What about Japan?What about Japan?What about Japan?What about Japan?

Unit 1Unit 2Unit 3Unit 4

Unit 5

Unit 6

1Seawater Pump

Elevation: about 10m

TurbineBuilding

① ②＋ ⇒ Station Black Out

Tsunami (estimated more than 10m)

Grid Line

② D/G Inoperable due to Tsunami flood

D/G

Seawater level

① Loss of offsite power due to the earthquake

All Motor Operated pumps (including ECCS pumps) became inoperable

ReactorBuilding

1Seawater Pump

Elevation: about 10m

TurbineBuilding

① ②＋ ⇒ Station Black Out

Tsunami (estimated more than 10m)

Grid Line

② D/G Inoperable due to Tsunami flood

D/G

Seawater level

① Loss of offsite power due to the earthquake

All Motor Operated pumps (including ECCS pumps) became inoperable

ReactorBuilding

4

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

Unit 5

Unit 6

US ResponseUS Response

Federal RegulationsFederal Regulations Industry Response Industry Response

NRC OrderNRC Order

• NRC issued three orders

1. FLEX - companies to enhance protection of portable emergency equipment and to obtain additional equipment to ensure facilities can cope with events that may affect multiple reactors at a site

2. Reliable hardened vents for boiling water reactors with Mark I or Mark II containments

3. Requires additional instrumentation to monitor water levels in used fuel storage pools

• NRC issued three orders

1. FLEX - companies to enhance protection of portable emergency equipment and to obtain additional equipment to ensure facilities can cope with events that may affect multiple reactors at a site

2. Reliable hardened vents for boiling water reactors with Mark I or Mark II containments

3. Requires additional instrumentation to monitor water levels in used fuel storage pools

Industry ResponseIndustry Response

• Nuclear industry Fukushima Response Steering Committee provided responses to NRC Orders

• Coordinated through Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)– NEI is the policy organization for the nuclear

technologies industry

• Nuclear industry Fukushima Response Steering Committee provided responses to NRC Orders

• Coordinated through Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)– NEI is the policy organization for the nuclear

technologies industry

F L E XF L E X

• Approach for adding diverse and flexible mitigation strategies—or FLEX

• extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP)

• increase defense-in-depth for beyond-design-basis scenarios

• loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink (LUHS)

• Approach for adding diverse and flexible mitigation strategies—or FLEX

• extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP)

• increase defense-in-depth for beyond-design-basis scenarios

• loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink (LUHS)

FLEX ElementsFLEX Elements

• Portable equipment power and water to maintain or restore key safety functions

• Reasonable staging and protection of portable equipment from BDBEEs

• Procedures and guidance to implement FLEX strategies

• Programmatic controls that assure the continued viability and reliability of the FLEX strategies.

• Portable equipment power and water to maintain or restore key safety functions

• Reasonable staging and protection of portable equipment from BDBEEs

• Procedures and guidance to implement FLEX strategies

• Programmatic controls that assure the continued viability and reliability of the FLEX strategies.

Overview of FLEX ConceptOverview of FLEX Concept

Spent Fuel PoolSpent Fuel Pool

• Spent Fuel Cooling - Makeup with Portable Injection Source

• SFP Parameters - Reliable means to determine SFP water level – to prevent undue distraction of operators – and identify conditions when makeup/spray is

required

• Spent Fuel Cooling - Makeup with Portable Injection Source

• SFP Parameters - Reliable means to determine SFP water level – to prevent undue distraction of operators – and identify conditions when makeup/spray is

required

Flex Objectives & Guiding Principles

Flex Objectives & Guiding Principles

• The objective of FLEX • to establish an indefinite coping capability

to prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools

• to maintain the containment function

• Both by using installed equipment, on-site portable equipment, and pre-staged off-site resources.

• The objective of FLEX • to establish an indefinite coping capability

to prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools

• to maintain the containment function

• Both by using installed equipment, on-site portable equipment, and pre-staged off-site resources.

Off-Site ResourcesOff-Site Resources

• Pre-staged off-site resources will be housed at two locations

• One on the east coast and one near the west coast.– The west coast site will be in Arizona (phoenix

metropolitan area.

• Pre-staged off-site resources will be housed at two locations

• One on the east coast and one near the west coast.– The west coast site will be in Arizona (phoenix

metropolitan area.

Questions?Questions?

NISANuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

Regulatory and Technical OrganizationsRegulatory and Technical Organizations

International

Japan

United States

Palo Verde Containment Palo Verde Containment and Fuel Buildingsand Fuel Buildings

San Andreas and Sonora FaultsSan Andreas and Sonora Faults

Palo Palo VerdeVerde

“In Arizona, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station sits in the "low" earthquake hazard area.”

Lee AllisonArizona State Geologist

arizonageology.blogspot.com

March 13, 2011

Source (map): Arizona Geology, Volume 30, No. 1, Spring 2000 / Arizona Geological Survey

Palo Palo VerdeVerde

Palo Palo VerdeVerde

Back-up PowerBack-up Power

Two redundant emergency diesel generators in each unit

Two diesel fueled turbine generators shared by all units 

 

Four redundant sets of batteries in each unit

Emergency PreparednessEmergency PreparednessEmergency PreparednessEmergency Preparedness

Emergency PreparednessEmergency PreparednessEmergency PreparednessEmergency Preparedness

• Full-scale Drills and Exercises held annually

• Joint Response – Palo Verde – State – Maricopa County– Local Groups and

Agencies– Federal Agencies– Media

• Full-scale Drills and Exercises held annually

• Joint Response – Palo Verde – State – Maricopa County– Local Groups and

Agencies– Federal Agencies– Media

Knowledge and TrainingKnowledge and TrainingKnowledge and TrainingKnowledge and Training

Key PointsKey PointsKey PointsKey Points• No Vulnerability to TsunamiNo Vulnerability to Tsunami• Technical Differences/UpgradesTechnical Differences/Upgrades• Significant Differences in Organizational Significant Differences in Organizational

Support (U.S. and International)Support (U.S. and International)• High U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/SupportHigh U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/Support• Mitigation Strategies/Procedures in PlaceMitigation Strategies/Procedures in Place• Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo

Verde, Local, State and Federal)Verde, Local, State and Federal)• Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement

of Safety Marginsof Safety Margins

• No Vulnerability to TsunamiNo Vulnerability to Tsunami• Technical Differences/UpgradesTechnical Differences/Upgrades• Significant Differences in Organizational Significant Differences in Organizational

Support (U.S. and International)Support (U.S. and International)• High U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/SupportHigh U.S. Industry Standards/Unity/Support• Mitigation Strategies/Procedures in PlaceMitigation Strategies/Procedures in Place• Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo Extensive Emergency Preparedness (Palo

Verde, Local, State and Federal)Verde, Local, State and Federal)• Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement Lessons Learned / Continuous Improvement

of Safety Marginsof Safety Margins