Wright on the McKinsey Problem

Wright on the McKinsey Problem

anthony brueckner

University of California, Santa Barbara

The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Con-

tent Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solu-

tions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright’s work on the problem. I

argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the

problem.

I would like to raise an objection to Crispin Wright’s proposed solution

to the McKinsey Problem.1 The problem can be set up as follows.

According to the doctrine of content externalism (CE), there is a depen-

dence between intentional mental states and their thinkers’ external

environments. Thus CE has the Consequence that for some external

world proposition E (a proposition which entails the existence of an

external, physical world), the proposition that, say, I am thinking that

water is wet logically ⁄ conceptually implies E. (In general, p logi-

cally ⁄ conceptually implies q iff ‘‘there is a correct deduction of q from

p, a deduction whose only premises other than p are necessary or con-

ceptual truths that are knowable a priori, and each of whose steps fol-

lows from previous lines by a self-evident rule of some adequate system

of natural deduction.’’ (McKinsey 1991: 14)) I have an a priori warrant

for believing that I am thinking that water is wet, since my warrant for

this belief does not depend upon empirical investigation. Call this claim

about a prioricity Privileged Access (PA). A plausible Closure Principle

for A Priori Warrant (CPAPW) says that if I can have an a priori war-

rant for believing p, and if p logically ⁄ conceptually implies q, then I

can have an a priori warrant for believing q. So: I have (and so can

have) an a priori warrant for believing that I am thinking that water is

wet (by PA); thus I can have an a priori warrant for believing external

1 The locus classicus of the problem is McKinsey 1991. For a recent considered dis-

cussion of the problem, see McKinsey 2002. For Wright’s proposed solution, see

Wright 2000. For a recent considered discussion, see Wright 2003.

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXXVI No. 2, March 2008� 2008 International Phenomenological Society

WRIGHT ON THE MCKINSEY PROBLEM 385

world proposition E (by CE’s Consequence and CPAPW). But I do not

have, and cannot acquire, an a priori warrant for believing E. So: the

conjunction of PA and CE gives rise to an apparent problem—the

McKinsey Problem.2

Let us consider a categorization of possible solutions to the problem.

A Category I solution will consist in either the denial of PA, the denial

of CE, or the denial of both.3 Proponents of Category I solutions are

driven to deny one or the other of the plausible doctrines PA and CE

because they think that (1) the a priori warrantability of E follows

from the conjunction of the two doctrines, and (2) E is not a priori

warrantable.

As I argued in Brueckner 1992, the assessment of the McKinsey

Problem depends upon the specification of E. Clearly, proponents of a

Category I solution are thinking that there is some problematic exter-

nal world proposition which is in fact not a priori warrantable but

which would be a priori warrantable if both PA and CE were true.

Candidates for such an E are: water exists; either water exists or I inha-

bit a speech community in which speakers have theorized that H2O

exists.

Let us turn to the other possibility in the proposed categorization

of possible solutions to the McKinsey Problem. A Category II solution

will not involve the denial of either PA or CE. A Category IIA solu-

tion will consist in the claim that there is no external world proposi-

tion E which is such that E’s a priori warrantability follows from the

conjunction of PA and CE. According to Category IIA solutions,

there is therefore no pressure to deny either of the two plausible

doctrines.4

A Category IIB solution will consist in the claims that (A) there are

some external world propositions (the E’s) whose a priori warrantabili-

ty follows from the true doctrines PA and CE (the E’s being the only

external world propositions whose a priori warrantability so follows),

and (B) the E’s are in fact a priori warrantable. According to Category

IIB solutions, there is therefore no pressure to deny either of the two

plausible doctrines PA and CE. Candidates for allegedly unproblematic,

2 This setting up of the problem follows McKinsey 2003, but unlike McKinsey, I have

focussed up a priori warrant rather than a priori knowledge. This is because

Wright’s proposed solution to the problem focusses upon warrant.3 For example, McKinsey 2002 contains the denial of PA, and Boghossian 1997

contains the denial of CE. As far as I know, no one in the literature denies both

doctrines.4 See for example Brueckner 1992. In that paper, though, I consider a Category IIB

solution as well. See the discussion below in the text. A denial of CPAPW would be

sufficient to ground a Category IIA solution.

386 ANTHONY BRUECKNER

a priori warrantable external world propositions include: either water

exists or I am a member of a speech community which possesses the

concept of water; there is an external, physical world.5 Once a philoso-

pher has made a convincing case for (A) and (B) above, he has done

enough to provide a convincing solution to the McKinsey problem.

Let us leave behind our categorization for a moment and consider

Crispin Wright’s proposed solution to the problem. Wright begins by

drawing a distinction between the Transmission of warrant across

known entailment and the Closure of warrant across known entail-

ment. According to Closure, if I have warrant for p, and I know

that p entails q, then I have warrant for q.6 Wright does not deny

Closure: he is skeptical about the existence of any genuine counte-

rexamples to the principle.7 According to Transmission, if I have

warrant for p, and I know that p entails q, then my warrant for p

transmits across the known entailment in the following sense: I can

begin by having a warrant for p while lacking a warrant for q, then

come to know the pertinent entailment, and then thereby come to

acquire a warrant for q which I previously lacked. Suppose, for

example, that I have a warrant for believing G (=A goal has just

been scored) and that I know that G entails S (=A game of soccer

is in progress). My warrant for believing G is that a game of soccer

is apparently in progress and a player has just driven the ball into

the net. In this case, I cannot start in the position of having that

warrant for believing G while lacking a warrant for believing S and

then end in the position of acquiring a warrant for believing S by

means of appreciating the entailment from G to S. This is because

the warrant I have for believing G depends upon having a prior

warrant for believing S and so cannot generate a new, heretofore

absent warrant for believing S.8 Still, even though such a case argu-

ably refutes Transmission, it does not refute Closure. Indeed, as

Wright points out, my warrant’s failure to transmit in the soccer

case presupposes that Closure is not violated: if I do have a warrant

for believing G, then I must have a prior, independent warrant in

place for believing S.9

5 For discussion of the first external world proposition, see Sawyer 1998. For discus-

sion of the second, see Brueckner 1992 and Brueckner 1999. For some other Cate-

gory IIB solutions, see Brewer 2000 and Miller 1997.6 Closure is a different principle from McKinsey’s CPAPW. We will discuss their con-

nections below.7 See Wright 2003, p. 58.8 This case is first discussed in Wright 2000.9 See Wright 2003, p. 67 and p. 77.


There is much to be said about the nuances of the various cases in

which Transmission apparently fails.10 For our present purposes, suffice

it to say that Wright holds that the crux of his solution to the McKin-

sey Problem is this: my warrant for believing that I am thinking that

water is wet fails to transmit across the entailment embodied in Conse-

quence, viz. the thesis that the proposition that I am thinking that

water is wet logically ⁄ conceptually implies (and hence entails) an exter-

nal world proposition E.

To see the basis for Wright’s claim about Transmission failure in

the context of the McKinsey Problem, we need first to see which

external proposition is Wright’s candidate for E. Though the matter

is not entirely clear, it is fair to say that Wright’s candidate is the

proposition that my speech community has had contact with water

that is sufficient for the genuine contentfulness of the apparent

thoughts I express by using the term ‘water’.11 Call this proposition

EW. On Wright’s view, I have a special sort of warrant for EW

which he calls an a priori entitlement. This a priori entitlement ‘‘is

conferred not by positive evidence for…[EW] but by the operational

necessity, so to speak, of proceeding on the basis of such so far

untested assumptions if one is to proceed at all.’’ (Wright 2003: 67)

The ‘‘so far untested assumptions’’ are presumably those embodied

in EW, regarding ‘‘my speech community’s historical interactions

with water.’’ (Wright 2003: 69) It is not completely clear which way

of ‘‘proceeding’’ on the basis of the ‘‘so far untested assumptions’’

Wright has in mind. He may be thinking of our proceeding to use

such concepts as water. Or he may be thinking of our proceeding to

form second-order beliefs about our thoughts involving the term

‘water’. It is not important for our present purposes to settle this

interpretive issue.

Let us return to Transmission. Wright holds that the warrant that I

have for believing T (=I am thinking that water is wet) does not trans-

mit to EW across the entailment embodied in Consequence. According

to Wright, in order to have a warrant for believing T, I need to have a

prior, independent warrant for believing EW. I do have such a prior

warrant: it consists in my a priori entitlement to believe EW. So I can-

not acquire a heretofore lacking warrant for believing EW by the trans-

mission of my warrant for believing T across the entailment embodied

in Consequence (using my knowledge of that entailment). Having the

10 See, e.g., Beebee 2001, Brown 2003, Brown 2004a, Davies 1993, Davies 1998,

Davies 2000, Davies 2003, and McLaughlin 2003.11 See Wright 2003, pp. 68-9.


latter warrant for believing T requires having an antecedent, indepen-

dent warrant for believing EW.12

Once again, we see that a failure of Transmission presupposes that

Closure is not violated: I have warrant for believing T, I know that T

entails EW (since I know that Consequence is true), and I also have

warrant for believing EW (since I have an a priori entitlement to

believe EW).13

Let us return to our categorization of possible solutions to the

McKinsey Problem. Contrary to what Wright maintains, the crux of

his proposed solution to the problem is not the failure of Transmissibil-

ity in the cases that are relevant to the problem. Indeed, the problem

has nothing to do with Transmission. So long as one is going to avoid

Category I solutions and hold on to PA and CE, the issue that a solu-

tion-provider must consider is whether PA and CE guarantee the exis-

tence of some a priori warrantable E. Proponents of Category IIA

solutions say ‘‘No,’’ while proponents of Category IIB solutions say

‘‘Yes.’’ Wright is clearly a Category IIB man. He holds that the exis-

tence of an a priori warrantable E would follow from PA and CE, viz.

EW. Since he accepts PA and CE, he maintains that EW is in fact a

priori warrantable. EW is a priori warrantable, according to Wright,

because we have an a priori entitlement to believe EW. If Wright is

correct on this score, then this is the end of the story. That is, if Wright

12 This is the analysis of Transmission failure in the McKinsey inference presented in

‘‘Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and

Putnam’s Proof’’ and in the first half of ‘‘Some Reflections on the Acquisition of

Warrant by Inference.’’ Towards the end of the latter paper (sections 5 and 6),

Wright considers a more complex analysis of Transmission failure. He holds that

my warrant for believing T requires a background entitlement regarding the ‘‘integ-

rity’’ of my concepts. In the case of my concept water, the entitlement in question

is that when I token ‘I am thinking that water is wet’, I am thinking a contentful

thought and not suffering from a ‘‘content illusion’’ engendered by a lack of an

appropriate natural kind. What I am a priori entitled to believe, then, is that my

speech community has interacted with some watery stuff or other—-H2O, XYZ,….

Call this proposition EW*. My warrant w for believing T, then, will not trans-

mit to EW* via a McKinsey-style inference, since w presupposes a prior entitlement

to believe EW*. According to Wright, the (modest) good news is that w will trans-

mit to EW: w presupposes an entitlement to believe EW*, and since ‘‘it is a priori

that water is the watery stuff of our actual acquaintance,’’ w generates warrant for

believing EW (in virtue of w’s presupposed background entitlement regarding

EW*). Thanks to Jonathan Vogel for a helpful discussion of these points.13 In the papers cited in fn. 10, Martin Davies has developed (independently of

Wright) a response to the McKinsey Problem that centers around Transmission

failures. I have not discussed Davies’ work here because it is not completely clear

whether he holds that even though a priori warrant is not transmitted in the perti-

nent cases, one nevertheless does have a priori warrant for some external world

proposition E. The significance of this difference between Davies and Wright will

become clear shortly.


is correct on this score, then we have a successful Category IIB solu-

tion to the McKinsey Problem. Failure of Transmission is a separate

issue. If it is plausible that I have an a priori warrant for believing

EW—whatever the source might be, ‘‘operational necessity’’ or some-

thing else—then the McKinsey Problem is solved. It does not matter

for the problem’s solution whether or not the a priori warrant is trans-

mitted across the known entailment embodied in Consequence, so long

as the a priori warrant is in fact somehow in place.14

Wright might reply that if his position is correct, then he has shown

that objectionable ‘‘armchair knowledge’’ is not possible: I cannot

acquire a warrant for believing EW by deducing it from T while in my

armchair. Nevertheless, the McKinsey Problem was this: does the con-

junction of CE and PA entail the a priori warrantability of some exter-

nal world proposition that is not in fact a priori warrantable? Wright

has provided a solution to this problem that is independent of Trans-

mission failure: according to Wright, the conjunction of CE and PA is

true and does entail the a priori warrantability of EW—an external

world proposition for which we in fact have an a priori entitlement.

References

Beebee, H. 2001. ‘‘Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and

Semantic Externalism.’’ Philosophical Quarterly 51: 356–74.

Boghossian, P. 1997. ‘‘What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.’’ Pro-

ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161–75.

Brewer, B. 2000. ‘‘Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical

Facts.’’ In New Essays on the A Priori, edited by P. Boghossian

and C. Peacocke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 415–32.

Brown, J. 2003. ‘‘The Reductio Argument and Transmission of

Warrant.’’ In New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Scepticism, and

Self-Knowledge, edited by S. Nuccetelli. Mass.: MIT Press, 117–30.

——. 2004a. ‘‘Wright on Transmission Failure.’’ Analysis 64: 57–67.

——. 2004b. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Mass: MIT Press.

14 McKinsey’s own take on Wright in McKinsey 2003 is as follows. Wright accepts

PA and CE and denies neither Closure nor CPAPW. Wright is thus committed to

the a priori warrantability of some external world proposition. (In my parlance,

Wright is a Category IIB man.) Even if Transmission does fail in the context of the

McKinsey Problem, this is irrelevant because no external world proposition is in fact

a priori warrantable. So, McKinsey concludes, Wright has provided no solution to

the McKinsey Problem even is it is true that Transmission fails in the cases relevant

to the problem. The foregoing view of Wright, however, dismisses out of hand all

Category IIB solutions to the McKinsey Problem. An anonymous referee drew my

attention to a discussion of Wright by Jessica Brown in Brown 2004b. On p. 257,

she makes a point that is close to McKinsey’s in this footnote.


Brueckner, A. 1992. ‘‘What an Anti-individualist Knows A Priori’’.

Analysis 52: 111–18.

——. 1999. ‘‘Transcendental arguments from content externalism.’’ In

Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, edited by R.

Stern. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 229–50.

Davies, M. 1993. ‘‘Aims and claims of externalist arguments.’’ Philo-

sophical Issues 4: 227–49.

——. 1998. ‘‘Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.’’ In

Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by C. Wright, B. Smith and C.

Macdonald. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 321–61.

——. 2000. ‘‘Externalism and armchair knowledge.’’ In New Essays on

the A Priori, edited by P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 384–414.

——. 2003. ‘‘The problem of armchair knowledge.’’ In New Essays on

Semantic Externalism, Scepticism, and Self-Knowledge, edited by S.

Nuccetelli. Mass.: MIT Press, 23–55.

McKinsey, M. 1991. ‘‘Anti-individualism and Privileged Access.’’ Anal-

ysis 51: 9–16.

——. 2002. ‘‘Forms of externalism and privileged access’’. Philosophical

Perspectives (Language and Mind) 16: 199–224.

——. 2003. ‘‘Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.’’ In

New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Scepticism, and Self-Knowl-

edge, edited by S. Nuccetelli. Mass.: MIT Press, 97–115.

McLaughlin, B. ‘‘McKinsey’s Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and

Skepticism.’’ In New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Scepticism,

and Self-Knowledge, edited by S. Nuccetelli. Mass.: MIT Press, 79–

96.

Miller, R. 1997. ‘‘Externalist Self-knowledge and the Scope of the A

Priori’’. Analysis 57: 67–75.

Sawyer, S. 1998. ‘‘Privileged Access to the World.’’ Australasian Jour-

nal of Philosophy 76: 523–33.

Wright, C. 2000. ‘‘Cogency and Question-begging: Some Reflections on

McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof.’’ Philosophical Issues 10:

140–63.

——. 2003. ‘‘Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Infer-

ence.’’ In New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Scepticism, and

Self-Knowledge, edited by S. Nuccetelli. Mass.: MIT Pres, 57–77.


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Wright on the McKinsey Problem