validation objectives and related success criteria defined in the Demo Plan. Identified Validation Objective has been successfully met. Qualitative and quantitative data allowed to assess very important results. According to the feedback provided by ATCOs involved in the validation and confirmed by the analysis performed, validation leads to the conclusion that:

the use of ASAS and i4D doesn’t impact negatively ATCOs Situational Awareness even if some controllers highlighted that in case of high traffic it is hard to have an high situational awareness due to not optimal HMI;

ATCOs assert that ASPA and i4D use increases their monitoring but decreases the number of tasks to be performed;

It is important to highlight that the transition from new technologies to the traditional vectoring has been performed without problems by ATCOs because they currently use vectors to manage traffic;

ATCOs assert that ASPA and i4D use allow to standardize flow of traffic during sequences.

Despite the positive end-user feedback and concept acceptability (even if need to be tested in other validation) some general recommendations were provided:

ATCOs suggested to add a third “Red” color, when two aircraft involved in the ASPA maneuver are going to lose their separation;

i4D technology is mainly useful during En-route phase when ATCO has usually time to plan and avoid potential issues;

. ATCO’s reported, ASPA is a specific maneuver including many stringent conditions. According this, ASPA maneuver should be applied only when traffic permitting and during good weather conditions

ATCOs requested that ASPA and i4D new procedures must not impact current ones, in order to minimize the change of practices. Furthermore, ATCOs required the publication of dedicated procedures in order to apply ASPA and I4D concepts.


293 of 343


Security

It has been demonstrated that a compromise of the integrity of ASPA messaging and in general of the CPDLC dialogue may impact multiple aspects, such as Safety and Performance. From a Security point of view, however, no incidents have happened during the RUN, because the controller realized in time the anomaly and re-established the standard procedures.

Nevertheless, some loss of confidence has happened and before the controller recognized the anomaly, two flights had reduced their longitudinal separation (of course, they were vertically separated).

Finally it is possible to conclude that the intentional modification of ASPA messages may impact multiple aspects, which include:

Safety

Performance

This attack demonstrates some weaknesses of communications protocols against threats affecting Integrity. Security tests may highlight weaknesses and provide guidance for security controls to be taken into account. It is strongly recommended to apply all security recommendations as described in SESAR 16.06.02 Security Reference Material from the initial phases of the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).

Environmental sustainability & Fuel Efficiency Results

The analysis relevant to the Environmental Sustainability & Fuel Efficiency produced good results in terms of saving of fuel burn and Co2 emission.

The comparison of reference versus Solution 3 scenarios, shows that Fuel burn and Co2 emission are reduced with combined use of E-AMAN, I4D+CTA and ASPA S&M for the traffic analysed.

The most interesting results in terms of environmental sustainability have been assessed in the comparison between Reference scenario and scenario with the use of I4D only . The scenario which implies the ASAS S&M influences a little in a negative way the fuel efficiency consumption compared with the Reference to induce a bit of distance flown (3NM medium per flight) for the following reasons: in many cases when the ATCOs initiate the manoeuvres in TMA (especially for the follower a/c) it implies a minor tactical instruction in order to engage the exactly spacing chosen by the ATCO. This analysis is an average of the Traffic flown within the simulated traffic sample,

Predictability

The analysis of the results showed put in evidence the positive trend of the index in SS2, the joined use of E-AMAN + i4D + ASPA-ASM, in reduction when compared with RS.

And the positive trend of the predictability analysis reflects better the management of the traffic flows both for Arrivals and Overflying flights in the Area of Responsibility.

Airspace Capacity


294 of 343


The analysis comparison between scenario of the ASPA S&M and the solution scenario (all Concept) shows that the integration of the concept implies a benefit for the accuracy of the trajectory from the 250NM over the FAF, consequently the ASPA during the last phase of flight improve the Airspace Capacity, thanks to the work that has been done in the pre-sequencing phase.

Airport Capacity

With the Integration of the Operational concept Scenario Solution 3, in some cases it seems the integration of the concepts for not of all the cases it will satisfy the optimum Runway Threshold separation. The results of the high level analysis confirm the variability of the results due the limited statistical samples. The comparison should be performed with a difference of Traffic in terms of Complexity with a different pick to evaluate the Analysis.

Regarding the Experimental Organization where the RTS is able to test the ASAS S&M in a stand-alone scenario results in a more efficient spacing between the aircraft in particular during the approach phase until the FAF. However the results in Airport capacity does not improve the runway throughput as expected in ASAS S&M organization. This is a deviation by the performance target of ASAS concept.

In the ASAS S&M organisation with the integration of i4D, the results, shows an increase of RWY throughput thanks to the pre-sequencing E-AMAN tool, and the i4D aircraft

5.2 Recommendations

Human Performance Ground

RECOM-805-Design-01: Controllers suggested that a potential improvement aimed to further increase their situational awareness could be to have an alert (audio or visual) in case of reached TOD. Otherwise the monitoring of TOD achievement could become a task of planner, who has to communicate to executive controller of that.

RECOM-805-OPS-01 :An adequate ATS geography and related procedures is often mandatory in order to allow that an innovative solution could provide the expected benefits. RECOM-805-OPS-02: Majority of controllers asserted that CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M both in stand-alone and in integration modes require an acceptable change of practice assuring a clear definition of roles, responsibilities and task sharing and moreover providing adequate training before introducing CTA/i4D and/or ASPA-IM-S&M. RECOM-805-OPS-03: Controllers affirmed that increase in their workload has been experienced especially in case one of first flights in the arrival sequence was unable to reach the assigned CTA, in these circumstances controllers really have to spend effort in order to adequately re-elaborate the arrival sequence. It happened in case a flight was unable to reach the CTA and shall be shifted in the sequence, it is quite stressing for controllers that in order to do not compromise other flights with CTA already assigned has no enough room to re-insert the flight. They asked for specific working methods and procedures to be adopted in those cases in order to reduce at minimum the impact on arrival sequence and related mean delay.


295 of 343


RECOM-805-OPS-04: Controllers are worried that after long application of ASPA-IM-S&M they could lose their abilities to tactically act on the arrival sequence due to due to lack of regular useRECOM-805-Design-02: Controllers suggested some improvements to futher increase HMI usability, even as regards reference scenario:

• To have added lateral monitor for notifications/diagnostic messages, in order to avoid to overcrowd the main monitor providing GRP.

• To have visible sequence number exclusively for the flights already evaluated by the sequence manager.

• To have opportunity to manually highlight flights already evaluated by SM/AC and for which the sequence position is confirmed.

• FLAG that automatically displays unable ASPA (system automation). • To avoid presentation of STCA between levelled flights. • To improve R&B usability. • To improve ASPA target identification graphic objects (yellow link and then grey link

have been considered too invasive). RECOM-805-OPS-05: ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts allowed to increase teamwork and to improve shared situational awareness. Information sharing was improved or was maintained unaltered in all solution scenarios in comparison with reference one. Very positive feedback has been provided by Sequence managers who appreciated both ASPA-IM-S&M and CTA/i4D concepts, that allowed to better coordinate arrival sequence with all other interested actors. On the other hand Departure sectors confirmed their disappointment due to the fact that investigated solutions could penalize, in their sectors, departing and no equipped incoming flights. RECOM-805-OPS-06: Prescribed roles and responsibilities were always considered clear and exhaustive and however very similar as considered for reference scenario. Notwithstanding that all controllers required that specific working methods and procedure should be defined in order to correctly work with the new system. RECOM-805-OPS-07: Prescribed roles and responsibilities were always considered clear and exhaustive and however very similar as considered for reference scenario. Notwithstanding that all controllers required that specific working methods and procedure should be defined in order to correctly work with the new system. RECOM-805-OPS-08: Prescribed roles and responsibilities were always considered clear and exhaustive and however very similar as considered for reference scenario. Notwithstanding that all controllers required that specific working methods and procedure should be defined in order to correctly work with the new system. RECOM-805-OPS-09: Controllers really appreciated the possibility to have at any time two available mean of communications. Controllers working at TMA and ARR sectors adopted always CPDLC as prescribed to perform ASPA-IM-S&M manoeuvres. On the other hand in case the communication was considered time critical, or after an unable, controllers preferred to switch to R/T communication to manage the communication promptly or to provide explanations to the interested pilots.


296 of 343


RECOM-805-ENV-01: In the future (SESAR2020) a new model regarding the analysis of the environmental KPA needs to be developed in the order to get more reliable fuel burn data for both CTA and ASAS to overcome the limitations of the current version of IMPACT in which when calculating fuel burn results of concepts involving speed changes, there is a risk to introduce potentially large errors due to the AEM Fuel Burn calculation method.


297 of 343


References

5.3 Applicable Documents [1] M315-step1 DOD report- Fourth Update (P 5.2 DOD)

[2] Template Toolbox 03.00.00 https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/SESAR%20Template%20Toolbox.dot

[3] Requirements and V&V Guidelines 03.00.00 https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Requirements%20and%20VV%20Guidelines.doc

[4] Templates and Toolbox User Manual 03.00.00 https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Templates%20and%20Toolbox%20User%20Manual.doc

[5] European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) - 3.0 [February 2010]

[6] EUROCONTROL ATM Lexicon https://extranet.eurocontrol.int/http://atmlexicon.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/en/index.php/SESAR

5.4 Reference Documents The documents mentioned in the template are examples that can be removed.

The following documents provide input/guidance/further information/other:

[7] V&V Road Map latest version of reference

[8] SESAR Business Case Reference Material https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[9] SESAR Safety Reference Material https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[10] SESAR Security Reference Material https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[11] SESAR Environment Reference Material https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[12] SESAR Human Performance Reference Material https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[13] D07 Guidance on list of KPIs for Step 1 Performance Assessment Ed1 https://extranet.sesarju.eu/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx

[14] ATM Master Plan https://www.atmmasterplan.eu

[15] WPB.01 Integrated Roadmap Latest version

[16] SESAR 05.06.04 D32 OSED Version 01.00.00 of 22/07/2013

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/SESAR%20Template%20Toolbox.dot

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Requirements%20and%20VV%20Guidelines.doc

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Requirements%20and%20VV%20Guidelines.doc

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Templates%20and%20Toolbox%20User%20Manual.doc

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Templates%20and%20Toolbox%20User%20Manual.doc

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Forms/Procedures%20and%20Guidelines.aspx












https://www.atmmasterplan.eu/


298 of 343


[17] SESAR 05.06.01 D67 Step 1 OSED second iteration Version 02.01.00 of 27/11/2012

[18] SESAR 05.06.06 D23 Stream 1 OSED – Version 00.00.06 of 10/05/2013

[19] WP5 D18-D50 Validation Strategy for Concept Step 1 - Time Based Operations

[20] P05.02-D18-D50-WP5 Validation Strategy for Concept Step 1 Time Based Operations 00.00.05

[21] European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) - 3.0 [February 2010] [22] SESAR 16.6.X-B.5 Guidance on Scenarios & Assumptions for Primary Project Validation

Exercises for Step, edition 00.01.01 dated December 15th 2011 [23] SESAR 16.06.03- Environment Reference Material LV1&LV2 –Edition 00.01.00 [24] SESAR PB.05- D07- Guidance on list of the suggested Key Performance Indicator-Edition

00.01.00 [25] SESAR Concept of Operations document Step1 Edition 2013- V02.00.00

[26] EXE 708 dependencies with other exercises of P05.06.06, P05.06.04, P05.06.07, P05.06.01 and P04.03.

[27] Release Strategy 2014

[28] P05 03-D91 Validation Exercise Plan EXE-05 03-EXE-708 Version 00.03.00 of 03/12/2014

[29] SESAR 05.06.06 D50 Stream 1 SPR – Version 00.00.06

[30]

http://extranetarchive.sesarju.loc/Programme%20Library/Release%20Strategy%202014.doc


299 of 343


Appendix A Assessment Report

HP log for VALR 00.00.09.xlsx

HP Report Assesment 805_V0.4.docx


300 of 343


Appendix B Environmental sustainability & Fuel Efficiency: full analysis report

In this section are reported all the results (numerical) related to the Environmental Impact Assessment performed for this validation exercise. SCENARIOS WITH OVERFLIGHTS

REFERENCE

(With Over flights)

DISTANCE (NM) FUEL (KG) CO2 (KG)

52162 159246 501466

AVERAGE DISTANCE PER FLIGHT (NM)

AVERAGE FUEL PER FLIGHT (KG)

AVERAGE CO2 PER FLIGHT (KG)

442 1350 4250

I4D/CTA

(With Over flights)


49501 151698 477698




419 1286 4048

ASPA IM-S&M

(With Over flights)


53415 163098 513595




453 1382 4352


301 of 343


I4D/CTA + ASPA IM-S&M

(With Over flights)


51603 156387 492463




437 1325 4173 SCENARIO ONLY ARRIVALS WITHOUT OVERFLIGHT

REFERENCE

(Only arrivals without over flights)


17486 46989 147969




426 1146 3609

I4D/CTA



17010 45386 142920




415 1107 3486

ASPA IM-S&M

(Only arrivals without Over flights)


302 of 343



17628 47261 148824




430 1153 3630

I4D/CTA + ASPA IM-S&M



17157 46327 145884




418 1130 3558


303 of 343


Appendix C Human Performance Assessment Methodology

Human Performance Assessment The Human Performance Assessment provides a structured framework within VP-805 to effectively accomplish declared objectives by systematically addressing the HF aspects (i.e. benefits & issues, gaps derived from past related projects) throughout the whole project life-cycle, i.e. operational solutions design, implementation/demonstration, evaluation. Human Performance (HP) denotes the human capability to:

Successfully accomplish tasks and Meet job requirements.

The capability of a human to successfully accomplish tasks depends on a number of variables that are usually investigated within the HP underlying “discipline” known as Human Factors (HF). These factors can be external to the human (e.g. light & noise conditions at the work place, technical systems & interfaces, procedures in place, organisational aspects) or internal (e.g. fatigue, stress). In this way, “Human Factors” can be considered as focusing on the variables that determine Human Performance. The overall aim of HP assessment has been to validate that the integration of E-AMAN, i4D/CTA and ASPA S&M operational concepts does not negatively impact, if not improves, human performance compared to current operations. Thus, these integrated concepts must adhere to two fundamental HP principles, that is: The role of the human actors in the system is consistent with human capabilities and characteristics; The contribution of the human within the system supports the expected system performance and behaviour. Specifically validation objectives addressed by Ground Human Performance Assessment were mainly:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001 - To confirm CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002 - To confirm ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003 - To confirm integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0019 - Assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities that controllers deploy to achieve their task goals including perception, decision making, planning, and memory and task execution.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0020 - To assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M procedures and HMI allow controllers efficient teamwork & communication

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021 - To assess that roles and responsibilities of controllers are clear and exhaustive.


304 of 343


Secondarily, in order to complement Airborne HP Assessment the following validation objectives have been partially addressed:

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0026 -Evaluate CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M operational integration acceptability.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029 - Assess the impact of CPDLC usage in descent and approach phases on timeliness of communications between pilot and ATCOs.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0031 - Assess if the defined procedure in case of RTA MISSED occurrence can be efficiently followed by controller and pilots.

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0033 - Evaluate if the defined procedure in case of ASPA UNABLE occurrence can be easily and efficiently followed by controllers and pilots.

Investigated HP Areas and related Metrics and Indicators To assess the integration of E-AMAN, i4D/CTA and ASPA S&M operational concepts under evaluation in terms of human performance of the following areas have been investigated. Situational awareness Situational awareness is defined as “the continuous extraction of environmental information, the integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture, and the use of that picture in directing further perception and anticipating future events” (Dominguez et al., 1994). In this regard, situational awareness can be considered a mental state consisting of three phases:

Perception of the situation (perception of important elements in the environment); Comprehension of the situation (integration of different pieces of data in order to determinate

their relevance); Anticipation of future states of the current situation.

Controller’s Situational awareness assessment has been performed through SASHA questionnaire, The SASHA is part of the SHAPE questionnaires. The SHAPE questionnaires were developed to assess the effect of automation on controller workload, situation awareness, teamwork and trust in the system. The SASHA questionnaire serves to assess the effect of innovative operational concepts on controller situation awareness. Specifically SASHA’s questionnaire is characterized by the following questions:

I was ahead of the traffic I started to focus on a single problem or a specific area of the sector There was a risk of forgetting something important (like transferring an a/c on time or

communicating a change to an adjacent sector) I was able to plan and organize my work as I wanted I was surprised by an event I did not expect I had to search for a item of information.

Airbus Pilots’ situational awareness assessment has been performed through an ad hoc questionnaire allowing the pilots to rate on a scale their situational awareness with the introduction of the integrated concepts. This assessment was complemented with pilots' feedback collected during the debriefings, mainly to gather some explanation on the causes of the difficulties related to situation awareness. Workload There are two main parts in perceived workload: physical workload and cognitive workload. Cognitive workload has been defined as the “degree of processing capacity that is expended during task performance” (Eggemeier, 1998) and as being “the difference between capacities of the human information processing system that are expected to satisfy performance expectations and that capacity available for actual performance” (Gopher & Dochin, 1986). Physical workload, on the other hand, is related to the physical actions required to interact with the system in performing tasks (e.g. clicking, making a phone call, moving head to switch form a monitor to another, etc.).


305 of 343


In ATM, the mission is to keep operators (ATCOs and pilots) global workload in a range where they are kept (at least mentally) stimulated without going to the point where they become overloaded and start to postpone tasks. Controllers’ workload assessment has been performed through NASA TLX questionnaire; The NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) is a widely-used, subjective, multidimensional assessment tool that rates perceived workload in order to assess a task, system, or team's effectiveness or other aspects of performance. Furthermore the Impact of Automation on Mental Workload has been assessed through AIM questionnaire. AIM allows the analyst to determine the Mental Workload due to:

Monitoring of Information Sources; Memory Management; Managing the Controller Working Position; Diagnosing and Problem Detection; Decision Making and Problem Solving; Resource Management and Multi-Tasking; Team Awareness.

Specifically NASA-TLX questionnaire is characterized by the following questions:

How mentally demanding was the task? How physically demanding was the task? How hurried or rushed was the task? How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? How insecure/ discouraged/ irritated/ stressed/ annoyed were you?

How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? The Airbus pilot’s workload assessment has been performed through an ad hoc questionnaire allowing the pilots to rate their level of workload with the introduction of the integrated concepts. This assessment was complemented with pilots' feedback collected during the debriefings, mainly to gather some explanation on the causes of the workload. Quantitative assessment of Controllers workload has been performed with the application of ground platform system data logging, when controllers are using the E-AMAN, i4D/CTA and ASPA S&M operational concepts integrated functions under evaluation. The quantitative assessments are based on a set of data logged by the ground system during the RTS simulation sessions. These data are relevant to the evolution of flights, the interaction of controllers with the ground system, the air-ground voice and data communication and the events occurred during the simulations which are relevant for HP measurements. The main recordings that have been captured from the platform in order to perform the quantitative workload assessment are:

ATCO tactical orders: whenever an ATCO issues a clearance she/he is expected to input the corresponding order into the CWP/HMI. for the analysis the interesting objectives that should be captured are the CFL (cleared flight level), direct route, speed variation, re-routing and headings;

Coordination: the coordination between sectors: XFL (exit flight level) and EFL (entry flight level). Both proposal and related reaction (proposal can be accepted, rejected and countered) have been be recorded.

Audio recordings: all the data concerning the communications between ATCOs and pseudo-pilots (i.e. the radio communications) and phone communication between ATCOs (i.e. the telecom communications). The Audio Recordings between the ground and the cockpit in Toulouse is also considered.

Teamwork The application of the HP assessment process related to team structures and team communication ensures that effects on the team composition are identified; that there is an appropriate allocation of tasks between human actors and, that the communication between team members supports human

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA


306 of 343


performance. On Ground Side Teamwork assessment has been performed through STQ questionnaire, aimed to assess the effect of innovative operational concepts on teamwork. Specifically the following topics related to teamwork have been investigated within VP-805:

Team Situational Awareness, Team Roles & Responsibilities, Team Co-operation, Team Climate, Team Error Management, Team Communication.

Specifically STQ is characterized by the following questions: It was clear to me which tasks were my responsibility It was clear to me which tasks were carried out by the other team members It was clear to me which tasks I shared with the other team members The system enabled the team to prioritize tasks efficiently The system helped the team to synchronize their actions The goals of the team were clearly defined The system promoted a smooth flow of information The system helped the team to follow the procedures The system helped me to detect the other team members’ inaccuracies or mistakes The system helped me to share information about developing traffic situations with other team

members I liked working in the team I felt supported by the other team members.

On Airbus pilots’ side, the main topics investigated were the following:

Task sharing Team communication

The assessment of pilots’ teamwork has been performed through observation (completeness and fluidity of task execution, application of task sharing), debriefing, questionnaire and recording of duration of CPDLC dialogues.

Acceptability Acceptability indicates how willingly the ATCOs operate with E-AMAN, i4D/CTA and ASPA S&M operational concepts integrated functions under evaluation. Specifically acceptability has been assessed in terms of

Procedure Flexibility; Change of Practice; Risk of deskilling.

Next table summarizes the investigated HP Ground areas and related metrics and indicators addressed within VP-805.


307 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0001

Objective To assess CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the

sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions. Title CTA/i4D solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives OFA OFA04.01.02 OIs TS-0103

Identifier Success criteria Metrics/Indicators Data Collection Methods

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.001


Change of practices acceptability Questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.002


Procedure flexibility Questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.003


Perceived Mental demand Perceived Physical demand Perceived Time pressure Perceived Frustration Perceived Performance

NASA-TLX questionnaire


308 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.004


Average maximum duration of R/T communication Average duration of R/T communication Average minimum duration of R/T communication Average total number of R/T communication Frequency Channel Occupancy Average total number of STAR orders Average total number of Speed orders Average total number of Heading orders Average total number of Direct To orders Average total number of CFL orders Average number of coordination between sectors: XFL (Exit Flight Level) and EFL (Entry Flight Level

System Data Recordings

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.005

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on: situational awareness.

Ability to anticipate traffic behaviour Focus on problem/area of the screen Potential risk to forget important info Possibility to plan and organise activities according to own preference; Unwanted surprise due to unexpected event Time spent to search for info on the screen

SASHA questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0001.006


Perceived risk of deskilling Questionnaire


309 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0002

Objective To assess ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a function of the outcomes of the

sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions. Title ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers perspectives OFA OFA03.02.01 OIs TS-0105-A


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.001



CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.002



CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.003





310 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.004




CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.005



SASHA questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0002.006




311 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0003

Objective To assess integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives of the “Implement ENR/E-TMA in a strategic environment” scenario in terms of workload, change of practices, versatility of procedures, situation awareness, vigilance, risk of deskilling as a

function of the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, in realistic environments including varied conditions. Title Integrated CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M solution feasibility and acceptability from controllers and pilots perspectives OFA OFA04.01.02 /OFA03.02.01 OIs TS-0103/TS-0105-A


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.001



CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.002



CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.003

Positive feedback from controllers, complemented with proofs of feasibility based on acceptable level of workload qualitative assessment




312 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.005




CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.006



SASHA questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0003.008




313 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0019

Objective Assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI supports capabilities that controllers deploy to achieve their task goals including perception, decision making, planning, and memory and task execution.

Title CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M HMI support capabilities OFA OFA04.01.02 /OFA03.02.01 OIs TS-0103/TS-0105-A


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.001

Positive feedback from the user. Building and Maintaining Situation Awareness Monitoring of Information Sources Memory Management Managing the Controller Working Position Diagnosing and Problem Detection Decision Making and Problem Solving Resource Management and Multi-Tasking Team Awareness

AIM questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.002

To confirm that HMI supports the user To achieve their tasks. HMI usability Questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.003


Building and Maintaining Situation Awareness Monitoring of Information Sources Memory Management Managing the Controller Working Position Diagnosing and Problem Detection Decision Making and Problem Solving Resource Management and Multi-Tasking Team Awareness

AIM questionnaire


314 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0019.004

Controllers confirm that HMI allows to gain and retain the appropriate level of situation awareness.

HMI usability Questionnaire


315 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0020

Objective To assess that the CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M procedures and HMI allow controllers efficient teamwork & communication Title Controller teamwork & communication OFA OFA04.01.02 /OFA03.02.01 OIs TS-0103/TS-0105-A


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.001

Positive feedback from the user. Clarity of own responsibility tasks Clarity of task executed by the other team members Clarity of shared tasks with the other team members System support in prioritizing tasks System support in synchronize team actions Team goal clarity System support for a smooth flow of information System support to the team to follow the procedures System support in detecting other team members’ inaccuracies or mistakes System support to share information ATCOs level of satisfaction in working in the team Other team members’ support

STQ questionnaire


316 of 343


CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.002

Perceived situational awareness related to the interaction among ATCOs is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective.

Perceived situational awareness related to the interaction among ATCOs

STQ questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.003

Perceived cognitive workload related to the interaction between pilots and ATCOs (and among ATCOs) is maintained within acceptable level from ATCOs perspective.

Teamwork cooperation mental demand AIM questionnaire

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0020.003

Quantitative workload assessment related to the interaction between pilots and ATCOs (and between ATCOs) is maintained within acceptable level from pilots and ATCOs perspective.




317 of 343


OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0021

Objective To assess that roles and responsibilities of controllers are clear and exhaustive. Title Roles and responsibilities OFA OFA04.01.02 /OFA03.02.02 OIs TS-0103/TS-0105-A

Identifier Success criteria Metrics/Indicators Data Collection Methods Success criteria

CRT-05.03-VALP-0100.0021.001

Controllers confirm that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, compatible and complete.

STQ Team Roles & Responsibilities

Questionnaire

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0029

Assess the impact of CPDLC usage in descent and approach phases on timeliness of communications between pilot and ATCOs.

Impact of CPDLC on timeliness of communication

OFA04.01.02 /OFA03.02.02

TS-0103/TS-0105-A Identifier Success criteria Metrics/Indicators Data Collection Methods

ATCOs vs Flight crews Communications

Observations

OBJ-05.03-VALP-0100.0033

Evaluate if the defined procedure in case of ASPA UNABLE occurrence can be easily and efficiently followed by controllers and pilots. ASPA-IM-S&M UNABLE Procedure


ATCOs working methods compliancy in case of ASPA Unable

Observations


318 of 343



319 of 343


HP Data collection methods In order to validate the HP objectives presented in previous section qualitative and quantitative measurements were applied during the RTS. provides an overview of the data collection methods adopted for Human Performance Assessment, detailing their classification in terms of objective/subjective and qualitative/quantitative methods.

Data Collection Methods

Qualitative Quantitative Objective Subjective

Over the shoulder Observations

√ √

Questionnaires √ √ √ Debriefings √ √ System data recordings

√ √

Table 50: HP Data Collection Methods

HP Analysis Process Objective and subjective data collected during the simulation are the main source of information, which give the initial start to the whole results analysis. The measures have been employed to assess the RTS success criteria (validation objectives). In respect with these criteria, the analysis provided a response about the observed differences between the reference and the solution scenarios. Note that on airborne side (Airbus cockpit simulator), all the data were collected only during the solution 3 scenario, including E-AMAN, CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M in order to evaluate the integration of CTA enabled by i4D with ASPA-IM-S&M. Data flow is organized in different levels as described in the following .


320 of 343


Raw data collection (level1) has been performed during the simulation execution through questionnaires, debriefings, interviews, observations and system data recordings. After the simulation execution collected raw data have been arranged in dataset in order to perform synopsis analysis among them (level 2). Finally data collected via different collection method have been integrated together (level 3) in order to obtain final conclusions of the study (level 4). Data collected through questionnaires and system data recordings have been analysed following descriptive statistics rules, in order to quantitatively describe the main features of them. Specifically descriptive statistics aim to summarize a sample and is not developed on the basis of probability theory. In order to provide information related central tendency and variability of the analysed data set mean and standard deviation respectively have been measured and presented in §4.2.1.. Specifically, during level 2, data collected through questionnaires and system data recordings have been analysed as follows. Post Run Questionnaires’ answers and system data recordings have been categorized per scenarios (reference, solution 1, solution 2, solution 3) and sector type and/or controllers’ role (En-route, E-TMA, DEP, TMA, ARR, AC, SM) and then it has been calculated the mean value and standard deviation for them. Data have been aggregated in order to compare answers provided for different experimented scenarios and among simulated sector type. presents the following sectors’ grouping adopted for the results analysis. . Furthermore reports information related CTA/i4 and ASPA-IM-S&M orders/events effectively executed by sector groups during the real time simulation session. Please refer to §3.1.6 for further details on prescribed working methods related to each simulated sector/position. TYPE SECTOR EXE PLN DESCRIPTION CTA/i4D ASPA-IM-S&M

Level 4: Final conclusion in relation to specific exerciseobjectives.

Level 3: Information integration (integration of preliminaryresults obtained by each data collection methods) withcomments provided by operative experts and exercise experts.

Level 2: data collected via each methods have been analysedand interpretated individually and then in a synoptical way inorder to underline the significant aspects concerning bothobjective and subjective collected data.

Level 1: raw data (objective and subjective).


321 of 343


TYPE SECTOR EXE PLN DESCRIPTION CTA/i4D ASPA-IM-S&M

En-route

MI1 X X This sector is responsible for the arrival traffic flows from North West to LIRF-LIRA airports and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

X Sector delivering CTA

X Select TGT Deselect TGT

PAD X X This sector is responsible for the arrival traffic flows from North East to LIRF-LIRA airports and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

ESE X X

This sector is responsible for the arrival traffic flows from South and West to LIRF-LIRA airports and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

E-TMA

US/TS X X

This sector is responsible for the pre-sequencing of arrival traffic flows from South-South East to LIRF-LIRA airports and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

X Sector delivering CTA

X Select TGT Deselect TGT Merge Behind

NE X X

This sector is responsible for the pre-sequencing of arrival traffic flows from North to LIRF-LIRA airports and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

NW X X

This sector is responsible for the pre-sequencing of arrival traffics from North West to LIRF (16R) and LIRA airport and for the transit flight crossing the AOR

TMA

TNE X - This sector is responsible for the arrival traffic flow landing on LIRF-16R

X Cancel spacing retain TGT Merge behind Remain behind TGT Select TGT UNABLE merge

TNW X - This sector is responsible for the arrival traffic flow landing on LIRF-16L

ARR

ARR1 X - This sector is responsible for the final approach phase of traffics landing on LIRF-16L

X Merge behind Remain behind TGT

ARR2 X - This sector is responsible for the final approach phase of traffics landing on LIRF-16R

DEP OV X X

This sector is responsible for pre-sequencing arrival traffics from West to LIRF (16R) and LIRA airport, the transit flight crossing the AOR and for the departures from LIRF 25 and LIRA 15

X Select TGT Deselect TGT

SM SM - X

The Sequence Manager is responsible for the management of arrival sequences to LIRF and LIRA and for the coordination (silent) with En-Route/E-TMA sectors to enable the CTA uplink.

- -

AC AC - X The Arrival Coordinator is responsible for the coordination of the arrival sectors

- -

Table 51: Sectors’ grouping Both qualitative and quantitative data collected during the RTS were analysed according the following criteria:


322 of 343


Reference including only E-AMAN vs. Solution 1 including E-AMAN and CTA/i4D

RUN_01 RUN_04 RUN_16

vs. RUN_02 RUN_11 RUN_21

Reference including only E-AMAN vs. Solution 2 including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M



Reference including only E-AMAN vs. Solution 1 including E-AMAN and CTA/i4D vs. Solution 2 including E-AMAN and ASPA-IM-S&M vs. Solution 3 including E-AMAN, CTA/i4D and ASPA-IM-S&M




vs.

RUN_05 RUN_06 RUN_07 RUN_08 RUN_15 RUN_17

Furthermore quantitative assessment related to workload has been performed analysing the following data:

CWP orders o AOC Assume Of Control o DCT DireCt To o EXT-RCR Rerouting o FEL Fir Entry Level o PEL Planned Entry Level o TOC Transfer Of Control o TOF Transfer Of Flight o XFL eXit Flight Level

PWP orders o DIRECT DireCt To o NEW_ROUTE Rerouting o LEVEL Level Assignment o SPEED Speed Assignment o TRANSFER_ACTIVE Transfer Of Control o ROD Rate Of Descent o ROC Of Climb o SSR Kill of Flight o HEADING Change Heading; o TURN o ORBIT

AMAN orders o LOCK o UNLOCK o Change Sequence


323 of 343


o Change Sequence - UNABLE i4D events Active CTACancelled CTA Achieved CTAMissed CTACTA Waypoint Not foundASPA orders

o Cancel spacing retain TGT o Merge behind o Remain behind TGT o Select TGT o UNABLE merge o UNABLE merge behind o Deselect TGT o UNABLE remain behind o UNABLE remain behind target o Switch to remain behind

Frequency Channel Occupancy. Coordination.

Specifically data have been grouped per sector type/role: En-route sectors; E-TMA sectors; DEPARTURE sectors; TMA sectors; ARRIVAL sectors; ARRIVAL COORDINATOR; SEQUENCE MANAGER.

Data have been then mediated and normalized per hour in order to perform their comparison among the simulated scenarios. The airbus cockpit simulator was coupled during 8 runs of the solution 3 scenario, including E-AMAN, CTA and ASPA-IM-S&M. 4 flight crews participated in the evaluation, each flight crew performed 4 flights (except 1 flight crew who performed only 3 flights due to technical issue) distributed as follow: 2 flights (respectively flight 4Y1171 and flight 4Y1172) during one run, then again the same two flights (4Y1171 and flight 4Y1172) during another run. The main features of the flights tested by the flight crews are the following ones:

Scenario 1.1 (4Y1171): the flight starts at the end of CRZ, in North East of Rome, at FL370, and flies from VIC to Rome Fiumicino airport (LIRF), via SONTI. The flight will receive an RTA on SONTI and then an ASPA manoeuver. No particular events are expected, it’s a nominal scenario.

Scenario 1.2 (4Y1172): the flight starts at the end of CRZ, in South East of Rome, at FL360, and flies from DOGUS to Rome Fiumicino airport (LIRF), via BUKOV. The flight will receive an RTA on BUKOV and then an ASPA manoeuver. No particular events are expected, it’s a nominal scenario.

Scenario 2.1 (4Y1171): exactly the same flight than in scenario 1.1, but during the flight, just before SONTI, a failure of cabin pressure system occurs on-board.

Scenario 2.2 (4Y1172): exactly the same flight than in scenario 1.2, but in case the event was not observed before, the A/C is eventually unable to succeed the ASPA manoeuvre, after having accepted and activated it ("ASPA UNABLE" message).

Data collected during all the flights were gathered for most analysis. For some objectives, the data collected during the scenarios 1.1, 1.2 and 2.2 were gathered to analyse the nominal situation and compared to the data of the scenario 2.1, considered as a non-nominal situation. Next sections contain results obtained for each validation objective and related success criteria relevant for Human Performance Assessment.


324 of 343


Results are supported by the graphical presentation of questionnaires and system data recordings data elaboration. Consider that results related to Human Performance Assessment have been obtained elaborating exclusively outcomes of runs without unusual events. Non nominal runs’ have been analysed under safety perspective. Nevertheless, note that, as explained above, one unusual event was introduced on-board during one flight and analysed from HP perspective, but this event did not really impact controllers, for them the situation remained nominal.


325 of 343



326 of 343



327 of 343


Appendix D Results Alenia Prototype In this section are reported the summary of results for what concern the 9.3 ASPA exercise for military and civil A/C & ATC interoperability. During the test session, we have performed, following the D16 scenario, a sequence at 90 s and a merge and sequence at 120 s and 90 s. The route for C27 J was established by the following points: limf/top/alexa/lagen/anaki/ixito/unita/kafee/koner/elb/gilio/taq/golpo/

Figure 1: C27J Route

In the following pictures the snapshots extracted from ADS-B interface and TCA HMI


328 of 343


Figure 2: ASPA S&M Manoeuvre


329 of 343



330 of 343



331 of 343


In order to de-risk the activity to be performed for 805 exercise, it was also tested a flight following the 805 procedure, following the route: LIMF/SIRLO/ASTOR/NEDED/LAGEN/ANAKI/IXITO/UNITA/TIDKA/KONER/BAKRO/ELB/ELKAP/BIBEK/SORES/LOKRU/FN16R/TH16R The way points SORES e LOKRU are artificially created and are not visible in the below chart:


332 of 343


The exercise has considered a sequence of 90 s.


333 of 343


N° title Identifier Requirement Test result 1 ASPA APPC

function input KEY4DSW -APPC-000-00 The Clearance

instruction data shall be will be

OK (Start mission button is present on the HMI). The


334 of 343


acquired form HMI interface

clearance is communicated by Voice.

2 ASPA APPC function input

KEY4DSW -APPC-001-00 The target a/c data shall be acquired from TADP module

OK


KEY4DSW -APPC-002-00 The A/C actual data shall be acquired from FTI interface

OK


KEY4DSW -APPC-003-00 The SPA phase actual shall be acquired from ADD module

OK

5 ASPA APPC function Computing r

KEY4DSW -APPC-004-00 The computing shall check if the information in the clearance instruction data is complete. If not, the clearance incomplete shall be reported

OK. The clearance is communicated by voice.

6 ASPA APPC function Computing

KEY4DSW -APPC-005-00 The computing shall check if requested ASPA manoeuvre is feasible on the base of aircraft actual state. If not, shall be reported in the ASPA feasibility

OK

7 ASPA APPC function Computing

KEY4DSW -APPC-005-00 The computing shall check if the target aircraft deviates from its route. If so, the target deviating message shall be produce

OK

8 ASPA APPC function Insert

KEY4DSW -APPC-006-00 The flight crew shall insert the CTO information for E/E WAY POINT

NOT Applicable. Implemented only for i4D

9 ASPA APPC function store r

KEY4DSW -APPC-007-00 The clearance incompatible shall be stored in a dedicated notebook area

NOT Applicable. The ASPA exe uses Voice Communication.

10 ASPA APPC function store

KEY4DSW -APPC-008-00 The Target deviation shall

OK. Not applicable before


335 of 343


be stored in a dedicated notebook area

the merge point.

11 ASPA APPC function store

KEY4DSW -APPC-009-00 The ASPA feasibility shall be stored in a dedicated notebook area

OK.

12 ASPA SM function input

KEY4DSW -ASPASM-003-00 The target deviating, Clearance incompatible, ASPA S&M feasibility shall be acquired form APPC module

OK. Not applicable for Clearance.

13 ASPA NDB function input

KEY4DSW -NDBASPA-000-00 The Access Request shall be acquired form HMI interface

NOT Applicable.

14 ASPA NDB function DISPLAY

KEY4DSW -NDBASPA-001-00 the WAY POINT list shall be displayed on notebook

OK

15 ASPA NDB function store

KEY4DSW -NDBASPA-002-00 The FAF information shall be stored in a dedicated notebook area

OK. The FAF is the last point of route configuration file.

16 CARTE_AP function stored

KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-010-00 The E_A_E shall be stored for the SAPP function computing

OK


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-011-00 The FMS error shall be stored for the SAPP and SCC function computing

NOT APPLICABLE

18 CARTE_AP function input

KEY4DSW –CARTE_AP-000-00 The TGT A/C data shall be acquired as input from TADP block

OK.


KEY4DSW –CARTE_AP-001-00 The ASPA phase activated shall be acquired as input from ASPA A/D

OK


KEY4DSW –CARTE_AP-002-00 The A/C ACTUAL shall be acquired as

OK


336 of 343


input from FTI 21 CARTE_AP

function input KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-003-00 The Clearance

Instruction data shall be acquired as input from HMI I/F

NOT applicable. The clearance is communicated by

voice.

22 CARTE_AP function computing

KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-004-00 The E_O_A shall be computed

OK. Not visible in the HMI but computed in the algorithm.


KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-005-00 The E_T_A shall be computed

OK. The parameter’s name is ABP overfly time.


KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-006-00 The ABP_distance shall be computed

OK


KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-007-00 The Actual_spacing shall be computed

OK


KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-008-00 The E_A_E shall be computed

OK. The parameter HMI name is “spacing error”


KEY4DSW CARTE_AP-009-00 The FMS error shall be computed

. Not applicable.


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-010-00 The E_A_E shall be stored for the SAPP function computing

OK. Stored in the log file


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-011-00 The FMS error shall be stored for the SAPP and SCC function computing

NOT APPLICABLE

30 CARTE_AP function display

KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-012-00 The E_O_A shall be displayed on the HMI I/F

OK. Not visible in the HMI but computed in the algorithm


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-013-00 The E_T_A shall be displayed on the HMI I/F

OK


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-014-00 The ABP_distance shall be displayed on the HMI I/F

OK

33 CARTE_AP function

KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-007-00 The Actual_spacing

OK


337 of 343


display shall be displayed on the HMI I/F


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-010-00 CARTE_AP function stored

OK


KEY4DSW -CARTE_AP-011-00 CARTE_AP function stored

OK

36 SAPP Function : functionality

KEY4DSW-SAPP-000-00 The Spacing Achieving Phase Processing (SAPP) data exchange block shall provide in output the : IAS demand parameter, Spacing Achieving Distance, Spacing Achieving Time

OK

37 SAPP Function :Calculation

KEY4DSW-SAPP-001-00 The IAS Demand shall be Upper and lower Limited

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-00 The calculation shall be performed by means of a proper ERF algorithm, based on the following formula: IAS Demand = CAS Demand * CAS to IAS Correction

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-01 The CAS Demand shall calculated from :CAS Demand = f(EAS Demand)

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-02 The EAS Demand shall calculated from :EAS Demand = f(TAS Demand, Air density ratio)

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-03 The TAS Demand shall calculated from :TAS Demand = f(GS Demand, wind speed, Wind direction,

OK. The wind parameters are not applicable.


338 of 343


Track Angle true)

42 SAPP Function : Calculation

KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-04 The RTA-ABP shall calculated from: RTA-ABP = f(ETATGTABP, Requested Spacing)

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-05 The GS Demand shall calculated from :

GS Demand = f(Along Track Position WP, Along Track Position AC, RTAABP, Actual Time)

When (Along Track position ABP WP - Target Along Track Position) > 0

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-002-06 The GS Demand shall calculated from :

GS Demand = f(Spacing Error, Ground Speed TGT)

When (Along Track position ABP WP - Along Track Position X) > 0

OK

45 SAPP: Display KEY4DSW-SAPP-003-00 The IAS Demand parameter shall be displayed on the key 4D notebook HMI

OK

46 Identifier KEY4DSW-SAPP-004-00 The Spacing Achieving Distance parameter shall be displayed on the key 4D notebook HMI

OK.

47 Identifier KEY4DSW-SAPP-005-00 The Spacing Achieving Time parameter shall

OK.


339 of 343


be displayed on the key 4D notebook HMI

48 SAPP Function: Other Output

KEY4DSW-SAPP-006-00

The SAPP block shall provide also the following output: Spacing Tolerance not Achievable

OK


KEY4DSW-SAPP-006-01

Spacing Tolerance not Achievable shall be calculated as:…..

OK. TCA-SRS-795 (If own ship cruising speed needed for ASPA manoeuvre is out of the range of configured performance (max, min, normal cruising speed) the spacing tolerance is not achievable).


KEY4DSW-SAPP-006-02

Spacing Tolerance not Achievable shall be send to STATUS MONITORING block

OK

51 SAPP Function: scheduling frequency

KEY4DSW -SAPP-007-00

The SAPP block shall be scheduled at least one time per second

OK.


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-000-00 A/C Actual shall be acquired form FTI interface

OK.


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-001-00 The ADS-B in data quality shall be acquired form ADS-B interface

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-002-00 The FAF signal shall be acquired form NDB

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-003-00 The target deviating, Clearance incompatible, ASPA S&M feasibility shall

OK. Not applicable for clearance.


340 of 343


be acquired form APPC module


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-004-00 The Data Consist shall be acquired form TADP module

OK.


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-005-00 The Safety violated shall be acquired form SCC module

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-006-00 The Spacing not in tolerance shall be acquired form SMPP module

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPASM-007-00 The Tolerance not achievable shall be acquired form SMPP module or SAPP Module

OK

60 ASPA SM function calculation

KEY4DSW -ASPASM-008-00 Check all data consistency and error condition

OK

61 ASPA SM function store

KEY4DSW -ASPASM-009-00 If exit a failure shall be store the failure condition and shall be active the ASPA Deactivation Module

OK.

62 ASPA AAD function input

KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-000-00 A/C Actual shall be acquired form FTI interface

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-001-00 The Failure message shall be acquired form SM Module

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD002-00

The Pilot ASPA activation / deactivation shall be acquired form HMI interface

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-003-00 The Clearance instruction data shall be acquired form HMI interface

Not applicable. Data for ASPA are provided by voice.

66 ASPA AAD function

KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-004-00 Check the ASPA current phase

OK.


341 of 343


Calculation and Error Message and if necessary shall be set the deactivation message

67 ASPA AAD function Calculation

KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-005-00 Check the pilot request and if necessary shall be set the deactivation message

OK.

68 ASPA AAD function Calculation

KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-006-00 Check if the ASPA terminate condition and if necessary shall be set the deactivation message

OK

69 ASPA AAD function store

KEY4DSW -ASPAAAD-007-00 ASPA phase Actual shall be stored in a dedicated Area of the notebook

OK.

70 ASPA SCC function input

KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-000-00 A/C Actual shall be acquired form FTI interface

OK


KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-001-00 The Target a/c data shall be acquired form TADP Module

OK


KEY4DSW –ASPASCC-002-00 The FMS error shall be acquired form CARTE Module

Not Applicable.


KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-003-00 The Clearance instruction data(spacing) shall be acquired form HMI interface

OK

74 ASPA SCC function Calculation

KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-004-00 Check the safety thresholds. Spacing too low, IM aircraft low height, Cross track error too high are checked and if necessary shall be generated the Safety Violated signal

OK

75 ASPA SCC KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-005-00 Check the pilot OK


342 of 343


function Calculation

request and if necessary shall be set the deactivation message

76 ASPA SCC function store

KEY4DSW -ASPASCC-006-00 The Safety Violated signal shall be stored in a dedicated Area of the notebook for SM Module

OK

Table 52: Test results table


343 of 343


END OF DOCUMENT