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The editors and publisher of this volume gratefully acknowledge therous support of the Korea Foundation. The opinions, findings, and

sions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of thehors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Korea Foundation.

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IiIarandemocracAComparative Studyof theKorean Warand thePeloponnesian War

David McCann and Barry S. Strausseditors:[1]

AN EAST GATE BOOK

'IIcJvf.E. SharpeArmonk, New YorkLondon, England "1C>Q J


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13Thucydides TheoretikosjThucydidesHistor: Realist Theory and the

Challenge of HistoryJosiah Ober

Thucydides intended his accountofthe,Athenian-PeloponnesianWar to be a "possession forall time" (ktema es aiei: 1.22.4); not just a record of past events, but aneducation in the realities of power and, human relations that would help a futurereaderto understand his own s i t u a t i o n ~ The success ofThucydides' ambitious undertakingcan be measuredby the eagerness with which subsequent generations ofreaders have goneabout the projlect of assimilating their diverse theoretical agendas to h is history--and vice versa. For several decades after the Second WorldWar, Thucydideswas read by many Americanopinion-makers (and by those academics who taughtthem) as a prototypical cold war policy analyst. Jennifer Roberts discusses this cold war reading ofThucydides and offers a particularly vividKorean War era example:

In the 1950s Life magazine ran a series of articles cautioning Americans aboutthe disasters that might attend on ignoring the lessons .ofthe Greek past. RobertCampbell's piece "How a DemocracyDied" was designed for high drama, beginning with an account of deadly powers facing onc anothcr across thc 38thparallcl, only to rcvcal a bit latcr on that the author is describing fifth-centuryGreece and not the endangered universe of his own era.'The ancient historian's depiction of the operations of raw state power within a

polarized international environment seemingly justificd a forcign policy prcdicated on' the brutal and simplistic logic of hegemonic rivalry-a logic that leftlittle room for liberal scruples about morality or interstate justice. This cold warreading was implicitly predicated on the authority of a univocal authorial voice.


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274 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARThe job of the reader of Thucydides was to grasp the author's lesson, and thecombination of wise author and astute reader assured that the "right" lesson wastransmitted. Thucydides' wisdom was generally seen as unimpeachable-hewasa grand exemplar of Western political thought. Although it would certainly befoolish to suppose that the KoreanWar, or any modem conflict,was the product ofa particular approach to readingThucydides, he was then-and remains--a livingpresence in American thinking about international relations.2Thucydides, however, offers his readers much more than an abstract theory ofstate power. His text presents us with a noteworthy example of a shrewd and subjective historie;ll intelligence attempting to make narrative senseof extraordinarily complex events on the basis offragmentary documentationand the ideologically slantedaccounts of participants (1.22.1-2). Moreover, he inaugurates the tradition of presenting his narrative as a rigorously scientific, objective record of events and theircauses. Thucydides defines not only a starting point for the Western tradition ofpolitical thought, but also for the tradition ofwriting history that is, ab initio, didactic, argumentative, self-consciously skeptical of its own sources, and yet confidentof its own authority and veracity.3 Thucydides' account of the PeloponnesianWarmay help us to make sense of the events of the Korean War by offering a betterunderstanding of the complex interrelationship between domestic policy, concernsabout national security, and the clash of great hegemonies through minor-powerproxies. Moreover, reading Thucydides' ostensibly "objective" narrative as policyanalysis and as critical history may offer the outsidersome perspective on the issuesat stake in the higWy contested field ofKoreanWar studies, where the problems offragmentary sources, biased accounts by participants, ideologically loaded interpretations, and attempts to monopolize the high ground of objective historical truth bysilencing hostile critics appear to be so prominent and so potentially problematic.That Thucydides remains a significant p r e s ~ n c e in the construction (and de-fense) of theories of international relations is clear enough from a spate of recentwork.4Michael Doyle summarizesmuch of this scholarship and argueswith greatcogency that Thucydides can fairly be adopted by the contemporaryRealist schoolof international relations theory as an intellectual ancestor, a Realistavant la lettre.Realist models take states as quasi-individuals, as primary actors in the internat ion al a rena tha t t end to mimie the behavior of rationally self-interested,profit-maximizing, risk-managing individuals in themarketplaee-that is, in crudeterms, ;IS individuals as they are understoodby modem market-centered economictheories. Thucydidcs obviollsly had no access to the psychological or behavioraltheories employed by modern economists. But that does not preclude his thinkingin similar ternlS. Doyle succeeds in showing that a reading of Thucydides as a"minimalist" Realist--onewho focuses on states as primary actors in an environment of international anarchy in which no general restraint is sufficient to eliminate conflicts or to guarantee their nonviolent resolution-neednot be tendentiousor two-dimensional. Moreover, the text seems, at first, to provide the basis fordeveloping a considerably stronger Realist theory of interstate behavior, a theory

THUCYDIDES. THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR. 275

thatwill focus on the rationally self-interested behavior of state-actors in seekingto accumulate the resources that will allow them to successfully deploy power inpursuit of hegemonic ends and self-defense in a world composed of similarly rational, self-interested, and power-hungry state-actors.5Granted that Thucydides' account of states and power supports the develop

ment of some sort of Realist international relations theory, the question I wouldlike topose iswhetherreading Thucydidesas a strongRealist will dojustice to thecomplex text that is Thucydides' history of the PeloponnesianWar. My eventualconclusion, like Doyle's, is no. I will suggest that Thucydidesthe "strong Realist"theorist is indeed a centrally important presence in the text. But the careful readereventually finds Thucydides the theorist of state power (hereafter ThucydidesTheoretikos) challenged and even confuted by anotherof the text's central authorial presences: Thucydides the historian (hereafter: Thucydides Histor).6 The initial theoretical premise of the war as a conflict between unitary and rationallyself-interested state-actors pursuing hegemonic ends--a premise that seems to besecurelyestablished in book I and the first partof book 2- is demonstrated by thenarrative of events in the rest of the (incomplete) history to be a dangerous oversimplification. Theory proves incapable,'in and of itself, of predicting or explaining the actual behavior of states, groups, or individuals under the pressure of aprotracted and violent power struggle. This does not mean that we should regardThucydides' work to be anti-theoretical. Rather, Thucydides reminds us that anypropertheory of power mustbe grounded in a close analysis of human behavior inactual circumstances. Theory,by its nature, seeksto be transhistorical. Thucydides'text, however, suggests to the system-builder that the best theorizing will be infonned and chastened by the same attention to the complexities and contingencythat characterizes the best historical narratives.7ThucydidesTheoretikosBook 1and the first part of book 2 ofThucydides' history certainly encourage thereader to develop something very much like a strong Realist theory of international relations. Thucydidesmakes it clear thatthe primary actors in his story willbe poleis. Whetherhe refersto a polis by its given name("Athens") or by the nameof its citizenry("theAthenians"),he seems toregard the polis asa "quasi-person"an entity capable of making decisions and acting in an environment inhabited bysimilar "quasi-person" entities.8Moreover, he regards the key aspects of the environment in which these entities operate to be what we would, nowadays, not hesitate to describe as economic factors: the human andmaterial resources sought andfought over by states. The antithetical structure of the Greek language allowsThucydides to contrast these sorts of "real"factors andthe willful efforts of poleisto acquire them with superstructural, epiphenomenal, or merely ideological factors that sometimes disguise or mask themotivations of state-actors.9Thismaterial/ideological contrastis most oftenexpressed by Thucydides' anti-


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276 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARthetical use of the tenns ergon (fact, deed, action) and logos (speech, account,story): when the authorclaims that in logos (according to what peoplesaid) factorAwas in play, but in ergon (according to the underlying facts of the matter) itwasfactorB, hemakes it clear to his readers that B wasthe true issueand more worthyof their serious attentiol1. lo By extrapolation, state policy that was predicated onan understanding of the relevant 'erga is likely to be rational; policy that is basedprimarily on logos is likely to be irrational. Thus Thucydides Theoretikos, as agood (proto-)Realist, establishes the ideal nonn of rational state-actors makingpolicy on the basis of a more or less thorough understanding of the relevant data.Of course, in practice states may be inadequately infonned about certain unportant, butcomplex or cryptic, realiaor they may bemisinfonnedaboutthem. Underthese conditions, the states in question will be likely to make policy errors andtheir mistakcs may have a profound effecton the international order. Butthe like-lihood that bad policywill sometimesbe made as a resultof poor information doesnot negate the general model of rational state-actors thatconsciously seek the bestavailable infonnation and are in general agreement with other state-actors aboutthe categories of infonnation necessary to make realistic policy.Furthennore, ThucydidesTheoretikos is clearly and explicitly concerned with

the operationsof state power. He isinterested inpower defined as the material andefficient forces whereby a state seeks to gain its policy ends (the general tenn heuses for an aggregate of such forces isdunamis). He isalso interested in the supranational regime that is established as an effect of successfully deployed powerthe hegemonic structure or empire (arkhe) through which a strong state-actorcontrols the actions of weak ones, and whereby resources are extracted by thepowerful hegemon from its subjects. When various impediments to efficient de-ployment of power have been removed, and the necessary prerequisite resourceshave been acquired, a state becomes strong. A strongstate will employdunamis inan attempt to establish andextend its arkhe. In the so-called "Archaeology" (1.21 9 - a n account of Greek prehistory), Thucydides succinctly establishes for hisreaders the nature of the impediments to the growth of strong hegemonic statesand the material prerequisites of dunamis. He then demonstrates the means bywhich dunamis was employed to achieve the end of constructing an arkhe bythose states that succeeded in removing the impediments and in gaining the pre-requisites of power.

In the Archaeology, the most serious impediment to the development of statepower is internal division-that is, the failure of the society in question to coalesceinto an integrally coordinated state-actor. I1 This lack of coherence is attributedvariously to extreme economic differentiation among the inhabitants of naturallyfertile districts (1.2) and to the selfish individualism typical of dynastic tyrants(1.17). Thus a measure of social unity adequate to the maintenance of politicalunity is established as a necessary precondition to the growthof state power. Thepolis of Sparta provides Thucydides with his prime example of the advantages ofunity: due to their early adoption of a set of social nonns that emphasized simplic-

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 277ity and moderation (and thus deemphasized distinctions between social classes),the Spartans were able to become united and strong, and to extend their controlover other states (1.6 with 1.18). But Spartan power, is, the reader soon realizes,limited because it does not accommodate the major material factors that makepossible the unconstrained growth of dunamis and arkhe. Primary among thesematerial factors are strong city walls,: a "modern" navy of large oared warships(triremes), and significantstate treasure (khremata).12 After the social unity issuehad been (atleastprovisionally) settled, itis thetriad of(1) walls forsecurity, 13 (2)ships as a mobile striking force, and (3) the capital reserves that allow advanceplanning and the survival of reverses that undergirds Thucydides' analysis of thegrowth of state power.The developmental scheme laid out in Thucydides' Archaeology subtly intertwines the three clements of the "material triad." In the earliest period, we arc told,

before Greek towns were walled, the populations of the peninsula simply wandered from one area to the other, pushed here and there by unstable coalitions ofstrongmen. Therewere no capital reserves, no way of protectingaccumulated capital, and no organized military presence on theseas (1.2). Settlements without wallswere especially vulnerable to the surprise attacks of sea pirates and thus earlytowns tended to be built inland (1.5, 7-8). We come to realize that the materialimpoverishment of this early period was based on a vicious circle: walls wereexpensive to build (1.8), and given their lack of access to the sea, the early settlements were incapable of engaging in lucrative overseas commerce. The reductionofpiracy by force was thus a precondition to the growth of wealth, which was intum a precondition to the building of walls. Enter King Minos ofCrete. Accordingto Thucydides (1.4, 8) Minos was the first to build a great navy and "it is reasonable to suppose" that he attempted to suppress piracy in order to secure his ownrevenues.14Because ofMinos' suppression of the pirates, maritime commerce flourished and capital reserves were soon accumulated by various parties. This meantthat walled settlements could be built on the coasts (1.7-8) and once walled, theseplaces were secure from piracy-presumably even after the end of Minos'thalassocracy. Communities that invested their capital in walls (and, at least in thecase of Minos, in ships) became strong. The remaining, weaker, communities intum recognized thattheir ownmaterial interests wouldbe furthered bysubmissionand thus they willingly accepted the hegemony of the stronger (1.8). Both strongand weak communities evidentlymade theirdecisions on rational grounds, as stateactors, and thus an "international" regime came into being. This was, we are told,the condition of Greece before the TrojanWar.Agamemnon's Mycenae (despite its inland location) is clearly intended by

Thucydides as an early Greek example of a strong, hegemonic state. Thucydidesspends some time in demonstrating that Agamemnon had the most powerful navyofhis day and that he used it to control a considerable arkhe (1.9). Considerable,that is, by the relativelypaltry standards of the time. As it turns out, in comparisonto the standards of Thucydides' day, the force against Troy was unimpressive in


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278 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARTHUCYDIDES. THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR. 279

and it was Athens, not Sparta, that was determined to pursue the anti-Persian crusade after the defeatof theEastern invaders. In the decades after the PersianWars,some Greek writers, notablyAeschylus and Herodotus, had begun hinting that thedramatic growth of Athenian power might have a darker side; perhaps Athensrisked self-corruption as a result of having assimilated the dangerous "Eastern"passion for creating overseas empires. 16 Thucydides' Archaeology, by contrast,gives hegemony a firmly Greek prehistory.The post-Persian War activities of the polis of Athens provided Thucydides

Histor with his real-world test of the model of imperial power developed byThucydidesTheoretikosin book 1. Butby the same token the longue duree surveyof theArchaeology demonstratesthat theAthenian empireof themid-fifth century1e. was notmerely a contingentresult of unique and irreproduciblecircumstances;it was not to be attributed toAthenian exceptionalism, not the result of a distinctive and innate Athenian national character (ethos). I? The impulse of strong stateskl self-aggrandizement, their tendency to seek power and to deploy dunamis in. p1rsuit of arkhe, i s Shown in the Archaeology to be a constant and predictablefactor in Greek interstate relations. Rather than focusing onAthens' peculiar national character, Thucydides' implication is that Athens, under the fortuitouslyprescient leadership first of Themistocles and then of Pericles, was the polis that. p:rfccted (or seemed to have perfected) the symmetrical arrangement of the sameriad ofmaterial factors that had been operative since the beginning of settled, civi-

Security

~ ~ CONCEPTUAL e

. < \ ~S ~ ' \ . x

Walls

c: MATERIAL~ ~ I ' q l

Figure 1.

total size and the Greek commanders atTroy were incapableof concentrating theirforces. The Hellenic expedition's failure to use power effectively to achieve itspol icy goals (we mightsay, its low "dunamis rating") was, according to Thucydides'analysis. the effect of insufficient capital funds. Without the cash reserves to victual and pay the soldiers, too much eHart was dispersed in supply-gathering raids;thus the war dragged on despite the overwhelming manpower superiority of theinvaders (1.1 1-12).The Thucydidean power equation is clear: walls + ships - capital = limited

dunamis. Thus each of the Greek hegemonic confederations (arkhai) in the"premodern" period (that is, in the period before the rise of the Athenian empire)was similarly limited in scope and effectiveness. IS But these imperfect early ex-amples nonetheless demonstrated the fundamental importance of the "materialtriad" of walls/ships/treasure in the formulation of the comparable "conceptualtriad" of defensive security/dunamis/arkhe (see Figure 1). And Thucydides' ac-count of early Greek political development allows, even invites, the presumptionthat the power equation was capable of being perfected. A big, powerful navywould always be a source of considerablestrength (1.15.1). That naval force couldbe used to defend against the depredations of pirates, to encourage trade, and thusto gain capital resources. Those resources could then be employed in constructinga system of wallscapable of ensuring adequate defensive security againstthe rela-tively meager military forces that could be brought overland by one state againstanother (1.15.2).With its wal ls bui lt and thus its defensive secur ity ensured, the successful

Thucydidean city-state coulduse its naval power more aggressively in consolidating and extending its arkhe. As that arkhe expanded, weaker states would recog-nize that theirown interests lay in voluntarysubmission. As thesesubject, tributarystates contributed to the treasure of the hegemon, the hegemon's treasury wouldgrow accordingly. With deeper reserves came a corresponding ability to increaseand focus its growingdunamis upon appropriate objects and a concomitant potential for engaging in the sorts of ambitious, high-stakes imperial enterprises thatwould be avoidedas too risky by less secure stateswith shallower capital reserves.Because wealth and naval power encouraged enterprise, while secure walls limited risk, the upward cycle of power seemed, on the face of it, potentially unlimi ted. The only significant external obstacle would be the presence of anothercomparable or superior hegemonic power that would see continued growth ofarival power as a threat to i ts own secur ity or ambit ions (e.g. , 1.16: example ofIonian power stymied by the rise of imperial Persia).TheArchaeology, withits explicit focus on the development of the Greekpoleis,

reveals that Thucydides' model of international relations is intended to apply spe-cifically to Greece. This is significant inthat before the mid- to late fifth century,the tendency among the Greeks had been to associate large-scale, hegemonic im-perial structures with the East-first with Lydia and then with Persia. Atheniannaval forces had been a keyfactor in the Greekvictoryover Persia in480-478 B.C.


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280 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARIized Greek life. Those factors had led tothe power ofAgamemnon's Mycenae buttheir imperfect alignment had placed limits on Mycenaean power. It remained tobe seenwhether the Athenian arkhe had actually solved the geometric equation ofinterlockingthe materialand conceptual triads (Figure I) and had therebyachievedthe strong Realist's grail: a secure hegemony witha potentially limitless capacityto extend its power.Another set of questions remained: If Athens' behavior in building its arkhe

was, in hindsight, predictable in light ofThucydides' "proto-Realist" model, couldthe behaviorand performance ofAthensas a polis inthecourseof the PeloponnesianWar also be successfully predicted and understood in terms of that model's as-sumption that poleis could be treated as rationally self-interested state-actors? Orwould Greek behavior under the stress of war actually prove to diverge from thatof the ideal-type "state-actor",? If there were significant deviations from the pre-dicted patterns of behavior, how are those deviations f rom rat ionali ty to be ex-plained'? At what level of deviation would the strong Realist model have to besignificantly modified or even abandoned?What sort of additional theoriesmightbe developed to explain major deviations from the Realist scheme? IfAthens' risetopower could be explained withoutrecourse toAthens' distinctive"national ethos,"might appeal to that ethos help explain its subsequent failure to act rationally? Or'might that failure be explained in terms of the distinctive structural properties ofAthens' internal political regime--the demokratia?To anticipate theargument: Thucydides'narrative encourageshis reader to sup-

pose that after the death of PericlesAthens did indeed deviate from the patterns ofbehavior appropriate to the strongly Realist state-actor; Athenian policy lost itscoherence and became at least sporadically "irrational."The reader is led to sup-pose that the breakdown of orderly and rational policymaking is the result of thefa ilure of the domestic Athenian political system to resolve conflicts among rivalpoliticians and among politically and sociologically defined groups within theAthenian citizen body. In spite of Pericles' optimistic claims in the Funeral Orat ion, the democratic government is depicted as being unable to negotiate betweenthe demands of freedom and equality; of state, group, and individual interests; ofpublic and private orientations; of logos and ergon. The reader is taught that thepractice of democracy atAthens ultimatelyprovided a fertile ground forthe growthof parochial individual and factional self-interest, for destructive competitionsamong would-be leaders for popular favor, for the willful dissemination and re-ception of tendentious misinformation, and for the instantiation of highly dubiousmodels of human behavior as the foundation forpolicy formation. IS These domes-t ic issues eventually had a profound effect on the conduct of international policy.The ultimate outcome isAthens' failure in the PeloponnesianWar-a failure thalbelies the confident assessment ofAthens' resources and chances in books I and2.1-64.The expectations initiallygenerated by thereader's closeattention toThucydides .

Theoretikos are confounded by Thucydides Histor's detailed narrative of events 31

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 287home andabroad. Historyas erga fatally complicates theory as logos, and the readeris left sadder but wiser.19 By the time shearrives at the abrupt end of the narrative,Thucydides' reader has been taught to be less arrogant about the human ability tounderstand group behavior on the basis oflgeneralizations and abstractions. She istaught that under the pressure of events, even the best and most sophisticated ofpolitical systems can fail in itsrationalpolicygoals and come to betray its moral andcultural ideals. But shehas also come to understand the cryptic comment of 1.22.4:Thucydides' history is a "possession forall time" because of its simultaneous attention to the explanatoryabstractionsby whichhumans tryto organize theworldabout!bern and tothemuch more complex realityof the lived experience of individuals,groups, and states. In the ashes of theory and idealism, the text itselfremains. And!bus each weary, chastened generation of readers crowns its author, who stands victorious and w it hout ri val in t he g ames his t ext inaugurated. Or so, I suppose,Thucydides imagined it. Thus, far from lending unconditional support to a strongRealist view of the world, readingThucydides' historyshould invite opinion-makersand policymakers to think twice--to take into account history, sociology, politics,and the diversity of ideological commitrnents-beforemaking the move from abSll'3ct Realistregime theory to foreign policy.Pericles and Athens

Perusing Thucydides' account of the Pentecontaetia-the half-century betweenIhe Persian and Peloponnesian Wars (ca. 478--431 B.c.: 1.89-117)--the readerquickly realizes that in fifth-century Athens the threematerial factors essential toIhe development of national strength and hegemonic authority were abundantlypresent. Moreover, she learns that the importance of walls, ships, and treasure,lheir relationship to one another, and their relationship to the conceptual triad ofstcurityidunamisiarkhe were wel l understood by Athens' outstanding post-Persian War political leaders, Themistocles and Pericles. In close conformity to theliehavior ofweakerstates afterthe establislunentofMinos' thalassocracy, the variousGreek states of theAegean assume thattheir material interests will be furthered byilIbmission to the authorityof the hegemon-and thus, looking to their immediateIIl3terial advantage rather than concerning themselves with ideological notionsike "autonomy," they willingly pay Athens to undertake the' burden of ongoingsaval operations against Persia (1.97-99, esp. 1.99.3). Thucydides also presentslis reader with a detailed account of the building programs that resulted in thepeat fortification walls of mid-fifth-centuryAthenS-the Piraeus circuit (beguniI the archonship of Themistocles before the Persian Wars and completed after6e PersianWars by his encouragement), the city circuit (built immediately after6ePersian Wars at Themistocles' urging, despite the opposition of the Spartans),lid the LongWalls that connectedthe city with Piraeus (the product of the leader~ ofPericles).2o Various narrative passages discuss the size and efficiency of6e Athenian navy and the extent of Athenian financial reserves.2J But it is in


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282 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARconsidering the twoAssembly speeches delivered by Pericles to theAthenianAssembly, onejust before the outbreak of the war and the other in the war's secondyear, that Thucydides' reader is most fully and explicitly apprised of the tight fitbetween the model of state power developed in the Archaeology and imperialAthens under the leadership of Pericles.These speeches are particularly revealingwhen read in the context of other speeches, including the Funeral Oration.22In his first Assembly speech (1.140-44), Pericles begins by asserting that hispolicy recommendations have been consistent over time and that he would nowsimply reiterate the advice he had previously given his fellows citizens.After explaining that accommodationwith a hostile Sparta was truly dangerous to Athensandthat the mainSpartan demand(rescinding theso-called Megarian Decree) wastherefore unacceptable, Pericles lays out the resources available to the two opposing sides. The Peloponnesians, he bluntly explains, have no financial reserves andno signilicant naval forces. Thus they will tight the war at a severe disadvantage.Theywere used to fighting only short,simplewars among themselves--the sort ofcontests typical of impoverished people (1.141.1-3; cf. Archaeology: 1.15). Thislack of the essential resources that (aswe have seen)undergirded dunamis is exacerbated by the diffuse Pcloponnesian alliance structure; the alliance was incapableof acting as a single entity and thus, divided in their councils, thePeloponnesiansfritter away their opportunities (1.141.6). Pericles assures theAthenians that theyneed not be concerned for their security in the face ofPeloponnesian invasions ofAttica: the invaders will not be able to construct fortifications capableof threatening Athens' own fortified city-harbor complex (1.142.2-3).The bulk of the speech expands on these central themes. Pericles argues that,having begun the warwith inadequate reserves, thePeloponnesians will not easilybe able to acquire capital surplus norwill they easily develop a credible sea power.He explains that the Athenians will be completelysecure as long as they preserveintact their citizen manpower and the empire that is protected by the deploymentof that manpowerthroughthe instrumentalities ofAthenian treasure andsea power.This entailed withdrawing Athens' population from rural Attica (Athens' hometerritory) behindAthens' impregnable wallsand refusingto meet thePeloponnesianinvaders in open battle since a major land battle in Attica would put Athenianmanpower resources at risk (esp. 1.143.5).In the ensuing narrative, the reader learns that despite the psychological and ma-terial suffering that this austere policy inflicted on those citizens (a majority ofthetotal) with holdings outside the city walls, theAthenians went along with Pericles'recommendations. They refused the Spartan ultimatum and declined to meet thePeloponnesians inbattle when thelatter invadedAttica inthe summer of 431.23 Theinvaders left after a couple of weeks, having accomplished nothing of substanct jotherthan demonstrating theirincompetence at siegecraft by a failure to capture the'.fortified town of Oinoe.24 After the first, ineffectual, Peloponnesian invasion, the,warseemed to be going accordingto Pericles' strategic planand Pericleswaschosen;by his fellow citizens to deliver the traditional oration over t he wa rdead. .

THUCYDIDES. THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 283

The Funeral Oration (1.34--46), in which Pericles praises the polis of Athensand the unequaled dunamis thatAthenian activity abroad had broughtabout, originallyappears to be a monument to his vision ofAthensat this optimistic high pointofsuccessful, strong Realist policymaking.25 But on closer inspection, when readin the contextof the rest of the history, theFuneral Oration also reveals the fragilesocial and political bases ofAthens' standing as a unitarystate-actor. The contrastbetween logos and ergon is reiterated throughout theoration.26 Two passages, whichconcern the substantiality ofAthenian dzmamis, are particularly noteworthy.

Furthermore, thepower (dunamis) of thepolisitself, [a power] established bythose [Athens'] veryqualities, demonstrates (semainei) that this [Pericles' statement regarding Athenian excellence] is the truth (aletheia)--and not a productofwords (logoi) produced forthe present occasion rather than [a product] of fact(erga). (2.41.2)

Here, Athenian dunamis is presented as a fact, an ergon that is capable of demonstrating the truth of words, logoi, that might otherwise be suspectgiven their location ina public speech of praise. By appealing to Athenian dllnamis as an exteriorreality, Pericles calls the rest of his speech into question: he tacitly admits thatsince his speech was (by definition) merely a construct of words, and was prepared for an honorificoccasion, itmightnot be true. But, heclaims, the self-evidentpower of the city, a "fact"rather than a product of words, will establish the truth ofAthens' greatness. A similar sentiment; reprising the terminology of power, proof,truth, word, and deed, is expressed a few lines later:

Ourpower (dunamis) is not without thewitness ofgreat proofs(mega/on sell/cion)and we will be the source o( wonder for those yet to come, as we are for ourcontemporaries. Furthermore, we have no need of a Homer to singour praises, orof any suchlike whose fine verses please only for the moment, since the truth(aletheia) will show that in comparison with the facts (erga) [the verbal depiction] i s a n underestimate. (2.41.4)

Again, the contrast is between the potentially misleading verbal praise and thetrustworthy evidence of facts. It is through the witness of great proofs, megalasemeia, that future generations will be amazed at Athens. What are these proofsthat will survive the current generation to convince "thoseyet to come"? In lightofthe rejection of Homer, the proofs' in question can hardly be in the form ofwords; we must imagineseeminglypermanent, material monuments of some sort.The audience is, I would suggest, being put in mind not only of victory monuments established in enemy lands (implied at 2.41.4) but also of the city's newpublic buildings, and perhaps especially of the great fortification walls of the city.The public cemeteryin which theFuneral Orationwas deliveredstood just outsidethe citywalls and themighty walls themselves would have provided the speaker'sbackdrop.

We modem readers know that Pericles was right to suggest that future genera-


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284 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARtions will be amazed at the great fifth-century architectural monuments to Athenian power. But does our amazement reflect an accurate assessment of Athens'actual power? Not if we a re to j u dg e b y Thucydides' earlier comment, in the Ar-chaeology (1.10.1-2). There he specifically states that to criticize Homer's lagason the Trojan War on the bas is qf the proof (semeian) of the small size of theexisting town ofMycenae (the imperfect, proto-Athens oftheArchaeology), wouldbe improper method. In this same passage Thucydides points out tha t if futuregenerations were to j ud ge b y the physical magnificence of the c ity a lone , thedunamis of Athens would appear twice as great as i t was in fact . Read in light ofthisearlier,"archaeological"passage,Pericles' rejectionofAthens' need for a Homerbecause the great proofs, the megala semeia, will impress future generations withthe truth about Athenian dunamis, seems an empty boast.In a key passage of the Funeral OrationPericles describes the structure ofAth-ens' internal government:

and it [ourpaliteia] is called by the name (anama) demakratia because government (ta aikein) is not oriented towardthe few (es aligaus)but towardthemajority (es pleionas). However, in regard to access to the law for resolvingdisputesall are equal. Yet again in regard to acknowledged worth, it is a matter of individual reputation; the nature of a man's public contribution is not decided inadvance on the basis of class (auk apa meraus), butrather on thebasis of excellence. And if someone is worthy and can do somethingworthwhile forthe polis,he is not excluded by poverty, nor because of his obscurity [ofbirth]. (2.37.1)In the first clause of this passagewe learn that demakratia isthe name used for the"the paliteia [internal regime] of Athens" because government (ta oikein) is oriented toward the majority (es pleionas) rather than toward the few (es oligous).This is a somewhat ambiguous statement, when viewed from the perspective ofpower and self-interest. Periclesdoes not go so far as to saythat demokratia is therule of the many in their own self-interest over and against the interests of the few,butneither does he suggest that it istheunified policy apparatus of a rational stateactor. Pericles hints that Athens is divided into two interest groups: the few and themany, and the paliteia is cal led a democracy because i t t il ts toward one grouprather than the other.27Thenexttwo clauses of the passage,which shouldexplainand clarify thepoliteia,are spectacularly antithetical. The clause "but in regard to access to the law for resolving disputes all are equal," does not explain the term demokratia, but contraststo it (alloma mell .. . metesti de). Thus, the equality in regard to the law is grammatically opposed to the government favorable to the majority, and therefore tenns for"many" cannot stand for"all citizens"(as theydid in democratic ideology,see 6.39.1).Thethird clause, "but in regard to acknowledged worth, it is a matter of individualreputation,"contrasts the individualcitizento thegrouping of the citizenry into " f e w ~and"majority" in the first clause, aswell as contrasting the citizen'sindividualworthto the generalized equality of "al1" in the second clause. What happens if there is a

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 285conflict between the perceived interests of the groups, or between the equality of alland themeritof individuals? Can a politicalbalance based on such a complexset ofcontrasts hold up under the stressful circumstances of a long, hard war'?Oneother key passage in theFuneral Oration deals explicitly with thefunction

ing of the Athenian polity:and we [Athenians] ourselves can [collectively] judge rightly regarding affairs,even if [each of us] does not [individually] originate the arguments; we do notconsider words (lagai) to be an impediment to actions (erga), but rather [regardit as] essential to be previously instructed (pradidachthenai) by speech (lag6i)before embarking on necessary actions (erg6i). We are peculiar also in that wehold that we are simultaneously persons who are daring and who debate whatthey will puttheir hands to.Amongother men ignorance (amathia) leads to rashness, while reasoned debate (lagismas) justbogs them down. (2.40.2-3)

This passage helpsto clarify thecontrast between group-interest oriented government and individual merit, alluded to in the earlierpassage. The Athenians recognize that noteveryoneis equally capable of comingup with plans (this will be thejob of the individual political leader), butthe many can and do participate in making the d ec i si o n ( a s a s se m bl y me n ). T h is d i vi s io n of labor is presented asnonproblematic, as is the way Atheniansmove from speechto action. Here, however, Pericles must appeal toAthenian uniqueness. "Othermen" either act hastilyout of ignorance or find that debate renders them incapable of efficient action.What, thereadermay ask, renders theAthenians differentfrom other people?Whatis the secret of the ir abi li ty to avoid the common problems involved in movingfrom deliberation about policy to its implementation? The requirement that theAthenians be substantively different from other people in this important regardseemingly threatens the value of the general theory of power established in theArchaeology, which was predicated on a generally applicable understanding ofhuman (or Greek) nature. The Archaeology had, we remember, demonstrated theneed for a state to transcend internal conflict arising from social differentiation ifit were to achieve (and maintain) the s ta tus of unitary state-actor. The FuneralOration underlines thecomplexity and diversity of thegovernment and thesociety!bat constituted the Athenian state-actor. Is this complex form o f g o v e m m e n t -which necessarily drawsmembers of diverse social groups,with their diverse interests and talents, into the process of policy formation--


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286 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARPericles begins the speech by asserting that he had accurately predicated the

downturn in theAthenianmood--the readeris ledto suppose that very pronouncedshifts in the national climate of opinionwere factored into Pericles' planning andthus that mood swings within the electorate could be accommodated by Pericles'political calculus. He boldly reasserts the priority of the unified public interestsofthe state over the diverse private interests of each individual Athenian (2.60.2-4).In the Funeral Oration we became aware of the tension between public and private, between the self-identity of the Athenian as a citizen and as a private personor a member of a social subgroup. Now Pericles bluntly underlines the essentialprecondition of the Realist's focus on the unitary state-as-actor: the individual'sidentificationwith the state musttake priority over all otherloyalties or allegiances.Pericles then claimsthathe will let his audience in on a secret that layat the heartnf Athenian policy: the special character of Athenian sea power. He describes seapower in quasi-mystical terms as the control of one of two earthly spheres and asa power completely unlike anything produced on land: as it stands, because oftheir command of the seas, there is no power onearth, noteventheking ofPersia,who can stop the Athenians from goingwhere they might choose (2.62.2-3; con-trast Archaeology 1.16: lonians stymied by Persia).This passage inPericles' secondAssembly speech stands as a particularly evoca-tive attempt to define the mysterious essenceofAthenian dunamis: sea power is alatent strength: theshipscan liemotionless intheir sheds until needed. SotoowereAthenian reserve.capital andmanpowerlatent sources of strength: Capital lay dormant, most strikingly in the form of the cult statue of Athena Polias, with its removable goldendrapery. Athenianmen remainedpassive behindtheir walls whilethe enemy invaded Attica. But at the moment a need arose, capital could be conjoined withmen and ships to produce extraordinary levels of deployed power andvirtually limitless freedom of action. The Athenians could go where they wished,do as they liked becauseAthens' latent strength could be almost instantaneouslymaterialized as the mobilized fleet cutting through the waves of the Aegean toeffect Athens' will upon any object identified by the policymaker. Pericles describes this as a secret, because when regarded from the set of traditional assumptions about the sort of power produced and delivered by land armies, sea powerwas nearly incomprehensible. The rapidity and precision withwhich power couldbe deployed by the state commanding superior naval forces collapsed conventional assumptions about the relationship between power, time, and space-jUSlas, in the United States of the 1950s, new technology (notably atomic weaponsand jet power) conjoinedwiththe dynamism of postwar capitalism to encourage asense oflimitless opportunities.28 Athenian,sea power narrowed to the disappearing pointthe gap between desire and fact, between the wish of the state-actor thatsomething should occurand the accomplislunent of that wishin thematerialworld.In 430 B.C. the sum ofAthens' accomplished wishes was theAthenian empire.

Much of the rest of the speech focuses on the nature of the arkhe itself, which .'Pericles reminds his listeners is "noWlike a tyranny" (2.63.2). Pericles is at pains to

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOSjTHUCYDIDES HISTOR 287explain to the Athenians that the possession of the empire entailed grave securityrisks-but only if they were foolish enough to suppose that their freedom of actionwas a freedom from imperial responsibilities. The entirely unrealistic andpseudo-altruistic policy advocated by certain apathetic and useless Athenians whowanted to give up the empire would, according to Pericles, put Athens in gravedanger (2.63). Pericles does not need to spell out the equation in detail; its outlinesare clear enoughfromwhat had g o n ~ b e f o r e : without the empire Athens would losethe revenues that had provided for the fortified security of the city and that maintained thenavy. This was especially problematic in light of the anticipated reactionof Athens' subjects to a condition in which Athens had stripped itselfof imperialpossessions. The weight ofAthenian tributeand the rigorofAthenian punishmentofrecalcitrantsubjects had eventually broughthome thereal meaningof lost autonomyto the states of the empire. Tribute and punishment had mnde their original, selfserving decision to pay Athens to maintain Aegean security appear shortsighted.Resentment at their own past folly le9 to hatredofAthens (2.63.1,2.64.5), and thismeant that other state-actors would take the Athenian attempt to drop imperial responsibilities as an opportunity to seek revenge against the one-time hegemon. Deprived of the resources by which the conjoinedmaterial and conceptual triads weresupported,Athens would become weak in fact andwouldsufferthe consequencesofthe rationally self-serving policies that had created and that maintained her currentstrength. The realistic policy that led Athens to a position of hegemonic authoritycarried with it burdens that could not lightly be shed. As twentieth-century leadershave often reminded their own citizens, a great power cannot, in its own interest,afford to shirk itsduties in the international arena.Pericles and Athens in ContextThucydides' reader is presented'with Pericles' twoAssembly speeches, with theircomplementary (material and conceptual) analyses ofAthenian power, in the context of other public speakers' attempts to define the natureof powerand the structural relations betweenstates. Someofthese speeches, delivered byAthens'enemies,make light of Athenian power, whereas others seem to share the Realist assumptions adumbrated by theArchaeology and elucidated by Pericles. The Corcyreanenvoys in book 1 (1.32-36), addressing theAthenian Assembly, take a strongRealist line inexplaining their state's policy, pastand present, andthey closely mirrorPericles' and theArchaeology's focus on the essential distinction between sea andland power. By contrast, the Corinthians, in their address to the Athenians opposing the Corcyrean proposal for an Athenian alliance (1.37-43), concentrate oninternational justice. That is to say, they are unrealistic in supposing that there is(or could be) somegeneral constraint among nations capable of ensuring the nonviolent resolution of conflicts. The Corinthians fail to persuade theAthenian audience and the alliance is struck. This was, we are told (1.22.5, 1.55.2), among thekey incidents that sparked the war.29


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288 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARCorinthian speech makers return to the fray when they attempt, this time suc

cessfully, to persuade the Spartans to lead a war effort against Athens (1.68-71).They point to a key"triadic" material factor, alludingto Sparta's error in allowingthe Athenians to refortify their city after the Persian Wars and to build the longwailS connecting the city with the harbor complex at Piraeus (1.69.1). But at theheart of the Corinthianargument is it claim thatthe Athenians areby nature fundamentally unlike the Spartans. The former are ambitious, restless, eager to takerisks, and endlessly active; the latter are overcautious, slow to act, and tend toignore danger evenwhen it is nearby. The Corinthian accountofAthenian activitymeshes well with Pericles' evocation of Athenian exceptionalism in the FuneralOration and with his emphasis on the unique quality of sea power in the secondAssembly speech. But the Corinthians seem to miss the point by attributing theAthenians' hyperactivity solely to their national character, rather than to their ra-tional pursuit of a Realist policy over time.3o This approach casts the war into themoralistic terms of a conflict between national characters, and blurs the focus onstate-actors and their respective sources of power. The strong Realist will simplyscoff at the Corinthians' "error"-but what if Corinthians and other Greeks actu-al1y acted upon their moral convictions?The Corinthian position is quickly challenged by the Athenian envoys whohappened to be in Sparta on other business andwereallowed(in Thucydides' text,anyway) to respond to the Corinthians' charges ( 1 . 7 ~ 7 8 ) . Thucydides states thatthe Athenian envoys were concerned to explain to the assembled Peloponnesiansthe extent of Athenian dunamis (1.72.1) in hopes of preventing a hasty decisionfor war. The speech itselfis a model of strong Realist analysis. The envoys claimthat when states aggrandize themselves and seek arkhe they are simply actingaccording to human nature. Nor is the Athenian empire anything new or surprising: it is simply a manifestation of the well-known principle that the weak mustsubmitto the strong--that is, the general principle established in theArchaeology.I f Athens is occasionally high-handed in its dealings with its allies, this is to beexpected; whatpeopleforget isthatAthens ismore scrupulous in itsrelations withimperial subjects than it needs to be (in light of the power inequity) and indeedmore scrupulous than are other imperial powers toward those they control.The language of human nature and the inevitability of the rule of the strongover theweak dramatically foreshadows the languageused by anotherset ofAthenian envoysmuchlater inThucydides' history: the anonymous speakers whocarryon a policy dialogue with the hapless rulers of the i s l ~ n d - p o l i s ofMelos inthe endof book 5. The Mel ian Dia logue can be read as a reductio ad absurdum of theRealist position developed in book 1: according to the rules of debate establishedby the Athenians at Melos, no considerations of justice were allowed voice; allargumentswere to be grounded in state interest alone. Moreover, theMe1ians wereinstructed to explain how their proposed line of action would serve Athens' bestinterests. The Melian Dialogue is indeeda confrontation between a (Melian) viewof appropriate behavior based on traditional Greek morality and the (Athenian)

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR. 289

sophistic view that justice is nothing more than submission to necessities established by strength (see the essay of G. Crane in this volume). But itmay also beread as a confrontation between theory and history. In light of the argument of theArchaeology (the argument assumed by theAthenian speakers), the Melians appear perverse because they fail to act like those self-interested weak communitieswho submitted to strong Minos. And yet, Thucydides' reader now must considernot only the logic of the Archaeology, but the historical example of Athens' ownimperial subjects. Pericles has let on that these no longer regard their originaldecision to acceptAthens as a hegemon as rationally self-interested; as we shallsee (below), some are willing to take considerable risks to free themselves fromthe relationship that theAthenians sought to imposeupon the Melians. This helpsexplain why the Athenians must set such narrow rules on the debate: the weakerstate's self-interest is no longer transparently compatible with that of the imperialpower. The Melians cannot come up with a Realist reply to the Athenians, but thelevel of Melian physical resistance to annexation (quite considerable as it hlmsout: 5.114-116) isthe limiting factorto theAthenians' ability to freelyextend theirown power. Melian resistance to Athens in word and deed points directly to thedifficulties Athens can expect to experience when it comes to attempting to annexthe much larger and more distant island of Sicily (books 6-7).

To returnto thedebate at Sparta: the Peloponnesians reject the realisticpoliciesadvocatedby theAthenianenvoys at Sparta and vote for war. A somewhat different Realist argument is subsequentlymade by King Archidamus in addressing theSpartan citizen Assembly (1.80-85). Like Pericles, Archidamus focuses on thedifficulties the Spartans will encounter in conducting the war due to their lack ofmaterial resources. Rejecting realisticArchidamus, the Spartans embrace a decisionto confront Athens head on. The Peloponnesian and Spartan decisions seemsto be precipi ta ted on the one hand by the Corinthian reading of Atheniananti-Peloponnesian activity as an outgrowth of their innate natural character, andon the other by the Spartan ephor Sthenelaides' laconic speech to the effect thatthe Athenians must be punished as international wrongdoers (1.86). Much moremay be going on behind the scenes, of course---we might choose to put less emphasison Corinthian rhetoricabout national characterand considerably moreweighton the thinlydisguisedCorinthian threatto secedefrom thePeloponnesianLeagueandjoinAthens (1.71.4). In this case we could make the Spartan decision for hotwar an outcome of a realistic assessment that their alliance (and thus the basis oftheir military superiority) could not survive an extended cold war.31

On the whole, however, it seems to me that in 1.1-2.64 Thucydides leads hisreaderto draw a sharp contrast betweenAthens, a consummately powerful unitarystate-actor guided by the clear realistic vision and power-centered foreign policyofPericles, and the ill-prepared Peloponnesian confederation, which lacked boththe material prerequisites of true power and the stable leadership capable of identifying those resources in the first place. According to the premises established byThucydides Theoretikos, Athens was set to win the war. But then comes section


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290 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR2.65: a laudatory summary of Periclean policy, the announcement that Athens infact had lost thewar, andthe statement ofThucydides' opinion that Athens lost thewar because Pericles' inferior successors did not stick to his policy with regard to:-ea power and empire, and that they gave away Athenian chances by looking totheir private good rather than to the commongood of the state. Section 2.65 is, inthe reading I offer here, the watershed, the point at which thetheses developedbyTheoretikos are summed up and the long period of Athenian decline from thePericlean acme traced by Histor is first anticipated.Atthe beginning 01'2.65, having explainedthat Pericles' secondAssembly speechwas meant to stauneh the Athenians' anger at Pericles and to tum their thoughtsaway from their present miseries, Thucydides makes a particularly telling comment. With respect to state policy (demosiai), the Athenians accepted Pericles'words: they did not send a peace embassy to Sparta and they began to prosecutethe war with renewed vigor. But with respect to their interests as private individuals (idiai) they still felt aggrieved (2.65.1). Taken as individuals, "they" arc furtherbroken out by Thucydides into classes: the ordinary people, the demos, were angry since they had lost what little they had; the powerful elite (dunatoi) had losttheir l:mded estates in the country. Thus the potentially dangerous internal divisions signaled in the Funeral Oration have come back to haunt us. Yet as long asPericles lived, this tendency of the Athenians to fragment into private interestoriented classes was restrained or at least masked. This is underlined by the resumed narrative: Pericles was reelected general because the Athenians knew hewas the best man in the polis for dealing with state interests (2.65.2-4). In thisgeneral Athenian opinion our author heartilyconcurs: Under Pericles and duringthe peace, he says, Athens had been wisely led and th e polis reached its peak.Moreover, "when the war broke out, in this circumstance too, he seemed an accurate prognosticator in respect to power" (prognous ten dunamin: 2.65.2). Periclesdid not livelongafter his second speech: he died two and a halfyears into the war.Yet after his death, we are told, his forethought (pronoia) in respect to the warbecame clearer than ever, since he had told theAthenians that they would prevailin the war if they avoided risking their sea power, attempting to expand their empire, or otherwise endangering the polis (2.65.6-7). And there it is: the confidentstatementthat assumptions aboutAthenianpower establishedby Theoretikos wouldhave accurately predicted the course of the war if only realistic Periclean leader-ship had beenmaintained.But. continues Histor, post-Periclean leadership was not up to Pericles' stan-dard. The key differenee, we are immediately told (2.65.7), is that Pericles' successors failed to pay attention to the interests of thestate, andthey made policy onthe basis of what they supposed would conduce to their private (idiai) advantage.As a result, their successes brought advantage only to themselves, while their failures weakened the ability of the state as a whole to conduct the war. And nowcomes Thucydides' dramatic revelation of the"true" nature ofAthenian domesticpolitics under Pericles: By contrast to his successors, he was a leader, not a mere

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 29/

follower of the will of the demos. Indeed, under Pericles the polis was "in logos ademocracy, in ergon therule (arkhe) of the foremost man" (2.65.8-9). His successors, more or Jess equal to one another buteach eagerto become first man, soughtto please the demos-that is to say, per what has gone before, they looked onlytoward the selfish interests of one sodal class within the polis--in so doing theygave up control of the affairs of state (ta pragmata). And so (as we, students ofTheoretikos, would expect) given these circumstances and given a "great poliswith an empire to govern," serious mistakes were made(2.65.10-11). Thucydidestakes as his case in point the policy errors made by the Athenians in respect to theSicilian expedition and its aftermath.He then concludes section 2.65 with a returnto the theme of Pericles' exeellence: Evenafter the disaster in Sicily the Atheniansheld out for another eight years against a staggering array of enemies, includingthe son of the king of Persia (note the echo of Pericles' second Assembly speech)who provided the necessary capital for a Peloponnesian fleet (2.65.11-12). Thus,in the end it was the Athenians who destroyed themselves by their "private quarrels" (idiai diaphorai). "So overwhelmingly great," concludesTheoretikos, "werethe resources which Pericleshad inmind at the time when he prophesied an easyvictory for the polis over the Peloponnesians" (2.65.13).Atthe watershed passage01'2.65,TheoretikosandHistorseem to be well matched

yokemates: Theoretikos' confident prediction of victory on the basis of Pericles'Realist approachmeshes well withHistor'sexplanationofdivisive selfishnessamongthe post-Periclean leaders as the explanation of what went wrong and whyAthenseventually lost. But I do not think that Thucydides' text would have its enduringappeal if this rather simplistie explanation for Athenian failure really undergirdedthe subsequent historical narrative. Nor does 2.65 actually anticipate the rest ofThucydides' narrative as well as it might. It has beenpointed out bymore than onecommentator thatThucydides' description at 2.65 ofwhatwent wrong in Sicily(i.e.,a failure by the Athenians back home to adequately reinforce their expeditionaryforces rather than a misestimation of the nature of theoppositiontheywould face inSicily [2.65.11-12]) is notborne outby thenarrative of books 6 and 7. 32 At 2.65, wemight say, Historconcedes toomuch ground to Theoretikos.Moreover, upon reflection, theunstinting praiseof Pericles at 2.65 seems some

what misplaced. The Funeral Oration shows that Pericles understood the complexity of the Athenian social and governmental situation. One might thereforesuggest that, fora manrepeatedly lauded forhis insightand his forethought, Pericleswas remarkably blind to the conjoined factors of the structure of internalAthenianpolitics and his own mortality. If "a Pericles" was the indispensable preconditionfor rational policymaking because Athens was a crypto-monarchy, why did itsleader make noprovision for hisown successor?The readerbegins to suspect thateither (1) Pericles was inadequately insightful about the importance of his ownrole, or(2) he was selfishly uninterested inAthens' fate after his death, or (3) thedescription of Athens as a crypto-monarchy is overdrawn.Happily forThucydides' reputation, the value of hiswork is notactuallysununed


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92 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARp by section 2.65. Rather than simply aberrant selfishness on the part of a few

bad leaders, the long narrative following 2.65 suggests that there were deep structural problems associatedwith decision-making (and thuspolicy formation) in theAthenian demokratia. Pericles' unique leadership qualities may havesuccessfullymasked those structural problems for a time. Bu t a Realist analysis that requiresPericlean-style leadership as a dependable norm, as a predictable constant of thepolicy environment, will be worse than useless in the real world in whichPericlesis mortal and unable to designate a successor. Rather than simply playingout theresults of an unexpected selfishness on the partof a few bad men, Ristor's narrativedemonstrates the weakness of any theory of power that focuses uniquely on unitarystate-actors and ignores internal social forces, the complexities of domestic politics,and "irrational" attachment to a transnational set of norms and values.33A full exposition of how the narrative following 2.65 complicates the strongRealist'svision ofAthens as a unitary state-actor, behaving rationally to further itshegemonic interests in a world of similarly motivated state-actors, would muchexceed the limits of this chapter. Here I offer justQne example of how the Realistcalculus established by Theoretikos becomes inextricably tangled in Ristor's unfolding analysis ofAthenian internal politics and in issues of social diversity, norms.and values.Mytilenean DebateInthe fourth year of the war (428 B.C.) the greatpolis ofMytilene on the islandofLesbos declared itself independent ofAthenian control, thus confirmingPericles'comment about the attitudes of subject states and fulfilling a prediction about re-volts within Athens' empire made by the Corinthian envoys to Athens in the debatc ovcr Corcyra.34 Thucydidespoints out that the revolt ofMytilene occurred IIa difficult time for Athens: the citywas sutTering from plague and "from the war.which had only just now reached its full strength" (3.3.1). Beset by these pro!>- "lems, mostAthenians were reluctant to acknowledge thetruth of the report (3.3.l).iBut eventually the danger of the situation intruded on the Athenian consciousllCS5 :and a fleet was sent to besiege Mytilene. The Mytileneans were soon shut up be- jhind their city walls. Rard-pressed bya n efficient Athenian siege and betrayed illtheir hopes of reinforcements from Sparta, they ran low on food. The aristocraticleaders of the revolt consequentlyarmed theMytileneanlower classes in anticipation of a battle. Yetonce armed, the demos ofMytilene failed to support them--:,rection. Faced by insurrection and the specter of civil war, the leaders of Myti1c*: !hurriedly surrendered (3.28). The crisis over, the Athenian Assembly set abo_a::deciding who had been responsible for the revolt andwho should be punished.

The material factors detailed by Theoretikos played key roles in the AthesUII'}suppression of the revolt: Athenian capital reserves and sea power proved fuIJ .capable of overwhelming or scaring of f a ll opposit ion, whether it was a.,Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean or the army of the revoltingMytileneans.BIll.

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDEs HISTOR 293irrational emotions, confusedAthenian perceptions regarding the wellsprings oftheir own power, and stark domesticsocial divisions were made manifest in theensuing debate over the fate of Mytilene.

Thucydides' account convinces his ~ e a d e r that, althoughAthenian dunamis hadstoodthe test, suppressing therevoltofMytileneconsumed considerableAtheniantime, effort, and cash. The revolt coincided with a Spartan naval expedition toIonia (3.29-33). Although the Spartan admiral with his small fleet accomplishedli ttle in mil itary terms, he threw a bad scare into the Athenians and he bruta llymurdered a number of captives (3.32.1). Themood of theAssembly was notcharitable: In a f it of anger theAthenians voted to treat the population ofMytilene as asingle, unitary entity (i.e. , to treat Mytilene judicially as a state-actor). They ordered their general on Lesbosto kill all adult male Mytileneans and to sell the restofthe polis' population into slavery (3.36.1-3).A triremewas dispatched toLesboscarrying the grim instructions. But very quickly, while the ship was still en route,Athenian anger was replaced by a sense of remorse and "it became clear" that"most of the citizens"wanted a chance to reconsider their action (3.36.5).A second Assembly was hastily called and we are told that several speeches

were given on either side of the issue. Thucydides presents two orations that, hesays, represent the most starklyopposed positions (3.49.1). The first of the pair isspoken by Cleon, son ofK1eainetos, the citizen who had been "victorious"(3.36.6)in advocating the general punishmentat the first Assembly. Thucydides describesCleon as "themost violent of the citizens [o fAthens] and by far the best trusted bythe demos" (3.36.6). Cleon's speech, which opposes any amelioration of the sentence against theMytileneans, is attacked (3.41) by a certain Diodotus, the son ofEukrates, about whom we are told nothing other than tha t he had al so spokenagainst Cleon at the previous meeting. The two speeches are a matched pair andshare several themes; both offer a substantial "meta-rhetoric" (i.e.. a rhetoricaldiscussion of the nature of publiedcliberation), and both purport to explain theproper foundations of state policy. Together they offerThucydides' readerher firstdetailed insight into the environment and the tenor of post-Periclean democraticpolitics and policymaking. Although, in l ine with the ana lysi s of 2.65, theself-interest of Athenian politicians is a key factor, the Mytilenean Debate as awhole suggests that self-interested behavior of politicians was only one factor in amuch more complicated social and p o l i ~ i c a l situation. ,Cleon begins his speech with an implicitrejection of one of Pericles' points in

the Funeral Oration: he had often noticed tha t a demokratia is incapable of running an empire (3.37.1). Why is this? Because the Athenians fail to see that theirempire really is a tyranny (not just "like a tyranny," per Pericles), and because oftheir indecisiveness (3.37.2). The root of the problem is overclever public speechmakers. Athens has no need for these men; indeed,

ignorance (all/a/Ilia) mixed with moderate sobriety is more beneficial [to thepolis] than cleverness mixed with insubordination. Ordinary men, when com ..pared with the more gifted, actually administer poleis better. For the latter [the


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294 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARgifted] wish to appear wiser than the laws and to excel at speaking about thepublic weal, since they are unable to express a clear opinion in regard to moreimportant things. And thus they often ruin poleis. Butthe former [ordinarymen],not trusting ovennuch in their own sharp wits, are content to remain less leamedthan the laws, and are unable to pick apart a speech by a good speaker. These aremen who can judge impartially rather than [actinglike] rival athletes, and so thingsgo well. It would be best for us [politicians] to do likewiseand avoid being so sweptaway by c1evemess and keenness for the competition that we contradict our owntrue opinions when we advise you, themasses (to plethos). (3.37.3-4)

Thus, if there must be politicians, Cleon suggests that they should act and speakmorc like ordinary Athenians. Butas it is, he g o e ~ on to say, instead of politiciansacting like ordinary citizens, the ordinary folk all wish that they could be cleverspeakers themselves. Lacking actualoratorical attainments, they fancy themselvesconnoisseurs of oratory (3.37.6-7). As a result, debate causes delay, which is tothe advantage of wrongdoers. Instead of wasting their time listening to speechesand thcn cndlessly changing thcir minds abollt policy, the Athenians would dobetter to act (that is, vote on policy issues) in the heat of righteous anger and thenstick by those decisions (3.38.1).Cleon implies that there can be no good reason for opposing his own policy ofgeneral punishment, of treating Mytilene judicially as a unitary state-actor ratherthan as a diverse society. He sets up a narrow and exclusionary framework toexplain the motives of those Athenianswho spoke against his proposal: either theyhoped to make a public aisplay of their rhetorical powers or they had been bribedto support an inherently bad policy. In either case, Cleon reminds his audience, inthese sorts of contests (agones) it is the speakers who reap the prizes (i.e.; adulat ion or bribe money) while it is the polis tha t isexposed to dangers (3.38.2-3, cf.3.40.3).

But you [citizens] yourselves are the cause of this evil for having set up thesecontests (agones); you have become accustomed to being spectators of orations(logoi) while gaining your knowledge of facts (erga) from what you hear. Youdecide what is possibleregardingwhat has to be done in the future by looking tothose who speak well. Even regarding events of the past, you don't rate the evi-dence ofwhat you actually saw above what you hU"e heard in some over-cleverbit of verbiage. (3.38.3-4)

This statement,with its emphasis on the priority of experience and erga, has clearand obvious affinities toTheoretikos' Realistapproach. Cleonclaims thathismis-sion is to leadtheAthenians away from their foolish habits of speech-spectatorship(3.39.1). Butwhat does he offer instead? Hardly a dispassionate grasp ofmaterialrealia. Rather Cleon urges theAthenians to recallvividlytheir emotionsat the timethe revolt first broke out, and advises them to act according to that mimeticallyrestored emotional state (3.40.7). Like Thucydides of 2.65, Cleon finds much tocriticize in democratic Athens and he uses some of the same terminology, but in

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR. 295the end Cleon urges his listeners to take the easy path of relying on their visceralemotions when making decisions. Thucydides' reader, struggling with the complex text, is not offered such an easy road to rightjudgment.Cleon'smeta-rhetoric resultsin his claim that political speech is an impediment

to action and that strong-felt emotion is a more appropriate wellspring of policythan public debate. Diodotus, on the otherhand, stoutly defends reiterated publicdiscussion of especially important affairs. Indeed, he says, anger and overquicknessare the two greatest impediments to good policy (euboulia: 3.42.1).

Bur if someone argues that speeches (logo i) are not teachers in regard to affairs(pragmata) either he is a fool or he is 011 the lookout for some private (idiai)advantage. He is a fool ifhe supposes that it is possible to consider the uncertainfuture by some other means; he is seeking his own advantage if he hopes topropose some shameful thing, and is unable to speak well or convincingly regarding it, yet by slandering well is able to strike fear into both the opposingspeakers and the listeners. (3.42.2)

Here,Diodotus reveals the obvious flaw inCleon's anti-publicspeech meta-rhetoric:Cleon's a ttack on clever speech is embedded in a c lever speech, and so demonstrates the impossibility of communicating meaning except through the mediumofwords. Like Cleon, Diodotus attributes to his opponents an illegitimate privateinterest in personal gain and he claims that those private interests will endangerthe state. But having suggested tha t Cleon is e ither a fool or is out for personaladvantage, Diodotus then attacks the rhetorical practice of claiming that one'senemies place personal gain over the public good (3.42.3-6). It would be muchbetter, Diodotus goes on to say, if the Athenians would abandon their habit ofdishonoring thosewho lose public debates. If they quit punishing losers of oratorical contests, thenorators would speak their minds honestly, rather than advocatingpolicies they did not believe in with an eye toward gaining the praise of the many(tople/hos). But, he continues, as it is, we do just theopposite, and becausespeakers haveto work under constantsuspicion of beingbribe-takers, thepolis loses thebenefit of good advice. Evil andgoodwilledspeakers alikeareforced to lie and thepolis is the only entityfor whose good it is impossible for a citizen towork openly(3.43.1-3).Although the appeal to the public good ini tial ly recal ls Per ic les, Diodotus'

meta-rhetoric is almost as muddled as Cleon's: he accuses Cleon of self-interest,and in thenext breath points out how destructive therhetorical practice of makingsuch accusations is to the political practiceof decision-making. Indeed, he claimsthat s landerous rhe tor ic is spec if ical ly destruct ive in tha t all speakers, even

; goodwilled men (like himself) are made into liars. In sumDiodotus willfully embraces the well-known "Cretan Liar" paradox: SinceDiodotus isan orator and allorators areliars, the truths he claims to teactithrough speech are thoroughly compromised and his defense of the value of public discussion becomes paradoxical:What public good can result from reiterated debates among liars? Moreover, his


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296 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARcomment on the impossibility of doing good openly for the polis explicitly contradicts Pericles' Funeral Oration encomium ofAthenian public-spiritedness. If publicspeakers are liars and unable to dogood for thestate inany overt way, howarewe totake his next statement (meant to refute Cleon's claim that ordinary, ignorant citiI.cns arc good administrators)? It is nccessary, he says, that we speakers look a littlebit further ahead than the rest of you citizenswhojust glancethings over ina superficial manner (3.43.4). What techniques will the speaker use to gauge the likelycourse of future events? How will the results of this forethought be translated intogood state policy in a democracy, given the necessity of public mendacity? Whyshould listeners believe that an acknowledged liar is sincere when he claims to seekthe public good rather than private advantage? Diodotus does not say, but then,given his argument about the impossibility of doing good openly, he simplycan't.The reader of these convoluted meta-rhetorical arguments may opine that nei

ther Cleon's claims for policymaking by ordinary men nor Diodotus' claims forleadership of the democracy by foresightful public speakers is particularly convincing. Our senseof unease is not assuagedby their respectivearguments regarding the proper basis for policy. Both speakers appear at first to be Realists: theyagree that themain determinant inthe Assembly'sdecision must beAthens' imperial interests and each claims that his policies will best serve Athenian interests.Eachorator acknowledges the fact thatAthens' imperial incomederives from prosperous cities, a very salient point given the importance of capital in the "materialtriad." Cleon comes up with a tortuous argument for linking the utter destructionur Mytikne with imperial prosperity (3.39.7-8) but the economic point clearlyfavors the case for leniency: dead men don't pay tribute. Yet Diodotus mentionsthe negative economic consequences of Cleon's policy only in passing (3.46.3).Rather than work through the benefit/loss equation with specific reference toMytilcne, both Cleon and Diodotus emphasize that the issue at hand has more todo with the future than the present and with the empire in general rather than thepolis ofMytilene in particular (3.40.7,3.44.3,3.48.2). They are theorists of powerbeforebeingpolicymakers. Theyagreethat thetreatment ofMytilene will bea testcase for what happens to insurgents, and thus the issue is not the material andparticular results of exterminatinga greatand prosperous city, but ratherhowAthenian harshness or leniency will be perceived by the other subject states. Each, inshort, claims theoretical insight and that policyshould be made on the basis ofhistheory of human behavior; neithermakes any serious use of actual Greek history.The issue thus becomes group psychology ratherthan the "material or historical

facts of the matter"-indeed, neither speaker suggests that facts matter verymuch.And as a result, thetwo contestants must base their argumentson appeals to humannature, to assumptions about what "men or states are likely to do ina given situation." Human nature (Phusis) is a major issue forThucydides.But how, according tothese Athenian public speakers, is one to know human nature? Despite his statedconfidence in ordinary citizens as decision-makers, Cleonimplies thatthe everydayexperiences of the men in his audience are not an adequate basis for making judg-

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 297

ments about international relations (3.37.2), whereas Diodotus--who believes thatonly politicians withspecial insight intoaffairscan comeup withgood publicpolicyclaims (45.2-3,45.6) that the collective behavior of poleis closely mimics the private behavior of individuals. Cleon claims that people only revolt when they havesuffered some form of violence (3.39.2). And hence he is able to argue that it wouldbe improper to forgive the Mytileneans on the grounds that "it is human nature to dowrong" (3.40.1). Diodotus disagrees: it is in fact the natural tendency of both individuals and poleis to do wrong (3.45.3). Yet for Diodotus it is not only sufferingviolence that leads people to revolt, but a wide variety of factors: poverty, wealth,hope, chance, and emotion of various sorts (3.45.4-{j). Once again, neither offersany historical examples to buttress his opinion.

If they disagree on the wellsprings of human perversity, nor do the two speakers agree on what factors will successfully deter the tendency of people to dowrong (i.e., the tendency of subjects to resist their hegemon). For Cleon, it is auniversal truth that people despise kindness but respect harsh treatment (3.39.5).Wrong, according to Diodotus: the harshest treatment is the death sentence, andthat has not prevented peoplefrom doing wrong in the past. To support this claim,Diodotus develops a quasi-historical argument: It "seems probable" that long ago(3.45.3) sentences for wrongdoing were less strict than they arenow, andthat theywere gradually made harsher in a vain attempt at deterrence. He cites no authorityfor this opinion, and it is not at all clear that it would fit what most Atheniansthought they knewabouttheirown past history.35But itdid fit his argument nicely,and rhetorical expediency, not historical validity, is obviously the point.Cleon's position on the value of a deterrent example is part and parcel of his

general rule thatholding anempireis a matterof raw strength ratherthan goodwill(eunoia: 3.37.2). He therefore refuses to take into cognizance the political implications of social distinctions between Mytileneans: the Athenians mllst not saythat it was "the few" (hvi v/igoi) who were the cause of the revolt and It::t theMytilenean demos gofree; the few and the many were all equallyguiltyof wronging us (3.39.6). Diodotus, on the other hand, urges that punishment be meted outindividually, and to as few individuals as possible (3.46.3). Rather surprisingly, inlight of his prior Realist linkage of individual and state behavior, he focuses oninternal social distinctions within poleis. He notes that as matters now stand, inevery polis of the empire the demos (meaning the lower c l a ~ s e s ) is well-disposed(eunous) toward Athens. As a result, if in some allied town hoi oligoi initiate arevolt, they cannot count on the support of the demos, and so you (Athenians)have to plethos (the many) as an ally (3.47.2). Obviously if the Athenians treatMytilene juridically as a state-actor, that is, punish demos and oligoi identically,they will lose this valuable ally. Notably, both speakers use the term "demos" in its"sociological" or "factional" sense ("lower.Class" not "citizenry"), and thus they reveal what Pericles' Funeral Oration attempts to conceal-the " fact" ( from aThucydidean perspective) that demokratia was the self-interested rule of a sociallydefined faction rather than the rule of all citizens by all citizens. But Diodotus


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298 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARwants to use this sociological fact pragmatically inAthens' interest; Cleon, whomThucydides has told us is the darling of the Athenian demos. and whose stronglyegalitarian sentiments might be expected to appeal to poorerAthenians, sees nopurpose in encouraginga "transnational" lower-class sociopolitical solidarity thatwould cut across the nationalist sentiments of polis populations.

The two speakersalso differ on the question of whetherjustice has anything todo with the decision. Cleon pretends it does. Hisconglomerateargument switchesback and forth from the language of law and right to that of necessity and advan-t a g ~ : thc Athenian cmpire isa tyranny, heclaims, and whether it isjustor unjust isirrelevant (3.37.2, 3.40.4); yetby opposing this tyranny tl?-e Mytileneanshave actedterribly unjustly and so they deserve the general punishment demanded by righ-teous anger. Diodotus is quick to jump on Cleon's inconsistency. This is not jurytri:II. hut a policy lkhah:. 1I0t a c a s ~ in which justice and national i n t ~ r e s t go handin hand, but o n in which advantage alone deserves a hearing. Whether guilty ornot the Mytileneans are more of a benefit to Athens a live than dead, and thatshould be the end of it (3.44.1-4, 3.47.5).36So what is the audience-either the original audience of assemblymen orThucydides' audience of readers-to make of all of this? The contestants in theMytileneanDebate pose several questions thatour reading of sections 1.1-2.64, inlight of the assessment of Pericles and his successors at 2.65, has taught us arevitally important: Can a post-Periclean democracy run an empire? What is therelationship betwecn deployment of power in the international arena, domesticpolitics, social diversity, and Panhellenic norms?What is the proper role ofpoliticians and public debate in the democratic state?What is the relationship betweenan individual speaker's personal interests and the public interest? How can onedetennine if there is some discontinuity between public and private interests, andwhat should be done about it? Can prudent (in this case, restrained) policy anddecisive action be reconciled? What is the appropriate basis for a future-orientedpolicy? How is foresight cultivated?Arguably, the workability of democracyand thesuccessofAthens as a state-actordepends on having the answers to these questions. Yet neitherthe speech ofCleonor that ofDiodotus gives a convincing answer to any of them. The reader is surelyled to preferDiodotus' position, by theclearlyprejudicial introductionto Cleon as"most violent and most influential" of the public speakers, by the brutality of thepolicy Cleon advocates, and perhaps by the relatively greater degree of rationalrealism in Diodotus' arguments. Diodotus' approach of exploiting social distinctions within the allied statesmight be made congruent with the logic developed intheArchaeology by assumingthat Diodotus recognized that socialdivisionsmadefor weakness in communities; Athens might have an easier time ruling weakersubjects. But his rhetoric is a long way from the confident integration of publicspeech and foreign policy that characterized Thucydides' portrayal of Pericles,and the reader has becomevery aware that there are deep social divisions in Athens, as we ll as in the subject states. She is not l ikely to be sanguine about the

THUCYDIDES, THEORETIKOS/THUCYDIDES HISTOR 299chances of the cryptic and necessarilymendacious styleofleadership that Diodotusoffers his audience and shemay not be surprised to find that Diodotus disappearsfromThucydides' textafter thedebate. The unsatisfactory nature of thetwo speechesis reflected in the final decision: Diodotus prevailed (3.49.1) but, Thucydides pointsout, the vote was very close.3?

The complexities entailed by the social diversity and political practices thatunderpinned the polis as a state-actor are front and center in the Mytilencan D ~ bate. There isno doubt that thedivisionbetweenmass andelite, demos and dunatoi,in Athens and in the poleis Athens must deal with is of key significance both forAthenian internal politicsand forAthenian international relations. Yet neitherCleonnor Diodotus offers a coherent vision of thc relationship between public speech,nat ional policy act ion, and the mater ia l world or of the relationship betweenstate-actor and polis society. And without a coherent vision, it is hard to illlagillcthatAthens will consistentlymake the right choices on diflicult matters of policy.ConclusionsIt will be a long road from the confused rhetoric of the Mytilenean Debate to thecollapse ofAthertianpower after the Sicilian disasterand then to the final collapseof 404. As in the case of the revolt of Mytilene, Athens' Sicilian policy and thelong endgame of theIonianWar(410-404 B.C.--notrecorded in Thucydides' text,but well known to him and anticipated in his narrative) will hang on the intertwining of material factors (ships, walls;and money) with the problematic factors ofdemocratic politics, social diversity,; and Panhellenic values. But by the end ofbook 3 of the his tory, the reader has a lready begun to grasp a basic lesson: theconfident, strong Realist theory developed by Theoretikos in 1.1-2.64 is inadequate to expla in what rea lly happens to s ta tes in confl ic t, and a fort iori inadequate to explain the behavior of s ta tes tha t are democra tic in fac t as well as inname. He who would truly understand why great affairs of the past played out asthey did, or how they might p lay out in the fu ture, mus t move beyond the t idytheory of unitary, self-interested state-actors. Hemust, Histor suggests, lookto theworld of social relations andpolitics, theworld of speech and reception, of humanintereststhat are hopelessly tangle'd up withcompetingloyaltiesto traditional Greeknorms, to thepolis, to various social groups, to individual selves. Histordoes notactually refute the Realist theses presented by Theoretikos. But heshowsus tha taknowledge of theoretical principles animating stateswill only be useful when that. knowledge is tempered by the close attention to human complexity that comesfrom learning to think historically.How might the reading of Thucydides offered here be brought into a fruitful

engagement with mid-twentieth-century history? I do not actually suppose thatthere is a lot tobe gained by a direct one-to-one comparison of historical individuals or specific events. Roberts notes that "GeraldJohnson writing in the New Re-public in 1961 identified Cleon with Joseph McCarthy and the impeachment of


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300 THE KOREAN WAR AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WARAlcibiades [in 415 B.C.] as the work of a House Committee on un-Athenian activities."38 Although Johnson's sort of comparison seems to me tendentious, perhapscomparisons drawn rathermore broadlymay help us to think through both historical periods. I must, however, admitmyself to bewellout ofmy professional depthwhen dealing with the cold war era. Thereader must take what follows as provisional and as an invitation to academic colleagues with the appropriate expertiseto test and revise the following hypothesis: The citizemy of the United States inthe 1950s, I would posit, found itselfin a position at least superficially analogousto that of the Athenian citizenry on the threshold of the PeloponnesianWar. LikeAthens, the United States was then a young, powerful, democratic state with awar-tested political and military leadership-as well as beinga diverse societyheld together in part by a national self-identity strongly influenced by the recentexperience of having led a coalition of free states to a dramatic victory against anightmarish common enemy (Persia, Axis)

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