ZIF Peace Operations 2025

8/13/2019 ZIF Peace Operations 2025

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PEACEOPERATIONS


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IMPRINT

Authors: Tobias von Gienanth, Wibke Hansen, Stefan Kppe

We would like to thank Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff for his comments on earlier drafts of thispublication and Dr. Anja Hanisch for her research assistance.

Peace Operations 2025 is part of the project Peace Operations Fit for the Future.We would like to thank the German Federal Foreign Office for its support.

ZIFs scenario process was facilitated by Z_punkt The Foresight Company. Z_punktis a leading strategy and foresight consultancy, operating internationally and focusing onstrategic future issues. They are experts in corporate foresight the translation of nd-ings derived from trend and future research into practical advice to assist with strategicmanagement.

Illustrations: Main Illustrations: Sebastian Haslauer | www.hasimachtsachen.com Additional lllustrations: Nina Juric | www.nindustrict.de

The illustrations are in part based on photos by Albert Gonzalez Farran,Marie Frechon, Mark Garten, Johann Hattingh, Christopher Herwig,Sophia Paris, Pernaca Sudhakaran (retrieved from UN Photo).

Production: Letters Are My Friends|www.lettersaremyfriends.comCD & Design: Nina Juric | www.nindustrict.de

Kirsti Maula | www.lufudesign.comPrint: Medialis, BerlinCopyright: Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin 2012Contact: Zentrum fr Internationale Friedenseinstze Ludwigkirchplatz 3-4, 10719 Berlin, Germany www.zif-berlin.org | [email protected]

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PEACEOPERATIONS


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P E A C E O P E R A T I O N S


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PREFACEThe world of peace operations has changed tremendously in recent decadesand will surely continue to do so in the future. Thats not exactly news. Buthow will it change? What will be the drivers and key factors, what will be thelandscape for change? What kinds of conict will we face and what concepts,instruments and resources will we have to face them? In other words: Howcould the peace operations world look in the year 2025?

To predict and inuence future events is one of mankinds most ancientactivities. Everything from celestial objects to tea leaves has been used in thepast. In lieu thereof, ZIF has applied modern scenario methodology with thesupport of Z_punkt, a German foresight company. Furthermore, this scenarioprocess has built on the contributions of an outstanding group of experts,practitioners and so-called wild cards, that is, non-insiders to peace operations.

We labeled our group the Futurologists of Peace Operations. FoPOs metin three interactive workshops on three continents, in Berlin, Addis Ababa,and New York. On this solid basis, ZIF has created four distinct scenarios forpeace operations in the year 2025: National Interests , Erratic Progress , Regional

Diversity , and Global Cooperation .Scenarios can be described as vivid pictures of the future, in this publication

presented as narratives, backcasting events and illustrations. They serve as atool to order our perceptions about alternative future environments. Dont beconcerned if the pictures on the following pages appear at rst sight somewhatover-vivid. Some aspects were deliberately exaggerated in order to portraypossible alternatives more sharply.

While scenarios are not about exact predictions, they can serve as the

foundation for strategic planning. They help us to develop specic measuresthat lead to desirable outcomes and avoid less desirable ones; or, to quotethe German futurist Matthias Horx: We cannot predict the future completely,but we can design organizations, mindsets, and systems to be more adaptableto evolution.


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With these scenarios we want to contribute to the conceptual evolution ofpeace operations. They will hopefully provide impulses for dialog among experts,practitioners and decision-makers. They should also help promote a changefrom the current, mostly reactive approach to crises and conicts in the worldto a more proactive or preventive one.

We would like you to use this publication as a living instrument: tear thescenarios from the fold-out book cover and pin them to a board in your office.Let them serve as a small reminder to change into a preventive mode to crises.The blank pages intentionally left at the end will be lled with recommendationson the operational relevance of the scenarios. Of course, you can add your ownconsiderations, too. We hope you will.

We would like to thank the German Federal Foreign Office for its generoussupport. Please enjoy reading and be inspired by our scenarios!

Dr. Almut Wieland-Karimi | Director, ZIF


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TABLE OFCONTENTS

Introduction .....................................................

Key Factors and Givens ...................................

Timeline ............................................................

Peace Operations 2025:Factors, Projections, Futures .............................

Scenario 1 | Erratic Progress .............................

Scenario 2 | National Interests ..........................

Scenario 3 | Regional Diversity ..........................

Scenario 4 | Global Cooperation ........................

So What? ..............................................................

From Shaping Factors to Scenarios ....................

Space for Comments and Thoughts ....................

Endnotes ................................................................

Participating Experts .............................................

Abbreviations .........................................................

4

5

6

9

17

27

37

47

57

61

66

69

70

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INTRODUCTIONWHY SCENARIOS?Scenario processes are a useful tool for a number of reasons particularly inhighly complex elds shaped by a multitude of factors, actors and interestssuch as international peace operations.

First, these processes can bring together experts with diverse backgroundsand from different disciplines in order to avoid groupthink and allow for newthinking and fresh approaches in a given eld. Emerging trends and develop-ments can be assessed from different angles leading to a more comprehensivepicture of possible future impacts.

Second, scenario processes help identify key factors likely to drive changein a given eld and make it possible to distinguish between those factors whosedevelopment can be inuenced and those that must be accepted as given. Theyhelp us think about which factors could truly change the game.

Third, while scenario development does not result in forecasts, it generatesibig pictures. Scenarios present both more and less desirable versions of thefuture and the pathways leading to them. They thus encourage thinking abouthow to promote preferred outcomes and avoid undesirable ones and can helpprepare for a large number of contingencies.

While scenarios do not come with policy recommendations as such, theyallow policy-makers to think about the future and their own options in a morestructured manner.

WHAT TO EXPECTIn this publication, ZIF presents the results of a process that brought together a

diverse and interdisciplinary group of experts in three workshops on three con-tinents over a period of 18 months. The publication is structured in four parts.

The rst part provides an overview of the factors seen as critical by theparticipants for the future of peace operations and of the ways these factorsmay develop in the next thirteen years. It also outlines the main features of fourpossible scenarios distilled from combinations of such key factor projections.

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5KEY FACTORS AND GIVENS National Interest versusGlobal InterdependenceState of the Global Economy

Economic and Political Power ShiftsNorms and Values Evolution of InternationalOrganizations

State Fragility Organized CrimeResource Scarcity

Migration, Refugees, Diasporas New TechnologiesNew Media

Private Security Companies Demographics Climate Change

The second part contains the full scenarios: Erratic Progress, National Inter- ests, Regional Diversity, and Global Cooperation . Each one portrays a differentstate of peace operations in 2025, and describes the path that has led to thisstate as well as events that have shaped it.

The third part of the publication offers some more thoughts on how the sce-narios might promote strategic thinking on peace operations. We have added afew questions that can help jumpstart a debate.

Finally, the scenario process and the underlying methodology are describedin more detail in the section From Shaping Factors to Scenarios.


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TIMELINE PEACEOPERATIONS 1 9

4 8 , r s t U

N p e a c

e o p e r a t i o n ( U

N T S O

, M i d d l e E a s t )

1 9 4 8 / 4

9 , r s t O

A S p e a c e o p e r a t i o n

( C o s t a R i c a / N i c a r a g u a )

1 9 5

6 , U

N E F I , r s t

a r m e d U N p e a c e o p e r a t i o n

1 9 6 0 , r s t m

u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l o p e r a t i o n

i n c l u d i n g p o l i c e o c e r s ( O

N U C , C o n g o )

1 9 6 1 , r s t A r a b L e a

g u e p e a c e o p e r a t i o n ( K u w a i t )

1 9 8 8 , U

N P e a c e k e e

p e r s a w a r d e d N o b e l P e a c e P r i z e

1 9 9 5 , r s t N

A T O p e

a c e o p e r a t i o n ( I F O

R , B i H ) ; S r e b r e n i c a m

a s s a c r e

2 0

0 0 , B r a h i m

i R e p o r t

2 0

0 3 , r s t E U

a n d r s t A U

p e a c e o p e r a t i o n ( E U

P M , B i H

; A M I B , B u r u n d i )

2 0

0 7 , n u m

b e r o f p e r s o n n e l i n

U N p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s t o p s 1 0 0 , 0 0 0

2 0

0 8 , r s t h y b r i d p

e a c e o p e r a t i o n ( U

N A M

I D , U N / A U

i n D a r f u r )

2 0

0 8 , n u m

b e r o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l i a n

p e r s o n n e l d e p l o y e d b y U N t o p s 5 , 0 0 0

2 0 1 6 , E U

O p e r a t i o n

i n G u i n e a - B i s s a u

( E U G I B

E l e c t r a )

2 0 1 7 , E U

b r e a k - u p

2 0

1 8 , c o l l a p s e o f f u n d i n g f o r U

N p e a c e o p e r a t i o n

s

2 0

1 9 , U

S - l e d c o a l i t i o n i n t e r v e n e s i n

H o n d u r a s

2 0 2 5 , C h i n a - I n d i a s t a n d - o

i n P e r s i a n

G u l f

2 0

2 4 , S u d a n - S o u t h S u d a n

w a r , a l l i a n c e o f I n d i a ,

K e n y a a n d U g a n d a i n t e r v e n e s

2 0

1 4 , U

N - m

a n d a t e d c o a l i t i o n

d e p l o y s i n S y r i a

2 0 1 8 , f o u n d a t i o n

o f P e a c e a n d

S t a b i l i t y I n i t i a t i v e ( P S I 2 6 )

2 0

1 9 , U

N - A U

M i s s i o n

f o r t h e K e n y a - S o m

a l i a

B o r d e r ( U N A M

I K E S )

2 0

2 2 , U

N - A S E A N

M i s s i o

n i n B u r m

a ( U N A S M

I B )

2 0

2 5 , A U

t a k e s o v e r U N M i s s i o n

t o

C a b i n d a ( U N M I C A

B - A M I C A B )

2 0 2 4 , f o u n d a t i o n

o f P a c i c S e c u r i t y

O r g a n i z a t i o n

( P A S O )

2 0 1 5 , e l e c t i o n s i n

t h e I s l a m

i c F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f S o m a l i a

2 0 1 6 , A U

M i s s i o n

t o t h e S a h e l ( A M

I S A H )

2 0 1 8 , f o u n d a t i o n

o f t h e U

N O

c e o f M

a r i t i m e S a f e t y ( O

M S )

2 0 2 1 , B e i j i n g C o n f e r e

n c e c r e a t e s g l o b a l p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s s y s t e m

2 0 2 3 , K o r e a n

R e u n i c a t i o n

2 0

2 2 , U

N 2 0 2 2 S u m

m i t

2 0 1 4 , U

S a n d E U r e f o

r m s s i g n a l s t a r t o f e c o n o m i c r e c o v e r y

2 0

1 6 , E C O W

A S a n d E U o p e r a

t i o n s i n M a l i ( M

I C E M A , E U

M I A r i a d n e )

2 0

1 8 , C h i n a - A S E A

N C o o p e r a

t i o n A g r e e m

e n t

2 0

1 9 , E a s t M

e d i t e r r a n e a n C r

i s i s

2 0

2 0 , C E L A C

a n n o u n c e s B o l i v a r D o c t r i n e

2 0

2 5 , c o n f r o n t a t i o n

o f A U a n

d A L i n L i b y a

2 0

2 3 , r e f o r m

o f C h a p t e r V I I I o f U

N C h a r t e r

2 0

1 5 , C S T O

i n t e r v e n t i o n i n

U z b e k i s t a n

National Interests

Erratic Progress

Regional Diversity

Global Cooperation

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PEACE OPERA-TIONS 2025:FACTORS, PROJECTIONS, FUTURES

One of the few continuities in peacekeeping is its ever-changing nature. In thatsense, the most daring scenario would probably be one in which things stay just the way they are. At the same time, fundamental changes in the interna-tional system rarely occur overnight though writing this in Berlin compels oneto add that sometimes indeed they do. However, many of the factors that willshape peace operations in the future are subject to long-term developments. Itthus seems fair to ask: How much change can we realistically expect by 2025?

At the time of writing, 2025 is less than thirteen years away in manyways a short time span. However, looking back at the past thirteen years inpeacekeeping gives an idea of the degree of change that can occur duringsuch a time period. In 1999, the UN launched its rst ever missions with abroad executive mandate in Kosovo and East Timor. This also marked thereal beginning of state-building as a part of peace operations. That same timeperiod saw the evolution of new norms such as the Responsibility to Protect(R2P), NATOs rst use of Article Five in response to 9/11, the deploymentof the rst EU mission, the rst AU mission, and the rst hybrid mission. UNpersonnel in peace operations for the rst time exceeded the 100,000 markand, with peacekeepers on the ground, three new states emerged during thisperiod: Kosovo, Timor-Leste and South Sudan.

Or look thirty years back at the period between 1982 and 1995, which

was marked by a number of far-reaching events: the fall of the Berlin Wall, theviolent break-up of the Balkans, the Rwandan genocide. It also saw the evolu-tion of traditional peacekeeping into multidimensional peace operations, thefounding of UN DPKO and the rst ever NATO operation.

These examples also provide a glimpse of the range of factors that haveshaped peace operations in the past: conict patterns, state fragility, and newsecurity challenges, the interest of inuential actors, missions successes and

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failures or emerging norms. In the Peace Operations 2025 project, partici-pants identied twelve key factors or variables that will in one way or the other in-uence the future of peace operations, in addition to two known, given factors.

For the two given factors, demographics and climate change , the direc-tion of future developments is fairly clear and much has been written elsewhereabout how these two megatrends are likely to unfold within the next decades.We know, for example, that the worlds population will continue to grow andwhile youth bulges will persist in some low-income countries, population gray-ing will become a challenge in most developed economies. We also know thatglobal temperatures will rise and that higher sea levels, extreme weather con-ditions, droughts, desertication and ooding are some of the consequencesassociated with global warming. While the consequences will be global, vulner-abilities and the capacity to cushion the ecological and economic impact ofglobal warming will be extremely unevenly spread.

For the twelve key factors identied by workshop participants, however, a num-ber of projections are plausible. The twelve factors are closely interrelated andthe impact of each one is never only one-dimensional. However, they can broadlybe categorized into those that primarily inuence the demand for peace opera-tions and those that are likely to shape the response to emerging crises andsecurity threats. In a nutshell, the twelve key factors relate to the why, who andhow of peace operations, and different combinations of projections producedistinctly different answers to these questions.

DRIVING THE DEMANDThe objective demand for peace operations will primarily be determined by theextent and nature of conict on one hand and the ability of states to handle politi-cal, economic and social pressures on the other. These factors will not only deter-mine the scale of the demand for peace operations. The need to respond to newchallenges could also considerably change the character of these operations.

The World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council on Population Growth identied 14 countries (450 millionpeople) in which high population growth is combinedwith water and other resource stresses. 1

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It is safe to assume that state fragility will still be a challenge in 2025.The 2011 World Development Report notes the link between state fragilityand violent conict: countries where government effectiveness, rule of law,and control of corruption are weak have a 3045% increased risk of civil war.According to the same report, violent conict and violent crime reinforce eachother in fragile states: 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeatedcycles of political and criminal violence.

Fragile and conict-affected states are particularly vulnerable to orga-nized crime . Organized criminal activities and illicit streams of goods andincome have an impact on human security, state stability and the prospectsfor post-conict recovery. Organized crime can sustain conict by providinga major funding source for politically motivated violent actors. Already today,organized crime is affecting the sustainability of peace operations efforts inthe Balkans, West Africa, Haiti and Afghanistan.

In future, more conicts might evolve around the competition for natural re-sources such as water and arable land as a growing world population, eco-

nomic progress, consumption patterns as well as climate change continueto fuel resource scarcity . Already today, 20% of the worlds population isexperiencing extreme water shortage. New technologies, innovative policiesand international regimes are required to ensure a more sustainable use ofresources that could counteract this trend.

The citizens of todays world are more mobile than ever and a range of factorsis fueling the global movement of people. For many states, managing the im-pact of population movements has become increasingly complex, particularlyin areas of perceived or de facto resource scarcity, economic hardship orwealth disparities. Take for example migration. With an estimated 214 million

In 2005, the European wholesale price for 2.9 grams ofcocaine was equal to Liberias annual per capita GDP. 2

In 2008, the South Korean investor Daewoo Logistics signed a 99-year lease covering nearly half ofMadagascars arable land. 3

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migrants worldwide (3% of the world population), global migration has reachedan unprecedented scale. Not only migration as such but also the social, politi-cal and economic roles of diasporas , well connected to their home countriesthrough advances in communication and travel, have the potential to inuencefuture conict patterns.

SHAPING THE SUPPLYWhile it is difficult to establish a hierarchy among the factors that will shapethe response to conict or supply of peace operations, there are some denitegame changers. One of the critical questions in this regard is how states willmanage the dichotomy of national interest versus global interdependence .National interest continues to shape states reactions to transnational challeng-es. Their prevalence frequently leads to highly fragmented global governancecapacities to address systemic risks and hampers the reform of internationalgovernance frameworks. At least three distinct reactions to rising global risksare thinkable: an embrace of existing forms of multilateralism, an emergenceof new regional frameworks, or a retreat from multilateral structures altogetheri in addition, a combination of the three is conceivable. In the rst case, theUN would most likely retain its central role within a modular approach drawingon partners. In the second case, regional organizations could take charge ofoperations within their areas. In the third case, bilateral initiatives or narrow,ad-hoc coalitions of the willing will likely be the primary actors. The preciseoutcome will both be determined by, and, in turn, determine the evolutionof international and regional organizations and whether they will have the

capacity to manage conicts and respond to transnational risks.Yet another game changer is the state of the global economy . In a climate

of economic prosperity, one long-term aspiration for peace operations couldbe fullled: the matching of mandates and resources. A global recession inturn would most certainly reduce the willingness and capacity of states to actglobally, to respond to crises and to resource global governance structures. Ashrinking resource base and changing spending priorities in member states

In 2009, diaspora remittances made up 35% ofTajikistans GDP. 4

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could produce missions impossible. At the same time, in the developingworld, growing economic inequality and price increases for basic commoditiescould fan pressure on fragile governments and cause unrest or crises and thusheighten the demand for peace operations.

In 2025, the geopolitical landscape will be different from today, however. Itis unclear what implications economic and political power shifts will havefor peace and security. Will new players integrate into existing multilateralstructures? If they do, how will these structures be affected? If they do not, willthey stay outside or create new structures? Pressure on existing multilateralframeworks to accommodate these new actors will most certainly grow. Powershifts could also bring new actors to the forefront of peacekeeping and withit new spheres of interest and new leverage, but also new principles and newways of doing business.

Aside from the hard realities of economic and political power, more intan-gible factors will also play a role. The presence or absence of a broadly sharedset of norms and values , for instance, will inuence the attitudes of societiestowards peace operations and thus shape both supply and demand. In anincreasingly connected, prosperous and optimistic world, the prospects formultilateral action are much better than in one dominated by ethnic, national,social or religious identities and zero-sum competition.

Greater awareness of global responsibility has also led to an increase ininorm entrepreneurs. Non-state actors such as lobby groups and foundationsare assuming increasing inuence through creative actions that shape publicopinion. In addition, the sheer nancial power of megafoundations makes thempotent players in the political, social and cultural realm. As a consequence,peace operations could be facing more support but also more scrutiny.

Finally, at the operational level, missions in 2025 could look very different fromtodays multilateral missions. Innovations in technology could change the faceof peace operations by opening up new options for monitoring and surveillance.

Together, grant payments by the Open Society

Foundations , the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundationand the Ford Foundation totaled the equivalent ofover 50% of the UN peacekeeping budget for 2010. 5

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However, peace operations might also need to protect themselves from risksposed by sophisticated technology in the hands of opposing parties. Imagine alean but technologically highly sophisticated peace operation generating head-lines such as peacekeepers checkmated by cyber attack.

Developments captured by the term new media could offer new oppor-tunities for early warning, public relations and political inclusion. At the sametime, as information travels faster, mission environments could become evenfaster-paced.

What role will Private Security Companies have in peace operations in 2025?A growing substitution of regular forces by PSCs, for example, will not comewithout implications for issues such as accountability and command and con-trol, but also for the legitimacy of such operations and for host nations consent.More broadly, it is unclear how the growth of private security would relate tothe issue of state power and authority.

FOUR POSSIBLE FUTURESCombinations of projections for these factors led us to four possible futures.

These four scenarios are briey summarized below and presented in full in thenext section. There, each one will be introduced by Grace Kimunya, a youngKenyan who started her career in the eld of peace operations in 2012. Sheis looking back from the viewpoint of the last day of 2025 at four distinctlydifferent pasts, the changes in her life reecting the changes in her area ofwork. It is also important to note that the scenarios are in no particular order,although the convention to end on a high note has been followed.

The charity Not on Our Watch provided funds forthe use of a commercial satellite to observe the borderbetween northern and southern Sudan ahead of the2011 referendum. 6

With more than 650,000 employees, the worlds largestprivate security provider G4S is one of the largestemployers listed on the London Stock Exchange. 7

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Erratic ProgressIn this scenario, things are kind of so-so in a familiar way. The stutteringengine of multilateralism is limping along through under-resourced initiativestowards poorly dened or unrealistic goals. New and powerful actors thatcould make a difference are still trying to nd their place in the internationalsystem and have not yet translated their economic clout into decisive politicalaction. A partial consensus on key norms and values is reected in informaland minilateralist club governance structures. However, the UN remains thecenterpiece of multilateralism. Peace operations are muddling through withoccasional successes and frequent setbacks. After various shifts in strategyhave failed to produce better results, there is not much appetite for investing inthe stabilization of failed states. Uneven economic growth has done nothing toreduce global income inequalities. This continues to fuel conict while keepingthe resources for international crisis management efforts scarce. The overalloutlook is not hopeless but somewhat messy.

National InterestsAs the global economy is hard hit by the worst recession since the 1930s, aninternational climate of growing isolationism and unilateralism leads to theend of multilateral peace operations as we know them. Objectively, there isa strong demand for peace operations as many of the more fragile states re-lapse into violent state failure. Conicts are also fanned by erce competitionfor natural resources and the unchecked spread of organized crime whichin some cases has resulted in state capture by criminal networks. However,nations focus on economic survival and internal security at the expense oftheir international footprint. In addition, the rising powers fail to rally aroundshared values and agreed goals. A permanently blocked Security Council isyet another symptom of a growing divergence on basic norms and values and

the prevalence of national interests. As a consequence, few operations aredeployed and blue helmets are largely a phenomenon of the past. Where statesdo intervene in a crisis, ad-hoc and narrow coalitions of the willing prevail usually not deploying their own boots but those of private security companies.

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Regional DiversityRegional organizations are clearly in charge including of peace operations.Transnational challenges from climate change to resource scarcity, organizedcrime, state fragility and violent conicts are increasing the need for function-ing global governance structures. However, after the rise of the rest and theidecline of the West, existing multilateral structures failed to accommodatethe new powers who in turn found ways to accommodate themselves largelythrough a network of regional organizations. As a consequence, the UN has lostits role as the major multilateral player in the area of peace operations and theSecurity Council is no longer the primary legitimizing body for such operations.While the regionalization of peace operations could have led to regional solu-tions for regional problems, key actors alternate between cooperation, com-petition or mere co-existence without much consideration for each other. Forpeace operations, this to and fro is frequently getting in the way of sustainablesuccesses. Fragile states remain a major challenge but state fragility fatiguelimits reliable support and stabilization initiatives.

Global CooperationThe golden age of global cooperation has nally arrived and the framework forpeace operations is one of well-endowed multilateralism. This is underpinnedby a broad global economic boom beneting established and rising powers andeven the least developed nations. With new actors on the stage, multilateralshave realized reform plans in order to better reect the new realities. Interna-tional and regional organizations across the board not only enjoy an adequatenancial base but are also backed by a broad consensus on values and normsdeveloped under the growing inuence of advocacy groups, civil society organi-zations, megafoundations and social media. Peace operations have changedconsiderably but the main driver of change is innovation rather than resignation.

As the number of conicts and fragile states decrease, so too does the demandfor peace operations. While fewer peace operations are deployed, those thatare in the eld are better resourced, benet from advanced technology and,crucially, take a longer perspective on conict resolution.

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M e s s yMultilateralism

Muddl ingT h r o u g h

U n e v e nE c o n o m i c

G r o w t h

R i s eo f Non-StateA c t o r s

I n f o r m a lCooperationMechanisms

OrganizedC r i m eM a j o r

Challenge

C o m p e t i t i o nf o r

R e s o u r c e s

N e wTechnologiesC h a l l e n g eP e a c eO p e r a t i o n s

S h a k yC o n s e n s u so n

N o r m s

S t a t eFragili tyF a t i g u eN e wM e d i aI n c r e a s eC o n f l i c t


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ERRATICPROGRESS

There was a big party at the Bangalore headquar-ters of the Sustainable Resilience Group on thislast day of 2025. I havent seen so many Indians thishappy at least not since it was announced that the2028 Olympics would go to Mumbai, Grace Kimu-nya told a co-worker. At rst she had been uneasyabout taking a job with a private security company.But her career prospects with the UN had lookeddim after all the big African operations were closed.It had seemed such a pity to leave with the job halfnished, but what could you do when some memberstates no longer believed all the money and effortwould bring results? Thankfully, there was still a de-mand for her expertise. SRG had just won the con-tract to provide satellite imagery and cybersecurityservices for the AU operation in Cabinda, meaningthat Grace would have to keep not only the AU hap-

py but also the Europeans. That would not be easy,but after all the ups and downs of the last thirteen

years, Grace felt ready for anything.


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Clearly, the international community has not found a comprehensive strategy,a grand design, to address the numerous challenges facing the world in 2025.But it is muddling through somehow. While this state of affairs is falling shortof the aspirations of some academics and think-tankers, it is better than whatmany doomsayers predicted. What everyone can agree on is that our worldhas become more complex, heterogeneous and multipolar. In combinationwith another obvious fact global interdependence through connectednessi this increased complexity places a huge strain on the international system.

On the one hand, there is a pressing need for more global governance inareas like nance, trade, energy, climate change, migration, and organizedcrime. None of these spheres can adequately be addressed separately or on anational, bilateral or even regional level. On the other hand, the internationalcommunity has been unable to gure out how to meet this challenge predict-ably and systematically. One factor more than any other is the source of thisimbalance between demand and supply: the rise of new powers, and their asyet unclear position within the international system.

In the economic sphere, the biggest of the new players have denitelyarrived at the top of the table. China and India have overtaken the GDP ofall other nations apart from the US and Japan. While Germany is still in fthposition, it will soon fall behind Brazil. At the same time, the glitter of the rising

powers economic booms hides an internal brittleness. Their societies are inthe historically unique position of being key economic players without havingachieved high per capita incomes. Social pressure is mounting as their grow-ing middle classes demand increased domestic spending on welfare systems,infrastructure and environmental protection. All struggle to nd their placein the international system, unsure of how to translate economic weight intopolitical inuence, and whether to challenge the existing order or to accom-modate themselves within it. While each national approach is unique, the

result is a bewildering mix of cooperation, detachment and confrontation.The most confusing case is China, where the Communist Party still clings

to power, even though civil society enjoys more political space and calls forgenuine political reform are growing louder. Fueled by its economic growth,the country is now a military power of the rst rank if still rmly behind theUS. Contrary to some fears, the Chinese leadership did not completely jet-tison its generally risk-averse foreign policy, but it did begin to ex its newly


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The new powers struggleto nd their place in theinternational system,unsure of how to trans-late economic weight

into political inuence,and whether to chal-lenge the existing or-der or to accommodatethemselves within it.

acquired muscles, both regionally and on occasion in more distant arenaswhen its core interests were at stake. And while this shift towards a more as-sertive China-rst policy enjoys much popular support at home it has madeother inuential actors decidedly nervous.

Some commentators see Chinas involvement in UNAMIKES (UN-AU Mis-sion for the Kenya-Somalia Border) a rst step along this road. In 2019, theperception of growing Kenyan meddling in the internal affairs of the precari-ously unied Somalia and the suppression of Kenyas own Somali minority ledto military clashes along the shared border. Prompted by the need to safe-guard its interests in the oil pipeline and terminal at the Kenyan port of Lamu,China acted. It provided a major part of the UN component of the hybrid mis-sion which also in-cluded an EU logis-tics support packagei tasked to stabilizethe situation. Today,the popular memoryof this operation is ofcourse dominated bythe devastatingly ac-

curate missile attackby a Somali militia onits headquarters thatkilled over 80 UN andAU personnel, includ-ing the Chinese gen-eral acting as UNforce commander.

The international sympathy for China generated by this tragedy quicklyevaporated, however, under the impact of what its neighbors saw as its in-creasingly aggressive posture in the resource-rich South China Sea. In fact,the loss of a Vietnamese corvette in the Paracel Group early last year triggeredone of the most remarkable political realignments in recent history. Mas-sive anti-Chinese protests following the loss of the vessel ultimately turnedVietnam towards confrontation with China. Its territorial dispute with the


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A shaky consensus thusstill holds about thecentral position of theUN within the interna-tional system, largelyfor want of a broadlyacceptable alternative.

Philippines was resolved bilaterally with US assistance and around this coreother nations feeling threatened by the growth of Chinese economic and mili-tary power formed the Pacic Security Organization. The PASO Charter con-nects the original trio with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, andMalaysia in a security framework modeled on NATO, including an equivalentof its famous Article Five. What the emergence of this iAnyone-but-China-Coalition will mean for the future of regional stability and global cooperationremains to be seen.

While their rise has not created the same level of tensions as Chinas,India and Brazil, and also Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia, have added increas-ingly stronger voices to the controversies over issues such as the rights andresponsibilities of national sovereignty, the legitimacy of the use of force,and the institutions of global governance. At the same time, however, theseactors have taken on responsibilities in peace operations under the umbrellaof the UN and regional organiza-tions, but only selectively, whenand where it suits their nationalpolicy priorities. India continuesto provide military assets, if at areduced level, with the shortfall

partly made up by the availabilityof Indonesian troops. Brazil has,with some assistance from Mexi-co, in effect taken over responsi-bility for the Western hemisphere,most prominently in Haiti.

A shaky consensus thus stillholds about the central position of the UN within the international system,

largely for want of a broadly acceptable alternative. While many of its struc-tures are seen as fundamentally awed, decisive reform has remained unat-tainable. As a result, some regional organizations have grown in importance.In addition, peace operations fatigue is widespread, particularly among theWestern powers that are still recovering from the economic turmoil of themid-2010s. Voters in many nations question the effectiveness of interna-tional state-building efforts, and nancial resources have dried up in a time of


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austerity. All suppliers of peace operations therefore now apply a more rigor-ous test of their national interests before making commitments.

As a result, the number of large, long-term, multi-dimensional operationswith a centralized command structure has been in decline for several years.The major African UN missions in the DRC, Darfur, and South Sudan have allbeen declared a success and closed down. There also exists a broad con-sensus on an alternative. In principle, the international organizations, theirmember states and external experts all support the creation a comprehen-sive framework for coalitions combining the local knowledge and legitimacy,peacekeeping experience, and assets of a number of organizations. This mod-ular structure would enable a mix of mission types ranging from heavy oneswith a dominant military component to lighter versions, such as specializedpolitical, monitoring, rule of law or logistics and mobility support missions.

While this common vision is certainly a step forward, the devil is still inthe details. Two key questions remain unanswered: rst, how to develop theorganizations internal capacities, and second, how to build strategic andworking-level partnerships between them. In spite of well over a decade ofdiscussions, there still is no agreement on a systematic division of labor or areliable formula for the allocation of funds, personnel and equipment. Thank-

fully, two recent developments have helped make the stuttering multilateralengine run a little more smoothly.

As so many other spheres of global governance, the eld of peace opera-tions now has its own informal mechanism for major power cooperation. Since2018, the Peace and Stability Initiative has provided a forum for minilateralism,bringing together the smallest possible number of actors needed to have thelargest possible impact, 8 in this case the P5, Japan, Germany, India, Brazil,


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As so many other spheresof global governance, theeld of peace operationsnow has its own informalmechanism for major

power cooperation.

and South Africa, as well as the UN, EU, AU, ASEAN, OAS, and AL. This groupi generally known as the PSI 26, after earlier examples like the G20 and theNuclear 25 has achieved some notable successes. It facilitated the ill-fatedUNAMIKES in 2019 and the rst, UN-led mission in Cabinda (UNMICAB) toseparate the Angolan and DRC forces the following year.

Its high point probably came in 2022, when the forum built a consensusfor what became the UN-ASEAN operation that supported the transition to de-mocracy in Burma (UNASMIB), one of the largest civilian missions on record.There was even talk of creating institutional structures for the PSI 26 in theform of a permanent secretariat, causing some discomfort at UN headquar-ters. But with the South China Sea crisis already spilling over into the SecurityCouncil, the brief honeymoon seems to be over. Just a few months ago, Chinavetoed the renewal of UNMICABs mandate, forcing the AU with some EUassistance into a rushed take-over of the operation, now renamed AMICAB.

A second source of supporthas been the growing engage-ment of non-state actors inpeace operations. Civil societyactivism, mobilized especiallyover new media platforms,

had of course been a factorfor some time. Then, majorinternational corporationsand charities joined the fray.Beginning in the late 2010s,car manufacturers from India,reinsurance giants from Germany, Russian oil tycoons, Swiss bankers, andUS purveyors of soft drinks and software have opened their hearts and their

pockets to the cause of post-conict stabilization. They have provided generalfunding for several operations and paid for satellite surveillance. But moreoften they have sponsored highly desirable, and highly visible, infrastructureand equipment such as vehicles, helicopters or even entire eld camps.

The various international organizations gladly accepted the offers but sooncame to see them as a mixed blessing as the new actors added a further levelof complexity to the already challenging task of coordinating the international


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presence in the eld. Particularly military officers longingly remember thedays when they only needed to guard their operational secrets from civilianmission staff, rather than the public relations departments of several interna-tional mega-corporations wishing to publicize their good works.

While PR offensives are in fact only a sideshow, cyber offensives are verymuch in the spotlight. Today, gaining information supremacy is as much akey objective for peace operations as it is for national militaries. Numerousstate and non-state actors have become so adept at asymmetric forms ofconict that most eld operations and organizational headquarters have inrecent years been the target of computer-borne attacks. The mother of themall was of course the virus that hit the EUs network during its engagement

Car manufacturers from India,reinsurance giants from Germany,

Russian oil tycoons, and US purveyorsof soft drinks and software opened

their hearts and their pockets to thecause of post-conict stabilization.


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in Syria in 2014. Mixing European components with elements provided byTurkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Russia, that mission was already an exerciseof nightmarish complexity. After the virus, chaos reigned in Brussels and theeld mission for over a week.

After this Damascus experience, the EU and the other organizationsrushed to create cyber capabilities. The demand was partly met by recruit-ing computer security experts into civilian expert pools, but these serviceswere mostly outsourced to private contractors, already a familiar presencein peace operations. Mostly, they have done their job well, but some expertsworry about their suitability for such a sensitive role and the general lack oftransparency and accountability enforced by a regulatory framework. Prob-ably the experts worry too much. Probably the rumors about the involvementof the chairman of a prominent private security company in shady businessdeals across the globe, including in some post-conict areas, are just that rumors. And the Indian company hired by the AU to provide satellite and cyberservices for its Cabinda operation enjoys a truly stellar reputation.

Numerous state and non-stateactors have become so adeptat asymmetric forms of conictthat most eld operations and

organizational headquarters havein recent years been the target of

computer-borne attacks.


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N A T I O N A L I N T E R E S T S


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N e wUnilateralism

EconomicC r i s i s

W e a k

InternationalOrganizations

S t a t e

F a i l u r e

N a r r o wCoali t ionso f t h eW i l l i n gC o m p e t i t i o nf o rR e s o u r c e s

O r g a n i z e dC r i m eo nt h eR i s e

N e wM e d i aF u e l

C o n f l i c t s

M a j o r R o l ef o r

P r i v a t eS e c u r i t yP r o v i d e r s

N e wT e c h n o l o g i e sC r i p p l eP e a c eO p e r a t i o n s


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NATIONALINTERESTS Grace Kimunya was bored and cold. Sure, heatwas frightfully expensive, and the Museum of Peace-keeping was probably not high on anyones list of pri-orities. But if that tired skeleton of a United Nationswanted to put on an exhibition on UN Peacekeep-ing 19482023: Seventy-ve Years of Success andmade her work on a New Years Eve to proofreadthe nal text of the tablet-brochure for the grandopening in early January 2026, they should payfor a heater. Not that her employer could afford to pay for much of anything anymore. But maybe the Americans, Chinese and Indians would nd a wayto sort out the latest Persian Gulf crisis, and maybeoil would drop again to below 300 dollars per bar-rel. Maybe. And maybe the big nations would startto take the UN seriously again and kindly ask their permission before intervening in a foreign crisis. Atleast, Sweden and Norway were footing the bill forthe exhibition. Grace tried not to feel bitter but this job was not what she had had in mind when she had joined the UN thirteen years ago, lled with so muchoptimism.


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One driver of conict isorganized crime oneof the few economic acti-vities that is ourishingtoday.

No one should have been surprised, the warning signs were everywhere. Afterpromising yet again that this time will be different, the nancial acrobats hadnally created one bubble too many. When it burst, their entire elegantly lever-aged building came crashing down. The rst few bank collapses looked contain-able, but werent. When the rst nations followed the banks into insolvency, aperfect storm developed that hit the global nancial system in late 2015. It wasnaturally followed by an economic meltdown that plunged the Western nationsinto the worst recession since the 1930s.

The political fallout was similar, too. As retrenchment and austerity rulenational policies, societies have drawn inwards. A deep sense of insecurity nowfavors an appeal to popular prejudices, xenophobia and religious zealotry. Thenew media fuel this resurgence of traditional identities based on nation, class,ethnicity or belief. Many of the exploding megacities experience violence againstmigrants or the enemies of God. International cooperation has become anincreasingly alien concept in the current political culture dominated by fear andzero-sum competition. Isolationism is on the rise and most nations reduce theirinternational footprint to focus on internal security and economic survival. Itis not a good time for peaceoperations. Their legitimacy

is eroded, not least becauseof the abject failures of globalgovernance structures in theface of the Syria and Congocrises between 2012 and2014. International politicalwill is in short supply, as arenancial resources.

An early indicator of this trend was the bill passed by the isolationist majorityin both houses of the US Congress in 2018 forbidding all future payments to theUN and other international organizations. A number of nations quickly followed,although with less fanfare. As a result, the UNs peacekeeping budget had to bedrastically cut, spelling the end of large, multi-dimensional missions. Hardesthit was the UN engagement in Africa. In quick succession, MONUSCO, UNMISS,iand UNAMID were closed or reduced to tiny political offices. By 2023, UN


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peacekeeping was effectively nished. Capacity building assistance to otherinternational organizations is, needless to say, also a thing of the past.

Not that the demand for peace operations has diminished. After twodecades of decline, the number and scope of violent conicts across theglobe is on the rise again. One driver of conict is organized crime one of thefew economic activities that is ourishing today. Of course, organized crimealways existed but the accelerating loss of legitimate economic alternativesand the weakening of state structures in recent years have given it a newlethality. The Guinea-Bissau disaster is a case in point.

After the ECOWAS presence had been withdrawn due to a lack of funds, in2016 a wave of violence between ethnically based drug gangs rst triggeredand then nanced a bloody ethnic conict. As the appalling pictures ofatrocities committed against the civilian population spread over the internet,public pressure began to build for international action. Divided and distractedby the nancial crisis, the EU at that point was still grudgingly prepared torespond. It quickly became clear, however, that the resulting EU Operation


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in Guinea-Bissau (EUGIB Electra) was poorly planned and under-resourced andthus unable to overcome the opposition it encountered. After suffering severecasualties in attacks by ethnic militias under the control of drug cartels, its 300soldiers were nally withdrawn as a result of the of the EUs internal upheavals.

The UK and Denmark had already left in 2015. The rest had limped alonguntil Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland successively followed Greece into eco-nomic chaos and were forced out of the euro zone starting in late 2017. Theremaining core EU, consisting of Germany, France, the Benelux states, the otherScandinavians, and Poland, decided to literally fence itself in. Over the com-ing years the Europeans have succeeded in raising the drawbridge even higher.While the Common Security and Defence Policy has officially been abolished,EU members now focus exclusively on territorial defense, internal security andborder control.

International stabilization missions have not disappeared completely,however. But most can hardly be described as multilateral. Powerful nationsstill take action when their strategic interests are at stake, yet nowadays theytypically do so unilaterally or within a short-term alliance. It comes as no sur-prise that the resulting operations are almost exclusively military in character.Long-term peace building has fallen out of fashion. When, for example, theimminent election of a presidential candidate with close ties to drug cartelsthreatened to turn Honduras into a narco-state in 2019, the US intervened. Theparticipation of Mexico and Guatemala provided a cloak of legitimacy.

As is now the norm, a major element of the operation consisted of person-nel provided by private secu-rity companies. While theseproved highly effective mili-tarily, civil society groupsalso documented several

instances of human rightsviolations committed by theicorporate warriors againstthe local population. Whenthese circulated on theinternet, the legitimacy ofinternational interventions

International coope-ration has become an

increasingly alienconcept in the current political culture domi-nated by fear andzero-sum competition.


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suffered a further set-back. To make thingsworse, soon after therapid withdrawal ofthe bulk of the forcerumors started to cir-culate that some PSCstaff had developeda lucrative businessrelationship with thecriminals they had ear-lier fought.

Another prominent driver of international conict in recent years has beenthe vicious competition for resources. The global recession has certainlydampened the growth of demand for energy and raw materials to a degree,but the state-led economies of the newly developed nations have weatheredthe global recession more successfully than Europe and North America. Infact, they are still expanding, if at a slower rate than before. In all of them,most clearly in undemocratic China, the governments legitimacy is based ontheir ability to improve the living conditions of their citizens. The search forcheap commodities from energy to minerals in order to fuel economic growthhas consequently become a centerpiece of their national strategies. The re-sulting resource nationalism has created some of the most combustibletrouble spots in todays world.

Although all major powers are joining the fray, Western commentatorslove to denounce China as the most notorious resource-grabber. No doubt,its navy now dominates the South China Sea, although the Vietnamese arepushing back, with Indian and US assistance. The confrontation between

the two Asian giants is more direct in the Persian Gulf, and has given rise tosome strange marriages of convenience. In order to safeguard their access tooil, they felt compelled to choose sides in the erce struggle for dominanceplaying out in the Middle East.

Due to common interests in reducing radical Sunni inuence in Southernand Central Asia, India supports a now nuclear-armed Iran. China is alignedwith the Caliphate of Arabia whose support of Pakistani and Afghan militants

Powerful nations stilltake action when theirstrategic interests areat stake, yet nowadaysthey typically do sounilaterally or withina short-term alliance.


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and attacks on its Shiite minority keep tensions with Iran and India at a boil-ing point. Thankfully, the US still guarantees a minimum level of stability thatkeeps the oil owing. In this situation, the EU is reduced to convening futilesummit meetings and the UN, with the Security Council blocked by Chineseand US vetoes, is simply irrelevant.

Resource competition has also aggravated the effects of a further sourceof instability in the form of environmental degradation caused by climate

change. While the use of nuclear energy has signicantly expanded, it isdwarfed by the massiveconsumption of carbon-based energy supplies inthe newly developed na-tions. As a result, emis-sions of greenhouse gaseshave risen dramatically

and global warming hasaccelerated. The chain ofevents we are currently witnessing was predicted decades ago, and whileit is certainly a nice touch that many of the scientists responsible for thepredictions have been awarded Nobel Prizes, this will do nothing to stop thedownward spiral: lack of water and food has become a reality for roughly twobillion people. At the same time, population pressure in youth bulge states

iResource nationalism hascreated some of the mostcombustible trouble spotsin todays world.


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has grown more acute. The political repercussions are obvious: the arc ofinstability has, at least in parts, turned into an arc of state failure.

Unsurprisingly, the continent worst hit by this man-made disaster hasbeen Africa. Some experts were optimistic that the income generated by therecent oil and gas boom in many African nations could be used to mitigate theeffects of climate change. However, this has only happened in those where theimprovements in governance achieved before 2012 have proved sustainable.In most, the new wealth has only beneted a tiny elite and thus sharpenedincome inequality and fueled ethnic strife. The reaction of the major powerswas sadly predictable: energy-hungry outsiders have been falling over them-selves to support any regime willing to grant them privileged access to localresources. After the expulsion of the Chinese, Brazil quickly locked downAngola in a transatlantic alliance of lusophone petroleum exporters. India hasbecome remarkably cosy with Nigeria and South Sudan. Not to be outdone,China formed an alliance with Kenya and Uganda.

Tensions had, of course, already existed between China and India in Africa,yet the realignment caused by the 2024 crisis added a new dimension to thesituation. In that year, open war erupted again between Sudan and South Su-dan. A severe drought on the Horn of Africa had led to widespread starvation,mass migrations and political protests that threatened to overpower the weak

governments in Khartoum and Juba. Both saw the best way to cling to power

in channeling popular unrest into a mobilization against the arch-enemy. Whenthe military campaign turned so sharply against South Sudan that a forciblereunication of the former nation seemed possible, the neighboring statesand their allies saw their strategic interests in South Sudans oil endangered.Yet while Kenya, Uganda, and India acted decisively, China missed the boat.

Energy-hungry outsiders have beenfalling over themselves to support

any regime willing to grant them privileged access to local resources.


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The military intervention by this ad-hoc coalition of the willing soon pushedthe Sudanese to the old North-South border and guaranteed the Souths in-dependence. The belated European attempt to bring the moribund AU intoplay was a non-starter from the beginning. What could the organization havedone, without credibility, funds or troops? Tellingly, no one had even botheredto involve the UN. But apart from demonstrating yet again the ineffective-ness of multilateral approaches to conict resolution, the Sudan crisis hadmuch more urgent repercussions. Angered by the loss of its position in EastAfrica, China struck back. It was an open secret that it was channeling militarysupplies to Khartoum via its friends in Arabia. Even more worrying is the factthat the recent crash of an Indian satellite has been linked to China particu-larly in the Indian press and blogosphere. Only last week, Indian and Chinesewarships exchanged gunre in the Strait of Hormuz. No wonder the price of oilis at an all-time high.


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R e g i o n a lOrganizationsD o m i n a t e

R i s eof theR e s t

S t a t eF r a g i l i t yF a t i g u e

R e g i o n a l i z a t i o nof Norms andV a l u e s

Competitionf o r

R e s o u r c e s

C o m p e -t i t i o n C o o p -e r a t i o n C o - e x -i s t e n c eb e t w e e nR e g i o n s

W e a kG l o b a l

Institutions& R e g i m e s

R i s eo f Non-State A c t o r s

N e wT e c h n o l o g i e sC h a l l e n g e

P e a c e O p e r a t i o n s- D e c l i n eof the West


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REGIONALDIVERSITYiNot another security brieng! groaned GraceKimunya as she stowed her helmet and vest next toher seat. The Libyan militias had been bad enough,but ever since the tensions between the two com-

peting missions had erupted into open hostilities,there seemed to be one brieng every morning.Why did the Arab League have to interfere? Untiltheir stabilization force had shown up, she andher colleagues with the African Union Mission inLibya had the situation under control. Well, mostly.Now, while AMIL and AL patrols were exchanging

gunre in Benghazi, diplomats in Addis and Cairowere exchanging threatening notes, and the EU wasdesperately trying to defuse the crisis. And Gracehad to carry her body armor wherever she went. Asthe South African cyber forces colonel giving thebrieng was droning on about the latest virus at-tack against the AU intranet that was tracked to

a source in Dubai, Grace could not help thinking:iIf somebody had told me when I started my careerthirteen years ago that it would ever come to this, Iwould have called him mad.


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For over a decade we hadwondered how the emerg-

ing powers would accom-modate themselves withinthe existing internationalsystem. Now we know theanswer: They havent.

In order to come to grips with our world of 2025, it helps to order an extralarge bowl of alphabet soup. Economically, the BRICS have fully arrived, whichmeans that the E7 are catching up with the G7. The N11 are on their way, ledby the MIKT. The G20, naturally, cannot be caught as they include the BRICS,the E7 and the MIKT (but only four of the N11). ASEAN, AU, ECOWAS, SADC,CSTO, and CELAC are ne. The UN, NATO, OSCE, and OAS, not to mentionthe ICC, WTO and R2P, have not done so well.

This decline of the West and rise of the rest is the result of very uneveneconomic growth experienced by the two spheres after 2012. While most ofthe emerging nations boomed, North America, Europe and Japan stagnated.However, the old powers have not slipped as much as some experts gleefullypredicted. Their per capita incomes still greatly exceed those of the new play-ers. The US is still the worlds leading power and the EU has not broken apart.Their loss of position is thus onlyrelative but still clearly visiblein the shifting of the global bal-ance of power.

For over a decade we had

wondered how the emergingpowers would accommodatethemselves within the existinginternational system. Now weknow the answer: They havent.As a result, the internationalsystem has changed remarkably.


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International governanceis more necessary thanever, but it is largely

provided by a network ofregional organizations.

International governance is more necessary than ever, but it is largely provid-ed by a network of regional organizations. In most cases, these organizationsact independently within their spheres. However, inter-regional cooperationin the form of short-term, functional coalitions also occurs. Peace operationscontinue to be an important aspect of governance, but they have evolved tot this messy, multipolar reality.

Several factors explain this rearrangement. Probably the most prominentare the new emphasis on regional identities among the emerging powers, thedisengagement of the West from global institutions, and the perceived lossof legitimacy and lack of effectiveness of the international system of 2012.

Led by the surging condence of China and other Asian nations in thevalue of their cultures, social systems and political and economic regimes,regional identities are going through a boom of their own. Just do an onlinesearch for Asian values or African solutions and count the hits. The newpowers have grown increasingly impatient with constant lectures on any-thing from human rights and economic governance to climate change andhave largely turned their back on the universal norms championed by theWest. Regional mechanisms have therefore gained new attractiveness andlegitimacy. Economic cooperation led the way, but political integration is alsoprogressing.

China is, of course, the hub of an increasingly connected Asian EconomicZone built around the Asian Monetary Unit established in 2016 by China, Ja-pan, South Korea and the ten ASEAN members. This was followed, in 2018, bythe China-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement, which not only solved the territori-al disputes in the South China Sea but also created regional peace operationscapabilities. Thesehave proved quite ef-fective, if somewhat

heavy-handed. Admit-tedly, there are somecracks in the harmo-nious faade. Indone-sia and Malaysia areunhappy about thetreatment of alleged


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The EU has learnedto lead from behind.It now concentrates on

providing its partnerswith training and high-value equipment, while

putting very few European

boots on the ground.

Muslim rebels in southern Thailand and Mindanao by ASEAN peacekeepers,for example. But by and large, the Dragon and Tigers alliance is working well.

Much ink has been spilt over the question of whether the resurgence ofnon-Western regional structures was the cause of, or rather caused by, thewithdrawal of North America and Europe from institutions of global govern-ance. Instead of trying to solve this chicken-and-egg problem, one can simplystate that Western retrenchment is a fact. Still recovering from their nancialcrises of the mid 2010s, the US and the EU now invest primarily in internalsecurity, border control and intelligence, and have cut political and nancialsupport to the UN drastically. NATO is in decline, but transatlantic coopera-tion continues in a number of areas where interests converge, such as trade,intellectual property rights, terrorism, and cyber security.

The EU is still active in the eld of international peace operations, if in adistinctly new fashion. Focusing on their key strategic interests in the MENAstates and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Europeans have supported the growthof regional organizations through increased capacity building support. Natu-rally, this assistance was con-ditional on increased efforts tostem immigrant ows and grantpreferential access to raw ma-

terials. With European armiesand defense budgets shrinking,the EU has learned to lead frombehind. It now concentrates onproviding its partners with train-ing and high-value equipment inareas like intelligence, commu-nications, logistics and mobility,

while putting very few Europeanboots on the ground.

An early indication of this new taste for proxy warfare was the 2016 in-tervention in Mali to stop the spread of the Islamist insurgency in the Norththat was fueled by the Second Libyan Civil War. After several unsuccessfulattempts to gain UN Security Council endorsement, ECOWAS deployed anoperation to Mali without UN involvement, but aided by a small EU Field Sup-


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port and Mobility Mission (EUMI Ariadne). Militarily, MICEMA was quite suc-cessful, largely because the open terrain of northern Mali proved eminentlysuitable for the new Euro-drones. Yet long-term stabilization has remainedelusive.

Mali was of course not the only case where the UN failed in the eyesof a growing number of countries. In addition, some also felt that UN man-dates had been perverted in the course of their implementation and weredetermined to stop the trend towards interference in the internal affairs ofsovereign nations or promotion of regime change. Libya in 2011 and 2016,Syria in 2012, Mali in 2012 and 2016, the DRC in 2013 taken together, theyfatally eroded the UN position as the central pillar of the international peaceoperations system. But fear not, the UN still exists, even if with reduced

responsibilities.It has survived because it still has its uses. Sure, a number of global re-

gimes and norms have decayed. The ICC and the WTO have ceased to function,and R2P is gone. Many issues, however, still create a global consensus forcooperative action,such as combatingpiracy, terrorism,and the spread of

infectious diseases.There is even agrowing momen-tum for revitalizingtalks on climatechange, as there isno such thing as a

The revision of ChapterVIII of the UN Charter in2023 authorized regionalorganizations to use forcewithin their area without aSecurity Council mandate.


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regional climate. Until recently, the UN also did often endorse uncontroversialregional peace operations, although that might change. After all, the revisionof Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in 2023 authorized regional organizationsto use force within their area without a Security Council mandate. In theabsence of a credible alternative, New York also on occasion serves as amoderator or referee between regional organizations, a function that mightgrow in importance in the future. Finally, the UN still administers a number oflegacy operations such as UNFICYP.

Indeed, UNFICYP. How useful that operation proved at the ripe old ageof 55, during the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis. Despite Turkish warnings, in2018 the Republic of Cyprus had begun to develop the oil and gas deposits indisputed waters in cooperation with Greece and Israel. In 2019, Turkey lookedready to invade the RoC to stop this challenge to its regional leadership posi-tion. With numerous strategic interests in play, the US and EU leaned on allthe parties to accept UN mediation. The parties grudgingly did, and as a resultUNFICYP was enlarged and a naval component added. It is now mandated toclarify the maritime boundaries and design a plan for the development of theenergy resources that benets all sides.


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But this episode was just that. Most peace operations are now conductedby other actors, including some unexpected ones. Russia, Belarus, Armenia,and the central Asian nations are boycotting the OSCE and have drawn pro-gressively closer together within the Collective Security Treaty Organization.In fact, CSTO launched its rst mission as early as 2015. The location wasUzbekistan, where after the death of the incumbent president a short-livediUzbek Spring was quickly followed by violence between supporters of theformer president and modernizers that also took on an ethnic dimension. Tostop the spread of the violence, CSTO very much under Russian leader-ship intervened and established calm. Unsurprisingly, it also established apro-Russian regime.

Some Western commentators have used cases such as this one to arguethat the new system of global governance is a clear step back from whatexisted in 2012. They point out that many operations today are short-term,strongly military missions, conducted in the interest of a dominant regionalpower, that lack strategies and structures to build sustainable peace. Whilethat is unfortunately often the case, there are also positive examples. Lookat the Western hemisphere.

Even severe critics admit that the Community of Latin American and Carib-bean States is doing a ne job. Led by the regional superpower Brazil, CELAChas completely replaced the OAS as the forum for Latin American affairs. Actu-ally, CELAC really is the OAS minus the US and Canada. It also replaced theUN in Haiti in 2017, and no one has heard the Haitians complaining. Economicintegration is progressing in parallel, under the umbrella of the Alliance for theAmericas. So condent has the organization become that in 2020 it adoptedthe Bolivar Doctrine of strict non-interference by outsiders in Latin America.

The reaction of the US to this decision is not hard to imagine. All themore credit is due to the political leaders on both sides for their decision

to coordinate US and CELAC efforts in support of the Cuban transition afterthe long-expected fall of the Communist regime in 2022. It is still too soonto be completely sure, but so far that difficult process is working better thanexpected. For instance, the feared expansion of organized crime syndicatesinto Cuba seems to have been averted.

This achievement indicates that peace operation partnerships can stillwork in our fragmented world. In Cuba, the US provided nancial resources


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and technical expertise, the Latin Americans an understanding of local condi-tions, legitimacy, and manpower. A similar division of labor has also contrib-uted to the at least partial successes of several missions deployed by Africanregional organizations in cooperation with the EU such as MICEMA, or theAU-EU operation in Burundi in 2019.

However, the example of Cuba also hints at a new challenge posed byfragmentation: the potential for conict between regional actors. The Westernhemisphere ultimately got its act together. That does not seem to be the casewith the AU and the Arab League in Libya. As anyone who has been watchingthe news lately knows, the two have come close to a full-scale confronta-tion. The AU planted its ag rst, intervening in its member state when thethird intra-Libyan conict after 2011 and 2016 caused civilian casualties andthreatened yet again to destabilize the Sahel states. With the support of theEU, the AU green helmets did manage to establish a degree of security. How-ever, the underlying tensions between the East and West of the country, andmodernizers and Islamists, simmered on.

Then, prompted by one of the competing factions, the AL appeared on thescene, spearheaded by a resurgent Egypt. Maybe the organization wanted tomake a point and improve its reputation as a credible actor among the otherregional bodies. After all, Libya is not just a member of the AU but also of theAL. Maybe some Arab states worried that a clear-cut success of AMIL mightlead to a dominance of European and African companies in Libya. Or maybethe Egyptian army felt it needed to justify its still signicant size. However thatmay be, the world is again watching Benghazi, holding its breath.


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G L O B A L C O O P E

R A T I O N


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T e c h n o -l o g i c a lB r e a k -t h r o u g h s

S t r o n g

Internat ionalOrganizations

GoldenAge of C o o p -eration

I n t e -g r a t i o no f N e w

P o w e r s

F e w e rF a i l e dS t a t e s

G l o b a lD r i v ea g a i n s t O r g a n i z e dC r i m e

New MediaD e c r e a s eC o n f l i c t s

N e wT e c h n o l o g i e s Aid Peace Operations

S h a r e dInternationalN o r m s

G l o b a lE c o n o m i cB o o m


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GLOBALCOOPERATIONFor once, Grace Kimunya did not mind working ona holiday, even if it was New Years Eve. She wasvery tired the past weeks had been incredibly hec-tic at UN DPKO and she would have preferred to

be out celebrating, but she was also elated. In spiteof the untold number of legal and technical glitch-es and last-minute changes, the documents wereready, the speech almost nished. With the start ofthe new year 2026, the Secretary-General would beable to announce that the UN would nally have itsown stand-by force, built around several Europeanbrigades. As the two EU liaison officers, an Icelan-dic navy captain and a colonel from the Turkishunmanned aerial vehicles forces, started lling the plastic cups to celebrate, Grace leant back, closedher eyes and allowed herself a moments reectionon how much her eld of work had changed sinceshe had entered it, only thirteen years earlier, freshfrom Kenyatta University.


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It seems that the better angels of our nature have won. In 2012 few expertswould have dared to predict this outcome: the turbulences they were witness-ing marked the dawn of the age of mass collaboration. Granted, over the fol-lowing years the international system did become ever more complex. Thetrend towards the diffusion of knowledge, legitimacy and power accelerated.Emerging powers had to be accommodated within the international system andthe growing inuence of non-state actors added some hurdles. As was to beexpected, this transition caused a few stumbles. Yet all things considered, itwent remarkably well including in the eld of international peace operations.How did it happen?

Of course, this outcomewas only possible againstthe background of a world-wide economic expansionthat has safeguarded theprosperity of the Western na-tions, allowed the emergingpowers to catch up and liftedmillions out of poverty in thedeveloping world. Looking

back, it is clear that ourblessed state of global pros-perity was triggered by thehappy marriage of two wildlyimprobable events: the political earthquakes that ended years of deadlock andenabled the US and Europe to overcome their debt and currency crises, andthe scientic triumphs that triggered the Energy Revolution.

In 2014 the Democrats and Republicans negotiated a sweeping compro-

mise to restructure US public nances. Spending on defense and welfare wascut, taxes were raised and major investments in education and infrastructurewere announced. To say that the world was stunned by this breakthrough wouldbe an understatement. We had hardly recovered when a few months later theleaders of the EU shocked us anew with their decision to combat Europesfestering crisis through a grand strategy of deeper integration: Eurobonds com-bined with tight scal controls, exicurity schemes to help workers adjust to

A worldwide economicexpansion that has safe-guarded the prosperityof the Western nations,allowed the emerging powers to catch up and lif-ted millions out of povertyin the developing world.


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labor market changesand an integrated im-migration strategyto attract talentedyoung migrants rmlyset Europe on a pathtowards recovery andthen expansion.

Pointing towardsa future of ever clos-er cooperation, theemerging economiesalso played an impor-tant role in this revival of the established powers. Some very open wordswere spoken behind closed doors to US and European leaders about theimportance of vision and leadership, and the punishment for missing historicopportunities. Wisely, China, India and other new players backed their advicewith substantial support for the dollar and the euro during the upheavals thatcontinued to rock the nancial markets in the rst years after 2014.

That these political developments coincided with a wave of scientic dis-coveries seems almost too good to be true. Yet, the Energy Revolution is areality and promises in the near future to nally break the link between thecreation of wealth and the consumption of resources. Conicts over energy

The real game-changer,however, was the revo-lution in alternativeenergy technologies,with Chinese and Indianresearchers and corpo-rations providing somekey innovations.


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are something you only nd in history books. In a rst round, new technologiesopened inaccessible or uncompetitive oil and gas deposits. The real game-changer, however, was the revolution in alternative energy technologies, withChinese and Indian researchers and corporations providing some key innova-tions. Renewables such as wind and solar, hydrogen and liquid gas technologies,and fuel cells providing vast energy storage capacities have spread into allaspects of our lives. In fact, the Under-Secretary-General for Climate Change just recently announced the conversion of the entire UN eet of vehicles tozero-emission models, thanks to a donation by Guangzhou Mobility Industries.

The Energy Revolution, in combination with global economic expansionand political transformations, has begun to create prosperity in unexpectedquarters. This has made the task of international peace operations easier. Justask the staff of the AU Mission in the Sahel. Visibly energized after its earliersuccess in Somalia, in 2016 the AU had sent its brand new African StandbyForce into Mali and Niger full of optimism. But the going had been rough ini-tially for AMISAH, as stability woul

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