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    INTERNATIONAL PRESS RELEASE

    CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST

    U.S. ATTORNEY ANARCHY BRIAN ALBRITTON

    CRIMINAL CONCEALMENT OF SCAM O.R. 569/875

    Legislation which constitutes an invasionof the province of the judiciary isinvalid. Thursby v. Stewart, 138 So. 742(Fla. 1931).

    Here, there were

    NO legislationNO lawmakers.

    It is not, however, an established fact that

    the document is forged or invalid.

    Doc. # 159, 04/21/10 p. 4, B.

    U.S. Attorney, Anarchy Brian Albritton

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    Respectfully submitted,A. Brian AlbrittonUnited States Attorney

    By: s/ Jennifer Waugh CorinisJennifer Waugh CorinisAssistant United States AttorneyFla. Bar No. 49095400 North Tampa Street, Suite 3200Tampa, Florida 33602Telephone: (813) 274-6310Facsimile: (813) 274-6200Email: [email protected]

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    admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

    trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

    Here, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that there are any facts in the record that

    are material, let alone that there are undisputed material facts. Conclusory statements

    cannot pass for facts in a summary judgment motion.

    B. Plaintiffs Motion Fails to Establish Any Material Facts

    The facts Plaintiffs cite in their brief are not facts at all; rather, the facts consist

    of Plaintiffs insistence that a 1969 Lee County document is a forgery, and that all

    defendants know that it is a forgery:

    there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, becauseGovernmental forgeries D.R. 569/875" and 12-44-20-01-00000.00A0were contrary to Florida and Federal law and null and void from the outset.The fake legal descriptions in said forgeries never existed, Plat Book 3,Page 25 (1912).

    It is not, however, an established fact that the document is forged or invalid. Plaintiffs

    make no effort to cite to anything in the record -- other than their own statements -- to

    establish any facts, material or otherwise. Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden

    to establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary

    judgment must be denied. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

    C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of law

    Plaintiffs fail to state any cognizable legal arguments in support of their

    conclusory allegations against the USAO Defendants. For example, they fail to plead

    even the bare minimum required to state a claim for fraud. Allegations of fraud must

    satisfy the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

    Procedure Rule 9(b), which requires that a party must state with particularity the

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    HOWHITLEREXPANDEDHIS EMPIRE BYCRIMINALLAND CLAIMS

    PARODY BY JOHN E. STEELE

    Signedand executedby the Fhrer in Fort Myers Gas Chambers

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    Buy Document Now

    BEN D. THURSBY v. ISAAC A. STEWART (12/23/31)

    SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, EN BANC

    Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com

    Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com

    December 23, 1931

    BEN D. THURSBY, ET AL., APPELLANTS,

    v.

    ISAAC A. STEWART, APPELLEE; ISAAC A. STEWART, APPELLANT,

    v.

    BEN D. THURSBY, ET AL. APPELLEES

    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

    Hull, Landis & Whitehair, of DeLand, for Board of Trustees of Volusia Co. Fair;

    W. J. Gardiner, for Daytona Beach, for Ben D. Thursby, et al., individually and as constituting Board o f County Commissioners o f

    Volusia County;

    Stewart and Stewa rt, for DeLand, for Solicitors for Isaac A. Stewart.

    Davis, Commissioner, Buford, C. J., And Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown And Davis, J. J., concur.

    Author: Davis

    DAVIS, Commissioner. -- Isaac A. Stewart, whom we will refer to as the complainant, the owner of property and a taxpayer in

    Volusia County, Florida, filed his bill of complaint in the C ircuit Court of Volusia County against the members o f the Board o f County

    Commissioners of said County of Volusia, individually and as constituting the sa id Board of County Commissioners, Samuel D.

    Jordan, Clerk, etc., Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., a corporation, Board of Trustee o f Volusia County fair, a corporation, W. E.

    Swope, Lillian Frances Nordman, G. A. Tyler, A. B. Prevatt and J. G. Dreka, individually and as constituting the members of "Board o f

    Trustees of Volusia County Fair", a corporation, and herein alleged substantially that the said County Commissioners, without

    authority of law, dona ted and paid out, as a gratuity, the sum of four hundred dollars of the public funds of Volusia County to

    Volusia County Fair Association, a corporation, to help in securing the operation of a county fair, a warrant for sa id sum having been

    issued by the Chairman and Clerk of the said Board; that in the budget prepared by said Board, an appropriation of $6,000.00 was

    provided for to be paid out of the agricultural fund to the said Volusia County Fair Association, and that it was out of said

    appropriation that said sum of $400.00 was paid; that at the regular session of the Legislature of Florida, in 1931, a bill was passed

    entitled,

    "An Act requiring the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, to Pay Over to the Board of Trustees of the Volusia

    County Fair, the sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) which was appropriated to the Volusia County Fair Association, by the

    Board of County Commissioners of said County, in the budget for said County for the fiscal year beginning, on the 1st day of

    October, A.D. 1930, and to end on the 30th day of September, A.D. 1931."

    the same being known and referred to herein as Senate Bill No. 910; that the same Legislature also passed a bill entitled,

    "An Act creating a Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair, in Volusia County, Florida, and requiring said Board o f Trustees to

    acquire, purchase and take over in the name of Volusia County, all property of the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., and to

    promote, mainatain and carry on annually a fair or exposition in said county, and investing said Board of Trustees with othe r powers

    and dut ies for the carrying out o f the provisions of said Act, and requiring the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County,

    Florida, to levy a tax su fficient to raise the necessary funds to carry out the provisions of sa id Act, said Act not to exceed One Mill on

    the dollar, and giving the sa id Board of Trustees the entire control of such fair or expos ition and all matters conne cted therewith

    and a ll property that may be acquired under said act and all funds derived from said tax or any other sources."

    the same being known and referred to herein as Senate Bill No. 911 and that both bills were approved by the Governor on June 11,

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    1931; that pursuant to the terms of Senate Bill No. 910, the said Board of County Commissioners, had been requested by said

    Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair, to pay over to them the sum of $6,000.00 which has been appropriated to Volusia County

    Fair Association, and tha t the defendants, W . E. Swope , Lillian Frances Nordman, G. A. Tyler, A. B. Prevatt and J. G. Dreka, were

    designated in Senate Bill No. 911 as such Board of Trustees; that although the complainant had objected personally to a number of

    said Board of County Commissioners against the payment of said sum, a meeting of said Commissioners had been called to be held

    on July 13, 1931, for the purpose of taking action and making payment of such money to the Volusia County Fair Association, and to

    include in their budget for the year 1931, such sum of money as may be required or demanded by the Board of Trustees of Volusia

    County Fair, and it was alleged upon information and belief that it was the intention of said Board of Commissioners to

    misappropriate the further sum of $6,000.00 by paying it over to the Board of Trustees o f Volusia County Fair in accordance with the

    provisions of said Acts of the Legislature; that the appropriation to the Volusia County Fair Association was without authority of law,

    in that it was in violation of Section 9, Article X, of the Constitution of Florida, wh ich provides that,

    "The Legislature shall not authorize any County X X X to obtain or appropriate money for or to loan its credit to any company,

    corporation, association, institution or individual,"

    and that the Legislature is without power to turn over the administration of public funds or to expend or disburse the same in any

    way, except under and pursuant to law , by a duly commissioned o fficer of the State of Florida, or of the Counties of the State , for a

    valid County purpose.

    Complainant alleged further, upon the information and belief, that said bills, 910 and 911, copies o f which were atta ched to the b ill

    of complaint, are each unconstitutional because it is beyond the legislative power to impose compulsory taxation upon the people of

    Volusia County; that sa id bill 911, is unconstitutional and vo id because it is not authoritative in nature, but is mandatory as to the

    requirement that the County Commissione rs pay sa id sum of money arbitrarily and without de fining any purpose for wh ich it is to be

    used, that it is not w ithin the power of the Legislature to d irectly levy or compel the levying by a county of an ad va lorem tax for an

    exclusive local purpose , or to compel the appropriation of money by a county in which the State has no concern, that it mandatorily

    requires the appropriation of money to be expended by non-commissioned officers, designated as such, in violation of the

    requirements of the Constitution, and that it violates Section 25 of Article III, of the Constitution, which requires tha t the legislature

    shall provide by gene ral law, for incorporating educational, agricultural, mechanical, transportation, mining, mercantile and othe r

    useful companies or associations as may be deemed necessary, but shall not pass any special law on any subject, and any such

    special law sha ll be of no effect.

    The constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 911 is further attacked upon the grounds that, (a) it manda torily requires the said Board of

    Trustees to acquire, purchase and take over in the name of the county, all property of Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., (at a

    sum not to exceed $83,000.00, and pledging the name and credit of Volusia County for the payment thereof), and to promote,

    maintain and carry on annually, a fair or exposition in said county, and it also, mandatorily requires the Board of County

    Commissioners to levy a tax to raise funds sufficient to carry out the provisions o f the Act, (b) it requires the Board of Trustees, in

    effect, County Officers, to be freeho lders to be elected by districts and not by the County at large, (c) it names and des ignates the

    said o fficers, until an election provided for therein, in violation of the provision of Section 27, Article III, which provides for an

    election of officers by the people or appointed by the Governor, (d) it permits the ho lding of such offices after the next gneeral

    election to be he ld in the State, (e) it -- a special law -- attempts to regulate and de termine the compensation of certain officers

    provided for therein, (f) it provides tha t if the sa id Board of Trustees at the time of taking title to the said property, does not have

    on hand, funds sufficient to pay the purchase price in full, it is autho rized and empowered to make and issue, interest bea ring

    negotiable promissory notes in the name of Volusia County, for the deferred payment, and to secure the same by mortgage on all

    said property, or any parts thereof, (g) it is in conflict with Sec. 1486, Revised General Stats., Sec. 2191, Compiled Gene ral Laws of

    Florida, 1927, a general law which provides that,

    "No contract shall be let for the work on any road or street, construction or building of any bridge, erecting or building of any house ,

    and that no goods, supplies or materials for county purposes or use be purchased when the amount to be pa id therefor by the

    county shall exceed $300.00 unless notice thereof be advertised once a week for at least two w eeks in some newspaper of general

    circulation of the County, calling for bids upon the work to be done, and for goods, supplies or materials to be purchased by the

    county and requiring in each case the bid of the lowest responsible bidder shall be accepted unless all bids are refused because

    same are too high."

    It is further alleged upon information and belief, that the Board of County Commissioners are about to levy the millage provided in

    said act to be levied, for the year 1931, and that the said Board of Trustees intends to pay to themselves out of the funds so

    collected and paid out of the public funds of Volusia County, or to be raised by general taxation, the salaries and compensation

    provided therein to be paid to themselves for services as such trustees, unless restrained by order of the Court.

    The complainant prayed for a temporary injunction, (1) restraining the members of the Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair from

    paying to themselves or to one another, any salary or compensation for any services rendered, or to be rendered, in or about the

    performance of the duties prescribed by the Act creating the said Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair, (2) restraining the said

    defendants from submitting "to the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, on the 1st Monday in July or at any

    time thereafter, any estimate of any pretended amount of money necessary to be raised for the purpose of carrying out the

    provisions of sa id act, to-wit, Senate Bill No. 911, as a foresaid, and that sa id Ben D. Thursby, W. C. Jackson, Bedford Jones , T. K.

    Apgar and Davis Forster, and Saml. D. Jordan, Clerk of said Board, be enjoined from levying annually or at any time ad va lorem tax

    for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of said Act," (3) restraining the Volusia County Fair Association and the individuals

    constituting the members of said Board of Trustees "from issuing any note under color of said Senate Bill No. 911 for the sum of

    $83,000.00 or any other sum of money in the name of the County of Volusia and State of Florida, for the purchase of any prope rty

    or other assets of Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the

    State of Florida, or in any wise pledging or obligating the County of Volusia and State of Florida to any extent whatsoever," and that

    said injunction be made permanent. The bill was sworn to by the Complainant.

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    Notice of an application for a temporary injunction was filed in the cause, and thereupon the defendants, Volusia County Fair

    Association, Inc., and Trustees of Volusia County Fair, interposed certain objections to the granting of same, which objections, were

    under oa th, and based, in substance upon the grounds that (1) the bill is multifarious, (2) that the Volusia County Fair Association,

    to whom the $6,000.00 appropriation was made, was chartered under the General Laws of Florida authorizing the formation of

    corporations not for profit, for the purpose of operating fairs, etc., and which law authorized the Board of County Commissioners to

    make contributions to such association, to assist in carrying out its purpose, and to expend in their discretion, such sums as they

    deem best in aiding the development of the agricultural, horticultural and live stock resources o f the county, giving publicity to the

    same by a iding the exhibiting of such resources at or in connection with such fairs, including the offering and paying of premiums,

    (3) that Senate Bill No. 910 is in pari materia w ith Senate Bill No. 911, and that sa id Senate Bill No. 911 specifically declares that the

    purchase and taking over of the property of Volusia County Fair Association, and the promoting, maintaining and carrying on

    annually of a fair, the levying of the tax and paying the same over to the Board of Trustees o f Volusia County Fair, are all for a valid

    County purpose, (4) that it is shown to be the duty of the County Commissioners to pay over the said sum of $6,000.00 and that no

    showing is made that any of the defendants are about to issue the said promissory notes, (5) that the appropriation of money to

    the Volusia County Fair Association is not for the benefit of any such company, but for the benefit of the County, and its citizens, (6)

    that it is not true that the tax sought to be enjoined or the appropriation of money sought to be enjoined, is one pertaining to an

    exclusive local affair, and in which State of Florida has no interest or concern, (7) that it is not true that the Board of Trustees of the

    Volusia County Fa ir are non-commissioned o fficers, but on the contrary, they have been commissioned in the form contemplated by

    the constitution of the State of Florida, (8) that Senate Bills numbered 910 and 911, do not authorize the County to loan its credit to

    any company, association or individual, (9) that the Board of Trustees o f Volusia County Fair is nothing more than a subordinate

    public agency, established in aid of a public purpose , and that the provisions of Section 25, Art. 3, of the Constitution do not apply

    to such Board, and that Senate Bill No. 911 does not contain special legislation on subjects forbidden by said Section of the

    Constitution, (10) that the provision of Senate Bill No. 911 that the Boa rd of Trustees of Volusia County Fair shall be free-holders

    does not curtail the Governor's power of selection so as to violate Section 27 of Article III of the Constitution, or any Constitutional

    provision relating thereto, (11) that Senate Bill No. 911 provides that in the event the naming of the Trustees of the Volusia County

    Fair should be judicially determined to be unconstitutional, that the Governor shall appoint such trustees and that the Governor has

    appo inted the same individuals as are named in the Act, to be such Trustees, and they have been duly commissioned, (12) that the

    term of office of the said trustees is less than six years, and is not condemned by any provision of the State Constitution, (13) that

    Senate Bill No. 911 does not attempt to fix the fees of officers of the State o r County, (14) that the said purchase money, notes and

    mortgage are not in effect bonds, and if they were, the provision authorizing the issuance of same, is separable from the remainder

    of the Act and may be eliminated w ithout affecting the primary purpose of the Act, (15) that the legislature was competent to

    provided that the provisions of Section 1486, Revised Gen. Statutes o f Florida, Section 2191, Compiled General Laws of Florida,

    1927, shall not apply to the Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair, nor to any contracts or agreements o f said Board, or to

    any purchases or obligations the reof, and if held otherwise , such provision may be eliminated from the Act without affecting the

    purpose of the Act, and (16) that the bill is without equity.

    The application for a temporary injunction was denied by Judge Daniel A. Simmons, sitting in Volusia County, Complainant then

    amended his bill of complaint by alleging further, upon information and be lief, in substance, that the property referred to in Senate

    Bill No. 911, was acquired by the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., by deed from Sidney A. Wood, as Executor and Trustee under

    the last w ill and testament of Asa D. McBride, deceased, for a recited consideration of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable

    consideration, but as a matter of fact, no consideration was paid therefor; that the sa id land was donated to the Volusia County

    Fair Association, Inc., and w as in violation of the trust reposed in the said Executor, and Trustee, inasmuch as the sa id will only

    authorized him to sell or convey real estate of the estate for the purpose of converting the same into cash for re-investment and

    uses as directed under the terms of the w ill, and in consequence the reof, the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., did not have title

    to the property, and that the same with the improvements thereon, constituted practically all of the property and assets of the said

    Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., and that unless restrained and enjoined by order of the Court, the said property will be

    acquired by the said Board of Trustees, and obligations will be issued in the name of the County of Volusia to the great and

    irreparable injury of said County and the taxpayers therein. The said amendment alleged further, that upon the day the bill of

    complaint was filed, the said County Commissioners prepared the ir tentative budget for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1931,

    and placed therein, an appropriation of $15,000.00 for the use and benefit of the said Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair,

    which unless prevented by order of Court, will cause a millage to be levied upon the taxable property of Volusia Count, in an

    amount sufficient to raise said sum of $15,000.00. Certified copies of the said deed and the said will were attached as exhibits and

    made a part thereof. The amendment was verified by the oath of the complainant as true, except as to matters stated on

    information and belief, and as to such matters, he believed them to be true.

    The judge o f the Seventh Circuit being absent from the Circuit, the bill of complaint and the amendment thereto, w ithout notice to

    the defendants, was presented to Judge Paul C. Albritton of the Twenty-Seventh Circuit, who thereupon granted a temporary

    restraining order as prayed for in the bill. In support of the application, Tom Stewart, an attorney for the Complainant, made an

    affidavit before Judge Albritton, which averred,

    "That the said defendant Board of County Commissioners have deferred making payment of the money mentioned in the bill of

    complaint to the Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair, because o f an insufficiency of money in the agricultural fund of Volusia

    County, which fund has now become adequate to pay the sum of $6,000.00 and that urgent demands are being made on sa id

    Board of County Commissioners to make sa id payment, and that his Excellency, the Governor of Florida, has signified to said Board

    his desire that it make such payment promptly or show cause of not so doing; that said Board of County Commissioners has now

    under consideration the preparation of its annual budget, and is in almost continuous session from day to day in the preparation of

    same; that affiant believes that to give notice of this application for injunction would cause immediate payment of sa id sum and

    accelerate the injury sought to be enjoined; and believes that the injury apprehended will be done if an immediate remedy is not

    afforded the complainant, and affiant fears tha t the Board o f Trustees of the Volusia County Fair may take title to sa id Fair property

    and issue obligations in the name of Volusia County in payment thereof unless immediate relief is granted."

    From the said orde r granting a temporary injunction the defendants , Ben D. Thursby, W. C. Jackson, Bedford Jones , T. K. Apgar, and

    Davis Forster, individually and as constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, Volusia County, Saml.

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    D. Jordan, Clerk of the Circuit Court, in and for Volusia County, Florida, and ex-officio Clerk of the said Board of County

    Commissioners for themselves and for the o ther defendants (naming them) on the 18th day of August, 1931, filed the ir notice and

    entry of appeal.

    On the sa id 18th day of August, the Volusia County Fair Assocation, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair, said

    Board cons isting of W. E. Swope, Lillian Frances Nordman, G. A. Tyler, A. B. Prevatt and J. G. Dreka, jointly and severa lly moved the

    Court to dissolve the temporary injunction. Objection to the hearing was interposed by the complainant, but on 21st day of August,

    A.D. a hearing was held and an orde r was made by Judge Simmons, acting in the place and in stead of the Judge o f the 7th Judicial

    Circuit dissolving the said injunction. From this orde r and the order of Judge Simmons denying the first app lication for a temporary

    injunction, the complainant appealed. The two appeals have been consolidated here.

    It is settled here that the granting, continuance and modification of temporary restraining orders are large ly discretionary, and the

    rights of the gene ral public, if affected thereby, should be considered. Suwannee & S.P.R. Co., vs. West Coast Ry. Co., 50 Fla. 609,

    612, 39 So. 538; McMullen vs. P inellas County, 90 Fla. 398, 106 So. 73.

    Equity Rule 46 provides that in all cases of applications for injunctions, the judge to whom presented, before granting the same

    shall be satisfied that sufficient notice of the application has been given to the party sought to be enjoined, and of the time and

    place where the motion is to be made, and no order shall be granted without such notice unless it is manifest to such judge from

    the sw orn allegations in the b ill or affidavit of the complainant, or other competent person, that the injury apprehended w ill be

    done, if an immediate remedy is not afforded, when he may grant instanter an order restraining the pa rty complained of until the

    hearing or the further order of the court or judge.

    "To satisfy the granting of an injunction exparte, and w ithout notice, the allegations o f the swo rn bill or accompanying affidavit must

    state facts show ing how and why the giving of notice w ill accelerate o r precipitate the injury complained of from which the court can

    determine for itself whether the giving of notice will, or is likely to so result, and such facts must make it manifest to the court that

    the giving of notice of the application will, or is likely to, have such result." Godwin vs. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597, and other

    cases cired therein.

    The allegations in a bill for an injunction must be clear, direct and pos itive, and must be verified by an affidavit, which also, must be

    direct and positive; and where any of the material allegations in the bill are stated upon information, there should be annexed to

    the bill, the additional affidavit of the person from whom the information is de rived verifying the truth of the information thus g iven.

    If the direct and positive allegations o f fact in the sw orn bill as amended, are sufficient to constitute a ground for an injunction, and

    the refusal of the court to grant a temporary injunction upon the first application is not a bar to the making of the order upon the

    second application, the lower court should not be held in error for granting the order from which the first appeal was taken. We

    cannot say that the showing was not sufficient to dispense with notice to the oppos ite parties o f the second application for an

    injunction.

    As a general rule, a second application will be denied merely on a showing that the first one was denied, unless complainant

    presents new and additional matter discovered since the former hearing but "the refusa l of an application for a preliminary

    injunction does not bar complainant from making a se cond application, the decision being an act of discretion; and the Court may, in

    subsequent application, reach a different conclusion on the same or more convincing evidence. The court is not bound to adhe re to

    its former ruling, nor is it bound, in case the former application was in another court, although it will generally do so by way of

    comity." 32 C.J. 336; Louisville & N.R. Co., vs. Ky. R.R. Commission, 214 Fed. 465.

    While a second application for an injunction, when based upon the same evidence or upon evidence which should have been

    presented upon the first application w ill generally be denied, it being a matter in which judicial discretion should be exercised, a

    court will not be held in error in granting a second application if a clear case is presented.

    In McMullen vs. Pinellas County, supra, we he ld that "to the granting of every temporary injunction, two essential conditions must

    prevail. The bill must allege facts which appear sufficient to constitute a cause of action or ground for injunction, and, on the full

    show ing made from both sides it must appear in the light of the circumstances, that the injunction is necessa ry to protect the lega l

    rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation."

    On an application for a temporary injunction, the chancellor may consider the merits of the bill. City of Apalachicola vs. Apalachicola

    Land Co., 9 Fla. 340, 70 A.D. 284; McKinney vs. County Commissioners Bradford County, Fla. 267, 4 So. 855, McMullen vs. Pinellas

    County, supra.

    That a citizen and taxpayer may enjoin an unauthorized expenditure of public money, is we ll established. Rickman vs. Whitehurst,

    73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205, Whitner vs. Woodruff, 68 Fla. 465, 67 So. 110; Anderson vs. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, 41 So. 684, 6 L.R.A. (NS)

    1026, 120 A.S.R. 170, Lass iter & Co. vs . Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So. 14.

    Likewise, equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the assessment and collection of an illegal tax levied upon real estate, which, if assessed

    and collected, will cast a cloud over the title of such real es tate. Pickett vs. Russe ll, 42 Fla. 116, 634, 28 So. 764.

    We are, therefore, confronted with the inquiry; Are the facts alleged, either in the original bill, or the bill as amended sufficient on

    the showing made by both sides to justify the chancellor in the exercise of his discretion, in granting the second application for an

    injunction?

    In all cases where there is no constitutional provision making an expense chargeable to the county, it must be for a county purpose

    in order to justify the legislature in authorizing a county to resort to taxation to defray it (Opinion of Justices, 13 Fla. 687; Board of

    County Commissioners Escambia County vs. Board of P ilot Commissioners, 52 Fla. 197, 42 So. 697). There is no general rule for

    determining what is a county purpose (Commissioners of Duval County vs. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 So. 339). In Jordan vs. Duval

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    County, 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298, we said:

    "While the Constitution provides that 'the Legislature sha ll authorize the several counties * * * in the state to assess and impose

    taxes for county * * * purposes, and for no other purposes,' the term 'county purposes' is not defined or amplified in the organic

    law. This being so, the Leg islative power, in exercising its appropriate law making functions, may determine what is a 'County

    purpose,' and the courts are not authorized to render such determination ineffectual, unless some provision of the Constitution is

    violated, or unless the particular enactment can have no legal or practical relation whatever to any 'county purpose.' Where the

    courts may as in this case inquire into the existence of legislative power to enact a statute, the absence of power must clearly

    appear be fore the statute w ill be declared to be ineffectual for the purpose des igned."

    See Also, Jacksonville vs. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769; Anderson vs . Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775.

    "A staute cannot be judicially declared beyond the power of the Legislature to enact, unless some provision of the Constitution

    which is in conflict with it, can be pointed out." Neise l vs. Moran, 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346.

    Complainant insists that both Senate Bill No. 910 and Sena te Bill No. 911 violate Section 10 of Article 9 of our Constitution, which

    provides that "the Legislature shall not authorize any county * * * to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to any

    corporation, association, institution or individual." In the first state contention, the county commissioners a re in accord with

    complainant. On the other hand, the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., and the Trustees of the Volusia County Fair contend that

    the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., is a non-profit corporation, and any taxes levied to obtain funds to be pa id to it are not

    levied for the benefit of a chartered company, but for the benefit of the people; that this court held in Earle vs. Dade County, 92 Fla.

    432, 109 So. 331, that taxation for a fair and agricultural exhibition is for a valid county purpose, and that be ing true, they aske,

    "Wha t valid objection is there to placing the money in the hands of a non-profit corporation to a id in the carrying out of such

    purpose?" It is not for the Court to say that such an act shall be upheld or declared invalid because the believe it to be wise or ill-

    advised, as the case may be. We are only concerned in whether or not it is denounced by some provision of the organic law. In

    Earle vs. Dade County, 92 Fla. 432, 109 So. 331, we uphe ld a decision of the lower court, validating bonds of the County of Dade,

    the issuance of which was authorized by the Legislature under an act providing for the acquirement and holding of real property for

    fair and fairground purposes, and for the construction thereon of buildings and other structures necessary or desirable for the

    purpose of conducting fairs and agricultural exhibits, authorizing the County Commissione rs to levy upon property an annua l tax to

    be expended in carrying out such purpose and requiring them from time to time, upon the issuance of such bonds, to levy and cause

    to be collected, a tax sufficient to pay the interest thereon, and the annual installments of such bonds from year to year, as they

    mature. In speaking for the Court, Justice Brown said.

    "The effect of these fairs has no doubt been to s timulate an interes t in improved agricultural methods. It may also be true that the

    public benefits to be derived from such fairs are sufficient to authorize the Legislature to place the expense thereof upon the public

    rather than upon a few individuals who have the public spirit to promote and organize such enterprises. As to this feature of the act

    in question, though somewhat paternalistic in its nature, we a renot prepared to say that the Legislature has exceeded its powers

    or come in conflict with any constitutional restriction. This Court has held that the Leg islature, in exercising its appropriate law

    making functions, may determine what is a county purpose w ithin the meaning of Section 5, Art. 9, of the Constitution, and the

    courts are not authorized to render such legislation ineffectual, unless some other provision of the Constitution is violated, or unless

    the particular enactment can have no practical or legal relation whatever to any county purpose. * * * If the state has the power to

    establish and ope rate a s tate agricultural department, or provide for a commissioner of agriculture, it would appear that it might

    also, by prope r legislation, authorize a county, a political subdivision and agency of the sta te, to promote the local agricultural

    interests of the county by acquiring the property and constructing the buildings necessary to the conduct of free public county fairs

    in the particular county." (Italics supplied).

    Senate Bill No. 910 does not direct for what purpose the said sum of $6,000.00 shall be used, but merely requires the County

    Commissioners to pay it over to the Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair.

    Senate Bill No. 911 declares that the purchasing and taking over of the prope rty of Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., the

    promoting, maintaining and carrying on annually of a Fair or Exposition in the county, and the levying of a tax by the County

    Commissioners in orde r to carry out the provisions of the act, "are all for a valid County purpose."

    While the constitution provides that the powers and duties of county commissioners are prescribed by law (article 8, section 5,

    Constitution of Florida), this particular mandate of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions of sa id bill, that makes it the

    duty of the Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair, to make and submit to the Board of County Commissioners an amount of

    money necessary to be raised for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act, and give to the Board of Trustees of Volusia

    County Fair, the supervision and control of "all moneys that may be raised by the tax" as therein provided. County Commissioners

    have only such authority as is conferred by statute (Baden v. Ricker, 70 Fla. 154, 69 So. 694; Stephens vs. Fulch, 73 Fla. 708, 74 So.

    805), and administrative duties pe rtaining to the affairs of a County may be conferred by law upon o fficers other than the County

    Commissioners (State ex re l. Buford vs. Daniel, supra).

    The power of the Legislature to pass laws creating County Officers, other than those provided for in the constitution, is "absolute

    unless res trained by some constitutional provision." (State ex rel. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 376, 39 So. 929).

    "All persons by authority of law instrusted with the receipt of public money, or through whose hands such money may pass to the

    treasury, are 'public officers', whether the se rvice be general or special, transient or pe rmanent."

    "Section 27, article 3 of the State Constitution means that when not otherwise provided in the Constitution the executive and

    administrative governmental functions of the state and counties shall be performed by officers who shall be elected by the people or

    appo inted by the Governor, and that the duties and compensation of such officers shall be fixed by law. Section 7, article 8, requires

    that such county officers shall be commissioned by the Governor, and that before being commissioned they shall file with the

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    secretary of state a bond to be approved by the county commissioners and by the comptroller, Section 14, article 4, provides that a ll

    commissions shall be in the name and under the authority of the state of Florida, sealed with the great seal of the state, signed by

    the Governor and countersigned by the secretary of state. Section 2, article 16, requires every officer to take the prescribed oath.

    Section 7, article 16, provides that the Legislature sha ll not create any office, the term of which shall be longe r than four years."

    Dade County vs. State, 95 Fla. 465, 116 So. 72, 76.

    We a re impelled to the conclusion that the lowe r court committed no error in granting the order temporarily restraining the Board of

    Trustees o f Volusia County Fair from issuing any note under color of Senate Bill No. 911, for the sum of $83,000.00, or any other

    sum of money in the name of Volusia County, for the purchase of any property or other assets of Volusia County Fair Association,

    Inc., or otherwise pledging or obligating the said County to any extent whatever.

    Since no one other than the Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair is authorized to perform the duties attempted to be conferred

    by the said Senate Bill No. 911 upon the said Board of Trustees, and the expressed purpose of the levy of the ad valorem tax is to

    carry out the provisions of the act, and such provisions as we have seen cannot be carried out because said Board of Trustees are

    powerless to act for the county, it follows that the levying of the annual tax on all taxable real and personal property in the county

    should not be made. We hold therefore, that the lower court did not err in granting an orde r temporarily restraining the members of

    the Board of County Commissioners from levying an ad va lorem tax for the purpose o f carrying out the provisions o f Senate Bill No.

    911.

    We w ill now ta ke up the appea l of the complainant from the order denying a preliminary injunction upon the first application, and (2)

    from the orde r dissolving the temporary injunction granted by Judge Albritton. In view of the fact that w e have upheld the o rder

    granting the injunction upon the second application, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the propriety of the Court's action upon the

    first application o f complainant for such injunction. If error was committed in denying the application when first made , it was

    corrected when the order for the injunction was made upon the second application therefor.

    When the order dissolving the injunction was made, an appeal had been entered by the County Commissioners, and the Clerk, for

    themselves and for their co-defendants. This notice and entry of appeal having been filed and duly recorded as required by law

    (Sec. 4904 (2172) Compiled General Laws o f Florida, 1927) it gave to the appellate court jurisdiction of the cause and a lso of the

    appe llants and appellee. Stovall vs. Stovall, 77 Fla. 116, 80 So. 744.

    The defendants, who voluntarily appealed, had the right to join their co-defendants, who were also affected by the order, as

    parties appellant. (Rabinowitz vs . Houk, Fla. , 129 So. 501, Hay vs. Isletts, 98 Fla. 1026, 125 So. 237; Guaranty T. & T. Co. vs.

    Thompson, 89 Fla. 35, 103 So. 110.)

    It is a general rule that when an appeal is perfected, the cause becomes one for the cognizance of the appellate court, and for that

    court alone. The authority of the lower court is terminated, and it cannot proceed in the cause, at least as to the subject matter of

    the appea l, until the appeal is heard and determined. 3 C.J. 1252, 1255; 2 Enc. P. & Pr. 332. See a lso Holland vs. State, 15 Fla. 549.

    Furthermore, where the defendants are so corrected that the rights of one cannot be determined without affecting the rights of the

    others, and an appeal is lawfully taken by one defendant, the trial court pending the appeal, cannot take any steps in the case. 3

    C.J. 1261; 2 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 334.

    This court has said that "W hen jurisdiction of appellate court attaches, it is exclusive as to subject covered by appea l." Wiley v. W. J.

    Hoggson Corporation, 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126.

    By applying the rule just stated to this case, the lower court was without authority to make the order dissolving the injunction at

    the time it was made, and for that reason the said order should be and the same is hereby reversed.

    A supersedeas is not essential to the acquisition of or to preservation of appellate jurisdiction. Wiley v. W. J. Hoggson Corporation,

    supra.

    Per Curiam. -- A majority of this Court are of the opinion that so many vital and controlling provisions of Sena te Bill No. 911, Acts of

    the Legislature, Session of 1931, being Chapter 15560, of the 1931 Special Laws, are unconstitutional that by reason thereof the

    whole Act is unconstitutional and inoperative, it being impossible for the Court to say that w ith the plainly unconstitutional

    provisions eliminated from Senate Bill No. 911 (Chapte r 15560) entitled:

    "An Act Creating a Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair, in Volusia County, Florida, and requiring sa id Board of Trustees to

    acquire, purchase and take over in the name of Volusia County, all property of the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., and to

    promote, maintain and carry on annually a fair or expos ition in said County, and investing said Board of Trustees with othe r powers

    and dut ies for the carrying out o f the provisions of said Act, and requiring the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County,

    Florida, to levy a tax su fficient to raise the necessary funds to carry out the provisions of sa id Act, said tax not to exceed One Mill on

    the Dollar, and giving the said Board of Trustees the entire control of such fair or exposition and all matters connected the rewith

    and a ll property that may be a cquired under said Act and all Funds derived from said tax or any othe r sources,"

    that sa id Bill would have been ena cted at all. Therefore that Act falls in its entirely.

    Senate Bill No. 910 (Chapter 15557), entitled:

    "An Act requiring the board of County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, to Pay Over to the Board of Trustees of the Volusia

    County Fair, the sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00), which was appropriated to the Volusia County Fair Association, by the

    Board of County Commissioners of said County, in the budget for said County for the fiscal year beginning, on the 1st day of

    October, A.D. 1930, and to end on the 30th day of September, A.D. 1931,"

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    is in pari materia w ith Senate Bill No. 911, and if Senate Bill No. 911 is wholly void, the legislative purpose and intent designed by

    Senate Bill No. 910 cannot be accomplished, so that Act must likewise be he ld insufficient as a bas is for any action or payment of

    money by the County Commissioners of Volusia County, such as was sought to be enjoined in this case.

    Since the principal object of the bill of complaint is to de clare uncons titutional and void the aforesa id Acts of the Legislature of 1931,

    and relief so adjudging them void and unconstitutional is sufficiently sustained by the b ill, the injunctions grante d should be a ffirmed

    insofar as they enjoin and restrain acts of the County Commissioners of Volusia County under the two 1931 enactments

    hereinbefore referred to.

    The injunctions granted are accordingly limited and modified in effect so as to enjo in and restrain only the threatened acts of the

    County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, specified in the bill of complaint, insofar as such acts are based upon Chapter

    1557 and 15560, Acts of 1931, Laws of Florida, as so modified the orders granting injunctions are a ffirmed. The order of Judge

    Simmons dissolving the injunction which had been granted by Judge Albritton is reversed .

    The question o f enjoining payments of moneys by the County Commissioners of Volusia County, Florida, under Sections 6516-6526

    C.G.L., 4517-4527 R.G.S., Acts of 1927, is not passed on, because neither the validity, construction nor effect of same is prperly

    involved in the present appeal.

    Orders granting injunctions limited in effect, and as so modified, affirmed. Order disso lving injunctions reversed.

    BUFORD, C. J., AND WHITFIELD, ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN AND DAVIS, J. J., concur.

    WHITFIELD, J. -- Even though under section 6526 (4527) C.G.L. the county commissioners may have duly made an appropriation

    from county funds to the Volusia County Fair Association for an authorized county purpose , the act des ignated Senate Bill No. 910,

    is in the nature of a judicial decree requiring the county commissioners to pay over to the Board o f Trustees of the Volusia County

    Fair, a body p roposed to be created by an act of the Florida Legislature, out of the proceeds o f the taxes collected and to be

    collected in said county for the yea r 1930, the sum of $6,000.00 that was appropriated to the Volusia County Fair Association, by

    the Board of County Commissioners in the budget for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1931.

    The legislature cannot e xercise judicial junctions. A legislative command in the nature of a judicial decree that county funds w hich

    have been appropriated for payment to a specific payee shall be paid to a different payee, without anything in the act to show the

    right of the new payee or that the payment required to be made is for a lawful county purpose, is not contemplated by the

    constitution. It is alleged that the appropriation is not made for a public purose but violates sections 7 and 10, Article IX,

    Constitution. If it be assumed that the act may be shown to be valid by reference to the statute designated as Senate Bill No. 911,

    that act violates section 25, Article III, constitution, in that though it may have reference to a county purpose, Earle v. Dale Co., 92

    Fla. 432, 109 So. 331, yet it is a special law, not creating an agency for governmental purposes, but incorporating a "use ful"

    company or association with corporate powers, when the organic section forbids the legislature to "pass any special law on any

    such subject, and any such special law sha ll be of no effect," with exceptions no material here. The provision in the special act

    requiring the Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair to acquire, purchase and take over in the name of Volusia County,

    property owned by the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., and other provisions, do not make th Board of Trustees created by the

    special act an agency for governmental purposes. In State ex rel. v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804, the act was a general law and

    created an agency for governmental purposes. It is not necessary to consider whether section 20, Article III, or sections 7 and 10,

    Article IX, constitution, are a lso violated.

    BUFORD, C. J., AND ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN AND DAVIS, J. J., concur.

    BROWN, J., (Concurring specially): -- It appears that the conducting of a County Fair in Volusia County constitutes a purely local and

    county purpose, and this being true, the legislature has no authority under the constitution to require or compel the county to

    assess and impose ad valoren taxes for such a purpose. The legislature may authorize the county to do so, but it cannot compel or

    require it. Sec. 5 of Art. IX of the constitution provides that the legislature shall "authorize" the several counties to assess and

    impose taxes for county purposes. This, we have held, refers to ad valorem taxes.There is a vast difference between authorizing a

    county to impose taxes for an exclusively local purpose and compelling it to do so. The former recognizes that the county should

    have some voice in purely county affairs whereas the latter would make possible the centralization of authority over all the local

    affairs of the counties in the State government, thus tending to build up a centralized and bureaucratic form of government, which,

    to my mind, is contrary to the system established by our constitution.

    This question was very ably discussed and the previous decisions of this court thereon reviewed, by this court, speaking through

    MR. JUSTICE STRUM, in the case of Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308. A few e xtracts from the opinion in that case read as

    follows:

    "But the existence of local county officers as a part of our form of government, and for the performance of purely local functions, is

    clearly recognized by the Constitution, altough the legislature possesses powers of the broadest possible nature consistent with

    the constitutional existence o f those o fficers, in determining the extent of their local powers and duties. Therefore, while the

    legislature may shape local institutions and regulate the frame work of local government with reference to local pow ers, it can not

    abroga te these constitutionally recognized institutions and take to itself the complete and direct exercise of local functions in

    matters of purely local concern."

    "It is contended in this case that a county is a mere arm or agency of the State -- that it is merely 'the State Acting locally.' The

    foregoing resume of our constitutional system negatives this theory so far as the administration of purely local affairs is concerned.

    It is true that a county is an agency of the State, having no inherent power, but deriving its powers wholly from the sovereign

    State. It is also true, to paraphrase the language of one of the briefs herein, that the principle of local self-government does not

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    constitute each county 'an independent sovereignty, managed by a board having legal rights.' Nevertheless, their existence as local

    entities for local purposes as well as their existence as legal political divisions of the State is recognized by the Constitution. The

    same power which created the legislaure, namely, the sovereign people, recognized the counties. While a county in the

    performance of certain funcstions is an agency or arm of the State, it is also something more than that. If a county were no more

    than a mere agent of the State , -- the State acting locally, -- bonds issued by a county by a county would in effect constitute State

    bonds , and therefore by virtue of Sec. 6 of Art. IX of the Constitution would be void ab initio. While the county is an agency of the

    State, it is also, under our Cons titution, to some extent at least, an autonomous, self-governing political entity with respect to

    exclusively local affairs, in the performance of which functions it is distinguished from its creator, the State, and for its acts and

    obligations when acting in purely local matters the State is not responsible. This, as we have seen, must be conceded in order to

    susta in the validity of county bonds." * * *.

    "When the language of Section 2 and 5 Art. IX is contrasted, however, and is considered in the light of our institutions of

    government and in the light of the construction placed upon what is now Sec. 2 of Art. IX in Cheney v. Jones, supra, it is our

    judgment that the framers of the Constitution intended to and d id withhold from the legislature the power to directly levy, or to

    compel a county to levy, a local county ad valorem tax for an exclusively local purpose as already defined herein. Local

    administration of exclusively local affairs, that is, affairs in which the State has no sovere ign interest as such, is undoubtedly

    contemplated by our Constitution. To withhold the co-ordinate power of local determination as to taxation in matters of exclusively

    local concern, would leave little of local government. See Coo ley, Taxation (4th ed.), Sec. 416; et seq; Jackson Lbr. Co. v. Walton

    County, 116 So. 771; People v. Mayor, etc., 51 Ill. 17; Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 682, 700; Morgan v. Schussells, 81 N.E. 814;

    People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 366; People v. Village o f Pelham, 109 N.E. 513; State v. Omaha, 200 N.W. 871; 46

    A.L.R. 602, 610; Cooley Const. Lim. (7th ed.) p. 337."

    It may be as contended by Commissioner Davis, that the legislation here under review comes in conflict with Secs. 7 and 10 of Art. 9

    and Sec. 20 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, but I am inclined to base my concurrence in the conclusions reached by Commissioner Davis

    upon the compulsory features of the legislation, in respect to matters which under the constitution the legislature may only

    authorize, and not require, a county to do.

    I am also inclined to agree w ith Justice DAVIS that unde r section 6526 C.G.L. the County Commissione rs were authorized to

    appropriate $6,000.00 to the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc. for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 1930, but I doubt the validity

    of the act compelling them to pay this appropriation to the "Trustees of the Volusia County Fair." The tax was not levied for that

    specific purpose. And, for the reasons above set forth, I am inclined to think the act creating the "Board o f Trustees of the Volusia

    County Fair" is itself unconstitutional.

    DAVIS, J., concurs.

    DAVIS, J., concurring w ith WHITFIELD, J.: -- I concur with the view expressed by MR. JUSTICE W HITFIELD that Senate Bill No. 910,

    which became Chapter 15557, Acts of 1931, is in the nature o f a judicial decree requiring the County Commissione rs to pay over to

    the Board of Trustees of the Volusia County Fair, a body proposed to be created by an Act of the Florida Legislature, the sum of

    $6,000.00 that was appropriated to the Volusia County Fair Association by the Board of County Commissioners in the budget for the

    fiscal year ending September 30, 1931, and that such legislative command be ing in the nature of a judicial decree that County funds

    which have been appropriated to a specific payee shall be paid to a different payee is not contemplated by the constitution. I

    therefore acquiesce in the holding that Chapter 15557, Acts of 1931, insofar as it operates as a mandatory requirement on the

    Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County is unconstitutional, and that payments as commanded by the 1931 Act should be

    enjoined insofar as the 1931 Act seeks to coerce such payments by legislative fiat.

    I also concur in the view that Chapter 15560, Acts of 1931, is unconstitutional for the reasons pointed out in the opinion by MR.

    COMMISSIONER DAVIS and in the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITFIELD.

    The bill of complaint show s that an appropriation was made of the sum of $6,000.00 to the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., by

    the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1930, and ending September 30,

    1931.

    Such appropriation was specifically authorized by Section 6526 C.G.L., 4527 R.G.S., which provides that "Board of County

    Commissioners of the various counties of the State of Florida, are authorized to expend in their discretion such sums as they deem

    for the best interests of their counties and in aiding the deve lopment of the agricultural, horticultural and livestock resources of their

    counties and in giving publicity to the advantages, facilities and agricultural, horticultural and livestock poss ibilities and production of

    their counties by providing for, aiding and assisting the exhibition and demonstration of such resources at and in connection with

    such fairs and expositions, including the offering and paying of premiums for such exhibition of resources o f their respective

    counties. This Section is a part of Chapter 7388, Acts of 1917, which has been unquestioned as to its validity for fourteen years.

    The object of the 1931 Act was simply to amend this a lready "fixed appropriation" which had been validly made, by providing that it

    should be paid, -- not to the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., a voluntary corporation which has existed in Volusia County for

    many years, but to the new body also created in 1931 known as the Board of Trustees of Volusia County Fair.

    If such change gives any one the right to complain, it is not a taxpayer of Volusia County, but is the Volusia County Fair Association,

    Inc., whose "fixed appropriation" has thus been diverted to another separate and distinct body.

    In fact, the real complaint against the payment of this $6,000.00 which is a " fixed appropriation" to the Volusia County Fair

    Association, Inc., seems to be tha t Chapter 7388, Acts of 1917 (Sections 6516 to 6528, C.G.L.), is uncons titutional, -- particularly as

    to Section 6526 C.G.L., 4527 R.G.S., which authorizes county commissioners to appropriate moneys of the county fair associations to

    aid in the development of the agricultural and livestock resources of the several counties, by means of the publicity which is afforded

    through these fairs.

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    I am unable to see where w e can declare such purposes as those set out in Section 6526 C.G.L., supra, not proper county purposes

    in view of the Legislature's specific declaration that they are a valid purpose for which the county commissioners of a county may

    appropriate money. If there was any doubt on this score it has been removed by the holding of this court in Earle v. Dade County,

    92 Fla. 432, 109 Sou. Rep. 331, where the court said that the use of taxation by a county to develop and advertise the agricultural,

    horticultural and livestock advantages of a county through county fairs and expositions was a proper county purpose.

    Publicity is perhaps the most powerful influence which exists in our modern life. So grea t is its value that over a billion dollars a yea r

    is spent for it by the people of the United States. Holding a fair of exposition to exhibit the county's resources is one way of taking

    advantage of this powerful influence of publicity, and the word "publicity" is expressly used in the law when referring to the purpose

    for which these appropriations of money are authorized. Publicity with reference to advantages and facilities o f a community is now

    generally recognized in all enlightened communities as being a public purpose, for which tax money can be spent when authorized

    by appropriate legislation, where the expenditures made for it remain within the control of the public authorities and are not

    delegated to private agencies.

    Here the Board of County Commissioners in September, 1930, determined that the publicity of the advantages of Volusia County

    through the medium of a fair or exposition would be worth at least $6,000.00 to the County, and they put that much in the budget

    to be used for that purpose.

    This was appropriated to be paid over to the Volusia County Fair Association, Inc., as a consideration for the publicity and other

    advantages which the county would receive through the medium of the Volusia County Fair Association's activities in holding a fair

    or exposition during that fiscal year. Unless we are going to declare the 1917 statute unconstitutional, as well as the 1931 statute

    unconstitutional, there is no ground to enjo in and prohibit the County Commissioners from paying out this money which they

    deliberately appropriated under express authority of the 1917 statute, and in consideration of which Volusia County Fair

    Association, Inc., evidently has incurred expenses and rendered se rvices to the County which justly entitle that Association, if not its

    1931 successor, to receive these appropriated funds.

    BROWN, J., concurs.

    19311223

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    INTERNATIONAL PRESS RELEASE

    CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST

    U.S. ATTORNEY ANARCHY BRIAN ALBRITTON

    CRIMINAL CONCEALMENT OF SCAM O.R. 569/875

    Legislation which constitutes an invasionof the province of the judiciary isinvalid. Thursby v. Stewart, 138 So. 742(Fla. 1931).

    Here, there were

    NO legislationNO lawmakers.

    It is not, however, an established fact that

    the document is forged or invalid.

    Doc. # 159, 04/21/10 p. 4, B.

    U.S. Attorney, Anarchy Brian Albritton

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    The Florida Constitution

    CONSTITUTION

    OF THE

    STATE OF FLORIDA

    AS REVISED IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED

    The Constitution of the State of Florida as revised in 1968 consisted of certain revised articles as proposed by

    three joint resolutions which were adopted during the special sess ion of June 24-July 3, 1968, and ratified by

    the electorate on November 5, 1968, together with one article carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as

    amended. The articles proposed in House Joint Resolution 1-2X constituted the entire revised constitution with

    the exception of Articles V, VI, and VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 4-2X proposed Article VI, relating to suffrage

    and elections. Senate Joint Resolution 5-2X proposed a new Article VIII, relating to local government. Article V,

    relating to the judiciary, was carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended.

    Sections composing the 1968 revision have no history notes. Subsequent changes are indicated by notes

    appended to the affected sections. The indexes appearing at the beginning of each article, notes appearing at

    the end of various sections, and section and subsection headings are added editorially and are not to be

    considered as part of the constitution.

    PREAMBLE

    We, the people of the State of Florida, being grateful to Almighty God for our constitutional liberty, in order

    to secure its benefits, perfect our government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and

    guarantee equal civil and political rights to all, do ordain and establish this constitution.

    ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

    ARTICLE II GENERAL PROVISIONS

    ARTICLE III LEGISLATURE

    ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE

    ARTICLE V JUDICIARY

    ARTICLE VI SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS

    ARTICLE VII FINANCE AND TAXATION

    ARTICLE VIII LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    ARTICLE IX EDUCATION

    ARTICLE X MISCELLANEOUS

    ARTICLE XI AMENDMENTS

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    (c) The governor shall appoint all commissioned officers of the militia, including an adjutant general who

    shall be chief of staff. The appointment of all general officers shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.

    (d) The qualifications of personnel and officers of the federally recognized national guard, including the

    adjutant general, and the grounds and proceedings for their discipline and removal shall conform to the

    appropriate United States army or air force regulations and usages.

    SECTION 3. Vacancy in office.--Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office, upon the death,

    removal from office, or resignation of the incumbent or the incumbent's succession to another office,unexplained absence for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the residence required when elected or

    appointed, and upon failure of one elected or appointed to office to qualify within thirty days from the

    commencement of the term.

    History.--Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary

    of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

    SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions.--

    (a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution

    shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the

    purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on

    the realty, the following property owned by a natural person:

    (1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous

    land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent

    inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land,

    upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family;

    (2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.

    (b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner.

    (c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child, except

    the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real

    estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,

    may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is

    incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.

    History.--Am. H.J.R. 4324, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. H.J.R. 40, 1983; adopted 1984; Am. proposed by

    Constitution Revis ion Commiss ion, Revis ion No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998;

    adopted 1998.

    SECTION 5. Coverture and property.--There shall be no distinction between married women and married

    men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that

    dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.

    SECTION 6. Eminent domain.--

    (a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to

    each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.

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    ARTICLE XII SCHEDULE

    ARTICLE I

    DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

    SECTION 1. Political power.

    SECTION 2. Basic rights.

    SECTION 3. Religious freedom.

    SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.

    SECTION 5. Right to assemble.

    SECTION 6. Right to work.

    SECTION 7. Military power.

    SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.

    SECTION 9. Due process.

    SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.

    SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.

    SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.

    SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.

    SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.

    SECTION 15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.

    SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.

    SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.

    SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.

    SECTION 19. Costs.

    SECTION 20. Treason.

    SECTION 21. Access to courts.

    SECTION 22. Trial by jury.

    SECTION 23. Right of privacy.

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    SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.

    SECTION 25. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.

    SECTION 26. Claimant's right to fair compensation.

    SECTION 27. Marriage defined.

    SECTION 1. Political power.--All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain

    rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.

    SECTION 2. Basic rights.--All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have

    inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be

    rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance,

    disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by

    law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.

    History.--Am. S.J.R. 917, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision

    No. 9, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

    SECTION 3. Religious freedom.--There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting

    or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public

    morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivis ion or agency thereof shall ever be

    taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid

    of any sectarian institution.

    SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.--Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all

    subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the

    liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be

    given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the partyshall be acquitted or exonerated.

    History.--Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary

    of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

    SECTION 5. Right to assemble.--The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their

    representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.

    SECTION 6. Right to work.--The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of

    membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through

    a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the

    right to strike.

    SECTION 7. Military power.--The military power shall be subordinate to the civil.

    SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.--

    (a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the

    state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.

    (b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, between the

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    purchase and delivery at retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer

    of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun" means a firearm capable of being carried

    and used by one hand, such as a pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in

    Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

    (c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of this section, effective no later than

    December 31, 1991, which shall provide that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a

    felony.

    (d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade in of another handgun.

    History.--Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 43, 1989; adopted 1990.

    SECTION 9. Due process.--No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,

    or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against

    oneself.

    History.--Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary

    of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

    SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.--No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of

    contracts shall be passed.

    SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.--No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.

    SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.--The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers

    and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private

    communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,

    supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or

    things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This rightshall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by

    the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be

    admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States

    Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

    History.--Am. H.J.R. 31-H, 1982; adopted 1982.

    SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.--The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost.

    It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invas ion,

    suspension is essential to the public safety.

    SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.--Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense

    punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person

    charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on

    reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical

    harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the

    accused may be detained.

    History.--Am. H.J.R. 43-H, 1982; adopted 1982.

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    Florida Attorney General

    Advisory Legal Opinion

    Number: AGO 78-118

    Date: September 27, 1978

    Subject: Counties, roads and streets, dedication, vacation

    Robert Bruce Snow

    Hernando County Attorney

    Brooksville

    QUESTION:

    May a county legally divest itself of ownership and control of

    certain dedicated streets and roads in a subdivision, and transfer

    to a homeowners' association the right to exercise ownership and

    control of, and to maintain, the streets and roads?

    SUMMARY:

    A county is statutorily authorized in the sound discretion of the

    board of county commissioners to close and vacate dedicated roads

    and streets designated on a recorded subdivision plat. Such

    authority must be lawfully exercised in the interest of the generalpublic welfare and may not invade or violate individual property

    rights. The county is not authorized, however, and cannot in any

    manner legally convey or transfer the ownership and control of the

    vacated roads or streets to a homeowners' association as such, but

    upon lawful vacation thereof the abutting fee owners hold the title

    in fee simple to the vacated roadways or streets to the center

    thereof unburdened and unencumbered by the public's prior easement

    to use such roadways or streets for travel. The county would not be

    liable to any abutting fee owners as a result of closing or

    vacating such roadways or streets unless an abutting owner is

    thereby deprived of and suffers a consequent loss of access to his

    property. An abutting fee owner would also have a private or

    implied easement and cause of action to enforce such easement for

    access or egress or travel as against the homeowners' association

    or other abutting owners seeking to obstruct such access and use of

    and travel upon the vacated, now private, roads and streets.

    According to your letter, several miles of platted roads or streets

    in a large subdivision in Hernando County were dedicated to the

    public and accepted by the county through its approval for

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    recording of the subdivision plat andits acceptance of the

    dedication of the streets and roads contained thereon. A property

    owners' association representing the majority, though not all, of

    the residents and property owners of the subdivision has requested

    the county to relinquish its control, ownership, and maintenance of

    the dedicated streets and roads and turn over this control,

    ownership, and maintenance to the association in order that it

    might not only maintain such streets and roads but also restrict

    access to and within the subdivision to its residents and propertyowners. As attorney for the county, you ask whether the board of

    county commissioners may legally transfer its ownership and control

    of the streets and roads to the association and, if it does so,

    whether it will be subject to any liability as a consequence of its

    actions.

    Initially, it is necessary to consider the elements and effect of a

    dedication. A dedication is simply the donating or appropriating of

    one's own land for use by the public. That is, the owner of the

    dedicated property is precluded from using it in any way

    inconsistent with the public's use thereof. There are two essential

    requisites to a finding of a dedication of property to the public.

    There must first be a clearly manifested intent by the owner of

    property to dedicate it to public use. Second, the public, through

    its authorized agents or officials, must clearly manifest its

    intent to accept the dedication. City of Miami v. Florida East

    Coast Railway Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920); Roe v. Kendrick, 200 So.

    394 (Fla. 1941). An offer of dedication to the public an be

    accomplished by making and recording a plat and selling lots with

    reference thereto, the method apparently employed in the instant

    situation. See, e.g., Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Worley, 38So. 618 (Fla. 1905); Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty and

    Investment Co., 21 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1945); and see s. 177.081, F. S.

    It appears from your letter that the dedication of roads and

    streets in the subdivision in question was properly accepted by the

    appropriate county officials and I, therefore, assume that a proper

    dedication has taken place.

    The effect of a dedication does not operate as a grant of the

    dedicated property but rather by way of an estoppel in pais. That

    is, the legal title to the property remains in the grantor (or his

    vendees) while the public takes the beneficial use of the property.

    Effectively, then, the fee remains in the grantor (or his grantees)

    while the public acquires only a right of easement in trust, so

    long as the dedicated land is used for the intended purpose of the

    dedication. The grantor (or grantees--abutting lot owners) is

    precluded from using the property in any way inconsistent with the

    public use. Burkhart v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 156 So.2d 752 (2

    D.C.A. Fla., 1963), decision quashed 168 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1964);

    Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corporation, 107 So.2d

    51 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1959); Robbins v. White, 42 So. 841 (Fla. 1907).

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    Absent a contrary showing, not made evident here, the legal title

    of the grantor-subdivider in properly dedicated property passes to

    the grantees of lots sold in reference to a plat, which lots abut

    the dedicated streets. Their title extends to the center of the

    streets subject to the public easement. Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d

    886 (Fla. 1954); Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915); New Fort

    Pierce Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 171 So. 525 (Fla.

    1936); United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, 342

    So.2d 476, 480 (Fla. 1977); cf., Emerald Equities v. Hutton, 357So.2d 1071 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978), wherein the court held that, when

    a single owner conveys to the county the title to or an easement in

    a roadway which is later abandoned by the county, that owner or his

    successors takes back or retains title to all the ababdoned

    property unless the owner is a subdivider who has later *4438

    conveyed lots (and his interest in the abutting road) which abut

    the dedicated roadway to separate owners without specifically

    reserving any reversionary interest in the roadway. In such a case,

    the general rule prevails that the abutting owners on each side of

    the abandoned or vacated road become the fee owners out to the

    center line. See alsoss. 177.085(2) and 336.12, F. S. These

    purchasers acquire their title, however, subject to the easement of

    the public in the dedicated property. Smith, supra; New Ft. Pierce

    Hotel Co., supra; Gainesville v. Thomas, 54 So. 780 (Fla. 1911).

    Your inquiry does not state that the dedicator or subdivider

    reserved any reversionary interest or rights in the streets and

    roads in the plat in question. I assume, therefore, for the

    purposes of this opinion, that no such rights exist in or under the

    plat. However, if such plat was made and recorded in the public

    records before July 1, 1972, and if no action has since beenbrought to establish or enforce any such reversionary rights, they

    are now barred and unenforceable by operation of s. 177.085(2), F.

    S. See also16.33 Acres of Land in County of Dade, supra, and

    Emerald Equities, supra.

    It seems evident that the governing body of Hernando County does

    not 'own' the streets and roads in the subject subdivision which

    were dedicated for public use. Th