Waxman's Hume

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Wayne Waxmans Humes Theory of Consciousness John P. Wright Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 2 (November, 1995) 344-350.

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HUME TUDIESVolume XXI, Number 2, November 1995,pp. 344-350

Critical StudyW ayne WaxmansHumes Theory of ConsciousnessJOHN P. WRIGHT

WAYNE WAXMAN. Humes Theory of Consciousness. London: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994. xvi +347. $54.95.In Humes Theory of Consciousness Wayne Waxman sees himself as

recovering the orthodox interpretation of Humes epistemology andmetaphysics which has been subverted to a greater or lesser extent by manycontemporary Hume scholars. Fortunately, according to Waxman, Humescontemporaries, nearly every major thinker since, and most philosopherstoday have recognized that Hume is merely a negative and destructivethinker and a subjectivist. The scholars who, following the lead of NormanKemp Smith, treat Hume as a positive thinker, have a number ofmotivations-foremost among them the desire to reexamine orthodoxy andbe original. In this book Waxman proposes to save us from their newrevisionism through new work to probe Humes basic concepts and to takethe analysis deeper than before(xiii).

Orthodoxy in the history of philosophy, as in religion, often leads itsadherents back into some strange doctrines. Oddly enough, at least one ofWaxmans favourite ones-that which appears to have led to the bookstitle-derives from Kemp Smith himself. According to Kemp Smith, there aretwo strands in Humes philosophy-a Newtonian strand which stresses amechanistic associationism, and a Hutchesonian one which rests on afundamental distinction between mind in its character as observer, and the

John P. Wright is a t the Philosophy Department, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset,Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4e-mail: wright&erver.uwindsr.ca


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BOOKREVIEWS 345items observed (cited by Waxman on p. 14). This latter doctrine, which ismore obviously derived from Husserl rather than Hutcheson, is fullyembraced by Waxman and his disagreement with Kemp Smith lies in hisassertion that association, far from being a blind sheerly reactivemechanism, is really a phenomenological operation.. .essentially comprisedof feeling-data immanent to consciousness(l5). These data of consciousnessitself are neither impressions nor ideas. Rather, on Waxmans account, theyare various attitudes which the mind adopts in confronting theseperceptions (18).Thus, according to Waxman, the vivacity which, on Humesanalysis, constitutes belief in reality is a phenomenological attitude, not aquality of perceptions. Similarly, the feeling we have when we observe a causalsequence on a number of occasions is not itself an impression but merely theverisimilitude instinctively attached to customary transitions of thought(187). Both of these interpretations fly in the face of strong textual evidence.2Indeed, Waxmans very attempt to detach consciousness from perceptionsseems to go against Humes own claim that consciousness is nothing but areflected thought or perception (T 625). In the final analysis Waxman himselfadmits that Humes theory of consciousness is sketchy and obscure and thatwe may suspect him of intentionally ignoring (41) the distinction laterdeveloped by Husserl. Needless to say, this is a strange attribution of authorialintention.

Waxman rejects the objective validity of what Kemp Smith called naturalbeliefs-that is, the beliefs in an independent objective reality which resultfrom the operations of the imagination. Waxman justifies this by givingprecedence to what he calls immediate consciousness. According to him, thenatural beliefs of imagination are shown to be false by the natural beliefs ofimmediate consciousness. This latter is quite a remarkable faculty, available toordinary people and philosophers alike, which shows us that imaginativefeeling is constitutive of everything that enters into objective conception,and that such feeling can have neither sense nor significance outside andindependently of the imagination. This immediate consciousness detachesitself from feelings engendered by imagination which muddle ourapprehension of the reality actually before us, and leaves us with a truerpicture of that reality. Most importantly, it convinces us that our naturescondemn us, without possibility of reprieve, to know the falsehood of thatwhich we are powerless to disbelieve (273, 274, 268).

It is difficult to see why, on Waxmans view, Hume should have givenprecedence to natural beliefs engendered by immediate consciousness. Theonly reason I can find lies in his claim that Hume was, through and through,a subjective idealist. His vantage point, as a philosopher, was that ofimmediate consciousness, and his problem was explaining how we are able tobreak out beyond its solipsistic precincts (139). But the notion of naturalbeliefs of immediate consciousness is an invention of Waxman, not Hume,Volume XXI, Number 2, November 1995


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346 BOOK REVIEWSand there are good reasons to believe that the vantage point of Hume as aphilosopher was not that of immediate consciousness. To take the mostobvious, Hume begins his whole discussion of the Section of the Treatiseentitled Of scepticism with regard to the senses by announcing that theexistence of body, is something we must take for granted in all our rea-sonings. By body, Hume tells his readers, he means that which is DISTINCTfrom the mind and perception (T 187-88). I have argued elsewhere thatHume does in fact presuppose the existence of body throughout the argu-ments in this Section, including the argument where he establishes that ourperceptions have no independent existence. In the comparable discussion inhis first Enquiry, he presents his own scepticismof the senses as being of a kindwhich, in contrast with the pre-scientific scepticism of Descartes, is con-sequent to science and enquiry. He concludes this discussion by pointing outthat even the rational correction of the common-sense belief engendered bythe imagination cannot convince an impartial enquirer (EHU 150-55; seealso T 212-18). But this does not mean that Hume adopts a solipsistic pointof view, or abandons the objective natural attitude which his explanatoryproject presupposes.

I do not deny that Waxmans subjectivist interpretation of Hume hassome historical antecedents. When he argues that on Humes viewimmediate consciousness naturally convinces us that the senses presentonly fleeting existents (18)and that therefore it is impossible for our naturalmetaphysical beliefs to have any objective validity (17), he is echoing one ofHumes earliest interpreters, namely Thomas Reid. Reid clearly thought, likeWaxman, that Humes scepticism led to an ontology of subjective perceptions:my impressions and ideas are the only existences of which I have anyknowledge or conception; and they are such fleeting and transitory beings,that they can have no existence at all, any longer than I am conscious of them.So upon this hypothesis...all things without exception, which I imagined tohave a permanent existence, whether I thought of them or not, vanish atonce . . . 3 However, it should be noted that there were other eighteenthcentury thinkers, most notably Kant, who disagreed with the assessment ofHumes philosophy given by Reid and his followers. Kant claimed that Humesuffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood:Reid and those who followed him were ever taking for granted that which hedoubted, and demonstrating with zeal...hat which he never thought ofdoubting.According to Kant, Hume never doubted that the concept of causewas right, only whether it could be thought by reason a prion.He did notdeny that causation correctly implies objective necessity; he denied that ourjudgments of the objective necessity of causation arise from in~ igh t .~Kants remark echoes Humes own claim that experience never gives us anyinsight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects, but onlyaccustoms the mind to pass from one to another (T 169). While Waxman

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BOOKREVIEWS 347cites Kant as an ally for his Pyrrhonian interpretation of Hume, he does n otbother t o m en tio n th e precise na tur e of t he scepticism tha t Kant ascribed toHume (16-18; 191-92). Kant saw Hum e as trying to sho w th e limits of reasonwhen he denied its role in determining the necessary connection betweencause and effect; h e tho ugh t t ha t Humes error lay in his ado ption of thelimited conception of reason which he inherited from his predecessors, thatbased o n analysis of ideas (Kant, Prolegomena, 17-18).

An appreciation for th e role of reason b oth in H umes sceptical argum entsand in his mitigation of that scepticism is absolutely essential for an under-standing of his epistemology and metaphysics. However, Waxman follows atrend among recent writers on Humes epistemology who seek to reduce thefaculty of reason to th at of imag ination. For W axman, t he comparison of ideasis reduced to the association of ideas. Philosophical relations are reduced tonatural ones. Humes principle that every simple idea is derived from acorresponding impression becomes nothing but a principle of association.Association itself is reduced to a faculty which does nothing more thangenerate certain phenom enological feelings for consciousness. The deter-mination of the mind from which our idea of necessity is derived gets re-duced to a feeling of ease of tran sition ( 4 6 4 1 , 7 7 4 4 , 164ff.). These are justa few of th e Hum ean concep ts th at get muddled in th e labyrinth of W axmansanalyses in this book. In reading it I was constantly reminded of Humesremark in the first section of the Enquiry Concerning H u m an Understanding ofth e imp ortance of a mental geography which teaches us th e differentoperations of th e mind, to separate the m from each oth er,... nd to correct allthat seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object ofreflection and enquiry (EHU 13). Indeed, he was specifically concerned todistinguish the faculty of reason from that concerned with Tastes orSe nti m en t~ ~ -th e wo faculties which W axman seems most concerned t oconfound with each other!One c ann ot d eny tha t there are passages in Humes early Treatise ofHumanNature which provide a basis for Waxmans reductions. However, Waxmanoften takes a remark in isolation from its surrounding text, as when hediscusses the last paragraph of Section iv of Part 1 of Book I of the Treatise,where Hume notes that complex ideas, including relations, generally arisefrom association. Waxman (cf. 81-82) disregards the paragraph thatfollows-the first para graph of Section v-where Hume explicitly says th at wemay compare ideas to form philosophical relations even when there is nonatural or associational relation between the m . At ot he r times, there certainlyis textual evidence in t he Treatise to suppo rt his readings. W axm an (If f) makesmuch of Humes claim in the Conclusion to Book I that, in following thereasoning of Of scepticism with regard to reason we can only choosebetwixt a false reason an d n on e at all (T 268). However, th e validity of t heargument in Treatise I iv l-where Hu me concludes tha t com parison leads usVolume XXI, Number 2, November 1995


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348 BOOKREVIEWSto repose absolutely no evidence in our faculty of reason-is veryquestionable. It is an argument which is not repeated in the firstEnquiry whereHume claims to correct some negligences in his former reasoning and morein the expression (see Humes Advertisement, Enquiries 2). Waxmanexcuses himself from following Humes own expressed view in asking us torely on this book as the ultimate arbiter of his philosophical principles on theground that almost certainly he was...motivated by a long history of suf-fering on account of material present in the Treatise but absent from theEnquiry (20). This kind of hyperbole, which cannot be based on a seriousreading of the events of Humes life and letters, can hardly give the readermuch faith in Waxmans own judgments about Humes philosophicalintentions.

According to Waxman, Hume aimed to teach us to free ourselves fromthe myth that scientific methods take us in the direction of objective, in-dependent truth (174).This would indeed have been a remarkable project fora man who, in 1751,was elected secretary to the Philosophical Society ofEdinburgh, forerunner of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Waxman claimsthat Hume sought to free his readers from the assumptions of thinkers likeLocke and Berkeley who took for granted the objective validity of generalprinciples of necessary connection such as the principle that everybeginning of existence must have a cause (17).But Hume made exactly thesame assumption himself. In 1754, s Secretary of the Philosophical Society,Hume edited a collection of scientific papers which included an exchangebetween his friend Lord Kames, and John Stewart, Professor of NaturalPhilosophy at the University. Kames had claimed that there are active causesin nature over and above purely mechanical ones and, in opposing this claim,Stewart had identified it with what he took to be Humes view in the Treatisethat something may begin to exist, or start into being without a cause.6Ina letter to Stewart Hume denied that he ever asserted so absurd a Propositionas that any thing might arise without a Cause. He went on to expresshis regretthat he published his Treatise so early because of the misunderstandings thatthat book might engender: Where a man of Sense mistakes my Meaning, Iown I am angry: But it is only at myself: for having exprest my Meaning so illas to have given Occasion to the mistake. He then expresses his hope that hisreformulation of his doctrines in the book we know as the Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understandingwill meet a better fate (HL I 187).But what is even morerevealing is that, in spite of Stewarts attack on Humes claim in the Enquirythat Newton ascribed active causes to nature, Hume continued to rejectStewarts own view of Newton. Hume denied that Newton sought to robsecond causes of all force and energy and he commended that greatphilosopher for having recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain hisuniversal attraction; though he was so cautious and modest to allow, that itwas a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experiments


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BOOKREVIEWS 349(EHU 73n.). All this is a very far cry from Waxmans view that Hume thoughtthe true efficacy of experimentation, unbeknownst both to the vulgar and tothe scientist, is to instill a new custom-that is, merely to produce changes inthe subject. The issue behind Humes dispute with Stewart was materialismand the question was whether Newtonian active forces required animmaterial cause-namely, the Deity.

In Humes own day philosophical issues concerning causality were clearlybound up with religion; this cannot be missed by any careful reader of his firstEnquiry. The bulk of Humes discussion of necessity in Section VII is directedagainst philosophers-including Locke, Berkeley and Malebranche-whothought we have some special understanding of the underlying force of theuniverse by examining the operation of minds. Hume is especially concernedto refute the latter philosopher who sought to rob nature, and all createdbeings, of every power ...(EHU 71). By showing that we have no rational in-sight into causation, and that all knowledge of it must be derived from ex-perience, Hume undermined the theological claims of his contemporaries. AsKant wrote, Hume sought to deprive reason of its most important prospects(Kant, Prolegomena 6n.).

Waxmans total disregard of the context of Humes opposition totraditional metaphysics is accompanied by a perverse unwillingness toacknowledge the frequent references in Humes writings to the unknownpowers and forces, by which (the course of nature) is governed (EHU 54; seealso EH U 30, 32-33, 63-64; T 159, 400-01; cf. Waxman, 191-99). Perhaps, ifhe had taken more care with his analysis of what Hume calls fictions of theimagination, Waxman would have understood how Hume thought thatbeliefs-such as that in absolute space or external existence-can be generatedin cases where we have no distinct ideas. He might even have been less willingto distort the writings of contemporary scholars who have sought to showhow Humes sceptical account of the limits of human understandingcomplements his realism.

In his Preface, Waxman claims that an interpretation of Hume stands orfalls by the quality of its textual analyses and its success in elaborating basicnotions of Humes system (xiii). My own view is that the book fails on bothcounts, as well as in the authors complete disregard for the historical contextof Humes arguments. While Waxman denies that h e has embraced any formof negative dogmatism, it is difficult to agree. In his last chapter he deniesthat Hume in any way mitigates his scepticism by accepting the veracity of anyaspect of natural beliefs. Humes mitigated scepticism in Waxmans hands isbased merely on our willingness to retain our composure and be content tolet nature take its course while remaining cognizant of the illusory, anti-nomial character of our natural beliefs (268, 271). But Hume describes thephilosophical decisions of his own mitigated scepticism or academicalphilosophy very differently; they are based on the reflections of commonVolume XXI, Number 2, November 1995


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350 BOOKREVIEWSlife, methodized and corrected (EHU 161, 162). The correction of theinstinctual judgments of the imagination comes from an autonomous reasonwhich, however limited in its ability to discover truth, is still able to compareideas and determine probabilities and possibilities. No one who has studiedHumes greatest work in metaphysics-his Dialogues Concerning NaturalReligion-can doubt Humes use of reason to speculate about the unknownforces of nature. And only a philosopher like Kant, who still hankered after thegoals of rational religion, could regard such as use of reason as purelynegative, and as causing positive injury to mankind (Prolegomena, 6n).One would hope that it is not merely a desire to be orthodox and unoriginalwhich has led Waxman to follow Kant in regarding the goals of Humesphilosophy as merely negative and destructive.NOTES1 Waxman cites Husserl in note 19 at the bottom of page 15. Later on,appealing to Husserls distinction, Waxman writes that, for Hume, the feelingsof consciousness like vivacity and facility are situated on the hither (noetic)rather than the thither (noemic) side of awareness (42). For Hutchesons

opposition to a Hume-like conception of the mind see the letter from FrancisHutcheson to William Mace reproduced by David Berman in FrancisHutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux Problem, Proceedings of the RoyalIrish Academy 74 (1974), 263-652 In his Appendix discussion of belief Hume is careful to refute the view that

it is only annexd to (the simple conception), after the same manner that willand desire are annexd to particular conceptions of good and pleasure (T 625).In Husserlian terms it seems clear that he is placing it on the noemic ratherthan the noetic side of consciousness. As to the feeling connected withnecessity, Humes whole project is to find the impression-it turns out to be animpression of reflection-from which our idea is derived.3 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry nto the Human Mind, in The Worksof Thomas Reid,

edited by Sir William Hamilton, 8th ed., vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1880), 96.4 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to an y Future Metaphysics, translated by P.

Carus, revised & edited by L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 5-7.5 See David Hume, The Philosophical Works, edited by T. H. Green and T. H.Grose, 2nd. ed. (London, 18827; reprinted by Aalen, 1964), vol. 4, 1On.Thisnote to the discussion of mental geography was included in the first twoeditions of the first Enquiry-before the publication of the Enquiry Concerning

the Principles of Morals. Thereafter the remark was incorporated into AppendixI of this latter work. See EPM 294.6. Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion and the Inertia of Matter, Essays andObservations, Physical and Literary, Read before a Society in Edinburgh andpublished by them, edited by David Hume and Alexander Munro, vol. 1(Edinburgh, 1754), 130.

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