White-Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labor Movement

E G I L F I V E L S D A L "

White-Collar U n i o n s and the Norwegian Labor Movement

IN THE PAST, European white-collar associations typically were opposed to collective bargaining.' And those who did engage in bargaining usually rejected the strike. Nevertheless, many white-collar associations-especially of professional workers and the lower grades of public employment-were able to exert considerable influence on pay and working conditions by other methods, e.g., petitions, go-slow tactics, and lobbying. However, postwar ferment in white-collar groups in Europe indicates a growing dissatisfaction with such gentle tactics. Paradoxically, white-collar associations are now becoming more militant, while the labor unions, in Scandinavia at least, are becoming less militant. In Norway this development appears to be a consequence of Labor's rise to a position of national power and responsibility.2

After a brief description of the Norwegian labor movement, I shall present some aspects of the development and present structure of white-collar unionism in Norway and then discuss relations between white-collar unions and the labor movements3

* Research Fellow, the Norwegian Research Council and the Institute for Social Research,

1 I am obliged to Dr. Melvin L. Kohn for his comments on this article. 2 For general accounts of labor relations and political life in Norway, see WaIter Galenson,

Labor in Norwa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), and Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, Poitical Parties in Norway (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964). For a penetrating analysis of postwar collective bargaining in connection with the economic policy of the Labor Government, see Mark W. Leiserson, Wages and Economic Control in Norway, 1945-1957 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

3 It should be remembered that Norway is one of the smaller Western nations as far as the size of population is concerned. According to the 1960 Population Census, total population numbered 3.6 million and the total economically active population 1.4 million. Of the latter, 7.8 per cent were emplo ers (including farmers), 11.6 per cent self-employed (including farmers),

In 1930 the white-collar group constituted only 13.6 per cent of the economically active population.

Oslo.

24.9 per cent white-col Y ar workers, and 55.7 per cent blue-collar workers (including foremen).

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Symposium: Norway / 81

Labor in Norway The first national trade union in Norway, the Typographical

Union, was started in 1882. Five years later, the Norwegian Labor Party was founded, and in 1899 the Federation of Trade Unions (Norwegian initials: L.O.) was established. The latter move led to the formation of the National Federation of Employers in 1900. When the L.O. was founded, it comprised seven unions with a total membership of 5,000. It experienced a stunning growth in the course of the last two generations and now com- prises 40 unions with approximately 570,000 member^.^

Both the L.O. and the Federation of Employers are characterized by a high degree of centralization in decision-making and constitute a bipolar power system without rival in the Norwegian economy. From its beginning, the L.O. has had multiplex relations with the Labor Party. Indeed, integra- tion has been so close at all levels of organization that the two systems have been fittingly described as Siamese twins. In the following, I often refer to them as the Labor Movement.

The Labor Party shifted in the interwar years from a revolutionary ideology to a policy of social-democratic reformism, and the leadership became much concerned with the problem of enlarging the social scope of the Party in order to obtain a majority in the Storting (the Norwegian Par- liament). At the beginning of the thirties, agricultural and forest workers, small farmers and fishermen, together with various segments of the white- collar force, proved responsive to new appeals of the Party. After an elec- toral landslide in 1933, the Labor Party, supported by the Agrarians, formed the Government in 1935. Then, during the period 1945-1961, the Party achieved an absolute majority in the Storting. Its base was now composed of lower and middle income groups in general, irrespective of occupation.

The Labor Party remains nominally Socialist, but its socialism is a domesticated type, more preoccupied with the goals of economic growth, full employment, and the development of social security institutions than with expanding state control over the economy. This position is attractive to many middle-class groups, but the 1961 loss of an absolute majority in the Storting has made the Party painfully aware that it cannot rule without stronger support from the rapidly expanding white-collar segment of the population.

4 In a recent national survey of Norwegian working-class attitudes, 73 per cent of the sample reported union membership (75 per cent of male and 58 per cent of female workers). See Sverre Lysgaard, Arbeidernes q n pd fuglige og politiske sp@stndZ (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965).

82 / EGIL FIVELSDAL

The Development of White-collar Unionism In the eighties and nineties, when labor was building a broad

protest movement with explicit economic and political goals, a wave of independent associations arose in the white-collar sector. As one might expect, these associations developed among persons employed in large-scale bureaucracies5 and within occupations with cultures of their own, e.g., the professions and semiprofessions. By the turn of the century we find a cluster of such associations, most of which were originally social clubs but which were slowly developing into economic interest organizations. In the process, the associations were stimulated to develop answers to several important dilemmas. Should they take up collective bargaining and model themselves on the labor union pattern? Should they work in isolation or coalesce? If isolation was rejected, should they affiliate to the L.0.-implying open support of the Labor Party-or seek other partners and thus remain neutral in political matters?

The choice of strategies has been infiuenced by social status as well as economic interests and political orientations. White-collar associations were slow to copy the working-class union model, as the weapons of the labor union smelled strongly of class revolt and socialism. It is interesting to note that lower-ranking public employees, who are in several important respects proximate to the working class, were the first salaried group to adopt the weapons of the labor union. The choice was prompted by inflation during World War I and the economic confusion which led to widespread radical- ization of the middle and lower grades in public employment. The unions of postal and railway employees affiliated with the L.O. in 1919 and were followed by municipal employees in 1920. These unions encompass both blue- and white-collar workers. In addition, professional civil servants formed an autonomous federation in 1918.

Public sector. Public employees were granted full bargaining rights in 1933, which led to the formation of a bargaining cartel of public unions in the L.O. in 1936. Subsequent events have only solidified this structure and increased its concentration. There are now four cartels facing government bargainers: the Federation of Professionals, the L.O. cartel, and two minor federations of semiprofessional, military, and clerical employees. In

5For a very interesting attempt to e lain clerical unionization in Great Britain in terms of “bureaucratization,” see David Lockwoo T , The Blackcoated Wodcer (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).


addition, as I shall discuss below, there is the Central Organization of White-collar Workers (FSO) which does not engage in bargaining.

Private sector. Since 1923 the L.O. has stated the principle that unions should organize vertically (“industrial unionism”), but it has been obliged to accept deviations in practice. The policy has been implemented in the face of considerable resistance in the public sector, but implementation has proved impossible in the area of private employment, where white-collar workers are organized by the L.O. along occupational lines.

The Union of Commercial and Office Employees was established in 1908 and affiliated with the L.O. in 1930. It has carried out successful organizing drives among the lower grades of clerical, sales, and warehouse employees. The Union of Foremen and Technical Employees was established by the L.O. in 1951, a move which was opposed by the Federation of Employers and the independent Union of Supervisors.

The L.O. unions have been generally successful in reducing jurisdictional disputes among themselves, but in some occupations or branches of service there is considerable competition between the L.O. and unaffiliated unions. Some of the latter are small but aggressive and have tried-not without success-to exploit political and status resentments against the L.O.

Compared to the public sector, white-collar unionism in the private sector is still rather underdeveloped. Again, “bureaucracy” and “semipro- fessionalism” seem to be the major forces conducive to unionization. Unions are concentrated in banking, insurance, and in large-scale industry and com- merce where foremen, supervisors, and technicians are especially well organized. Professional associations have many members in private employment, but so far have engaged in bargaining only in the public sector.

Structure and Tendencies Level of unionization. Data from various surveys indicate

that between 40 and 50 per cent of Norwegian white-collar workers are still unorganized. According to a survey of mine conducted in the winter of 1961-1962,42 per cent of nonprofessional salaried employees are organized in unions affiliated to the L.O., 16 per cent are organized in unions and quasi-unions outside the L.O., while 42 per cent are unorganized.6 Table 1

6 For a report on this survey, see Egil Fivelsdal, Funksjomrenes syn pd faglige og politiske s p @ r d Z (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964). The survey was anned and executed in coopera-

it was financed in the main by the L.O. ant! administered through the Gallup Institute. The sample did not include professional workers and high-level management rsonnel, but did include lower-rank public employees (e.g., postmen, railway conductors, anrpolicemen).

tion with Dr. Sverre Lysgaard, who made a arallel study o p’ Norwegian workers (see note 4);

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TABLE 1

UNION MEMBERSHIP OF NORWEGIAN NONPROFESSIONAL SALARIED EMPLOYEES, BY TYPE OF UNION AND EMPLOYMENT SECTOR

(percentages)

National Private

M F M F M F M F Member of L.O. union 70 31 71. 27 75 76 21 17 Member of independent union 15 28 9 29 9 0 17 8 Not unionized 15 41 20 44 16 24 62 75

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N = 344 85 196 48 44 17 489 208

governmenta Municipalities Cooperativeb firms

a State-owned industry not included. b Union shop for mast employees according to agreement with the L.O.

TABLE 2

OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT SECTOR

National Private government Municipalities employment

AFFILIATION OF UNIONIZED NORWEGIAN \vHITE-COLLAR WORKERS, BY

Civil servants Salaried municipal Office employees employees

Police Sales employees

Military

Federation Post of Labor (L.O.) Railway

Merchant marine officers (lower rank4

Technicians

Telephone Foremen

Telegraph Labor journalists

Custom officials

Technicians

Total 55,000 36,000 51,000

Civil servants Nurses

Police Librarians

Military Teachers Others

(non-L.O.) Telephone Municipal administration

Technicians

Professions Professions

O5ce employees

Merchant marine officers (higher ranks)

Technicians

Foremen

Journalists

Professions

Total 40,000 30,000 55,000


shows the degree of unionization by type of union and sector of employment. Note the striking difference between the private and the other sector~.~

Social cleauages in the white-collar force. Table 2 summarizes the present character of Norwegian white-collar unionism by occupation, branch of service, and type of affiliation.’ (Several occupations are covered by both

TABLE 3

UNION MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF NORWEGIAN NONPROFESSIONAL SALARIED EMPLOYEES

(percentages)

Member of L.0 union‘

Member of independent

union Not

unionized

Income in 1,000 Norwegian Crowns Up to 15 18-17 18-19 20-35 Not ascertained

Level of education Elementary Elementary and vocational Secondary Secondary and vocational;

secondary, upper stage

Socialist and Communist Labor Nonsocialistb Did not vote Not ascertained

Class identification Middle class Working class Not ascertained

Party preference

Total N’ =

M

34 20 19 24 3

35 25 24

16

3 71 18 3 5

27 66 7

100 333

F M

89 11 5 17 4 23 0 46 2 3

42 14 6 20

38 21

14 45

4 2 54 37 20 52 15 4 7 5

32 55 62 29 6 16

100 100 95 180

F M

66 38 20 14 3 13 9 30 2 5

9 36 25 15 41 25

25 24

2 2 20 34 55 46 12 7 11 11

55 47 32 41 13 12

LOO 100 56 357

F

86 4 4 3 3

27 13 42

18

0.5 24 42.5 20 13

48 44 8

100 225

Public transport employees excluded. There are four nonsocialist parties (V, Kr.F., Senter, h’oyre).

c N’s slightly lower for some questions.

7 My study indicates that the level of unionization is higher in larger offices than in smaller offices,& erhaps , because larger offices are more bureaucratic. The difference between large and small o ces IS much greater in the private sector than in the government, perhaps again because even the smallest government offices are subject to bureaucratic rules. Indeed the over-all, generally higher level of unionization within the government may in part be ascribed to more bureaucracy.

8 Instead of translating the names of all the relevant unions, I have listed major occupations or branches of service. The total figures must be taken as approximate. Especially within the large ublic unions affiliated with the L.O., it is hard to draw any clear line between blue- collar a n 8 white-collar occupations. I have used the official L.O. figures concerning “salaried employees,” which include some working-class groups.

86 / EGIL FIVELSDAL

L.O. and independent unions; this has caused considerable friction during the postwar years, particularly in the public sector.) I will not maintain that the horizontal line between the L.O. and the nonaffiliated group reflects a natural break in national stratification, but there is evidence to indicate that the cleavage may be based on differences in social status, political orientations, and economic interests. My sample survey showed that white-collar groups in the L.O. tend to have lower incomes and less education than white-collar workers organized outside the L.O. (see Table 3).

The differences between L.O. and the non-L.O. members become greater when we turn to political preferences. The respondents were asked which party they had voted for at the Storting election in 1961. A much higher proportion of L.O. members voted for the socialist parties (i.e., the Labor Party, the Socialist People’s Party, and the Communist Party) than did non-L.O. members.

Data on subjective class identification also showed a cleavage within the Nonvegian white-collar force in terms of af€iliation. Table 3 shows that L.O. members were more likely to identify with the working class.

The Middle-class Protest Movement Of course, the above data cannot explain the strategies and

tactics developed by the leadership of the various groups of unions, but I think that the material may provide a basis for interpreting contemporary ferment in the white-collar work force. Independent white-collar unions have made great membership gains during the last 20 years and in quite a few cases middle-class salaried groups (e.g., school teachers, ship’s mates, policemen, technical and clerical employees) have struck. Strike threats are increasingly common and many of the non-L.O. unions are now striving to accumulate fighting funds.

There are, I think, four basic reasons for this general shift of the independent unions towards militancy. First, collective bargaining has become respectable and no longer carries revolutionary or unethical implications. Second, postwar idation and a “salary squeeze” put an economic strain on middle- and higher-level salaried groups. Third, the L.O.’s progress among public employees has created concern as well as resistance among clerical, semiprofessional, and professional groups in public employment. Fourth, the independent unions’ lack of access to central decision-making bodies in a period of increasing economic-political centralization has gen- erated a desire for more power.

As mentioned, the Labor Party had a majority position in the Storting during the period 1945-1961. Policies of progressive taxation and com-


pression of incomes were accompanied by an inflation caused by rapid industrialization, devaluation of the pound in 1949, and the Korean War. Many white-collar groups became restive under the policy of “levelling,” as it was called by critics of the Labor Go~ernment.~ The nonsocialist parties tried in various ways to encourage this discontent. Several active spokesmen for the Conservative Party assumed leadership roles and thereby added a political dimension to a movement which professed to be “politically neutral” and thus provided the Labor Party with propaganda ammu- nition. The battle between the Labor Party and the salaried middle class has been fought on many institutional levels: in newspapers, in the Storting, in election campaigns, in municipal councils, in factories and offices. I shall now present some of the main issues and actors in this protracted and com- plicated confiict.

Equalitarian incomes policy. The Labor Movement’s economic policy has led to a narrowing of economic differentials, but when the goal of equality has clashed with the goal of increased productivity the latter has gained the upper hand. Internal solidarity has its price though, and the mounting pressures of skilled and white-collar workers have been so hard to withstand that the Labor Movement is now willing to accept a certain degree of economic differentiation.

The wage and salary policy was more rigid, for monetary as well as ideological reasons, during the first postwar decennium. The independent white-collar unions objected primarily to emergency economic legislation which placed exclusive responsibility for wage and salary settlements in the hands of L.O. and the Federation of Employers (NAF). The independent unions were powerless, and when the inflationary trend became steeper, they decided to pool their resources.

In 1949 the Association of Professional Workers was established-a more comprehensive unit than the Federation of Professionals in Public Employ- ment which was set up in 1918. The two organizations now work closely together and in 1965 represent 57 member organizations with a total membership of 34,000. Both maintain a policy of political neutrality, but relations with the Labor Movement are strained because of repeated attacks on the Labor Government’s salary and taxation policies. Labor accuses the organizations of defending “special privileges”; the professionals, on the other hand, maintain that a high degree of differentiation is necessary to main-

9 There were also signs of owing dissatisfaction within the L.O. In 1955 a breakaway union of policemen was establisfd, and in 1957 the Union of Marine Engineers withdrew from the L.O.

88 / EGIL FIVELSDAL

tain work motivation and to compensate for the costs associated with university study.

The same economic and political forces which mobilized the Norwegian professionals affected semiprofessional and middle-level salaried employees. A federation of independent white-collar unions, the Central Organization of White-collar workers (FSO), was formed in 1951. This federation has been the most aggressive center of white-collar protest in the postwar period. It does not engage in collective bargaining, but concentrates on influencing public opinion by means of press releases, interviews in the nonsocialist newspapers, and by using Conservative politicians as white- collar spokesmen in the Storting. The economic objectives of the federation are clearly anti-equalitarian. I t has issued vehement criticisms of Labor's tax and salary policies and also of the L.O.'s involvement in the Labor Party. The L.O. has been afraid that the FSO would gain extensive support among the independent unions and has repeatedly counterattacked the federation. It has thus been made clear to the nonaffiliated unions that joining the FSO might have harmful consequences. In fact, the FSO has been shrinking. Two large unions withdrew recently, and the federation has been unable to establish cooperative relations with the professional unions. I t seems that the FSO and the affiliated unions have recently been giving less attention to the dangers of income equalization and increasingly more attention to the issue of political unionism."

Political involvement. In Norway, the interpenetration of the L.O. and the Labor Party at all levels is so complete that affiliation with the L.O. is often perceived as a political act. There can be little doubt that this represents a serious obstacle to the L.O.'s expansion in the white-collar sector. All the independent unions present themselves as politically neutral and are not likely to deviate from this line. Furthermore, survey data indicate that a large proportion of unorganized white-collar people in private employment would prefer nonpolitical unions if they were forced to make a choice.

The political issue assumed importance with the establishment of the independent white-collar federations which proclaim themselves politically neutral, The FSO especially has tried very hard to establish neutrality as the rallying point for all independent unions. However, it detracted from the authenticity of this ideological position by allowing quite a few promi-

1'' Since this article was written the FSO has been formally dissolved (May 1965), following a decision of the constituent unions to form a new federation (FTF). It remains to be seen whether the change of name also implies a change of policy.


nent conservative politicians to be active within it. Not surprisingly, the L.O. has centered its counterattack on this point.

It is obvious that the Conservative Party as well as the other nonsocialist parties have a political interest in keeping the independent unions outside the L.O. and in stimulating the establishment of independent white-collar federations. The labor unions represent the backbone of the Labor Party. Support of the L.O.’s rivals in the white-collar sector might possibly keep salaried employees out of reach of the Labor Party. “Nonpolitical unionism” has therefore become a major slogan in the nonsocialist parties’ campaign directed at white-collar employees.

It is interesting to note that several of the white-collar unions affiliated with the L.O. apparently try to adjust themselves to the neutralist tendencies of their actual and potential membership. A content analysis of union journals published during the election campaign of 1957 showed that all working-class unions in the sample took a clear partisan stand, whereas white-collar unions affiliated with the L.O. tended to be weakly engaged or not engaged at allall Other data indicate that in contrast to manual locals very few white-collar locals are “collectively affiliated to the Labor Party.12 Informed observers have estimated that a maximum of 5 per cent of the white-collar membership in the L.O. belong to collectively affiliated locals, but nevertheless my 1962 white-collar survey showed that 41 per cent of the L.O. respondents believed that their local was collectively affiliated (34 per cent denied such affiliation and 20 per cent were in doubt). The same survey showed that 45 per cent of the male respondents who be- longed to the L.O. disapproved of collective membership and giving financial support to the Labor Party, whereas only 35 per cent approved. Among the male respondents organized outside the L.O., 75 per cent disapproved of these practices.

It is possible that in the next few years neutralist propaganda may create a strong echo within the white-collar wing of the L.O. So far the L.O. leadership has reacted to attacks by affirming the basic unity of the political and union branches of the Labor Movement, but in the long run, it may prove increasingly diflicult to maintain this po~ition.’~

11 See Egil Fivelsdal and Knut Dahl Jacobsen, Interesseorganisasjoner og stnrtingsoalg (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1962). This report is summarized in Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, op. cit., .306-311.

12 “Collective a 8 a t i o n ” or “collective membership,” which is practiced by many locals in Norway and Sweden, implies that the local union reports a certain uota of its members as members of the local Labor Party organization and pays membership sues for this quota. The quota varies considerably from district to district. The practice ma be described as an instru-

persons. ment of financial support of the Labor Party and does not impy r “membership” of specific

13 At the L.O.’s General Conference in May 1965 the retiring president, Konrad Nordahl,

90 / EGIL FIVELSDAL

Union recognition and union representation. Labor’s political power has made it difEicult for the independent white-collar unions to represent their members’ interests. Often when they try to implement their bargaining objectives by means of aggressive tactics, the Government refers the dispute to the National Wage Board for compulsory arbitration. Frequently this sort of action is regarded by the white-collar unions as a means of enforcing the equalization objectives of the Labor Movement.

Some of the unions have had trouble obtaining bargaining rights, while many have complained that the Government does not consult with them on vital matters. The problem of bargaining rights has been most critical for the National Union of Municipal EmployeeP4 and the National Union of Technicians, which the L.O. considers to be competing with its own unions. A union without bargaining rights has little raison $&re, and the two unions have struggled hard and even struck to obtain such rights. Resistance to their efforts is; still strong in the local government sector, especially where the Labor Party has a majority in the municipal councils and thus is in a position to keep the L.O.’s rivals at bay.

The problem of gaining access to central decision-making bodies has not gained the same amount of public attention as have struggles for union recognition, but this is a problem which is likely to become increasingly important. The main reasons are the trend towards centralization of wage and salary settlements and the Government’s growing concern with “incomes policy” as a means of achieving price stabilization. In the latter connection, the Labor Government has been eager to obtain the cooperation of the economic interest organizations, and two committees of top leaders have been instituted to maintain regular contact with the Government. Not surprisingly, the L.O. is represented, but none of the independent white-collar unions has a spokesman at the top level.

It is quite possible that even if they were invited to send one representative, the independent unions would have great difEculties in agreeing on a person, but an invitation might also give impetus to coalition tendencies. There is every reason to assume that the Labor Movement is not the least interested in stimulating such cooperation.

- warned representatives that “the L.O. in twenty-five years would be reduced to a small sect of true believers” if the Federation did not adjust to technological trends and the rapid changes in occupational distribution.

1 4 The National Union of Municipal Employees has approximately three thousand members. It com tes with the L.O.’s General Union of Munici al Employees, with a membership of 63,000 bcecollar and white-collar workers. The presi&nt of the National Union in the fifties and early sixties was also a Storting Representative of the Conservative Party and has been very active in the political struggle for white-collar support.


Summary The L.O. and the Labor Party have been able to secure the

allegiance of certain salaried groups who in several important respects are close to the working class. The Norwegian experience demonstrates that there is no clear dividing line between manual and nonmanual workers, but that the differences within the white-collar work force may constitute the bases for important cleavages. The Labor Movement has tried to eradicate these differences and has often denied their legitimacy, but the result has been vehement protests, especially from the middle and higher ranks of the white-collar force.

It should be added, however, that in all industrialized countries white- collar people have proved difficult to organize, and when they have organized, they have usually not been eager to join forces with other white- collar groups. This lack of solidarity is clearly related to social, economic, and occupational differentiations within the white-collar pyramid (which is a pyramid with very deep cracks). In Norway, however, the professional groups have proved able to erect a tightly integrated federation which has pursued a militant policy in economic matters, and this federation might become the model for the semiprofessional groups, which so far have been unable to coordinate their economic claims.

Large and important groups are still unorganized or organized outside the L.O., and a majority of these vote for the nonsocialist parties. These groups are increasing rapidly and constitute a major problem for the Labor Movement. There is no reason to assume that trends in occupational distribution will be reversed. It is easy to foresee that if the L.O. does not broaden its membership bases further, the federation-and thus also the Labor Party-will be slowly undermined. Consequently, the establishment of a viable system of independent white-collar unions represents a major threat to the Labor Movement.

The expansion in the L.O.’s membership during the postwar period has drawn into it groups who do not sympathize with the socialist cause and who are irritated by the relations between the L.O. and the Labor Party. The independent organizations, as well as the nonsocialist parties, have perceived the L.O.’s vulnerability on this point and have launched a series of attacks on the system of political unionism. Some groups have made an attempt to establish “political neutrality” as a rallying-point for the middle- class unions, but so far this ideology seems to be too limited a basis for enduring federations.

Powerful economic interest organizations play a very important role in

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Norwegian society, and the establishment and coordination of strong independent federations are the basic preconditions for increasing the general influence of the salaried middle class. Tod.ay large sections of the white- collar work force feel that their weak position in the national power system is out of all proportion to their numbers and functional importance. Labor has been unwilling to recognize their claims for representation and economic rewards, but the expansion and growing importance of the salaried middle-class groups make it increasingly dangerous for Labor to work against them.

Documents

White-Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labor Movement