Download pdf - BREAKING THE SILENCE: DIFFERENTIATING CRISES OF AGREEMENT

SPAEF

BREAKING THE SILENCE: DIFFERENTIATING CRISES OF AGREEMENTAuthor(s): DAPHNE GOTTLIEB TARASSource: Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (WINTER, 1991), pp. 401-418Published by: SPAEFStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40861484 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 20:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

SPAEF is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Public AdministrationQuarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.78.113 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 20:30:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=spaef

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40861484?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


BREAKING THE SILENCE:

DIFFERENTIATING CRISES

OF AGREEMENT

DAPHNE GOTTLIEB TARAS University of Calgary

INTRODUCTION

When many or all individuals within a group privately express doubts about the group's decisions or processes while publicly supporting them and are aware that their reservations are shared by many or all other groups members, a crisis of agreement exists. What makes individuals reluctant to voice dissent even when they are aware of the negative ramifications of their silence? It is the purpose of this article to advance both the theoretical and practical treatments of crises of agreement.

Although the definition of crisis of agreement subsumes a wide range of group behaviors, this article will focus on only two specific variants-groupthink and Abiline. The two variants are distinguisha- ble because they invoke different individual member cognition; they have dramatically dissimilar consequences on group cohesion; they involve different levels of analysis; and, from a practical standpoint, each condition requires custom-tailored diagnostic strategies.

This article is organized into three sections. In the first, brief descriptions of Abilene and groupthink are offered and the two conditions are compared and contrasted. The second section enu- merates the conditions conducive to crises of agreement. The final section proposes that diagnosticians must be familiar with both conditions in order to be effective. Further, Abilene and groupthink seem to co-exist, a fact whose significance has never been explored in the OD literature.



(402) FAQ WINTER 1991

DESCRIBING CRISES OF AGREEMENT

The Abilene paradox is based on the commonplace, even trivial, experience suffered by Jerry Harvey (1974, 1988), his wife, and in- laws. They each agreed to leave the relative comfort of a shaded porch where they had been playing dominoes and drinking lemon- ade, in order to take a miserably-long car ride in the scorching Texas sun for a substandard meal at a cafeteria in Abilene. Later each disgruntled family member revealed that his or her true preference had been to stay at home.

Abilene can be extrapolated to serious organizational crises. Harvey (1977:161) defines the paradox as "Organizations frequently tak[ing] actions in contradiction to the desires of any of their members and therefore defeating] the very purposes the organizations are designed to achieve." The Abilene paradox is widely known in OD circles, but references to it are almost non-existent outside OD.

The conditions necessary to diagnose Abilene are clear. In general, group members as individuals are fully aware of the problems facing the organization and of its poor responses. They admit, to themselves, to serious reservations. They often even agree, unknown to one another, about the solution required to solve the problem. Nonetheless, in collective situations such as group meetings, they withhold their private feelings and allow other group members to believe that decisions are unanimously supported. The group makes defective decisions, producing the paradox. Individuals suffer frustration, irritation, anger, and feelings of impotence. They assign blame, choosing as targets either themselves, the group, the task or the organization as a whole. The organization begins to experience what Harvey calls "phoney conflict." More than likely, it also could plummet into a low-energy, low-motivation state best described as generalized malaise (Golembiewski, 1989).

The more famous variant of a crisis of agreement is described by Irving Janis (1972, 1982) in Groupthink. He offers mesmerizing accounts of defective group decision-making leading to fiascoes such as the failure to foresee the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Vietnam, and Watergate. The groupthink syndrome bears some superficial similarities to the Abilene paradox. The decision-making procedure is defective, with premature conver- gence on a single option and the closing-off of sources of alternative information and courses of action.1 Although the decisions are



FAQ WINTER 1991 (403)

poorly conceived, they are endorsed in both settings. Both groupthink and Abilene begin with an individual's attraction

to a group, so much so that he or she will express concurrence with a decision perceived to be the group's rather than voice dissent and suffer the real or imagined consequences. The expected negative consequences need not be based on reality. Indeed, catastrophic fantasies are as inhibitive to the individual as real threats.

Harvey goes no further than this stage of explanation. Janis, however, created a rich conceptual model, providing descriptions of the conditions that exacerbate the tendency towards defective decision-making (Janis and Mann, 1977; Janis, 1982:244; Hirokawa, 1980, 1987, 1988).

Groupthinks's antecedent conditions are easily specified: the group is cohesive, insulated, homogeneous, and has neither a tradition of impartial leadership nor norms requiring a systematic information search. Defective decisions are triggered by provocative situational contexts, comprised of high stress from external threats, low self-esteem of group members, and decisions that involve questions of morality. Faced with an intolerably elevated degree of uncer- tainty, individuals seek greater affiliation with the group as a protec- tive device. This banding together produces overestimations of the group- that it is invulnerable, inherently moral or superior.

Recall the label "best and brightest" as it was applied to President Kennedy's inner circle. The group becomes closed-minded and develops defenses against both internal and external dissent. Person- al identifies are, to some extent, dependent on group affiliation (Raven, 1974). At this point, group members are prepared to make, and support, decisions they might not have made as individuals had they not been seduced by group membership.

Groupthink can be distinguished from Abilene on four different levels. First, the consciousness of participants must be examined. Abilene riders each knowingly lives a lie which he perceives as the communal truth whose absurdity is enormously and psychically oppressive. Groupthink situations lack this paradoxical element where individuals want to do one thing but willingly, though in despair, do the opposite. In groupthink, the situation is not absurd until after the fog lifts. Not surprisingly, the strongest support for Janis' model is culled from the reflections and recriminations of group participants in which hindsight is crystal clear. At the time they made defective decisions, however, they were often described as "euphoric," enjoying high morale and a heightened sense of efficacy.




To put it in simple, although somewhat extreme terms, groupthink makes people feel good about bad public decisions, while Abilene makes people feel bad about good private decisions withheld from the group.

Second, at the group or organizational level, Abilene engenders conflict and/or malaise, while groupthink creates esprit de corps, optimistic portrayals of the future, and loyalty to the organization. What differentiates descriptions of groupthink from Abilene is the lack of conflict after faulty decisions are made.

Third, the relevant unit of analysis differs in the two conditions. In groupthink, individual entities become submerged and the group as a whole becomes analogous to a single organism; it responds to stimuli in patterned ways, is self-correcting, and expends energy to maintain homeostasis. In groupthink, the group is "more than" the sum of its parts. In contrast, Abilene groups are "less than" the sum of their real parts. Individuals and their expectations dominate in Abilene.

This third distinction raises a troubling issue of morality and responsibility. Post mortems of Abilene illuminate the individual's inability to speak out and his or her awareness of the paradox miti- gates the capacity to deflect culpability. Abilene offers no recourse to absolution of guilt by seeking refuge in group dynamics. In groupthink, however, the group is guilty of poor decision-making and, because group members have surrendered their separate identities, they are exonerated from individual responsibility. Janis (1982:243) suggests that

every executive who participates in group decisions is potentially susceptible to groupthink. Irrespective of the personality characteristics and other predispositions of the members who make up the policy-making group, the groupthink syndrome is expected to emerge whenever the situational conditions that are conducive to it are present.

In case after case, Janis mounts a brilliant line of defense for individuals who are accused of contributing to defective decisions. Pressure towards conformity, he argues, is the main factor that leads individuals to make and own defective decisions.

Fourth, intervention strategies differ. As the logical outcome of the preoccupation with group-level forces, groupthink interventions have focused on group structures and processes (Janis, 1982; Sauser, 1988). Abilene, with its focus on the individual, suggests interven-




tions at the impersonal level-stressing disclosure, feedback, openness, and owning of privately-held views (Harvey, 1988, 1977; Harvey and Albertson, 1971; Golembiewski, 1989).

EXPLAINING CRISES OF AGREEMENT

No matter how frequently the phenomenon of silenced dissent arises in governmental or corporate settings, researchers have been unsuccessful in replicating the exact sequence of defective decision- making in laboratory conditions. Groupthink has been subjected to empirical investigation a few times but with mixed findings and only limited support for Janis' causal sequence (e.g., Moorhead and Montanari, 1986; Leana, 1985; Courtright, 1978; Flowers, 1977; overview in Posner- Weber, 1987). The historical cases Janis presents are engrossing and quite convincing, although he is careful to specify that only in highly specific circumstances is full-blown groupthink likely to occur (see also Tuchman, 1984).

Harvey made no attempt to describe any conditions that induce Abilene and his article is largely anecdotal and atheoretical. Yet reports of Abilene situations occur often enough that we know it is not an aberration, but a clear type of group dysfunction (Dyer, 1988; Golembiewski, 1978, 1979). Despite our rudimentary level of knowledge of exactly how the forces interact and shape group outcomes, we know that both conditions do occur.

Strong dynamics perpetuate crises of agreement. First and foremost, since retention of membership in the group is imperative, individuals remain silent because they dread separation from the group. In both conditions, when an individual's dissonance poses a danger to membership, a primal separation anxiety is activated and fear of abandonment, however irrational, takes hold (Janis, 1963; Harvey, 1977, 1988). If a person feels depersonalized or alienated within a large organization, he may react by clinging excessively to a group, seeking friendship, support, and affirmation (Golembiewski, 1989).

Interveners must appreciate that, despite all organizational assurances to the contrary, a person who contemplates breaking a silence and exposing a defective group decision faces actual danger. A "whistle-blower" is usually pressured by the group to conform or, failing that, is punished if possible. Even in groups that allow members to express doubts about decisions, research indicates that, after an initial burst of activity to elicit conformity, the amount of




communication directed to deviant members precipitously declined. If necessary, group members eject the deviant member or redefine the boundaries of the group in some way as to exclude the deviant member (Cartright and Zander, 1968:145-146).

A review of the literature on group dynamics yields a long list of conditions that likely contribute to the propensity to fall into a crisis of agreement, whether of the Abilene or groupthink type. Nine dis- tinct, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, conditions interact to produce crises of agreement. Researchers have not yet achieved a rigorous causal model explaining the interaction of the variables. Indeed, it is more likely that each individual has his or her own unique cognitive map, and attempts to draw a generic model are extremely difficult and ultimately might prove futile.

1. Initial cohesiveness of the group. Most theorists agree that group cohesiveness refers to the degree to which the members of the group desire to remain in the group, as discounted by the forces to leave that group.2 A cohesive group is highly attractive. Important subcomponents related to cohesiveness are the incentive properties of the group, the motives of individual members, the expectation that membership will have beneficial consequences, and that the group compares favorably to other groups (Cartright, 1968).

In most research, cohesiveness is treated as either a dependent variable (the product of specific inducing conditions) or as an independent variable (effects of different levels of cohesiveness upon the group and its members). Clearly, Janis considers cohesiveness to be the single most powerful independent variable in his formulation of groupthink, and subsequent research on groupthink has confirmed this initial requirement (Moorhead and Montanari, 1986; Leana, 1985).

The Abilene paradox has a trickier view of cohesiveness. It begins with cohesiveness as an independent variables but moves full circle to cohesiveness as a dependent variable- or rather, to the crumbling of cohesiveness as a result of group members' dissatisfac- tions.

2. Leadership. There are three major situations in which the style of leadership supported by a group might contribute to a crisis of agreement:

a) An authoritarian leader, especially under stressful conditions, will make decisions for the group, often without seeking consensus.

b) A prestigious leader who has made his values and/or preferences known to the group unknowingly creates a context in which it




is difficult for weaker individuals to express dissent without fearing a loss of face or membership. This is typical in groupthink.

c) Nonexistent, incompetent or ineffective leadership might lead to a process breakdown within a group so that tasks are not assessed systematically and faulty decisions arise (Burke, 1966; Gouran, 1969, 1982). This was certainly the case in Harvey's Abilene parable.

3. Norms of "no criticism" or "no conflicts." There is a strong as- sumption running through organizational communication literature that conflict is dysfunctional and signals serious problems. To many groups, "Disconfirming responses ... go beyond the norms of accept- able criticism" (Schultz, 1989:65). Not only is conflict frowned upon, but often strong sanctions are directed at individuals who adopt dissenting roles (Wenburg and Wilmot, 1973). Both groupthink and Abilene require an aversion to open conflict.

4. Lack of vigilance. For various reasons, group members fail to seek alternative sources of information or to appraise new scenarios properly. The possibilities include:

a) The status or expertise of some members of the group is so high that their opinion, or even silent assent, suffices.

b) The group is insulated from discordant opinion-e.g., because of position in an organizational hierarchy or the secretive nature of the group's task. Crises of agreement are more uncommon in fish- bowl situations where the group's processes and decisions are subject to surveillance by an attentive audience. Significantly, all Janis cases of groupthink took place in meetings that were totally private, c) Lack of procedures that would insure a thorough information search (Janis and Mann, 1977; Hirokawa, 1980, 1987, 1988) and lack of group norms which reinforce such procedures. The situation is often exacerbated by a gatekeeper who inhibits both search and its normative reinforcement.

5. Methods of decision-making. Certain modes of decision-making contribute to all crises of agreement. To illustrate:

a) Decision by lack of response in which silence is interpreted as the proxy for an affirmative vote.

b) Authority rule or "abdication by choice" (Simon, 1976:127) in which the leader's preferences are allowed to dominate the group's decisions.

c) Minority rule in which a small number of highly energetic, respected or persuasive individuals in a group can prevail, especially if the prestige of their subgroup is high.

6. Poor role differentiation. This is more apparent in large groups




where many members are underutilized and remain unclear about expectations regarding their participation. The term "Ringelmann effect" has been used to signify a reverse relationship between the number of people in a group and the size of an individual's contribution (Shaw, 1981). In a large and/or poorly differentiated group, many members will tend to slack off, transferring responsibilities from the individual level either to the group level or to more active members of the group. More recently called the "social loafing effect," this condition leads to crises of agreement especially when apathy and low energy among some group members decrease their likelihood of providing needed information or voicing dissent (Latane, Williams, and Harkins, 1979; Petty, Harkins, and Williams, 1980).

7. Homogeneity of group. A similarity in values and preferences among group members stifles contrasts. If the group members are homogeneous in their outlook, there is a high likelihood of premature eliminations of alternatives encouraging a crisis of agreement. Researchers have found that homogeneity of values is more powerful in groups than similarity in traditional demographics such as age and education (Janis, 1982).

8. Nature of the decision. Is there a crisis? Is it of high salience? Does the group experience stress from external threats?

People exposed to external danger show a dramatic increase in group solidarity. As Janis (1963:227) observes: "[T]hey manifest in- creased motivation to retain affiliation with a face-to-face group and to avoid actions that deviate from its norms." The loss of group membership during a crisis is therefore intolerable and dissent is unthinkable. On the other hand, Abilene can occur even when low salience decisions are involved. For example, "keeping peace in the family" often supersedes the need for an objective or rational decision.

9. Characteristics of individuals. Janis did not add personality characteristics to his model, believing instead that everyone is susceptible to groupthink regardless of personality, but adding these factors into the mix helps explain the virulence of some crises of agreement. The characteristics of individuals must also be consid- ered at two stages in the developing model: first, as independent variables which interact with all other variables to produce a group decision and, second, as intervening variables which determine an individual's adaptive responses to the dissonance produced by a group decision that is out of step with privately held views.



PA Q WINTER 1991 (409)

Four important personality characteristics affect the amount of conformity in groups (Rosenfield, 1973):

a) People with relatively high submissiveness to authority and deference to others are most prone to submit to their perceptions of the will of the group. In a study of the Nixon group, Raven (1974) demonstrated that individuals with sycophantic predispositions contribute to crises of agreement.

b) Individuals can hold values and preferences useful for assess- ing the substance of the group decision or process. One model, based on cognitive dissonance theory, holds that, if a group member disagrees, the decision of whether or not to voice his true beliefs rests in part on the enormity of the dissonance between himself and the group (Festinger and Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1956; Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956; Sande and Zanna, 1987). Sande and Zanna (1987:49) state: "Inconsistent, or dissonant, cognitions lead to psychological discomfort, which motivates activity aimed at restoring consonance." In their studies of cognitive dissonance, Festinger and Aronson (1968:130) isolate the degrees of dissonance and expect different effects from various dissonance-reduced strategies:

He may attempt to convince himself that the content area in which the

disagreement exists is relatively unimportant; he may attempt to dero-

gate the person or group that disagrees with him; he may attempt to

eliminate the disagreement either by changing his own opinion or at-

tempting to influence the disagreeing persons to change theirs; or he

may seek additional social support for the opinion he holds, thus, in

essence, adding new cognitions which are consonant with his own opinions.

The strategy used to adjust to dissonance depends upon the magnitude of the dissonance and is based in part on the prestige of the holders of opposing positions and the individual's own commitment to his position in addition to the kinds of factors listed earlier. The higher the prestige of the group, the more likely is the individual member to suppress discordant thoughts from the group. Generally speaking, however, if the individual is firmly committed to private views even in the face of group pressure to conform, he is more likely to become an Abilene rider. Alternatively, if his views are only mildly divergent from the group's or if he lacks conviction in his views, he is more susceptible to groupthink,3

c) The lower an individual's self-esteem, the greater the tendency



(410) FAQ WINTER ¡99 J

to go along with the group. There are two related reasons: first, the group decision is given the benefit of the doubt and, second, a person with low self-esteem dreads ridicule. It appears that Abilene outcomes are generated by a conscious fear of humiliation.

d) Perceptions of choice and responsibility contribute to individual responses to the group. If a group member feels coerced into making a decision, the likely response is detachment from that decision and an Abilene effect can result. If, on the other hand, the member feels that the choice has been made of his own free will, he is more likely to support the group and experience the groupthink effect.

However, degree of coercion is strictly a subjective measure. As Sande and Zanna (1987:55) point out: "Because group members underestimate the extent to which their behavior has been coerced, cognitive dissonance may cause them to change their attitudes to correspond with, and justify, their actions." The choice and responsibility elements of decisions have powerful effects on the way people cope with conflicts of agreement.

DIAGNOSIS AND INTERVENTION

There is a dearth of research on interventions into crises of agreement as well as a lack of consciousness of the existence of crises of agreement among many ODers. Conventional intervention techniques do not equip an intervener to deal effectively with crises of agreement. An intervener who is not knowledgeable about Abi- lene would assume that the breakdown in cohesiveness requires a strategy of rebuilding. An intervener unfamiliar with groupthink could fail to diagnose the syndrome, or indeed, any problem at all. In both cases, adherence to popular team-building techniques neglects the real roots of the problem- defective decision-making and the silencing of dissent.

Before OD interveners embrace the concept of crises of agreement they must recognize two important provisos. First, Abilene and groupthink can occur simultaneously within a group, depending on how individual members adapt to their disagreement with the group decision. To date, the literature on crises of agreement has always assumed that the situation for the group as a whole is either/or, rather than Abilene and groupthink. This oversimplification might lead OD interveners to diagnose a mixed group incorrectly as suffering from the more common crisis of disagreement, to which standard



PAQ WINTER 1991 (411)

team = building designs would be applied. The cohesiveness of some members and the suffering of others would lead the unwary ODer into applying confrontational intervention designs intended to air differences and resolve discord by building even greater group cohesion. This is an extremely dangerous situation and may, in part, contribute to explanations of why some team-building interventions have unexpectedly poor or adverse results.

Jerry Harvey (1977:169) suggests the use of six simple questions to diagnose a crisis of agreement:

1. In general, how are things going in the organization? 2. What in particular is going well? 3. What are some specific organization problems which need to

be solved? 4. What actions do you think need to be taken to solve them? 5. What problem-solving actions have you and others attempted,

and what were the outcomes? 6. If you haven't taken action, what prevents your taking action to

solve them? If the entire group suffers from an Abilene paradox, then the

questions will reveal the crisis of agreement and an intervention can begin.

Unfortunately, Harvey's diagnostic questions are too limited for present purposes. The questions are framed to produce confessions of private doubts of Abilene riders, not the defective group processes which produce groupthink.

In the throes of groupthink organizational members express satisfaction with the decisions and with the group itself. A diagnosis of groupthink can be made only by examining the structural and procedural characteristics of the group. There are myriad organizational climate surveys which contain questions relevant to diagnosing the conditions favorable to the emergence of groupthink. (See, for example, Janis and Mann, 1977:371.) Rather than focusing on satisfaction measures, however, attention should be turned to process and structure. Questions which deal with leadership styles, information dissemination, adequacy of role and task definitions, and so on, can be helpful in penetrating the enigma of high cohesiveness in tandem with poor group decisions. If enough of the factors enumer- ated earlier are present, the warning flag should rise.

Harvey's questions will not expose a mixed groupthink/Abilene situation. A mix of the two conditions will give the unwary diagnosti- cian confusing signals. If a sub-group signals high cohesiveness while




other members of the group indicate problems, the intervener must consider whether both types of crisis of agreement exist. Because this is probably a common occurrence in groups, Harvey's questions should be used only in tandem with an examination of structures and processes.

The second proviso follows from the tendency to rationalize disasters after the fact. If a group decision produces a poor outcome, many group members will have a strong need to disassociate themselves from the decision and absolve themselves of blame. Few decisions are made with absolute certainty, and it is likely that any linger- ing doubts of participants would be magnified later. Plausibly, group members might underestimate the extent to which they were mildly enthusiastic about an idea which is later repudiated. In his epilogue to the Abilene Paradox, even Harvey (1988:37) admits that "it is altogether possible that my in-laws really wanted to go on the origi- nal trip, but changed their stories once we ... had such a lousy time."

As was discussed earlier, groupthink also provides a convenient means for an individual to reanalyze his contribution to defective decision-making by blaming the group as a whole. Thus, post- mortem analyses of crises of agreement might be dealing with pseudo-group effects rather than truly virulent group dynamics. Nonetheless, an intervention might still be required, particularly one which is aimed at identifying the causes of poor decision-making.

The specific procedures for intervening under both conditions are on public record and need not be replicated here. Accepted intervention strategies for Abilene are based on the intuitions of experienced ODers but are not grounded in theory and lack empirical support (Harvey, 1977, 1988; Dyer, 1988; Golembiewski, 1989). Moreover, although Janis' Groupthink is heavily cited throughout all group-focused research, it has had little impact on OD group diagnostic techniques and group intervention designs. ODers have been particularly remiss in failing to adapt Janis' recommendations for structural and procedural changes in groups, preferring instead a more interpersonal focus. Unfortunately, there has been no work whatever into whether intervention is even possible once a group is in the throes of groupthink. All groupthink "cures," including Janis', are ex post facto suggestions about how groupthink can be prevented in the next round of decision-making rather than whether it can be reversed in mid-course (Janis, 1982; Mann, 1986; Janis and Mann, 1977; Sauser, 1988).

A few brief remarks about interventions are in order. For both




conditions, the tone of the intervention is crucial. An intervener who attempts to empower individual members of a group to confess to reservations about group directions by pressuring them- whether publicly or even privately- is likely to be rejected. Abilene sufferers will retain their catastrophic fantasies about humiliation at the hands of an otherwise-united group and conclude that the cure is worse than the illness. In the groupthink situation, individuals will conclude that the intervener is a quack, an enemy, an incompetent or, as Janis might put it, a member of an "out-group."

A clear blueprint for an Abilene intervention is drawn by Harvey (1977; reprinted in Golembiewski, 1978, Vol. 11:160; Golembiewski, 1989) and Janis and Mann (1977) suggest possible strategies for groupthink. Confrontation designs and most traditional team-building methods should be avoided. These will only highlight the defi- ciencies of the group and of its individual members.

In Abilene, given the malaise, low-energy designs are preferable. All designs must be non-threatening and reflective. Survey/feedback or interview/feedback designs are indicated. To break a crisis of agreement, the intervener must reduce the virulence of the forces which are silencing dissent and, when the individuals are willing, explore the mechanisms for voicing dissent. Harvey (1977) and Golembiewski (1979, 1989) argue that the key to progress in a crisis of agreement intervention is to find a way to allow the individual to speak out without threatening removal from the group. The irrational catastrophic fantasies, the "hypothetical horribles" must be chal- lenged (Shaffer and Galinsky, 1989:153; Janis and Mann, 1977:354), but while respecting the knowledge that the phenomenon popularly known as "killing the messenger" is an ever-present danger.

The emphasis then in on visualizing and preparing for the realis- tic outcomes of ending the "agreement," which can be as severe as job loss and even prosecution. The individual must be willing to break free of his own volition and without any hint of coercion by the intervener. Otherwise, the intervener merely creates stronger conflicts within the individual and generates more emotional tension with the concomitants of hostility, rigidity, and regression (Lewin, 1951).4

After the crisis is exposed, focusing on the norms which have developed in the group is imperative. Without the injection of new modes of group work, the possibility exists that a conflict of agreement will recur as the effects of an interpersonal-level intervention




dissipate. Once group standards or norms are entrenched, experi- mental data show their remarkable resiliency. Even turnover in membership does not necessarily change group standards (Jacobs and Campbell, 1961; Cartright and Zander, 1968:145-149).

In order to create a climate more supportive of openness and owning opinions, upper management must strongly endorse a reward system for the introduction of dissent into group norms. In this regard, Janis' structure and process recommendations are helpful for injecting a new group culture without threatening the strong affiliation needs of group members (Janis, 1982:260-276). Other scholars have added to Janis' list (e.g. Sauser, 1988; Dyer, 1987; Tjosvold, 1986). The weaknesses of consensual methods of decision- making have led to a call for the introduction of "programmed conflict" via such methods as devil's advocacy and dialectical inquiry which are initially unpopular with group members but produce demonstrably better group decisions (Schweiger, Sandberg, and Rechner, 1989; Cosier and Schwenck, 1990).

Interveners must combine interpersonal with structural and procedural change in order to accomplish two aims: first, ensuring that the intervention wipes out both Abilene and groupthink tenden- cies (which probably tend to coexist in many groups) and, second, effecting enduring defenses against defective decision-making in all its guises.

CONCLUSION

The prognosis for breaking the silence in a crisis of agreement remains on the research agenda. Crises of agreement are prevent- able but not easily reversible. Any organization which suspects the existence of silenced dissent among group members should be wary of OD interveners who assure easy solutions and endorse "hit and run" approaches. ODers must be prepared to commit time and energy to the intervention, from diagnosis to intervention, to follow- up. Applying a band aid to a bullet hole would be unethical and irresponsible.

Crises of agreement are understudied, especially in real life, non- laboratory settings. Given the heavy emphasis on teamwork within modern organizations and on group intervention strategies among ODers, however, dissemination of the crisis of agreement concept is desperately needed. In the specialized, though not necessarily




uncommon conditions of Abeline and groupthink, blanket applica- tion of conventional designs is discouraged.

NOTES

1. It is also exceedingly difficult for a group or individual to admit fault (Silver and

Mitchell, 1990; Gouran, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Dion, Baron, and Miller, 1978; Staw, 1976). It seems that one of the outcomes of defective decision-making modes is that the window of opportunity in which dissent may be voiced is very brief and slams precipitously and completely shut. Groups exhibit a tendency to

push ahead even in the face of evidence that the decision may have been faulty. 2. A case might be made for reducing the importance of group cohesion as an an-

tecedent condition. In a series of classical experiments, Asch (1952) used non- cohesive groups to demonstrate the profound influence of group membership on individual judgment. A third of the group members conformed to the group esti- mate of the length of two lines even though they knew it was wrong. It could be

that, in non-cohesive groups with low-salience tasks, the Abilene outcome is likely. Moreover, the groupthink symptoms found in the Stockholm syndrome (where hostages identify with their captors) cannot by any stretch of the imagination be said to begin with an initially cohesive group.

3. See the discussion in Festinger and Aronson (1968:129-131) in which various

laboratory experiments are reviewed, e.g., Aronson and Mills (1968)1 Back (1951); Schachter (1951); Zimbardo (1960). See also Sande and Zanna (1987). None of these authors discussed groupthink or Abilene explicitly, but their findings are relevant.

4. The logic underlying this discussion is based on Lewin's concept of "quasi-station- ary equilibrium": a group standard consists of a field of forces whose distribution is such that any deviation from the level of the standard encounters forces whose effect is to bring about a return to that level (Lewin, 1947, 1951; Heider, 1958). The best way to achieve a change is by redirecting the preexisting forces or by reducing the magnitude of the opposing forces. Introducing new forces or pressures should be avoided. Support comes from studies concluding that disconfirm-

ing information may not undermine basic religious beliefs and, in fact, may lead to belief intensification (Batson, 1975: Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956).

REFERENCES

Asch, S.E. (1952). SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Batson, C. (1975). "Rational Processing or Rationalization? The Effect of Discon-

firming Information on a Stated Religious Belief." JOURNAL OF PERSONALI- TY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 32:176-184.




Cartwright, Donvin (1968). "The Nature of Group Cohesiveness," in Dorwin Cart-

wright and Alvin Zander (eds.). GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY. New York: Harper and Row.

Cartwright, Dorwin and Alvin Zender (1968). "Pressures to Uniformity in Groups: Introduction," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zender (eds.). GROUP DYNAM- ICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY. New York: Harper and Row.

Cosier, Richard A. and Charles R. Schwenk (1990). "Agreement and Thinking Alike:

Ingredients for Poor Decisions." THE EXECUTIVE (ACADEMY OF MAN-

AGEMENT) 4;69-74.

Courtright, JA. (1878). "A Laboratory Investigation of Groupthink." COMMUNI- CATIONS MONOGRAPHS 45:229-246.

Dion, Kenneth L., Robert S. Baron, and Norman Miller (1978). "Why Do Groups Make Riskier Decisions than Individuals?" in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.). GROUP PROCESSES. New York: Academic Press.

Dyer, William G. (1987). "Overcoming Unhealthy Agreement," in TEAM BUILD- ING: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, 2nd ed. Boston: Addison- Wesley.

Festinger, Leon (1957). A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Festinger, Leon and Elliot Aronson (1968). "Arousal and Reduction of Dissonance in Social Contexts," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.). GROUP DYNAMICS: RESEARCH AND THEORY, 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Festinger, L., H. Riecken, and S. Schachter (1956). WHEN PROPHECY FAILS.

Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

Flowers, M.L. (1977). "A Laboratory Test of Some Implications of Janis's Group- think Hypothesis." JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL- OGY 35:888-896.

Golembiewski, Robert T. (1979). APPROACHES TO PLANNED CHANGE, Vols, I and II. New York: Marcel Dekker.

(1989). IRONIES IN ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT. New Bruns- wick, N.J.: Transaction.

Gouran, D.S. (1982). MAKING DECISIONS IN GROUPS: CHOICES AND CONSEQUENCES. Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman.

Harvey, Jerry B. (1988, 1974). "The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agree- ment." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 17 (Summer): 16-43.

(1977). "Consulting During Crises of Agreement," in W. Warner Burke (ed.). CURRENT ISSUES AND STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZATION DEVELOP- MENT. New York: Human Science Press.

Harvey, Jerry B. and Richard Albertson (1971). "Neurotic Organizations: Symptoms, Causes, and Treatment." Parts I and II. PERSONNEL JOURNAL 50.

Heider, F. (1958). THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS. New York: Wiley.




Hirokawa, Randy Y. (1980). "A Comparative Analysis of Communication Patterns Within Effective and Ineffective Decision-Making Groups." COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS 47:312-321.

(1987). "Why Informed Groups Make Faulty Decisions: An Investigation of Possible Interaction-Based Explanations." SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR 18

(February):3-29. Hirokawa, R., Dennis S. Gouran, and Amy E. Martz (1988). "Understanding the

Sources of Faulty Group Decision Making: A Lesson from the Challenger Disas- ter." SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR 19 (November):41 1-433.

Jacobs, R. and D. Campbell (1961). "The Perpetuation of an Arbitrary Tradition

through Several Generations of a Library Microculture." JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 62:649-659.

Janis, Irving L. (1982, 1972). GROUPTHINK, 2nd ed, revised. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

(1963). "Group Identification under Conditions of External Danger." BRIT- ISH JOURNAL OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 36:227-238.

Janis, Irving L. and L. Mann (1977). DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT. New York: Free Press.

Latane, G., D. Williams, and S. Harkins (1979). "Many Hands Make Light Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing." JOURNAL OF PERSONALI- TY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 37:822-832.

Leana, C.R. (1985). "A Partial Test of Janis' Groupthink Model: Effects of Group Cohesiveness and Leader Behavior on Defective Decision Making." JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 11:5-17.

Lewin, K. (1947). "Frontiers in Group Dynamics." HUMAN RELATIONS 1:5-42.

(1951). FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE. New York: Harper. Mann, Carl P. (1986). "How to Remove Groupthink from Executive Decision-

Making." PUBLIC RELATIONS QUARTERLY 31 (Fall):28-31. Moorhead, Gregory and John R. Montanari (1986). "An Empirical Investigation of

the Groupthink Phenomenon." HUMAN RELATIONS 39:399-410.

Nisbett, RE. and L. Ross (1980). HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall.

Petty, R., S. Harkins, and K. Williams (1980). "The Effects of Group Diffusion of

Cognitive Effort on Attitudes: An Information Processing View." JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 38:81-92.

Posner-Weber, Cheryl (1987). "Update on Groupthink." SMALL GROUP BEHAV- IOR 18 (February): 118-125.

Raven, B. (1974). "The Nixon Group." JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 30:304-320.

Rosenfeld, L.B. (1973). HUMAN INTERACTION IN THE SMALL GROUP




SETTING. Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill.

Sande, Gerald N. and Mark P. Zanna (1987). "Cognitive Dissonance Theory: Collec- tive Action and Individual Reactions," in Brian Mullen and George R. Goethals

(eds.). THEORIES OF GROUP BEHAVIOR. New York: Springer- Verlag. Sauser, William I. Jr. (1988). "Injecting Contrast: A Key to Quality Decisions."

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 53 (Autumn):4, 20-23.

Schultz, Beatrice G. (1989). COMMUNICATING IN THIS SMALL GROUP: THEORY AND PRACTICE. New York: Harper and Row.

Schweiger, David M., William R. Sandberg, and Paula L. Rechner (1989). "Experien- tial Effects of Dialectical Inquiry, Devil's Advocacy, and Consensus Approaches to

Strategic Decision Making." ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 32:745-772.

Shaffer, John and M. David Galinsky (1989). MODELS OF GROUP THERAPY.

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Shaw, M.E. (1981). GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Silver, William S. and Terence R. Mitchell (1990, forthcoming). "The Status Quo

Tendency in Decision Making." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.

Simon, H.A. (1976). ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, 3rd cd. New York: Macmil- lan

Staw, Barry (1976). "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commit- ment to a Chosen Course of Action." ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 16.

Tjosvold, Dean (1986). "Constructive Controversy: A Key Strategy for Groups." PERSONNEL 63 (April):30-44.

(1985). "Implications of Controversy Research for Management." JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 11 (Fall/Winter):21-37.

Tuchman, Barbara W. (1984). THE MARCH OF FOLLY. New York: Alfred Knopf. Wanous, John P. and Margaret A. Youtz (1986). "Solution, Diversity and the Quality

of Group Decisions." ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 29

(March): 149-159.

Wenburg, J. and P. Wilmot (1973). THE PERSONAL COMMUNICATION PROCESS. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Whyte, Glen (1989). "Groupthink Reconsidered." ACADEMY OF MANAGE- MENT REVIEW 14:40-56.

