V ANGUARD SERIES

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

ALLIED TANK DESTROYERS

T ext by BRYAN PERRETT

COIOUT plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLISHI NG LON DO N

Published in 1979 by Osprey Publishing LId Member company of lhe George Philip Group 12- 14 Long Acre, London WC2E 9LP © Copyright 1979 Osprey Publishing Ltd

This book is copyrighled under lhe Berne Convention. AH righlS reserved. Apan from any fair dcaling for lhe purpose ofprivale sludy, research, crilicism or rcview, as permilled uncler lhe Copyright Act, 1956, no part of lhis publicalion may be reproduced, sLOred in a retrieval syslem, or transrnitted in any form or by any rneans, electronic, elcctrical, chemical, mcchanical, optical, photocopying, rccording or otherwise, WilhoUl lhe prior perrnission Oflhc copyright owner. Enquiries should be addrcssed 10 lhe Publishers.

ISBN 0850453151

Filmset by BAS Printers Limilcd, Over Wallop, Hampshirc Printed in Hong Kong

The author would likc la thank Coloncl RobcrtJ. Icks for his invaluablc advice; also MI' Theodore H. Aschman Jr and Mr Albert Baybutt. Thanks are also due to MI' J ohnJ. Slonakcr ofthe Uniled States Army Military History Institulc and Brigadier R.J. Lewendon of the Royal Arlillery Institution for perrnilting access 10 their records. Sorne of the material on colour Plalc G is taken from the published researches oflhe Company ofMililary HisLOrians, USA. We are gralefu l LO M. Daniel Ambrogi and J ohn Sandars for lheir assislance with Plates C, D and G. Mike Chappell's cover painting depicts an M 1 o of lhe HQ Company, 8991h Tank Destroyer Bn., flying lhe pennant ofthe 8th T.D. Group, against the background of lhe LudendorS" railway bridge al Remagen, March 1945. The insignia on lhe back cover are lhe shoulder pateh ofthe US Tank Destroyer Farees, and lhe Royal ArtilJery eap badgc narmally worn by British lank destroyer erews,

1943- 45·

Prescience

In '9'4 William Albert Murley joined the Royal Regirnent of Artillcry. He was cornmissioned the following year, and before the Orcat War had ended he had becn awarded the Military Cross. Between the wars promotion for Regular officcrs was slow, bUl by 1939 he had reached the rank of major, having held a variety of appointments, including that of Pcrmanent Staff Instructor to a Territorial regimento He served throughout World War JI and retired as a lieutenant~colonel in 1946. Ostensibly, his thirty-two years of service had followed the pattern of hundreds of his COI1-

tcmporaries; but there was a difference. In 1923, while still a licutenant, he gave a grcat

dcal of thought tú the problems oC anti-tank defence, and he sel clown his conclusions in an artide which was printed the same year in the RoyaL Artillery JoumaL. He began by criticizing lhe British Army's currenl anti-tank gun, the 3.7in howitzer. He pointed out that it lacked lhe essential charac­teristic of an anti-tank weapon, all round traverse- the 3.7's lraversc was limited lO 40 degrees on the top carriage. The weapon had

2pdr. portee and crew at range practice. In action as many oC the crew as possible worked OD the ground, as a direct hit would orten dismount tbe gua, which would be tbrown backwards, killing or injuring tbe men on tbe vehicle. (hnperial War M u seum)

insufficient muzzle velocity; it lacked mobility over rough going; and it required lhe dumping oflarge quantities ofammunition beside the gun.

,j'J"ext, he -took issue with anti-tank tactics prescribed in the ManuaL oJ ArtiUery Training, which suggested that 'When engaging tanks with guns giving only a Iimited degree of traverse, a section [i.e. two guns] should be employed against each tank.' Murley commented that 'any method which necessitates the changing of a target from one gun to anolher is bound to be unsatisfactory, as there will nearly always be delay in getting lhe second gun to open fire at the proper momem, and unless both guns shoot exactly alike, which would be very doubtful, erra tic shooting will result'.

The solution to these problems, he fell, lay in the adoption of the 6pdr. gun in place of the 3.7in howitzer, and he went on to describe how it could be done.

' (a ) It should be possible to fix a central pivot mountingtoa tank chassis, thusadmittingall -round traverse. The recoil of the 6pdr. is shon and lhe base plate to which the pedestal is bolted would

Tbe Deacon,l •• t oftbe portee • . h walil outranged even before it entered service. (RAe Tank M u seum)

lherefore have to be fairly thick in order to withstand the shock ofthe firiog ofthe gun. As the gun will be mOUnled on a central pivot it will be possible lO traverse it rapidly in any required direclion. The largel could therefore be engaged in a fraction oflhe time taken with the 3.7io howitzer, and when once on the target the layer could follow it anywhere by simply swinging lhe gun round. Also, the layer will have ooly the elevaling wheel and firing handle 10 worry aboUl, which will result in more rapid and aceurate shooling. Jt may be necessary to fit a traversing handwheel, bUl if so, a quiek release clamp should also be provided.

'(b) Thc ract or,hc 6pdr. being a gun and nOl a howitzer will enable greater muzzle vcloeity lO be obtained. The extra muzzle veloei ty of lhe 6pdr. would compensate for the differenee in weighl of shell. The typc of shell suggested for use Wilh the 6pdr. is an armour-piereing with a delay action fuse . A 6pdr. is quile heavy enough lO stop a tank.

'(e) The faet ohhe gun being mountcd 00 a lank ehassis would inerease its mobility.lt is nol suggested lltal the anli-tank gun s/wuld go oul lo meellhe lank, bulllte facl of the gun being ah/e lo move quick{y would pennit a cerlain amount oJ manoeuvre, and the gun could therifore take up flfry previous{y selected position al a momalt's nolice. Under presmt conditions il would seeTn lhal a gun musllake up o posilion ond hope lhat a lonk will appear, and iJ one should oppear il mtry nol be possih/efor tite gun lo engoge il. [Author's italics]

'(d) ''''ith the gun mOUnled on a tank chassis lhere should be no difficulty in arranging for lhe carrying of al Icast one hundred rounds of ammu­nition, so lhe diffieulty of dumping ammunition wiII disappear. The ammunition eould be plaecd in

4

a kind ofbox on wheels runniog on a circular track, thus ensuring lhat it wi ll a lways be close to the breech.

'The next poiot lO eonsider is the proteetion of lhe dctaehment against rifle bullets and splinters.lt should be a simple matter 10 provide a circular shield about tin or tin thick. The shield would be bolted to the carriage, so lhat when the gun is moved the shield moves with it. The fact of the shicld movingwith thegun will permitofall-round traverse and will also afford protection of the detachment against fire from 0191 direetion.

'The engine could be driven from inside the shield, so that the driver would nol be exposed to fire . Two Lewis guns could also be carried for use lhrough movable [sliding] slots in case of emergency.'

Murley conduded his anide by submitting with due deference that his suggestions were worth a trial; but in the political and national climate ofthc timc, very similar lO today's, there was nol the slighlest chance of their being accepted, although some years laler lhe shon- lived Birch Cun (an 18pc1r. field piece on a Vickers Mec1ium tank chassis) was produced.

The significance of Murley's article is that not only did it predict lhe layoul of the typical World War II turreted tank destroyer, but also forecast the sort of tactics which would be employed. It would be too easy to suggesllhal Murley conceived the idea of the tank destroyer; very possibly other officers around the world were thinking along similar lines, although it would be many years before lheir thoughts turned to substance. In such circumstances one callnOl help wondering whal might have beeo the thoughts of lhe now middlc­aged lieutenant-colonel in 1945, as the Allied armies swarmed across Europe using hundreds of lhe type ofvehicle he ha'd suggested building more than twenty years earl ier.

In fact lhe British Arrny had entered World War 11 without any self-propelled artillery al all, whelher field or anti-tank, a nd lhe lack of it was cruelly feIt for several years. 1t was true lhal the guns had a new mobiJily due to the replacernent of lhe old horse tcams with malar traction units, bUl lhis had only bcen achieved a fler a struggle, which in sorne measure also eontributed 10 lhe failure to

develop self-propelled artillery.

Opposition to mechanizauon within lhe Royal Artillery was not simply a matterofbloody-minded anti- radicalism, an ultra-conservative rejection of the concept of total mobi lity as defined by the fashionable 'Armoured Idea'. Nor was it lhe product of sentimental a6'eclion for lhe 'hairies' which had always dragged the guns iOlO action and which had always been the gunners' constant companions. Artillerymen are, after all, practical people, and it seemed to many lhat as long as sorne of the leam were on their feel it would always be possible lO attempl recovery of a gun from a difficull siluation. Internal combustion engines, on the other hand, were subjecl to breakdown, and lhis could lead lo the loss of a towed gun unless other vehic1es were on hand te lend assistance; in the case of a self-propelled gun engine failure during a withdrawal would almost certainly lead te its loss, an idea abhorrent lO a RegimeOl which had always fought to the muzzleand beyond as a matter ofcourse. In lhe end it waslhedistances involved in mechanized operations that led to lhe demise ofthe horse leams- although, curiously, lhe majority of German field batteries oUlside arrnoured for­mations remained horse-drawn throughout lhe war.

7snun Gun Motor Carriage M3I with front and liide-door IcreeQS nú~. (RAe Tan,k MuseUlll)

On its own, the horse team versus internal combustion engine debate could nOl have dclayed the introduction of self-propelled arti llel)' inlo the British Army for long. The Birch Cun battery serving Wilh lhe Experimental Armoured Force were en thusiastic abOUl its róle, for which they saw a greal future. It was unfortunate that senior officers of the Royal Artillery and lhe lhen Royal Tank Corps got on extremcly badly. The brilliant and irascible Coloncl P. C. S. Hobart, RTe, later to command the famous 79th Arrnoured Division, for sorne reason could nOl telerate Cunner officers and made no bones aboul it ; he added fuellO the ftames by speaking ofsclf-propelled guns as 'Royal Tank Artillery'. To Woolwich this sounded rather like an auempled take-over, and lhe very cool response was that iflhe Royal Tank Corps wanted self-propelled guns to support ilS operations it should modify sorne ofi151anks accordingly. This is simply lhe tip of lhe iceberg, and the whole story is an excelleOl example ofBritish military tribalism al ilS worsl, lhe net result being lhe waste ofthe best pan of a decade during which research and developmeOl could profitably have been pursued. Norshould it be forgouen lhat for mOSl ofthe in ter-

war period the Army as a whole was forced to work within stringent finaneia l limils, and no funds could bespared for projecls upon which lhere was a lack of common agreemenl on policy and which did oot seemingly bear the slamp ofimmediacy.

In 1973 lhe editor of the Royal Artillery Journal, looking for items ofinterest from fifty years earlier, carne aeross William Murlcy's articlc, and had it rcprinted with the comment that the young author had shown considerable prescience. By then the big gun tank destroyer had become a battlefie1d memory for as long after the evenl as it had bcen Murley's vision before il; bUl in the few years of iLS active Ji fe it had had a most interesting and unusual careCL

The Concept The dramatic success of lhe German bLit<.krieg leehniquc in PoJand, Franee, the Balkans and the 'oVestcrn Desert illuslralcd beyond any reasonable doubl lhat a defensive cordon of towed anti-lank guns was nol lhe answer to a massed tan k attaek, particularly ir the tanks were closely supported by aircraft and infantry. Once lhe cordon had beeo ruplUfed the tanks moved 100 quickly for funher defensive fronts 10 be constructed across their path, and lhe eontainrnent of such breakthroughs seerncd 10 presem insuperable difficultics for armies equip­ped with conventionaJ artillery.

In the still neutraJ United Sta tes lhe problem was studicd carefully at lhe highesl levels. ''''ithin tbe Unitcd Slales Army, as wilhin cvcry army of thc period, lhere bad been a debate as to whether the best defence against the tan k was the anti -tank gun or another tank. Events abroad seerned to indicate that lhe anli-tank gun had faiJed in its primary mission; but the tank represemed an expensive Solulion, and in any evelllthe Chief ofthe Arrnored Force did nOl wish bis vehicles to be employed in a dcfensive role, as the nature and lraining ofhis arm was spceifieally designed for o[ensive operations.

On the other hand, the anti -tank gun was potentially a more powerful weapon than that carricd by the majority ofconlemporary tanks, and ifit could be given a self-propelled mobility it could be deployed and re-depJoyed rapidly 10 deal with any developing crisis, which lhe towed gun could nol.

6

MJ witb annoured sCreflIslowered. (US Anny)

On 14 May 1941 General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff United States Army, issued a directive for the establishmen t of an organization, a rmed wi th an offensive weapon, whose function would be defenee against armoured rorces. 1 n his directive Marshall emphasized that lhis 'was a problem beyond the eapabilities of any one arm and probably required lhe organization and use of a special force of combined arms, eapable ofrapid movement, interception and active ralher than passive defence tactics"

The following day Lt.-Col. Aodrew D. Bruce was detailed to set up a planning branch for the new organization, designed to look into lhe questions of equipmelll, training and adminis­lrali~l. By the end of November lhe planning phase had been compJcled, and Bruce was appoin­ted·to command lhe new Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center al its temporary headquarters al Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In accordance with lhe new concepl of aggressive defence, existing anti-tank batlalions were re-designated Tank Destroyer battalions the following month.

The task facing Bruce was enormous. He had 10 build a central adminislraLÍvc organization for lhe rapidly cxpanding Tank Destroyer Force, and al the same time formulale doctrine, organize train­ing, superintend weapons devclopmenl, and pre­pare tablcs of organizalion. With very limitcd rcsources he was founding what amoullled 10 a new arm ofservice, starting from scratch.

The basic thinking behind lhe new arm was simple. Mobile lank destroyers in large numbers

I Tlle Tonk Des/oya History. Study No. 29, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces.

would be deployed rapid ly in the path and on the flanks of any enemy mass tank attack, where they would destroy their opponcnls by direct gunfire. In Brucc's own words, ' Panther-like, we seek infor­mation of enemy tanks and of suitable firing positions; pamher-like, we strike and destroy by gunfire from favou rable positions. This does not mean that we seek out tanks with guns, nor chase lhem, nor pursue lhem, nor charge them." In lhe ycars that followed, this was emphasized time and again in tra ining circu lars: 'The primary mission of

Ilbid.

tank destroyer uni ts is thedestruction ofhostile tanks by [lhe direct] fire ofa superior mass ofguns.'2 The choice of a panther head for a badge and a motto of Seek, Strike and Destro) were constant remindcrs of the ncw methods.

Belligerent monoes are not usually taken too seriously by the mcn who actually do the fighting.

'Training Circulan 88 and 125, June and November 1943.

TIte nonna! recoil ofthe MI8g7-Á4 7,;mm gun was 4:Pn. This pbotograpb illustrates the sbarply tapered construction ofthe baTrel and the method ofita carriage iD. the recoilaUdes. (RAe Ta.n1r.Muaeum)

FoUowiDg the arrival oC the fir.Jt Muw in North Africa, a DUlDber oC M3S were handed over to the French Anny, which iJnposed its OWD lDotded sand colour scheJne. (ECP Années)

In this case occasional over-usage by instructors sometimes led to irreverem yells of 'Shag Ass!' a coarse expression which might be translated as 'It sounds unpleasant~l'm nOl slopping to find out!' In spite of this the TD soldier was proud of his trade, and reckoned he was a better aH-round soldier than anyone else in the Army.

The basic unit was the battaJion, of which initially there were three types, as foHows: Heavy, Se/j-Propelied: Headquarters Company and three gun companies with a total oftwenty-four 3in or 75mm anti-tank guns, twelve M6 37mm anti­tank guns and eighteen 37mm anti-aircraft guns, aH self-propelled. A Reconnaissance Company equipped with M3 halftracks (Iater M8 armoured cars) was added tú this establishment, performing the invaluable service of roule finding and selection of fire positions for the battalion. The 37mm ami­aircraft guns were later replaced by dual mount .50 cal. machinc guns in M3 halftracks, and the M6 light tan k destroyers replaced by the heavier weapons. Light, Se/j-Propelled: Similar establishmem to Heavy Baualion, but equipped with thirty-six M6 37mm anti-tank guns and eighteen dual moum .50 cal. anti-aircraft machine guns, aH self-propelled. The light tank destroyer was soon seen lO faH be!ow battlefield requirements, and units so equippcd were converted to the Heavy róle. Light, Towed: Similar establishment to Light SP

TDF did not dispense with towed anti-tank guns altogether, and at one phase there was even an increase in the proportion of towed guns. The 37mm was replaced by the 3in anti-tank gun MI.

The heavy anti-aircraft e!ement within eaeh battalion was a clear indieation that the dive­bombing attacks which had disrupted the British and French static anti-tank gun cordons would have less success against the new American formations. In the event, the twin (and later, quadruplc) .50 mounting was used extensively against ground targets as well, with su eh murd­erously suecessful results that il earned ilself lhe title of'the meat grinder'.

As already mentioned, tank destroyers were designed to operale enmasse and the next step up the formation ladder from battalion was the Tank Destroyer Croup, consisting ofa group Headquar. ters and HQ Company, plus three TD battalions. The largest formation of all was the Tank Destroyer Brigade, which included a Headquarters and two TD Croups. As originally conceived one TD Brigade would SUppOfl each eorps, and two each army; in raet only two such brigades were raised and ofthese only one, the 1St, saw active serviee.

The Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center began moving from FortMeade to a new per­manent station named Camp Hood at Killeen, Texas, in the middle of January 1942. Once eSlablish«l, the Tank Destroyer Center was able ro concentra te on the training of individuals and units. The men carne from the cavalry, the artillery

battalion, and equipped with thirty-six towed ~~~~~~~~ 37mm anti-tank guns and eighteen dual mount .50 cal. anti-aircraft machine guns, sclr.propelled. The ...

8

and the infantry; the first task was lO establish a common standard oftraining, including the use of small arms and explosives, after which they learned their basic TD crew trade. Training of entire battalions took aboul three months, including five weeks' gunnery and range practice, six weeks' taetics, and one week's battle eonditioning. 1 In addition 10 training new battalions, lhe TD Center established its own Offieer Candidale Sehool and a Replaeement Training Center, designed to keep batlalions in lhe field at full strength. A total of 5,187 offieers and 17,062 enlisted men qualified on courses conducted by the TD Sehool, while 42,000 enlisted men passed through the Replacement Training Center and 5,299 2nd lieutenants grad­uated from the Officer Candidate School. Thc unit

l"Dle Tank Destroyer Center eslabtished somelhing or a fint in il5 batde oonditioning melhods, in thal advancing trlXlps were fired on frorn Ihe from with tive arnmunition, instead of from Ihe nanb; Ihis wasfrightening, reatisticalld effective.

1'!bos in Tunisia. The complete absence oC stowage suggests tKat tbe vehicles are in transit to join their battalions; the undam.aged condition oCtbe sandshields seen¡s to support this view. Note tank crasb-helmets, later generaUy replaced Cor crews oC apeo vehicles by steel helmets. (hop. War Mus.)

training record was equally impressive, including two Brigade and twenty-four Group Headquarters, and 100 battalions. In lhe equipment field the Tank Destroyer Board had devcloped lhe MI8 Tank Destroyer and evaluated the bazooka on behalf of the Arrny'

Because of his vastly increased responsibilities, Lieutenant-ColoneJ Bruce was promoted to Brigadier-General in February 1942 and to Major­General in September ofthat year. He handed over command orthe Tank Destroyer Center to Major­General Orlando C. vVard on 25 May 1943. His achievement should not beseen assimply a brilliant piece of administration; prior to the establishment ofthe'TDF the US Army had serious doubts that it

!TheTank DutroyerHistory.

could meet lhe Panzer Divisions on equal terms­those doubls no longer exisled.

General Ward had commanded 1St Armored Division in North Africa and had seen the new tank destroyer ba tta lion; in action. H e was able to comment on what was good battle practice a nd what was not, and instituted a seri es of'battle plays' to emphasize lhe lessons, as well as having signs placed around the ranges illustrating good and bad combal firing posilions. Under Ward the Tank Destroyer Cemer reached its maximum expansion, and at one time lhere were more guns at Camp Hood than the total of all the divisional artillery pieces possessed by the American Expeditionary Force in \<Vorld War l.

Thereafter, the importance of the arm declined and the T D Center contracted rapidly towards its eventual inactiva tion. T here were several reasons for this. First, by the autumn of 1943 the US Army had achieved the strength required to altain its stra tegic objec tives. Secondly, lhe German mass

A scene in the Áluio beachhead on 3 M ay 1944. The MIO is standing by in the counter-attack rÓle. and its suspension has been protected apiost ground strafing by enenly airuaft; otherwise. its crew Seet1l to be very poor housekeepers. even allowing for the conditions oí static war! (Imp. War Mus.)

10

tank attack was no longer the threat it had becn in 1940 te 194 1. Thirdly, tanks were inevitably fighting tanks on lhe battlefield, regardless of doctrine. Finally, such progress had been made in tank design that tanks were now capable of carrying guns of grea ter rangc and killing-power than those carried by the tank destroyers j in fact, there was sorne da nger ofthe hunters becoming the hunted.

The Weapons: General Bruce had becn quite clear from the outsel a bout thesort ofweapon he was looking fOL ""'hal we are after is a fast-moving vehicle, armed with a wcapon wi lh a powerful punch which can be easily and quickly fircd, and in lhe lasl analysis we would like to get armoured protection agains l small arms fire so that this weapon cannOl be pUL out of action by a machine gun.'1 He wanted 'a cruiser, not a battleship', and he favoured the employment ofthe Christie suspension, which provided the best basis for high speed cross-country movement.

' /bid,

75JlU1l Gun Motor Carriage M3 Pending the appearance of such a vehicle, Bruce had lO makc do with whatever was a~ailable. Thcrc \\Iere several hundred old 75mm guns on hand, and Bruce learned from a French ordnance designer that this lypC of weapon had becn mountcd successfull y 00 a 5-lon truck. It was decided that the American stock should be filted lO the M3 halftrack armourcd pcrsonneJ carrier, and Major Robert J. kks was assigned lO carry out lhe Ordnance Department 's request for the gun and pan of ilS field carriage la be mounted in lhe vchicle and test fired . H aving complctcd lhis task a l the Aberdeen Provi ng Ground, lcks dclivercd the vehic1e lo Fort Meade, where it underwent [urther tests and modifica tions befare being sent tú the Autocar Company of Ardmore, Pennsylvania , ror lhe production runo

A total or 2,202 vehicles were converted , or which all but842 were re-converted la ter to APCs. Arter lhe MI8 entered service the M3 became a limited standard (i.c. seeond line) vehicle, bUl it served on in the British Army in the heavy lroops or armoured car and divisional recee regiments . In general, the vehicles were popular with their erews and did their work well:

'They wcighed ten lons and were equipped Wilh a 75mm M1897-A4 gun. The normal rate or fire was six rounds per minute, bUl 26-28 rounds per minute was possible with a well-trained crew. T he tube and breech or this gun weighed 1,035 pounds and the barrcl had a unirorm right-ha nd twist with '24 lands and grooves. Total traverse or the piece was 39 degrees, 20 right and 19 lert. Consequently when we pulled into position, lhe whecls or lhe haIrtrack were eramped hard lO the right. To gain more traverse lo lhe len, the vehicle was baeked up- more to lhe right, you pulled ahead. Elevation was rrom minus 10 degrecs lO plus 29. vVhen fir ing, lhe vehicle was always len in neutral gear with lhe engine running. Normal recoil or lhe piece was 43in, and on more than one oecasion the loader was knocked Hat. On our vehicles we used an M33 fixed sight- a simple but elfect ive sighl Wi lh lead and range markings.'l

3¡tn.Dl Gun Motor Carriage M6 There were numerous designs contcnding ror

'Theodore H. Aschman J r, 8'4th Tank Destroyer Batlalion.

'Ihe gunner's quadrant, which, D1.ounted on the breech blO(:k and used in conjunction with the traverse indication, pe .... IDitted tank destroyers to engage iD indirect firing.

standardization as the TDF's light lank destroyer- so many, in raet, that there was a saying that lhe Army had mounted a gun 'on anylhing and everylhing rrom a roller skale up'. A total or nineleen vehicles in the light class were devcloped, nine mounting the 37mm gun, seven a 40mm gun, and lhree a 57mm gun. or these the 37mm mounted on a t-ton truck was standardized as the GMC M6, and 3, 117 were produced. In layout lhe M6 followed thal o r lhe British 2pdr. portees already fighling in the Western Desert, and indeed the two guns had a very similar performance. The light dass or tank destroyer was intendcd as an ex­p'i?dient, vo!ume production measure pending the appearance ofl arger vehicles, bUl sorne did serve in North Africa.

3ÍD Gun Motor Carriage MIO Meanwhile lhe General MOlors Corporation and the Ford MOlOr Company were producing a tank destroyer based on lhe M4A2 mcdiurn tan k chassis. In aceordance wi th lhe Tank Destroyer Board's specifica tion it had an angled hull and an open­topped turret, capable of all-round traverse, mounting a 3in high-veloeity gun.

When General Bruce examined the vehicle at lhe Aberdeen Proving Ground on 2 May 1942 he was againsL its being acceplcd as a standard weapon sys tem . Al thirty tons he relt it was lOO heavy; wirh a lOp speed of 30mph he felt it was too slow. Nonetheless it was accepted as standard, and became lhe best-known of all lhe US Army's tan k deslroyers. lt was constructed in two versions, the

Elem.ent. oCthe Álnerican advance guard iD ROlDe, -iJUDe 1944. Detall. oC the do.e-defence .so cal. IDOUDting and stowage oC ' ready' anununitiOD are dearl), visible on the MIo iD the Coreground. Behind i. an Mt lDediwn ta.nk and ODe oC the UDpopular M8 annoured can. (hnp. War Mus.)

MIO and lhe M lOA 1 , of which lhe former was more popular with its crews:

'The M 10 mOlor carriage, powered by two diese! engines, proved 10 be a very good se!f-propelled mount. The main advantages were: ( 1) the f1exibililY oflhe lWO mOlors, which made it possible 10 move afler one had becn knocked out or failed in operation; (2) lhe power of lhe diese! motors al low

12

spccd; (3) lhe increascd rangc per gallon of fuel; (4) lhe case of motor maintenancc of lhe diescl engine.

'The MI oA I motor carriage, powered by a 500hp Ford tank gasoline cnginc, a lso proved to be a vcry slurdy and well-dcs igned gun mounl. The units thal were equipped Wilh bolh lhe MIO and M lOA I fell lhat lhe latter had a lilde less power lhan lhe MI O, lhal its one engine made il less flexible, and that lhe gasoline engine was a ¡iule harder to maintain and would not stand lhe rough

going as well as the diese! engines.'1 Over6,700 MIos were built, and as well as being

the TDF's primary wcapon, the vchicle saw active servicc with the British , French and Russian armies.

90JlUIl Gun Motor Carriage M36 The appearance in early Ig43 of larger, beuer­armoured German tanks meant that lhe TOF needed a gun capable of greater penetralion than the 3in carried by the MIO, and the weapon choscn was a gomm high-vclocity AA gun. The basic M 1 o turrel could not housc this, so a ne\\' turret was designcd and fitted tú thc MIO chassis, the new vehicle being accepted as standard and dcsignatcd M36 ¡nJune '944·

The gomm gun was the mOSl powerful carried by unmodified US lank deslroyers. It could penetrate six inches of armour at 1,000 ya rds; al the same range it could penetrate five feel of reinforced concrete, usingonly two rounds as opposed 10 ten of 3in. Other improvements upon lhe MIo were thicker armour and lhe addition of a power traversc, although lhe rate of fire was slower because of the larger ammunition.

The M36 GMe proved lO be an acceptable answer lO lhe Tigcr and total of 1,722 were built, including 500 converted MIOAl s.

Near [sola del Piano, an MIO oí 93rd Anti_Ta.nk RegUnf'!D.t RA overtakes 5th Battalion, Sherwood Fornten. When D1.oving mto the line, taDk destroyen ofteo carried a..nunu.nitiOD and

IS/ud] of Organisa/ion, Equipmtn/ and T ac/icol Employmtnt ~ Tonk coDsolidatiOD stores for the infantry. Tbe vehide crew's pads Dulrf.I]tT Unils; General Board, US Force:s, European Theatre, Study are attacbed to an additional stowage rail whicb has been No. 60. = .......... _w.,.lded across the glacis plate. (hopo War Mus.)

' 3

'¡6nu:n Gun Motor Carriage MI8 Unlike the M3, M I O and M36, lhe MI 8 was not a modification of existing equipment but had been dcsigncd ' from the ground up' as a purpose-built tank destroyer and carne closest LO the original concept ofGeneral Bruce and the Tank Destroyer Board (who, it will be recalled, had always sought high speed, hilling power and limiled protcction against small arms).

While the early preference for a Christie-type suspension had given way LO a túrsion bar system, the MI8 ba rcly topped 19 lOns a l combat weighl and was driven by a 400hp engine, a power to weight ratio that made it the fastes t tracked AFV of World War Il and earned it the name of'Hellcal ' .

As originally planned , the M 18 would have mounted a 7.5mm gun, bUl in September 1942 Lhe Ordnance Dcpartmelll called Bruce's auentíon tú a new 76mm gun which had been dcveloped for lhe laLer modcls of theM4 medium lank series. 'This gun embodied the same physical characterislics as lhe 75mm, had lhe same breechblock, recoil and similar design of tu be. Through a longer tube and lhe use of a larger cartridge case, a much higher muzzle velociLY and a grealer slriking power were attained lhan wilh lhe 7.5mm gun, and lhal wi lhout an appreciable increase in weight. The 76mm gun was in rcality a 76.2mm calibre wcapon, equivalenL to lhe 3in bUl much lighter in weight. It had lhe additional advantage over Lhe 7.5mm of using the same projective [sic] as lhe 3in.'!

The M 18 began entering service in the autumn of 1943, and was an immcdiaLe success. lt 'proved LO be an ideal tight destroyer and was highly praised by Lhe using lroops. Tntú lhe design ofthis destroyer were built maintenance aids which proved ofgreal value in combat. Two such aids were (1) the extension lrack for replacing engines, and (2) Lhe removable frontal plate which made it possible 10 change lhe lransmission in less than one hour. In a vcry largc per cenl of its employment in this lhealre, its road speed of60mph and iLS grcat cross­country spced were never needed. However, its flota Lion did prove lO be a greaL advantage during Lhe winter operations.'l!

The Buick Division ofGeneral MOLOrs manufacl­lured a total Of2.507 MI8s betweenJuly 1943 and October 1944. A turret less version, known as lhe Armored Ut ility M39, was employcd as an APC,

' 4

an ammunition carrier wilh a payload of 263 rounds, and as a prime mover for the lowed gin anti-tank guns MI and M6.

M8 Light Armored Car and M20 Armored Utility Vehicle 'These vehicles were not popular wilh lhe tank destroyer units. The common complaints were: lack of power in lhe higher range of speeds; lack of flotalion ; lack of sufficient armour and armament; the open turreL of lhe M8 alld lhe open-top conslruction ofthe M20; thc position oflhe driver and com mander directly over lhe fronl wheels caused casualties whenever a mine was hit; lhe lack ofsufficientoperaling room for lhe crew in lhe M20 ; and lhe vulnerability ofthe radiator LO small arms fire. Maintenance was nOl difficult) but it was a major operation LO gCl lO lhe motor for even lhe first echelon check.'3 The M20 was a command version oflhe M8, and was intended LO carry a crew ofsix, plus two radios. IL was a lso used as an APC and asa cargo carrier.

US Tank Destroyers in Combat The Philippines, 1941- 42 In December 1941 fifty 75mm M3 halftracks werc haslily despa.tched to Luzon to bolster lhe island 's defences. Details of their use is fragmentary, and one source indicates that ' they were used cffectively as sel f-propelled arLillery'. Thc majority were sent 10 lhe soulh oflhe island, bUl several were allached lO lhe Provisional Tank Group which was contest­ing lhe principal J apanese axis of advancc) from Lingayen GulfsoUlh 10 Manila. TheJapancse were using lanks on lhis axis, and quile heavy a rmoured engagements took place al Moncada and Bali uag. On lhe basis ofLhc evidence available il seems vet)' probable that lhe TDF's firsl vic lims were T ype 89 and T ype 97 medium tanks and T ype 94 lankettes oflheJapanese 7th T ank Regiment. The M3s were 1051 in Lhe subseq uent fighting and general sur­rendcr.

¡Tan!" DtSt,a.JU Hislbry. In spite orthis Ihe two rounds werc 1101 inter­changeable. 'Sludy No. 60. 3lhid.

North Afriea, 1942- 43 The next vehicles 10 find themsclvcs in the M3's gunsights were obsolete French tanks, and belonged to armoured units which brieft y opposed lhe Allied landings in North Afri ca. A typical example was the action fought by 3rd Platoon, Company 'B', 70 lS1 Ta nk Destroyer Ba ltalion a t Sl Lucien, south ofOran , on 9 Novembcr 1942. The 3rd Pla toon was supporting a light ta nk compa ny,

Even w eary infantry corniog out oC the line could oot Cail to commeot 00 a sight such al! this. The vehicle conunander'l! explanation must uve provided lIOtne interestiog listeoing! Just visible on tbe Cront top decking oCthe turre t is a Brirish air recognition rowtdel. (hnp. Wa r Mus.)

and bcgan the engagement by knocking out 1WO lanks a l a range in exccss of 2,000 yards, a range weH beyond lhe capability of any tank on either side. T he remaining lweJve French vehicles werc also disposed of withoU1loss.

' 5

In British service tbe MIO wa$ known a. tbe Wolverine. This V Corps vehicle ¡. Sftn beiog guided aeross the River Sa vio on 24 October 194{, usiog a causeway of Churdúll AR.Iú;. A 'dead' Pantber lies beyond. Tbe crew are clearly experienced at looking alter thenllelve!J, a$ can be 1Jet9l by tbe neat, flecure IJtowage, tbe 'acquired' oversize fwmel (an invaluable aid during repleni.flhment), bivouac stake!J and bucket. (Imp. War MU!J.)

It was a small but optimistic beginning; but thereafter tank destroyer battalions in North Africa found themselves shamefully misused by senior commanders who did not properly understand their function. To quole Theodore Aschman, a former officer of814th Tank Destroyer Battalion:

'The TDs were a sort of maverick. Regimental and divisional commanders looked upon us as a SOrl

or makeshift organization and an cxpendablc onc a l that. Often we were used as an attacking point and preceded lhe tanks- sort or a sacrificiallamb. We were (at leaSl our battalion) never permanelltly assigned tú any division .... We were always on the move, lravelling from 200 LO 300 miles during

lhe nige.t to be on hand for an engagemenl during the pre-dawn orthe nex1day, afterwhich we would pack up and move anotheronc hundred orso miles. 1 madc a dozen or so such trips across the lOp of Arrica. On occasions, we would acl like ani llcry and sel up emplacemcnts and lay in wait rOl" ground troops. On olher occasions we aCled as inrantry. To me itseemed lhal wedid everylhing that nooneelse wanted to do. However, our esprit de corps was high, and 1 am surc thatleft to lheir own devices, the TDs would have done better thejob for which lhey wcre organized. Patton, in his misguided wisdom, used them indfeclivcly, lO the poinllhat he placed lhem in tactical engagcments ror which they were n01 intended, in that he used them as tanks. My outnt was all bUI wiped out beca use of lhis, as was lhe 60Ist. '

In mid-February 1942 the Gcrmans launched a massive armoured auackon lhe US 11 Corps. After penetration had been achieved, lhe plan ca ll cel for

lhe panzer divisions 10 seize Kasserine Pass and then swing nonh-west, so isolating all 1st Allicd Army's troops in sou lhern Tunisia. It was a tcxlbook situation which called for lhe cleploymenl en masse of tank destroyer battalions. Unfor­lunalely, the Arnericans responded wüh an ar­moured counter-attack of their own, which lhe Gcrmans were expecting and wiLh which lhey dcalt severely. Such tank destroyers as were involved were employed in 'penny packets'.

By the evening of 14 February the US 1st Armored Division's CombaL Command 'A' had been CUL o([on Lwo hills eas t ofSidi Bau Zid. The following day a relief opcralion was mounted by the tanks of CCB, accompanied by Company 'B', 70lSl Tank Destroyer Baualion. The advance was

made in open order, and lhe action is described from the TD's viewpoint:

'Our attack was launched aboul 1400hrs on lhe 15th from an assembly point some len miles west of Sidi Bou Zid. The lanks of 2nd Baltalion, 1st Arrnored Regirnenl were preceded by a lightscreen of rcconnaissance. Our 3rd Plaloon was 10 protecL lhe ...... right ftank, the 2nd Platoon to support the centre and be ready LO protect the left Hank, and the 1St Plaloon was LO guard lhe rear and be ready to move lO either Hank. The artillery and infantry moved along with the rear elements.

'The enemy had had many hours' warning ofour approach and had placed many 88s in position in and aboul Sidi Rou Z id. As our tanks drew c1ose, two or tluee 88s would comrnence firing. Then as our tanks would concentrate on lhese and Illove in c1oser, having apparently si lenced them, olher 88s would open up. Tanks in lhe open were al a grea l disadvantage. After lhe baltle had progrcssed for sorne Lime, enemy tanks rnoving from Faid men­aced the right ft ank of our force. After lhe 3rcl Platoon hacl moved oul lo meel this attack, other enemy tanks, procecding from Lassouda, menaced lhe left Aank. The reserve lank company was in lhe best position LO meel lhis threal, bUl il sel out in a

17

mistaken direction. As our 2nd and grd Pla100ns (lhe lalter had been ca lled back from ilS mission 10

lhe right flank) were attempting lO deal wilh lhe last lhrea t a third enemy taok columo c10sed in from the soulh. Our forees were being fired on from four direetions. All that were not too far advaneed beat a hasty retreal, or rather rout, our eompany abandoning olle 37mm gun and one jeep. Only seven out of fifty-four medium tanks of lhe 2nd Battalion escaped from this well-eonceived and perfectly exeeuled trap.'1 lt took several days' hard fighting befo re the German dueal was eventually contained.

Meanwhile, M I os were beginning to arrive in North Afriea, and several battalions handed over 1heir M3S to lhe under-equipped Freneh, now firmly commiucd 10 the Allied cause. On 23 March an MIO ballalion, the 8991h, ahead ofwhich laya mOSl distinguished combat record, showed what could be done. The day began badly when a spoiling attack by 10th Panzer Division overran the M3S of60IS1 TD Battalion near El Guettar after a night approach marcho The panzers were lhen sta lled by a mineficld · eovered by lhe 8991h'S 'B' Company, which had moved hurriedly into posi­tion. Under lhe command ofLieutenant Gerald G. Coady, lhe M lOS engaged in a six-hour fire fight across lhe minefield against the hull-down lanks, destroying ten PzKpfw IVs, damaging three more and knocking out two anti-tank guns, in exchange for five damaged TDs.

Meanwhile, 'C' Company had moved iOlo position along a ridge from which 'jt was possible 10

watch all the proceedings, just like one would watch an opera from a balcony seal'. After an air attack, the German infaOlry began to advance bUl walked into the American artillery's defensive barrage, ánd two PzKpnv IVs wh ich ventured out in support were picked offatonce by 'C' Company, as were abrace of APCs. 10th Panzer Division retired during the nighl, and it was withjustifiable pride that lhe 8991h'S historian was able lo write, 'This was lhe firsl time an American unit had slopped a German armoured attack'.2

On 7 April, while attached to Benson Force, lhe 899th became the firsl American unil lo make contact with lhe Idl flank ofthe advancing Brjtish 8th Arrny.

In spite of its ma,IY frustralions, the North

314 Battery, 105 AT Regt. RA, on parade with their Archers shortly after the conclusion ofhostilities.

African campaign vindicaled lhe concept of the mobile lank destroyer. On lhe other hand, many senior American officcrs had becn impressed by lhe British system ofinterlocked arlillery and stalic in­depth anti -tank defence which had provided Rommel with such a signal defeal al Medenine. As a resul t of their reporlS the TDF was instructed in December 1943 that its establ ishment henceforth would be fifty per cent self-propelled and fifty per cem LOwed ballalions, and sorne twemy self­propclled units were converted to the .latter role. 3

ltaly " The Italian landscape did nOl pcrmit lhe deploy­men1 of large a rmoured formations, and TD baualjons serving in this theatre were largely confined to what was termed their Secondary Mission, that is providing dirccl and indirecl fire in lhe role of supplementary arti llery, supporting infantry opcrations, acting in the counter-attack role, and opportunity shooling. In this American praclice varied little from British, and further dctails can be found in the British section of lhe book.

France and Gennany No sooner had the in itial Norrnandy landings becn complcled than it became obvious that the 10wed anti-tank gun was entirely unsu itable for lhe bocage. INorth AJriconCompaign Diory, 'B' Company, 70lS1 TD Bn. and 2nd PI, Ren Company, 70151 TD Bn. ITD- A Brie! Hi.swry oflhe 899th Tanlc Dtstroyer Baltafwn. 'Sludy No. 60.

Il was unable lO fire over the hedge~lOpped banks, could cover only a limited are, was difficult to emplace and was easily lost if the local infantry were forted lO givc ground. In conseq uence, there was an immediate clamour for self~prope lled TDs. Simultaneously, lhe appearance ofwell·armed and heavily armoured tallks and tank hunters on the German side led lO a request that the M lOS should be replaced by M36s.

By September 1944 a new policy had begun to take shape. Only twelve of the fifty- lwo battalions in lhe theatre would remain lowed; twenty battalions would be eq uipped with the M36, and the remainder wi lh the MI o or MI 8 as availa ble. Later losses during the Ardennes campaign spelled the doom of the towed gun, and by lhe end of hostilities all towed units had either beeo converted or were scheduled lO COllvert to the SP róle}

By now there was a general acceplance that TD cornmanders, as the experts in direcl shooting, should be permitted to execute assigned missions in accordance with lheir training and without in­terfcrencc from aboye. As well as carrying out their Primary Mission of destroying enemy armour, TOs also acted extensively as assault guns for infantry fonnalÍons , destroying pillboxes, bunkcrs and olhcr fonificalions, and as supplementa ry a rtillery. Unfortunatcly thcir very popularity tended to work against the róle for which they had been designed , for once a formation had acquired the support of a TD company it was mOSl reluctant to relinquish it. This meant thal the TO battalion commander could be left without a single plaLOon under his

Although the two vehicles were c:arried 00 si.n:ill.ar suspen. s ioDs, the MJ6 (rigbt) can easily be distinguisbed frODl the MIO (Ieft) by ¡ts larger gun and distinctive turret. (lm.p. War Mus .)

immediate command, with the rcsu!t lhat it was nOl always possible to co~ordinate a mobile anti- tank defence in an emergency.

00 lhe other hand , local aCl ions by TD COIll~

panies could prevent a most serious situalion dcveloping. Al o2oohrs on 11 Jul y 1944 lhe Panzer Lehr Division la unched a lhrusl at lsigny, delermined to cut lhe American beachhead in two. The German attack was canalized by marshes on ei lher ftank, and directly in its path lay the 899lh"Tank Destroyer Batta lion, the vicLOrs of El Guettar, with Com panies 'A' and 'C' supporting respectively lhe 39th and 47th Infantry RegimenLS. In a desperate c1ose-quarter night action the TDs halted the enemy's advance, 'A' Colllpany destroying six Pan thers, one PzKpfw IV and an assault gun, while'C'Company accounted for a fur­lher six Panthcrs. Shortly a fterdawn the Germans' cxploitation force was discovered a Illile down the road and destroyed by bombing. Both companics received almost identical Presiden ti al Citations for lhis action, and that of 'A' Com pany is quoled below.

'Company 'A', 899th Tank Destroyer Ba ltalion

'610 Tank Destroyer Battalion aetually went through the whole range of TD equipmem. InJanuary ' 943 il was equipped with M3!, and eonverttd 10 M lOS in July of that year. During the following winter it was converttd lO the towtd role, and fought iu way across Franee with towtd guns. In September 1944 the battalion was re­assigntd as a self-propelltd uni! and equipptd wi th M36s. When ¡he war endcd it was in process of exehanging lhese for MISs.

19

is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action on II July 1944, near St Jean de Daye, France. Company 'A' was supporting 39th In­fantry in a tdefense role near StJean de Daye. Al 0200hrs on the morning of I I J uly 1944 the enemy launched a combined armored and infantry attack in this sector. Two columns of heavy lanks Wilh supporting infantry smashed lh rough and penetratcd to the rcar ofthis position in an attempt to capture StJean de Daye and to sever the Allied beachhcad. Outgunned and outnumbcred, and despile the fact that the enemy infantry threalened to overrun their tank destroyers, the men of Company 'A' fearlessly remained in position and fired on enemy lanks wherever discernible in the darkness, fully realizing that the Aash ofeach round would draw not only artillery and tank fire bUl also small arms fire as wel!. As daylight appeared, Company 'A' , aware that their 3in guns could not penetrate the heavy frontal armor of the Panther lanks, bold ly manoeuvred their tank deslroyers under close enemy observation to Aanking positions where effecl ive fire was placed on the enemy tanks. Forced to fighl al extremely close quancrs and al

This pbotograpb illustrates bow tbe earth banks of tbe NOrrDandy boclI.ge inhibited tbe fire ofta.nk destroyers.1D sum cirCUIllStaDCeS towed anu-ta.nk guns were almost use1ess. (hopo War Mus.)

20

point-blank ranges, the officers and men of Com­pany 'A' gallantly and courageously repelled numerous attempts of the enemy to seize these positions. So cffective was their fire that the enemy was forced tú withdraw their remaining tanks from the action, leaving the infantry in s·mall isolated pockets which were quickly overcome by our forces. The individual courage, valor, and ten­acity displayed by the personnel ofCompany 'A' in the face of superior odds were in keeping with lhe highcst traditions of the Armed Forces aod are worthy ofhigh praise.

By command of Major-General Craig: William C. Westmoreland,

Colone!, G.S.C., ChiefofStalf.' The identity ofthe signatory will be ofinterest 10

studems of more recent military history. The higher TD formation headquarters were oot

used extensively. The 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade HQ commanded Third Army's Task Force 'A', whose mission was to assist in clearing the Brittany Peninsula. Task Force 'A' consistcd of2nd and 15th Cavalry Groups, 6th TD Group plus 705th TD Baualion, '59th Combat Engineer Battalion and 509th Light Pontoon Company. The task force advanced rapidly up the peninsula to St Malo in mid-August, whence it proccedcd lO Brest, making

One Dlethod of cutting through the banks was by attaching a 'rhino' device, here seeD fitted to an MIo. The 'rhino' was invented by Sgt. Curtis Culin, US Anur, and preveDted the vehide's DOse rismg as it pusbed its way tbrough. Doze r blades were also attached to the MIo and MJ6. (US Anuy)

contact with 6lh Arrnored Division, and laler assisled in clearing the city itseJe

The TD Croup headquarters generally acted in an advisory capaci ty to their respective corps, although one Croup HQ found itseJf running the Corps Rest Cen ler! Occasionally Croup HQs would cornrnand specific lask forces, bUl these occasions were infrequent, and one exarnple will suffice.

During the Roer River crossing on 23 February [945 XIX Corps used the 2nd Tank Destroyer Group (702nd TD Bn. wilh M36s, and SOISl TD Bn. with 3in towed guns) to provide neutralization and interdictory fire on targets up to 4,000 yards distant in supplement to the Corps' own arti llcry, with which the Croup had established a firc control centre. The M36s fired at the rate of 100 rounds per hour per platoon, while lhe towed guns fired a l 300

rounds per hour per company. It might be expected that the Ardennes fighting

provided numerous occasions involving the use of TD Groups, but the situation was so fluid that as TD uni ts arrived they were pushed straight ioto the line, where they continued to write down the enemy's armour.

011 7 March 1945 the great railway bridge over lhe Rhine at R emagen was captured almost intact by a coup de main. Amongsl the first troops rushed across to support lhe dcfenders of rhe shallow

bridgehead were the 899th Tank Destroyer Bat­talion; Company 'c' crossing on the 8th, aod 'A' and 'B' two days la ter, all crossings being made under fire:

'The Cermans fired direct at the bridge and the surrounding arca on both sides of the ri ver. lt was a ' hot spot', and not a healthy one to be in for any lenglh of time. As the TDs neared the river it was necessary to slow down, almost to a halt every few feet .... The bridge was hit often, but there was onlya sl ight deJay until it was cleared ofwrecked vehicles and trafRc continued once again. Gerrnan planes carne in at regular intervals, and all hell would break loose from the anti-aircraft uni ts. 1 f we weren't dodgingJerry's shells, bornbs and strafings there was rhe falling ack-ack to put up with.'

For several days the Germans made fanatical attempts lo throw the Americans back ioto the river. Then, as further bridgeheads were estab­lished eJsewhere resislance collapsed, and the AHied armoured columns ftowed across Germany. 1 May found the 899th on the Mulder River, waiting; in due course lhere appeared on the far bank hard-looking soldiers in woro, drab uniforms. They were Russians. For a day or two they were quite friendly.

The Pacific Theatre In itself, J apanese armour posed no problem to American forces. On the other hand, 'The War Department feJl growing concern over the Iarge number of casualties experienced by units attack­ing Japanese fortifications. Ley te, le Shima and Okinawa were extremely costly in wounded and dead. Japanese field fortifications were mainly natural lerrain barriers developed into intricate subterranean strongholds from which theJapanese would emerge and attack American units in the rear and on each ftank. Cave openings were self­supporting and were so ably concealed thal assault teams, after taking a frontal andjor reverse slope, would find thal they had bypassed strongpoints from which a murderous fire all but wiped thern ou1.']

To combat this menacc the Tank Destroyer Center set up a study unit known as the Sphinx Delachment, which had full-scale replicas of

'Tank Deslrop Hislory.

21

AD MIO crew at maÍnten.ance near Montch.arivel, Nonnandy, subjected to banter from 6th Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers, who SeeDl to appreciate the skill with wbich the driver is u sing bis 'tool, special adjusting'. (Ln.p. War Mus.)

Tank Destroyer success in COD1bat (1) Enemy losses incurred directly by action of

TDF units, compiled from the after action reports of thirtywnine baualions serving in the European theatre. The figures are said to be incomplete, and are quoted from Study 60:

Tanks and SP guns: 1,344. Average battalion scorc, 34· Top score, 105

Annoured Cars and Heavy Vehicles: 251 Other Vehicles: 924 Antiwlank guns and olher arlilLery pitas: 684 Pillboxes knocked out : 668 Machint Guns: 614 Aircrafl shol down by organic AA weapons: 18. Top

score, 5 Prisoners cif War laken: 40,070. Top scorc, 5,42 1 (2) Analysis of kills scored by 899th Tank

Destroyer Baualion in North Africa and Europe, from the unit history citcd elscwherc:

Tanks: PzKpfw 111 8 Antiwtank guns 67 PzKpfw IV 27 Field Guns Panther 32 Aircraft 4 Tiger Pillboxes 62 Others Strongpoints 15

]agdpanther Machíne gun nests 93 Other SPs 15 20mm AA gUlls 20

Halftracks 10 Observation posts 7 Other vehicles 45 Prisoners 2,618

Qlher targets destroycd include a barracks, a factory and a flak towcr.

Japanese positions built, and then established the best method of either demolishing them or at least sealing the cave entrances. Various types of projectile were used with fuses varying from instantaneous to .15 second dclay, and ir was found that the 90mm M36 produced the best results, with the 76mmMI8 not far behind.

Since direct shooting was a TDF speciality, the J.najority ofrank destroyer battalions in the Pacific theatre found themselves serving in an assault gun

róle, dealing with bunkers and cave entrances. This was not lhe róle for which they had trained, bUl it saved their infantry comrades countless casualties.

British Service: Africa When in 1940 the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from France it left behind it no less than 509 2pdr. anti-tank guns which would have lO be replaced immediately. The 2pdr. was also the principal British tank armament of lhe time; and although lhe more powerful 6pdr. design for both tank and anti-tank use was well advanced, the ordnance factories were forced ro continue quan­tity production of the smaller gun for the im­mediate requirements of home defence. This decision, whi le inevitable in the circumstances, was to have disastrous effects for some years tú come.

Tn the Western Desert the British forces in Egypt were ffced with an invasion in strength from lhe Italian colonics in Libya. Antiwtank gunners, forced to tow the hule 2pdrs. al speed over all sorts of going, found that the weapon's efficiency was becoming badly impaired by the constal1l baltCfw

¡ng, and urgently 50ught mcthods ofreducing wear and tear whilsl sti ll maintaining mobility.

T he answer appeared in the shape of lhe portee, said to be the invention of a Lieutenant Gillson, a Rhodesian officer. 1 The gun was mounted on lhe back ofa cut-down lorry, usually a Chevrolet, and the idea was that it would be carried piggywback fashion te the scene of action and there dismounted for use. In fact rhe gun was very rarely dismounted, first beca use time would not permit, and second because the mounting itself permitted a wide

LA variety of porlu equipments were already in use in the United Kingdom, and had been produce<! lO incrcasc lhe mobilityofresponse to Ihe expectoo Gennan landings.

degree of traverse and the ammuniüon bins were located immediately behind the driver. The 2pdr. portee was the first British self-propelled an ti-tank gun to see action, and was used extensively during the offensive which ejected the Italians first from Egypt and then from their own province of Cyrenaica.

The final action ofthis campaign, foughl at Beda Fomm during the early days ofFebruary 1941, saw lhe portees being used in preciseJy lhe role which lhe United Slates Army in tended for its own Tank Destroyer Force. The Italians, decisiveJy bcaten in lhe fieJd al Sidi Barrani, had fallen back on their fortresses of Bardia and Tobruk, but each of thesc hollow refuges had becn stormcd, and whal was len of lheir army was now relreating a long Lhe coaSl road through Bcnghazi lOwards T ripolitania.

Hoping to intercept them, Lt.-Gen. Richard Q'Connor, commander ofthe British XI I I Corps,

An MJ6 involved in clo$e quarter amoa in Bust, September 19+{. The vehicle beloags to Compaay 'B' . 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and carries a full set of unir markings. The 705th fonned part ofThird Army's Task Force 'A', which was CODl.Dlanded by HQ. 1St Tank Destroyer Brigade. (US Anny)

dcspatched 7th Armoured Division through the difflCUIt going of lhe Djebel Akhdar, so cutting across lhe base of the coastal bulge round which lhe Italians were moving. Thc division's advancc guard, consisting of lhe armoured cars of the 1 Ith Hussars, 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade, the 25pdrs. of cC' Battery Royal Horse Artillery, and nine 37mm portees of 106lh Royal Horse Artillery, emerged from the DjebeJ in the nick of lime to establish a road block in the path of the retreating enemy.l

lA number of 8ofors 37mm ami-tank fXJ,utJ were also in service at this pcriod, but wcre withdrawll shortly anerwards. 80th the 37mm and '1pdr. saw action al Seda Fomm.

The crews of 106th RHA, a Territorial regiment otherwise known as the Lancashire Yeomanry, snugged their portees down among the dunes on either side ofthe road, and were in action almost at once as the ltalian advance guard drove up. StaHed, the column began launching a series of desperale atlacks, accompanied by MI3/40 tanks, hoping lO smash its way lhrough. By now, however, more and more Desert Rats were emerging from lhe Djebcl, and allhough their petrol tanks were almost dry, they were fastening onto the flanks of lhe c1even-milejam as well as reinforcing the block itsclf. For a day and a night the 1 talians struggled in the net, and made one last, brave attempl to break out on the morning of7 Februal)'.

The weight of their attack feH mainly on 106th RHA, whose portees received the full benefit of lhe enemy's supporting artillery while lhe M 13s surged forward. The attack was pressed home hard, and clearly rhe ltalian tank men meant business as they began trading losses with the gun detachments. One gun commander calmly waited until the tanks had driven past his position and then shot six of them 'up the seat'; bUl one by one the little portees were wrecked until only one remained, manned by lhe batlery commander, his batman and a cook. This drove out 10 a flank and destroyed the last Ital ian tanks as they drove onto the objective itself.

The Italians had played lheir last eard . Every­where men carne forward to surrender, to the number of 25,000, leaving behind them over 200 gunsand aboul 100 tanks, nOlall ofwhich had been knocked out. The 106lh RHA, which had done as much as any to 'Seek, Strike a7ld Destroy', claimed a total of twenty-seven tanks destroyed, and was awarded [wo Mililary Crosses, one Distinguishcd Conduel Medal and three Mil itary Medals for its first action. Sad 10 relate, the unit was later all bUl destroyed fighting in Greece and Crete.

WithoU l exception, British tank crews had the highesl possible regard for lhe portee gunners, who fired steadily away from their exposed platforms with only lhe flimsy proleetion of lhe gun shield. Quite oflen 2pdr. portees would be found in action alongside the lanks; unlike lheir German Opposile numbers manning lhe massive 885, they could not lie back from the lank battIe since they carried lhe same gun as rhe tanks themselves, ami to gel wilhin killing range meant going forward into lhe very

heart ofthe action. Perhaps more than any other, lhe action fought

by 'J' Battery 3rd Royal Horse Artillery at Sidi Rezegh epitomizes the spirit of the men who manned lhe portees. Operation 'Crusader', designed to effect the relief of beleaguered Tobruk, was in full swing, a nd the 7th Armoured Division's Support Group under Brigadier J. C. Campbell had ta ken possession of the escarpments around Sidi Rezegh. The Germans rightly regarded the arca as a vital pivot of manoeuvre around which operations could be mounted 10 smash through their siege lines, and lhey were determined lhat lhe Support Croup was going to be ejeeted from the position.

On lhe morning of 21 November 1941 the Support Group's artillery was deployed al lhe foot of the Upper Escarpment and completely domi­nated the Sidi Rezegh airfield. The 4th RHA were on the left, and in lhe centre was 60th Field Regiment RA, both equipped with 25pdrs., while on the right were the 2pdr. portees of'J' Battery, 3rd RHA under the eommand of Major Bernard Pinney.

Pinney deployed his 'c' Troop, under Lieu­tenant Arthur Hardy, to cover lhe right flank of 60th Field , while 'A' Troop, commanded by Lieulenant Ward Gunn, was further sli ll to lhe right. The Baltery's third troop was retained as a mobile reserve. ~

Al aboul 1130, after dive-bombing altaeks and heavy shclling, the 21st Panzer Division began to advance against lhe Support Group, and the 25pdrs. went in to action overopen sights, u~ing first High Explosive and then changing to Armour Piercing. This reaction was far more violcl1l lhan anything the Germans had expeeted, and they were shakcn to discover that a 25pdr. HE shell was quite capable of blowing the turret off a PzKpfw IV. Having already lost six tanks when sti ll 2,000 yards from lhe objective, they halted and began to engage lhe distant gun lines with concentrated machine gun fire, while the PzKpfw IYs slammed over HE shells. The Cerman artiJlery joined in and then their infantry mortar teams, until, as a Rifle Brigade officcr pUL il, 'to look over the edge of a slil lrench wassuicidal' The British artillery was dimly seen through a miasma of smoke, shell bursts and drifting dust , the red muzzle f1ashes showing 1hat

Above: Crew oC 75nuTl M] halCtrack oC US Tank Iñstroyer Bn., Tunisia, winter 1942-4]. in firing positions. Below: General arrangel1l.ent oC M3 halCtrack hull with 7511l.11l. gun l1l.ounted.

A

MIO of unidentified US VI CorPI tank dutroyer unit in static: emplacement; Anzio beac:hhead, Italy, May 1944

B

MJ6 of US ']05th Tank Destroyer Bn.; Brest , France, September 1944

MIO oC Peloton de Commandemenl, le Escadron, Regt. lliadé de Fusiliers Marin., French 2e Division Blindé; Pari., Franee, summe r 19+f

r---~

MI8 Melleal oC US 6th Tank Destroyer Group; Brest, Franee. August 1!)oH

L DO~'T WANT'A __

e

D

2pdr. portee of Jrd Royal Horse Artillery, British 7th Armoured Division; Western Deliert, NovemMr 1941

!'!:: ~ol.v"rine oC uni . r, tal)', OClob"r 1;:: a.nti-"gllD"nl¡ Savio ~i::hfi:d 8ritish V Co

E

e

1 BoD'lbardier , Britis h Royal Horse Artillery; We¡¡¡tern Desert, 1911 11 NCO Instructor, US Tank Destroyer Center; CaD'lp Hood, 19411 3 Loader of MI8 crew, J06th AT Co., US 7¡lh Division; Okinawa, April 1915 i Sergeant, Royal Artillery; North-West Europe, winter 191i-45 5 Q.uartier Mallre, Fusi1iers Marins, lle: Di"ision Blindé; France, 1914 6 Major, US 8th Tank Destroyer GrouPi ReD'lagen bridgehead, GerD'lany. March 1915 a Standard, US 6 .... th TD Bn b Guidon. CoD'lpany 'B', US 774th TD Bn e Pennant, US 8th TD Group d Flag, US 6th TD Group

G

SP 17pdr. Archer of 314 Bauery, I05th AT Regt. Royal Artillery, British V Corp5; Italy, 1944

SP 17pdr. Archer of divi5ional AT regiment, 15th Scottish Oivilion; North-West Europe, winter 1944-45

H

lhe gunners had not paused for an ins.tant from the rhythm of their gun dril!.

During a ll this Ward Gunn had been cominually edging his four portees out towards Lhe enemy, bringing them into killing range. They were spotted and the fu ll fury of the Germans turned upon lhem. 'A' Troop began to fire back, the crews, according Lo a witness, completely composed, serving lheir guns, while their troop leader moved between them, directing and controlling. Wa tch­ing Gunn through the a ll -enveloping smolher, a Rifles' officer commeilled that 'never was there a cJearcr case of aman possessed with lhe joy of batde'.

Two of lhe portees were knocked OU l quickly by direcl hits, but lhe two survivors cOiltinued to hil back wiLh good rcsults, to become the immediale focus of the Germans' attention. Spectators watched in fascinalcd horror as the detachments dropped one by one around the guns. A third portee was knockcd out, bUL Lhe last gun continued to fire unti l only one man was left, and he began to drive it out of action.

Sorne way behind, Gunn was talking tú Pinney, who brusquely ordered him to stop Lhe gun's withdrawal. The troop ¡eader did so, and then manned the weapon himself arter removing Lhe dead crew. Hewasjoined by Pinney, who almost al once was compelled tú deal with a fire in an arnmunition bino While this raged Gunn kept on firing until struck in lhe head. He slumped dead, and Pinney, throwing away lhe fire extinguisher, dragged his body as icle and continued to man the gun alone. lt is not possible to estimate lhe enemy's loss, bUL when al last lhe Battery Commanderdrove the gun out, further hits having made il unusable, lhe lwO nearest tanks were certainly in flamcs.

Pinney clrove straight to Hardy's 'C' Troop, now coming under intense pressure. Two of iLS portees had been knocked out, but the remaining two were pulling back slowly onto the fl ank of 60th Field, concentrating their fire on sorne German tanks which were trying to work round lhe posi tion. Arter lhe lwO leacling Panzers had been knocked out the rcmainder withdrew, and the crisis ofthe battle had passed.

80th Gunn and Pinney were recommended for the award of the Victoria Cross; il was given only to Gunn, posthumously. The morning after

the action Pinney was killed by a stray shell . In recognition of its heroic service his Battery was awarded that rarest of artillery distinctions, an Honour Title, and is now known as 'j' (Sidi Rezegh) Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.l

The Middle Years : Italy During the immediate post-Dunkirk period, analysis of lhe events in Franee had led lO recommendat ions that each corps should have an anti-tank regiment al the direcl disposal of lhe corps commander, and that one battery of the Divisional anti-lank regiments should be self­propelled.

By SepLember 1941 lhe General Staff was wanning very slowly to lhe concept of the self­propellcd anti-lank gun, but in spite ofthe benefiLS which had arisen from lhe aggressive use of portees in the \'Vestern Desert , it still envisaged a largely defensive role for such weapons, in direct contraSl lO Lhe United Sta tes Army's poliey. However, it was conceded that sclf-propelled anti-tank guns per­miued longer marches than could be achieved with lOwed gunsj that lhey had a bener cross-country performance; that lhey were valuable hit and run weaponsj and that such equipment enabled reserve guns LO be deployed rapidly. It went on to suggesl lhe fitting of a 2pdr. LO a Loyd earrier in such a manne.r as lO permit 225 degrees of traverse , the idea b~ing that lhese vehicles would equip one quarter of the divisional anti-tank rcgimcnt's slrength as weJl as the anti-tank plaloons 01' lhe divisional rcconnaissance regimenLs. Only a very few were ever bui lt, although the Australian Anny produced its own variation on lhe same theme.2

By mid-1942 the long-awaited 6pdr. was begin­ning lo arrivc on the battlefield. A number of balleries carried this en portee, but as it was a much larger gun lhan Lhe 2pdr., it was not as conveniclll, and tended lo be dismounted more often before going into action. These were la ter supplemented, or replaced, by an armouroo version known as the Deacon, in whieh the gun was housed inside a

IOnly five sueh litlo were awardcd for serviceduring World War 11. 106lh RHA's aClion al Bcda Fomm did nOI contain all Ihe circumstanecs rcquircd by the very striet rulogoveming sueh awards. 'DewllJjJmml qf Ar/illery Toe/us and EquiJ1mA/ '939-45. Interestingly, ¡he Germans mountcd a 37mm anli-tank gun on eapturcd Loyd earriers.

A Britisb MIo Wolverine supports infantry consolidating Dewly-wOD ground during the Gothic Une 6ghting in ItaIy, I!H4. (Inlp. War Mus.)

turret mounted on an AEC Matador lorry. This arrangement permitted very titde traverse, but as the gun engaged 'over the tail' further traverse was quickly obtainable by geUing the driver to swing the vehicle in the required direction. The Deacons were usually issued on the scale of one battery per anti-tank regiment, and their official role was that ofmobilc anti-tank reserve. By June 1943 they were becoming obsolete and were beginning lO be replaced by American M lOS, for which an initial order of 1,500 had been placed.

Meanwhile work was proceeding on the pro­duction ofthe first British tracked tan k destroyer to en ter service, the Archer. This consisted of the excellent '7pdr. anti-tank gun mounted on the chassis of the now-obsolete Valentine lnfantry Tank. While the fighting compartment was housed at the front ofthe vehicle, the longgun pointed over the tail, and consequently the equipment had to be reversed into iLS firing position. In position, the driver became an ammunition numberofnecessity, as the breech recoiled directly over his seat. Traverse was timited to I I degrees either side ofthe centre line, but could be supplemented by moving the vehicle.

Archers began reaching the tine in October 1944, and as their numbers began te increase many

26

M lOS were withdrawn so that their 3in guns could be replaced with the more powerful 17pdrs. In this composite version of the MIO, known in British service as the Achilles, the breech-heavy piece was balanced by a counter-weight 1Tj.ounted im­mediate1y behind the muzzle brake.

British thinking on tank destroyers was now firmly seto 'In contrast to the American policy, the idea of seeking out and destroying enemy armour was discouraged. A suitable role for the SP anti­tank gun, it was lhought, was the engagement of tanks thal stood off and neutralized our forward localities; or when employed with armoured formations, to he1p in the defence of pivots or localities he1d by the infantry.'1

This bald statement perhaps sounds a trifle stuffy, but it must be remembered that the days of lhe massed tank attack were over in the Mediter­ranean. In Tunisia, Sicily and Italy the Germans fought defensive actions in mountainous country, and in Italy in particular the self-propelled gun played a dominant role in defence. An SP, surrounded by half a dozen machine gun posts, would often wait in concealment and not open fire until the Allied tanks were within a point-blank 100

yards; then, having destroyed two or three, it would make its escape.

'What was needed was a weapon that could move across country by a covered route to a position f;f-om which enemy tanks could be engaged by surprise. For lack ofit, anti-tank protection ha"d become perhaps the most important role for tanks in support ofinfanlry.2

In fact the MIOS and Archers provided such a weapon, and lhe result was an extreme1y tight battlefie1d interlock of a1l arms involved in an attack. The tanks dealt with the enemy's infantry and machine gun posts; the infantry dealt with fixed anti-tank guns and pan;:.erfaust teams; the fie1d artillery, through its Forward Observation Officers, would lay on immediate concentrations as required; and the tank destroyers, Iying back in good overshoot positions, would deal with any enemy armour which tried to intervene. In the consolidation phase the tan k deslroyers might also dig in 011 the captured ground until lhe infantry's OWI1 guns could be brought up.

'Developmtnt of Artillery Tactics and Equipmtnl 1939- 45 1/bid.

A good exam ple of these highly devcloped minor lactics is an incidenl which occurred on the aHernoon of 4 Seplembcr 1944 during lhe GOlhic Line fighting. The infanlry battalion, the Canadian 48th Highlanders, had becn stalled by enfiladed machine gun fire; their supporting armour, Churchills of 'B' Squadron 48th Royal Tank Regimenl , was unabJe to deal with lhe problem since lhc tanks wcrc thcmsclves slallcd by whal were bclieved to be Gcrman SPs. In support was a nine-gun battery of MIOs (nol identified) and a field ba tlely of 105mm guns. I 1 was decidcd lhal while lhe M lOS engaged lhe SPs, the lanks would lake OUl lhe rnachine gun positions, follow­ing which lhe infanlry would continue their advance.

'The M lOS were manoeuvred carefuJly into fire positions to take on the SP guns. The SP on lhe right was observcd to be a Panther and the range 2,000 yards. It was engaged and moved off at once,

The.:;e is the wary tension oC rnen stUl under fire about these infdtryJnen rnoving slowly inco Foatainebleau on \13 Augusc 1944. The rapid advance bad stretched even radio corn­Ulunications tothe lim.it, as the amount oCaerial being carried by the MIO shows. (US Army)

first behind a house and lalcr into sorne trces. The M l OS fired about a dozen rounds and the 105s fired to encourage him to move into view again. Whal success was achieved is hard lO say, bUl la lcr lWO brewcd-up Panthcrs werc examincd in the arca. The gun or tank on lhe left could not bc obscrved so we put down a concentra tion of 105s on lhe suspected area.'l

The lla lian campaign had become a killing match between ski llcd lcams of professionals, but now lhat they had been properly cquipped, ba tteries like 314th Anti-Tank, which had grimly rcversed thcir lin!e portees into lhe hean of numerous tank baldes without much hope of

'General Account ofOpcratioru from August 28th 10 September 23rd, 48RTR.

t

In additiOD to cratering road.s in lbe path of th" advancing Allied armielJ, lbe Gennans mined the verges, so that once a by-pallS had befta cleared it had to be stuck too (I.rn.p. War Mus.)

survival, now lookcd forward to lhe prospect of action. During this same period an engagement took place when sharp eyes in one of 314th Battery's Archers detected a Tiger, and lhe 17pdr. lashcd back on recoil. The round missed narrowly, bUl lhe crack of heavy, high-velocity shot is instantly recognizable, and lhe German lank commander al once swung his hugc vehicJc out of sight bchind a building. Unrortunatcly for him lhe Tiger was spotted by a Lysander Air OP, which signalled its whereabouLS. The Archer fired again and lhe 17pdr. ShOl slarnmed straight through lhe building and lhe lank's lhin side armour as wel l. It was Wilh considerable pleasure lhal lhe gunners inspecled the wreck sorne days laler.

Firing High Explosive, lhe tank destroyers also aCled as reinforcing artilJery, a role in which lhey served in aH theatres ofwar, bUl which was initially developcd on a large scale during the first year of lhe Italian campaign. Sometimes the firing was

28

Oirect, lhal is Wilh lhe target in sight, but by c1amping a Gunner's Quadrant onto lhe breech and using lhe traverse indicator it was also possible to undertak.e lndirect fire, in which lhe fall of shot was correclcd by a distant observer until the target was struck. Once targets had becn acquired and lhe relevant elevation and traversc angles registcred on a range card, they could be engaged by night as we ll as by day.

Normandy and North-West Europe Back in lhe United Kingdom , as training pro· ccedcd for lhe invasion ofEuropc, il was becoming quile apparent thal in certain circumslances lhe tank destroyer held lhe key to success. Everyone agreed thal lhe German reaction to lhe landings would probably lake lhe form of a series of massive armoured counter·au acks. There was also general agrccment that as lhe towed '7pdr. anti-tank gun was awkward lo handle, difficulties could be

EquipDlent history oC JOSth Anti-Tank Regi­ment, Royal Artillery-a Corps anti-tank regiment:

1941- 42 Western Desert '2pdr. portee 314 Banery of this regiment accompanied 7th Armoured Brigade lO Burma, and was forced to destroy its !)orlees during the retreat lO India. Il subsequen tl y rcturned to the Middle East vía India and Iraq.

1942-43 Western Desert , '2 baueries 6pdr. portee

1943

Ear!J 1944

Tunisia '2 batteries Deacon

Sicily

Italy

ltaly

'2 battcries [7pe1r. towed

'2 batteries 6pe1r. towed

'2 batteries MIO [ battery [7pe1r. towed [ battery 6 pelr. LQwed

'2 batteries Archer [ batteryMlo [ battery 17pe1r. towed

Batlcry establishment in the period 1944- 45 was lwelve guns.

Aa M36 oC 6cryth Tank Destroyer Battalion in Metz, 20

Novem.ber 1944. (US Army)

anticipated in gelting it across lhe beaches and emplaced in lhe line in adeq uale time. lt was décided that the anti-tank regiments of lhose divisions which carried out lhe assault landings would be cquipped wilh a proponion of MIOS, which could simply motor out of their LCTs and fonn an immediale anti-tank gun screen where required. That armoured counter-auacks did not immediately develop on the scalc expected was largcly ,he faul, of AdolfHi,ler.

The nature of lhe Normandy bocage imposeel much lhesame SOrL offighling thal was laking place in 1 taly, with lhe M I os providing direct firc suppon for inlantry/tank operalions. 'lt was as imporlalll as evcr lO gel anti-tank guns forward quickly lO a capLUrcd objective; all lhe more SO

because of lhe inadequate killing power of the Churchill tank. Thc lOwed '7pelr. was nol easy lO manoeuvre and it was oflcn twelve to fifteen hours befare il cou ld be dug in ready for action in lhe new position. Hence il was decided la perpetua le lhe SP

29

Per cen tage analysis oC Gennan tank losses in Nonnandy

Cause

Armour piercing Hollow Charge (bazooka, PIAT etc. ) High Explosive Mines Rocket-firing aircraft Cannon-firing aircraft Bombs

6thJun~ 8th- 31st 7th Augusl August

65 63 w

'The armour piercing projectile, whcther (¡red from our own tanks or from an anti-tankgun, easily held pride of place as the killer of tanks. ' (DtV(IOfJmlnt oj ATlillery Tacliu and Equipment 1939- 45.)

element introduced into anti-tank units for the initial landings. In future, infantry divisional anti­tan k batteries were to consisl of one lroop 17pdr. lowed, one troop 17pdr. Wolverine (sic) or M lO,

and one troop 6pdr. towed. The idea was that the 6pdr. 01 SP 17pdr. should be used as the FDL (Forward Defended Locality) gun, with the towed I7pdr. acting as a 'long stop'.'1

A l7JKlr. AchiJJes oC 11th Annoured Oivision's anti-tank regiment in amon against a pillbox on the Gennan {rontier, II October 1944- (hnp_ War Mus.)

In response the Germans, already well aware of the MI o's prirnary weakness, began subjecting tank destroyer crews to air-burst shelling against which even well emplaced vehicles could offer ¡iule defence. Not surprisingly, demands were made for splinter-proof overhead cover, but beyond the production of a few mock-ups, nothing was done.

On 8 July 1944 a battery of 62nd Anti-Tank Regirnent RA fought a spectacular action in the rnanner for which their vehicles had originally been designed. The battery concerned had supported an infantryjtank attack on the village ofBuron, and by ogoo all seemed to be over; however, as the War Diary recounts, it was nol.

'At about 0900 the infantry (the Highland Light Infantry ofCanada) had taken Buron though there werc several Germans stilJ holding out at the far end of the village. The battery moved up, and 'B' Troop were deployed on the south-east side ofthe village and 'A' Troop at the south and west ofthe village. Shortly aftervvards the G-errnans put down a very heavy shelling and rnortar barrage and quickly fo llowed this up by a counter-attack of sorne twenty or thirty taliks. Two guns of'B' Troop were able to engage, and between thcm accounted forsorne twelve to thirteen Panthers and Mark IVs. The rernaining tanks then withdrew tú the south­east. The guns which accounted for the tanks were

'DeV({opmtnl oj AriiJJery TactÍts and EquifJmlnl 1939- 45

(cornrnanded by) Sgt. H. W. Bowden and Sgt. G. P.]. Donovan.'

The battery had nOl got offlightly, and arter lhe action only three ofits Achilles were in a fit state to

cootinuc. There was also an interesting sequcl. '00 a subsequcm visit by lhe Prime Minister, lhe victims were shown te him as lhe bag of our Shermans and it took sorne effort on lhe part of Second Arrny to adjust our claim,'l

During subsequent operations in Belgium, Hol­land and Germany lhe British tank destroyers, in addition lO their other duties, orlen acted as heavy­weight snipers, moving ioto position before lhe stan of an attack to take out potemial enerny obser­vation posts in lhe church steeples and windmills that dominated lhe flat landscape. 2

I&yal Artillny ClJmmnnoration Boo". 'A case of hislOry repeating itself. In 1917 Cdr. Oliver Locker­Lampson's No. 1 Squadron RNACD, struggling to hold a 25-mile gap in the line abandonoo by the disintegrating Russian Anny, had used their 3pdr. Seabrook Heavics in juSI this role.

Another Achilles of the same wút. Gua barreis of tbis length sdi:k out Iike very son thum.bs, and their outline must be broken up if the vehicle is sited in a concea1ed firing posicionó hence the chlcken wire sleeve behind the counter-weight. (Imp. WarMus.)

The periodJune 1944 tú May 1945 saw the high­water mark of British tank destroyer usage. Although a fully turreted version, the Chariotccr, mounting a 2opdr. gun on a Cromwell tan k chassis, entered service during the early 19505, by then lanks were themselves mounting such heavy armament that lhe need for lank destroyers as a separale family had ceased to exisl. Thus the fundamental question was resolved; in fUlure it would be the tank that'would concentra te on the destruction of its own kind.

Perhaps it would be as well to leave the story at a high point in Royal Artillery history~its greatest bombardment ofWorld War 11, fircd in support of Operation 'Veritable', better known as theBattle of the Reichswald. Participating in an HE Indirecl

fire 'Pepperpol' group were the Archers of 20th burning out long before lhe round falls. 1 am quite Anti-Tank RegimeOl RA, whose commanding certain of one thing; our war correspondents will officer has left a vivid word picture ofthe occasion: run out of adj ec tives long before we run out of

' Fifteen seconds LO go ... len . .. five. There goes ammuni tion. Il is terrific; by far lhe best thing I've one of my SP troopsj they' re a few seconds early- cver seen. More impressive than D-Day- and not that you'd notice it , beca use almost im- ma kes Crystal Palace seem like ta ble fi reworks.' mediately the sky seems crammed with tracer. (Lt.-Col. G. B. Thatcher, DSO, in T he ROjal Bofors pumping away from in front, from (he sides Artillery Commemoration Book.) and over our heads from behind. Wi th their fta t trajeclory they seem LO be ski mming lhe houselops. The 17pdrs. have a more sober air as, wilh reduced charge and comparatively high traj eclOry they sail gracefull y away iOlo lhe night sky, lhe tracer

MIOS at speed in the Huertgen Forest, 18 November 1944. (US Anny)

Basic ballistic data oC anti-tank guns mentioned in text:

Brilish Wtighl Mua.Le ofshot Velociljl

.pelr. ··Slb '2800ft jsec 6pe1r. 6.olb '2700fljsec

17pdr. '7·0Ib '2900fljsec

American 37mm M3 .. 611b '2600ftjsec

75mm ·4·6Ib ' 950ftjsec M.897A

3in M7 1'2.65Ib '2800ftjsec 76mmMI 'S'Slb '2600ft jsec

series gomm M3 'Hlb '280oftjsec

h is interesling to note thal during Ihe relevant period increase in weight of shol was preferred to increased muzzle velOCily as a meansofbetter tank killing. Effective rangc varied from 600 ya rds ('2 pdr. and 37mm) 10 2,000 yards ( 17pdr. and gomm), bUI kills were regu larly recorded ahovc these figures, particularly in cases where lhe enemy's lhinner side or rcar armour had been penetrated. There are many imponderables in anti·tank gunnery, not leasl ofwhich are lhe angle and poinl o fimpacl.

British and Atnerican Tank Destroyers

BR IEF TECHNICAL DETAILS

Archa Length: '21' 11 " Height: 7' 4t" Width: 8' 7t" Weight: 16 tons Armour: 60mm max. Armament: 1 x 17pdr. Speed: 15mph max. Ammunition stowage : 39 rounds Crew: 4

Achilles Armamenl: I X I 7pdr. otherwise as MI o

Gun Motor Carnage MI O Length: • 9' 7" Height: 8' .t" Widlh: 10' O"

Weight: '29.4 tons Anno ur: 37mm max. Armamcnt: J x 3inM 7 Speed: 30mph max. Ammunition slowage: 54 rounds erew: 5

Gun Motor Carriage M36 Length: '20' '2" Heighl: 8' I IN

Width: 10' O"

\oVeight: '28.1 lons Armour: 50mm max. Armamenl: 1 x gomm M3 Speed: 30mph max. Ammunition stowage : 47 rounds Crew: 5

Guu A/olor Carriage 1\/ 18 Length: 17'4" Height: 7' 9" \Vidth: 9' 9" \Veight: 18.'25 LOns Annour: I '2 mm max. Arma ment: 1 x 76mm MI Specd: 50mph max. Ammunition slOwage: 45 rounds Crew: 5

The Plates A: Crew positions and general interior arrangeDlent, 75tntn M3 halftrack The erew are depicled at lhe moment of opening firc, a nd we take lheir positions from pholographs in a US Arrny manua l. The gunncr crouches on lhe left ofthe breech at lhe sights, and is about LO give the cornmand l o fire. The assistant gunner stands, crampcd under lhe cover of lhe gunshieJd , 0 0 lhe r¡ghl ; he has pullcd lhe lanyard , and awails lhe gunner's cornmand before releasing it lO fire the gun. The loader is foreed to grovel on the deck to keep clear of lhe recoil of lhe weapon, which frequentl y caughl unwary loaders, with painful results. The ammunit.ion stowage was benealh the breech, with three rows of slOwage 'pipes' for rounds; these' were slaggered, six above seven aboye six. The IOp row can be secn ; lhe o lhcr two

33

rows were below lhe main deck level, accessible precautions obviously negate the usefulness of the only because a we ll in tbe deck gave access. The tip- camouflage painting, and give excellent aiming up seats can be seen on the hull interior walls on marks for German gunners. Note the fairly un­each side; crew accommodation was extremely common application of an individual tactical basic. The lower painting shows from aboye the number-'S'; and lhe mouming of two .50 cal. general interior arrangemem , with lhe tip-up seats machine guns, one al lhe from and one at lhe rear on the side walls and rear hull door and the accéss of the turrCt. well for the ammunition stowage.

B (lOp) M.o ofunidentified US VI Corps tank destroyer unit; Anzio beachhead, ltaly,

MaY'944 A pholOgraph of lhis vehicle appears in the accompanying pages. The markings are interest­ing, as is lhe use ofOlive Orab in conjunction with Earth Yellow in a faded and indistinct camouflage scheme. Such paint jobs were sometimes seen in Sicily and Ita ly, allhough nol' often as late as this. The plelhora of white slars indica tes a certain anxiety as 10 Allied lroops' slandards of vehicle recognition, and the large white area on lhe rear of lhe lurret probably had the same purpose. Such

MJ6s of 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion tnoving into positiOD in support of &.md Airborne DivisioD during the Arden.nes 6.ghting. Note abseace of unit tnarkings and visible stars. (US Anny)

34

B (bollOm) M36 of 70Sth TD Bn. US:Jrd Arm.y; Brest, France, September 1944 Again, th is painting is an interpretation of one of the accompanying photos. The plain overall Olive Orab paint job is entirely typical of armoured vchicles in lhe European lheatre, as is the relalive obscurity of the whi te Allied recognition star. NOle typically heavy stowage ofcrew packs and bedrolls, jcrrycans, cable reels, etc. around the outside of the turret. The application and retention of full unit codes in the fronlline is nOl so typica!. They follow the regulation sequence: '3A' for US 3rd Arrny, '705 T O' identifying the battaJion, and '8-14' identifying company and vehicle. In units under Corps or Army command the first code (e.g. '3A', or ' 11 ' for 11 Corps) replaced lhe usual divisional cocle (e.g. '2 lriangle' for 2nd Armorcd Oivision).

e (top) MIO, Peloton de Conunandernent. 3

e Escadron, Regt. Blindé de Fusiliers

Marins, French 2 e Division Blindé; Paris, sununer 1944 The famous 'Division Lec1erc' included repre­sentatives ofmany Free French units, and the self­propelled la nk deslroyers were crewed by sailors of the Fusiliers Marins. Arter cscaping from occupied France al various times from June 1940 onwards, these seamen led a checkered career. At one point lhey provided lhe anti-aircraft crews for lhe garrison of Sir Hakeim in the Libyan desen; incorporaled into the premier Free French for­mation for the liberaLion of their homcland, they commemorated their origins by painting lhe names of their form er vessels on their armoured vehicles, e.g. 'Ftibustier'. The divisiona l insignia was the cross ofLorraine 0 11 a map ofFrance, in whi le and blue as illuslrated, on bolh forward hull sides. The Frcnch tricolour was painled on lhe hull sides of mOSl Free French AFVs, usually to lhe rear, and sometimes with a yellow ouler rimo The tactical sign ahead of il is lypical ofFrench practice at this time. Each major unit ofthe division was identified

MIOS firing iD tbe indirect role at night. Tbe occaSiOD is an operational test ofhigh{low flash propdla.ots. Tbe vehicle 00 tbe left is usiDg standard iUIllDunition, which produced a brilliant white IDuzzle flash, wbile tbat on tbe right is usiDg a specially prepared charge which gaveooly adull, red glow. (US Army)

M,J6 iD SDOW caumuflage shortly after tbe ' Battle oftbe Bolge'. (USArmy)

by a ¡etter- here, 'V'. The company was identified by lhe number of uprighls on the bar, whose position aboye, below, or venically at ei ther side of lhe regimental ¡etter indicated the platoon. A French serial numbcr has replaced lhe US number, painted in white 'Cyrillic' l1umerals on the frolll glacis and always preceded by a small, narrow lricolour. Allied recognition Slars are retained. The erew wear US uniforms Wilh French headgear and insignia. Seamen retained lheir bonnets, petty omcers and officers lheir pcaked caps; officers seem often LO have worn the French armoured lroops he lm el of pre-war vintage, in khaki wilh brown lcalher furnilure (see Pla le FfG fig. 5) .

e (bollom) MIS Hellcat ofUS 6th Tank Destroyer Group; Brest, France, August 1944 Photographcd during lhe winkling-out of lhe Cerman garrison of Bresl in the summer of '944, this example of the fast and deadly Hellea l bears ralher more in lhe way of individual crew insignia lhan one normally sees in front-line photos. The na me DON'T \VANT' A is painted in small \\Ihile capitals 10\\1 on the hull side cenlrally, and furthcr forward is a swim-suiled pin-up. \Ve have made an educated guess at the colours and design ofthis pin­up, judging from the tones and outline of the necessarily small and blurred monochromc photo-

35

Tbe wrecked jeep, ca$uaItie$, and infantrytneo $priotiog for me cover oftbe tank destroyer eDlpbasize me fanatical quality oC Gennan resistance in sOlDe areas: Schillingeo, 15 March 1945. (US Anny)

graph from which we worked. Crossed legs would seem to be logical, given the name .... There are two staggered lines of white lettering to the left of the girl's head; these may be a repetition of the vehicle name, butcannot be made out clearly in the photo. The vehicle seria l number is clearly marked- often it was painted over or allowed to

wear off in the front line. The bridge classification code is presented on a yellow disc on the hull front cheek plate, probably on one side only.

D: 2 pdr. portee of 3rd Royal Horse Artillery, British ¡th Annoured Division; Western Desert, November 1941 Two views of the equipment made famous by 'A' Troop, 'J' Baltery, 3rd RHAon 21 November 1941 al Si di Rezegh, where Lt. Ward Gunn won a posthumous Victoria Cross in the action described in the body ofthe text. The typical stowage would be heavier and more varied, as the vehicles of old desen hands were liberally slacked with bedrolls, jerrycans, oil and waler cans, small arms ammu­nition boxes used for crew kit, packs, greatcoals, camou fl age netting, ra tion boxes, tarpaulins, and personal weapons. We have limiled lhe stowage the belter to show details of the rather complex 2pdr. gun and its Chevrolet-built Canadian Milicary Pattern 3-tonner. Markings are limited to the divisional sign, presented on a single plate (lypi­cally of 7lh Armoured Division) with lhe tactical sign-the Royal Artillery's red-over-blue, with the white 'SS' carried al that period by vehicles ofthe

divisional anti-tank regirnent. Sorne, but not all portees had a white serial nurnber rnarked high and centrally on the cab doors, apparently 'L' followed by seven digits. The lieutenant sighting the gun in the lower view wears a typical (bUl purely speculalive) combination ofregimental No. 1 Dress cap- a frequenl affectation by officers of'mounted' regiments at that tirne- with battledress blouse and KD slacks. The crewman in the upper view wears standard KD shirl and shorts with the khaki Field Service cap.

E (top) MIO SP I ']Pdr. Achilles of divisional anti.tank regirnent RA, British 11th Annoured Division; North-West Europe, winter 1944- 45 The photo of this vehicle which accompanies the body of the text shows typical stowage when unobscured by foliage. It was highly characteristic of Allied armoured vehicles in the often close country of France and Germany to concentrate attached fo liage, scrim-net and chicken wire camouflage on the turret and upper part of the hull - the arcas most frequently exposed to the enemy's view aboye hedges and banks. The long 17pdr. gun of the Achilles, with its prominent counterweight and muzzle brake, was a prime identifica tion feature, a nd was often swathed in chicken wire or hessian. The markings are ab­solutely re~ l ation-the divisional sign of 1I th Armoured, a black bull on yellow, on the near side front and off side rear; and the tactical sign of the arrnoured division's integral anti- tank regiment, by nowa white '77' on the red-over-blue RA flash , in lhe opposite positions. Loss of a track guard has apparently lcd lo repainting of lhe latter on this vehicle. The accompanying photo confirms that no other markings were carried on the turret or hull sides, not even the Allied star. The crewman wears lhe rirnless Royal Armoured Corps steel helrnet.

E (bottom) MIo Wolverine ofunidentified British V Corps anti·tank regirnent RA; Savio River, ItaIy, October 1944 Again, from one of the accompanying photo­graphs, this painting shows lhe heavy slowage typical of frollt-line vehicles. Apan from bedrolls, tarpaulins, ammunition boxes, spare lrack links, buckets and fuel funne1, this vehicle carries a

MISs of Company 'B', 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion, engaging Japanese positions dug into the hills oC LuzoD, Philippine Islands. (US Arrny)

blue RA flash with the number '11 ', and the while top b<b" of Corps troops. An additional marking sometimes carried on the solid lOp decking at the front ofthe turret was a British air recognition sign, in the form ofthe RAF roundc1- red centre, white ring, bluc ring, and thin yellow outer rimo

F IG: Crew unifonns and unit fiags: 1 Bombardier~ Royal Horse ArtiLlery; Western Deserl, 194 1

.. This 'desert scruff' wears a typical combination of bundle ofstakes and several picks and shovels at the garments. The khaki greatcoat has been cut down rear, for the use of accompanying infancry when in to a 'shortie' j on the shoulder-straps are the consolidating captured positions-a róle in which black-on-khaki regimental tabs which officially SP anti-tank guns and infantry oflen co-operated replaced metal or coloured cloth shoulder titles al in this theatre. Another photo ofthe same vehicle the beginning ofthe war- here, 'RHA'. The Field from the front shows the full markings, which were Service cap, with the RA's bomb and scroll badge, repeated exactly on the rear: the V Corps sign on is carried under the shoulder-strap; and the the left as viewed; a white square- probably a bombardier's chevrons appearon both upper arms. convoy station-keeping device- centrally; and the KD shirt and slacks and khaki wool sweater are set regimental flash on the right. This lalter is lhe red- off by a touch of 'swank' in the form of the

37

regimcntaJly colourcd 's lablc bclt'. He carries his basic web equipment, which, typically for the type of unil and the period, includes the old '08 clip pouches.

2 Technical Sergeanl, Instructioll Sta1/: US Tallk Destroyer Cenlu; Camp Hood, 1942 The ubiquitous overall oflight Olive Drab t\-vill in a herringbone pallern was lhe basis ofthe US vehicle crewman's working kit. h is worn here with the summer 'chino' version of lhe 'overseas cap', piped around lhe turn-up wilh branch-colour cord. Al lhis date Tank Destroyer enl isled men wore an unofficial piping reflecling their aH-arms origins, in a ' twis l' panern of repealed yellow-red-blue, for lhe cavalry, art illery, and infantry. In March 1943 lhe branch was officially authorized a piping 01" black and gQlden orange in alternating twist. Rank chevrons in light Olive Drab on midnight bluc appear on bOlh upper sleeves.

3 ÚJader, MI8crew, 306thATCo., US 77th Division: Okinawa, April 1945 From a photograph of a erew re-ammunitioning with 76mm AP rounds, this paintingshows the two­piece faded Olive Drab fatigues which formed lhe basis of mOSl eombal uniforms in lhe Pacific theatre, worn in combinalion with lhe US lealher tan k erew hclmet. The rathe r archaic-looking goggles are intercsting- the big rubber-rimmed single-lcns type worn by lhe preceding figure are much more common in photos. The trouser lcgs are rolled high over standard russet lea ther double­bucklc comba l boots. The gunnery gloves are wom

to prevent ha ndling accidents caused by sweating palms, and were indispensable when clearing hot expended cases I"rom the turret Hoor. In action many loaders preferred lo work without gloves, but they were not such an encumbrance as the painting might suggesl, as American loaders used their balled fist for ramming, lhis being knocked clear by lhe c10sing breech-block. British loaders preferred to use a hard back-hand sweep, whieh was faster and which kept fingers OUl of the danger area; use of lhe fingers of lhe forehand (i.e. that nearesl lhe rear ofthe gun) was likcly lO result in their neal and rapid severance between lhe breech-block and chamber.

4 Sergealll, Royal ArtiLlery SP AT regiment, XXX Corps; .Norlh-West Europe, willter 1944- 45 This Aehilles eom ma nder is retuming from a foraging or barter expedilion among lhe friendly DUlch Wilh his Royal Armoured Corps helmet full of spuds, and a SlOne bOltle of 'Geneva' to wash them down. His 'beret' - aclually, the General Service cap which replaced lhe Field Service cap in 1943- bears lhe RA bomb and scroll badge. Over his battledress he wears the popular leather jerkin worn by most British soldiers in both ' '''orld Wars, a nd the absolute minimum ofwebbing in the form of his bcJl alone. Vehicle crews shunned webbing, for fear ofca lching iton protrusions ifforced to bail out ofa burning vehide in a hurry. Al lhe lOp oflhe blouse sleeve is the XXX Corps sign- a black boar on a white dise on a black square- and below it the RA arm of service flash. Sergeants of Royal Artillery wore lhe regiment's cannon badge aboye their rank chevrons on bOlh sleeves. A slung Sten gun is a lypical vehicle commander's weapon when wandering aboul in the open.

5 Quartier Maitre 1I Classe, Regl. Blindé de Fusiliers Marins, Frencll :? Division Blindé; France, summer

'944 Thisjunior pctty officer, lugging a box ofbeJled . .50 cal. amm unition back 10 his MIO, wears almost ent irc1y US issue clothing j lhe American Army look over the outfitting and arming of lhe Free Freneh forees in 1943, while the Brilish Army provided lhe samc services for lhe BeJgians a nd DUlCh. The MI 941 fieJd jacket is wom over the one-piccc herringbone lwill vehicle overall and an

Olive Drab wool shirt. The headgear and insignia are french j lhe sailor's bonnet, doubtlcss treasured during lhe rcgiment's long wanderings since 1940, bears the cap ta lly 'FUS ILI ERS MARI NS'. The lhree red chevrons of lhis rank are worn on a midnight-blue slip-on on both shoulder-strapsj and lhe crossed foul anchors in red on a blue square were lhe insignia of all active naval unils in ' lhe fl eet'. US boots and webbing complele the uni­formo

6 .Major, US 8th Tank Destroyer Group; Remagen bridgehead, Germmry, March 1945 Taken from published reminiscences of a Croup veteran, this figure wears lhe tan windchealer ' tanker's jackel' with knit waist, collar and cuffs; US crews ofS? guns in Europe seem to have worn combinat ions of infantry and tank c101hing in­discriminately, but the popular tank jackel was much in demando Since it has no shoulder-straps, lhe major's leafinsignia is sewn to the shoulder 011 a leather patch. The Tank Deslroyer force shoulder patch is worn high on lhe left sleevc only: it is repcated in detail on the back cover of lhis book. The cavalry ye llow scarf betrays lhis officer's previous branch. The proofed M 1943 combat trousers are lucked into slrapped lealher booLS with composition soles- probably cut-down modifica­tions of pre-war fie1d boots. Full basic combal webbing is worn, and an MI carbine is carried as well as a holslered .45 pisto!. The he1mel markings are most inleresling: on lhe front, a deca l ofthe TD Force insignia, above a brazed-on major's rank ¡eaf; on each side, a decal of the Group's pennam, point upwards, in orangc and black; on the back centrally, the white vertical bar indicating an Officer.

a Batlalion standard, US 644th TD Bn. The battalion badge, a spiked gauntlet, is jusl visible on lhe central panel on lhe eagle's ches!. b GuidonojCo. 'B' , US 774'" TDBn. In lhe branch's colours of orangc and black, wi th a stylized 75mm M3 halftrack device, this guidon measured 2ft 3iin long by 1 ft Sin deep ovcral!. e P,nnant qfUS 8th TD Group, March 1945. The 1944 vers ion was in black and orange only, lhe shape being a stylized representalion of lhe cross-section

was added over ha lfoflhe black as a complimenlto lhe auachmcnt of lhe 281St field Artillery Sn. 10

lhe Croup in the Remagen bridgehead in March 1945. Other Croup units were the 629th, 6561h, 814th, 81 7th , 893rd and 899th TD Sns; lWO lroops of 14th Cavalry; and 16th Belgian Fusilier Sn. d Flag qf US 6/h TD Group, 1944. Overall dimen­sion, 4ft long and 3ft deep.

H (IOp) SP l¡pdr. Archer oC314 Battery, 105th AT Regt. RA, British V Corps; Italy, 1944 Front travc lling- view ofthe Archer. In contrast la the overa ll dark olive green of lhe other British vehicJes dcpicted, this gun sports lhe a lternativc colour rOl" the Italian front, officia lly described as 'Iigh t mud'. Markings are limi ted 10 lhe serial and the vehicle name, 'DEFIANT' .

H (boltom) SP l¡pdr. Archer oC divisional AT regiJn.ent RA, 15th Séottisb Division; North-West Europe, winter 1944- 45 Rear- business end !- view of the Archer; note extra rail welded across rear deck 10 hold jcrrycans, etc. The RA flash bears lhe '46' of an illfantry division's integral AT regiment. The central marking, a blue square with a red comer, is lhe batteryftroop idenlifica tion, the red comer moving around lhe square aecording 10 lhe lroop. The divisional sign is on the right.

Tbe la.t oC the big-gua tank d e.troyen, the Charioteer, could otrer DO Un.proveDleDt UpoD the fire..power available to cODteDlporary batde tanlu. (RAe Taok MuseUID)

of an AP shell with a false ogive. The red seclion ~. "; .. .l.

39

Notes sur les planches en couleur

A Le canon.nier (¡}, gauche) donnc l'ordu de tiur; IOn second (a droite) .se pTipare¡},actlOnner le m«anisme dc ti r, landisquc lcehargcur (premicr plan) ,'aplatit pour ctn: hors de porlee du mouvnncnt de n:cul dc la CUlaMC. On

~~s;~~U:a~~ ~:':ui~!~~/:~~,~,~'d:t~~I.7:u1;.' r::;~~:'i~~~t::t~~~ ,:: montrcladispolilionintcrieurcgénmleduvchlculc,aveclc'puilS'dansla panielOmbrc.

B{_ haut) La coulcurdo "chicules blindés US n'itait pa$ toujours Olir>t DNlb unie en Sicile ou en I talie, c:omme id, le revetemem de camoullage des

~~:~:: q~r:~;~tt ~~~~n:::~ ¡.:li~~~:~ .;!~~~ed., ~'~~~e ~:.:~~~~ a:~~~:r~:~~ 1~~~e;;i3~:~~ .. ~~a~, rn;CC~~i~=~i~npc:n:~J:: ~.:! 9ue Ics.,·éhiculo des lipes de Crom ne portaiem pa$lOu"em I'e~mble.des mscriptlOnJ d'identification reglcmetalTu de l'unité. c.:. IIl$Cripl10ns

~:'S;~:\~,'tn~i;ue~eSv]~eu~e7n~¡v~~;~'D' - le bataillon; ' 8-14' - la

e (oen hauI) Les célebres Fusilien Marins pcignaient le nom de leun anciens bateaux surkun M tos. Le 'Y' doigue le régimel1lde la division; IOlroisbarrt$ \'cnicales,l'cscadre;lapo$itiondelbarresd'~adrc,lepclo::m;etlacartcde Franec av~e, par-dosus, lacroixde Lorraine, est I'in.sig.ne de la d.ivision. (en ba.) l;inscripl1on: 'I)Qn't \Vant 'A' (Onn'cn\'cuI pas), 3tnl, quela pm-upcn maIllot, IOn! l'a:uvre de I'equipage. Le 't6' correspond a une classifieation de poids permel1antlepassagedesponl.

D V¿hieu!e du rcgi.menl qui prit pan a la célebre batailJe de Sidi Rezegh le ~ I Novembrc I!}¡t .. qut val"t au 1.1. Ward G"nn ~n~ Victoria Cross po$dmmc L'nnblcmcdcd""sion$C tron"e au·dessusde l'tnllgne réglmcntal qui at le llumiro'55'pcimenblanclurfondbleuet rouge, eodede la Royal Artillery

~ . (en ha".t) Le laurea" noir esl )'jnsigne de I~ "Ih Armoure:d Divisio~l ; les tns'gm:s rcg,mentaux du régimen! imégral anll-char d'unc d,vision blllld¿e

t':!r~cn~~~:;:Vi~~~~rI::'~:b\~;;tb~u~:;~~~'I~~~'~ tí~~:r:itll~:~e(: l'artillerie esl sunnont& de la barre bl~l[ehe de tOUI régimen~ IOUS !e commandemenl des CJrpt.. La pelles a l'ami're du MIo IOnt p:rur I'mCantene d'esoorte.

FI T cnur de cor',& du dé5cn type, ave<: manteau coun, el le 'cdnturou de con'~e' aux couleundu r~gimenl. t 'a La c:omhinaóson réglnnentain:gri.JvCTe pale des lmupcs bhndm el da m«anos US ponee a\'e<: la vcrsioro d'Etc du IRJnluHtlpk calot¡, Q: calot est borde dejaunc, de blf:u el de rouge, désignant

~~r~~is !~'~ a~il\~ari~:ina¿~t~!rf~.u~i ~rd:~~;;c~íl~~O;:ene~ ~I;:~r:: aUlomtt en Man 1943. F3 La lenue de con'ee Iype du soldal US dalll k Pacifique esl accompagní:e du casque de l'equipage de char. G.t Le ])¿rel

~~·~~~:;I~ai~s!;,:~~i;..~~?:~d~h=;¡:i~~;;~i:R~~~fA~ti:;:~r:;;~ ~1~u~:sse~~~;~~'aG~leri&II,~e~:i~~1 ~~~~:I f~~~~~~~'~uil:f;n~ ~ffil~f::s,~~::t~P~~:,~'~gl~~::n~~~/o~~nie:;,~;e:\~~~~~Sd'~u l :1! pantalon impenncable dc l'inCanlerie; el da hones faita a partir dc holles d'officicrdcl·avantgucfTe.l~casqueportclemotifd·épauledesTankDcst,?ycr

rn~~~~~tUI~ !'~~:~;~~h¡~e~~St::I~re~~c~~~:~U~~~~,hae~I:Cu:a~~~'~~~1,~~ Icdr.apeaudugroupe;cI:'tl'arriere,unebarrcverticalc blancheindiqucqu'ilcn oOieter.

H ( .... haut) En l talie,eetteeouleur,domlenomo!l1ciclest 'houec1aire',élail parfoisadoplceparl'arlllcebrilanniquepourscsvéhicules,ordinairemenlpeints d'uII "erl olive. O: vchieule n'a que 1011 numcrod'immalriculation el..,n nom, 'De.fiant'. (en bu) Le numcro '46' lur ~laque.bJeue e~ rouge esll'insigne du ~cgmlenl intégr~1 anti·chan d'une diviSlon d·",Cantcne. La plaque ccntrale mdiquela battCTlCet la troupe; la pJaquedcdroiteesleellcde la tsth Division .

Farbtafem

A Der Kanonier (lino) gibt dcn 8dchl zum Schiesscn; sein AMuten (rechc.) bcrcilctlÍch vordic Schnurzu ziehen, um das GCSChÜIZabzukuern, wahn:tld der Lader lÍeh aus dem \Vcgc da zurucklauCenden VenchluSlSludes hinlcgl. Dn::i Rcihcn ' i\lunitionsaufbewahrróhre' lÍnd lÍchtbar, wovon zwei sieh in cinCT ' Kuhne' umeT den Dcckplatten bcfinden. Unten kann man die allgnntine Innencinrichlungdes Fahrzcugs,mitdunkel angroeuteter'Bühne'sehcn

B (ob.. .. ) Von 7~ilzu ü:il wan::ndic US Panu:ñahrzcugeniehldurchausOlitv Drd angt$trichen, IOIlckm grob mil cincr hellcnm Farbc fJ:etaml gewóhnlichC1Wei.se in Si7.ilicn oder Italien, wie hierder F!lll isl. Die wiederhohen ... ·cisscn Seerne auf diom ~llo deuten auf cinc Angsllichkcit, daJI die MannKhaftell an den lIanden ,"Orcilig..r Crcundlicher Anillensten leiden kónnletl! ( ......... ) TY,Pischcr cinfaeh~r Ol;ot Drd Anslrich, dcsscn cinzigt' AUS.5CffJ:ewohnlichkcil m dcrTauache hcgl, dasa die .-ahrzcuge dCT Vordcnrop­lletl SCltCIl die volle Rcihe der 8euichnungcn Irugen, wodurch die Einhc;1 erhnnbar war. Diese Markierungen bcdeulen: '3A' - US 3rd Army: '705TD' _ das Balaillon: '8-14' _ die Kompagnic und das einzelne Fahneug.

e (oben) Die lIeruhmlen ' Fusilicrs Marin,' haOcn die Namcn ¡hrer chemaligcn $chifl'c aufih rc ~l tO angestrichen. Das 'Y' bcdeUlel das Rcgimenl innerhalbderDivision.dicdreisenkreehteStabe,dieKompagnie:dieLagedCT Kompagniesmarkierung, den ZUfJ:;.die Landkane Frankn:ichs ,,:,il daruhcf'g:dcg­tem Lolhringerkrcuz ist das Divislonscmblcm. (UDten) Der Tllel 'Don't \Vant 'A' (hab' keíne Lust) und das im Badcanzug gekleidelc Pin-up-GirJ sind zusatzliehc Markierungennach \\'unschdcr/o.lannschan. Das't6'bcdcute tcine GcwichtsklassifizierullfJ:in HezichungaufdieTragfahigkeitderBrüeken

D Fllhrzeug des RcgimentJ, das zu Sidi Rczcgh am ~t. November 1941 die heri,hmtc Aktion bckJ,mpftc, worin der I..-:umant \Varo Gunn eín po$tlnnes ve \'erdicmc. Das Di"isionscmblcm liegl oherhaJb des Rcgimcntskennzclchcn, die wcissc Schlussclnummcr '55' aufder rot_blaucn Grundfarbe der Royal Arlillcry

E (obfll ) DcT $Chwanc Sticr 1" das Divisionsemblem der 11th Armoured J)i,-ision; zu dieser Zeíl war die weissc Nummer '77' das Kcnnzcichen des integriertcn PanurabwehfTcgimenlS ciner Panzerdivision, die au,f der.~­blauen Gnmdrarbc der Artillerie uOcrgdegt wurde. (UJlten) Der Wikmgschtlrlst das t;mblem des V CJrpl, und das rot·blaue Kennzciehen der Artilleric tragt obcn den wcisscn Stab mil der 8edeutung cines Rcgiments, das ,vm KorpoI befehliglwar_DieSpatcnhimenamMtOlÍndfiirdiemitfahrendc lnfanlerie,

~e'ne~')'~~~~r~:~:~:n~~i~lI\~a~l~our;:', d~ \~:te~:':~:;;~r:~~hr.;:; \"Of'SehriClSmiusige hcllgrau_grüne cinlcilige Combiul1ifonn der US Pan­zertruppcn uoo .'ahrzcu$*l"hloucr, mil dcr Sornmerreldmut1:C «Krsnu cllf gelragen. Die Mutle Ílt m'l gclbem, TOIem and b~ucm Schnurbcsau ,'~hen, die farbcn der drei Wafl'cngauungen aos dencn dIe Mannscharlen mrdle Tank Deslroyer Force PanZ(:rzerstorerfonnation) henlammten: Kavallcrie, Arlil_

~~:~;~:~a~~:~~'m~;I.MF~ t1{3r ~;.;'~~;n~:'e~~Ni;~e;e~~~:u~~':rng~s SoIdalen im Sltllcn Ouan ",ird mil dem Stunhelm der Panunnanll$Chaften fJ:etragen. e" I)ie Fcldmutze ",urde im J ahn: '943 durch die khaki-8askcnmutze ersctzl. Dicscr Kommlmdeur cines Gachulzcs aur selbslfahrender Lafelte tr .. gt rolgendc Kenn~ciehen am Anncl: "on obcn naeh uuten: 30 CJrps; Royal Artillery; Rangszcichen ein~ Artillcric-sergeants. IXr Stahlhelm ohne Rander "'tadc v.on den Manuschaflcn dcr .Panzcr~ahr~eugc gelTagcn. G'J" O rigmal CranrosÍJche Malrosenmütze m,1 amenkamschCT

~:~:~~I,~i,::::~~:~·~~~cg:n ~i:dre?~~:~;~1c~:t~inl~}~~~~~~hk~~~e ~~~ SlicCd aU$ kurzabg~hnillenen \'orkricgs-Offi~ieTllltiefcJ hergeslclh, VOTllC am Hclm Iriigl er ein Abzug.des Tuehab~eiche'tJ der Tank Destroyer Force, das auch an seinem linkcn Anncl zu sehcn ist; umcr dcm bcfindel sieh sein Rangab~eiehen , An der Seite des H~lmes befindel sich ein zwciter Abzug in Form dcr Fahnc seincr Grullpe und hmten cin weÍS5cr Stab, dCT ihn als OOi ... ier hneichnel,

H (obClil ) In Italien wurdc dicsc Farhe, amllieh als li,M mil" (htl l-Drcck) hneichnet, manehmal au~ britischcn f'ahr-zo:ugcn anslal! dem gewóh.nlich~n Olivengron gebr~uehl, Die einzige Kennzclehen dieses Fahrzcugs Jmd dIe Seriennummer und sein Name 'Oo:fiam' ( .... ten) Die Nummer '46' aufrot­blauem Grund iSl das Kennuichcn d~ intcgricrlcn PanzcrabwehfTcgimentes einer lnfanlericdivision. lnderMittebcfindc:tsichdas Kennzcicl1enderBalIerie und des Trupps; rechlSdas Kennzciehcndcr 15th Divuion.

British 7th Annoured Division Panzer-Grcnaruer Division ~Grossdeutschland' US Istlnfantry Division Fallschinnpanzerdivision ~Hennann Goring' US IOlstAirbomeDivision The Lee/Grant Tanks in British Service 2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich' US 1st Marine Division British Guards Annoured Division

10 Allied Tank Dcstroyers