Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in EducationAuthor(s): David Zarifa and Scott DaviesSource: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 32, No. 2(Spring, 2007), pp. 259-278Published by: Canadian Journal of SociologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20460634 .
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education*
David Zarifa
Scott Davies
Abstract: Public opinion may be exerting greater influence on the organization of professional work as a consequence of two trends. First, political parties are placing issues of governance in
social services on their agendas. Second, governments are subjecting professionals to more
stringent controls, often for public relations purposes rather than to make workplaces more
effective. In this study, we examine public opinion about teaching, an occupation which
sociologists view as a "semi-profession" that combines several professional traits with a
subordinate position in bureaucratic hierarchies. To gauge support for different kinds of control over schooling, we operationalize Freidson's typology of bureaucratic, client, and professional
logics using the 2002 OISE/UT Public Attitudes Towards Education in Ontario Survey. We find
considerable support for all forms of control, yet also significant opposition to a further extension
of any single type. In estimated logistic regression models neither background variables nor
educational attitudes consistently predict preferences for forms of control. We interpret these
findings as indicating that Ontarians prefer public education to be controlled via a balance of
powers shared among the provincial government, teachers, and parents. This preference signals,
nonetheless, an acceptance of a decade-long trend that has strengthened central government and
parental powers at the expense of teachers.
Resume: L'opinion publique exerce une plus forte influence sur l'organisation du travail pro
fessionnel comme cons6quence de deux tendances. D'abord, les partis politiques placent les ques
tions relatives a la gouvernance dans les services sociaux a leur ordre du jour. Ensuite, les
gouvernements soumettent les professionnels a des contrOles plus rigoureux, souvent a cause des
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2005 at the International Workshop on the
Professions, McMaster University, and in 2006 at the annual meetings of the American
Sociological Association in Montreal. We would like to thank David Livingstone, Doug Hart
and Lynn Davie for generously supplying the data. We would also like to thank Nico Stehr and
the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 32(2) 2007 259
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260 Canadian Journal of Sociology
relations publiques plutot que pour rendre les milieux de travail plus efficaces. Dans cette etude,
nous analysons l'opinion publique sur l'enseignement, que les sociologues considerent comme une << demi-profession >> combinant plusieurs caracteristiques professionnelles a une position
subordonnee dans la hierarchie bureaucratique. Pour mesurer le soutien accorde a differentes sortes
de contr8les sur l'enseignement, nous operationnalisons la typologie de Freidson axee sur la
logique bureaucratique, professionnelle et du client, en utilisant le Sondage de 2002 de l'Institut d'etudes pedagogiques de l'Ontario de l'Universite de Toronto sur les attitudes dupublic a' V'egard
de l'enseignement en Ontario. Nous trouvons un soutien considerable pour toutes les formes de
controle, de meme qu'une opposition significative a une plus grande extension de tout type
particulier. Dans les modeles de regression logistique evalues, ni les variables de renseignements
generaux ni les attitudes par rapport a l'education ne predisent avec regularite les preferences pour
certaines formes de contr6le. Nous interpretons ces resultats comme indiquant que les Ontariens
preferent que l'enseignement public soit contr81e par un equilibre des pouvoirs qui sont partages entre le gouvernement provincial, les enseignants et les parents. Cette preference signale
neanmoins 1' acceptation d'une tendance qui s'est prolongee pendant une decennie et qui a renforce
le gouvernement central et les pouvoirs des parents au detriment des enseignants.
Introduction: New Controls Over Professional Work?
What influence does the public have on the organization of professional work?
Sociologists typically view "classic" professions in medicine and law as
exemplars of professionalism, characterized by collegial control over work,
autonomy from the dictates of government, and public recognition of their
declared service ethics (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2001). Yet, sociologists have
also noted that the public can indirectly influence professional autonomy either
through market forces or through electoral politics, particularly in jurisdictions
that are highly politicized and influenced by inter-party competition (Abbott,
1988: 59-60). Indeed, over the past two decades, governments in most English
speaking nations have adopted new stances towards public service profession
als.' As described in theories of "new public management" (e.g., Savoie, 1995;
Olssen and Peters, 2005), governments are increasingly embracing neo-liberal
rationales which aim to make public services more productive and accountable,
and which view public-sector professionals as self-interested actors who are
prone to inefficiency, and who require stern management through imposed
performance targets. Whereas professionals idealize forms of work character
ized by collegial governance in relatively flat structures, many business-minded
governments are retracting some of the autonomy once ceded to professionals,
and are themselves dictating more of the conditions and goals of service work
(Leicht and Fennell, 2001).
1. Research indicates that public opinion generally has a moderate influence on social policy,
though the extent of this influence and its causal direction is the subject of some dispute
(Brooks and Manza, 2006; Petry and Mendelsohn, 2004; Petry, 1999; Monroe, 1998; Wlezien,
1995; Page and Shapiro, 1983).
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 261
How can these various processes be set within a broader sociological frame
work? Freidson (2001) offers a typology of three logics that govern work:
bureaucratic, market, and professional. What Freidson calls "the third logic" is
the defining character of professionalism: exclusive control and discretion over work in the hands of experts. According to this logic, work is organized by
socially-recognized expert knowledge. Licenses are obtained only through lengthy training periods by an exclusive set of recruits. Only those individuals
who have obtained formal credentials are authorized to practice, thus obtaining
a monopoly or labour-market shelter from any competing occupations that
attempt to encroach upon their jurisdiction (see also Abbott, 1988).
In contrast, a "bureaucratic" logic invokes a top-down, centralized structure of control. In ideal form, bureaucracy rationalizes production through a
hierarchy of power, creating cost-effective methods to deliver services in an orderly manner. Bureaucracy tends to restrict professional discretion via initiatives to cut costs and signal accountability. These bureaucratic forms of
control are appearing in several professional realms. For instance, health care
organizations are replacing heteronomous structures of authority with hierarchical forms in which doctors are merely represented on boards that are
governed by salaried administrators. Similarly, increasing numbers of lawyers,
information technology experts, and accountants work in large corporations
managed by CEO's (Leicht and Fennell, 2001: 23). This logic is also guiding
accountability initiatives in public services such as social work, and as we
describe further below, education. Freidson's other logic is that of a free market, where suppliers compete to
satisfy the demands of the client or consumer. According to this logic, power
rests in the hands of consumers, who choose those services that best serve their
needs. No occupation can proclaim a monopoly on a particular task jurisdiction,
and suppliers thus jockey for customers, needing to be flexible and adaptive in
light of market pressures. With free-flowing skills bases, this logic forces
loosely-defined occupations to survive not by creating credential barriers or
issuing licenses, but through sheer competition for clients in an open market.
This is of course an ideal-typical model; Freidson recognizes that most
occupations are hybrids of more than one form. Nevertheless, these three logics
illuminate new pressures on public services. In realms affected by the new
public management, state officials sometimes impose performance criteria on
social service provision, thereby bolstering bureaucratic hierarchies. In other
instances, governments champion the use of market mechanisms. In either
instance, the net result is to erode the workplace autonomy of professions. As
Freidson (2001) puts it, both bureaucratic and market logics are slowly "slicing
into the soul of professionalism" by raising public scepticism of the ethics of
social trusteeship that hitherto guided professional tasks (see also Brint, 1994).
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262 Canadian Journal of Sociology
Changing Logics of Control in Education
Teaching is a strategic occupation in which to employ Freidson's ideal types.
As much as any other occupation, teaching combines all three logics of con
trol, straddling the boundary between professional and non-professional
statuses. Indeed, for decades, sociologists have categorized teaching as a "semi
profession" (see Ingersoll, 2001; Brint, 1994; Etzioni, 1969). Teachers possess
several professional-like traits on the one hand, such as requiring university
credentials, certification, and possessing a considerable degree of task
discretion. Most public school boards in Canada require both an undergraduate
degree and additional years of teacher training. Required certificates give
teachers a near-monopoly to practice. Teachers are subject to little direct
monitoring in their classrooms, facing only infrequent and largely ceremonial
evaluations (Ingersoll, 2001). Indeed, staple concepts in organizational research
such as the "logic of professional confidence" and "loose coupling" (e.g., Meyer
and Rowan, 1978) were originally spawned from studies of schools. Each of
these traits offers teachers a modicum of professional status (Abbott, 1988:
209). On the other hand, teaching lacks several qualities that are typically regarded
as the hallmarks of professionalism. Its knowledge-base has been decried as thin
and unscientific (Ingersoll, 2003). Whether teaching involves specialized skills
and exclusive knowledge is continually disputed. Theories of pedagogy are
often characterized as lacking substance, as a set of vague goals and platitudes
more than a meaty body of technique (e.g., Rowan, 2006). Such disputes
encourage teachers to embrace a form of professional authority based on "social
trusteeship" and proclaimed concern for societal betterment rather than on
esoteric expertise (Brint, 1994; Ingersoll, 2003). Moreover, since teaching is
mostly conducted in large classrooms rather than in intimate settings, it
necessitates abilities for managing order and student discipline rather than
cognitively complex procedures (Hum, 1993). Teachers' one to two years of
specific training is relatively brief compared to medicine, law, academics, and
other traditional professions. Finally, even though teachers are seldom
monitored directly in their classrooms, most key decision-making is made by
provincial, board or school administrators. Since teachers occupy a relatively
marginal position within extensive bureaucratic hierarchies, they are sometimes
depicted as "proletarians" rather than "professionals" (e.g., Filson, 1988).
Yet, despite these shortcomings, the decades between 1950 and 1980 repre
sented an era in which teachers considerably improved their professional
standing. Before the 1950's, teaching was a largely female occupation that was
poorly remunerated and was practiced under some trying conditions. But the
occupation enjoyed several gains over the ensuing decades. Provincial govern
ments poured millions of dollars into education to accommodate the baby boom
generation, reduce dropout rates, and widen access to higher education. They
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 263
built larger schools and consolidated small administrative units into county-level school boards (Gidney, 1999). Hundreds of smaller and older schools were replaced with larger, state-of-the-art educational facilities. Teacher colleges increasingly migrated into universities and required undergraduate degrees from their applicants. Teacher federations attained a near-monopoly in public schools, and made the credentialed instructor an institutional standard. A norm of profes
sional development emerged, as teachers were increasingly expected to continue their education or develop a specialty. Educational research became a mass
enterprise in universities, built on an optimism that it could guide teacher
training and establish best pedagogical practices. In Ontario this culminated in
the late 1960's with the establishment of the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education (now OISE/UT). In many respects, this era was the heyday of teacher
professionalism. These changes allowed teachers to resemble other well-established
professions in many respects and institutionalized a "logic of confidence" over teachers' work (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 101). Inspections by officials were
either reduced or eliminated, and were replaced by a rising tide of progressive
ideals. The new outlook endorsed more holistic and open-ended conceptions of learning in which autonomous and well-trained teachers were assumed to best know their students' needs. Such "student-centred" learning was seen to be best enhanced by a decentralized control structure in which teachers independently applied their know-how in the classroom and in which provinces and boards
played mere supporting roles by providing funds and infrastructure. This level of classroom discretion gave teachers a moderate amount of professional
autonomy. Since the 1990's, however, many counter-reforms have rocked Canadian
education. Some, with affinities with the new public management, are cen
tralizing decision-making authority in the name of educational accountability.
Others are decentralizing aspects of schooling in the name of responsiveness to
parents (Bedard and Lawton, 2000; Davies and Guppy, 1997; Gidney, 1999).
Standardized curricula and standardized testing, for instance, shift control over
school content, student evaluations, and educational assessments from teachers
to the grip of provincial officials. Most provinces have created central bodies to
oversee testing, have advertised competitive school-by-school league tables, and
in Ontario's case, imposed re-accreditation programs against the wishes of
teachers (though that particular initiative was short-lived). These reforms serve
to wrest some control over core educational practice from teachers, placing it
in the hands of higher level administrators. In aggregate, the reforms threaten
teachers' existing level of semi-professionalism. At the same time, decentralizing trends are shifting influence over school
level decision-making towards parents, aiming to grant parents a greater say in
where and how their child is educated. All provinces over the past decade have
established school councils. Though their degree of actual influence is open to
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264 Canadian Journal of Sociology
considerable dispute, councils aim to give parents a greater voice in the daily
operation of schools. Further, school choice has become a rallying-cry among
some reformers, and has been implemented to a considerable degree in Alberta
and Quebec. While Ontario has not pursued choice agendas to the same degree, its school choice movement is growing. Perhaps in part due to its relatively limited choice policy, a burgeoning market for private education is emerging in
Ontario, particularly in the Greater Toronto Area, where almost 10% of all students are now enrolled in private schools.2 Demand appears to be growing
for other forms of private education, including tutoring businesses and
homeschooling (Aurini, 2006; Davies, Quirke and Aurini, 2006).
School choice channels some influence over education away from teachers
by forcing schools to accommodate fee-paying parents as a matter of survival.
Fee-payers are likely more apt to see teachers as selling a service rather than
providing a morally-driven professionalism. As educated, middle class parents
push for more choice and turn to market-based alternatives, they alter power
relations in those schools. Indeed, research in Toronto suggests that new private
schools are more likely to adopt a "customer care" ethos than one of rigorous,
quality education (Quirke, 2006). What is further noteworthy about Ontario's
private school market is that it is subject to very little provincial regulation, and as such, many hire non-certified teachers who lack formal credentials or
licenses, and are not members of unions. Rising private school enrolments can
thus weaken teachers' monopoly over classroom practice. Both trends - top-down actions by state officials and rising numbers of
students in deregulated markets - have the potential to further undermine teachers' already limited degree of professionalization. As parents seek market
alternatives or representation on public school councils, and as governments seize more control over the curriculum, they squeeze power from middle levels of education and from teachers (Davies and Guppy, 1997). In tandem, these reforms represent an encroachment upon teachers' professional jurisdiction
(Abbott, 1988).
Public Opinion in an Increasingly Politicized Jurisdiction
In task jurisdictions that are highly politicized and shaped by inter-party com
petition, professions can be subject to the influence of public opinion (Abbott,
1988: 59-60). Teaching is a prime example. Across English-speaking nations,
2. This figure comes from data sent to the second author from the Ontario Ministry of Education
in November 2004. Schools in postal codes beginning with "M" had enrolments of 35,600, which in that year represented 9.7% of all Toronto school enrolment. While this figure may
appear high, it is corroborated by data collected by Linda Quirke (2006) which show
substantial growth in the number of private schools in the city of Toronto over the past decade.
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 265
education has become "high politics" over the past two decades (Guthrie and
Koppich, 1991). Prime ministers, premiers, presidents, and governors routinely put greater priority on school reform. Canada's federal and provincial governments increasingly frame schooling as a vital tool of wealth creation and
human resource development. Provincial parties routinely cite education on their poll-driven electoral platforms. Like other government bodies, ministers of education are more likely to consult with a range of groups (Levin, 2005:
26-27).' In particular, initiatives that affect control of education, ranging from
new curricular standards to standardized testing to school choice (e.g. Ontario's short-lived tuition fee tax credit), have garnered considerable public attention. The contentious reforms of Ontario's Harris government attracted much media attention, and the Tories and teacher federations fought public opinion
campaigns against such reforms for several years (Bedard and Lawton, 2000).
Since government evaluates such reforms partly for their potential electoral
impact, public opinion can be consequential for teacher professionalism. What the voting public thinks about standardized testing, curricular standards, and school choice increasingly matters to policy-makers.
A consequence is that teachers must compete with other stakeholders for the
government's attention, and do so in an era when governments have less
patience for teachers' claims to autonomy or unique expertise (Levin, 2005: 57).
This has led to much contestation in education, as in other institutional realms, as many speculate that "new public management" reforms have been pursued
more for their electoral popularity than for their demonstrated efficiency or
effectiveness. That is, neo-liberals strive to be seen as fighting public wasteful
ness and taming interest groups rather than genuinely controlling costs or
improving services. Such trends make school reform both more visible and
contested in the public eye, and put more of the content and structure of public schools within reach of state bodies.
Research Questions:
Several contemporary trends are converging to challenge teachers' professional status and make public opinion increasingly consequential for schooling. This
3. Ontario's three royal commissions on education provide an example of this kind of change. Data collected by the second author show that 1950's Hope Commission generated very little
public attention, generating a few dozen public submissions and attracting media coverage that
consisted mostly of verbatim recounts of the report's major recommendation. In contrast,
1968's Hall-Dennis Report attracted over two hundred submissions, and far greater number of
newspaper articles. By 1995's Royal Commission on Learning, over a thousand educational
stakeholders offered submissions, and media coverage was much greater and varied than ever
before. See Santin (2006) for details about newspaper coverage.
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266 Canadian Journal of Sociology
paper examines public opinion about control in education, using survey data
from Ontario. To conceptualize different forms of control, we operationalize
Freidson's (2001) three logics of organizing work. We pursue two sets of
empirical questions. First, what forms of control over education does the
Ontario public desire in the post-Harris era? Do Ontarians support a profes
sional logic which grants teachers more autonomy and authority, do they
endorse a bureaucratic logic that leads to more government-controlled reform,
or do they desire a market or client-centred logic that promotes more parental
input into schooling? Second, who desires various forms of control? We explore
the background characteristics and educational attitudes that predict desires for
each form of control. By addressing these questions, we explore an issue that
has not been systematically addressed in the professions literature. While many
authors acknowledge how public opinion can legitimize the occupational pursuit
of professionalism (e.g., Ingersoll, 2003; Freidson, 2001; Brint, 1994; Abbott,
1988; Larson, 1977) none have identified various socio-demographic or
attitudinal influences on public perceptions. We believe our findings have
implications for Canada as a whole, though they can be confidently generalized
only to Ontario. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of this context that are
unique versus those that may be more generalizable.
Methods:
Our data come from the 2002 OISE/UT survey of educational attitudes (Living
stone et al., 2003). This telephone survey of 1053 randomly selected Ontario
adults measured attitudes on a range of educational issues. Our dependent
variables come from eight survey questions (see table 1 and figure 1). Support
for bureaucratic control was measured with two items: "Do you think that the
provincial government now has far too little, somewhat too little, about the right
amount, somewhat too much, or far too much control over local education?" and
"What level of government should control the amount of money spent for each
elementary and high school student in each community? Would you say the
local authorities or the provincial government?" These measure two different
dimensions of bureaucratic control, with the former expressing an abstract
sentiment, and the latter addressing a more concrete issue.
Our indicators for market or "client" control come from two items: "Do you
feel the public has too much say, enough say, or too little say about how schools
are run?" and "Would you favour or oppose, and how strongly, giving school
parent councils the power to hire and fire school principals?" While neither item
addresses forms of market forces per se, both hint at Freidson' s notion of "client
power," with the former being a more abstract item, and the latter being more
concrete.
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 267
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variables Description Mean/Proportion (Std. Dev.)
Background Age Years of age in 2002 44.06 (15.977) Occupation Blishen SES score for 1980 Standard Occu- 47.05 (14.27)
pation Classifications Parent = 1 if parent, step-parent or a guardian of any .48 ( .500)
children under twenty-five years of age Female = 1 if female .54 ( .499) British = 1 if British .33 ( .471) French = 1 if French .07 ( .248) Irish = I if Irish .09 ( .281) Italian = 1 if Italian .05 ( .223) Protestant = 1 if Protestant .40 ( .490) Catholic = 1 if Catholic .29 ( .453) Other Religion = 1 if other religion .13 ( .331) Left Wing = 1 if leftist .11 ( .312) Centre = 1 if centre .49 ( .500) Conservative = 1 if conservative .21 ( .404) Other Party = 1 for all other political parties .02 ( .148) Social Class Self-identified social class (0 = lower class; 1 2.14 ( .920)
= working class; 2 = lower middle class; 3 =
upper middle class; 4 = upper class)
Education Highest level of education (1 = elementary; 2 4.94 ( 2.274) = some high school; 3 = high school; 4 =
some community college; 5 = community
college; 6 = some university; 7 = undergrad
uate university degree; 8 = some graduate
university; 9 = graduate university degree)
Educational Attitudes General Satisfaction Satisfaction with the school system in gen- 2.99 ( 1.178)
eral (1 = very dissatisfied; 5 = very satisfied)
Satisfied with Satisfaction when it comes to the job teach- 3.64 ( 1.156)
Teachers ers are doing (1 = very dissatisfied; 5 = very satisfied)
Morale Problem Extent teacher morale is a problem (1 = 3.18 ( 1.164)
none; 5 = great deal)
Preparation Problem Extent teachers who are not well prepared for 2.71 ( 1.180) a teaching career is a problem in schools in
your community (1 = none; 5 = great deal)
Dependent Variables Bureaucratic:
Centralized Control 1 = the provincial government has enough or .45 ( .497)
too little control over local education
Centralized 1 = provincial government should control .62 ( .471)
Spending the amount of money spent for each elemen
tary and high school student in each
community
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268 Canadian Journal of Sociology
Table 1 (continued)
Variables Description Mean/Proportion (Std. Dev.)
Market: Parent Control 1 = giving school-parent councils the power .38 ( .485)
to hire and fire school principals
Public Voice 1 = the public needs more say about how .68 ( .458)
schools are run
Professional: Professional Plan 1 = teachers should provide evidence that .85 ( .360)
they are following a plan of continuing pro
fessional education in order to keep their
licenses Teacher Autonomy 1 = teachers should be able to develop their .34 ( .483)
own professional learning programs Teacher Strike 1 = teachers in Ontario should have the legal .44 ( .498)
right to strike
Professional 1 = private schools only hire teachers who .71 ( .434) Training have graduated from government-approved
teacher training programs
Finally, we measured support for professional control with four items:
"Should teachers be required to provide evidence that they are following a plan
of continuing professional education in order to keep their licenses?"; "Should
teachers be able to develop their own professional learning programs or should
they be required to take particular types of courses?"; "Should teachers have the
legal right to strike?"; and "If tax credits are given to private school parents for
tuition fees, would you agree or disagree with requiring private schools to only
hire teachers who have graduated from government-approved teacher training
programs?" These four items tap different dimensions of teacher professional
ism. The first and fourth describe a version of professionalism that is largely
imposed by government, while the second and third items favour more
occupational autonomy.
The independent variables were arranged into two blocks (see table 1). The
first contains demographic and background characteristics such as age, occupa
tion, parental status, gender, ethnicity, religion, political party, social class, and
educational attainment, and whether respondents have children under the age of
25.4 In addition, we included political party preference (whether respondents
voted for a left wing, centre, conservative, or other party in the last election).
4. Occupation (1980 Standard Occupation Classification) was recoded according to Blishen et
al.'s (1987) socioeconomic index scale, allowing for numeric rather than categorical com
parisons.
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 269
Figure 1. Percentage of Ontarians Supporting Bureaucratic, Client, and Professional Forms
of Control, 2002
Professional Training 71
Teacher Rights 44
Teacher Autonomy 34
Professional Plan
Public Voice
Parent Control L J
Central Spending
Central Control 4 :
0 20 40 60 80 100
Theories of the new public management presume that support for curtailing
professional powers come from neo-liberal bases such as conservative voters,
males, higher socioeconomic groups, and majority ethnic groups. Here we
expect these groups to support extensions of both central and client powers,
since neo-liberals often call for both greater bureaucratic controls on public
services and the partial privatization of those services. In contrast, we hypothe
size that sympathy for teacher professionalism may come from parents and from
older respondents, since parents have more direct contact with teachers, and
since older Ontarians may prefer forms of teacher professionalism they
encountered in a previous era.
The second block contains measures of educational attitudes. The first item
represents general satisfaction with the education system; the second measures
satisfaction with teachers, and the final pair measure whether teacher morale and
teacher preparation are perceived to be problems in today's schools. We read
any general satisfaction with the system as an endorsement of the government's
actions, and satisfaction with teachers as an opposite sentiment.
The analysis consists of eight binary logistic regressions: two models
measuring the effects of predictors on bureaucratic control, two models for
market control, and four for professional control. In all models, pseudo R square
values increased from first to second blocks, indicating that the addition of the
educational attitudes improved the explanatory power of the models (not
shown).
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270 Canadian Journal of Sociology
Results:
To provide a broad overview of public support for different forms of control,
table 1 and figure 1 contain descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows that Ontarians
are roughly split over whether the provincial government has enough control
over local education, with 44.6% supporting centralized control. Next, almost
two-thirds (61.8%) prefer provincial (centralized) control over per capita
educational spending, indicating that a majority favour top-down management
of funding. Turning to market or client forms of control, fully 68.0% believe
that the public needs more "say" over schools. Yet, when the issue is posed in
a more concrete manner - whether parent councils should have the power to
hire and fire principals - only 37.8% are in favour.
Next we examined several measures of support for professional control. An
overwhelming majority of Ontarians (85%) believe that teachers should be
required to follow a plan of continuing professional education. Further, fully
71% agreed that if tax credits are granted for private school tuition fees, those
schools should hire only graduates of government-approved teacher training
programs. In contrast, only 33.8% endorse having teachers develop their-own
professional learning programs, and only 43.9% agree that teachers should have
the legal right to strike. It thus appears that most Ontarians support a type of
"regulated professionalism" where practising teachers are expected to hold
certified credentials and to continually develop their craft, but are not granted
the autonomy to guide their own development or engage in collective action. This pattern may underlie a belief that teachers indeed possess a specialized
knowledge that requires a life-long process of upgrading, but that such
professionalism needs to be governed by higher-level administrators.
A further look at these descriptive statistics reveals that items that receive the most public support (i.e. central spending, public voice, and professional
training) tend to be rather ambiguous "motherhood issues" that may confound
responses. That is, both respondents who are staunch critics and those who
defend public schools could positively respond to these three items. For
instance, the item about central control could be supported by enthusiasts of
"new public management" initiatives for accountability and by those who seek
a more equitable distribution of resources. Similarly, calls for a greater public
voice in education could come from respondents who are highly critical of
teachers as well as those who oppose the provincial government's educational
policies. Finally, both supporters and opponents of professional control could
answer the item on training affirmatively. Perhaps as a result, none of these
three high-agreement items are predicted significantly by political party measures in table 2. Since these three items could be interpreted in different
ways, opposed political sentiments may cancel each other, leading to an absence
of significant effects. The other dependent variables have lower rates of
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 271
agreement likely because they are more tangible and specific, and are less likely
to confound sentiments across political lines. Notwithstanding these caveats, these descriptive statistics provide little overall evidence that Ontarians favour one form of control over another. Instead, most Ontarians appear to support
initiatives that limit the further extension of each type of control. Table 2 provides logistic regressions of preferences on background
characteristics and educational attitudes.5 The first two columns show models for centralized control and reveal several significant effects. Older respondents and parents are less supportive of provincial control, while those who vote for
a right-wing party and those with higher social class are more supportive.
Among measures of educational attitudes, two findings are noteworthy. Ontarians who are generally more satisfied with the education system seek
provincial control. In contrast, those who are more satisfied with teachers in
particular are less likely to endorse such central control. In the column for
central control over spending, three effects are significant: women are more
likely than men to be supportive, as are those who rate teacher morale and
preparation to be problems. These findings suggest that judgments of teachers readily affect preferences for control.
Turning to models of support for parent/client forms of control, age is the
lone significant effect among background variables, as older Ontarians oppose giving school-parent councils greater power. Among attitudinal variables, two significant relationships emerge. Those satisfied with teachers are less likely to
desire parental control, while those who view teacher preparation as a problem
support parent power. The model for the next item - public voice - shows
that respondents from higher class and occupational statuses desire less public
say over schooling. In terms of educational attitudes, more satisfied Ontarians
are less likely to favour client control. It is surprising that in neither model of
market control do parental status or education yield significant effects, even
though educated parents are often at the centre of most education movements.
One possibility is that highly educated parents may feel they themselves are
qualified to control the education system, but the the general public is not.
Models for professional control show a variety of effects. Older respondents
are more likely to want teachers to follow a professional development plan, as
are parents and those with higher occupational status. Among measures of edu
cational attitudes, three significant relationships emerge. Those who are satisfied
with the system and those who see teacher preparation as a problem both sup
port imposing continuing teacher education, while those who are satisfied with
5. Variables were entered in two stages, beginning with background characteristics and then edu
cational attitudes. Table 2 presents only full models, both for reasons of space and since
educational attitudes improved the R squares in all cases.
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272 Canadian Journal of Sociology
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 273
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274 Canadian Journal of Sociology
teachers are less supportive. Conversely, more educated respondents and those
who are satisfied with teachers are more supportive of granting teacher
autonomy over professional development, while those who are more critical (i.e.
view teacher preparation as a problem) are less willing to grant this autonomy.
Examining teachers' right to strike, both older Ontarians and those who voted
for a right-wing party oppose this dimension of occupational control, while
those who are satisfied with teachers are supportive. In the final model, females
and those who are satisfied with teachers support requiring professional training
for private school teaching, while more educated respondents are less likely to
support this requirement. This latter finding is consistent with the school-choice
literature (Davies, 2004) which finds higher educated parents are more likely to
seek unregulated forms of education.
In sum, background characteristics did not consistently predict preferences
for different logics of control, though a few noteworthy patterns emerge. Older
Ontarians are relatively consistent supporters of teacher professionalism.
Though they do not favour teacher strikes, they are less supportive of manage
rial or market alternatives. For these respondents, the 1960's-1980's "heyday"
of teacher professionalism may serve as a point of reference. More educated
individuals support teachers' autonomy, yet would also allow private schools
to hire teachers without official credentials. And, conservative voters express
a desire for top-down management.
In contrast to these background measures, educational attitudes are more
consistent predictors. Those who are satisfied with the general education system
and who are more critical of teachers are more supportive of government
control, while those who are dissatisfied want more parental voice. In both
cases, support for teacher control lessens. In contrast, those who are more
satisfied with teachers are more supportive of teacher professional control.
Indeed, satisfaction with teachers was the most consistent predictor of
preferences, reaching statistical significance in six of eight models. Those who
support teachers are critical of extending both parent and government powers,
while Ontarians who are critical of teachers support other forms of control.
Conclusion: Preferring a Balance of Power
This study suggests that in 2002 Ontarians expressed mixed levels of support
for teachers' occupational control. The magnitude of public support also varies
for bureaucratic and market controls. Ontarians strongly favoured central
control over spending but wavered over other forms of provincial powers. They
desired more public say in schools but opposed granting more power to school
parent councils. This pattern suggests that the public supports a sharing of
control among parents, government, and teachers. Rather than favouring a single
logic over another, Ontarians appear to desire a division of authority that
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Balance of Powers: Public Opinion on Control in Education 275
simultaneously checks the professional self-interests of teachers, limits the province's exercise of top-down management, and allows for only a moderate
level of client input. For those alarmed by the trend of centralizing reforms in
many education systems, these results may provide some solace, since they
indicate that public support for such initiatives is far from total, and that
criticism of teachers is not as vociferous as might be imagined in media
accounts. To what extent can we generalize our findings? The OISE/UT survey was
conducted in the immediate aftermath of several years of contentious reforms led by the Conservative government. During the seven years preceding the survey, the Harris government took an antagonistic and aggressive stance
towards teachers, and imposed several reforms despite direct opposition from teacher federations. Those initiatives brought issues of control over education to the fore, provoked teacher strikes, and facilitated the formation of several reform groups and organizations that advocated school choice. This included the
mobilization of religious minorities who won a short-lived tax credit. One could also argue that the Harris years in particular bolstered the formation of parent
councils, and spurred the growth of Ontario's private school market. Thus, it is
possible that the strife seen in Ontario schooling in the late 1990's, since mostly
dissipated, may have made Ontarian's attitudes different from respondents in
other provinces. However, we note that many similar reforms - especially
those that centralize power such as standardized testing and curricula - have
been adopted in most other provinces. Further, a recent national survey of
educational attitudes (Guppy et al, 2005) did not reveal significant provincial variations on most items. Hence, we believe that a similar preference for a
balance of power exists in other provinces, though only further national-level
research could confirm this intuition. If true, a preference for a balance of power represents a culmination of a
long-term trend. Unlike a generation ago, today's schools are governed by less,
not more, teacher control, with strengthened central government and client
powers. Teachers have lost some professional ground to both the centralizing
initiatives of the provincial government and, to a lesser degree, parents. Ironi
cally, as education becomes increasingly valued in society, teachers' work is
subject to greater control, whether by bureaucratic or market forces.
This suggests that today's dissatisfaction with teaching is very different than
it was in a previous era. For instance, consider the tone and content of the
famous "Hall-Dennis" report on Ontario education published in the late 1960's
(Government of Ontario, 1968). In its day, it publicly expressed dissatisfaction
with "old-school" teachers who were seen to lack adequate levels of training,
who used methods that were considered out-of-date, and who were deemed to
be non-progressive. These older teachers were thus considered to be, in a word,
"un-professional." That commission was part of a broad tide of change that soon
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276 Canadian Journal of Sociology
ushered in more educational research and formal university training for teachers,
and which decentralized control over pedagogy. It helped remove most forms
of standardized assessment for both teachers and students. It legitimated notions
of "authentic learning" that prized the judgement of modern, professionally
trained teachers. But over a generation, the tenor of dissent against teachers has
changed. The "professionalized" teacher has come under greater attack as new
control options have emerged, whether in the form of more centralized decision
making or more parental authority.
This study advances the literature on professions by highlighting an
occupation that is more vulnerable to public opinion than are full-fledged
professions such as physicians and lawyers. It shows how semi-professions like
teaching must struggle to maintain their jurisdictional boundaries, which are
increasingly susceptible to erosion from both market reforms and/or new public
management initiatives. Future research can examine how other semi-profes
sions, such as nurses and social workers, face similar challenges.
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