WWII 373rd Field Artillery Battalion

8/3/2019 WWII 373rd Field Artillery Battalion

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THE 373rd IN COMBAT


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THE373rd IN COMBAT


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Printed by Karl Scharr, Worner &Mayer, StLlttgart-Vaihingen, Germany


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Scale t :3000000I C e n t i m e t r ~ = 30 Kilometres


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FOREWORD

During the more than six months the 373rd Field Artillery Battalion was in combat, Major Edward L. Hill, its able Executive Officer,faithfully recorded in the Official History a day-by-day accountof its more important activities. Since the Official History is closelyfollowed by this unofficial publication, Major Hill is due the creditfor most of the information contained herein, although indebtednessto Lt. Herbert Church, whose entertainingly-written S-2 Bulletin haslikewise contributed much, is alsD hereby acknowledged.

Since this record is much more general than the refreshing book,"Battery Adjust", published by the Battalion's Fire Direction Center,and is an account of the Battalion as a unit rather than of a particular section or selected group of individuals, the plan of the OfficialHistory to omit the mention of individuals by name has been adopted.A complete roster of the members of the Battalion during the combatperiod is included in the back of the book to make up for this deficiency.

The scope of this account has been limited to combat except fora very brief summary of the pre-combat days of the Battalion takenfrom the Official History and placed at the very beginning of thebook. This limitation has been made in the interest of accuracy (sufficient records are not presently available), and because it is believed


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that the training period is of small interest as compared with thedays of combat. Post-combat experience has been omitted, partlybecause of the great change in personnel, and partly for the reasonthat the occupational duties of the Battalion have been relatively oflittle interest.

Although we are not here concerned with the exploits of individuals, it is only fitting that tribute be paid to the following leaderswho in such great measure were responsible for the success of theBattalion in combat: Major General Withers A. Burress, the Commanding General of the 100th Infantry Division from activationthroughout the combat period; Brigadier General Theodore E. Buechler, Division Artillery Commander from activation until the autumnof 1943; Brigadier General John B. Murphy, who succeeded GeneralBuechler and commanded the Division Artillery throughout combat;Colonel Walter H. Delange, who commanded the Battalion fromactivation until the spring of 1944; and Lt. Col. Thomas G. Keithly,who succeeded Col. Delange and who so capably led the Battalionthrough combat in France and Germany.

While there are many others, men as well as officers, who wereoutstanding in their contributions to the Battalion, it was the responseof the average soldier and the teamwork of all that turned the trick,and it is to the unit as a whole that the real credit is due.

I! is hoped that this rapid retracing of the Battalion's treadmarksand muzzleblasts on the soil of France and Germany will be of valueto its men and officers in helping them to recall their experiences incombat ; l little better than they could without it.

Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, September 27, 1945.Chas. L. Cornelius, jr.


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The 373rd Field Artillery Battalion was activated15 November 1942 as the medium battalion of the 100th InfantryDivision Artillery, at Fort jackson, South Carolina. Its cadre camefrom the 76th Division, while the bulk of the enlisted personnel camefrom New England, New York and New jersey. The Unit TrainingProgram was completed on the 28th of November, 1943. Army GroundForce Tests were taken in june, 1943 and again in March, 1944.The Battalion participated in Tennessee Maneuvers from 17 November1943 to 17 january 1944, and was afterwards stationed at Fort Bragg,North Carolina, where it became tractorized and received new M-l.155mm Howitzers. Inspector General inspections were passed in September, 1944, and on the 29th of September of the same year, 'theBattalion left Fort Bragg by train for Camp Kilmer, New jersey, whereit was staged for overseas shipment.

On the 6th of October, 1944, the Battalion sailed on the M 0 r mac moo n from Staten Island, New York in an eleven-ship convoy which included the other units of the 100th Infantry Divisionand certain addit ional troops. At the time of embarkation no one inthe Battalion knew its destination or what its mission was to be.Rumors, as usual, included most of the possibilities. The Far East,

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Greece, Haly, North Africa, France, and England were all mentioned.Some guessed that the Division would become a part of an Army ofOccupation and one skeptic even yelled "Dry Run", but at least itwas certain to most that the Battalion was "on the way".

After a 14 day voyage characterized by exceedingly rough seas,crowded and foul-smelling quarters, many cases of seasickness, atraining schedule made practically impossible of fulfillment by thebehavior of the ship, monotonous announcements of black-out regulations each evening, French classes, and a marked and welcomeabsence of enemy submarines and aircraft, the Battalion arrived atMarseilles, France.

On October the 20th, the day of arrival, the Battalion disembarked and made a long uphill march under the burden of full fieldequipment to Septemes, a suburb of Marseilles, where it commenceda ,ten day bivouac in pyramidal and pup tents pitched in a largeand muddy field. During this ten day period, the Battalion completed jts staging and on November 1st commenced its movementnorth toward the front. The tractors, howitzers, and 180 men andofficers went by rail, but the majority of the unit made the marchby motor, bivouacing near Valence on the first night, at Dijon onthe second, and closing into a forward assembly area near Fremifontaine all the evening of the 3 rd of November. Here at Fremifontaine, for the first time, the sound of enemy guns was heard.

At the time the Battalion reached Fremifontaine, the 100thInfantry Division flad already been assigned to the VI Corps ofthe Seventh Army (Sixth Army Group), and part of the Division wasthen engaged in combat alongside .elements of the veteran 45 thInfantry Division. The 100th's first mission was to relieve the 45th.The 373 rd's first mission was to reinforce the fires of the l89th

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r ickl Artillery Battalion, the medium battalion of the 45th Division, and on November 4th, upon assignment of this mission, theBattalion was placed under the tactical control of the 45th DivisionArtillery.

Also, all November 4th the tractors and howitzers of the Battalionwere unloaded at the railhead at Chatel, and battery positions nearSt. Benoit were reconnoitered and prepared for occupation on thesLlcceeding clay. By 1100 on November 5th, the Battalion had closedinto its first firing position. Able, Baker, and Charlie batteries werenorth of St. Benoit. Headquarters Battery and the Battalion CPwere to the west of the town in some wrecked houses and ServiceBattery was at Bru, a shell -torn vil lage about 2 kilometers to therear. The Battalion Personnel Section was at Rambervil lers with theDivision Rear Echelon.

On the afternoon of November 5th, the Number I Howitzer ofBaker Battery fired the Battalion's first round in combat. The mission was a base point registration on a steeple in Raon L'E/ape.During the firing of this mission a e1irect hit On the target wasobtained with the resLllt, according to reports later received fromthe Division Artillery Commander, that an enemy observation post wasdestroyed. It was not until the next night, however, that the Battalion fired its first mission on a known enemy target. This missionwas il l the form of a Battalion Concentration, TOT, and was firedon a German artillery position.

On the 6th of November, in accordance with orders from higherheadquarters, a reconnaissance was made of posit ions much fartherforward and on into the Vosges Mountains. The positions assignedand reconnoitered were located at a farm settlement known as NeufEtang. They were in a valley and in the sale clearing in a huge wooded

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area which covered most of this mountain region, a circumstancethat made it relatively easy for the enemy to recognize the locationas a probable artillery position. At the time the reconnaissance wasmade the front lines were only a few hundred yards in front ofNeuf-Etang, and it was not until the 8th that the lines had movedfar enough forward for occupation of the positions with relativesafety. In the meantime, mine removal parties and digging partieswere at work making preparations for occupation, and a single gunwas sent forward for the purpose of registering.

On the 8th when many of the enemy were commencing to with-draw across the Meurth River, Headquarters and the fir ing batteriesmoved to Neuf-Etang. Service Battery remained at Bru and thePersonnel Section at Rambervillers.

On November 9th control of the Battalion reverted to the100th Division Artillery and it was given the mission of generalsupport of the Division (its nOrma I II I ission)) with the additionalmission of reinforcing the fires of the 375th Field Artillery Battalion. Most of the time during this day, which was rainy like all ofthe days since the 5th, was spent in improving the organizationof battery positions and, especially, in providing overhead coveragainst possible enemy shelling.

It was on the 9th that the Battalion suffered its first two casualties, both of whom were from the Battalion Medical Detachment.The two men were on their way to the Clearing Station, and hadreached a point several hundred yards from the Battalion area whenthey saw an infantryman, walking in file along the side of the pavedroad, blown up by a Schu mine. They immediately went to the aidof the injured man and, in doing so, were themselves wounded whenone of them stepped on a second mine. The area in which these men

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were injured was one of (the most heavily mined areas ncar theBattalion at any time during combat and accounted for a numberof other casualties (though not within the Battalion) in addition tothose just mentioned.

On the 10th the weather was very bad and visibility at thetwo Battalion OPs, established on the previous day, was very poor.Only occasionally could the observers see Raon L'Etape. As a resultlittle firing was done on this day and, indeed, there was little acti-vity of any type within the sector. On the II th, however, this situa-tion was completely reversed. The Battalion not only" fired l2 mis-sions of its own, but was the ungrateful recipient of a number ofmissions fired by the enemy.

The shelling received on "The II th" will long be rememberedby all the surviving members of the Battalion. A total of 104 roundswere received within the Battalion position between the hours of1126 and 2116. They were fired in c o n c e n t r a t i o n ~ varying from3 to 30 rounds of estimated 75mm or 105mm caliber. Their netresult in casualties was one killed and six wounded. All of thecasualties were sustained on surprise initial rounds.

The amazing accuracy of the enemy fire, which shifted fromone battery to another with apparent ease, Jed to the suspicion thatit was observed. Particularly subject to suspicion was a Hasan planeobserved overhead on the occasion of some of the shellings, but acomplete check revealed that all the planes in the air on each occa-sion were accounted for. A search by the infantry of the surroun-cling wooeled hills also failed to reveal the presence of an observer.

Azimuths of shell craters were measured and shell reports weresent through to the Corps Counterbattery Section which directedfire on several suspected enemy battery positions, but on the 12th

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at to 16 the enemy again put a concentration in the area, a total of9 rounds of the same caliber as those received on the previous clay.One man was killed on the first round, but no other casualties resulted. More azimuths were measured and another shell "rep" wassent to Corps who arranged for a 72-roulld TOT to be fired onthe suspected enemy battery. No further shelling was received afterthis TOT \\ias fired.

Although hampered by intermittent rain, the Battalion fired anumber of missions on the 12th and 13th, many of which wererequested by forward observers of the 375th who reported the firein each case to be extremely effective in eliminating mortar positions and other strong points that were holding up the advance ofthe infantry.

On the 14th a sniper with a machine pistol fired on a Battalionguard post on two different occasions, but without inflicting casualtis. On the sallie day a reconnaissance was made of positions northof Neuf-Etang, but riO plans for movement were formulated. Therewas little firing on the 14th, but on the 15th Battalion took part in apreparation fired in support of the renewal of the Division's attackand, later, on that day, effective fires were placed on enemy mor-tars, a command post, a factory strong point, and concentrationsof infantry. Also, on the 15th a new Battalion OP was established,this time at St. Remy.

On the 16th the positions to the north of Neuf-Etang were furtherreconnoitered following the receipt of orders to displace. At thesame time the Battalion's mission was changed to general supportwith the additional mission of direct support of the 2nd Battalionof the 398th Infantry Regiment which was holding a long linerunning through the immense wooded area 011 the southwest bank

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of the Meurth River, across from Raon L'Etape. The basic plan ofattack was now clear. While a relatively small force held the linesouthwest of the river, the real strength of the Division was beingshifted to the north, and a flanking attack to the south and southeastfrom Baccarat was being made on Raon L'Etape.

Orders were received on the 16th instructing the Battalion totake over an observation post of the 375th, which was located inthe area held by the 2nd Battalion of the 398th. When this OPwas taken over on the 17th, it was discovered that all of the 2ndBattalion except Company E had received orders during the nightto shift to the north. E Company had been attached to the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd In fantry Division, which was then onthe 100th's right flank. This meant that only Company E and apatrol from the 100th Reconnaissance Troop were along the 6000yard front separating the 373rd from the enemy. However, this situation was not serious since rapid progress was being made south and.east of Baccarat on the east side of the Meurth and the 3rd Divisionon the right had driven all the way to the river. Nevertheless, thealready strong local security measures were further strengthened.

In accordance with the change in the organization of the infantryil l front, the Battalion's mission was changed to general supportwith the additional mission of direct support of Company E of the3981h, an unusual arrangement dictated by the nature of the tacticalsituation.A registering howitzer from Baker was sent to the new positionnorth of Neuf-Etang, and a registration waS! obtained from thatposition on the 17th. Later, after the registratio'n, the remainder ofBaker Battery displaced, followed on the next morning by Able,Ch:lrlie, Headquarters, and the attached Anti-Aircraft Section (1st

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Platoon, Battery A, 898th AA 3n, attached at Neuf-Etang). Thepositions occupied were in a narrow valley about 2000 yards SOllthwest of Raon L'Etape which afforded practically no flash defiladeand only barely provided concealment from observation on the enemyheld hills surrounding the town. In the occupation of the positionsa 21;2 Ton truck of the 898th struck an S-Mine, but no seriouscasualties resulted. After occupation of position, Baker Battery hadonc man injured by a Schu mine.Service Battery remained at Bru and the Personnel Section atRam bcrvillers.The 19th was 8 day marked by the firing of a preparation for

the infantry jump-off in the morning, followed by interdiction fires,and later by a number of observed missions. On the 20th, as theDivision pushed on, the observation post taken over from the 375thbecame extremely valuable and the observers there were able tolocate and direct fire on a number of profitable targets, particularlyin and around Moyenmoutier.

By the 20th, Raon L'Etape was securely in the hands of theDivision and the enemy had begun a headlong retreat up the Rabocleat! River valley toward Senones. The German "winter line" inthe Vosges had been succeSSfully broken and the task then was toexploit the victory to the fullest. With the 117th Cavalry on theleft and the 3rd Division on the right, the JOOth pushed on in hotpursuit.On the 21st the Battalion's howitzers were approaching the limitof their range and, hence, a reconnaissance of positions farther forward was made. The positions reconnoitered were \in thc areabetween St. Blaise and Moyenmoutier and were adjacent to positions selected by the 938th Field Artillery Battalion, a Corps unit

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NOVEMBER--.-.- -----attached to Division Artillery, whose reconnaissance party accom-panied the 373rd's. On the same day the Battalion OP overlookingMoyenmoutier became valueless as a result of the enemy withdrawal, and its abandonment was ordered. In the process of leavingthe OP, two of the party that had been serving there and the Tonvehicle il l which they were riding were blown up by a German "R"(Regal) mine. One of the men was killed instantly, the other onlyvery slightly injured. The Jeep was demolished.

On the 22nd the Battalion displaced, the firing batteries goinginto the positions selected between St. Blaise and Moyenmoutierand Headquarters into St. Blaise proper. Service Battery was orderedto reconnoiter a new position for forward displacement of its installations. C Battery registered from its new position, but there wasno other firing since the advance of the "doughs" was now so rapidthat the howitzers were out of range again shortly after the newpositions were occupied.

The 23rd of November was Thanksgiving Day, memorable forits Turkey Dinner and bad weather. On this day a reconnaissancewas made of positions near Le Puid, but, because of the rapidityof movement of the infantry, these positions were never occupied.On the 24th, a reconnaissance was made of positions still fartherforward, and, upon the final selection of such positions, the Batta~ i o l l Commander radioed the Executive Officer to bring the Battalioniorward. The new positions of the firing batteries were betwcenLeSaulcy and Belva\. Headquarters was located at LeSaulcy and Service moved to Senones. At all of these just-liberated villages thcFrench people extended the Battalion the warmest possiOle welcomc.

At LeSaulcy and Belval the Battalion once again found the"No Fire Line" too far out in front for firing and, consequently,

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early on the morning of the 25th, a reconnaissance party pushedon farther to the east through a Iluge gap in the mountains andselected positions near Diesbach in Alsace. Displacement of theBattalion took place on the same day over the high Hantz Passand through the prepared, but never occupied, German defensivepositions in the mountains. The Battalion CP on this occasion waslocated at Fouuay On the road that leads north and northeast toStrassbourg.

The "ratrace" continued, and as a result the Battalion fired nomissions on the 25th. On the 26th a reconnaissance (oward Lutzelhaus was made to bring the Battalion within range again, and displacement was scheduled for JOJ 5. Orders were changed, however,and the information was received that the Division would not continue the pursuit to the north. Later, orders to move to the rearcame down, and in the afternoon the Battalion marched back toLa Petite Raon. All of the Batteries were quartered here exceptService which remained at Senones ..

At Petite Raon it was learned that the Division had been pulledout of action for transfer to the north, to another sector.

About 0230 on the 27th the Battalion received orders concerning the Divisions's movement north to Sarrebourg and at 0630quartering parties left for Raon L'Etape where they met a representative oj" the Division. At 1625 the Battalion hit the lP (initial point)and the march to the Sarrebourg area was completed without accident or casualties, although the crowded condition of the roads,clogged with French rej"ugees as well as with military traffic of alltypes, did cause many halts and delays. Before the Battalion finallyclosed into its new area, night had fallen and the long column hadto move under black-out conditions. Headquarters, Able, Baker, and

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Service Batteries went into Hesse, a village south of Sarrebourg,while Charlie Battery went into nearby (mling.

Except for the 397-374 Combat Team which was almost immediately attached to the 45th Division and committed to action, theJDOth Division, then assigned to the 15th Corps, remained in CorpsReserve in the Sarrebourg area until December 1st. During thisreriod the Battalion spent most of the time on maintenance, cleaningup, and resting. On the 28th Service Battery moved to Reiding, avillage east of Sarrebourg, where an Ammunition Supply Point wasestablished and to which, with the aiel of 22 Quartermaster trucks,the more than 3100 rounds of ammunition left at Senones wereSlll!ttled.

On the 1st of December, instructions were issued by DivisionArtillery that the Battalion would move to a forward assembly areaon the next morning, but a shod time later such instructions wererescinded, and the Battalion Commander was advised that the Battalionwas being attached to the 208th Field Artillery Group - for op.erations only. The 208th Group was a medium artillery group of theXV Corps, which had been given the mission of reinforcing thefires of the Division Artillery, anel which had been attached to theDivision for that purpose.

On the 2nd at December, in accordance with orders receivedfrom Group Headquarters on the previous day, a reconnaissancewas made for firing positions in the vicinity of Lohr. While thereconnaissance was being made, the Battalion commenced its marchto the north in accordance with the Division March Schedule,following guides_ which the Battalion Commander had left along theroute taken by the reconnaissance party. firing battery positionsWCre occupied near Lahr, and Headquarters went into Schaenburg.

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Service Battery remained at Reiding. The Personnel Section was stillat Rambervil1ers, but moved the next day to Sarrebourg.

Reconnaissance for observation failed to reveal suitable OPs, butregistrations were obtained by the use of air observers and duringthe night five interdicting missions were fired. Just before midnighton the 2nd about 15 enemy shells of light caliber landed very nearBaker and Charlie Batteries and about 40 additional rounds landedsome 400 yards to the northwest, but no casualties were sustained.

As the Division attack started - on the 3rd of December few missions were fired due to Jack of observation, bad weather,and the uncertainty of the front linc situation. A reconnaissance inthe vicinity of Puberg was made, but the only orders received concerning displacement were countermanded almost immediately aftertheir receipt.

At dawll on the 4th the Battalion displaced forward, followingadvance parties which had left an hour before daylight. Able Battery had two guns stuck in the deep mud at its position and Bakerhad one gUll temporarily immobilized by a broken spade-lock pin,but the delays occasioned were slight in each case. The firing batteries went into position south of Puberg, and Headquarters wentinto La Petite Pierre. Service Battery remained at.Reiding.

Registrations were obtained after occupation of the new positionon the 4th of December, and 12 missions, mostly interdiction andcounterbattery, were fired. The next day was a day of even moreactive firing and a total of 45 missions, exclusive ot registrations,were fired. Many of these missions were adjusted by light battalionforward observers, but the majority of them consisted of "road-runners" and night interdiction missions. Fire Direction Center andthe howitzer sections were busy throughout the night.

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The Battalion's mission on December 5th continued to be generalsupport, but in addition it was given the mission of reinforcing thefires of the 925th Field Artillery Battalion and, a Hason party wassent to the 925(h in iccordance with SOP.

On the 6th the 208th Group ordered a forward reconnaissancefor positions in the vicinity of Sarreinsberg and adequate positionswere finally located, although the large number of artillery reconnais-sance parties working in the same area made the task of selectingpositions a relatively dif ficult one. During the day and night of the6th, the Battalion fired 26 missions, most of them interdiction fireson Group order.

On the 7th the Battalion took part in a preparation for the con-tinuation of the Division attack toward Bitche, while advance par-ties went forward to the new positions to prepare them for occupa-tion. Shortly before noon, the Battalion was alerted by the 208thGroup to displace as soon as road clearance could be obtained.Clearance was obtained within an hour and at 1300 the Battaliondisplaced in the order Hq, C, A, B with Baker having considerabledifficutty in extricating several of its howitzers from the heavy mudOn the steep slope of its po.sition. After an uneventful march, thethree firing batteries went into position south of Sarreinsburg. whileHeadquarters Battery established the Battalion Command Post innearby Althorn. Service Battery displaced from Reiding to La PetitePierre, occupying the CP just vacated by Headquarters.

December 8th was a day of great activity. As the Division movedahead to probe the outer defenses of the Maginot Une. the Batta-lion participated in several scheduled preparations, a number of ob-served missions by light battalion forward observers, and 30 inter-uiction missions on the the enemy's lines of communication.

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One ot the chief problems confronting the Battalion at this timewas that of observation. The enemy in withdrawing was able tochoose his terrain and accordingly took advantage of the high groundthat offered the best observation. On the other-hand, the Battalion,left with inferior terrain, was unable to locate suitable OPs and wascompelled to rely upon light battalion observers and, especially,upon air observers for registratiolls. In an effort to improve thesituatioll, a short base was established which permitted registrationby high burst methods up to about 7500 yards, but bad weatherand the resulting poor visibility made registration by any methoddifficult.

The night of the 8th was a night of alarms, most of them fortunately false. A report was received at the Battalion CP (arterhaving passed through several hands) that Charlie Battery wasbeing shelled. Immediate checks by telephone proved that only oneshell had fallen, and that one at a considerable distance from theBattery. Able and Baker Batteries both 'reported that an enemy flarehad been set off within 150 yards of their positions, but upon investigation, the "flare" proved to be an enemy white phosphorous shellwhich landed just over the hill from !he Battery positions. Other"flares" reported by adjacent units proved to be of a similarcharacter.

Almost immediately after the report of "flares", the Battalionwas notified by Division Artillery that another artillery battalion alittle larther forward than the 373rd had received $mall arms fire.About the same time, the guard in Headquarters Battery's motorpark telephoned in a report that small arms fire from a nearbywooded area had come into the motor park. However, since thelocal security set-up in the area was !'trengthencd by the presence

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of a number of friendly tanks, little alarm was felt and the remainderof the night was quiet except for the usual and reassuring night-long blasts of friendly guns.

December 9th was another day of preparations, interdictions, andobserved missions. High burst registrations were obtained, but poorvisibility prevented the air observers from obtaining the long rangeregistrations necessary for accurate unobserved firing on the strongfortifications of the Maginot Line. As a result of one of the observedmissions in which the Battalion took part - a TOT on the objec-tive of an Infantry Battalion tilat was having trouble - the InfantryBattalion Commander concerned personally ' telephoned the DivisionArtillery COlllmander to thank him for the splendid support given,stating that it had enabled his battalion simpry to walk up on itsobjective.

The Division having taken its intermediate objectives on the 9th,the infantry on the 10th was reorganizing, and consequently notvery many missions were fired On the 10th by the Battalion.Tile Battalion's mission continuee! to be general support, buti ts reinforcing mission was changed from the 925th to the 375th.This change was occasioned by a change in the role of tile infantryregiments of the Division. The 3981h Infantry Regiment, directlysupported by the 375th, was to bear the burden of continuing theattack and, accordingly, was given priority on the fires of thel3a t tal iOll.With the continuation of the Division's attack on the 11 th, artil-lery suprort was again greatly in demand and a number of missionswere fired. The most interesting mission of the clay was fired forthe Company Commander of Company L, 398th Infantry, who successfully adjusted the Battalion on enemy flak gUlls and machine

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pistol groups that were inflicting c a s u ~ l t j c s on his company. TheCompany Commander had become separated from his artillery observer in the confusion, anel undertook the adjustment himself onlybecause of the exigencies of the situation. The enemy was effecti-vely silenced by the Battalion's fire, and the company was able tocontinue its advance.

On the 12th of December, th.e Battal ion part icipated in severalsmall preparations for attacks to secure jump-off 'positions againstthe Maginot Line and in several counterbattery missions. Also, wirewas laid to a Battalion OP that had been established on the pre-ceding day.

On the 13th as"the Division continued its steady progress throughthe rough terrain leading up to the Maginot Line at Bitche, thequestion arose as to when and to what positions the Battalion woulddisplace forward. The problem was complicated by the lack ofsuitable ground for positions and by the great number of artilleryuhits that had to be moved into the same general area,. Finally,orders were received to displace to either of two sets of positionsnear Lemberg. The positions were then occupied by the 925th andby the 250th F. A, Battalions, and the 373rd's displacement wasmade conditional upon the vacation of such positions by either orboth of the units just mentioned. Neither the 925th nor the 250tIJhad any plans for immediate movement and, hence, the Battalionstayed put, firing but a few missions, and enabling the howitzersections, the battery executives, and the fire direction personnel, whohad been fIring day and night, to get a little rest.

Reconnaissance was made of forward positions on the morningof the 14th, but no orders were received concerning displacement,since the 925th and 250th showed no signs of moving out. In the

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afternoon, the 208th Group ordered the Battalion to remain in theposition it then occupied in order to take part in the preparationscheduled for the next morning's attack on the Maginot Line. Thenight of the 14th was one of very active firing.

The attack on the Maginot scheduled for the 15th did not takeplace, and, therefore, the planned preparation was not fired, lnstead,the Battalion displaced to new positions south of Lemberg. Ableand Charlie Batteries were located in the open, and Baker in theedge of some woods in an old French artillery position, The BattalionCP was located in Lemberg, but because of the croweled conditionof the town, the remainder of Headquarters went into a nearby val-ley. Service Battery remained in La Petite Pierre until the 16th,when it. moved to Wingen.

While all battery positions were swept of mines, S-mines werediscovered between Baker and Charl ie Batteries when three signal-men from another unit were injured. Baker Battery removed a num-ber of Stapf plastic mines from its position.Again on the 16th, a scheduled attack on the Maginot Line wascallee! off. More fire plans were received, more ammunition broughtup, the Battalion OP alerted, and again the Battalion was ready,but once more the attack was postponed.

Finally, on the 17th, after a night of extremely intense firing,tile Division launched its attack and the Battalion had the greatestday of firing that it had all e1uring combat. More than 500 roundswere expended in less than three hours during the preparation pre-ceding the infantry's jump-off. After the preparation was over, TOTs,air and other observed missions, and counterbattery fires brought thetotal number of rounds fired in the 24 hour period of this day up to1123. Sixty-one 11l issiol1s in all were fi red.

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One of the interesting developments in connection with the firingon the Maginot Line was the lack of effect of medium and even ofheavy artillery on the strong concrete fortifications. The 155mm pro-jectiles of the Battalion's howitzers simply bounced off and even8-inch howitzer shells did little damage. It was readily apparentthat the Maginot forts could not simply be blown apart by artillery.

On the 18th the Battal ion continued its firing on the Maginot forts,particularly on fort Schiesseck, and on a number of enemy batteries.It was an active day, though the firing was not as heavy as it hadbeen on the previous day. The next day was very much the same,as the infantry continued its costly way through the Line, fort by fort.Finally, on the 20th it looked as though the Division was just aboutthrough the main part of the line, and a coordinated attack being plan-ned was expected to result in a break-through. The Battalion at thistime was giving its utmost in the way of support to the infantry,firing everything from large-scale preparations to few-round harassing missions, and hope was high that the Battle of the Maginotwould soon be won.

On the 20th the Division Artillery Executive visited the Batta-lion CP and, in addition to discussing plans for the immediatefuture, gave further news of the big enemy offensive in the 1st ArmySector. On the 21st of December, short ly before 0100 the Battal ionCommander was notified to attend a Unit Commander's Call at 0600.At this conference he was informed that the Division was to relievethe 44th Division which was on the 100th's Jeft, as well as to holdmost of its own line, and was to take lip a strong defensive posi-tioll. The Battal ion was released from attachment to the 208th Group,and as of 1200 on tile 21st reverted to Division Artillery control withthe mission of general support.

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DECEMBER

In accordance with orders from Division Artillery, a reconnais-sance was made for positions in the vicinity of Rohrbach, and aregistration was obtained by the single howitzer sent forward for thatpurpose. However, as it was late and the roads were jammed withheavy traffic, Char lie Battery displaced to the new positions, arri-ving there after dark and being temporarily attached to the 374th FieldArtillery Battalion which was in the area. Despite the plans madefor movement and the complete change in the situation as a resultof the enemy's Ardennes offensive, the Battalion's activity 011 the 21stfollowed the pattern of the preceding busy days and many success-ful missions were fired.

At 0200 on the 22nd, Division Artillery ordered the Battalion notto displace the other batteries to the positions near Rohrbach, butto select other positions near IMaierJing. Accordingly reconnais-sance parties feft at daybreak and located positions in what hadbeen part of the 44th Division's sector, in bare treeless country,quite unlike the wooded terrain to which the Battalion had becomeaccustomed. As soon as roael clearance could be obtained, Able,Baker, and Headquarters displaced, and when Able and Bakerwere laid and ready to fire, Charlie Battery reverted to Battalioncontrol and was ordered to move to the new area. The Battalion CPwas located in Guisberg, and Service Battery moved from Wingento Butten. Personnel was still at Sarrebourg with Division Rear.

The 23rd, a day of moderate firing, was spent chiefly in organi-zing tile new positions and in reconnoitering for OPs. That nightDivision Artillery directed that a reconnaissance be made for newhowitzer posit ions nearer Guisberg ancl, on the next morning, newpositions were selected. However, just as the firing batteries wereabout to disprace, Division Artillery ordered that the movement be

25


27/86

o [ CH I BER

called off Jlld that positions a little farther to till ' rear, IIL'ar Mont-bronn, Iw recolll lOitered. Baker and Charlie Balteries moved nearMontl)rolln upon selection of posi tions, but Able, due to a lack ofgl)()d positions in tile Montbronn area was located ncar Guisberg.I ieal.iquarters planned to move to MOlltbronn, but because of thecrowded condition of tile town postponed its diplacel11ent until the:l


28/86

D E C E ~ I B r R

Battalion's attaclled AA Platoon was alerted for possibll' ;-lir attacks.And, presumably to take care of the threat from enemy parachutistsand saboteurs reported in the Division Area, orders were issued byDivision Artillery to establish road blocks on al l main road withinthe sector

On the 27th two OPs were located, but, due to a shortage ofwlire, a line could be laicl to only one of them. The other had todepend on radio for communications. Firing during the day was l ight,and there were only five missions, al l harassing. The night was quietexcept for the occasi onal presence of enemy reconnaissance planesoverhead.

The 28th was a day of increased, though still not great, activity.One mission achieved direct hits on two pillboxes occupied by enemypersonnel, and another knocked out a machine gun position. Duringthe afternoon, there was intense ai r activity with many flights ofAmerican heavy bombers passing overhead en route to Germany.One of them, apparently crippled by flak beyond the frontier, retur-ned, anel, flying at a low altitude over Baker Battery's position jetti-soned some of its bomb load not far from the howitzer positions.Fortunately, however, no one in the battery was injured. The planecrashed a few miles farther to the rear.

On the 29th, as a result of increased enemy air act iv ity, muchemphasis was placed on improving the camouflage of the Battalion.In addition, several missions were fi red, one of them ending with tlledestruction of an enemy tank and another successfully wreakinghavoc Oil what appear ed to be an enemy chow line.

The 30th, a clay of little activity, was marked by renewed alert-ness to enemy aircraft, the result of strafing wi tn es se d near the Batta-lion area by what appeared to be P-47s. Intelligence reports received

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DECEMBER/JANUARY

on the next day revealed Ihal Ihe planes were Al1lerica-n P-47s whichhad been captured by the enemy, that some of the planes boreAmerican 1l1arkings and others German.

The last day of the year was quiet, but the enemy commencedthe New Year witll a strong attack, one of the attacks designed towithdraw pressure from the Ardennes Sector where the First andThird American Armies were gathering strength. As the infantrywif'hdrew, a considerable amount of small arms fire could be heard110t too far from tile Battalion position, and the ohserving party atthe OP was ordered to return. III the morning eight enemy shells landed in Baker Battery's position, and in tile afternoon both Able andBaker were strafed by a P-47, presumably enemy-operated. During[he strafing, the Battalion's machine gunners and the attached AA Platoon opened-up on the attacking plane, but without apparent success.

Late in the afternoon, the Battalion Commander reported to Division Artillery Headquarters. There he was told that the situationwas seriolls, that while the Division had beaten off all attacks frol11the front, the cavalry unit protecting the Division and Corps rightflank had been severely mauled and had been pusheel back so farthat the entire flank of the Division was exposed. The Battalion wasinstructed to prepare for a movement to previously reconnoi1ercclrear-positions. Preparations for such a movement were made andefforts to obtain 5-2 information were greatly increased.

On the 2nd, personnel from the Battalion 5-2 Section went on a"milk-run", as their information-gathering jaunts from one installation to another were called, and found that the enemy's progresson the rigllt was continuing. The enemy had now driven a deepsalient into the section of the line to the right of the Div ision, andthe Battalion was ordered to displace by battery to positions near

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30/86

JANUARY

M on tb ro nn . T he displacement was made under the extreme diffi-culty caused by the presence of snow Jn d ice on the roads. Also,Able Battery was strafed by a P-47 with American markings, andBaker was forced to locate another position when it found a batteryof a separate battalion in the position it intended to occupy. Nevertheless, the Battalion kept tw o batteries firing at all times and theclear weather enabled the ai r observers to make the enemy pay astaggering price in men and material fo r every foot of groLlnd gained.

By the 3rd, a combat team of the 36th Division had arrived toreinforce the Division, but the disintegration of the cavalry unit a llthe Division's right flank had left a huge gap between the lOath Divi-sion, and the 45th Division, the left f lank Division of the VI Corps. The45th at this time was making an effort to close the gap, but their pro-g r ~ s s in the face of strong resistance was exceedingly slow.

The 3rd of January was a day of active firing for the Battalion.One mission received through tw o radios and one switchboard wasfired for a lone observer of the harel-hit 117th Reconnaissance Squadron. He and the isolated group of men with him had sighted acolumn of enemy tanks advancing up a draw toward them and weremost direly in need of help. T he B at ta li on 's first volley was theanswer to their prayers. The lead tank was destroyed and the otherswere dispersed in confusion. Later, during the night the Battalionrouted tw o addit ional enemy attacks, besides firing a number ofusual interdiction and harassing missions.

As day broke on the 4th, the situation still left much to bedesired. In addition to maintaining pressure on the Division's rightflank, the enemy had penetrated fairly deeply into the positions heldby the 44th Division on the left flank. Th e lOath, however, merelyrounded off its flanks and held firm, declining to withdraw. It was at

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JANUARY

this time that the small, but fierce, battle of Rimling took place.A "milk-run" on the 4th by the Assistant 5-2 of the Battalion

discovered that the enemy had cut the road on which he had travelled the previous day and that they were then in possession of Wingen, thereby seriously menacing the Division's rear. This vitallyimportant information was promptly sent to Division Artillery andDivision t leadquarters, where it was received with incredulity sincethere had been no previous reports to indicate that the enemy hadtaken this ground.Later, it was learned that the enemy had also taken the highground near Meisenthal which looked down on Able Battery's position. Able accordingly moved to an alternate position providingconcealment and flash defilade.

With the news that the entire 36th Division was being b r o u ~ h tforward to reinforce the line and that a Combat Command of the2nd French Armored Division would bolster the 44th, the situationbegan to look more hopeful. The Battalion all during this periodwas firing night and day. Its mission was general support with theadditional mission of reinforcing the fires of the 131 st field ArtilleryBattalion, part of the first combat team of the 36th Division to arrivein the sector.

Early on the morning of the 5th instructions were received thatthe Battalion was to move back to its original positions near Guisberg. Apparently, the 100th Division was making room for the 36thto attack east and seal off the hostile force that had penetrated sodeeply on the right. Able Battery was ready to displace at dawn,but was delayed because of a reported tank threat. When A did moveat 0800 a great deal of trouble was caused by the icy roads. Thetractors proved to have practically no side-wise stability and conse-

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32/86

JANUARY

quently skidded and slipped allover the road. The march, whichunder ordinary circumstances would have taken less than a half-hour, took almost four hours. As a result of Able's difficulty, theother 1iring batteries were routed over a more level, though tacti-cal ly more dangerous, road.

Headquarters went into Guisberg which was also occupied bythe 399th Regimental Headquarters.

January 5th and 6th were quiet days and little firing was done.On the 7th, however, the Battalion fired a number of missions and,in addition, received from the enemy some 60 rounds of estimated.I05mm shells with a center of impact within 150 yards of BakerBattery's howitzer positions. Luckily, all personnel were well pro-tected in their dug-outs anel no casualties resulted.

When the 36th Division came into the line, the left boundaryof the 100th was changed. This made i t necessary for the Battalion'sService Batlery to move from Weisslingen. The move was made toHarskirchen, a village a few kilometers west of Sarre-Union andmore than an hour's drive from Ouisberg .

The 8th was relatively a quiet day, but the 9tl1 saw an appreciable increase in activity, consisting for the most part of unobservedfires. During tile early part of the night the Germans presentedA Battery with 12 unwelcome rounds of medium and heavy artillery,later identified as 1551111ll and 170111m, fired- from two different direc-tions. The fire was thought to be the result of sound and/or flashranging and was extremely accurate. Again, the Battalion was for-tunate in having no casualties.

On the 10th shortly before the noon meal, the enemy placed 55rounds of 170rnm within the Battalion area without inflicting casualties or doing any damage other than cratering the hard-frozen ground

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33/86

JANUARY-----.-.._---

with shell holes averaging 12 feet across and 5 feet in depth. Reportspassed down later from Higher Headquarters indicated that the] 70m111 guns responsible for the firing were in position about 30,000yards away, out of range of any friendly artillery pieces Oll the Corpshont. The plan, according to the report received, was to have the AirCorps attack the suspected posit ion.

At about 2100 on the 11 th of January Headquarters Battery wasthe recipient of some 49.rounds oi J0511l1ll enemy shell-fire with acenter oi impact about 200 yards from the Battery and Battalion CPs.Luckily, again, there were no casualties, although a pyramidal tentvacated for the shelter of a fox hole by machine gun security postpersonnel was cut to shreds by the fragments of iuze-quick projectiles. During the night 21 more rounds came in, but still no greatdamage was done.

The Battalion's firing on the 10th had been moderately heavy,but on the 11 th it decreased considerably, and on the next fewsucceeding days it was comparatively light. The Division was stillOn the defensive and was digging in, and apparently the enemy WctSdoing the same. In prepar ing defensive positions i t was necess3.ryfor all the troops in the area to use dynamite charges to blast holesin the frozen ground, so despite the lull in firing there was stillplenty of explosive noise in the sector and, sometimes, an abundanceof debris flying through the air.

On the 14th experiment's which had been carried on ior severaldays to determine the best method of camouflaging gun positionswere concluded. After tests with normal nets, white-garnished nets,ane! a system without nets all observed irorn the air, it was decidedthat the system without nets in which the pieces were covered Witlltied-down white muslin was the best. The only suggestion made

32


34/86

"

JANUAjl.YW(lS that the other section installations, in addition to the howitzeritseli, be covered with either white cloth or snow,

On the 15th ill conjunction with the 399th Infantry in Guisberg,tile Battalion held a rehearsal of defensive measures to be put intoeffect in the event of enemy infiltration. Only a few fire missionswere fired on the 14th and 15th.

On the 1(Sth the Battalion and Battery Commanders and theirparties spent most of the day on reconnaissance for positions to beoccupied in the event the Division was compelled to withdraw tocertain prepared defensive lines. Positions were selected north of Rahling and Lorentzen. OP locations were also chosen.

About 2100 on the 16th Baker Battery received a concentrationof about 60 rounds of 105mm fire. Telephone lines in the Batteryposition were cut in several places, but most of the personnel weresheltered in their deep dugouts at the time and were not injured asa result of the fire. There was no damage other than the quickly-repaired wire l ines. In accordance with established procedure in suchcases, a shell report was sent in and a short time afterwards Corpsplaced a TOT on the suspected enemy l)atlcry position with the373rd participa ling.

It snowed hard all during the day on the 171h and there waslillIe firing. However, further reconnaissance was made to the rear foradditional positions to be occupied in the event of the Division's with-drawal, and survey operations in the selected rear-positions werecommenced.

Baker Battery on the 18th displaced to positions close to Mont-bronn as soon as the 155th Field Artillery Battalion of the 36th Divi-sion vacatecl them. The 36th Division, complete, was then in theprocess of being transferred to the hard-pressed Haguenau sector.

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35/86

JANUARY

After Baker had moved, additional orders were received from Division Artillery requiring the movement of the remainder of the Battalion to the Montbronn area on the next morning.

On the 19th the Battalion was settled with al l of its batteries inthe general vicinity of Montbronn except Service which remained atHarskirchen. Headquarters and the Battalion CP were set up in anolel group of warehouses in a wooded area southwest of the town, aposition occupied for most of the next two months.

The snow already on the ground was increased in depth by additional snows On the 19th and 20th, both quirt days insofar as firingand enemy activity were concerned. On the 20th, however quite abit of excitement was created by a crippled B-17 which noiselycircled the area several times before nosing into a dive and crashinga short distance away. The incident was reported in the S-2 Bulletin,daily prepared by the Assistant S-2, as follows:

"The fortress, fly ing very low, first circled over the area, leaving a long string of open parachutes behind. The ninth chute inthe string opened over ,B ' Battery, and the great plane, evidentlyout of control, roared around in a great arc and disappeared intothe hill above ,e Battery, a tremendous cloud of smoke markingits grave.

"The pilot landed in a tree near ,B' Battery, and was takento the Battery CP, where a few drinks turned him into a verycheerful individual. On the way back to Division Headquarters,he told the story of his fl ight.

"The B-17 had left England at 0930, along with many others,and had dropped its bombs at a bridge across the Rhine. Therehard luck set in. They had to run the ack-ack three times, because,the target was hard to see. When they left, both inboard engines34

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36/86

JANUAR Y

were dead. Most instruments went with them, because they weredriven by their power. Snow on the windshield made it impossibleto see. The plane lost altitude steadily. Near Petit Rederching,the pilot ordered the crew to jump, while he circled. All jumped.Then he went out, and the plane crashed.

"It was the pilot's first mission, His biggest surprise: that hewas so close to the front lines when he landed. His biggest worry;that he would have to pay for the plane. Even with Air Forcespay that would take quite some time."The 21 st of January was another day marked by bad weather,

and most of the time during the day was spent in digging-in thehowitzers, preparing ammunition pits, and constructing dugoutsrather than in firing. Between J725 and 1820, 22 rounds of lightamI heavy caliber enemy shells fell in the vicinity of Charlie Batlery, some of them within the battery position. One dud of 170 mmcaliber bounced off the parapet of the Number 2 Howitzer and kickedup enough of the hard-frozen earth to injure a cannoneer. Aboutthe same time another man was scratched by a fragment from a bursting shell, but was not thereby prevented from carrying on hisduties. No additional casualties were sustained.

At about 0230 on the 22nd C Battery received more hostileshell-fire, five rounds of 170mm, but again no damage was done.Although the 22nd was cold, visibility was much improved and theliason planes adjusted the Battalion effectively on several profitabletargets. Numerous infantry in the open were put out of action andtwo enemy tanks were destroyed by direct hits.

Snow fell intermittently from the 23rd through the 26th andthere was lilte firing and little activity of any sort. However, on

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37/86

JANU ARY /FEBRUARY

the 25th direct hits were obtained on two bui ldings suspected ofhousing enemy CPs. and unobserved fires were placed on Bitche andthe surrounding road net. On the 26th, the Germans put 20 rOllndsof heavy artillery in the Battalion area, but without the desired results.

The days from the 28th to the 31 st of January inclusive wereall relatively quiet. Except on the 29th almost all of the missionswere unobserved because of the poor visibility incident to the prevailing bad weather. On the 29th, several missions were fired allellemy vehicles and troops by the ai r observers with good effect.Also, a reported enemy rest area consisting of a number of houseswas fired on with white phosphorous and five of the buildings wereleft burning. Shortly after noon on the 29th the area adjacent to tIleBattalion was strafed by several ME 109s accompanied by two P-5Is.One of the enemy planes was brought down.

Toward the end of January an unseasonable thaw took place,and by the 1st of February Charlie Battery was forced by the mud

and water to move from its valley position to higher ground. As thethaw continued, the entire Montbronn area developed into whatamounted to a sea of mud. Fortunately, during this time there wereno tactical moves to be made and the muddy roads and fields weremore a matter of inconvenience than anything else.

From the I st of February through the I I th of March the Battalion remained in the Montbronn area, except for a week's stay atHarskirchen with Service Battery in the case of each of the fjringbatteries. This was a period memorable chiefly for its inactivity.During most of this time, the Battalion was limited to firing 15 roundsper gUll per day, and sometimes not even this small allotment wasfired. The Divis ion's f ront- line infantry, st il l chargcLl with a defensive mission, made little effort to change the lines that had become

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38/86

FEBRUARY

so well established during the first part of January, and the enemy,likewise, was content to let things remain as they were. The chiefstruggle was with the mud and the cold, with bad weather ratherthan with the enemy.

Occasionally the German artillery would place a few rounds in thearea, although the average number of rounds falling in the entire Division sector during the period was considerably less than the [ownumber of 50 rounds per day. On the 7th of february, 36 rounds. .were dropped into Montbronn, but no casualties resulted. Most ofthe enemy fire throughout the time in question was of an harrassingnature, as the enemy lacked the ammunition (according to the best0-2 reports) required for tme counterbattery and destruction missions. While rounds sometimes fell in artillery positions, includingthe Battalion's, more frequently enemy fire was directed at crossroads and at the front-line elements.

Since poor visibility as a result of bad weather was the rule,and also because the terrain did not afford, adequate observation,most of the missions fired were unobserved. Many missions werefired time and time again. Bitche with its Citadel, Bismark Barracks,and College; Camp de Bitche; Reyersviller; and Mouterhouse, tomention a few, were targets that were fired on regularly and becameknown to everyone.

From time to time, as the weather permitted, fighter-bombersalso attacked Bitche and other front-line localities. On such occasions the Battalion, together with the other units of Division Artillery, customarily placed fire on known enemy anti-aircraft positions,thus making it extra-hazardous for the personnel charged withbringing down the planes to perform tlleir mission. Tn addition, thelight battalions frequently fired red smoke shells to guide the bom-

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39/86

fEBRUARY /MARCH

bers onto their targets. On onc occasion, following a careful studyof the locations of enemy flak installations, red smoke was fired intothe surrounding area as though in preparation for an air-attack, andthen, after sufficient time had passed to insure that the enemy hadcome into the open to man the flak gUliS, heavy concentrations wereplaced on them.

Some oi the missions fired eluring this period are worth mentioning. Most of them are more or less typical of the sort of firingelone by the Battalion throughout combat. On February 10th, twohouses in ReyersviJler suspected of being enemy CPs were set ablazeby direct hits with White Phosphorous, and on the 22ml, in thesame locality, three target hits were obtained on a house containingenemy troops. On the 24th, an enemy-occupied pillbox was COIll-pletely destroyed in a 12-round mission that included 6 direct hits.On the 28th, one of the few days clear enough for the planes to fly,a German flak gun fired On one of the artillery [jason planes, something that German AA gunners were generally wise enough not to do.The result was that the plane adjusted the Battal ion on the flak installation and effectively silenced the gun.

On March 3rd, 9 direct hits were obtained in 20 rounds fired onan enemy CP in Schwangerbach, an outstanding example of the Bat-t.:lIion's superior accuracy in fir ing.

Able Battery stayed at Harskirchen cleaning and maintainingequipment from February 19th to the 25th, Charlie from the 26th toMarch 4th, and Baker from March 5th to the I I tho Able and Charlieoccupied new positions On their return, Baker went back to its oldlocation.

It was while the Battalion was at Montbronn that the pass systemwas put into effect and the Battalion was given quotas for "rest"

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40/86

MARCH

trips to Paris, Nancy, and Brussels. Movies were shown nightly atthe schoolhouse in Montbronn, and a portable shower was madeavailable to tile Battalion. Church services were held regularly atDivision Artillery Headquarters. These things, and the knowledgethat a push would probably be stJgecl when the weather permitted,tended to make the long inactive days more bearable.

Also, during this period, new sights were placed on carbines anda range was established for zeroing them in. "Artificial moonlight",an aid to infantry action at night, was being experimented with onthe front Jines and accounted for the weird glow sornetimes observedin the cloudy skies over the front. The light battalions were havingsome slight success in obtaining the surrender of enemy troops byf ir ing propaganda leaflets into the hostile lines. The radar-principledposit fuze, with its "automatic" height of burst and with no powdertrain time-limit to cut down the range at which air bursts could beobtained, made its appearance in the Battalion ammunition pits andwas frequently used. Prisoner of war reports indicated that the newfuze was most effective.

The enemy, too, was trying some new things. Heavy rocket projecUes, from 210mm to 380mm in caliber, occasionally fell in theforward part of the Division sector to which their short range limited thelll. Occasionally, overhead, fhe long vapor-trail of a Germanjet-propelled could be seen.

In addition to the things just mentioned, everyone will longremember the beautiful vapor-streaked formations of highflying f o r ~tresses and Liberators which on clear days, could be observed passing overhead, the frequent "early bursts" from posit fuzes whichcould be heard nightly over Montbronn, the huge glass factory at


41/86

MARCH

nearby Sf. Louis, and many other particularities that came to beassociated with the Montbronn area.

On the 9th of March, the Corps Commander, the Division Commander, and the Division Artillery Commander all visited Able Battery's position, and were most lavish in their praise of it. Able didhave an ideal set-up. All of the pieces were cleverly concealed andcamouflaged so as to blend with the surrounding terrain and withthe combination farm-mill buildings to which they were adjacent.Since it was impossible to dig and maintain dry foxholes and dugoutsin the water-soaked ground, strong log parapets were constructed for the protection of personnel at the position. The steep hillsrising above the location provided excellent defilade.

Early in March the rumors concerning a push by the Seventh Armybecame stronger, and by the 10th. in accordance with orders frol\\Division Artillery, a reconnaissance was made by the Batfalion ofposition areas closer to the front lines, and on the 11 th orders werereceived to move 2000 rounds immediately into a dump to be established in the Montbronn region, a job that Service Battery commenced at once. Then, on March 12 the Battalion Commander wastold to report to Division Artillery Headquarters with a small f ( ~ c o n IlJissance party. Following the receipt of instructions there, positionswere selected in the vicinity of Enchenberg, and the Battalion wasalerted for a move on the next day.

Also, on the 12th, elements of the 7(st Infantry Division part ofwhose advance party had visited the Battalion on the 21 st of Fe-bruary, began to move into the area in order to take over the rightflJ.llk of the l O O ~ h ' s extended line. The Battalion played host to certain key personnel of the 564th Field Artillery Battalion and triedto give this unit, entering combat for the first time, the benefit of its

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MARCH

prior combat experience. The Battalion's Fire Direction Center, inparticular, was of valuable service to the 564th and obtained registrations for them.Early on the morning of the 13th, Charlie Battery displaced to

its new position near Enchenberg, followed later in the 'day by Headquarters, Able, and Baker. Although, the short march was madewithout incident, a great deal of excitement was caused shortly afterarrival when all of the anti-aircraft weapons in the area opened-upon several P-47s that dove out of the clouds in attack formation.On the 14th the long awaited Division 01 (Operations Instructions) setting forth the plan for the attack to be launched on theMaginot Forts and on Bitche was received. Here is the entry for the14th in the Official Battalion History:

"At last today, by Division Operations orders, we received thenews for which we've been waiting so eagerly through threewearisome defensive months - that .on 0 day the Division is toresume its assault on Bitche, Camp de Bitche, and its surroundingmaze of Maginot fortifications. Bitche - the concrete and steelcore of the Maginot Line, which is itself modern man's strongestand most ingenious system of fortification. How formidable theyare we well know, from our experience with them last December.As we expect 0 day to be soon, all personnel are laboring underpressure to complete the organization and protection of positions.We don't want casualties from hostile counterbattery fires. Service displaced forward and took over Headquarter's Battery CPat Montbronn. Charlie Battery fired at a tank near Bitche, destroying it with precision fire. The howitzer firing the mission put out6 rounds in 58 seconds in ,fire for effect' , during which it secured two target hits. At 2100 a message was received that D day

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l-IARCH

and H hour were to be 0500 tomorrow. Morale of all personnelis extremely high. Our mission is general support of the Division,"The entry in tile Official History on the 15th, the day the attack

was started, is also interest ing:"Today we hac! a field day. Matters began when at 0100 we

fired all extensive Corps counter-battery program to break tiphostile artillery resistance. There was no regular artillery preparation before the attack. Our infantry jumped off at 0500, andthe artillery support began at that hour. We fired every kind ofmission in the Battalion, including many observed fires on targetsof opportunity. Knocked out a tank with two target hits, plasteredenemy troops, shot up hostile mortar and rocket positions,destroyed dugouts, marked Bitche for some bombing by fighterbombers of the ! 2th T.A.C., neutralized enemy batteries, harassedenemy assembly areas and interdicted their routes of communication. The fur ious activity in Our Fire Direction Center made itresemble nothing so much as a 3-ring circus conducted in a madhOllse. At one time fDC was simultaneously adjusting two different batteries on two separate targets by observation plane, whileat the same time the third battery was firing a scheduled missionon a third target. But this racing activity was coaly controlled-- as was the flashing activity of the sweating gun squads and our fires were speedy, heavy, accurate. By evening the Division's attack had broken through the forts, had halhvay envelopedthe objective, and was progreSSing 1110st favorably."The 16tIJ was another day of heavy firing. Early in the morning

an intense preparation "vas fired on Bitche and Fort Otterbiel, which42


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MARCH

later in the day fell to the advancing infantry. Withering fire was placcd on cnemy troops withdrawing from Bitche by the observationplanes which were in the air throughout the aay. Ahout noon reconnaissance parties went forward and, after considerable searchingthrough heavify-Ill ined terrain, selected positions in the edge of thecompletely ruined and uninhabited vil lage of Schorbach. The Batta-lion CP was located in Hottviller, another wreck of a village in thesame general area.

On the morning of the 17th the Battalion displaced and occupiedthe new positions. Some difficulty was encountered in registeringhecause of the communications situation. Radio would not work betwecn the deep valleys and the long wire Jincs laid along the heavilymined roads were constantly being cut by the steady tank and vehiculartraffic moving toward the front. Finally, however, registrations wereobtained and during the day many interdiction missions on hostilpescape routes and a number of target-marking missions for the AirCorps were fired. Baker Battery's Number 2 Section fired the Battalion's first round into G('nnany from its position at Schorbach.

Since on the 17th the Division's progress to the north was continuing almost without interruption, the Battalion was ordered j( )make a reconnaissance for positions farther forward, and on the 18thHeadquarters, Baker, and Charlie moved to Bousseviller, a small village a few miles north of Bitche. Able Battery remained behind, temporarily attached to the 375th Field Artillery Battalion which wasalso located in the Schorbach area and which was in direct supportof the 398th, the regiment that had been given the mission of holdingthe Division's right flank. Though not many missions were fired duringthe day, those that were fired were extremely costly to the fleeing

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enemy who in several instances were caught in traffic jams on thecrowded roads behind the German frontier.

Able Battery rejoined the Battalion on the J9th, but on DivisionArtillery orders, went into bivouac rather than into firing position.About noon on the 19th, word was received that the 71 st InfantryDivision was to relieve certain elements of the 100th Division, and,soon afterward, the Battalion was instructed that in addition to itsmission of general support it would have the mission of reinforcingthe fires of the 564th Field Artillery Battalion (the medium Battalionof the 71 st Division), which was moving into position near BOllsse-viller. Firing, however, was light all during the day and, it was anti-cipated that a move would be made soon. The best guess at the timewas that the Division would follow the 6th Armored Division througha gap that was being opened in the Siegfried by the 3rd InfantryDivision, which had passed through the 44th Division and was thenon the 100th's left.

Early on the 20th, Service Battery, in 'preparation for a possiblesudden and extensive move, displaced to a bivouac in Bousseviller.About noon one of the observation planes spotted hostile gun flashesfrom positions behind the Siegfried Line, near Pirmasens, and adju-sted the Battalion 011 several batteries with excellent results. A rocketlauncher in the same enemy sector was also a victim of the Batta-lion's Mt's.

About 1630 on the 20th, as the 71 st Division's relief of the 100thwas nearing completion, the Battalion was ordered to take Baker andCharlie Batteries out of action and prepare for movement on shortnotice. The Batt.alion spent the next day, an uneventful one, in a stateof readiness and anticipation, but no orders for movement werereceived.

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On the morning of the 22nd in accordance with orders from Division Artillery, an assembly area was chosen by the Battalion for the802nd F. A_ Bn. which had just been attached to Division Artillery,and guides were sent out to show the 802nd's advance party the spotselected. And then, the news was received that the Division wouldmove through the gap in the Siegfried Line, turn east and head for theRhine. A reconnaissance was ordered to be made and reconnaissanceparties pushed on across the German border, through the Siegfried,up the dusty road to Zweibrucken, and from there east to a point near13urgalber, where positions were selected.

At 0700 the next morTling the Battalion commenced its march intoGermany, crossing the frontier at 0840. Plans at that time still calledfor occupation of the positions chosen on the evening before, butshortly thereafter, when the advance party reached Thaleischweilerwhere Division Artillery was located, it was learned that there hadbeen a change and that the entire column was to proceed on to theRhine valley. A "goose-egg" near Mutterstadt was given the Battalion Commander as the area in which to select positions. Word of theorders to continue the march was passed on to the main body of theBattalion lead by the Battalion Executive, and the 373rd joined the"Race to the Rhine".

The march over the heavily-wooded Hardt Mountains to positions near Schauernheim, which had been chosen by the reconnais-'sallce elements that went ahead, is one of the never-to-be-forgottenevents in the Battalion's history. More than 75 miles of unknownterrain on roads laden with displaced persons, deserting enemy troops,and liberated prisoners, was tra.versed with scarcely a delay andwithout an accident. Little information concerning the situation wasavailable. While it was known that the ellemy west of the Rhine had

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been c1ealt a crushing blow, the exact location of many desperatelyresisting PQckets of enemy troops was not known. However, despitethe fact tllat (as was later learned) the Battalion by-passed a considerable number uf enemy troops, no hostile action of any sort wasencountered on the long march. Both Service Battery, which madethe march, stopping at Mussbach, and Able Battery captured severalprisoners, the Battalion's first. Service turned in nine, Able four. Localsecur ity dur ing the first night in Germany was greatly emphasized.Almost no firing was clone ami it appeared that the Division's missionwould be more one of mopping up than anything else.

On the 24th, with the infantry working through Ludwigshafen andalong the bank of the Rhine south from Ludwigshafen, there wasagain little firing and most of this misty day was spent in digging-into protect against possible counterbattery fire. The flat plains of theRhine valley offered nothing in the way of flash defilade allCl made itrelatively easy for the enemy, in possession of much higher groundeast of the Rhine, to locate battery positions. Fortunately, however,at this time the enemy was thoroughly disorganized aIll! short ofallllnunition, :lnd no hostile artillery fire was received in thesepositions.

The 10Jlowing entry in the 0 f f i c ia I H is to r y reflects thest.1te of affairs on the 25th:

"At noon toelay the Division passed under the control of theVI Corps. Baker Battery joined Charlie, displacing to a new position in the vicintiy of Limburgerhof, while Able, in turn, displaced to an old German AA position near Mutterstadt. We firedseveral missions on enemy troops and batteries across the Rhine,and completely blew up a large ammunition or gasoline ware!louse. The surrounding countryside is still infested wih enemy46


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snipers, deserters (lnl! by-passed combatants trying to regain theirown lines, C Hattery this atternoolJ received SI1l


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lOOth, which upon completion of the relief was to go into VI CorpsReserve.

Although Service Battery collected another 28 prisoners, and theBattalion fired several effective missions into Mannheim and vicinity,the 26th was a relat ively quiet day. The Personnel Section movedwith Division Rear from Sarrebourg to Hassloch. On the. 27th activity was reduced still further, and late in the afternoon orders werereceived to ta ke the how itzers out of action.

On the 28th the three firing batteries moved into Schauernhcim,occupying dwellings that had previously been vacated by civiliansordered out by the Battalion. Service Battery was also scheduled tomove to Schauernheim, but was forced to remain in Mussbach whenthe Division called for seven of its trucks for transporting infantrymen. Charlie Battery discovered a German Lieutenant and an enlistedman in the cellar of one of the buildings which they had taken over,and, later, a search of every house in the entire town netted theBattalion two more prisoners.

For the next two days, cleaning up, maintenance, administration,and rest took the place of normal combat


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The crossing was successfully made, and the march to the positions selected ncar Grenzhof was completed without incident. Later,the Division Artillery Commander reported that the 0-3 of theVI Corps, who watched the Division column go by, remarked thatthe 373rd had the best march discipline of any unit he had everobserved.

Shortly after early morning Easter Services held in the prettypark-like area ;n the center of the small village of Orenzhof, orderswere received to displace to the vicinity of Oftersheim. As soon aspositions in that area had been selected, Headquarters and the firingbatteries displaced, Headquarters going into a large schoolhouse inOftersheim and the firing batteries into position south of the town.

Practically no firing was done on the 31st of March, Or the 1stand 2nd of April. The Division's mission at the time was to protectthe right flank of the Corps and of the Army, and, eventually, tomaintain contact with the french First Army which had just madea Rhine crossing near Speyer.

On the 3rd of April the Battalion moved to positions near Diihren,but no missions were fired from such positions due to the rapid progress of the Division to the east. Again, on the 4th the Baftalionmoved forward, this time to positions near Kirchhausen, about 10,000yards northwest of Heilbronn. In the case of both of the moves justmentioned the Battalion main body moved upon receipt of radioorders from the Battalion Commander after selection of positions.While both marches were made without unusual difficulty, the marchfrom Dlihren to Kirchhausen by the reconnaissance parties, in particular, was greatly delayed by mined roads and the heavy traffic.Service Battery moved from Edingen to Reihen.

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Almost immediately after the firing batteries occupied their posit ions, they commenced receiving missions of practically every type,including two defensive barrages against enemy counterattacks. Fromthe very beginning it was apparent that the enemy intended todefend Heilbronn with all his strength - the fanatical nature of theresistance and the character of the terrain from a defensive standpoint made that certain. The Neckar River was broad enough anddeep enough to constitute a most effective obstacle, and the longhigh ridge r is ing abruptly behind the town on the east side of theriver afforded almost perfect observat ion. There was no doubt thatthe enemy had chosen his ground and chosen it well.

The following entries in the 0 f f ie i a I H is to r y clearly showwhat the situation was at Heilbronn:

5 April 1945"The Division is in fo r a stiff fight. The enemy are defending Heil

bronn fanatically, with plenty of troops, tanks, artillery, and excellent defensive positions and observation. We've ferried troops acrossthe river under cover of smoke and darkness, but every time ourengineers even attempt to put pontoons down fo r a bridge, enemyartillery blows them out of the water. The approaches to our selected crossing area are under accurate and steady artillery and event!lortar fire. Having 110 bridge, it is difficult to get heavy weapons ortanks across to help support the infantry we were able to ferry orswim across. However" these latter are f ighting furiously, and we'rec lear ing out those parts of the town on this side of the river. ThisBattalion has been firing in support almost constantly and effect ively. Besides counterb-attery and sniping on hidden encmy self-pro-

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pelled guns, smoke missions, and harassing fires, we've burned outone enemy tank, damaged and stopped another, and demolished andset on fire numerous houses used by the enemy as strong points forholding up our infantry. This afternoon we established a good observation pas!."

6 April 1945"Fierce fighting continues in Heilbronn. The enemy have counter

attacked strongly twice today, and we've fired hard in helping the infantry in the bridgeless bridgehead to beat them off. Our doughs haveabout cleared the part of the city that is on this side of the river.The Battalion has fired heavily all day, at a variety of targets. Wesilenced two enemy batteries that were firing on our attempts to construct a pontoon bridge, destroyed several strong-point houses, andin conjunction with a Battalion of 8-inch howitzers knocked (lut twotanks and got two additional probables. We also established a newand additional OP, from which we hope to spot targets by meansof a short-base with our original OP. Hidden enemy guns are stilldestroying every effort to keep in a bridge."

7 April 1945"We continued to have a shooting field day. Stubborn house to

house fighting continued in Heilbronn. The Battalion's efforts at support included, among other accomplishments, the destruction of twomare hostile tanks by direct hits, and a third probable; the destruction of a concrete enemy observation tower with seven direct hits;and the leveling of more enemy house strong-points. We also fireda number of smoke missions to blind enemy observation, and harassing fires at night. Due to the smoke from the burning town, plus the

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protective smoke by our would-be bridge, our short-base was unableto pick up profitable targets. The bridge was shot out again today,just when it was almost across."

8 April 1945"More heavy firing. The grim step-by-step, house-by-house fight

ing continues in the city, without any spectacular progress. The enemyagain shot up our bridging attempts today, so wer're still trying toexpand a bridgehead with only a dangerous ferry service. Almostimpossible to get tanks and tank destroyers over to help the infantry,yet they need them badly. However, this Battalion again wiped outan enemy tank today, with two direct hits; and fired numerous accurate supporting and counterbattery missions. Targets are getting harder to find. We're reconnoitering for another OP farther to the south.We con.tinue to smoke the enemy's observation."

9 April 1945"The struggle in Heilbronn goes on. It's obvious that the days of

Kraut retreating are over - this is part of a thoroughly organized,well-planned defensive line, with plenty. of fanatical SS troops andloads of eqUipment and ammunition to burn - not to speak of allthe advantages of position. We've tried to flank it, but haven't hadenough strength. So we're forced to slug straight ahead. The Battalion continues its heavy firing, and has been complimented by theDivision Artillery Commander for its speed, accuracy, and effectiveness. The enemy is losing a lot in prisoners and casualties, weknow. The Battalion has had great difficulty getting enough ammunition to continue our heavy firing. Seventh Army is just new beginningt.) get ammunition up to the vicinity of the fighting, and has at last

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started to establish dumps on this side of the Rhine. Meanwhile, ourSCI "ice Battery has had to k'eep our ammunition train on the roadalmost constantly for several days making 200 and 300 mile rounettrips to bring us the shells and powder to keep us in action,"

While the 100th was thus engaged at Heilbronn. the 63rd Divi-sion on the left was also meeting fanatical resistance north and north-west of Heilbronn. The 10th Armored which had been spearheadingthe VI Corps drive east of the Rhine was also having its troubles,especially in keeping the supply routes to its Task Forces open, butwas working toward making a wide sweeping movement to the south,some thirty to forty kilometers east of the Neckar, which would flankthe entire region in which Heilbronn is located. The French on theright had pushed forward to the west bank of the Neckar, south ofthe 100th, and considerably north of Stuttgart , but were not attempting to make any crossings, While progress was slow on every hand,Heilbronn was the principal focal point of resistance.

The following comments in the S-2 Bulletin add to the information already given concerning the battle for Heilbronn:

(Tuesday, April 10, 1945)"T h c S it u a t i 0 11 :

General Burress, in a memorandum to the men of the Divi-sion, has this to say: ,The 100th Division is now engaged inwhat is probably the severest fighting on the Western Front. Afanatical enemy is doing everything in his means to hold thepivotal posit ion around Heilbronn, The fighting is some of thetoughest yet experienced by the Division, but the courageous andintell igent manner in which the fight is being conducted, espe-

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dally by front-line units, makes it inevitable that the pressuremList surely crack the enemy before long. You are doing a finejob and a big job!'

"That's about the story. Men can work no harder than ourdoughs, inching forward, block by block; than our engineers,determined to keep a bridge across the Neckar come what may;no harder than our artillerymen, who are pumping out the greatestshell concentrations since Bitche. But the fact remains that Heilbronn is a perfect spot to defend, and that the Krauts have ordersto defend it to the end.

"Yesterday was a quiet day, if hell can be described as quiet.The ]erries destroyed the third ponton bridge into Heilbronn,and determined Yank engineers, under cover of a dense smokescreen, went right back to work constructing a fourth. Insidethe towIl, the infantry enlarged their positions a bit, while American artillery lancled on everything that moved. But still Krautmachine gun fire clipped through the empty streets at every boywho stuck his nose out, and still rounds from cleverly concealedKraut arti

Documents

WWII 373rd Field Artillery Battalion