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‘Me Tarzan – You Jane’: The EU andNATO and the Reversal of RolesTrine Flockhart aa Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark
Available online: 27 Sep 2011
To cite this article: Trine Flockhart (2011): ‘Me Tarzan – You Jane’: The EU and NATO and theReversal of Roles, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12:3, 263-282
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‘Me Tarzan – You Jane’: The EU andNATO and the Reversal of Roles
TRINE FLOCKHARTDanish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark
ABSTRACT This article questions assumptions characterizing NATO as focused on ‘hardsecurity’ and the EU as focused on ‘soft security’. By asking how identities and narratives havebeen constructed in both organizations, subtle differences are brought to light, indicating thatchanges have taken place in the self-conception and narrative of the two organizations resulting indifferent conceptions of role and identity. It is suggested that identity and narrative constructionsare influenced by practical action and that the EU under ESDP has experienced positive action,leaving it in a stronger position than NATO on questions of ‘hard security’. The analysis utilizesrecent empirical evidence in which the EU and NATO are often compared in terms ofpartnerships and operations. The article shows that in the first decade of the twenty-first century,the EU has been constructing a ‘Tarzan’ narrative, whereas NATO’s negative experience inAfghanistan has driven the organization towards a narrative of avoiding failure, emphasizing a‘Jane’ narrative about partnerships. The pattern may however now be in the process of changing,as evidenced by NATO’s robust intervention in Libya, and the EU’s preoccupation withestablishing the new External Action Service and with the Euro-crisis.
KEY WORDS: European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European security
Multilateral Interventionism
The EU is often described as an economic giant or as a ‘normative’ (Manners, 2002)or ‘ethical’ (Aggestam, 2008) power, whereas NATO is seen as a defence alliance or‘military power’, suggesting that the EU has a soft and feminine ‘Jane role’ whereasNATO has a hard and masculine ‘Tarzan role’. Although this role division betweenthe two European organizations may at first sight seem compelling, and certainly inline with Robert Kagan’s characterization as Europe being from Venus and Americafrom Mars (Kagan, 2003), in reality both organizations have always been engagedsimultaneously in ‘soft’ norm promotion and have shared a concern for ‘hard’security issues, suggesting that the reality of role division between NATO and EUhas not fitted comfortably within the Tarzan and Jane role division – or indeed, overa longer time span, with the Mars and Venus distinction. Paradoxically, at times
Correspondence Address: Trine Flockhart. Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies,
Strandgade, 56, 1401, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Email: [email protected]
Perspectives on European Politics and SocietyVol. 12, No. 3, 263–282, September 2011
ISSN 1570-5854 Print/1568-0258 Online � 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandfonline.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2011.596306
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NATO, the presumed ‘Tarzan organization’, has itself emphasized female attributessuch as norms, values and partnerships, whilst male attributes such as militarymissions have been emphasized in the role conception of the EU under the EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP).
In this article I question longstanding assumptions that characterize NATO as atraditional defence alliance and the EU as only a ‘wanna be’ security actor. I open upa conceptual study of the two organizations by investigating the many similar andclosely related processes of identity and narrative construction taking place withinthe two organizations and their subtly shifting emphasis, which I argue are deeplyinfluenced by the two organizations’ different practical experiences. I suggest thatidentity and narrative constructions may be either reinforced or undermined by theexperience of practical action. Changes in action patterns – especially from successfulreinforcing action to unsuccessful undermining action – are likely to result in abruptchanges in narrative and identity constructions, which in the case of the twoorganizations are manifested as shifting emphases between the Tarzan and Jane role.The analysis utilizes both historical and contemporary evidence of such action in thetwo organizations, drawing in particular on recent empirical evidence from the twoorganizations’ enlargements and partnership programmes and on action through theengagement by both organizations in a growing number of operations.1
The article is divided into four main sections starting with a brief review of identityand narrative theory and their connection with action.2 Following this, the articlewill focus on NATO’s and the EU’s identity and narrative constructions in ahistorical perspective in which the connections between constructions of ‘self’, ‘other’and ‘significant we’, and the formulation of narratives, are traced in three differentperiods defined by critical moments in the two organization’s history.3 Theinvestigation reveals that narratives and identity constructions have been con-tinuously shifting from the very start of the two organizations. The analysis isdivided into the period before 1989, the period between 1989 and 1999, and finallythe period between 1999 and 2009.4 Each section will focus on how narratives andidentity constructions in combination with different action patterns have defined thetwo organizations differently despite their similar structural conditions and similarinfluence from the external environment.
Narrative, Identity and Action
In order to understand why subtle changes in NATO’s and the EU’s role conceptionshave taken place (Harnisch et al., 2011), and why two organizations within a similarstructural environment choose different options which over time will lead them onwidely diverging paths, it is necessary to consider the identity and narrative con-struction processes of each organization. For analytical purposes it is assumed thatNATO and the EU are endowed with agency and that they have identities whichchange through re-construction and re-constitution as a result of a variety ofrelational processes.5 This opens up analytical space at the agent level, in particularfor the use of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Hogg & Abrams,1988; Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1985) and its agent-level assumption aboutesteem maximization and continuous self- and other categorization processes(Flockhart, 2006). SIT has proven useful through extensive controlled empirical
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testing (Tajfel, 1978), suggesting that individuals always engage in self- and othercategorization processes between different social groupings with the aim ofmaximizing self-esteem. Although the so-called self-esteem hypothesis has only beentested in small groupings of individuals (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), interviewsconducted in NATO and the EU suggest that esteem maximization does take placeand that it is of central importance for the selection of material for the construction ofpositive narratives.6
SIT assumes that self-esteem cannot be maintained in isolation, but is derivedfrom, and maintained through, social relationships in hierarchically organized socialgroups (Turner, 1987, p. 1) that have clear definitions of ‘other’ and ‘significant we’(Flockhart, 2006, p. 94). Social constructivist thinking has tended to focus mostly onthe ‘other’ (Neumann, 1999), although arguably, if esteem maximization is thedriving force for agents, a focus on the ‘significant we’ would be more appropriate.In order to enhance and maintain self-esteem, all social groups need to have storiesor narratives about themselves which cast the social group in an attractive light andwhich ensure a degree of internal stability and biographical continuity (Maines et al.,1983, p. 167, 363; Williams & Neumann, 2000).
Narratives are reflexively created and do not constitute a complete catalogue ofhistorical events, but form a series of sequential happenings and developments carefullyselected from a much larger catalogue of past events (Ezzy, 1998). A narrative istherefore a construction, containing a selective historical memory coupled with a highlyreflective and agent-specific interpretation of history, events and past action. Strongnarratives are seen as an account of reality, which contributes towards stabilizing theidentity established through sociological processes of identity construction. Narrativesand identities are continuously reinterpreted and realigned against each other in aprocess of ‘shuttling’ back and forth between ongoing narrative and identity con-struction processes (Ciuta, 2002, p. 38) in an attempt to achieve alignment at a level thatproduces the most positive ‘story’ and the highest level of self-esteem possible.However, if a positive narrative cannot be established, or if competing or divergingnarratives co-exist, then the likely result is to undermine and weaken self-esteem and togive rise to an identity crisis and the deployment of a ‘crisis narrative’ (Hay, 1999).
The assumption put forward here is that identity and narrative constructionprocesses have to be reinforced through routine (non-reflexive) practices andthrough successful (reflexive/intentional) action, which may strengthen and maintainboth a positive and meaning-giving narrative and positive self-esteem.7 In contrast,negative or unsuccessful action is likely to have an undermining effect on bothidentity and narrative constructions by reducing the level of self-esteem and bypreventing the formulation of a positive narrative. This may in the first instance leadto a reduced level of action and subsequently to alternative action patterns that canbetter facilitate a positive narrative and a high level of self-esteem.8 It is this reactionto undermining practical action which explains the oscillating nature of narrativeand identity in both organizations.
NATO and the EU during the Cold War – Two Ships in the Same Pond
NATO and the EU9 share a common heritage as products of the postwar order andthe ‘transatlantic bargain’ (Ikenberry, 2011). This might lead us to expect a great
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deal of similarity and cooperation between the two organizations. Yet, as mostNATO and EU observers are aware and notwithstanding the difficulties in the EU–NATO relationship associated with Turkish, Greek and Cypriot disagreements, thetwo organizations are characterized by considerable differences and have followedalmost completely separate paths throughout their history. The differences betweenthem are perhaps not so surprising given that the institutional order from whichNATO and the EU originate can be conceptualized as an expression of two parallelstrategies for postwar order – the strategy of containment and the strategy ofinstitution building leading to a liberal order (Ikenberry, 2001). NATO has from thevery beginning largely been located within the containment order framework, whilstthe EU has been located within the institutional order framework. As a result, thetwo organizations have had very little interaction and have been characterized byvery different identity and narrative construction processes (Fierke & Wiener, 2001)and very different patterns of action.
NATO and the EU have had subtly different conceptions of ‘significant we’ and‘other’ because although both postwar strategies hailed from the United States, eachstrategy was based on a different ‘other’ and a different ‘significant we’. The ‘strategyof containment’ conceptualized the ‘other’ as a material ‘other’ (in the shape of theSoviet Union and the very concrete threat of nuclear war), whilst the ‘significant we’was conceptualized as ‘the free world’ (albeit that ‘the free world’ was a sufficientlyloose configuration to allow for the inclusion of not particularly liberal states such asPortugal, Turkey and Greece). The strategy of liberal order, on the other hand, wasbased on an ideational ‘other’, conceptualized as Europe’s own warring past (Wæver,1998) and the rather vague threat of the danger of a return to Great Power rivalry inEurope. In the ‘liberal order strategy’ the ‘significant we’ was conceptualized as acommunity of states based on liberal ideas and liberal institutions in which conflictwould be resolved peacefully and where liberal ideals such as ‘cooperation’, ‘rule oflaw’ and ‘free trade’ were highlighted (Wæver, 2002). Over time, the ‘significant we’of the ‘liberal order strategy’ became conceptualized as a ‘security community’(Deutsch, 1957; Adler & Barnett, 1998), and the liberal ideals became increasinglydominant and specified.
With different conceptualizations of ‘other’ and ‘significant we’, the conception of‘self’ in the two organizations has also differed considerably. Throughout the historyof both organizations, the construction of the ‘self’ has taken place through internalsocialization processes and in negotiations between the Member States (Diez, 2005).Although both the process and the dominant actors have been different in the twoorganizations, they have in common that the most powerful members have had themost influence – albeit in different ways. In the case of NATO, the role of the UnitedStates as primus inter pares allowed the United States to become NATO’s agendasetter and internal socialization agent, though within the constraints of NATO’sconsensus-based decision-making procedures. The EU in contrast does not have aprimus inter pares although some voices are more audible than others.10 As a result,the construction of the ‘self’ has taken place through more equal negotiations andhard bargaining, including political pressure and at times the disruption of normalinternal procedures.11 In addition, the construction of the ‘self’ has been much moreambiguous than in NATO, because different conceptions of the European finalitehave been in play causing fundamental disagreement among the Member States
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about which direction the EU should be taking; this is a disagreement that arguablyhas never been resolved.
During the cold war the self-conception of NATO was primarily based on theconcrete and menacing Soviet ‘other’ and the perception of an overwhelming Sovietthreat (Sjursen, 2004). As a result, NATO’s role at this time became very clearly thatof a defence alliance with the very specific task of ensuring that the containmentstrategy worked and that nuclear war was avoided. Virtually all action in NATO wasfocused on deterring the Soviet threat and ensuring alliance cohesion and thecredibility of the nuclear guarantee. However, in reality NATO has always beenabout more than simply containing the Soviet threat. This is clear from Article Twoof the North Atlantic Treaty which specifies that ‘the alliance will contribute towardpeaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutionsand by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which theseinstitutions are founded’ (NATO, 1949, art. 2). In effect, Article Two expresses acommitment to the institutional order strategy, although the dual commitmentcontained in the North Atlantic Treaty played almost no role in NATO’s action untilthe formulation of the Harmel Report in 1967 (NATO, 1967). As a result, during thecold war, the containment strategy formed the basis for the most dominant roleconception, and the raison d’etre of the Alliance, forging NATO’s cold war self-conception in the ‘Tarzan role’ of a defence alliance.
If NATO was seen primarily as a ‘Tarzan’ facing the Soviet nuclear threat, theEuropean Union was primarily viewed as a ‘Jane organization’, as it was increasinglyseen as an economic or civilian project (Duchene, 1973). The perception wasunderlined by the rapid economic integration of the late 1950s and 1960s, whichincreased self-esteem and created high expectations for further European economicintegration. At the same time, expectations for integration in defence and foreignpolicy were consistently downgraded following the rejection by the French NationalAssembly of the European Defence Community in 1954 along with the generallypoor record of the integration process in foreign policy and defence throughout thecold war (Gortemaker, 2009). The result has been a continuous crisis narrative aboutthe EU as a defence actor and its extremely low self-esteem in matters of defence andforeign policy, as well as an inability (until 2003 with the adoption of the EuropeanSecurity Strategy) to state precisely what the EU’s foreign and security policyidentity is (Mayer & Palmowski, 2004). Yet, just as NATO always included acommitment to the liberal institutional strategy, the first priority of the integrationproject was to ensure a peaceful Europe. The fact that the European integrationproject was originally conceived as a ‘project for peace’ and as part of the liberalinstitutional strategy was, however, not widely appreciated.
It is striking that, although both NATO and the EU included treaty-basedprovisions for roles that would be in line with the two strategies of the post-1945order, neither organization pursued this option during the cold war. Instead theyconcentrated on action which supported their identity constructed from the twoseparate postwar strategies. In the case of NATO, action was almost solely focusedon reinforcing the ‘Tarzan’ narrative of a cohesive defensive alliance based on sharedvalues, standing firm in the face of an overwhelming Soviet threat. In the case of theEU, action was almost solely concerned with reinforcing the narrative of the EU as adynamic economic community pursuing common policies in soft ‘Jane’ areas such as
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trade, commerce and agriculture. The issues of defence and foreign policy werecarefully avoided, as previous action in these policy areas had been unsuccessful andhad jeopardized the original EU narrative as a project designed to ‘make war notmerely unthinkable but materially impossible’.
With the end of the cold war, however, the primary focus on economic integrationin the EU and the exclusive focus on the Soviet Union in NATO could no longer bemaintained. Security and foreign policy abruptly came back into the Europeanintegration process and the institutional strategy was brought onto the NATOagenda.
1989–1999: A Golden Age for NATO and a Decade of Challenges for the EU
As the cold war was drawing to an end, the EU was in the midst of preparing itsmost ambitious integration project since the signing of the Rome Treaty: theintergovernmental conference on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The EUhad experienced rapid integration since the mid-1980s and had a positive narrativeabout ‘ever-closer union’. As the cold war drew to a close, the architects of EMUwere determined that the end of the cold war was not going to derail the integrationprocess, although the necessity of reopening the thorny issue of security, foreignpolicy and defence was acknowledged (Nugent, 1992). In addition, because it wasexpected that the EU would be the most obvious organization to deal with newrelationships and emerging issues in Central and Eastern Europe, a secondintergovernmental conference on political union was hastily added in June 1990.This resulted in the commitment in the Maastricht Treaty to political union,including the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) andmoves towards a common defence policy.
The situation for NATO following the end of the cold war was almost the exactopposite. The disappearance of the Soviet threat launched NATO into a deep crisisof identity and a realization that a new role had to be found if the Alliance was to‘stay in business’ (Shea, 2010). Perhaps the threat to NATO’s continued existenceconcentrated the mind, because NATO moved swiftly towards establishing a newconception of ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘significant we’. This was supported by a newnarrative of ‘stretching out the hand of friendship’ (NATO, 1990) to former enemiesin the East and by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in1991. At the same time, a new strategic concept was formulated which defined theemerging threat as political instability and ethnic unrest (NATO, 1991). This turnedout to be a very precise prediction and one which prepared NATO for a growing rolein the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.
The expectation that the end of the cold war could spell the end of NATO butbe good for the EU was therefore not vindicated. In fact, the reverse appeared tobe the case, as the Balkans crises turned out to be on the whole ‘good’ for NATO(Shea, 2010) and little short of disastrous for the EU. In addition, the growingpressures for enlargement of both organizations was seen in the EU as an irksomediversion from the ‘real’ project at hand – the further deepening of integration.NATO, in contrast, after some initial concerns, fully embraced the enlargementprocess and its growing partnership programmes as an important part of its newidentity.
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The Balkan Tragedies – Action through Operations
When the violent break-up of Yugoslavia brought practical security issues into theEuropean backyard, NATO had not yet made provision for ‘out of area’ action andwas therefore constitutionally constrained from involvement in the Balkan conflicts.The EU, on the other hand, was not bound by such area restrictions, and ‘sorting outthe Balkans’ was (naively) seen as a suitable task for the EU’s new Common Foreignand Security Policy. ‘This is the hour of Europe’, declared Jacques Poos, the foreignminister of Luxembourg, when Yugoslavia stood at the abyss in 1991, therebymaking the Yugoslavian tragedy a litmus test for the EU’s ability to evolve.Sadly, the immature institutional structures of the CFSP and the rather feeblediplomatic action by Brussels were woefully inadequate for solving Europe’s mosturgent crisis and failed dismally in preventing the death of around a quarter of amillion people.
Admittedly, it could be said that the Bosnian conflict occurred before thenecessary institutional structures and policies were in place (Jopp & Diedrichs, 2009),but the same excuse could not be used as the next Balkan tragedy loomed in Kosovosix years later. Despite the EU having had six years to implement its stated intentionof developing a European Security and Defence Policy, its development had barelymoved onto the drawing board since the intention was formulated in the MaastrichtTreaty. As a result, on the eve of the Kosovo conflict the EU had no operationalESDP and was utterly unable to play a role. The EU’s inability to prevent theunfolding human tragedy was an indictment on the organization’s performance as asecurity actor (Lucarelli, 2000), and turned the decade of the 1990s into one wherethe EU fell short in the operations it either undertook or was expected to undertakebut did not. This left the organization with an almost collapsed narrative and aseverely damaged self-conception as a legitimate and efficient defence and securityactor.
In stark contrast, the Balkans conflicts were on the whole positive for NATOand were essential for the construction of a new narrative for the organization andits on-going identity construction processes for the post-cold war era. The problemfor NATO in both Bosnia and Kosovo was not military capability, but rather thepolitically tricky issue of going ‘out of area’. When the Yugoslavian wars started inFebruary 1992, NATO action was confined to a symbolic and political role, butthis gradually became more action oriented as the Alliance became engaged in firsta monitoring role, then enforcement action, and finally in 1995 in the large-scaleaction of Operation Joint Endeavour in which the NATO Implementation Force(IFOR) was authorized to impose the military aspects of the Dayton Peaceagreement. This major step was followed in 1996 with Operation Joint Guard(Stabilization Force – SFOR) with a UN mandate to maintain the peace in Bosnia.NATO’s role in Bosnia provided the Alliance with the first out of area experienceand was effectively also the first time NATO was engaged in sustained action of anoperational nature (Flockhart & Kristensen, 2008). Notwithstanding the tragedy ofthe situation, the experience therefore was positive for NATO and contributedsignificantly to boosting NATO’s self-esteem by not only having proved thatNATO could agree to go ‘out of area rather than out of business’ but thatNATO’s military pressure in the lead-up to the Dayton Peace agreement had
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contributed to the negotiated end to hostilities. By the mid-1990s NATO hadturned the tide from being an organization whose days might have been numbered,to being regarded as the most dynamic and successful of the competing Europeansecurity organizations.
When the tragedy in Kosovo started to unfold in 1999, NATO agreed to engage inthe action to stop ethnic cleansing. However, despite the significance of the decisionand the overall success of the mission, the experience this time was not completelypositive as the implementation of Operation Allied Force gave rise to considerabletransatlantic disagreement and mutual recriminations. The trouble started when theClinton Administration categorically ruled out the option of committing troops onthe ground in Kosovo, which faced the Europeans with the unwelcome fait accomplithat the intervention would be executed from safe air distance alone (Reichard, 2006,p. 55). The experience led to a rift in the Alliance, where the Europeans saw theirpreference for committing troops on the ground to drive out the Serbs from Kosovooverruled, and where the Americans were irritated by the slow pace of decisions andthe perceived technological weaknesses in the conduct of the air campaign.Ironically, therefore, despite the success of having taken the decision to go out ofarea, and despite having achieved the strategic objective of ending ethnic cleansingand removing Serbian forces from Kosovo, NATO nevertheless emerged with adamaged self-perception of its ability to perform in pursuit of its long-establishedvalues applying agreed procedures.
The experience of action in NATO’s operations during the 1990s was therefore amixed one, containing both positive and negative elements. However, as the negativeaspects of the Kosovo conflict were mainly internal and related to specificoperational issues, NATO was still able to construct a public narrative thatemphasized the success of the mission, the importance of the decision to go out ofarea, and the overall importance of NATO as a security actor able to deal with newand emerging security issues. Operationally, therefore, NATO at the end of the 1990swas in a far stronger position than the EU and had established a strong narrativeand a positive self-perception. Indeed NATO was perceived to live up to itstraditional ‘Tarzan role’.
Towards New Relationships – Action through Enlargement and PartnershipProgrammes
If the 1990s were years of human tragedy in the former Yugoslavia, it was also adecade of new friendships and the (re-)establishment of relationships between formerfoes. Both organizations entered into increasingly structured processes for managingtheir new relationships in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and theMaghreb, and both organizations acknowledged early on, if somewhat reluctantly,that existing institutional relationships had to be expanded to include all of Europeand its immediate neighbours. Yet the problem for both organizations was that theywere faced with the task of defining their new relationships in the absence of adistinct and material ‘other’ and with no logical or material borders for defining the‘self’. Precisely what constituted ‘Europe’ was by no means clear. Ideas and valuesrelating to freedom, democracy, a market economy and the rule of law were nowshared by those who were not part of the two organizations, hence making it difficult
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to delimit the ‘self’ based purely on values such as support for liberal democracy.Therefore, as demands for membership and association with both organizationsincreased, the EU and NATO had to consider much more carefully theirmembership criteria, and had to be much more precise in defining their own role.Increasingly, therefore, the definition of the ‘self’ had to include more detail thanvague references to liberal values and democratic ideals. Prospective members had todo more than simply confirm rhetorically their support for liberal values. Theprocess led to a gigantic project of state socialization in which NATO and the EUboth took on a more ‘Jane-oriented’ role by becoming promoters of norms andvalues. Both organizations undertook practical action by establishing institutionalstructures for socialization purposes (Linden, 2002) such as the North AtlanticCooperation Council – later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). Asimilar process took place in the EU where PHARE (Poland and HungaryAssistance for Restructuring Economies) and TACIS (Technical Assistance for theCIS) were established in 1991. There followed partnership agreements and pre-accession strategies in which applicant states drew up individual plans for fulfillingmembership criteria. In similar vein to NATO’s MD scheme, the EU also establishedthe Barcelona Process in 1995. By the middle of the 1990s therefore bothorganizations had established a highly institutionalized and comprehensiveenvironment for socialization (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006, p. 31) and were thereforeboth set to develop ‘Jane roles’.
Although both organizations seemed to take their new role as socialization agentsseriously and although both were deeply engaged in the action associated withpartnerships and preparation for enlargement, their experiences differed. In general,NATO increasingly defined itself in terms of its relationships and came to see itsenlargement process and partnership structures as a major success. They were acritical ingredient in its own identity, hence adding a ‘Jane role’ to the alreadyestablished ‘Tarzan role’. The EU, on the other hand, remained sceptical aboutenlargement, and some Member States expressed on occasion views that framed theprocess as a source of institutional weakening and a major problem for efficientdecision-making (Wessels & Traguth, 2009, p. 82). Curiously, despite the majoreffort involved in the cumbersome and extensive EU enlargement and partnershipprocesses, they have not influenced EU identity construction processes or itsnarrative to the same extent as in NATO. The EU’s process seemed to be driven by asense of unavoidable duty rather than genuine enthusiasm.12 Broadly speaking, theestablishment of a large number of partnerships and the first wave of NATO’senlargement in 1999 had a reinforcing effect on its narrative and identity.13 In theEU, in contrast, enlargement never achieved such unambiguous status as itcontinued to be seen by some Member States as deflecting from the establishednarrative of the EU on ‘ever-closer Union’ and carrying the risk of slowing down theintegration process. The debate during the 1990s between widening and deepening isindicative of the concerns present in the EU; perhaps ‘widening’ would be at the costof ‘deepening’ (Nugent, 1992). As a result, although enlargement was achieved, theprocess did not give rise to a positive narrative in the EU. Once again, therefore,the two Brussels-based organizations can be seen to have reacted differently to thesimilar structural changes and to have had very different action patterns.
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1999 and Beyond – Busy Times and Changing Fortunes
The period since 1999 is a curious example of how quickly and fundamentally theprocesses of narrative and identity construction can change under conditions ofrapid change and action. Since 1999 NATO and the EU have both been busier thanever as both have been involved in extensive action through the growing number andscope of operations and through their continued enlargement and partnershipprocesses. Yet where NATO largely fared well in the 1990s and the EU’s identity as adefence and security actor all but collapsed, the EU has performed something of aphoenix act by emerging from the ashes of Kosovo to establish a fully operationalESDP in 2003.14 The Union achieved what few thought possible – a relativelypositive narrative on defence and security and a new-found confidence in itself as asecurity actor. However, in precisely the same timeframe, NATO appeared to beedging towards self-destruction as the transatlantic crisis during the first term of theGeorge W. Bush Presidency seemed almost to bring the Alliance to its knees in anonslaught of multiple and deep crises (Cox, 2005; Pond, 2004).
Yet although the EU’s progress in establishing the ESDP/CSDP seems impressive,in reality, action in the EU since 1999 has been characterized by ‘big words and smalldeeds’, whereas NATO’s action in the same period has been the reverse: ‘big deedsand small words’. The effect on the two organizations has been a positive narrativeand positive self-perception in the EU and the opposite in NATO – even though thissituation might be misleading.
Big and Small Deeds – Action through Operations
The Kosovo conflict clearly served as a wake-up call for the EU and led to thedynamic development of the ESDP, initiated at the St Malo meeting between TonyBlair and Jacques Chirac in December 1998 (Jopp & Diedrichs, 2009, p. 102).Change was made possible because the British position shifted, facilitating anagreement on a declaration stating that the EU should acquire ‘the capacity forautonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to usethem, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’ (Britain,1998). At the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 (whilst the Kosovocrisis was at its peak), the EU restated the goal enunciated at St Malo. In this way, anew process of rapid and wide-ranging institutional development and military andcivilian capacity-building was set in motion. A parallel conceptual process wasstarted in the spring of 2003 (whilst the Iraq crisis was at its peak), which led to thesigning later the same year of the European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in aBetter World (Council of the European Union, 2003). As a result, the EU has had theconceptual framework and strategic document as well as the institutional structuresfor undertaking action in military and civilian operations since 2003, therebycompletely altering the profile of the EU in a positive direction and towards thecoveted ‘Tarzan role’.
Since the ESDP was declared operational in 2003, the EU has undertaken nofewer than 25 ESDP operations, of which seven have been military including the firstnaval venture (the anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean). Such a large number ofoperations in such a short timeframe certainly constitutes a considerable and
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unlikely achievement (Ojanen, 2006) for those who over the years have been scepticalthat integration in the field of defence was feasible or even possible (Haas, 1975;Hoffmann, 1966). Although most of the operations have been relatively small andlimited in scope and duration, undoubtedly a fundamental change has taken placeboth in terms of the EU’s self-perception and in expectations from outside the Union(Korski, 2010). This has been proudly embraced by the EU and well mediatedthrough the ESDP website.15 Indeed, the EU under High Representative Solanamissed no opportunity to draw attention to the number, geographical spread andvariety of the operations undertaken under ESDP auspices. Overall this hascontributed to an EU narrative presenting the EU as an energetic and dynamicorganization. The narrative emphasizes the EU as security actor with a distinctiveappeal based on its high level of political legitimacy, economic strength and uniquemix of available means across military, civilian and economic spheres (despite thefact that the EU still does not live up to many of its own expectations and still hasconsiderable capability shortfalls) (Giegerich, 2008, p. 24).
Apart from emphasizing the large number of operations and their widegeographical spread, the EU has also managed to construct a narrative of successfrom relatively modest achievements. The reality behind the impressive number ofoperations is that about a third of them had fewer than 50 personnel and anotherthird fewer than 500 (DIIS, 2008). The biggest venture so far has been the Altheaoperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which started out with 7000 under the Berlin Plusagreement using NATO assets, but which was subsequently reduced to around 2000(DIIS, 2008). What in ESDP count as large and demanding operations such as themilitary presence in Chad (3700) or the two military operations undertaken in theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Artemis in 2003 with 1500 and EUFOR RDCongo in 2006 with around 2000) are relatively small operations in the broaderscheme of multilateral interventions(Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). This is clear fromcomparisons with the operations undertaken by NATO in Kosovo (around 17,500)and Afghanistan (around 150,000). The intention here is not in any way toundervalue the very important work undertaken by the EU under the auspices of theESDP. Even small operations can be politically very significant and can make adifference locally, and they undoubtedly constitute a major success for thedevelopment of the ESDP and for the EU as a security actor. What is interesting,however, is that in comparison to NATO, the EU seems able to get more credit forless, and in some cases even to claim success where success is far from evident. Forexample, few would characterize the construction of a state like Bosnia-Herzegovinaas a success, or the continuing desperate situation in DRC as much improved. Yetthe EU has been able to construct a narrative of positive achievement for itsoperations, and to claim to have made a difference. Because the EU claims success inits specific mission objectives, and not in solving the overall problem (in for exampleDRC) it has been able to construct a strong narrative and an identity as anincreasingly important security actor. Even in those operations where a claim ofsuccess is simply not possible (such as the police mission in Afghanistan – EUPOL)or where the Member States have been unable to reach agreement on action (such asdeployment of battle groups to the eastern part of DRC), responsibility for thesefailures is somehow not seen as lying with the EU as an institution. In all likelihoodan unsatisfactory outcome for the Afghanistan mission will be construed as NATO’s
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responsibility, and responsibility for the continued violence in DRC is likely to beplaced squarely with the UN. In other words, it seems that the many problemsencountered do not stick to the EU.
In contrast to the dynamic and positive developments in the EU, NATOexperienced possibly its worst crisis in the build-up to the Iraq War in 2003. In fact, itseems fair to say that NATO has been in a state of continuous crisis throughout mostof the first decade of the millennium, as the lingering questions about practicalcooperation in Kosovo led to a growing transatlantic disquiet and lack of confidencein the ability of the Alliance to perform the kind of practical tasks it had defined asits primary military role. This is an experience that has continued in Afghanistan,where intra-alliance cooperation has turned out to be more challenging thananticipated and where the foundational principle of shared values and equality ofrisk has not been translated into a willingness amongst the allies to share equally theburdens at the practical level. Although the crisis in NATO no longer is of theproportions of the first half of the decade, especially after the adoption of its newstrategic concept in November 2010, its failure to demonstrate concrete achieve-ments and progress in Afghanistan, and the continuously high level of casualties,constitutes negative action and this undermines NATO’s ability to maintain apositive narrative and an acceptable level of self-esteem. Therefore, where the EUappears to have been blessed with a non-stick ‘Teflon effect’ in the narrativeconstructed about its ESDP operations, NATO seems to be hampered with a mudsticks, ‘Velcro effect’.
In comparison to the EU, NATO has not been very good at playing the numbersgame in emphasizing every single operational endeavour ever undertaken, despite thefact that NATO has also been more busy than ever and has been engaged in severalsmaller operations (such as delivering aid in the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and inconnection with Hurricane Katrina, support to the African Union in Darfur,fighting terrorism in the Mediterranean, and fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden).Instead, NATO has concentrated on its two most major operations – the ISAFoperation in Afghanistan and the KFOR operation in Kosovo – and then, sinceMarch 2011, in Libya under Operation Unified Protector. All are substantial andchallenging military undertakings whose size and scope should validate NATO’sidentity. However, the reality is that it is difficult to focus on positive achievementsprecisely because the challenges are substantial, the capability shortfalls areconsiderable and the timeframe is long-term with a more demanding and ambitiousend-state than is the case in the more focused and time-limited ESDP operations.The problem for NATO is that long-term and complex action is bound to give rise todisagreements and raise operational problems which are likely to hamper theconstruction of a strong narrative and to have a negative impact on the self-perception of an alliance that started out framing Afghanistan as its practical litmustest.
Constructing a narrative of success is always difficult in a hostile operationalenvironment where ‘victory’ is elusive and problems and casualties are constantlymounting. In the case of NATO’s ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the possibility ofconstructing a positive narrative is further hampered by the perception that the alliesdo not share risks and burdens equally (Williams, 2009). To be fair, NATO doespoint to the successes in Afghanistan, but the high number of fatalities makes it
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impossible for successes such as improving women’s health and increasing thenumber of girls attending school to contribute to a narrative of success. Instead,NATO is stuck with actions that have an undermining effect on its self-perception,and which make it impossible to construct and maintain a positive narrative.Paradoxically, therefore, in the period between 1999 and 2009, the EU seems to havetaken on a ‘Tarzan role’, whilst NATO is having difficulty in living up to such a roledespite its major operations.
Enlargement Fatigue and the New Role of Partnerships – Action through Enlargementand Partnerships
The decade between 1999 and 2009 has not only been one of actual operations, buthas also embraced enlargement and the development of different forms ofpartnerships in both organizations. NATO started out in April 1999 with a ratherconservative round of enlargements, admitting only Poland, Hungary and the CzechRepublic. However, these tentative beginnings were soon followed with an explosionof further enlargement as both organizations undertook a ‘big bang’ expansion in2004. At this time the EU admitted ten new members and NATO seven. In 2007 theEU added Romania and Bulgaria, and NATO accepted Albania and Croatia as newmembers in 2009. Both organizations still have a few official candidates (for the EU:Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia and Turkey; and for NATO: Bosnia, Macedonia,Montenegro and Georgia).16 However, it seems fair to say that despite the successfulenlargements so far, both organizations are currently suffering from ‘enlargementfatigue’ and that they both recognize that all remaining prospective candidateswould enter the two organizations carrying considerable ‘baggage’ that is likely tomake their integration into either organization challenging.17 Further enlargement ofeither organization, with the partial exception of the Western Balkans (Tassinari,2010, p. 288) and possibly Iceland, is therefore not likely in the foreseeable future.Instead both organizations have engaged in a significant rethinking of the role ofdifferent forms of partnerships. The main difference from the previous period is thatwhere partnerships during the 1990s were seen as an integral part of the enlargementprocess and as a necessary first step towards membership, the status of partner hasnow been separated from questions of membership in both organizations. Althoughboth organizations thus have followed similar paths since 1999, there arenevertheless subtle differences between their partnership programmes.
The EU approach to enlargement was always pragmatic in response to a politicalsituation that made enlargement at some stage unavoidable. However, despite thissomewhat reluctant approach to enlargement, the EU has realized the potential forinfluence through various forms of socialization. At the same time, the increase inillegal migration, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime has underlinedthe importance of improved legal and governmental structures in the neighbourhoodcountries of the EU. Therefore, although the EU at times seems reluctant to engagewith further questions about enlargement – especially vis-a-vis the troubledmembership application from Turkey, it has adopted a much more positive attitudeto developing partnerships with countries on a case-by-case basis (Tassinari, 2010,p. 293). Even before the ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004, the EU was working on howto develop the existing Barcelona process into a more all-encompassing European
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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (EU, 2006). In a communication from theCommission in 2003, it was argued that the EU should aim to develop a zone ofprosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – ‘a ring of friends’ – with which the EUcould enjoy close, peaceful and cooperative relations, and partnership countries inreturn would benefit from closer economic integration with the EU (EU, 2003, p. 4).The ENP was adopted in 2005 and provides the main policy instrument for bilateralrelations between the EU and partner countries. The policy has subsequently beenrefined by developing geographically specific partnership forums such as the EasternPartnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Synergy, each ofwhich concentrate on problems and issues specific to their regions (Tassinari, 2010).
In contrast to the geographical approach to partnership developed by the EU,NATO has followed a much more pragmatic and ad hoc approach to partnerships,based on the concerns and interpretations of the day and the constellation of theinternational security environment of the time. Perhaps because of the crisis in thetransatlantic relationship caused by the Iraq War which coincided with the 2004enlargements, NATO did not revise its Partnership for Peace programme in the sameway that the EU did its structures. Although it is doubtful that a neat fix between theunderlying logic of security concerns and the institutional set-up of NATO’spartnerships will ever be achieved, the current partnership structure in NATO israther messy and in need of up-dating. This was recognized in the recently adoptedStrategic Concept (NATO, 2010). For example, Belarus and Sweden are bothpartner countries despite their obvious differences. At the same time Egypt, Jordanand Morocco, so-called ‘Dialogue Countries’, 18 have contributed to NATOoperations, taking their relationship well beyond just ‘dialogue’. Finally, countriessuch as Australia participate in NATO operations along similar lines to Sweden, butneither country has an institutional forum in which to meet and they have noinfluence on decision-making in relation to the very demanding NATO operations towhich they contribute.
NATO’s pragmatic approach to partnerships has been influenced by anunderstanding that core NATO countries (those with full membership) have tooperate in an environment where networks and partnerships with other actors in theinternational system is a necessary policy instrument for both operational reasons(being able to respond to a multitude of threats) and for preventive reasons(developing positive relationships and/or contributing to regional stability andinternal stability within weak state structures) (Flockhart & Kristensen, 2008).Within this strategy it is possible analytically – and even polemically – to distinguishbetween relationships with countries that ‘can/may become like us’, ‘cannot/will notbecome like us’ and ‘are like us, but have no interest in membership’. Yet, asindicated, this distinction is not currently reflected in NATO’s institutional structurefor partnerships. The current rather ambitious but nevertheless pragmatic goal forthe Alliance seems to be to develop partnerships in new ways, emphasizing what theSecretary General has called ‘global connectivity’. The aim is for the Alliance tobecome the hub for a network of security partnerships with a wide range ofinternational actors such as emerging powers, other international organizations andNGOs (Rasmussen, 2010).
Enlargement and the development of relationships with non-member countriesrepresent significant areas of practical action in both organizations and have had a
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significant impact on their narrative and identity construction processes. Overallthese have represented positive action in both organizations, contributing towardsmaintaining or increasing self-esteem and a positive narrative. Yet curiously,although the EU process towards establishing the ENP has been the most goal-oriented and, arguably, the most logical process, it seems that partnerships haveplayed a bigger role in the NATO narrative than in the EU narrative. It must beacknowledged, however, that both organizations seem to suffer from a generalenlargement fatigue and both have tended to shy away from some of the moreuncomfortable enlargement questions. Also, many NATO partner countries –whether European based or ‘partners across the globe’ such as Australia, havecontributed positively to the Alliance’s on-going mission in Afghanistan, which hasmade it imperative for NATO to reiterate the positive contributions to itsoperations. Furthermore, several officials have acknowledged that in the midst ofcontinuing failure to live up to expectations in Afghanistan, NATO’s partnershipsrepresent a welcome positive story that the Alliance has been quick to exploit. Itseems therefore logical that the EU has tended not to emphasize its important workon the ENP but to concentrate on its operations, whereas NATO has tended toemphasize its many partnerships and the positive contribution made by a variety ofpartners to NATO’s military operations. As a result, NATO can be said to havefollowed a more feminine ‘Jane’ strategy by working on, and valuing, itsrelationships. The EU in contrast has concentrated mainly on the more masculine‘Tarzan role’ by emphasizing its many operations.
Provided that NATO can claim some success in Afghanistan (and in Libya),however, and provided that the EU begins to look more positively on itspartnerships through the ENP, both organizations have the potential to becomewhat Parag Khanna (2004) has termed a ‘metrosexual power’. According toKhanna, ‘metrosexual men are muscular but suave, confident yet image-conscious,assertive yet clearly in touch with their feminine sides’ (Khanna, 2004, p. 66).Although the logic of this article might be that NATO needs to become more ‘manly’by developing its ‘Tarzan role’, it may actually be that NATO needs to become morelike the EU by working on its style and presentation whilst holding on to itsmasculine role as a security actor, whilst the EU needs to get more in touch with itsfeminine side by appreciating and working harder on its relationships.
NATO and EU – Towards Metrosexual Power?
Historians know that it is not what happened that is important, but only what isremembered. The same is true for the construction of the narratives about practicalaction on the part of NATO and the EU. By comparing the two organizations on anumber of practical actions they have undertaken since 1999, it appears that the EUhas been far more successful than NATO in establishing a positive narrative aboutits practical achievements in civilian and military operations. This is despite the factthat NATO made a good start in the 1990s and that NATO’s actions are far moredemanding in terms of size, scope and complexity. Even so, it appears that the EU(at least until recently) has been very skilled in constructing a narrative of successand dynamism, whereas NATO’s narrative in the first decade of the twenty-firstcentury has been dominated by crisis. Although a closer analysis reveals that this is
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not necessarily a true picture, the impression in the two organizations’ externalenvironment is nevertheless influenced by constructed narratives, as is the behaviourand self-conception of the organizations themselves.
This article started out with the observation that NATO and the EU have bothalways been engaged in a combination of practical security activities and normsocialization activities. Moreover, both organizations have been through a constantdevelopment of their role conception and shifting perceptions of the ‘other’ and the‘significant we’. Given that both organizations have been influenced by the samestructural conditions and that both have shared the same overall liberal value set(and a growing overlap in membership), it is not surprising that many of theprocesses of development have followed similar patterns. However, a closer analysisreveals that there are also less obvious, but nevertheless significant differencesbetween the two. NATO has traditionally been conceptualized as primarily amilitary actor – or Tarzan – and the EU as primarily a soft and normative power – orJane. Yet evidently this distinction is no longer clear cut. It seems that NATO duringmost of the first decade of the twenty-first century has emphasized a ‘Jane’ roleconception as facilitator and norm promoter of shared values to partners andprospective members. The EU on the other hand has increasingly nurtured a ‘Tarzanrole’ which emphasizes a practical security role dealing with a number of threatsidentified in its security strategy. In some ways, therefore, it can be said that the twosecurity organizations have swapped roles.
The situation described in the two organizations is not static however, but seemsto be extremely sensitive to changes in the outcomes of practical action. It appearsthat change in the narrative and self-perception of the two organizations is onceagain afoot, where the EU since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, its change ofHigh Representative from Javier Solana to Catherine Ashton, and the frustratinglyslow process of getting the European External Action Service up and running hashad a dampening effect on the EU’s self-esteem and ability to maintain a positivenarrative. Certainly no new operations have been undertaken, despite the manyopportunities for doing so in the Middle East and elsewhere. At the same timeNATO seems to have moved on to a more positive narrative and self-perceptionsince the adoption of its Lisbon document – the new Strategic Concept. This ishighly demanding on practical action, in relation to both operations and partner-ships, which will certainly test NATO over the coming years. In fact, the challengecame quickly as the situation in Libya deteriorated rapidly, leading to the (eventual)agreement for NATO to be the lead organization for enforcing UN Security Councilresolution 1973. It remains to be seen if Libya will be a ‘Balkan experience’ or an‘Afghanistan experience’ for NATO. But given the high profile and the high stakesinvolved, it is certain that it will constitute either positive reinforcing action ornegative undermining action. Either way, the outcome is likely to have profoundeffects on NATO’s future narrative and identity constructions.
Both organizations have entered into a new stage as both Lisbon documents –NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the EU Lisbon Treaty – are bound to usher inanother wave of action, identity construction and narrative construction. As suchchange is once again imminent in both organizations. The analysis here, however,has shown that both would do well to choose their action carefully and to aim for thevia media of ‘metrosexual power’.
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Notes
1 Although gendered role perceptions of the two organizations are deployed by referring to Tarzan and
Jane, these labels are employed only as a heuristic shorthand to describe the diverging emphases of the
two organizations, and should not be considered an actual gendered analysis of NATO and the EU.2 The focus in this article is on action conceptualized in a Haas-inspired way as functional activities.
Although there clearly is a close connection with ‘practice’ in a Bordieuian sense, the intention here is
to focus on cooperation and action which is the result of conscious political decisions rather than on the
effect of largely pre-intentional social practices.3 This argument is developed further in Flockhart (2011b).4 2001 is normally regarded as the critical juncture in the international system. However, although the
attacks on Washington and New York were shocking and certainly have had an important effect on
both organizations, in terms of European (NATO and EU) self-conceptions and practical experience,
the conflict in Kosovo was a perhaps a more critical juncture. The main analysis here ends in 2009 as
the initial rejection of Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent difficulties in getting the European External
Action Service up and running and the change in the leadership of both organizations, and the
adoption of NATO’s new strategic concept all are developments which are likely to have significant
effects, but which are not clear yet.5 The endowment of agency to collective entities such as states or international organizations is of course
contested. See for example the forum in Review of International Studies (Wendt, 2004; Wight, 2004).6 This impression is based on interviews conducted by the author in NATO and EU during 2008 and
2009. Although the evidence from these conversations cannot be seen as ‘scientific proof’, all agreed
that considerations of esteem and how to construct positive ‘stories’ are always important con-
sideration in decision-making.7 This argument is developed further in Flockhart (2011a), Giddens (1991), Kinnvall (2006), and Mitzen
(2006), and is itself seen as a precondition for the ability of agents to undertaken intentional action.8 A more in-depth presentation of the relationship between narrative, identity and action/practice can be
found in Flockhart (2011a).9 The term EU is used as a synonym for the whole postwar European integration process regardless that
in institutional terms and in terms of Treaty base, several major changes have taken place since the
process started with the establishment of the ECSC.10 For bargaining processes in EU decision-making see Moravcsik (1998) and Putnam (1988).11 An illustration of such willingness to obstruct the whole integration process is for example the ‘empty
chair crisis’ during the 1960s.12 This is a view that has been expressed in several conversations with EU officials.13 The EU also enlarged in 1995 to include Sweden, Finland and Austria. Although the enlargement
clearly contributed to the difficulties associated with decision-making, the inclusion of Sweden, Finland
and Austria was uncomplicated in all other respects and cannot therefore be seen as part of the
socialization process.14 The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2009, after which the ESDP changed its name to
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).15 For the graphic illustration of all ESDP/CSDP operations see for example http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id¼268&lang¼EN.16 Georgia has not signed a Membership Action Plan and, following the issues in the wake of the August
2008 Russian–Georgian war, the prospect of Georgian NATO membership has somewhat declined.17 This view is not stated officially but is a very clear message conveyed by officials in less formal settings.18 For a more in-depth outline of NATO’s different relationships see Flockhart and Kristensen (2008).
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