Working Paper 6 - Profiles of Indonesia's Foreign Debts

8/14/2019 Working Paper 6 - Profiles of Indonesia's Foreign Debts

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Since 1966/1967 Indonesia has received foreign aid (loans and grants) from twentycountries and thirteen multilateral agencies. Most of these countries and multilateralagencies were engaged in one group called Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia(IGGI) from 1967 to 1991, and then replaced by Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)from 1992 to 2007. IGGI was chaired by the Netherlands, and CGI was chaired by the

World Bank. Since 2005 CGI was officially chaired by Indonesia but in practice it waschaired and directed by the World Bank.1

Among the multilateral agencies, World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) arethe two major donors/creditors, and among the bilateral donors, Japan is the biggestaccounting for about 70% of the total aid. IMF was not a member of IGGI or CGI, but itwas always represented in the meetings of IGGI/CGI. It is interesting that although IMFis not included as donor; its presence in Indonesia has brought strong implications for thecountry and for the donors. The bilateral donors and the multilateral donors refer to IMFbefore making loans agreements with Indonesia.2

Compositions of Foreign Aid to Indonesia

From the compositions, the bilateral sources take the biggest portions of the debts, whereofficial development assistance is the largest. The official development assistance (ODA)is in general a loan, both concessional and commercial, and some parts are in grants.Multilateral development assistance is mostly in the form of technical assistance, whichis loan, and some small portions are grants.

Foreign aid supports both project and program. Project aid is used to support physical andinstitutional infrastructure. Bilateral aid mainly supports the projects, and less aid goes toprogram. Aid from multilateral agencies is more focused on program, with smallerportion on project. This is in line with the policies of the multilateral institutionsparticularly the World Bank and IMF that attach the aid with policy conditionalities, suchas policy reforms. Program aid is drawn when Indonesia is in critical situation, whetherdue to fiscal problems or the balance of payments problem. The program aid is aimed atsupporting the balance of payments and the state budget. In return Indonesia has to takepolicy measures that are attached to the aid requirements.

Though the program aid is relatively smaller than the project aid in numbers, the impactsof program aid to Indonesian economic and political system are significant. Structuraladjustment programs are conditionalities attached to the program aid package from IMFand the World Bank, that until bring huge impacts on the social and economic livelihoodof the majority of the poor population in Indonesia. The liberalization and privatization ofstate owned companies and the public services that influence the state revenues and the

1 Kwiks paper. Kwik Kian Gie was the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs (2000 2003) andMinister of National Planning (BAPPENAS) in 2003 2004. Paper prepared by Kwik Kian Gie to bepresented in the CGI Meeting in 2002 was edited by the World Bank. Kwik complained that the contentsof the paper was changed and did not reflect his view and the GOIs but the World Banks.2 Bappenas study, 2004.

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costs paid by the poor for the services are among the general conditionalities of the IMFand the World Bank. With the program aid, the World Bank staff can freely influence thepolicies of the Central Government of Indonesia and work as if they are parts of theIndonesian bureaucracy. Indonesian bureaucracy becomes so open to the World Bankthat none of the policies are confidential to non-residence.3

World Bank provided assistance from International Development Association (IDA) andother facilities for low income countries only when Indonesia was in economic crisis. In1998, when Indonesia was hit by the crisis, the World Bank approved the IDA credit ofUS$ 26.5 to Indonesia to prevent the excess of the effects of the crisis. In other figures,shown later below, there is an increasing portion of foreign aid allocated to social welfare(social safety net, health and education) after the crisis, which never happened before.This is mainly supported by the IDA credit. But the soft loans from IDA (a member ofthe World Bank group) have to be paid in high price by the poor Indonesian. Theconditionalities attached to the soft loans included that Indonesia has to implementprivatization and liberalization, including privatization of public services such as health

and education sectors, as stipulated in the Letter of Intent between Indonesia and IMF.Program loans are not visible, but the policy impacts are phenomenal. Program loans arein general tied to certain conditionalities designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions to beimplemented by Indonesian government.

The tables and figures below show the growth of foreign debts of Indonesia from variousyears.

Bilateral Debts:

The biggest bilateral donor for Indonesia is Japan, followed by US, France, Germany,Austria and Netherlands. The loans from these six countries are mainly for project loans.

3 A documentary video presented during the farewell party of the Country Director of the World Bank,Andrew Steer, in March 2007, described clearly how the World Bank has been integrated in the IndonesianEconomic Team (the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Tradeand the Ministry of National Planning). The documentary video could trigger the question of theindependence of the Indonesian economic team, and to certain extent, the question whether Indonesia isstill sovereign in making its economic policies.

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Table 3.1. Bilateral Loans, 6 top countries (million US$)

Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Japan 13,360.00 15,775.00 19,456.00 18,144.00 16,269.00 18,902.00 21,646.16 22,060.69 20,137.80 20,347.5

Germany 1,025.00 1,099.00 930.00 861.00 911.00 1,083.00 1,384.15 1,425.00 1,351.41 1,433.44

US 1,477.00 1,445.00 1,485.00 1,546.00 1,547.00 1,584.00 1,603.71 1,521.46 1,573.18 1,470.15

Austria 211.00 273.00 763.00 803.00 796.00 864.00 1,012.87 1,048.90 871.33 914.39

France 1,560.00 1,656.00 1,465.00 1,227.00 1,142.00 1,377.00 1,656.53 1,697.79 1,494.62 1,557.99

Netherlands 792.00 787.00 711.00 727.00 667.00 791.00 956.50 969.48 872.91 890.05

Sub Total 18,425.00 21,035.00 24,810.00 23,308.00 21,332.00 24,601.00 28,259.92 28,723.32 26,301.25 26,613.60OtherCountries 1,092.00 1,339.00 1,348.00 1,338.00 1,386.00 1,473.00 1,623.05 1,615.63 1,494.10 1,493.35

Total 19,517.00 22,374.00 26,158.00 24,646.00 22,718.00 26,074.00 29,882.97 30,338.95 27,795.35 28,106.95

Figure 3.1. Bilateral loans, 6 top countries (%)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

Other Countries

Netherlands

France

Austria

US

Germany

Japan

According to the Report on the Registration Number of Foreign Loans and Grants,Directorate General of Treasury, Ministry of Finance, as of 31 March 2007, Japan andIndonesia have signed 926 loans agreements in the period of 1965 to March 2007. USAand Indonesia have 352 loans agreements in the same period; Federal Republic ofGermany had 417 loans agreements in the same period. France had 695 loans agreementswith Indonesia; Netherlands had 204 loans agreements with Indonesia; and Austria had

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77 agreements in the period of 1975 up to 2007. Australia has 58 loans agreements withIndonesia since 1977 up to July 2007.

These agreements include for ODA and commercial loans. From the interest rates, Japanloans in average are relatively lower than the loans from other countries, ranging from

0.60% to 9% per annum; Austria ranging from 3.0% to 10.50%, except for two creditexport facilities which use Austrian market rate of 0.60%; the interest rates of loans fromUSA range from 0.40% up to 12.00%. Netherlands: 0.50% - 12.87; Germany: 0.60% -12.00%.

There are four countries (Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Japan) that have quite bignumber of tied loans. The tied loans are spent for capital goods, military and othersecurity equipment and consultancy. The table 3.6 below shows that between 80% and92% of the funds of the tied loans are spent in the creditor countries. The tied loans raiseits own problem of who is responsible for its quality, benefit and the sustainability. Thecases from German warships and Japan-funded dams particularly look at these tied loans.

The tied loans from the World Bank and ADB have raised particular questions of forwhom the loans are, for the interest of the World Bank and the ADB and their staffmembers, or for the interests of Indonesia.

Multilateral Debts:

World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) are the two major multilateral donorsfor Indonesia. IMF is to certain extent is included in this category, although IMFs loanscannot actually be categorized as loans since the funds were deposited in the CentralBank to secure the foreign exchange reserve of the Central Bank.

The fund from IMF was actually useless, since it was deposited in the Central Bank at thetime when the Central Bank itself has enough reserves. Until the end of the lendingperiod, the funds from IMF were not used at all but Indonesia has to repay the funds withits interests.

The most controversial debate about the funds from IMF is about the conditionalitiesimposed by IMF to Indonesia through the Letter of Intent and other memorandum ofunderstanding on economic policies that should be implemented by Indonesia. Since1997 up to 2005 there were 20 letters of intent that were signed by IMF and Indonesia onpolicy measures and other conditionalities that should be implemented by Indonesia.

The fund from IMF deposited in the Central Bank was in fact a Trojan horse forIndonesia. With the presence of the funds, counted as loans, the IMF could freely controlthe policies of Indonesia in order to be in line with the neoliberal policies imposed andpreferred by the developed countries and the multinational corporations whose interestsare represented in IMF.

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Below is the table and figure that show the amount of debts and its percentage to themultilateral donors, including IMF.

Figure 3.2. Multilateral Loans (%)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

MIGA

EID

IMF

IFAD

NIB

IDB

IBRD

IDA

ADB

The loans from ADB increase steadily by year, and in 2006 ADB became the biggestmultilateral donor for Indonesia. IDA constitutes small portion but increased in 2006. Thesecond biggest multilateral donor is World Bank followed by IMF for the period of 1997 2005. In November 2006 Indonesia paid back all the funds from IMF. IDB (IslamicDevelopment Bank) shows increasing interest in providing loans to Indonesia although itis still in small proportion. Debts to foreign private sector include also the governmentobligations or bonds purchased by the non-residents.

Table 3.2. Multilateral Sources of Loans (Million US$)

Donor 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

ADB 4,557.00 5,694.00 7,517.00 7,544.00 7,179.00 8,310.00 8,582.15 8,869.14 9,140.13 9,409.21

IDA 720.00 702.00 682.00 719.00 726.00 788.00 884.39 949.06 1,002.59 1,321.75

IBRD 10,307.00 10,229.00 11,494.00 11,774.00 11,577.00 10,802.00 9,776.10 8,942.99 8,106.53 7,420.81

IDB 27.00 32.00 51.00 215.00 184.00 138.00 151.47 162.58 202.85 396.70

NIB - 217.00 214.00 200.00 186.00 170.00 155.00 139.16 120.91 105.46

IFAD 57.00 84.00 72.00 65.00 57.00 65.00 78.71 78.98 71.06 73.72

IMF 2,973.00 9,082.00 10,255.00 10,983.00 9,105.00 8,829.00 10,238.61 9,653.89 7,806.03 -

EID 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 110.77 109.12 116.14 109.09

MIGA - - - - 8.00 3.00 - - - -

TOTAL 18,645.00 26,048.00 30,293.00 31,508.00 29,029.00 29,112.00 29,977.20 28,904.92 26,566.24 18,836.74

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World Bank had become the member of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia(IGGI) since its inception in 1967, and has been active in coordinating the donors forIndonesia since 1966, and became the chair (co-chair with Indonesia since 2005) of CGIuntil its termination in 2007. But aid from the World Bank group was started in 1968through IDA soft loans. The IBRD (which is publicly known as the World Bank) itself

started its first loan in 1974 when Indonesia has started to catch up with the momentumof development period. It was the time when World Bank started to involve in supportingphysical projects and supporting technical assistance group working in the NationalPlanning Board and the Ministry of Finance.

Though there are controversial projects and programs supported by the World Bank(Kedung Ombo Dam, and the policy reform program), the World Bank is successful inmaintaining its image as a donor organization. When Indonesia was burdened withstructural adjustment program in 1980s and the implementation of the policyconditionalities (privatization and liberalization) after the 1997/98 crisis, World Bankcould wash itself from being responsible for the failure of the policy reforms, where IMF

was the only institution to be publicly blamed. In fact it is the World Bank thatorchestrates the implementation of the IMF policy conditionalities.

There are two kinds of projects supported by the World Bank that should be paid specialattention. First, some of the physical projects supported by the World Bank that weresupposed to be public services of the government, such as water supply, irrigation,fertilizers, electricity now become objects of privatization as parts of conditionalities ofthe new World Bank loans after the Structural Adjustment Program and the 1997/1998crisis. The crisis, while still becoming the worst memory for the majority of Indonesians,has been used as the appropriate moment for the World Bank to impose liberalization andprivatization including the cut of subsidies in social sectors. The interesting case is thatwhile on one hand IBRD (World Bank) pushes the government to privatize the state-owned companies and the public services, on the other hand IFC (a family member of theWorld Ban) is making fortune of buying the cheap shares of the public services and theprivatized companies.

The second, after increasing critiques of the relevance of the World Bank in Indonesia,the World Bank has found its new project icon called Community Driven Development,which consists of two project components: Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) forrural areas and Urban Empowerment Project for urban areas. The World Bank is nowenthusiastically promoting this project as bait for new loans for Indonesia. All staffmembers of the World Bank see this KDP project as a new image of the World Bank thatbrings it to its main mission of alleviating poverty.

Scott Guggenheims paper on KDP has been treated by the World Bank staff in Indonesiaas the main reference of the success story of the Project4. The paper is started with a story

4 Scott Guggenheim, Crises and Contradictions: Understanding the Origins of a Community DevelopmentProject in Indonesia, paper 2003 downloaded from www.worldbank.org. The Project was started with alocal-level institutions study (LLI), which came out with rhetorical conclusions that re-justify the

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http://www.worldbank.org/http://www.worldbank.org/


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about a community meeting in Central Sulawesi, a province which has no record ofpoverty in its history; the story that has been common among the development tourists.Indonesian bureaucrats in fact have the same story when they come back to their officesafter visiting remote rural communities. The difference is that the bureaucrats keep andtell the story for their amusement, while the World Bank staff use the story for a proposal

for new loans for Indonesia. Like in other parts of the world, the project in fact put thepoor people to be responsible for the poverty alleviation, in terms that the poorthemselves will repay the debts in the future.

Types of Loans:

While from bilateral donors, the aid can be in the form of concessional loans (or softloans) and commercial loans, the loans from the multilateral donors are mainly soft loans.There are also private sources of loans, which provide commercial loans on market-basedinterest rate. These loans are in the form of credit export facilities. These forms of loans

are drawn to support the purchase of high technology equipments and weapons for thedefense purposes. Indonesia also draws loans in the forms of leasing of equipmentsprovided by foreign donors and foreign private companies. Bilateral sources are themajor loans followed by multilateral. Export Credit facility has to be paid specialattention, since the use of the loans is mainly for defense which has no economic return;the repayment will be totally from the tax revenues of the state.

Table 3.3. Foreign Debts based on the types of Loans, 2000 - 2006 (US$ billion)

Sources 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Q3)

Bilateral 24.60 22.70 26.10 29.90 30.30 27.80 27.80

Multilateral 20.50 19.90 20.30 19.70 19.30 18.80 17.70

Export CreditFacility 15.70 14.90 16.60 18.40 18.00 16.10 15.90

Leasing 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10

Commercial 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10

BI Certificate 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 -

Total 61.70 58.20 63.70 68.60 68.10 63.10 61.60

intervention of the World Bank in Indonesias development which in fact as the study from BAPPENASrevealed is only to secure the jobs of the World Bank staff in Indonesia.

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Figure 3.3. Loans, types of loans (%)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2000 2002 2004 2006

(Q3)

BI Certificate

Commercial

Leasing

Credit Export Facility

Multilateral

Bilateral

Debts based on Conditions:

The foreign debts can be grouped in commercial and non-commercial debts. Thecommercial debts are from private sources, including the bond holding by non-residence,and the non-commercial debts are both from ODA and non-ODA. Including in the non-ODA are from multilateral sources.

Table 3.4. Foreign Debts based on its types, 1998 - 2006 (Million US$)

Types 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Commercial1) 2,388 2,530 2,420 43,004 2,501 3,106 5,234.16 9,440.10 13,875.33

Non-Commercial 64,941 73,332 72,496 67,074 72,160 78,559 77,491 70,632 61,952

a. ODA 48,422 56,451 56,154 51,747 55,186 59,860 59,243.60 54,361.57 46,943.24

b. Non-ODA 16,519 16,881 16,342 15,327 16,974 18,699 18,247.36 16,270.30 15,008.37

Total 67,329 75,862 74,916 110,078 74,661 81,665 82,725 80,072 75,827

1)Including the obligations and bonds held by non-residents.

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Figure 3.4. Foreign Debts based on its terms (%)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%90%

100%

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Commercial Non-Commercial ODA Non-ODA

The figure shows that in 2001, the commercial loan was quite high. This was due to thepurchase of new equipment for defense purposes. The foreign aid is predominantly non-commercial and from the non-commercial aid, the ODA components are dominant.

The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provides both for ODA loans andfor export credit. This is quite tricky, although the management is separated, but in fact

the loans from JBIC whether for ODA and commercial are to certain extentoverlapping. The loans for toll road constructions are in non-commercial terms, but themachineries for toll roads are in commercial loans.

Debts based on the currency:

Most of Indonesias foreign debts are in US dollars; in 2006 the foreign debts in USdollar accounted for 49.66% of the total debts. This is followed by Japan Yen, which in2006 accounted for 31.52% of the total debts. The increasing percentage of Euro since2000 that put Euro in the third place is mainly due to the debt rescheduling through Paris

Club mechanisms, where the loans that were signed using each of European countrycurrencies were converted to EURO after the unification of the European currency.

Before the crisis in 1997/1998 the bilateral loans were predominant, but after the crisis itslightly shifted to multilateral loans. The shift brought its own consequences, namely thatIndonesia becomes more dependent on US dollar since the multilateral debts are bookedin US dollar. The needs for US dollar for the repayment of foreign debts will increase.This is indicated by the fact that in 1998 the Indonesian DSR reached 57.90%. This

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means that the impact of the depreciation of Indonesian Rupiah to dollar will be higherthan the increase in Indonesian exports.

Table 3.5. Foreign Debts, based on the Currency (US$ Million)

Currency 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

DEM 2,653.00 3,104.00 2,425.00 2,018.00 - - - - - -

EUR - - - 1,521.00 7,027.00 8,624.00 10,560.00 10,850.7 9,570.3 10,188.3

FRF 1,847.00 2,046.00 1,752.00 1,303.00 - - - - - -

GBP 1,022.00 1,048.00 1,206.00 1,154.00 1,158.00 1,312.00 1,447.44 1,444.5 1,295.2 1,370.2

JPY 18,581 22,251 27,428 25,038 22,162 24,981.00 28,283.51 31,312.0 24,933.7 23,898.5

SDR 3,035 9,187 10,352 11,134 9,283 9,105.00 10,655.96 9,758.0 9,098.2 1,753.2

USD 1) 23,066 25,342 28,570 29,530 30,939 29,127.00 29,654.84 28,217.2 34,226.2 37,649.6

Others 3,642 4,351 4,129 3,218 809 1,511.00 1,064.42 1,142.9 948.4 949.2

Total 67,329 67,329 75,862 74,916 71,378 74,660.00 80,855.00 82,725.2 80,072.0 75,808.9

1) Including the obligations held by the non-residents

From bilateral sources, Indonesian debts are dominated by loans from Japan. In 2004 theportion of Indonesian debts to Japan reached up to 74% of the total of bilateral loans.Japan is followed by US, France, Germany, Austria and Netherlands. This also meansthat Indonesian debt to Yen is also high. The economic turbulence in Japan will alsoinfluence the stability of Indonesian economy. This indicates that Indonesian economydepends on external factors, particularly on Japan and US economy rather than its owndomestic economic fundamentals.

Figure 3.5. Foreign Loans based on currencies (%)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

Others

USD 1)

SDR

JPY

GBP

FRF

EUR

DEM

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Besides the problem of dependence to US dollar and Japan Yen that might createvulnerability to Indonesian Rupiah, Indonesia also faces the aid conditionalities. Up to2003 Indonesias foreign debts were dominated by ODA (Official DevelopmentAssistance) that are categorized as soft loans (73.59%) and non-ODA (semi-soft) of22.64% and commercial loans of 3.77%. Although ODA loans are soft loans, the loans

are mainly tied loans. The government of Indonesia has to make policies that favor theinterests of the creditors. The program and project schemes have to be adjusted to theprogram schemes of the creditors. Indonesia cannot freely decide what the programs andprojects that are supported by foreign loans. This is mainly caused by the fact that eachcreditor has its own system and preferences. For instance the loans from Japan are mainlyfor infrastructures.

Tied Aid

Foreign aid is not only to fulfill the needs of the recipient country (the debtor, i.e.

Indonesia), but also for the interests of the creditors. This is indicated from the utilizationof the foreign aid. BAPPENAS estimates that almost 75% of aid goes back to the donorsin various forms such as the purchases of goods and services. Certain creditors requirethe purchases of goods from the countries, and the use of skilled labor or consultantsfrom the donors. The following table shows that more than 80% of the aid from bilateraldonors goes back to the countries, while 60% of the loans from ADB are absorbed byADB itself. This indicates that the loans are more for the benefits of the donors ratherthan for the recipients. Regarding the multilateral donors, the BAPPENAS other study 5seems to be proved, that the loans are more for project-seeking of the staff of the donorinstitutions for their own job security while victimizing the poor Indonesians. The morethe loans approved for Indonesia by the multilateral donors, the more secured the job ofthe staff of the agencies, since more loans means more overhead costs.

Tables 3.6. Tied loans

Creditors Foreign Utilization (%) Local Utilization (%)

GermanyAustriaDenmarkNetherlandsSouth KoreaJBIC

ADBWorld Bank

97.3192.8190.5587.4282.8880.45

61.9335.04

2.697.199.4512.5817.1219.55

38.0764.96

Regarding the project loans, where the main contractors, consultants and the supplies arefrom the creditor countries, the question is who is responsible if the project fails or if theproject brings harms to the local communities and environment? This is related to the

5 BAPPENAS, op.cit., 2004.

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unfairness in the foreign loans businesses in terms that recipient countries pay thecontractors, the consultants and purchase the supplies from the creditor countries usingthe loans from the creditor countries. The real case is that whether the project issuccessful and useful or not for the people in the recipient countries, it is not theresponsibility of the creditors.

In the case of projects funded by loans from Japan, the new debts are always booked forrepairing the faulty works of the Japanese contractors and consultants, or in overcomingthe problems coming out as the effects of the works of the Japanese contractors andconsultants. In many cases it is dilemmatic for the recipient country, i.e. Indonesia. IfIndonesia rejects the new loans, the project cannot be continued or the project will notoperate and Indonesia would pay the previous debts without any result for the country.

In the case studies of the three Dams in chapter 2.D. Japan slowly but steadily pourednew loans over the previous loans to Indonesia. Besides the projects are delayed thatincreased costs, there are also negative impacts that were not anticipated in the feasibility

study and the project design. The impacts caused other new loans, which then makeIndonesia as a free milking cow for Japan.

The Terms of Foreign Loans:

The table 3.7 below shows the terms of foreign aid to Indonesia from 1970 to 1999: theterms of interest, the maturity and the grace period. The terms of maturity of the loanscan be used to predict the accumulated points when Indonesia has to pay the principalsand the interests in critical amounts. The interest rates of the loans were steadilyincreasing. Between 1970 and 1997, the average interest rate was more than doubled, andthe maturity years and the grace period nearly halved. The grant element in 1997 wasonly 22.7%, while in 1970 it was 60%. In one hand this reflects that Indonesia is movingaway from the group of poor countries to emerging economy, but in the other hand it mayalso means that Indonesia was in desperate need, without considering the terms, forforeign loans for implementing the liberalization that started in the middle of 1980s. Themore dependent Indonesia to foreign creditors, the weaker its terms of bargaining in aidnegotiations become.

Table 3.7: Average Terms of Aid, 1970-1999

Year 1970 1980 1990 1995 1997 1999

Terms of interest(%)

2.4 5.4 5.6 5.1 6.3 3.8

Maturity (years) 35.9 25.5 23.1 21.3 19.5 16.7

Grace Period (years) 9.5 7.3 6.6 5.8 4.9 5.1

Grant element (%) 62.9 36.2 32.8 33.3 22.7 38.1

Source: World Bank (2001), Global Development Finance

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Program Loans and Multilateral Loans:

Multilateral loans are more for program loans rather than for project loans. The program

loans are more related to policy reforms and conditionalities made by the World Bankand IMF. Program aid reaches its peak during crisis period, when the multilateral donorscome with their rescue package. The program loans from the multilateral agencies areprimarily used for securing balance of payments and budgetary supports. Some bilateraldonors also provide program support to support program aid package from themultilateral donors, and they are orchestrated by the World Bank or IMF, as indicated bythe rescue package below.

The rescue package itself in fact did not rescue the economy of Indonesia. It was utilizedas instruments for IMF and World Bank to impose conditionalities to Indonesia in orderthat Indonesia adopts all policy prescriptions of Washington Consensus.

In 1971 the program aid was 2.5% of GDP compared to only 0.5% of GDP allocated forproject aid. The oil boom in 1974 that contributed to increasing state revenues, andIndonesian economy was steadily stable, shifted the program aid to lower percentage. Formore than ten years (1974 1985) program aid was not significant to Indonesia. Thesharp decline in the world oil price in 1982 that caused the crisis in the balance ofpayment, the program aid came in again through the IMF/World Bank structuraladjustment loans. In 1983 IMF approved SDR260 million under CompensatoryFinancing Facility (CFF). Indonesia received SDR463 million from IMF in 1987 underthe CFF to compensate for the decline in exports. In the same year, Indonesia obtained$300 million from the World Bank under the Trade Adjustment Program Loan.6

Program loans were meant to rescue the country from crisis, particularly related to thecrisis in balance of payment and state budget. Therefore program loans are mainlycharacterized by quick disbursing. The program loans provided following the crisis in1997/1998 have different characteristics with the commonly known as program loans.Compared with no conditionality in the case of the World Bank Trade Adjustment Loansin 1987, after the 1997/1998 crisis all program loans are tied to a long list ofconditionalities. The program loans during the crisis period with the conditionalities asdetailed in the Letters of Intent (LoIs) were used as reference by both the multilateraldonors and the bilateral donors.7 The disbursements of loans from multilateral donors andbilateral donors (both for program and project loans) were determined by whether thegovernment of Indonesia has implemented the conditionalities or not. The unity of thedonors was made possible because of the presence of regular meetings of CGI where the

6 Anis Chowdhury and Iman Sugema, How Significant and Effective has Foreign Aid to Indonesia been?,Center for International Economic Studies (CIES) Discussion Paper, No. 0505, University of Adelaide,Australia, 2005, p. 15.7 In 1998, the Fund postponed loan disbursement three times: March, May and November. Thisautomatically affected the disbursement of loans from the WB, ADB and some bilateral lenders.

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government of Indonesia had to provide regular reports to the donors, besides regularreports to and regular monitoring from IMF.

Table 3.8a. The IMF Stabilization Loans to Indonesia

Program Type Date ofApproval

Expiry AmountApproved

Amount Drawn(Disbursementratio%)

Stand-by March 1972 1973 US$ 14 million

CFF August1983

SDR 360million

CFF May 7,1987

SDR 463million

Stand-by November5, 1997

August 25,1998

SDR 34 billion SDR 3.67 billion(44.0%)

EFF August 25,1998

February 4,2000

SDR 5.38billion

SDR 3.79 billion(70.6%)

EFF February 4,2000

December 31,2003

SDR 3.64billion

SDR 1.99 billion(54.6%)

Source: IMF website (www.imf.org).

Table 3.8b: The World Bank Adjustment Loans to Indonesia

Type Date of Approval Amount Approved

Trade Policy Adjustment 1987 US$ 300 millionPolicy Reform Support 1999 US$ 1.5 billion

Social Safety Net Adjustment 1999 US$ 600 million

Water Resources SectorAdjustment

1999 US$ 300 million

Source: BAPPENAS, 2001

The IMF Support Facility and the Deepening of the Crisis

The loans from IMF, or better called IMFs funds deposited in Indonesias Central Bank,

was the most controversial one in Indonesias economic and political history. The fundswere never used by Indonesia but Indonesia had to repay the principals and the interests.Attached to the funds were a long list of conditionalities detailed in the Letter of Intent(LoI) and Memoranda of Economic Policy Monitoring. The funds and conditionalitiesalso determined Indonesian position in loans negotiations with other creditors/donors.Although IMF was not a member of CGI, all participants in CGI had the same voice toput pressure on Indonesia to implement IMFs policy prescriptions and conditionalities.

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CGI Meetings were also used to check how far Indonesia had implemented the policyprescriptions from IMF.

On 5 November 1997, Indonesia and IMF signed a three-year stand-by arrangement(SBA). IMF approved SDR 34 billion and committed to disburse emergency loans of

SDR 8.3 billion, but in fact IMF only disbursed (or properly said, deposited in the CentralBank) SDR 3.7 billion. The SBA was aimed at restoring market confidence, orderlyadjustment of the current account, containing the unavoidable decline in growth and theinflationary pressure of exchange rate depreciation. The fiscal austerity and tightmonetary policy were the key measures to achieve the objectives.

The measures taken did not bring any positive results. The economy deteriorated and thebanking crisis started to cause social unrests and uncertainty in the whole economicactivities. The fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, floating exchange rate regime andthe bank closure as the prescription from the IMF brought the economy into deeper crisis.To solve the deepening crisis, IMF and Indonesian authorities signed the first Extended

Fund Facility (EFF). EFF indicated that the crisis would not end in short-term period. Thefirst EFF with the commitment of SDR 5.3 billion was expected to end in February 2000.The program imposed stricter structural measures on fiscal and monetary policies as wellas banking and corporate restructuring.

The crisis seemed to be still faraway from recovery. This was added by the riots andpolitical crisis. While the Peoples Assembly Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat MPR)8 decided the general guidelines for the government to solve the crisis withoutdependence to foreign creditors, the government on the other hand could not avoid thepressures from IMF and the donors community. In February 2000, when the first EFFexpired, the government signed the second EFF involving a commitment of SDR 3.6billion from IMF. The second EFF was accompanied by a long list of conditionalities,including stricter measures on privatization and legal reforms. Ironically, when Indonesiawas in deep crisis the disbursement of foreign loans from the creditors declined.

Rizal Ramli, the then Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, in 1997 had warnedthat involving the IMF in Indonesias recovery program would inevitably plunge thecountry into a deeper economic crisis9. Ramli described IMFs role in Indonesia intothree stages that brought Indonesia into deep crisis and the people into misery anddestitutions. Following the Stand-by Arrangement (SBA), the inter-bank interest rate sky-rocketed from 20 to 300 percent from the third quarter of 1997 that in turn causedbanking crisis. The IMF in November 1997 recommended the closure of 16 banks thatcaused capital outflow of US$ 5 billion and further pressure on Indonesian Rupiah that inturn caused corporate bankruptcy and loss of thousands of jobs.

Then IMF recommended the conversion of private debts into public debts. Thegovernments domestic debts increased up to US$ 65 billion. At the same time

8 MPR is like a Congress in US democratic system, consisting of the House of Representatives and theSenate.9 Dr. Rizal Ramli, The IMFs Indonesuan Myths, mimeo, 2004.

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Indonesias public foreign debts increased from US$ 54 billion to US$ 74 billion, and theinternational private debts decreased from US$ 82 billion to US$ 67 billion, some ofwhich have been converted as foreign public debts. As a consequence of the financialcrisis and IMF policies, Indonesias debt has doubled over a period of just four years.

Furthermore, Ramli exposed that IMF policies put unsustainable pressure on thegovernment budget. For the 2002 fiscal year, debt servicing is estimated to total US$13billion (IDR 130 trillion) including domestic and international payments. These paymentsamount to more than three times the total public sector wage bill including the military,and eight times the education budget. In short, IMF policies have created a debt trapfrom which there is no escape. The IMF has forced Indonesia to accept its misdiagnosisand failed prescriptions, including the transfer of private debt to the public sector.10

The loans from IMF until now become sources of confusion among the public inIndonesia. The funds were supposed to be a bail out package to support the recovery ofthe crisis, and could be expended. The commitments of the bail out package from IMF

was followed by the same commitments from other creditors such as the World Bank, theADB, Singapore, the USA, Japan, Australia, China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Thefinancial scheme totaled to USD 43 billion and grouped into two lines: USD 23 billion inthe first line and USD 20 billion in the second line (Table 3.7). The second line helpwould be issued only after the first line was fully exhausted. In reality, the second linewas never been utilized.11

Table 3.7: International Financial Rescue Package for Indonesia

Contributors Amount (US$ Billions)First Line 23.0

IMF 10.0World Bank 4.5

Asian Development Bank 3.5

Government of Indonesia 5.0

Second Line 20.0Singapore 5.0

United States of America 3.0

Japan 5.0

Australia 2.0

China 3.0

Malaysia 1.0

Hong Kong 1.0

10Ibid. In 1999 The IMF admitted its errors in Indonesia in its internal reports. Despite stopping further

errors, IMF and the donors kept pushing the implementation of IMFs conditionalities.

11 Anis Chowdhury and Iman Sugema (2005), loc.cit.

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The fund from IMF until 2006, when Indonesia repaid the entire principal and theinterests, was not used at all. The net foreign reserves of Indonesia, which was about US$24 billion at the time when IMF and Indonesia signed the first EFF, were at a veryhealthy level, and there was no need for additional reserves for securing the balance ofpayments. Since Indonesia took the floating exchange rate regime, the Central Bank did

not need to intervene in the exchange market on regular basis and therefore additionalreserves were not necessary.12

While Indonesia did not need to use the IMF money, it still ended up bearing the cost. In2002 Indonesia paid US$ 2.3 billion to the IMF, consisting of US$ 1.8 billion in principaland US$ 500 million in interest payment13. On average the cost of this idle fund (fees andinterest) was about 3.5 percent. The following table shows the breakdown of repaymentsto IMF.

Table 3.8: Disbursement and Repayment of IMF Loans (SDR)

Year Disbursements Repayments Interests2002 825,720,000 1,375,920,000 153,322,4402001 309,650,000 1,375,920,000 369,498,855

2000 851,150,000 0 398,846,600

1999 1,011,000,000 0 267,539,445

1998 4,254,348,000 0 133,963,634

1997 2,201,472,000 0 0

The program loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and otherdonors can actually be obtained without tying them to IMF conditionality. The mainreason for involving other donors in the first rescue package was to maintain and prop up

market confidence by showing that the donors collectively were ready to help Indonesiafinancially with a large amount of money (US$ 43 billion). The study report ofBAPPENAS revealed that IMF actually did not operate alone; it was backed up by alldonors involved in CGI. When Indonesia decided to end the IMF program in 2003, thedonors decided that Indonesia was no longer eligible for debt rescheduling through ParisClub.

14So IMFs program package was needed by the foreign creditors to smooth their

business in taking the advantage from the crisis in Indonesia.

Since 2007 until 2003 there were 20 Letter of Intent and Memoranda of Economic andFinancial Policies (MEFP) signed by IMF and the government of Indonesia. Each MEFPcontains commitments of GoI to implement structural reform measures with the

benchmark criteria. Each semester IMF staff monitored the implementation of thestructural reforms. Reports from IMF were also presented in CGI meetings every sixmonths, and the commitments of loans and grants of the members of CGI depended onthe recommendations and the monitoring reports from IMF.

12Ibid.

13 Rizal Ramli, 2002, pg. 13.14 BAPPENAS (2004), The Existence and Roles of the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI),Summary, p. 9.

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The surprising thing is that reports from the IMF did not influence the market at all; eventhe reactions were vice versa. When IMF reported that Indonesian macroeconomybecame more stable, the exchange rate of Rupiah weakened; and when IMF reported thatthere should be stricter measures for reform, the capital inflow from foreign investors

tended to increase.

Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)

Almost all public donors/creditors of Indonesia were members of CGI. CGI wasestablished in 1992 with the chairmanship of the World Bank. Until 2000 the meetings ofCGI were held outside of Indonesia. Only since 2000 the meetings were held inIndonesia, and participation of civil society groups was allowed although only asobservers.

Since 1967 up to 1991, the aid coordination forum was called Inter-Governmental Group

on Indonesia (IGGI) that was chaired by the Development Minister of the Netherlands.The termination of IGGI and the establishment of CGI were mainly caused by politicalreason. The government of Indonesia, particularly the President Suharto himself, foundthat the Netherlands Government as the chair of IGGI had utilized IGGI as an instrumentto intimidate and utilized the foreign aid as instrument to impose its policies to thegovernment of Indonesia.15 CGI was established with the expectation that the aid forumcould focus on the aidper se without linking them to other issues separated from aid.

Since 1992 until the meeting in January 2003, the aid pledge from CGI amounted to US$58,824.89 million. The trend was that the pledge increased by years, and since 2000 itdeclined.16 From 29 countries and organizations participating in CGI, World Bank,Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan were the biggest contributors. In total thepledge from these three creditors/donors reached 80% of the total pledge. In general, inthe period of 1992 2003, there were only 11 participants who made pledge about 1% ofthe total pledge, and 5 participants who made pledge of about 2%. Pledge indicatescommitments of the CGI participants to support Indonesias development program, butdid not reflect the actual disbursements.

Since 2000 there have been changes in CGI Meetings. The changes included: (1) it wasthe first time CGI meetings were held in Indonesia; (2) for the first time CGI invitedparticipation from NGOs, and (3) CGI formed working groups.17 In reality the changesdid not reflect the country ownership and the country-led CGI. The topics discussed inCGI meetings and in the working groups often did not reflect the development guidelinesof Indonesia; they reflected the interests of the donors/creditors. The working groupswere dominated by the donors/creditors, both topics and the processes.

15 BAPPENAS, The Existence and Role of the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), Study Report,2004, p. 8.16 OECD Report 2006 shows that Indonesias position as ODA recipient declined from 2000 to 2005.17 Lukita D. Tuwo, Indonesia after CGI, paper presented in a Seminar by INFID on 2 February 2007,Jakarta.

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CGI, although it has been chaired by Indonesia since 2004, functioned as an orchestrawith the World Bank as the conductor, where all donors/creditors sang the same song,and Indonesian Government was treated as sick client that had to follow the prescriptionsof the donors/creditors. The atmosphere in the CGI meeting showed clearly the power

relations between the donors/creditors and the Government of Indonesia.

18

CGIfunctioned as if it was another legislative body where the executive body of thegovernment of Indonesia has to be accounted for, ignoring the real legislative institutionsin the country.

Looking at the whole process in CGI meetings and the results of the meetings, wherepolicy dictations were more than the actual aid disbursements, the termination of CGI inFebruary 2007 by President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono was reasonable. In the State ofthe Union Address in February 2007, the President clearly stated that the termination ofCGI Forum was intended to reduce the coordinated pressures from the creditors/donors.19The government of Indonesia finally found that CGI was used by certain donors/creditors

to put pressure on Indonesia for their own interests.

20

Table 3.8. IGGI/CGI Pledge

IGGI/CGI PledgeBilateral Multilateral

Years(Five Year Plan)

US$ Million % US$ Million %Total (US$

Million)1967/68 1968/69 522.87 98.5 8.18 1.5 531.05I (1969/70 1973/74) 2,870.10 81.8 636.53 18.2 3,506.63

II (1974/75 1978/79) 3,062.36 46.8 3,481.66 53.2 6,544.02

III (1979/80 1983/84) 3,961.58 38.2 6,419.85 61.8 10,381.43

IV (1984/85 1988/89) 5,798.17 39.7 8,804.09 60.3 14,602.26

V (1989/90 1990/91) 10,041.90 42.5 13,585.90 57.5 23,627.80

VI (194/95 198/99) 12,245.33 42.2 16,769.76 57.8 29,015.09

1999 - 2003 8,824.30 38.6 14,045.80 61.4 22,870.10

Total 47,326.61 42.6 63,751.77 57.4 111,078.38

Source: Directorate of Bilateral Foreign Financing, BAPPENAS, 2003

18 In CGI meeting in 2006, as an example of the atmosphere, IFC asked question whether Indonesia wascommitted to the promotion of manufacture industry, particularly textile industry. Considering that thequestion was targeted to the Minister of Industry, the Minister seemed to be panic in responding to thequestion while skimming through the papers in front of him. CGI meeting was like a court room for the

Government of Indonesia.19State of the Union Address, February 2007. See also the explanation of the State Minister of NationalPlanning, The utilization of Foreign Aid in Post-CGI Forum, 1 February, 2007.20 In INFID statement read in the 2006 CGI Meeting, INFID called for the termination of CGI since thetopics of the discussions in CGI Meetings had moved far from the themes of development aid coordination,and it threatened the democratic processes and institutions in Indonesia. Certain International NGOs, whoused to being participants and partners of INFID complained about INFIDs position and even stoppedpartnership with INFID since they considered CGI was still needed to put pressure on Indonesiangovernment. They forgot the fact that Indonesia now is a democratic country and they also ignored theinternational procedures and agreements on Aid Effectiveness.

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Following tables show the pledge of IGGI/CGI members for supporting Indonesiasdevelopment. The pledge does not reflect the actual contracts and disbursements. Not allpledges are actualized. Some were followed up by contracts or agreements but theagreements were not implemented due to various reasons, such as: the implementers inthe country were not ready, or the conditionalities of the creditors were hesitantly

implemented by Indonesia.

Table 3.9. IGGI/CGI Pledge based on Creditor/donor (%)

Year(Five Year Plan)

WorldBank

ADB Japan OtherMultilaterals

OtherBilaterals

1967/68 1968/69 1.5 0.0 32.0 0.0 66.4

I (1969/70 1973/74) 14.7 3.2 24.2 0.3 57.6II (1974/75 1978/79) 42.5 10.6 13.5 0.1 33.3

III (1979/80 1983/84) 43.6 15.3 14.1 3.0 24.0IV (1984/85 1988/89) 39.7 17.8 21.3 2.8 18.4

V (1989/90 1990/91) 32.7 21.7 29.0 3.1 13.5

VI (194/95 198/99) 27.9 23.8 31.3 5.6 11.3

1999 - 2003 30.7 26.8 26.2 3.9 12.3

Source: Directorate of Bilateral Foreign Financing, BAPPENAS, 2003

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Table 3.10. Summary of the IGGI/CGI Pledge, 1967 - 2003

No.

Donor/

Creditor

Pre-Repelita

1969/68 1968/69

Repelita I

19769/70 1974/75

RepelitaII

1975/76 1978/79

RepelitaIII

1979/80 1983/84

RepelitaIV

1984/85 1988/89

RepelitaV

1989/90 1993/94

RepelitaVI

1994/95 1998/99

1999 -2003

Total

1967 - 2003

1 Australia 19,43 112,41 185,87 200,34 168,40 226,80 274,66 272,70 1.460,61

2 Austria 0,00 0,00 0,55 0,00 22,27 54,10 88,40 80,00 245,32

3 Belgium 0,40 25,12 47,32 46,92 19,79 60,70 36,71 13,40 250,36

4 Canada 0,78 100,65 162,46 228,45 170,27 144,20 109,79 70,90 987,50

5 Denmark 0,00 8,30 8,35 0,00 0,00 17,40 15,04 26,20 75,29

6 France 11,14 116,95 341,32 783,41 420,59 717,90 379,57 30,00 2.800,88

7 Finland 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,00 6,20 3,12 1,00 14,32

8 Germany 50,50 211,42 317,85 199,56 216,41 511,00 856,96 431,50 2.795,20

9 Italia 0,40 6,25 4,58 35,97 186,66 66,70 11,52 27,00 339,08

10 Japan 170,00 848,45 882,08 1.467,30 3.104,90 6.850,00 9.095,75 6.004,00 28.422,48

11 Korea 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.90 155.86 90.90 274.66

12 New Zealand 0.00 6,521 7,96 0.00 6,03 1,60 15,81 14,00 71,92

13 Netherlands 40,95 207,87 255,07 299,46 378,21 267,20 0,00 198,70 1.647,46

14 Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 10.00 10.70 21.7015 Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.90

16 Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.00 145.00 174.51 208.00 587.51

17 Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.50 17.50

18 Switzerland 0.00 9.60 0.00 3.14 45.24 91.60 50.84 16.10 216.52

19 UK 5,26 95,66 37,55 59,27 414,40 290,50 387,49 135,80 1.425,9320 United States 224.01 1,120.90 801.40 637.76 581.00 552.10 579.30 1,175.00 5,671.47

Bilateral 522,87 2.870,10 3.062,36 3.961,58 5.798,17 10.041,90 12.245,33 8.824,30 47.326,61

21 World Bank 8,18 514,07 2.780,00 4.525,00 5.800,00 7.730,00 8.100,00 7.034,00 36.491,25

22 ADB 0,00 111,82 695,25 1.584,00 2.600,00 5.119,00 6.900,00 6.130,00 23.140,07

23 EU 0,00 10,64 6,41 52,00 83,29 59,90 0,00 40,00 252,24

24 UNAgencies

0,00 0,00 0,00 142,50 206,60 308,00 304,90 489,70 1.451,70

25 UNICEF 0,00 0,00 0,00 42,50 67,20 78,00 58,90 23,90 270,50

26 IFAD 0,00 0,00 0,00 73,85 47,00 111,00 114,07 18,00 363,92

27 EIB 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 244,89 168,20 413,0928 Saudi Fund 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 45,00 6,40 51,40

29 Kuwait Fund 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 87,00 0,00 87,00

30 IDB 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 70,00 735,00 76,00 881,00

31 NIB 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 110,00 180,00 59,60 349,60

Multilateral 8,18 636,53 3.481,66 6.419,85 8.804,09 13.585,90 16.769,76 14.045,80 63.751,77

TOTAL 531,05 3.506,63 6.544,02 10.381,43 14.602,26 23.627,80 29.015,09 22.870,10 111.078,38

Source: the Directorate of Foreign Bilateral Financing, BAPPENAS, 2004.

Conclusion:

The data and facts about the foreign debts to Indonesia, while some bring effects toIndonesias development, most of them were wasteful or have been utilized by thecreditors/donors to dictate policies that should be implemented by the government ofIndonesia. Some of the project loans, particularly those related to infrastructuresdevelopment, have contributed to the expansion of physical development in Indonesia,

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though most of them have not been free from continuous lending. The loans that used forpurchasing capital goods are mainly for the projects that are related to the interests of thecreditors.

The programs loans have no clear advantage for Indonesia; even on the contrary, most of

them have been proved to be wasteful. Most of the program loans from multilateralagencies were used to justify the presence of the agencies and their staff members inIndonesia rather than for promoting capacities of the government staff. The goodgovernance that is promoted now in Indonesia is a result of the democratization processesrather than the results of the works of the consultants paid by the program loans. Theprogram loan from IMF was the best example of wasteful and harmful loans inIndonesian history, and can become a case study how an International Organizationundermined state sovereignty and ignored the democratic processes in a country.

Looking at the annual percentage of the portion of the foreign debts to Indonesia, whichis below 3% of the annual state budget, the contribution is not too significant for the

development of Indonesia. The major determinant factor of the economic achievementsof Indonesia in the past was the domestic financial capacities. The foreign debts becomeproblematic and burdensome when the maturity of the debts is accumulated at the almostthe same period, that put pressures on the state budget in later years.

The small portion of the foreign debts, however, has triggered the heavy foreignintervention in Indonesias economic and political system. The coordinated pressuresfrom the donors/creditors through IGGI/CGI put Indonesia in such a condition that tied itto the agreements with the donors/creditors, and made it difficult for Indonesia to get ridof debt trap. Added with the fact that the staff members of the donor agencies are drivenby self-seeking behavior, while they are working together with Indonesian officials in theoffices of the Central Government of Indonesia, the policy measures from Indonesiangovernment that are more pro-poor, pro-job and pro welfare of Indonesians are hardlyexpected.

Documents

Working Paper 6 - Profiles of Indonesia's Foreign Debts