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WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security by, Atin Kumar Puja Thakral Soumya Das

WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

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WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security. by, Atin Kumar Puja Thakral Soumya Das. Agenda. Intro to WLAN Security mechanisms in IEEE 802.11 Attacks on 802.11 Securing a wireless network Future Trends Summary. Why WLAN ?. The major motivation and benefit from wireless LANs is increased mobility. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

by, Atin Kumar

Puja ThakralSoumya Das

Page 2: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

AgendaAgenda

Intro to WLANIntro to WLAN Security mechanisms in IEEE 802.11Security mechanisms in IEEE 802.11 Attacks on 802.11Attacks on 802.11 Securing a wireless networkSecuring a wireless network Future TrendsFuture Trends SummarySummary

Page 3: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Why WLAN ?Why WLAN ?

The major motivation and benefit from wireless The major motivation and benefit from wireless LANs is increased mobility. LANs is increased mobility.

Untethered from conventional network Untethered from conventional network connections, network users can move about connections, network users can move about almost without restriction and access LANs from almost without restriction and access LANs from nearly anywhere. nearly anywhere.

In addition to increased mobility, wireless LANs In addition to increased mobility, wireless LANs offer increased flexibility. offer increased flexibility.

The list is endless………..The list is endless………..

Page 4: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Wireless LAN TechnologiesWireless LAN Technologies

IEEE 802.11IEEE 802.11 HiperLANHiperLAN Bluetooth

WLAN End User Forecast(millions)

Page 5: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

HiperLAN2HiperLAN2 HiperLAN2HiperLAN2 KEY FEATURES KEY FEATURES    

High throughput High throughput Up to 54 Mbps (gross) Up to 54 Mbps (gross) LAN coverage LAN coverage Indoor 30 m radius Indoor 30 m radius Outdoor 150 m radius Outdoor 150 m radius Quality Of Service Quality Of Service Supports voice, video and multimedia applications Supports voice, video and multimedia applications 802.1p and ATM QOS 802.1p and ATM QOS Scalable security Scalable security 56 bit to 168 bit key encryption (DES) 56 bit to 168 bit key encryption (DES) Optional pre shared or public key authentication   Optional pre shared or public key authentication  

Page 6: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

BluetoothBluetooth Cable replacementCable replacement Self-forming PANs(Personal Area Self-forming PANs(Personal Area

Networks)Networks) Freq: 2.4 GHz bandFreq: 2.4 GHz band Power 1mw to 100 mwPower 1mw to 100 mw Mode : FHSSMode : FHSS Range: 40-50 FeetRange: 40-50 Feet Data Rate: Approx 400 KbpsData Rate: Approx 400 Kbps Security better than Wi-Fi but not MUCH of Security better than Wi-Fi but not MUCH of

a concern.a concern.

Page 7: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

What is an IEEE 802.11 Wireless What is an IEEE 802.11 Wireless Network ?Network ?

Speeds of upto 54 Mb/s Operating Range: 10-100m indoors, 300m

outdoors Power Output Limited to 1 Watt in U.S. Frequency Hopping (FHSS), Direct Sequence (DSSS), & Infrared (IrDA) (– Networks are NOT compatible with each other)

Uses unlicensed 2.4/5 GHz band (2.402-2.480 ,5 GHz)

Provide wireless Ethernet for wired networks

Page 8: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

More about WLANMore about WLAN

Modes of Operation Modes of Operation Ad-Hoc mode (Independent Basic Ad-Hoc mode (Independent Basic

Service Set - IBSS) Service Set - IBSS) Infrastructure mode (Basic Service Infrastructure mode (Basic Service

Set - BSS) Set - BSS)

Page 9: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Ad-Hoc modeAd-Hoc mode

Laptop users wishing to share files could Laptop users wishing to share files could set up an ad-hoc network using 802.11 set up an ad-hoc network using 802.11 comapatible NICs and share files without comapatible NICs and share files without need for external media eg. floppy disks.need for external media eg. floppy disks.

Client A Client B

Client C

Page 10: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Infrastructure modeInfrastructure mode

In this mode the clients communicate via a central station called In this mode the clients communicate via a central station called Access Point (AP) which acts as an ethernet bridge and forwards Access Point (AP) which acts as an ethernet bridge and forwards the communication onto the appropriate network, either the wired the communication onto the appropriate network, either the wired or the wireless network. or the wireless network.

Client AAccess point

Client B

Page 11: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

What makes a WLAN What makes a WLAN

2.4 -5 GHz radio band2.4 -5 GHz radio band ““Short” rangeShort” range 802.11 protocol spread spectrum 802.11 protocol spread spectrum

technologytechnology Modest speed of 1-11 MbpsModest speed of 1-11 Mbps Very poor security!!!!Very poor security!!!!

Page 12: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WLAN ComponentsWLAN Components

Page 13: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

The Chain of TrustThe Chain of Trust

AuthenticationAuthentication

AuthorizationAuthorization

Data IntegrityData Integrity Data Data ConfidentialityConfidentiality

Page 14: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WLAN security – Problem !!WLAN security – Problem !!

There is no physical link between the nodes of a wireless network, the nodes There is no physical link between the nodes of a wireless network, the nodes transmit over the air and hence anyone within the radio range can transmit over the air and hence anyone within the radio range can eavesdrop on the communication. So conventional security measures that eavesdrop on the communication. So conventional security measures that apply to a wired network do not work in this case. apply to a wired network do not work in this case.

Internal networkprotected

Wireless Access Point

Valid User Access Only

Page 15: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

IEEE 802.11 basic security IEEE 802.11 basic security mechanismsmechanisms

Service Set Identifier (SSID)Service Set Identifier (SSID) MAC Address filtering MAC Address filtering Open System AuthenticationOpen System Authentication Shared Key Authentication Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Shared Key Authentication Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

protocolprotocol Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocolWired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol

802.11 products are shipped by the vendors with all 802.11 products are shipped by the vendors with all security mechanisms disabled !!! security mechanisms disabled !!!

Studies revealed that 67% of the networks had the Studies revealed that 67% of the networks had the encryption system turned off.encryption system turned off.

Page 16: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Association and Authentication Association and Authentication The association process is a two-step process involving The association process is a two-step process involving three states:three states:

Unauthenticated and unassociatedUnauthenticated and unassociated

Unauthenticated and associatedUnauthenticated and associated

Authenticated and associatedAuthenticated and associated

To transition between these states the communicating To transition between these states the communicating parties exchange messages called management frames.parties exchange messages called management frames.

Successful Association Successful Association or Reassociationor Reassociation

DisassociationDisassociation notificationnotification

De-authentication De-authentication NotificationNotificationAuthentication

Page 17: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Service Set Identifier (SSID)Service Set Identifier (SSID)

Limits access by identifying the service area Limits access by identifying the service area covered by the access points. covered by the access points.

SSID is a unique string that identifies a network.SSID is a unique string that identifies a network.

AP periodically broadcasts SSID in a beacon.AP periodically broadcasts SSID in a beacon. End station listens to these broadcasts and End station listens to these broadcasts and

choose an AP to associate with based upon its choose an AP to associate with based upon its SSID.SSID.

Page 18: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

SSIDs are useless!SSIDs are useless!

Use of SSID – weak form of security as beacon Use of SSID – weak form of security as beacon management frames on 802.11 WLAN are always management frames on 802.11 WLAN are always sent in the clear.sent in the clear.

A hacker can use analysis tools (eg. AirMagnet, A hacker can use analysis tools (eg. AirMagnet, Netstumbler, AiroPeek) to identify SSID.Netstumbler, AiroPeek) to identify SSID.

In addition Windows XP does a great job of In addition Windows XP does a great job of sniffing!sniffing!

Page 19: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

MAC Address Filtering MAC Address Filtering

The system administrator can specify a list of The system administrator can specify a list of MAC addresses that can communicate through an MAC addresses that can communicate through an access point. access point.

Advantage : Advantage : Provides stronger security than SSIDProvides stronger security than SSID

Disadvantages : Disadvantages : Increases Administrative overheadIncreases Administrative overhead Reduces ScalabilityReduces Scalability Determined hacker can still break it!Determined hacker can still break it!

Page 20: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Open System AuthenticationOpen System Authentication

The default authentication protocol for 802.11.The default authentication protocol for 802.11. Authenticates anyone who requests authenticationAuthenticates anyone who requests authentication

(null authentication).(null authentication).

Can we call it a security measure ?Can we call it a security measure ?

Authentication Request

Authentication Response

End Station Access Point

Page 21: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Shared Key Authentication Shared Key Authentication How it worksHow it works

Authentication Request

Authentication Challenge

Authentication Response

Authentication Result

End Station Access Point

Page 22: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Open System Vs Shared Key Open System Vs Shared Key AuthenticationsAuthentications

Shared Key Authentication is never Shared Key Authentication is never recommended!recommended!

Better to use Open System Better to use Open System Authentication, which allows Authentication, which allows authentication without the correct authentication without the correct WEP key.WEP key.

Page 23: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

Designed to provide confidentiality to Designed to provide confidentiality to a wireless network similar to that of a wireless network similar to that of standard LANs. standard LANs.

WEP is essentially the RC4 symmetric WEP is essentially the RC4 symmetric key cryptographic algorithm (same key cryptographic algorithm (same key for encrypting and decrypting).key for encrypting and decrypting).

Page 24: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WEP Contd..WEP Contd.. Transmitting station concatenates 40 bit key with a 24 bit Transmitting station concatenates 40 bit key with a 24 bit

Initialization Vector (IV) to produce pseudorandom key Initialization Vector (IV) to produce pseudorandom key stream.stream.

Plaintext is XORed with the pseudorandom key stream to Plaintext is XORed with the pseudorandom key stream to produce ciphertext.produce ciphertext.

Ciphertext is concatenated with IV and transmitted over the Ciphertext is concatenated with IV and transmitted over the Wireless Medium.Wireless Medium.

Receiving station reads the IV, concatenates it with the Receiving station reads the IV, concatenates it with the secret key to produce local copy of the pseudorandom key secret key to produce local copy of the pseudorandom key stream.stream.

Received ciphertext is XORed with the key stream Received ciphertext is XORed with the key stream generated to get back the plaintext.generated to get back the plaintext.

Page 25: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

How does WEP “work”How does WEP “work”

802.11 Hdr Data

Encapsulate Decapsulate

802.11 Hdr DataIV ICV

Page 26: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WEP has its cost!WEP has its cost!

Page 27: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

WEP – vulnerability to attackWEP – vulnerability to attack

WEP has been broken! Walker (Oct 2000), Borisov et. al. (Jan 2001), Fluhrer-Mantin -Shamir (Aug 2001).

Unsafe at any key size : Testing reveals WEP encapsulation remains insecure whether its key length is 1 bit or 1000 or any other size.

More about this: More about this: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Documents/Dhttp://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/0-362.zipocumentHolder/0-362.zip

Page 28: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Seven Security Problems of 802.11 Seven Security Problems of 802.11 Wireless NetworksWireless Networks

Easy Access Easy Access "Rogue" Access Points "Rogue" Access Points Unauthorized Use of Service Unauthorized Use of Service Service and Performance Constraints Service and Performance Constraints MAC Spoofing and Session Hijacking MAC Spoofing and Session Hijacking Traffic Analysis and Eavesdropping Traffic Analysis and Eavesdropping Higher Level Attacks Higher Level Attacks

Page 29: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

““Drive By Hacking”Drive By Hacking”

Access Port Switch

Ma

in C

orp

ora

te B

ack

bo

ne

Server

Server

Server

iPaq

Mobile Phone

Notebook

If the distance from the Access Point to the street outside is 1500 feet or less, then a Intruder could also get access – while sitting outside

Less than 1500ft *

PalmPilot

Page 30: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

War-driving expeditions War-driving expeditions In one 30-minute journey using the Pringles can antenna, In one 30-minute journey using the Pringles can antenna, witnessed by BBC News Online, they managed to find almost 60 witnessed by BBC News Online, they managed to find almost 60 wireless networks. wireless networks.

"People have made these antennae out of Pringles tubes, coffee "People have made these antennae out of Pringles tubes, coffee cans and even old satellite dishes,"cans and even old satellite dishes,"

Page 31: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

War ChalkingWar Chalking

Practice of marking a Practice of marking a series of symbols on series of symbols on sidewalks and walls to sidewalks and walls to indicate nearby wireless indicate nearby wireless access. That way, other access. That way, other computer users can pop computer users can pop open their laptops and open their laptops and connect to the Internet connect to the Internet wirelessly. wirelessly.

Page 32: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Types of AttacksTypes of Attacks

Passive Attack to Decrypt TrafficPassive Attack to Decrypt Traffic

Active Attack to Inject TrafficActive Attack to Inject Traffic

Page 33: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Passive Attack to Decrypt TrafficPassive Attack to Decrypt Traffic

Sniff traffic for IV collisionsSniff traffic for IV collisions

XOR packets having same IVXOR packets having same IV

Get XOR of 2 plaintextsGet XOR of 2 plaintexts

Look for more IV collisionsLook for more IV collisions

Page 34: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Active Attack to Inject TrafficActive Attack to Inject Traffic

Plaintext KnownPlaintext KnownConstruct new messageConstruct new message

calculate the CRC-32 calculate the CRC-32

perform bit flips on original ciphettextperform bit flips on original ciphettext

Viola !! You have a valid packet Viola !! You have a valid packet

RC4(X) xor X xor Y = RC4(Y) RC4(X) xor X xor Y = RC4(Y)

Page 35: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

What are the major security What are the major security risks to 802.11b? risks to 802.11b?

Insertion Attacks Insertion Attacks Interception and monitoring Interception and monitoring

wireless traffic wireless traffic Misconfiguration Misconfiguration Jamming Jamming Client to Client Attacks Client to Client Attacks

Page 36: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Insertion AttacksInsertion Attacks

Plugged-in Unauthorized ClientsPlugged-in Unauthorized Clients

Pluged-in Unauthorized Renegade Pluged-in Unauthorized Renegade Base Station Base Station

Page 37: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Interception and monitoring Interception and monitoring wireless traffic attacks wireless traffic attacks

Wireless Sniffer Wireless Sniffer

Hijacking the session Hijacking the session

Broadcast Monitoring Broadcast Monitoring

ArpSpoof Monitoring and HijackingArpSpoof Monitoring and Hijacking

Page 38: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Packet Sniffing Packet Sniffing

Page 39: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

JammingJamming((Denial of ServiceDenial of Service))

Broadcast radio signals at the same Broadcast radio signals at the same frequency as the wireless Ethernet frequency as the wireless Ethernet transmitters - 2.4 GHz transmitters - 2.4 GHz

To jam, you just need to broadcast a To jam, you just need to broadcast a radio signal at the same frequency radio signal at the same frequency but at a higher power. but at a higher power.

Page 40: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Replay AttackReplay AttackGood guy Alice

Bad guy Eve

Good guy Bob

Authorized WEP Communications

Eavesdrop and RecordPlay back selections

Page 41: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Measures to strengthen WLAN Measures to strengthen WLAN securitysecurity

Recommendation (I) Wireless LAN related Configuration – Enable WEP, use 128bit key* – Using the encryption technologies – Disable SSID Broadcasts – Change default Access Point Name – No SNMP access – Choose complex admin password – Apply Filtering • Use MAC (hardware) address to restrict access • SSIDs – Change default Access Point password – The Use of 802.1x – Enable firewall function

Page 42: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

More measures to secure a WLANMore measures to secure a WLAN

Recommendation (II) Deployment Consideration – Closed Network (put AP away from door and windows) – Treat Wireless LAN as external network – Install in a Separated Network – VPN & Use strong encryption – No DHCP (use fixed private IP)

Page 43: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

TKIP-Enhancement to WEPTKIP-Enhancement to WEP

128-bit shared secret- temporal key (TK)128-bit shared secret- temporal key (TK)

f(tx's MAC,TK) = Phase 1 keyf(tx's MAC,TK) = Phase 1 key

f(Phase 1 key, IV)= per-packet keysf(Phase 1 key, IV)= per-packet keys

Use each key RC4 to encrypt one and only Use each key RC4 to encrypt one and only one data packet.one data packet.

Page 44: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Future TrendsFuture Trends

Extensible Authentication Protocol Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAP) The 802.1X standard for port-based

authentication and key distribution is based on EAP.

Page 45: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

RSN: The Wireless Security RSN: The Wireless Security Future? Future?

RSN security consists of two basic subsystems:RSN security consists of two basic subsystems:

Data privacy mechanismData privacy mechanism TKIP (a protocol patching WEP)TKIP (a protocol patching WEP) AES-based protocol (long term)AES-based protocol (long term)

Security association managementSecurity association management RSN negotiation procedures, to establish a security RSN negotiation procedures, to establish a security

contextcontext IEEE 802.1X authentication, replacing IEEE 802.11 IEEE 802.1X authentication, replacing IEEE 802.11

authenticationauthentication IEEE 802.1X key management, to provide cryptographic IEEE 802.1X key management, to provide cryptographic

keyskeys

Page 46: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Goals of 802.1X (RSN Provides)

Per packet authenticity & integrity Per packet authenticity & integrity between the RADIUS server and APbetween the RADIUS server and AP

Scalability & FlexibilityScalability & Flexibility Access controlAccess control One-way authenticationOne-way authentication

Page 47: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

802.11i –Secured Wireless802.11i –Secured Wireless

Tentatively called Wi-Fi Protected Tentatively called Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) -Access 2 (WPA2) -

Uses 802.1X, the new IEEE authentication Uses 802.1X, the new IEEE authentication standardstandard

Replaces WEP with a new standard called Replaces WEP with a new standard called Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).

Includes an alternative authentication scheme Includes an alternative authentication scheme using a pre-shared key (PSK) methodology for using a pre-shared key (PSK) methodology for homes and small businesseshomes and small businesses

Page 48: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Advanced Encryption Standard Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)(AES)

Rijndael algorithm with 128, 192 and Rijndael algorithm with 128, 192 and 256 bits key-lengths 256 bits key-lengths

Much stronger than the WEP Much stronger than the WEP Requires much more processing Requires much more processing

firepower than WEP firepower than WEP Requires a separate processor to Requires a separate processor to

avoid slowing down Wi-Fi avoid slowing down Wi-Fi communications communications

Is not backward compatible Is not backward compatible

Page 49: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

SummarySummary

802.11 security doesn’t meet any of its 802.11 security doesn’t meet any of its security objectives todaysecurity objectives today

802.11 TGe is working to replace802.11 TGe is working to replace• Authentication scheme using 802.1X and Authentication scheme using 802.1X and

KerberosKerberos• Encryption scheme using AES in OCB modeEncryption scheme using AES in OCB mode

Page 50: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Major Papers on 802.11 SecurityMajor Papers on 802.11 Security

Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11(Borisov, Goldberg, Insecurity of 802.11(Borisov, Goldberg, and Wagner 2001)and Wagner 2001)

Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes(Arbaugh, Shankar, and Wan 2001)Clothes(Arbaugh, Shankar, and Wan 2001)

Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4(Fluhrer, Mantin, and Algorithm of RC4(Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir 2001)Shamir 2001)

Page 51: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Some more ReferencesSome more References

The IEEE 802.11b Security Problem, The IEEE 802.11b Security Problem, Part 1 (Joseph Williams,2001 IEEE)Part 1 (Joseph Williams,2001 IEEE)

An IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Security An IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Security White Paper (Jason S. King, 2001)White Paper (Jason S. King, 2001)

Page 52: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security

Your feedback as questions or comments is Your feedback as questions or comments is welcome. welcome.

Thank You for ListeningThank You for Listening

Page 53: WLAN and IEEE 802.11 Security