WARRANTING THE NEW PARADIGM: A RESPONSE TO HARRI?

KENNETH J. GERGEN Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 190X 1, U.S.A.

At the outset I should make it clear that I fully share Harre’s visions of new paradigm inquiry as sketched in his paper. These visions may not constitute the complete program, yet they are surely foundational. Harr6 is correct in seeing the importance of explicating the syntactic structures of understanding. Work of the kind he describes (as well as that of Smedslund, Ossorio, Shotter, Sabini, Silver and others) seems essential to understanding the structure and limitations of social knowledge. Attention to the moral and political assumptions to which this understanding is wedded is also of cardinal importance. Critical theorists and feminists have played an invaluable role in demystifying the seeming neutrality of many theoretical investments; we now possess a mandate for broadscale expansion of such concerns. The intellectual challenge of developing non-individualistic accounts of social conduct is equally bracing. In this case, the theorist struggles against the boundaries of contemporary understanding, Should these boundaries be transcended (a concern shared by colleagues in dramaturgical theory, communications theory, feminism, and close relationships theory), the intellectual gains would be enormous.

To be sure, there are details worth the quibbling. For example, early in his paper, Harr6 claims that human conduct is the “implementation of a belief system.” As he then proposes, the new problematics concern the relationship between the public and the private sphere: the origin of the belief systems, the internal structure of the system, the availability of the structure to consciousness, and so on. Yet, should this position be extended, there would be little to demarcate the “enlarged paradigm” from the traditional or “restricted” one. These are bread and butter issues for most attitude change specialists, social learning theorists, and cognitive social psychologists. I was pleased to find the focus of HarrC’s discussion soon shifted to other domains. Further, I do not feel it entirely fair to attack traditional psychology for “the incorporation of unexamined commonsense understandings into the concepts of psychological science.” Underlying any theory of human conduct, whether in the old or the new paradigm, there will inevitably lie a deep penumbra of unexplicated understandings. Many of these will be linked in fundamental ways to common traditions of understanding within the culture. There is considerable gain to be achieved in the elucidation of these underlying assumptions, as Harr6 argues. However, I can see little reason to oblige the theorists to furnish the full explication before leaping into the breach of explanation - otherwise, we should demand companionate volumes on cultural history to accompany HarrC’s own works, Personal being (1983), and Social being (1979). Yet, on the whole, these

Commentary on R. HarrC (1987) Enlarging the paradigm, Vol. 5, No. I, pp. 3-12

19

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are but trifling ~onsitlei-~itioiIs, and should not iiisulate one against Hal-r6’s niore iinportaiit contentions.

It is inviting to elaborate on the implications of‘ Harr6’s propos;~ls, and to f‘urnish acltlitional examples of’the kind ot‘inquiry he envisions (ser, e.g. (;ergen & Davis, 19X.3). However, in the position of‘critical comrnentatoi‘, 21 nlore useful purpose may he ser\:ecI by exploring ii lm~bleni that I see its f’untlanieiital to much new l~aradigni research. It is a probleni that lies deeply enibetlcted within Harr6’s present paper, anti one that poses a significant threat to the future enterprise. In the pages that f’ollow 1 will try to lay out the contours of the l~roblenl, atid to offer a potential solution lhat I believe more consistent with the visions of‘ new paradigm research contained within Harr6’s offering.

The critical probleni is that of‘wirranting the shift tl-oiii the constricted to the new paradigin inquiry. Oil what gi-ounds is the new lmradigiii to be preftrred to the old? What justification can be f’urnished to the committed researcher of‘ traditional caste that might alter his/her iiivestirierits? Let us first coiisitler the warrmts suggested in the present paper. As Harry outlines, “‘Ilie real trouldc with this (the traditional) prddematic is that it does not derive f’ronl the intrinsic,

nature of‘ the subject matter.” He then goes on to argue that the traditional psychologists mistakenly believe they are studying causal mechanisn~s, ~vhen the)

are “1-eally” studying culturallv specific rules of‘ conduit. Now, there ;II~ ;I number ot‘ warrants available to the theorist who lvishes to justifv his/her intellectual c.oniniitnients. Conceptual cohereiice, authorit!,, ethic-al or political coiniiiitnieiits, and observation are certainly l~riiiiary ainong the available ti~riiis of‘ warrant. Of these, it is apparent that Harrt; is selecting observation. Purthcr, he specifically argues against srfectillg the ethical or political option. In f’:a, Ilr attacks the old paradigm inquiry for its IAtlg a “reflection of‘nloral and political assuiril~tioils,” llarnel?~ the “itlcii~idualistic technologism which is the moral basis of‘ coiiteniporary life in the United Statea.” ‘I‘he old paradigm is thus ~alu;itioiiall\~ biasccl, \zhile ill coiitr;ist, lhr ii?\\ lm~adigiii is said lo rrflcct a sounc~ assessnient of‘ the actual.

‘I‘his reliance on the objective fi,unclations of new paracligtn inquiry echoes

HarrP’s earlier attempts to ,justif’? the role-rule or ethog:cnic orientation (of’ which “the enlarged ptradignl” is partially iin extension). For exainple, in his earlier \olunle with Sword (Han-6 X: Second, 1972), “~a1 science” is said to require the positing of‘ “generative inechanisnis” underlying that \vhich we observe, and the “persistent attempt to check the reality of’tliese nwtIels.” (p. 67). Likewise, in his more recent volun~ (Hal-r6 rt cl/., 1985) a t‘ull chapter is dewtetl to the methodology fat an adecluate psycholo~gy. Iii this case appropriate niethods are said to include, aniong others, natural ohser\ation. account gathering and repertory grid analysis. With this conln~itnlent to ;I fi)rm of

empiricism (elsewhere dlecl realism), the context is set to do battle with interlocutors f’or the old paradigtn. In my estimate, such a battle cannot be secured by the f’orces of the new paradigm. ‘I‘his is chiefl) so because old paradigm research is itself warranted I)? its empirical base. It, too, claims that its propositions are justified 1)): systematically gathered observations. Thus, the argument conws dowl to the quality and rigor of “my ohserwtions vs vours.”

Warranting the new paradigm 21

Further, on these grounds the old paradigm would surely triumph. With more than a half century of accumulated evidence, complex experimental and multivariate research designs, extensive means of controlling against threats to validity, and highly sophisticated statistical devices, the handful of under- developed research methods offered by the new paradigm advocates will simply fall like a straw house under napalm.

Harre does have an alternative means of blunting such an assault. As he argues in both the sources cited above, the causal model of human functioning vindicated by the experimental method (and its sophisticated associates) is unintelligible. It does enable investigators to account for bodily movements or automatic, reflex-like activity. However, behavior is unintelligible unless we grant persons the power of intentionality. Our very understanding of persons is lodged in a language of intentions and thus our theories of human action must be so as well. If not, they are nonsense by cultural standards. I am persuaded by the argument for the necessity of intentional language (see also Peters, 1958; Taylor, 1964). However, granting the point on the level of theory does not discredit the findings generated by the experimental methodologies. Yes, the findings generated by the experimental method have been couched in terms of causal mechanisms. Further, intentionality itself is said to be a resultant of antecedent conditions. At this point the burden of proof falls on the new paradigm to demonstrate that its explanations are superior to those of traditional psychology in making the findings intelligible, and to provide further evidence to validate its claim. Given the vagaries of all empirical methods and the heavy role of interpretation in understanding empirical results, this game would never be won.

I can appreciate the desire to retain the empirical warrant for theories of human action. Certainly the rhetorical power of such a justificational device has reached hegemony within the present century, and represents the chief grounds on which the sciences claim a position of privilege within the culture. However, empiricist philosophy of science has come under stiff attack during the past several decades. Deeply debilitated are the assumptions of induction, verification falsification, decontextualized theory, meaning, operationism, word-object isomorphism, the criterion of coherence, the cumulative character of science, and so on. Further, in the case of the social sciences, it has grown progressively clearer that understanding is essentially a hermeneutic or interpretive enter- prise. Objective warrants do not apply. Much of this thinking I have tried to summarize in my 1982 volume. However, the important point is that the arguments for objective warranting of scientific propositions seem generally bankrupt. Empiricism lacks coherent or compelling foundations. One is thus invited to consider alternative forms of warrant-both for knowledge claims in general and for the superiority of the new paradigm in particular.

If the case cannot be secured on empirical grounds, how is new paradigm inquiry to be justified? At least one possibility is inherent in the above contention that theories of human action are primarily bodies of socially negotiated discourse. To enter into a given body of discourse is to enter into a “tale world” (Young, 1982), or an imaginary land created by the discourse itself. How is this

constructed world to be justified? Not hy observation, for all obser\ations are

supporting if contextualized in its terms. Kather, I suggest that the most

compelling war-rants also lie within the I-calm of discourse. When one has

entered the ~wrld of’ discourse one must honor its conventions; when 01le

violates the conventions of‘ understanding within this realm one ceases to make sense within the process of‘ iiegotiation.

Subjecting theoretical accounts to discursive analysis opens an immense an-a)

of‘ possible evaluative l~rocecl~ires. One is free at this point to bring to beal

virtualI\, an\ coherent set of’ scnsc-making conventions that cm sustain or

threaten a given theoretical position. Kather than examining the f’~111 contours of‘

such possibilities, it will be uset‘~d f’or OLII- purposes to touch on three f’orrns of’

analysis that can serve to warrant the exl~mdecl over the inore co~istricted

pardip.

At the outset one IKI~~ ask how, by contemporq conventions of’ under-

standing, a given theoretical acco~mt squares lvith other hotlies of discourse in

which one is invested. How consistent is the account with other suppositiotls OI

assumptions to which one is conin~itted? In this case we find the old paradigni

form of mechanistic theory to he deeply pi-ol~leinatic. Such theory is essentiall)

cleri\:ecl from ait1 consistent with an rinpiricist me~atheory ((;ergen, 1982; (;el-gen Xc Kenack, 1983). ‘I‘llat ia. the same premises of‘ dualism, the

preeminence of observation. deterministic analysis. and 50 on that constitute

empiricist iiieta~heor) are also e~itleiiiic to most tr;ttlitioiial psychological

theorizing. ‘I‘he t heoi-ies recapitulate thv iiietatheoi-y mtl thereby pIa>, an

essential supporting role. \r’et , as continued anal!3is in the l~hilosophy of science

has n~ade clear, the empiricist metatheory of knowletlgv is tlccplv fla\ved. E‘tw

l~hilosol~hers of science remain committed to empiricist fi,undatiotl;llislll a11t1, as

it is coi~inioi~lc’ said, we are now in ;i pliasv of “f”)st-““f’ii.icist” , ailalvsis. ‘I‘his

steady deterioration of‘ eiiipiricist nietatheoi-), removes oiir 01‘ the in;ijoi~ tmtlies

of‘ supporting discourse for the theories to which it was bwltled. In‘ effect, 11) virtue of the extended critiques ot‘ the nietatheory, the associ;itcd theories we also

impu,gnecl. ‘I‘hr atage is thus sc1 f’or ;iltcwiatiw tlirories mitl ~ne~athcor\. III nik’ view, ii social constructioriist irietatheory escapes most of’ the prol~leriis inlirreiit

in enipiricisni; it is ;ilao consistent with inost of’ the theoretical aims twdorsrd 1))

Hal-r6 in the present off’erirlg.

A second body oftliscours~ relcvaiit to the weighiiig of theoretical pref&rences

is evaluati\.e iii iwture. Within Lt’ester11 culture we possess ;I rich arm\' of

conventions for speaking about nwrals, ~xlues, ethics, ideologies, anti the like,

and such discourse often pIa) ;I critical role iii so&l lift-. .I‘here is no inherent

reason why such discourse caiiriot bc e~iif~loyed in the evaluation of theoretical

accounts. Such assessnienls have begun to errierge in the literature. (:rirical

theorists were among the first lo clemonstrate how wide-ranging theories in the

social sciences scrvc to sustain oppressive, exploitatiw, and alienati1ig f’ornis of’

society. Feminists have now i~ecoine effective iii elucidating the sexist bias

underlying seemingly neutral theories of‘ l~\:chology ant1 biology. Ha& himself

suggests that many theories of the old paradigm are reflections of. the “local

n~oral and political” orders. However, tlier~ is ii0 principled was011 for liiniting

Warranting the new paradigm 2. ‘5

valuational critique either to these particular groups or to theories generated by the old paradigm. One might hope for a general enhancement of valuational consciousness within the discipline.

It is also on this level that a strong case might be made for the superiority of the new paradigm perspective. Both philosophers and psychologists have long been aware that theories of efficient cause play havoc with the Western tradition of morality. To hold that human action is caused by external impingements is to deny the possibility of self-determination and, thus, the concept of moral responsibility. New paradigm formulations of the kind championed by HarrC retain the concept of human agency, and thus render support to a value system that many believe critical to the social order. Further, in the present paper, HarrC wishes to expand the new paradigm to include relational processes. .l’his shift in emphasis toward communal theory is in marked contrast to the individualism so much favored by traditional psychological accounts. Such a move would be enthusiastically applauded by many who find the Western value of individualism lacking, if not inimical to the future of humankind (Sampson, 1985). In effect, there are important ways in which new paradigm inquiry can be privileged on moral or ethical grounds in addition to conceptual ones.

A third means of warranting the new paradigm also emerges from our concern with theory as discourse. To argue that theories are not fundamentally constrained by observation is not to say that they are “merely talk.” Accounts of persons are insinuated into most all our claily endeavors. .l‘hey are used to motivate, to justify, to punish, to extoll, and so on. In effect, person-talk plays a major role in the pragmatics of daily life. Like the implements with which a surgeon carries out an operation, practices of ~,erson-accountiIig permit or prevent our fulfilling social relationships. In this light, it becomes useful t(J

inquire into the social or pragmatic implications of social science theory. In particular, we might ask whether a given theoretical approach offers the society any additional implements for action. Are the linguistic devices effective in broadening the human horizon. 7 In this context, theoretical accounts that facilitate new forms of action, solve problems hitherto obdurate, or offer fresh alternatives for action, are to be privileged over those that merely replicate longstanding conventions. It is such theorizing that elsewhere I have termed generutiue (Bergen, 1982). It is also in this domain that I think it possible to furnish additional support to new paradigm inquiry. I am particularly intrigued by the possibility of relational or collective theory of the kind that Ha& outlines in the latter section of his paper. In many respects, we fall heirs to over two thousand years of individualistic accounting. Should the sciences be able to render social life intelligible in terms of relational forms they would be making a generative contribution of enormous proportion. Therein lies a major form of justifying the new departures.

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