What’s Ahead for Russia and the West? Four Scenarios

8/21/2019 What’s Ahead for Russia and the West? Four Scenarios

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EUROPE POLICY PAPER 3/2015

WHAT’S AHEAD FOR RUSSIA AND THE WEST?

FOUR SCENARIOS

JOERG FORBRIG


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W’ A R WF S

E P P

J

by Joerg Forbrig1

1 Joerg Forbrig is transatlantic fellow for Central and Eastern Europe, and director of the Fund for Belarus Democracy, atThe German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin.

The Issue and Policy Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Key Dimension: Regime Cohesion in Russia vs. European and Transatlantic Unity . 3

Russia and the West: Four Basic Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Rethinking Western Policy: Caveats and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10


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W’ A R W 1

T I P P

1The Issue

O ver a year into the ever-worsening Ukraine

crisis, there is little doubt that an optimistic

era in Russian-Western relations has ended.

The post-1989 vision of a Europe that was whole,

free, and at peace had long suffered setbacks and

disappointments, but when Russia annexed Crimea

and the Kremlin waged war in Eastern Ukraine,

the post-Cold War order was buried. While this

is now acknowledged by most, few in Europe or

the United States have taken a closer look at the

potential new contours of the European order, and

especially of the changing relationship between theWest and Russia that lies at its heart. For the latter,

several scenarios are conceivable even if these have

no claim to precision. They can, however, indicate

longer-term trajectories that can endow Western

debate and policymaking on Russia with much

needed strategic foresight.

Conceivable scenarios are all based on different

degrees of regime cohesion in Russia, and of

unity among European and transatlantic partners.

Ensuring stability of the political, economic, and

social system created and led by Vladimir Putinin Russia is arguably the key driver behind the

confrontation imposed by the Kremlin on the West,

whose ability to respond is clearly a function of the

unity it can muster between the United States and

EU. High or low cohesiveness between the two sides

in this contest suggests four broad scenarios, or

trajectories for Russian-Western relations: standoff,

Western decline, Russian decline, or chaos. Each

of these constellations appears possible in the

mid-term. More importantly, however, they allow

for a closer look at the factors shaping individual

trajectories, and not least the policy options that

present themselves to the West in the short run and

that principally shape relationships with Russia in

the long run.

Policy Priorities

These scenarios underline the key importance

of Western unity. In order to withstand Russia’s

assault, a clearer-than-ever commitment is needed

to the norms underlying the European order as it

has developed over the last decades. Ongoing and

future violations of these principles by Russia must

be punished much more resolutely and quickly than

has occurred so far, while a constant effort must

be made to rein in countries that are, for various

reasons, at risk of breaking out of Western unity.

Secondly, European resilience to Russian meddling

must be boosted. Systematic measures are neededto decrease the vulnerability of Western countries,

and that of Russia’s neighbors, to the economic and

energy pressures, political meddling, propaganda,

and military threats launched by the Kremlin. In

so doing, thirdly, EU-NATO complementarity and

vision is critical. The EU and NATO must build

much stronger complementarity and coordination

than has been the case to date, acknowledging the

necessity of jointly countering the combined hard

and soft security threats that constitute hybrid

warfare. Ideally, the EU and NATO would not

limit themselves to their current membership but

provide necessary assistance, as well as membership

perspectives, to their Eastern neighbors. Fourthly,

the United States must re-engage in Europe.

Understanding that it is the end recipient of the

Russian challenge, which is designed to curtail U.S.

leadership in global affairs, Washington should

reprioritize Russia, re-engage with its European

allies, and strengthen its presence as a key

guarantor of security in Europe. Finally, in Europe,

German leadership is indispensable. Central to

cohesion among EU members, Berlin will haveto take the concerns of those EU members and

neighbors that are particularly exposed to Russian

pressures more seriously, formulate its position

accordingly and unambiguously, and increase its

political, financial, and military commitments to

securing the EU and NATO’s eastern flank.

Few in Europe or

the United States

have taken a closer

look at the potentia

new contours of the

European order.


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T G M F U S2

I

2

More than a year after the Ukraine crisiserupted and evolved through Russia’s

annexation of Crimea, its ever-less veiled

war in Eastern Ukraine, and its ever-more open and

broad confrontation with the West, strategic debate

in the United States and, even more so, in Europe

remains surprisingly short term. Western policy

and public debate is yet to fully appreciate the

extent and likely longevity of the Russian challenge

that has been so rapidly unfolding before Europe

and the West broadly.

It was natural that initial discussions were reactive.They were marked by surprise and even shock at

the shattering of long-held hopes and views on

Russia, tried to come to terms with an emerging

new reality, focused on Ukraine as the immediate

problem at hand, and devoted themselves primarily

to specific policy tools, from negotiations to

sanctions to military support. In so doing, policy

debate and decision-making in the West have

largely been driven by events, ceding agency mostly

to the Kremlin, instead of charting and pursuing

their own course and strategy.

A shift is needed in order to move the debate in

a direction that is more strategic and forward-

leaning. This requires a more systematic analysis of

the domestic determinants of external action, for

both Russia and the West. A good look is necessary

at the impact, potential, and manifestation, of

Russian influences on the internal cohesion

and room to maneuver of the West, and vice

versa. Policy options for additional and refined

instruments to effectively influence Russian

decisions and actions are needed, as are further

measures to curtail the Kremlin’s reach intoWestern countries. There are several key questions.

What constitutes success or failure of Western

action vis-à-vis Russia? What desirable andundesirable outcomes may result from individual

policy options? And which formats are conceivable

for a future relationship with Russia?

Scenario exercises are a useful instrument for

forward-looking policy consideration. They

allow for the examination of different courses of

developments, the impact of particular factors,

outcomes of individual policy choices and actions,

and conceivable resulting constellations. What

is important to stress, however, is that modelling

scenarios does not attempt to predict specificcourses of events or to advocate certain course

of action. It is merely a tool to help sharpen the

analysis of both drivers and costs and benefits of

conceivable developments.

The scenarios examined here are derived

from one central dimension. Internal political

cohesiveness — the cohesion of the Russian

regime on one hand and the unity of European

and transatlantic partners on the other — will

be critical to shaping the future relationship

between Russia and the West, in that it determines

the ability to act by either side. This suggests

four broad constellations for Russian-Western

relations that are subsequently detailed. Against

this background, several caveats are discussed that

have a bearing on Western policy choices, before a

number of broad recommendations are offered for

rethinking Western strategies and policies vis-à-

vis a revisionist and aggressive Russia. As central

elements, a revised Western approach to Russia

will have to include a conscious strengthening of

European and transatlantic unity and systematic

efforts at bolstering European resilience to Russianmeddling.

Western policy and

public debate is yet

to fully appreciate

the extent and likely

ongevity of the Russian

challenge.


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W’ A R W 3

The ability of any political actor, whether anindividual government or an alliance thereof,

to act effectively is determined by the extent

of legitimacy, elite consensus, and broader social

support that it can generate from within as well as

the material resources it has at its disposal. Neither

Russia nor the Western community is exempt

from this rule, although the quality, extent, and

foundations of their respective internal cohesion

differ considerably. What is more, the cohesiveness

both of the Russian regime and of the Western

community has undergone a significant evolution

that started well before, and has been amplified by,the Ukraine crisis.

In Russia, a principal shift in the mechanics of

power has taken place over the last years. The first

two terms of Vladimir Putin’s rule (2000-08) were

primarily devoted to political, economic, and social

stabilization at home. The president did so in an

authoritarian manner that was decried by many

in Russia and beyond, but he managed to bring a

degree of stability to Russia that was welcomed by

many. In so doing, he benefited from a quadrupling

of the oil price that provided Russia withunprecedented revenues, enabling the government

in Moscow to hand out a steady stream of benefits

to both elites and citizens-at-large. The only price

to be paid by Russians was political acquiescence

with the ever-more autocratic rule in their country.

With Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012,

foreign policy was placed center-stage, positing

that Russia must finally reassert itself as a global

power, claim its own sphere of influence, and shed

the constraints imposed by Western-dominated

institutions. In this spirit, the Russian regime haseffectively reintroduced a state ideology, consisting

of a revisionist approach to the post-Cold War

order in Europe, a denial of the independence

and inviolability of its former satellites, a sense of

civilizational superiority of the Russian Orthodox

and Eurasian space over an allegedly decaying

West, and the unique role for Russia to confrontthe United States and its European allies. In

taking to ideology, Putin has effectively moved his

power base from the material to the immaterial: if

earlier on, his social contract with both elites and

Russians-at-large was based growing prosperity,

it now rests on a putative historical mission that

everyone is to subscribe to, or else be considered a

traitor. This new deal, however, requires Russia to

permanently seek and win confrontation, whether

by proxy or directly, politically or militarily, with

the West.

The West, meanwhile, has gone through successive

crises that have undermined European and Western

unity and solidarity. The European Union has long

struggled to overcome governance deficits and

to devise policies that are conducive to growth.

Some countries, like Greece, continue to fight the

consequences of sovereign debt and banking crises

while others, like Hungary, witness democratic

backsliding and authoritarian tendencies. With the

United Kingdom, a key member even threatens to

leave the bloc. Momentum for further enlargement,

once a driver for pacification, development, anddemocratization on the continent, has effectively

come to a standstill. Euroskeptic and xenophobic

parties appear to be on a steady rise in almost all

EU member states and put a damper on a possible

deepening of EU integration, which was once a key

driver advancing the European project.

Ties with the United States have been badly

damaged over a decade of contentious

interventions, from Afghanistan to Libya, scandals

over secret CIA prisons and NSA surveillance, and

a heated debate over the Transatlantic Trade andInvestment Partnership that only fueled anti-U.S.

sentiments among many Europeans. Adding to this

growing rift was the withdrawal, real or perceived,

of U.S. engagement from Europe and Washington’s

shift of attention to other world regions. As a

result of strained transatlantic ties and seemingly

This new deal requ

Russia to permane

seek and win

confrontation, whe

by proxy or directly,

politically or militar

with the West.

T K D:

R C R .

E T U3


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T G M F U S4

endless challenges to the European project, theWest has indeed appeared to be in decline and its

institutions, first and foremost the EU and NATO,

to be end-of-line models.

On the surface, it may have seemed that historical

scales had tipped away from the West and toward

(re-)emerging global players such as Russia. And

this appearance may well have made Putin believe

his assault on the European order would go

unchallenged. To him, Ukraine provided the perfect

occasion to exploit the weakness of the West and to

boost the standing and stability of his own regime.Put differently, the issue of cohesion was present at

the outset of the crisis.

What is more, however, cohesion has been central

ever since. On one hand, it is at the core of Western

sanctions imposed in response to Russian actions

in Ukraine. These are, in effect, an attempt to test

and strain the cohesiveness of the Russian regime.

By punishing individuals through visa bans and

asset freezes, by excluding Russia from prestigious

clubs such as the G7, and by imposing economic

sanctions against Russian businesses, the West

hopes to drive up the political and material costs

of Kremlin adventurism and to sow doubt and

discontent over the Kremlin’s actions among elites

and society. The short and long-term effects of

Western sanctions remain hotly disputed, but they

clearly are intended to weaken cohesion on the

Russian side.

More obviously, and unexpectedly, sanctions have

had a positive effect on Western unity. Especially

among Europeans, reluctance and outright

opposition to imposing sanctions against Russia

was strong from the outset. It is only owing topermanent coalition-building within the EU and to

considerable patience in the United States, which

has more than once delayed unilateral measures

to make sure of being in lockstep with Europe,

that successive punitive measures were rolled out

against Moscow. Although achieving the necessary

unanimity within the EU, and consensus across

the Atlantic, remains an uphill struggle, sanctions

against Russia have become an important marker of

Western unity.

On the other hand, undermining Western unityhas become an important target for Russia. Over

the last year, it has come as a shocking revelation

to many that several EU countries are vulnerable

to Russian influence and manipulation. European

reliance on energy imports from Russia has been

highlighted again, as have Moscow’s efforts to use

lucrative business deals, from arms to pipelines,

to buy the acquiescence of individual EU capitals.

Extremist parties on the right and left have been

shown to have links with, and at times funding

from, Moscow, while a massive Russian propaganda

campaign swept across Europe to sow doubt inboth European media and governments and the

partnership with the United States. Direct military

threats were addressed to the EU and NATO’s

Eastern-most members, while the Russian army

has been posturing along NATO’s borders with

an intensity unseen since the Cold War. In short,

Russia no less than the West has understood that

chipping away at the other side’s cohesion, and

bolstering one’s own, will be critical in this contest.

he West has appeared

to be in decline and its

institutions, first and

foremost the EU and

NATO, to be end-of-line

models.


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W’ A R W 5

The confrontation that Russia is seekingwith the West will be critically shaped by

the degrees to which both sides are able to

maintain their cohesion and unity. It may indeed

be a race for time, with either side hoping that its

own efforts to undermine the cohesion of the other

come to fruition before its own ranks break apart.

And while the outcome of this contest remains

completely open, this basic fault line can serve

to model a number of scenarios for the further

evolution of relations between the West and Russia.

On this basis, four constellations can be conceived

of depending on whether cohesion of the Russianregime on one hand and unity among transatlantic

and European partners on the other are high or low.

These generic scenarios are visualized in Figure 1.

1. Standoff: Cohesion Prevails in Russia as

Does Unity in the West

This first scenario effectively reflects the status

quo. With its actions over the last year, from

invading Ukraine to nosing NATO

borders to undermining the Iran

agreements, Russia has made its

challenge to the West unmistakably

clear. Its “elegant” takeover of

Crimea has boosted the standing

of Putin among Russians, tensions

within the apparatus or criticism

from the beleaguered opposition

have remained manageable, the

political and especially economic

costs incurred have so far been

absorbed, and state propaganda

permanently feeds a nationalist

frenzy of a Russian return to itserstwhile position in the world.

The West, in turn, was initially

surprised at Russia’s breaking out

of what seemed to be a difficult

but still broadly cooperative

relationship but eventually regained its composure.Its responses to the evolving Ukraine crisis — a

mix of punitive measures and offers to negotiate

solutions — may not have been what many in

Ukraine and in the West wished for but they were

still unexpectedly unified and strong. At the same

time, European countries have become acutely

aware of the many vulnerabilities they have vis-à-

vis Russia. Whether through business ties or energy

supplies, media presence or political parties, the

West has realized that the Kremlin employs a vast

set of tools to manipulate European politics and

societies from within. In a gradual response, EUcountries are now developing strategies to limit

these disruptive Russian influences.

With cohesion prevailing on either side, a

protracted war of attrition is indicated. In this

standoff, Russia can be expected to be proactive

and to regularly seek the offensive, as its internal

cohesion fully rests on engaging the external

enemy, which is how the Kremlin portrays the

R W:

F B S4

Figure 1


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T G M F U S6

West. Russian pressure will continue, using allmeans from economic to military, on those of

its neighbors who remain outside of Western

institutions. Moscow will seek to puncture Western

institutions, whether by directly threatening

countries that are most exposed militarily, such

as the Baltic states and Scandinavian countries, or

by enticing those economically weakest, such as

Cyprus or Greece. Elsewhere in the world, Russia

will continue its efforts to build new alliances from

Asia to Latin America. This multipronged approach

is geared toward permanently testing the resolve,

ability, and standing of Western institutions, firstand foremost the EU and NATO.

The West, in turn, will likely be more reactive

and defensive. Compared to Russia’s single

actor advantage, determination, and escalation

dominance, Western agency is constrained in

a number of respects. Its decision-making is

consensual, requiring lengthy negotiations among

states and viewpoints. Its political measures, such as

sanctions, require solid evidence to be considered

legal. Electoral cycles in individual countries

limit Western decision-making no less than criseselsewhere in the world that may take priority. As

a result, and rather than deciding on an offensive

strategy that would bring to bear its vast economic

and military superiority, the West will continuously

be tempted to settle for a minimum.

Its focus will be on increasing its own resilience,

limited largely to the space encompassed by

the EU and NATO, and to reduce the multiple

vulnerabilities among many European countries to

Russian influences. Beyond that space, especially

regarding Ukraine and the other countries ofthe Eastern neighborhood, the West will remain

half-hearted and without the commitment and

assistance needed to fully integrate further

neighbors of Russia into its own institutions. It

will likely only respond to particularly egregious

actions by the Kremlin, such as further aggression

in Ukraine or elsewhere, with additional sanctionsbut be mindful to avoid any situation that risks

direct confrontation with Russia. The hope on both

sides is that cohesion of the other will wither first

and change the situation to one of the following two

scenarios.

2. Western Decline: European and

Transatlantic Unity Breaks Apart

Degrees of diversity and occasional disagreements

have long been a natural, although mostly

manageable, part of the European and transatlantic

communities. The last years have seen aconsiderable aggravation of fissures and tension, as

disputes from the Iraq war to the surveillance affair

have fueled anti-Americanism, while the eurozone

crisis, migration, and other policy challenges have

given rise to a host of ever more vocal Euroskeptic

parties. Perhaps more than ever before, the

European project and partnership with the United

States are questioned by many.

The shocking discovery of the last year, however,

was the extent, cunning, and strategic intent

with which Russia has been exploiting thesestrains. It has built inroads into nearly all EU

countries, whether through investments in politics,

propaganda to manipulate publics, lobbying

firms to influence legislation, armies of lawyers to

challenge EU policies, business ties, and, above all,

its substantial energy supplies to Europe. These

inroads have long served to turn public debate

and political decision-making in Russia’s favor.

Increasingly, they now seem to be employed to

paralyze the EU, to sow doubt and frustration

among societies, to establish protégé political

actors, and to drive wedges among European

countries, governments, and peoples.

Russia may well succeed in doing so. A litmus

test will be whether or not the EU musters the

consensus needed to extend political and economic

The shocking discovery

of the last year was the

extent, cunning, and

strategic intent with

which Russia has been

xploiting these strains.


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W’ A R W 7

sanctions imposed against Russia. If, now orlater, Europeans fail to agree on this question,

this will establish a dangerous precedent — with

a number of effects. It will make any resolute EU

response to future Russian aggression against

any of its neighbors nearly impossible to achieve.

It will render a common EU foreign policy an

ultimate illusion, failing as it does in the face of

Europe’s gravest external challenge and in its

nearest neighborhood, and throw the bloc back

into introversion. It will forsake transatlantic unity,

given that the United States is unlikely to relax

pressures on Russia. And in so doing, whether onthis particular occasion or a future one, European

disunity will issue a carte blanche to Russia to

pursue its revisionist policies and aggression against

other states.

Even worse, such a Russian triumph over the EU

will only embolden the Kremlin to also test the

other key Western institution: NATO. Moscow has

already intensified its posturing over the last year

massively, using all of its military capabilities and

some of its hybrid warfare innovations. Despite

NATO’s recent assurance initiatives, the Baltic statesremain particularly exposed — geographically,

socially, and politically — to Russian attempts to

expose NATO weakness. These arguably consist

of a poor preparedness to ensure the territorial

defense of its Eastern periphery, a lack of clarity

towards situations of hybrid warfare, poor material

ability after two decades of defense cuts, and, most

importantly, weak political will and public support

in a fragmented Europe to abide by Article 5

obligations.1 To puncture those treaty commitments

and to effectively neuter NATO is certainly the

ultimate prize for the Kremlin.

1 As a recent poll by the Pew Research Center found only 38percent of Germans, 40 percent of Italians, 47 percent of French,48 percent of Poles and Spaniards, and 49 percent of Britishsupported the use of military force by their country to defend aNATO ally that finds itself attacked by Russia; see Pew ResearchCenter, “NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, butReluctant to Provide Military Aid,” June 2015.

The end result, which Russia is likely aiming for, isto paralyze and fragment both the EU and NATO.

In its immediate neighborhood, this will give

Moscow a free hand to reestablish its hegemony

over former satellites, and to build the regional

sphere of influence that it believes it needs to

qualify as a global power. A less integrated and

principled Europe will provide fertile ground for

advancing Russian political and economic interests

in a traditional divide-and-conquer manner. And

vis-à-vis the United States, Russia will feel that it

levels the playing field, stripping the United States

of its European allies and questioning its globalleadership.

3. Russian Decline: The Cohesion of Putin’s

Regime Weakens

Alternatively, European and transatlantic unity

may continue to hold while Putin’s government

comes under pressure. Russia has long faced

formidable structural problems, dysfunctionalities,

and centrifugal tendencies, ranging from the

challenge of controlling and integrating a vast

territory to abysmal demographic trends, from

its excessive dependency on oil and gas exports

to the kleptocracy of its public administration,

and from an outsized military and security

apparatus to the rising cost of Russia’s ambitions

for Eurasian integration. As long as revenues from

energy exports were plentiful, as in the 2000s,

these problems could be masked with money.

But declining revenues, especially after a sharp

and lasting drop in oil prices, have exposed the

weaknesses.

To make matters worse, the introduction of

Western sanctions, designed to put a check on the

Russian government’s aggression against Ukraine,

is taking a serious toll on the Kremlin’s resource

base. Currency reserves have already declined

sharply, as the government has had to compensate

an economy that has found itself partially cut off

The end result, whi

Russia is likely aim

for, is to paralyze a

fragment both the

and NATO.


11/16

T G M F U S8

from global financial markets. Foreign investmentcame to a standstill after the annexation of Crimea.

Production of oil and gas has peaked and started to

decline given a lack of technology and investment,

and key European markets are diversifying away

from Russian energy. Although in the short

term, the Russian government has succeeded in

stabilizing the economic situation, especially the

ruble and inflation rates, Russia is in for a long

economic agony.

First and foremost, the Kremlin will naturally try

to avert any rapid economic deterioration without,however, addressing the underlying structural

problems or making political concessions to the

West. It touts “import replacement” and a pivot to

Asia for alternative partners and sources of funding

and revenues through its propaganda. There may

be some relief in the form of Chinese loans and

contracts, however, their scope and scale remains

far behind the revenues, consumer products,

and technologies, for which Russia has long

been dependent on the West. As a result, Russia’s

economic modernization is effectively halted, while

growing interaction with China squanders Russia’swealth.

At home, the resulting competition for resources

will increase tensions within the government

apparatus and ruling elite. Judging by decisions so

far, and much in line with its aggressive politics and

rhetoric, the Putin administration clearly prioritizes

boosting the capacities of Russia’s military and

security apparatus over investments in the social

welfare system or economic modernization. This

may well prompt a response among some of the

losers from this reallocation, especially technocratsin the apparatus, and in the urban middle class

that feels the pinch of the changed political and

economic environment. The next-possible occasion

to voice their discontent politically and publicly

is the Duma election in late 2016 and, if it indeed

generates momentum, such a political project

of modernizers may well take aim at the 2018presidential elections. Indications are that System

Putin will be able to handle this impulse, whether

by marginalization, suppression, or absorption.

However, structural challenges and crises will only

become more frequent and aggravated over time.

Prolonged economic stagnation will fuel infighting

among key parts of the state apparatus, put into

question elite loyalties, and lead Russia’s peripheries

to question their relationship to the political

center. And in order to postpone, if not prevent, its

eventual implosion, the Kremlin will need to useever-harsher internal crackdowns to suppress, and

ever-more desperate external conflicts to release,

growing internal tensions.

Thus, for a significant period of time, the West will

have to live with a Russian regime that is unwilling

and unable to reform from within but willing and

able to stem its breakdown by all means. Ironically,

the West will equally seek to delay, rather than

hasten, the inevitable. Intimidated by the prospect

of chaos in Russia, and absent a strategy and vision

for a democratic Russia in Europe, the West will

be tempted to moderate its pressures, and perhaps

even lend direct support whenever a Russian

implosion may seem imminent. Once that moment

arrives, however, the West will face many of the

same questions that arose with the fall of the Iron

Curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc.

No less now than back then, its successful handling

of the situation will depend on Western strength

and strategy but above all, on its unity.

4. Chaos: Cohesion Folds in Russia

and in the WestArguably the worst of the cases presented here, a

final scenario would see internal cohesion wither

both in Russia and among Western countries.

Likely as a result of a longer standoff, both sides

will feel increasingly worn down politically

The West will have to

live with a Russian

egime that is unwilling

and unable to reform

from within but willing

and able to stem its

breakdown by allmeans.


12/16

W’ A R W 9

and economically, and questions emerge as tothe rationale behind their respective behavior.

Given their democratic nature and described

vulnerabilities to Russian meddling, unity may well

break down first in the West, followed over time

by a weakening Russian regime, whose foreign

policy adventures increasingly fail to compensate

for its domestic weakness. Such a collapse on both

sides, however, will have dramatic consequences

for the entire Euroatlantic and Eurasian space, and

globally.

It will effectively end seven decades of expandingand deepening Western integration that resulted

in what is the single-most advanced model of

international cooperation seen to date. To be sure,

the central institutions reflecting that integration,

the EU and NATO, will likely remain but become

less significant. The EU loses any meaning and

ambition in the foreign policy arena, sees a

loosening of its internal depth of integration,

and abstains from any further enlargement in

the Balkans and in the Eastern neighborhood.

NATO will have proven ineffective in guaranteeing

the territorial inviolability of its members, thus

depriving Western integration of the key securitydimension. In so doing, the West will cease to be

a credible and effective actor that can project a

vision of a cooperative world order, whether in its

immediate vicinity or further afield.

Nowhere will this lack of an able West be felt

more strongly than in Eurasia. Absent the positive

effects emanating from the West for Russian

modernization and stabilization, whether they

are acknowledged by the Kremlin or not, Russia

will not be able to stem its decline and sink

into economic and political upheaval. Its directneighbors, all dependent on the erstwhile hegemon

politically, economically, and socially, will become

massively destabilized, with civil strife and poverty

unleashing migrant flows to Europe. The first

Western countries to experience the ripple effects

of an Eastern Europe sinking into chaos will be

the EU and NATO’s eastern-most members, many

of them already fragile polities, economies, and

societies. Unable to absorb these pressures by

themselves, they will turn to an EU whose capacity

to assist, as well as political will and sense of

solidarity, are greatly weakened.

Seven decades

of expanding and

deepening Western

integration ... resul

in what is the single

most advanced

model of internatiocooperation seen t

date.


13/16

T G M F U S10

None of these scenarios is bright. They alldefy the many hopes and efforts invested by

the West in the transformation of Europe,

and Russia, over the last quarter-century. Yet each

of these trajectories seems possible. This only

highlights the extent to which the West and Russia

find themselves at a principal junction, and it

speaks to the critical long-term consequences of

any political decisions made, by the West and by

Russia, in the short term. In considering its policy

options, the West would be well-advised to bear in

mind a number of caveats.

First of all, the fact that the strength and survival

of Putin’s regime in Russia is now fully dependent

on confronting the West effectively precludes any

positive scenario for their mutual relationship.

As hard as it may seem to accept for consensus

and compromise-oriented Western politics and

publics, there is no middle ground when one side

is openly challenging the entire European order, its

rule-based and cooperative nature, key principles,

and institutions. If either side in this contest was to

make serious concessions, it would undermine its

own foundations.

Nowhere is this more obvious than on the question

of accommodation. Repeatedly over the last year,

seasoned Western policy experts have called

for a new grand bargain with Russia. Whatever

its exact form and content, however, such an

accommodation is fraught with existential risks

for both sides. For the Russian leadership, the

concessions necessary for such an accord would

run counter to its ideologized claim to superiority

and challenge to the West; they might be read

as a weakness the Kremlin can ill-afford. Forthe West, concessions would almost certainly

have to compromise key Western principles and

values, such as the inviolability and sovereignty

of European states, to meet Russian geopolitical

demands. Thus diametrically opposed, neither side

can really afford accommodation without the riskof ushering in its own decline before the other side.

In this situation, and as counterintuitive as it may

sound, the current standoff is the least bad option.

It is preferable to any alternative, as it is the only

trajectory that keeps the West intact as a key global

player and advocate of a rule-based and cooperative

international order, without confronting Europe

with the repercussions of Russian collapse. When

the current regime in Russia eventually lapses, the

consequences and uncertainties will be comparable

to those of the breakdown of the Soviet Union.This potential fallout, in order to be managed, will

require a united and capable Western community

and institutions. Ideally, therefore, the West would

use the standoff to prepare itself for the eventual

collapse of the Russian regime; at a minimum, it

must make sure to get through this likely protracted

stalemate undivided and able.

Sustaining the unity this status quo requires will

not come easy to the West. Even worse, by its very

nature, it is at a comparable disadvantage to Russia.

After all, what is at stake for Putin and his inner

and wider circle is their personal and political

survival, and that of their fortunes. By contrast, the

stakes for Western leaders are much lower and their

temptation to break Western ranks much higher.

They find themselves subject to pressures from

political opponents who, typically from the fringes,

present anti-U.S., Euroskeptic, and often outright

pro-Russian views. Economic interests and energy

dependencies undermine principled positions no

less than fear of conflict, Russian propaganda, or

wooing, all instruments the Kremlin has shown to

use so effectively.

Finally, there is the risk that Western unity, which

is as important in this new reality as it is hard

to maintain, will be reduced to lowest-common

denominator positions. Over the course of the last

year, more resolute responses to Russian actions in

R W P:

C R5

The fact that the

trength and survival of

utin’s regime in Russia

is now fully dependent

n confronting the West

effectively precludes

any positive scenariofor their mutual

relationship.


14/16

W’ A R W 11

Ukraine have been repeatedly delayed or watereddown. Many on the Eastern flank of EU and NATO

yearn for stronger-than-symbolic measures to

boost their security against Russian pressures.

Eastern neighbors, especially Georgia, Moldova,

and Ukraine, wish to see stronger EU commitment

and assistance. Yet in all these cases, readiness in

many Western capitals to be proactive, determined,

and visionary has been all too limited. Whatever

its origin, this is an inhibition the West can hardly

afford in the face of the very determined adversary

that Russia has shown to be.

With these caveats in mind, a number of

recommendations can be derived for Western

policy.

1. Reinforcing Western unity is paramount. In

order to withstand Russia’s assault on the West,

it will be critical for the United States and its

European allies to fortify their cohesiveness.

This requires a clear commitment to the norms

underlying the European order that has developed

over the last decades. Ongoing and future violations

of these principles by Russia must be punished

much more resolutely and quickly than has been

the case so far, both to limit the damage done

and to weaken the culprit. This will also require

continuously reining in wobblers and renegades

among Western countries, tempted as they are

to prioritize electoral cycles, economic interests,

or Russian advances over principled positions.

In so continuously reaffirming its key principles,

however, the West will have to carefully weigh the

strength of its possible responses against the risk

of jeopardizing Western unity. When there is a

conflict between force and cohesion, the latter hasto take priority.

2. European resilience to Russian meddling

must be boosted. The West needs to boost its own

resilience, and that of Russia’s neighbors, to the

economic and energy pressures, political meddling,

propaganda, and military threats launched by theKremlin. Ongoing efforts, by individual countries

as well as by the EU and NATO, have already

borne some fruit in this critical field, such as the

emerging EU energy union and systematic work on

energy diversification or measures to boost military

security through air policing and the enhanced

rapid reaction force in NATO. These efforts need

to be stepped up and expanded. The full regulatory

arsenal at the disposal of the EU and its members,

from the European Commission’s anti-trust

measures to anti-bribery laws, media regulations,

corporate governance, and anti-terrorism measuresin individual countries, must be employed to limit

Russian interference. European business needs to

be supported in its reorientation away from the

Russian market. Outreach to the sizeable Russian-

speaking communities across the EU is needed as

much as far more generous political, economic,

and, if need be, military assistance to Eastern

neighbors.

3. EU-NATO complementarity and vision is

critical. In enhancing its own security, the EU and

NATO must build much stronger complementaritythan they have to date. Faced with hybrid warfare,

the combination of hard and soft security

challenges affecting many aspects of European

societies, a more conscious division of labor is

imperative. Where NATO has capabilities to avert

traditional hard security threats and increasingly

cyber warfare, the EU has resources to counter

soft security threats from energy to finance of the

media. In employing these mechanisms jointly and

strategically, the EU and NATO must not succumb

to introversion. Instead of limiting themselves

to their current membership, the West must actambitiously and proactively with a view to the

long-term integration of all of Europe, offering aid

and perspectives of EU and NATO membership to

Eastern neighbors.

In order to withstan

Russia’s assault on

the West, it will be

critical for the Unite

States and its Euro

allies to fortify their

cohesiveness.


15/16

T G M F U S12

4. The United States must re-engage in Europe. A particular responsibility for ensuring Western

unity and for facing up to Russia rests with the

United States and Germany. The former has to

acknowledge that it is the ultimate addressee of

Kremlin policy, whose end goal it is to curtail

U.S. leadership in global affairs. Consequently,

Washington should reprioritize Russia, reengage

with its European allies, and strengthen its

presence as a key guarantor of security in Europe.

Its approach to Russia will be closely watched by

emerging powers elsewhere in the world. Failure to

act resolutely in, and with, Europe will only invitefuture challengers around the globe.

5. German leadership in Europe is indispensableGermany, in turn, is central to cohesion among EU

members. In so doing, Berlin will have to take more

seriously the concerns of those EU members and

neighbors that are particularly exposed to Russian

pressures, and formulate its position accordingly

and unambiguously. Enhanced shuttle diplomacy

and focus on Russia as the EU’s key foreign policy

challenge will have to be ingredients of German

leadership, as will stronger political, financial, and

military commitments to securing the EU and

NATO’s Eastern flank.


16/16

O F F I C E S

W • B • P • BB • A • B • W

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What’s Ahead for Russia and the West? Four Scenarios