Zimmerman - From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism (Published in PAS)

2010 The Aristotelian SProceedings of the Aristotelia

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2

MindBody DualismDean Zimmerman and Penelope Mackie

IDEAN ZIMMERMAN

FROM PROPERTY DUALISM TO SUBSTANCE DUALISM

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days;substance dualism, notbe a property dualist aproperty dualist suppoqualia) are as fundamematerial objects could quire an adverbial conconscious because of tsubject of consciousnesto speculative forms omore likely to be true tdefended by contempo

Target: The Dual Aspple in most times and is more to a person thlogical death becauseoutlives the body.1 Msensus, developing dusons. Philosophical duand, in our day, KaHasker2disagree abcommon: they believeperiences, there is a thmany or most of the ping material objects li

1 For some conjectures about souls, see Barrett (2004, pp. 52 See Popper and Eccles (1977ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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so much. But it is not as easy as one might think tond a substance materialist. The reasons for being art the idea that some phenomenal properties (or

ntal as the most basic physical properties; but whatbe the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia re-strual (if they are modifications of the thing that ishem, not properties of something else to which thes is related), then the property dualist can be drivenf materialism none of which, at this point, lookshan the more modest versions of emergent dualismrary substance dualists.

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ect Theory. For one reason or another, peo-places have found it easy to believe that therean the body; and that life is possible after bio- this something morethe soul or spiritany philosophers have been part of this con-alistic theories about the nature of human per-alists such as Plato, Aquinas and Descartesrl Popper, Richard Swinburne and Williamout many details. But they have this much in that, for every person who thinks or has ex-inga soul or spiritual substancethat lackshysical properties characteristic of non-think-ke rocks and trees; and that this soul is essen-

cognitive mechanisms that might promote belief in immaterial69).), Swinburne (1997) and Hasker (1999).

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tial to the person, and in one way or another responsible for thepersons mental life.

Nowadays, this doctrine is often called substance dualism, andcontrasted with various forms of property dualismthe thesis thatthe mental properties of persons are significantly independent of, orin some other way distinct from, the physical properties of persons.The distinction between the two kinds of dualism allows for an in-termediate view: dualism about at least some mental properties butmaterialism about the substance that has the properties. The factthat one class of properties can vary independently of another doesnot rule out the posproperties. Substancepoint to examples likshape properties seemobject, such as a red bthat is red but shapelourless. Philosophers a robust form of propand physical properticolour and shape are,consisting entirely of times called the dual-

Not so long ago, almand dualismin thmeant what Im calliqualified occurrences losophy of mind todanon-starter, property aspect theory seems to

Combining properttricky, however. Whicbe? And can that choipsychological states astates? Here, I raise pr

3 Chalmers (1996), Forrest (1berg (2004), Seager (1999), Sgeon (2000) are a few exampcited; Jackson has since changselves from substance dualismwith panpsychism, and I migthey are true property dualistocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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sibility that some things have both kinds of materialists who are property dualists cane colour and shape. Colour properties and

quite independent of one another. Yet a singleall, can have bothand not by having a part

ess and another part that is spherical but col-who deny substance dualism while advocatingerty dualism are simply claiming that mental

es are independent in something like the way while remaining attributes of a single object,ordinary matter. Such a combination is some-aspect theory.

ost every philosopher was a property dualist,e context of the mindbody problemjustng substance dualism (and that is what un-of dualism will mean in this paper). In phi-y, although substance dualism is regarded as adualism remains popular. In fact, the dual- be enjoying something of a comeback.3

y dualism with substance materialism can beh particular material object am I supposed toce be reconciled with the idea that some of myre somewhat independent from my physicaloblems for the supposition that the materialist

993), Jackson (1982), Kim (2005), Robinson (2004), Rosen-mith (1993), Strawson (1994), Stubenberg (1998) and Stur-les of philosophers who, as I read them (at least in the worksed his mind), defend property dualism while distancing them-. There are complications; some of these authors begin to flirt

ht have to ask them a few more questions to find out whethers, in the sense I will articulate below.

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can identify each person with a garden variety physical object,such as a human body or braina physical object with which weare already familiar, as opposed to some more exotic physical objectdiscovered by examination of the brain, or posited in order to solveproblems for substance materialism. I cannot pretend to haveshown that property dualism leads inexorably to a dualism of sub-stances. But I shall try to show that it either leads to a dualism ofmental and physical things or to forms of materialism that cannotregard a human person as a body (or macroscopic part of a body)belonging to a familiar physical kind; and the prospects for moreunorthodox forms othose for at least some

The Thesis of Propertous aspects of objectssemble one another, inexample, all the shapspheres, of pyramids, etc. Objects that are silar with respect to onties in common fromfamily. Although talkterms, I take it that anlem of universals musaspects but not otherscal question whether t

Some respects in wdeep, objective similalarities in our dna arare not. Depth of simirespect to some object

Contemporary metterm natural propertytremely precise aspecnature at the joints;marks a joint in naturnaturalness is not all-ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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f materialism appear not much better than versions of substance dualism.

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y Dualism. It is hard to resist describing vari-, or various respects in which objects can re- terms of families of properties. There are, fores things can havethe shapes of cubes, ofetc.and all the coloursred, yellow, green,imilar in shape but different in colour are sim-e aspect but not anotherthey have proper- the shape family, but not from the colour

of aspects is most naturally couched in thesey adequate philosophical answer to the prob-t recover the phenomena of similarity in some; so nothing I say should turn on the ontologi-here are properties.hich we resemble one another correspond torities; others are much more superficial. Simi-e deep and objective; similarities in citizenshiplarity bottoms out in exact resemblance withive aspect.aphysicians, following David Lewis, use the to refer to objective resemblance in one ex-

t. Plato introduced the metaphor of cutting in todays terminology, a natural propertye of the simplest and deepest kind. Of course,or-nothing. Schemes of classification may be

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more or less natural. We make generalizations about similarities anddifferences among the English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh, eventhough belonging to the same ethnic group does not ensure muchobjective similarity. A persons ethnicity is not a highly natural as-pect; but it may not be completely unnatural either.

It should be uncontroversial that we human beings have mentalaspects and that weor our bodies, at leasthave physical as-pects. That is to say no more than that we can resemble one anotherpsychologically and physically. Putting the matter this way does notpresuppose anything about the relative naturalness of psychologicaland physical aspectsexample, be much moproperties. Neither dological aspects constitof properties, precluderties with physical fe

Phenomenal properproperty that could vsome kind of propertystate interchangeablystate, weighing 150 pMany different thingsproperties and states ahave anything originatinction between phemental state; nor do ments for property dupeat some platitudes known arguments.

A state is a phenomway that it feels to bea particular phenomethere is no distinctive believe that grass is who thinks or believesal state are not kindsvariably, they will som

4 Nagel (1974) makes use of sphenomenal aspects of conscocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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the most natural physical properties may, forre natural than the most natural psychologicales it presuppose that our physical and psycho-ute two mutually exclusive, irreducible kindsing the possibility of identifying mental prop-atures of our brains.ties are the best candidate for a kind of mentalary independently of the physical, supporting dualism. (I use the expressions property and; being in pain is a mental property or mental

ounds is a physical property or physical state. can be in pain or have the same weight; sore clearly, in some sense, universals.) I do notl to say about the proper way to draw a dis-nomenal consciousness and other kinds ofI have anything to add to the familiar argu-alism about the phenomenal. I will simply re-about consciousness, and mention some well-

enal one if there is something it is like or a in that state.4 Not every mental state impliesnal state. Intuitively, one wants to say thatway that it feels to think about Vienna or togreen, no experience undergone by everyone these things. And so these kinds of intention- of phenomenal statealthough, perhaps in-

ehow involve or at least be accompanied by

uch locutions in his seminal effort to focus attention upon theiousness.



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phenomenal states. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling textureand temperature, on the other hand, are all examples of modes ofconsciousness that do come with distinctive ways that it feels to bein them. And the different kinds of ways it feels can be divided atleast as finely as there are differences in what it is like to be in thesestates.

Philosophers of mind have not reached any kind of consensusabout the nature of phenomenal states. Most are anxious to explainhow phenomenal features can be made to fit into a world in whichphysics has the last word, but the strategies employed are many andvaried. Despite the dimer out a common though contemporaryagnostic about the kinly fundamental by somconfident of one thingfundamental propertipsychological or mentity will prove to be nonon-mental phenomemental causal transactstates. And everythingby, the facts describabics.

By means of now fadermine this physicaliworlds in which the pstates are differently dtures just like us, phyconsciousnessthere nothing it is like to beonly source of supporthought experiments for whom there is anare, of the spectrum olengths of light strikin

5 For a famous deployment o6 For an important discussionties, see Block (1980).ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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sagreement, a majority has managed to ham-credoa kind of minimal physicalism. Al- materialists are generally happy to remainds of properties that will be recognized as tru-e future final physics, they are nevertheless

: that serious science will never need to posites that divide things up based upon patentlyal similarities and differences. Ultimately, real-thing but atoms in the void or some equally

non. Whatever the terms of the most funda-ions, they will not be minds or include mental else will supervene upon, and be determinedle in terms of this fundamental, future phys-

miliar arguments, property dualists try to un-st consensus by inviting us to imagine possiblehysical facts remain the same, but phenomenalistributed. In zombie worlds, there are crea-

sically, who are utterly devoid of phenomenalis nothing it is like to be them, just as there is a rock.5 The possibility of zombies is not thet for property dualism; there are also famousinvolving creatures otherwise just like us, but inversion, relative to humans as we actuallyf phenomenal colours caused by various wave-g their eyes;6 there is Frank Jacksons knowl-

f zombies, see Chalmers (1996, chs. 3 and 4). of the inverted spectrum case, and related (alleged) possibili-

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edge argument;7 and several other styles of anti-physicalist argu-ment.8

What most of these arguments purport to show is that, in experi-ence, we are aware of phenomenal properties that could differ de-spite the fact that all the fundamental non-phenomenal propertiesare distributed in the same way. The same thought experiments thatare supposed to show the failure of the phenomenal to superveneupon the chemical and biological properties of brains should, if theyare successful in this role, also support the failure of the phenome-nal to supervene upon some unknown family of protophenomenalproperties that a protof our brains (Chalmech. 5). When we askphysically like us, butagining, in vivid detaexperiencesince movaguely know somethexcited. We are simplto whatever propertiewith which we are famism of physical and pimagined inverted sptophenomenal propesupported. Prospects propertiesneither thtion of non-mental thicould be more basic tenal similarities and dof physics or experien

What would invertsuccessful? I assume tidentify the most natuactual world; and thabetween possible crearespect to the non-mphysics would require

7 See Jackson (1982); for rece8 The latest rallying point for (2010).ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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opanpsychist might attribute to smaller partsrs 1998, pp. 1267, 2989; Rosenberg 2004, ourselves whether there could be creatures with inverted spectra, most of us are not im-il, the true neurophysiological side of colourst of us dont know all these details, but onlying about how networks of neurons may be

y imagining creatures just like us with respects our brains may have, other than the qualiailiar in experience. To the extent that a dual-

henomenal properties is supported by vaguelyectra cases and zombies, a dualism of pro-rties and phenomenal properties will also beare dim for finding some other family ofose mentioned in the final physics descrip-ngs, nor those discovered in experiencethathan our qualia, somehow grounding phenom-ifferences in a third realm, beyond the reachce.ed spectrum and zombie arguments show, ifhat the true final physics would successfullyral non-mental properties exemplified in thet the existence of phenomenal dissimilaritiestures that exactly resemble one another withental properties mentioned in our true final that some phenomenal properties are just as

nt developments, see Ludlow et al. (2004).the forces of anti-physicalism is provided by Koons and Bealer



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fundamental as the most fundamental non-mental properties. Thiswould falsify physicalism, because not everything would superveneupon the distribution of just the non-mental properties mentioned infinal physics. (Given the ambitious explanatory aims of physics, pre-sumably any fundamental phenomenal properties that have physicaleffects would have to show up in an ideal physics; thats why con-struing physicalism as just supervenience on facts describable in theideal future physics is not enougha crucial part of physicalism isits bet on the absence of mentality at the most fundamental level.)

The conclusion supported by appeal to zombies and their ilk is,then, a thesis about wwhich ones carve namost fundamental kiNaturalness comes ingrees; and property dsimilarities and dissimnatural. Although soless than perfectly nadisjunctive ones, like sones, like hearing somlieves there is some fathat satisfy the follownatural properties thascription of just the nthey serve as the basistypes of experiences inomenal properties squalia to refer to thewhatever they are, and

If property dualismties and fundamental finds in physics as it the hypothesis that mreality, on a par widamental properties that a property dualises in which a propertybe fundamentalforas electric charge athought to be just anocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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hich properties are the most natural onesture at the joints, being responsible for thends of objective resemblance among things. degrees because resemblance comes in de-ualism is a claim about where phenomenalilarities lie on the spectrum from more to less

me phenomenal properties or conditions aretural (for example, highly gerrymandered oreeing-red-or-feeling-an-itch; and determinablee sound or other), the property dualist be-

mily of the most basic phenomenal propertiesing conditions: they are as natural as the mostt would be mentioned in a final physics de-on-sentient material objects and systems; and for all differences and similarities among the

t is possible to haveall the less natural phe-upervene upon them. I shall use the termse most fundamental phenomenal properties, whatever has them.

is true, the catalogue of fundamental proper-laws must include more than just the kind onecurrently stands. Paul Churchland considersental properties are fundamental properties ofth length, mass, electric charge, and other fun-(Churchland 1985, p. 12). Churchland notest might cite, as historical precedent, other cas- was thought to be reducible but turned out to example, electromagnetic phenomena (suchnd magnetic attraction) which were once unusually subtle manifestation of purely me-

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chanical phenomena but ultimately had to be added to the existinglist of fundamental properties.

Perhaps mental properties enjoy a status like that of electromagneticproperties: irreducible, but not emergent. Such a view may be calledelemental-property dualism Unfortunately, the parallel with elec-tromagnetic phenomena has one very obvious failure. Unlike electro-magnetic properties, which are displayed at all levels of reality fromthe subatomic level on up, mental properties are displayed only inlarge physical systems that have evolved a very complex internal or-ganization. They do not appear to be basic or elemental at all.(Churchland 1985,

Churchlands objectiodualists have not donegest an advantage subargument. Churchlandfied by large physicalization; and he allegesphenomenal propertieof standard materialismost substance dualis

In this paper, I shall reasonable by the zomand so on; and move property dualism supcepting property dualithan it otherwise woudisagree about the valtake the conclusions osuch arguments. Thosism are likely to see methought experiments i

The Structure of Phenomenal states part cjects of the most fundinverted spectra and ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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pp. 1213)

n is not a trivial one, and I worry that property enough to answer it. Here, I will simply sug-stance dualists may have in responding to his assumes that mental properties are exempli-

systems that display complex internal organ- that this counts against the fundamentality ofs. Property dualists who accept some versionm may face an objection from this quarter; butts do not.take it that property dualism has been renderedbie arguments, inverted spectrum arguments,on to ask the question: to what extent wouldport substance dualism? I shall argue that ac-sm makes substance dualism look much betterld. (I issue the customary invitation: those whoue of the arguments for property dualism mayf the paper as conditional upon the success ofe sceptical of the arguments for property dual- as providing further reason to be suspicious ofnvolving zombies and inverted spectra.)

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nomenal States. Property dualists about phe-ompany when it comes to identifying the sub-amental phenomenal properties. Stories aboutzombies are supposed to show that, had the



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laws relating brains and conscious states been different, the objectswe see would have appeared differently to us, despite precise simi-larity in the light waves hitting our retinas and the patterns of neu-ral firing in our brains. Stop signs now appear red, but in theinverted world, they appear purple. Somewhere, qualia have beenswitchedbut what is it that switched properties, what kind ofthing has the most fundamental phenomenal properties?

The property dualist has a choice: she can either suppose thatqualia are exemplified by some range of things to which the subject isrelated in experience; or she can regard them as properties had by con-scious subjects themsediscipline was youngeulation about the amonomenal states; and eahas had its defenders.

Take the kind of exof me, or I hallucinateother situation that wthe centre of my visuappearing red is sometity of some kind, distexperience as of somwhich acquires its redTo be an act-object texperience is to attribAccording to an act-oof experience belong tperience; and differenare construed as diffewhich the subject is rerists took all phenomture.9

Other philosopherstion, claiming that beired before one is not aperience or of feelinging does not imply th

9 An extreme form of act-obj(1903). For defence of the acocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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lves. Philosophers (and psychologists, when ther) have engaged in considerable armchair spec-unt and kind of complexity to be found in phe-ch of the two choices for the subjects of qualia

perience I have when I see a stop sign in front a bright red object before me, or I am in someould lead me to say that something red is inal field. To some, it has seemed obvious thatthing that can only be done by an object or en-inct from the experiencing subject; to have anething red is to engage in an act of sensingdish character from the nature of its object.heorist about a certain kind of phenomenalute a relational structure to the experience.

bject theory, the distinctive qualia of this typeo something other than the subject of the ex-ces among similar types of phenomenal staterences in the properties had by the entities tolated. G. E. Moore and other sense-data theo-enal states to have such an act-object struc-

have rejected this act-object account of sensa-ng appeared to as though there were something relational property or state; it is a mode of ex-, and the fact that a subject has this sort of feel-at anything distinct from the subject exists or

ect theory is presupposed in Moores Refutation of Idealismt-object theory, see Jackson (1977, pp. 5087).

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appears to the subject. When it appears to a person as though there issomething red in front of him or her, the person is experiencing in areddish waysensing redly, as Chisholm put it. The phenomenalquality peculiar to experiences as of something red is not borne by athing to which the experiencing subject is related. Red, as a termused to describe types of phenomenal experience, is better construedas an adverb modifying the type of feeling or sensing undergone byan experiencing subject; and so such accounts of the structure of ex-perience have been dubbed adverbial theories of appearing.10

C. D. Broad considered the relative merits of act-object and ad-verbial theories underAct of Sensing and Sesensation types:

If we consider the be able to arrange ing through those tions, like headachthe analysis into acsensation of red seject, and not to me

If we now passtrue. It is by no man act of sensing athe whole more plaachy state of mindto have vanished; aheadache, just as thold that a sensatwithin which no di

Now this contraseries would not gkinds of sensation dle of the series. It a sweet taste into aan unanalysable mproperty of sweetn

The continuum naturvelop a theory of sensother, and then to for

10 For classic statements of adocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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the heading Are Sensations analysable intonsum? Broad discerns a kind of continuum of

various experiences called sensations, we seem tothem in an order, starting with those of sight, pass-of taste and smell, and ending with bodily sensa-e. Now, as regards the top members of the series,t of sensing and object sensed seems pretty clear. Aems clearly to mean a state of mind with a red ob-an a red state of mind. to the other end of the series the opposite seemseans obvious that a sensation of headache involvesnd a headachy object; on the contrary, it seems onusible to describe the whole experience as a head-. In fact the distinction of act and object seems herend, as there is clearly something mental in feeling ahere is in sensing a red patch, it seems plausible toion of headache is an unanalysable mental fact,stinction of act and object can be found.st between the top and the bottom members of thereatly matter, were it not for the fact that the twoseem to melt insensibly into each other at the mid-is about equally plausible to analyse a sensation ofn act of sensing and a sweet sensum, or to treat it asental fact, having no object, but possessing the

ess. (Broad 1923, pp. 2545)

ally tempts systematizing philosophers to de-ation based on examples from one end or thece the whole spectrum of sensory states to fit

verbialism, see Ducasse (1951, ch. 13) and Chisholm (1963).



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into a single (possibly Procrustean) bed. Broad resists the unifyingimpulse; the states we call sensations are so called because of theirsimilar causes (each is the immediate response to the stimulation ofa nerve), but they may be quite different in their intrinsic structure.For present purposes, adverbialism about even one fundamentalphenomenal state would be sufficient for the horn of the dilemma towhich I shall devote most of my attention.11

A view Broad sets to one side is what he calls the Multiple Rela-tion Theory:

The Multiple Relation Theory takes the view that appearing to be soand so is a uniquecharacteristic. Oliptical to me is totion of appearing characteristic of ell

William Alston (1999ple relation theory. Bulargely ignore it here;theory and adverbialierty dualism that taklike Alstons as its bamon with adverbialisproperties that accounby conscious subjects.

The differences amoterized using Gilbert posit mental paint inerties of things (Harmtell us where the ment

11 Act-object theorists take ansensed particular; while advethat person not essentially inp. 59). At least one philosophence consists in a relation to aing between a subject and a sred patch of colour I experiennor anywhere else; it is stricton the side of the adverbialistThe subjects of experience arnatural properties in virtue should say that qualia are exeocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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kind of relation between an object, a mind, and an this type of theory to say that the penny looks el-

say that a unique and not further analysable rela-holds between the penny, my mind, and the generalipticity. (Broad 1923, p. 237)

) defends a sophisticated version of the multi-t, even though the view is an important one, I the differences between the multiple relationsm are insignificant for my purposes. A prop-es the relations of a multiple relation theorysic phenomenal types has this much in com-m: both views imply that the fundamentalt for phenomenal differences are exemplified

ng forms of property dualism can be charac-Harmans nice metaphor: property dualists

addition to all the non-mental, physical prop-an 1989). They thereby incur an obligation toal paint is to be applied.

experience to be a relational state, involving a person and arbialists take an experience to be a unitary state, a state ofvolving anything over and above that person (Jackson 1977,er, Franz Brentano, has tried to have it both ways: an experi- sensed particular; but sensing is an intentional relation hold-ensed particular that, as a matter of fact, does not exist. Thece when looking at an apple is not on the surface of the apple,ly non-existent (Brentano 1995, pp. 77100). I put Brentanos, at least for the purposes of the dilemma posed in this paper.e the only real things available, on his view, to bear the mostof which phenomenal experiences are similar; so Brentanomplified by things that are, themselves, conscious subjects.

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The metaphor holds up well in the case of act-object versions ofproperty dualism. Since the fundamental quale kind (or paint col-our) is supposed to be a property of things, in virtue of which theylook red to us, it surely deserves the name redness, no matter whatits subject might be. The property dualist is likely to admit thatthere is a different property that we sometimes mean by red, aphysical or dispositional property of surfaces in virtue of which theyoften cause experiences of the distinctive phenomenal kind; and sothe name of the quale should be qualified: it is phenomenal redness,the kind of mental paint generated by red objects when normal peo-ple see them under idecertain circumstancesdrugs, etc. But to whtribute phenomenal re

Stubenberg (1998, cries. He takes sense-dthinking about phenstrategy, as far as the most sense-data theorties to which we are reare mental paint sprearist is the Whole-Hequalia from these menobjects we perceive Whole-Hearted Relocerty dualist, however. ists posit mental painquality is hardly plauverted spectrum thougkind of difference thacoloured spectacles. Twith spectacles, the chthe inverted world, itsurface of the stop sigtrum-inverted world. wavelengths remain tconscious subjects are

12 For classic versions of the(1922, chs. 5 and 7), Broad (ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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al lighting conditionsbut also generated, in, by non-red objects, non-red strobe lights,at should the act-object property dualist at-d?h. 7) provides a taxonomy of act-object theo-ata theories as the natural starting point foromenal qualitiesan historically justifiabletwentieth century is concerned.12 According toists, there are peculiar, mind-dependent enti-lated in experience, and phenomenal qualitiesd over them. Opposed to the sense-data theo-arted Relocationist, who wants to move thetal entities to the mind-independent physicalaround us (Stubenberg 1998, pp. 15668).ationism can hardly be endorsed by the prop-Given the nature of the reasons property dual-t, applying it to physical surfaces as an extrasible. The kind of difference envisaged by in-ht experiments, for example, is similar to the

t could be created by forcing everyone to wearhe chief difference between the two is that,ange is made upstream of the eyes; while in

is made downstream, even further from then. In itself, the sign is no different in a spec-Its dispositions to absorb and reflect certainhe same. A difference only shows up when brought into the picture. If coloured specta-

sense-data theory, see Russell (1917, chs. 7 and 8), Moore1925, pp. 140220) and Price (1932).



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cles do not change the intrinsic characteristics of stop signs, neithershould the more exotic ways of shifting the spectrum of experiencedcolours that are imagined in typical property dualist arguments.

So the act-object property dualist who dislikes sense-data must bewhat Stubenberg calls a Half-Hearted Relocationist: someone whostrips phenomenal redness from mind-dependent sense-data and ap-plies it to the only other material object that is a reasonablecandidatenamely, some part of the brain or nervous system, orperhaps to some part of the events going on in the brain or nervoussystem. The result has been called the coloured brain theoryor,when odours are invo 13

prevalence of zombieshabits of zombies, perview something like philosophical zombies

The coloured braiproperty dualists to pposed to be responsibformly coloured portishades of phenomenaing spread of phenomfied over and over again my brain that at leamy visual field) to be on inside the brain raifying phenomenal stat

The objection askssmooth, continuouidentical with a braulate, discontinuoularge numbers of e

Maxwell saw the grairesearch to find strucfields within the brainexperience.14 Whateve

13 For discussion, see Stubenbtext, see Price (1932, p. 127),14 See Maxwell (1978, pp. 39address the grain objection, tocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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lved, the stinking brain theory. (Given the in contemporary discussions, and the dietaryhaps we should focus on flavours and call thethe yummy brain theorythough of course merely seem to enjoy the taste of brains.)n theory is an unlikely place for act-objectlant their stakes. Phenomenal redness is sup-le for the similarity among the parts of a uni-on of my visual field. A huge range of precisel redness are responsible for a smoothly vary-enal colour. So similar qualia must be exempli-in, hundreds or thousands of times, by thingsst appear (to me, as I attend to the contents ofright next to one another. A look at what goesses Sellarss famous grain objection to identi-es with brain states:

, for example, how is it that the occurrence of as expanse of red in our visual experience can bein process that must, it would seem, involve partic-s affairs such as transfers of or interactions among

lectrons, ions, or the like? (Maxwell 1978, p. 398)

n objection as an invitation for neuroscientifictural properties of parts of the brain (or of) that better mirror the structures evident inr the neural correlate of an experience of red

erg (1998, pp. 16874); and for use of stinking in this con- who is evidently quoting Bradley.9401). Lockwood (2003) believes quantum physics can helphough I expect he would reject the act-object theory.

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might be, it presumably belongs to groups of neurons (or parts offields) within the brain. Whatever entities are involved in the neuralcorrelates would seem to be the best candidates, within the brain,for being the subjects of the property dualists redness qualia aswell. But then the appearance of spatial continuity of redness in thevisual field will doubtless prove highly misleading. The way rednessseems to be exemplified by the things that have it, and the way it re-ally is exemplified by those things, would be radically different. Butsuppose that is the case. If we can be so drastically mistaken aboutthe nature of phenomenal properties, why should we put any stockin inverted spectrum ments for property dusideration than I shalthat the coloured braisons for believing pro

Giving up the senseems to me to be a bThe visual field is divanalysis of phenomenfieldor the various seriously, as items to wproperties that give mental paint does noobjects, nor over parJ. R. Smythies (1956) gins to seem inevitablover sense-data that The visual field is a sense-data, the parts owithin the three-dimegenerated by the braispatio-temporally condata must stick out three to which our boextrusions can be couscious implies that onproperties falling undnot be called parts ofverify some core dualin unconscious materiocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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thought experiments and other a priori argu-alism? Although the topic deserves more con-l give it, here I simply record my convictionn theory is likely to undermine the typical rea-perty dualism in the first place.se-data theory, so as to relocate the qualia,ig mistake for the act-object property dualist.isible into left and right halves. The act-objectal consciousness bids us take the parts of thisthings that appear to us in its various parts

hich we are related in experience, items withour experience its phenomenal flavour. Thet seem to be spread over surfaces of externalts of our brain; but then where is it spread?offered an answer that, however shocking, be-e on an act-object analysis: the paint is spreadare spatially extended in higher dimensions.three- or at least two-dimensional array off which cannot be unproblematically located

nsional region occupied by the brain. Yet it isn; and so, on the assumption that effects aretinuous with their causes, a persons sense-in directions at right angles from the familiardies are confined. If these extra-dimensionalnted among a persons parts, then being con-e is, in part, a substance with fundamental

er patently mental types. Even if they should the thinkers that have them, such sense-dataistic theses: they are a kind of thing not foundal objects, and they are responsible for the fact



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that we have conscious lives. This gives us, not exactly a dualism ofthinkers and physical objects, but at least a dualism of parts of ourexperiences and physical objects.

For the remainder of this paper, I shall assume that the propertydualist who would reject substance dualism must also reject the act-object theory in favour of adverbialism: the subject of phenomenalexperience is the very thing that bears the qualia. The metaphor ofmental paint must be stretched considerably if it is to be extended todescribe property dualisms belonging to this family. (Indeed, Stuben-berg drops the metaphor when characterizing these alternatives.) Isuppose one might sayscious subject is suffuproperty dualism is evaphor; perhaps one shed, or that the paint is

I cannot pretend, bto have definitively cobject property dualisalism. There may be property dualism thamay, for example, beless unstable than I hphenomenal colours amy brain, then one cobe an organism with that is responsive to raise trouble for gardthis sort of view.15 Buadverbialist or multippaint, must spread hphysical objects, no ve

15 To foreshadow what is to cvariety object is vague. Reallprecise objects; and somethincise objects that are good canfor being the organism or brproperties that are supposed ory), phenomenal colour couocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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that, according to the adverbialist, each con-sed with paint. (A multiple relation version ofen harder to characterize using the paint met-ould say that both subject and object are paint-applied to a thin band that runs between them.)y means of the brief arguments of this section,losed off every avenue of escape for the act-t who wants to defend garden variety materi-ways to combine the act-object theory witht do not require Smythian sense-data. There forms of the coloured brain theory that areave made out. If phenomenal red and otherre fundamental properties of special parts ofuld hold that to experience them is simply toa functioning brain that contains them (and

their presence in some way). My attempts toen variety materialism will not work againstt the property dualist who does not, with thele relation theorist, dip the subject in mentaler mental paint on something. And, amongry good candidates present themselves.

ome: the problem I pose depends upon the fact that a gardeny, for each such object, there are many massively overlappingg is true of the vague object so long as it is true of all the pre-didates for being it. So long as all the overlapping candidates

ain must be similarly related to the fundamental phenomenalto belong to the parts of my brain (on the coloured brain the-ld be fundamental, although vague objects experience it.

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IV

A More Plausible Substance Dualism. Substance dualism and sub-stance materialism are different answers one may give to the ques-tion each of us can put by asking, What kind of thing am I?Ultimately, my conclusion will be that substance dualism should beback on the table for the property dualist, given the materialist al-ternatives. But there are many varieties of substance dualism, someof which should be taken more seriously than others.

Dualists have differed a great deal in what they mean when theysay that we are immaportance in the historywithin his metaphysicparadigmatic dualist; most familiar. Cartesiunlike material objectterial world as Descarstead simple substanthe physical world for

To make these threany view worthy of thto its widespread use amake-up of human peism so that adherentsall contemporary philists no longer qualifytenet.

The truth of the materize any of the viewsalism close to one endon the other. There iViews closer to the duattributes of ordinary But sensible dualists win common with physdualist might posit bsouls with necessarily dualism according toForms. Has anyone hare to their bodies asocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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terial or non-physical. Given Descartess im- of philosophy, and the importance of dualisms, it is understandable that he has become theand that his conception of immateriality is thean souls are immaterial in a very strong sense:s, they are not spatially located; unlike the ma-tes conceived it, they have no parts, but are in-ces; and they are in no way dependent upon their continued existence or ability to think.e doctrines about Cartesian souls essential toe name dualism would do pointless violences a label for a broad family of views about thersons. It would be peremptory to define dual- of animistic religions, spiritualists, and nearlyosophers who call themselves substance dual-. Yet all depart from one or more Cartesian

tter is that dualistic has been used to charac- on one end of a spectrum with Cartesian du-, and straightforward versions of materialism

s no obvious, sharp cut-off in this spectrum.alistic end posit entities that lack many of thephysical objects and their microphysical parts.ill admit that souls have some characteristicsical things. Perhaps the maximal difference aetween soul and body would be to identifyexisting objects, outside of space and timea which persons resemble numbers or Platoseld such a view? Some have said that persons programs are to the computers that run the



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programs. And, if programs are understood in a way that makesthem quite independent of the particular computers running them,they become abstract objects, mathematical entities. But it is hard totake this analogy very seriously. Surely we are concrete, contingentand temporal. After all, it is easy to imagine that I could have adoublea person distinct from but exactly similar to myself.However, distinct yet exactly similar programsconceived as ab-stract typeswould seem to make no sense. So few, if any, dualistswill be as far out on the spectrum as it is possible to be; almost alldualists, including Descartes, will agree that souls have this much incommon with ordinaexisting in time, and out to be without partsouls resemble some pelectrons and gluons,

A fixed point on thethat says human beinnothing but bits of mpurely physical objectand trees. A philosopin so far as it posits atributes in common wDescartes lies somewhattributing almost nonary matter. Between,bulk of those philosop

All contemporary dthat the ability to thibrain. Hasker, Swinbther, allowing that, wnervous system, it thesubstance to be the substance that remaupon the brain for moence.16 Some emergenbefore them, Lotze) athe brain, present whe

16 See Hasker (1999, pp. 18817 See Hasker (1999, p. 192),ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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ry material things: they are concrete entities,capable of change. If electrons or gluons turns, as some physicists surmise, then Descartesshysical things in a further way: his souls, likeare simple. opposite end of the spectrum is a materialismgs, and their larger parts, are composed of

atter that can also constitute paradigmaticallysobjects devoid of mentality, such as rockshical doctrine lies farther to the dualistic siden entity with a mental life that has fewer at-ith the stuff of the paradigmatically physical.ere far to the dualistic side of the spectrum,

thing to his souls that could be had by ordi- but still well within the dualistic range, lie thehers who consider themselves dualists today.ualists (among philosophers, at least) admit

nk depends upon the proper functioning of aurne, Taliaferro and many others depart fur-hen an organism has a sufficiently complexn automatically also generates a non-physicalsubject of that consciousnessan emergentins radically, but not completely, dependentst of its operations and for its continued exist-t dualists (e.g. Hasker, W. D. Hart, and, longre willing to say that souls are located withinrever interaction takes place.17

97), Swinburne (1997, ch. 10) and Taliaferro (1994, ch. 3). Hart (1988, ch. 10) and Lotze (1885).

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The less extreme dualisms are of greater philosophical interestthan Cartesianism for a number of reasons. It should not be whollyirrelevant, even to philosophers, that they correspond much moreclosely than Cartesianism to the dualistic anthropologies that havebeen central to most human cultures and nearly all religions. Per-haps more importantly, they are more defensible; many of the stockobjections to dualism turn out to have no purchase on them. Andmost arguments for dualism do not require that the soul have all thefeatures Descartes attributed to it; so less radical dualisms are safer,positing no more differences between souls and material objectsthan are required by tbe noted, however, thaway out of the dilemmwill prove to be no beposes that we are comries as vague as those

Garden Variety Substof thing am I?, the mmade entirely of partother utterly unthinkinwith different materiaalist and select entirelsome insane materialiearthenware, or that cartes 1984, p. 13). Alosophers have seriophysical particles lodgQuinn 1997). But moof materialism that pigarden variety objec

Some parts of livintheir spatial boundariare made out of partsform some function.strand of dna, the hecell, the respiratory syocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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he reasons for rejecting materialism. It shouldt some forms of dualism would not provide aa that I pose for property dualists. A dualist

tter off than the average materialist, if she sup-posed of swirling ectoplasm, having bounda-of ordinary objects.

V

ance Materialism. To the question What kindaterialist answers, A material thing, a thing

s that could constitute rocks, stars, or someg thing. But different materialists identify me

l things; and of course one could be a materi-y implausible candidates. Descartes mentionssts who believe that their heads are made ofthey are pumpkins, or made of glass (Des- couple of otherwise sane contemporary phi-usly wondered whether we might be tinyed somewhere in our brains (Chisholm 1978;re popular by far (and rightly so) are versionsck more familiar physical objects to be mets.g bodies are what I will call natural parts:es are reasonably sharply defined, and, if they themselves, their parts work together to per- Examples include: a single atom within aart, the kidneys, the spine, an individual bloodstem, the entire nervous system, the brain, the



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cerebrum, a single cerebral hemisphere, and the complete organism(that improper part that includes every other). Basically, if it isworth listing in a book about human physiology or biochemistry, itwill count as a natural part, for my purposes. I take it that, amongphysical objects, the most plausible candidates for being a thinkersuch as I am must at least have the size and shape of one of thesenatural parts; and they must also include all the parts upon whichour ability to think most immediately depends. The natural partsthat fit these criteria are primarily: the complete organism I refer toas my body, the entire nervous system within it, the brain, the cer-ebrum, and perhaps obrum. To be one of then, a thing must be one of them in size awill be the thesis thaparts (or that each peone of these natural p

The garden variety tial and temporal bouserious difficulties forlooking better offfsurprising versions ofphysical object.

Garden variety matvariety candidates, a tsense conception of tnatural boundaries, seven a single hemisphbelong on a spectrum tains, rivers, tidal wavfamiliar material objespatial and temporal mented to resolve the satisfactory when app

18 I throw in the qualificationstituting the other, who migham constituted by an organimight say this because they transplantation of my brain icount as garden variety materthe ordinary objects, like humocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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ne or the other single hemisphere of that cere-the garden variety candidates for being me,one of these objects (or at least coincide withnd shape). Garden variety materialism, then,t each human person is one of these naturalrson currently has the same size and shape asarts).18

candidates are all of them vague in their spa-ndaries. I shall argue that this vagueness raises garden variety materialism, leaving dualismor it will then only be competing with more materialism, ones that posit special kinds of

erialism identifies me with one of the gardenhing that already has a place in our common-he world. Such an object will have relativelyuch as those of an organism, or a brain, orere of a brain. But animals and their organsthat includes bushes, branches, clouds, moun-es, and all manner of fuzzy entities. All such

cts exhibit vagueness or indeterminacy in theirboundaries. And the strategies rightly imple-puzzles posed by vague objects do not seem solied to oneself.

for the sake of believers in coincident objects, the one con-t want to say that I am an organism, in virtue of the fact that Ism, while denying that I am identical to an organism. (Theybelieve that I, but not the organism itself, could survive thento a different body, for example.) Such philosophers will stillialists if the boundaries of persons are determined by those ofan bodies or brains, that constitute them.

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All the garden variety candidates for being the referent of some-ones use of the word I appear surprisingly like clouds upon closeinspection, vague at their spatial boundaries. Many particles are inthe process of being assimilated or cast off; they are neither clearlyin nor clearly out. Upon further examination, it even seems to bevague whether some bits of matter are inside or outside of the vagueborderlandthat is, garden variety objects display higher-ordervagueness, a fact that becomes relevant in the sequel.

Although less relevant here, the temporal boundaries of gardenvariety objects also display a disturbing fuzziness. No one doubtsthat meteorologists hexactly to draw the lstorm. But animal boamination of the origiplausible lines that cohuman person and mefirst and final momentcision like the one mnot be found by thoseries in favour of psychpsychological continuless; that personalitiegradually.

A garden variety mtial and temporal indefect human persons; afuzzy objects should ashall consider the natvague boundaries, anare vague in this way

Adverbial Theories annomenal experience astance dualismor sofaces the garden varietal phenomenal statesness, as they are accorocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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ave considerable freedom in deciding whereine between a hurricane and a mere tropicaldies are not unlike storms in this respect. Ex-ns and deaths of organisms reveals numerousuld be used to mark the divide between livingre mass of organic matter. Pressure to find thes in the lives of organisms can only force a de-ade by the meteorologists. Sharper lines will who, with Locke, dismiss biological bounda-ological ones. Neo-Lockeans must admit that

ity, like biological life, is a matter of more ands emerge, and frequently deteriorate, only

aterialist must, therefore, allow that the spa-terminacies of large-scale material objects in-nd that the correct strategies for coping withpply to persons as well. In the next section, Iural thing to say about objects with spatiallyd show how difficult it is to suppose that wewhile affirming property dualism.

VI

d Vague Objects. Act-object accounts of phe-rguably lead to sense-data and a kind of sub- I shall assume. A different sort of difficulty

ty materialist, if even a few of our fundamen- are exemplified by the subjects of conscious-ding to adverbialism and the multiple relation



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theory (for simplicity, from now on I shall mention only adverbial-ism). Property dualism and adverbialism, combined, make it diffi-cult to identify human persons with any garden variety materialobjects. A problem arises due to the fact that all the garden varietycandidates for being mechiefly, this organism and this brainhave vague spatial boundaries. While this does not lead directly tosubstance dualism, it does mean that, for anyone who accepts a du-alism of mental and physical fundamental properties, substance du-alism should be back in the game.

Adverbialism implies that the thing with the phenomenal proper-ty is a subject of experject, if garden varietyorganism or brain. Thtime consists in the faternal particles, atomsnitely outit is not cthat they are merely pthis vagueness is, of co

I shall assume that erly construed as due body or organ in the vindeterminacy with wgle object and many cjects indeterminate itreating garden varietmore spurious precisiowhich particles can bnumber up to infinite are precise answers toparts to exactly such-atwo precise answers,

The most appealingobjects are theories ththe existence of a pletcandidates for being thWilliamsons epistemididates, exactly one osic and highly contingcomprehend because related arguments agaocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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ience, a conscious being. But what is this sub- materialism is true? A vague object, like ane spatial vagueness of such objects at a givenct that many peripheral and even spatially in- and molecules are not definitely in nor defi-learly true that they are parts of the body, norarts of the environment. How to understandurse, philosophically controversial.

the vagueness of these boundaries is not prop-to the fact that, although there is exactly oneicinity, it fades out due to various degrees of

hich the part of relation holds between the sin-andidates for parthood. Perhaps there are ob-n their boundaries for such a reason; buty objects as vague in this way simply bringsn into the picture. However many degrees toe partswhether it be two, three, or anycardinalitiesit is as difficult to believe there the question whether peripheral particles arend-such degree as it is to believe there are justin or out. accounts of the vagueness of garden varietyat blame the indeterminacy of borders upon

hora of what are, in some sense, equally goode object in question. I set to one side Timothy

cist theory of vagueness, which has many can-f which wins the prize, but does so for extrin-ent reasonsreasons we will never be able toof their global scope and complexity. Closelyinst garden variety materialism can be made

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to go through on Williamsons epistemicism; but I confine my dis-cussion to what I take to be the most popular, and most plausible,approach to the vagueness of mountains, clouds, living bodies, andorgans: that it is an essentially linguistic phenomenon, due to se-mantic indecision or underspecification in words like mountain,cloud, human body, and brain. We speak of a human body orbrain as though there were just one physical object in the vicinity,when in fact there are many largely overlapping, perfectly precisethings, none of which has been specified with enough precision byus to qualify as the one-and-only object of reference.19

The combination oprovides an intuitivelof vagueness in objebatches of molecules acloud; many parcels ofor being a certain msingle out any one ovague thought and talthem. None is intrinsthere is no unique remonstrative expressioly one inspects a livina cloud, storm, or swboundaries; and, of mmatter whether and wand mountains, the vaby pointing out that tbeing the body and determine which one if some property is nothe brain, organism, brain, organism or tabsome form of superva

19 For important versions of (1994). David Lewis endorseocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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f many candidates with semantic indecisiony compelling explanation of the phenomenoncts like clouds and mountains. Numerousre equally good candidates for being a certainf earth and rock are equally good candidates

ountain. We have simply not done enough tof these precise objects as the subject of ourk; instead, we gesture indeterminately at all ofically more eligible to be what we mean, soferent of terms like Mount Everest and de-ns like that cloud (pointing). The more close-g human body or brain, the more it looks likearm of insects. It is vague in its outer spatialany things located inside its skin, it is a vaguehen they become parts of it. As with cloudsgueness of bodies and brains is accounted forhere are many equally eligible candidates forthe brain, and we have failed to do enough towe are talking about. And I shall assume that,t had by all the eligible candidates for beingtable, etc., then it is wrong to say that thele definitely has the property. I assume, then,

luationism about the truth of vague sentences.

such a theory, see Fine (1975), and McGee and McLaughlins such an account; see Lewis (1986, p. 244).



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VII

From Property Dualism (and Adverbialism) to Speculative Material-ism. Property dualism implies that the phenomenal properties areextremely natural, as fundamental as the explanatorily basic proper-ties that will be mentioned in final physics. There are obviouslylawful correlations between various kinds of nervous stimulationand phenomenal states (e.g. stop signs always appear the same wayto me under similar conditions). And laws themselves can displayfundamentality, but of a slightly different sort. Law-like generaliza-tions could mention fundamental lawsfocessity that, if a thingdeflect an approachinit to so-and-so degreemodal force from othdo not hold in virtue perfectly natural propbe some fundamentaproperty dualist mustof qualia are fundamethe most fundamentalBut if we ever did mation of qualia by brainmost precise respects o

Given what we knoactivity and phenomengeneration have, very organized and behavinnowsomething-or-ofundamental phenomnot be about neurons,general feature of the of pattern,20 or in inever has this phenomethat feels a very precwhat is the something

20 See Robinson (2004, pp. 2021 See Chalmers (1996, ch. 8)ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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none but fundamental properties, yet not ber example, it is a matter of nomological ne-

is either an electron or a proton, it will eitherg electron to such-and-such degree, or attract. But this sort of law-like statement derives itser laws. The fundamental laws are ones thatof others. I shall assume that, when there areerties generated in law-like ways, there mustl laws governing their generation. Thus the suppose that some laws about the generationntal. I doubt whether we have any names for qualia; all our terms for them may be vague.nage to state the basic laws about the genera- activity, the terms in those laws stand for thef phenomenal resemblance among subjects.w about the close connections between brainal experience in our own case, laws of qualia

roughly, the form: whenever some neurons areg like soe.g. like the ones in my brain rightther will be caused to have such-and-suchenal property. (The fundamental laws might per se; they might relate qualia to some morebrains activitye.g. to changes in some kindformation-state.21) Given adverbialism, what-nal property will be a conscious subjectoneise pain, senses a very precise smell, etc. But-or-other caused to have the property in ques-

726)..

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tion? According to garden variety materialism, it is a familiar objectsuch as a brain or a complete human organism.

If brain or human organism are terms for garden variety, vaguematerial objects, and I am such a thing, then there must be manyequally eligible candidates for being this brain or this organism.There is no problem, in principle, with vague macroscopic objects ex-emplifying fundamental, perfectly precise properties. All that is nec-essary is that each of the eligible candidates has the fundamentalproperty. But, given that the candidates differ from one another intiny ways, and these tiny differences supervene upon differences atmore fundamental levpens. It is easy for a vabecause every eligibleclose to 20 kgsome for a table to weigh pvery many will be evethan completely accur

Adverbialism aboutquires that there be acan be had only by cthese precise ways, anerning the generation date for being me has that the fundamental l

I suppose a properthe natural process oftion and distribution the brain generates veone for each of very mBut the defender of gathan that. The firing verbial qualia must sothat are eligible candior brain. The fundamtion, even if they are pshould not be expecteway that our everydayjects; that would be toto our linguistic pract

Prodigal laws of quocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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els, it should be very surprising if it ever hap-gue object such as a table to weigh about 20 kg, candidate for being the table has a mass verya little more, some a little less. It is much harderrecisely 20 kg; some table candidates will, butr so slightly heavier or lighter, rendering it lessate to say that the table has exactly that mass. some fundamental phenomenal properties re- family of perfectly natural properties whichonscious beings. If I am conscious in one ofd I am an ordinary vague object, the laws gov-of qualia must ensure that every eligible candi-this perfectly precise property. How likely is itaws select all and only the eligible candidates?ty dualist should grant that it is possible that qualia generation is prodigal in the produc-of fundamental phenomenal properties, thatry many instances of each phenomenal type,any distinct but overlapping physical objects.rden variety materialism must hope for more

of neurons that causes something to have ad-mehow target all and only the precise objectsdates for being what we mean by organismental physical laws governing qualia genera-rodigal in the number of instances produced,

d to choose precise objects in exactly the same terms for brains and bodies choose many ob- attribute to nature itself a touching deferenceices and to our rough-and-ready concepts.alia generation might choose a group of phys-



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ical objects that leaves out some of the candidates for identity withthis brain or organism; or they might choose all the candidates andmore; or they might, just possibly, choose all and only the eligiblecandidates. In each case, I would fail to be a garden variety object.

If fundamental laws of adverbial-qualia-generation do not selectevery single one of the eligible candidates for being this organism orbrain, the organism or brain will be at best sort of conscious. What-ever else I know about myself right now, I know that I am definitelyconscious; so if a smaller thing or things definitely have the adverbi-al qualia, I am not the thing that is only indefinitely conscious; I amthat smaller thing, or definitely identical wiindeterminate in referthe qualia generated bfew candidates are truan ordinary, garden mined not by our orpart of an organism ocohesion and functionspecial, sharp halo, aqualia. The property dthe resulting view is speculative materialisthinking person to bethe sort we clothe, or material object I am btermined by laws linkobject or objects, pres

Suppose the laws seincluding, among thenomenal states, somethe garden variety cacase, there are larger and it is just as true ome. Any object that lame, and that shares mcandidate for being mdrastically from the slism is once again falsprecise objects from tocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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I am one of those things, or perhaps I am in-th each of themI might be a vague term,ence among many of the things that truly havey my brain. On the hypothesis that one or aly conscious, my boundaries are not those ofvariety, macroscopic object; they are deter-dinary, rough-and-ready standards for beingr organ (which advert to vague notions likeal role); instead, my boundaries are set by a boundary drawn by possession of the preciseualist should admit that this might be so. Andmaterialism, fair enough; but it is a kind ofm, not the kind of materialism that finds a just another garden variety physical object ofremove surgically, or push around. The preciseecomes a matter of theoretical speculation, de-ing brain activity with a particular physical

umably somewhere in the vicinity of my brain.lect more than all of the eligible candidates many objects that share my adverbial phe- objects with parts that fall just outside all ofndidates for being this brain or body. In thatobjects of which this brain or body is a part,f them that they are conscious as it is true ofrgely overlaps an eligible candidate for beingy conscious experience, ought to be a good

e; so, unless these slightly larger things differightly smaller things, garden variety material-ea halo surrounds a different collection ofhe eligible candidates for being this brain or

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body. Although words like brain and body are not vague termsused to refer to such a thing, we could easily invent some terms; in-deed, given the platitude that I am the subject of my consciousstates, perhaps I in my mouth is already a term indeterminate inreference among these material objects.

Even if the laws are prodigal, causing many physical objects to beconscious, there remains a kind of magic halo surrounding me (or,rather, around the sum of all the candidates for being me)and thisis something one does not find in ordinary, vague, macroscopic ob-jects. The halo remains even in the wildly lucky case of laws thatselect just the eligiblegarden variety object, definitely part of, nor just things one might cut-off between the bparts. Notoriously, thorder vagueness woulphysical objects have

Prodigal laws of quproperty dualist, if cogarden variety bodies is much more likely tand shapeone detethings are caused to scious subjects could mto say that I am a vagthat of garden varietysons should count as a

If phenomenal propmental, there is little familiar, macroscopic,in abundance and exeoverlap the neurons tthe materialist to adopadverbial qualia, whirather by just one or psis would not be so bphysical thing, distincobjects, suitable to beof consciousness. Butocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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candidates for being this brain or body. In athere are not just bits of matter that are neitherdefinitely not part of, the objectthere are notcall borderline parts. There is also no sharpits of matter that are, and are not, borderlineis requires higher-order vagueness; but higher-d be obliterated by precise facts about whichadverbial qualia.alia production are needed by the adverbialistnscious persons are to have a chance of beingor brains. But even then, the chance is slim; ithat I am a physical object of a different sizermined by the sizes and shapes of whateverhave my qualia. A host of overlapping con-

ake I a vague term, so that it would be trueue object. Still, my vagueness would be unlike objects, and the resulting metaphysics of per- form of speculative materialism.erties are genuinely new and genuinely funda-reasonother than our affection for certain vague objectsto suppose they are producedmplified willy-nilly by a host of subjects thathat are their source. Non-prodigal laws forcet a speculative frame of mind. Brains generate

ch are not exemplified many times over, buterhaps a handful of physical objects. The the-

ad, were there a heretofore unnoticed kind oft from the familiar examples of macroscopic the true bearer of qualia and the true subject when one looks around for precisely demar-



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cated physical entities to receive the adverbialists phenomenalstates, no natural candidates present themselves. No cell or mole-cule or atom in the brain is distinguished in a way that would sug-gest that it is a better candidate than any of its rivals for beingconscious; there seems no precise physical entity in the vicinity thatfundamental laws could pick out in virtue of some special physicalstatus, either intrinsic (for example, a special type of particle, atomor molecule) or extrinsic (for example, a special place in my brainwhere only one particle, atom or molecule could be located). Ofcourse, it might be that the precise subjects of phenomenal states areone or many tiny partministic laws, sayfrjects are randomly choPerhaps different regidepending upon the loence. Speculative mateent algorithms could specific material objeca field, or even with pobjects in the vicinity,ture (intrinsic or extribrain could figure in fentities to be the bearty? There is no obvioucial part of the brain hprogramme! Perhaps tical objects to be explaws are strange ones,lar physical things, bube seen to hold betwthings.

In any case, propertist into dark speculatture of persons. I dunjustified, or scientifing to engage in it are the emergent dualists.ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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icles selected randomlyin virtue of indeter-om among those in my brain; or that the sub-sen larger portions of the matter in my head.

ons of my brain are chosen at different times,cation of the brain activity causing the experi-rialisms could take many forms; many differ-

be proposed to link neural activity with somet or objects, or perhaps with some portion ofoints of space-time. But, given all the precise

there is a pairing problem: what natural fea-nsic) of a physical entity in the vicinity of myundamental laws selecting one or several sucher of the newly generated phenomenal proper-s candidate, so far as I know. Perhaps the spe-as yet to be discovered; therein lies a researchhe laws about qualia generation choose phys-eriencers in some indeterministic way, or the linking particular neural events with particu-t not in virtue of any natural relation that caneen the neural events and those particular

y dualism and adverbialism lead the material-ions about the true location and physical na-o not say that such speculation would beically unfruitful; but I do claim that those will-not in a position to scoff at the speculations of

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VIII

Emergent Dualism: Back on the Table for the Adverbialist. Eitherthe fundamental laws of adverbial qualia generation are prodigal ornot. If prodigal, there are many physical objects caused to have eachof my experiences; in which case, I could believe that I am one ofthem or, better, that I is ambiguous or indeterminate in its refer-ence to many of thembut I should not suppose that the ambiguitylines up with the ambiguity or indeterminacy in our use of wordsfor garden variety objects belonging to biological kinds. If the lawsare less prodigal, andonly one instance, or orialist can hardly pretperson; as a matter ofdates for being the unof a human brain or b

The emergent duality remains: the possibnew fundamental procome with a new subjalist believes to be thegenerate consciousneserated. Given the perfly instantiated, one properties is itself as n

The details of the mmain, admittedly, as sparticle or a preciselyPerhaps there is someidentified as the sustbrain-and-soul pair atfiring that is responsthen and there. I supply: that many overlapwhich is the minimal single cause of its overpatterns of neural firin

22 Fledgling attempts to thinkof physics, psychology and liocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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more choosyso that neural activity causesnly a few instances, of each qualethe mate-

end to know the size and shape of a conscious empirical fact, there are no promising candi-ique, conscious physical object in the vicinityody.st is bound to point out that another possibili-ility that, as in other circumstances in which aperty is exemplified, the phenomenal statesect. And of course this is exactly what the du- case. Once there is neural activity sufficient tos, a subject for that consciousness is also gen-ect naturalness of the properties that are new-should suppose that any subject of suchatural in kind as a fundamental particle.22

echanism by which brains generate souls re-peculative as the search for a special conscious demarcated conscious chunk of brain matter. minimal level of neural activity that could beaining cause of the soul. Perhaps, for every every time, there is a single pattern of neuralible for the souls overall phenomenal state,ose that the following hypothesis is more like-ping sets of events occur in the brain, none ofcause of the souls ongoing existence, nor theall phenomenal state. With many overlappingg, each lawfully sufficient for the existence of

seriously about the relevance of this possibility to the sciencesnguistics can be found in Baker and Goetz (2011).



doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2

a soul with the same phenomenal states, there could still be just onesoul, its existence and phenomenal state simply overdetermined.There need be no vagueness about which pattern generates the sub-ject of consciousnessin fact, on this supposition, many are equallyresponsiblenor about how many subjects there are.

Emergent dualism is clearly not the only coherent way to combineproperty dualism with adverbialism about the most natural phe-nomenal states. But, given the unlikelihood that the laws of qualia-generation choose just the macroscopic candidates that have cap-tured our attention, garden variety materialism is extremely unlikelyto be true. And more bizarre, so long as no(or special fields or sppresent themselves. Tthat phenomenal statelike new fundamentathis as a genuine possseriously, especially if a physical alternative.

Alston, William P. 1999Perspectives, 13, pp. 1

Baker, Mark, and Stewa

23 I thank my co-symposiast,mind about the arguments oftions, I am grateful to particiand the University of Genevgroup at Rutgers. Special thanPhilipp Keller, Daniel Nolan, Stubenberg (from whose excrowed more than I realize). AUnger (2005), who first got mproperty dualism.ocietyn Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiv

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speculative forms of materialism become quite precise, physically special parts of the brainecial sets of space-time points inside the brain)he substance dualist alternative is to supposes come with their own natural kind of subject,l particles. Property dualists ought to acceptibilitya speculative hypothesis worth takingthere are no promising leads in the search for

23

Department of PhilosophyRutgers University1 Seminary Place

New Brunswick, nj 08901usa

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Mind-Body Dualism - Dean Zimmerman and Penelope MackieI - Dean Zimmerman - From Property Dualism to Substance DualismI. Target: The 'Dual Aspect Theory'II. The Thesis of Property DualismIII. The Structure of Phenomenal StatesIV. A More Plausible Substance DualismV. Garden Variety Substance MaterialismVI. Adverbial Theories and Vague ObjectsVII. From Property Dualism (and Adverbialism) to Speculative MaterialismVIII. Emergent Dualism: Back on the Table for the AdverbialistReferences

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Zimmerman - From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism (Published in PAS)