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AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE & INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AKIS)GOOD PRACTICE NOTE

DecentralizingAgricultural Extension

Lessons and Good Practice

The World BankRural Development FamilyAgricultural Knowledge & Information Systems (AKIS)

Work in progressfor public discussion

August 2000

Prepared by the AKIS Thematic Team with inputs fromGary Alex, Chris Gerrard, Derek Byerlee, C. Annor-Frempong, Daniel Moreau, David Nielson, DelyGapasin, Eliseo Ponce (Philippines), Graham Kerr,Jaakko Kangasniemi, Jaakko Kangasniemi, Joko Budianto(Indonesia), Mahamood Kamara, Marie-Hélène Collion,Matthew McMahon, Melissa Williams, SolomonBekure, and Willem Zijp

Agricultural Knowledge & Information Systems is a thematic team focusing on agriculturalextension, education, and research within the Rural Development Department of theEnvironmentally & Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank.

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Contents

Foreword iv

List of Acronyms v

Executive Summary 1

The Case for Decentralization 2Principles in Decentralization Reform 3Coproduction of Goods and Services 4Regional Governments vs. Local Communities 5National Frameworks for Decentralization 5

Issues with Decentralization of Public Sector Extension 6Recognizing Multiple Extension Functions 7Administrative Decentralization 8Decentralized Governance Introducing Accountability 9Fiscal Decentralization of Extension Services 10Transition to Decentralized Systems 11

Good Practice for Decentralization in AKIS Projects 13Centralize or Decentralize Programs As Appropriate To the Service 13Adapt Strategies to Local Institutional Environments 14Strengthen Central Support Services for Extension 14Provide Mechanisms for Policy Formulation in Mixed Systems 14Expect to Continue Public Sector Financing 14Fiscal Transfers for Research and Extension 15Plan for Transition and Local Capacity Development 15Ensure Monitoring and Evaluation of Decentralized Systems 15

Additional Readings and References 16

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Foreword

AKIS is the Agricultural Knowledge and Infor-mation Systems Thematic Team, composed ofWorld Bank staff working in or interested inresearch, extension, and education programs.The overall team objective is to enhance the ef-fectiveness of Bank support to agriculturalknowledge and information system develop-ment, and thus contribute to the Bank’s objec-tives of alleviating poverty, ensuring foodsecurity, and improving sustainable manage-ment of natural resources. The AKIS team em-phasizes policy, institutional, and managementissues associated with agricultural research,extension, and education, recognizing that otherthematic teams will focus on technical issues.The Team mission is to “promote the develop-ment of sustainable and productive agriculturalresearch, extension, and education systems inBank client countries.”

In 1999, the AKIS Thematic Team identifieddecentralization as an important issue in agri-cultural research and extension systems, andmade it one of the topics for the 1999 AKIS Re-treat. As input to the retreat, Graham Kerr andMahamood Kamara summarized data on thestatus of decentralization of extension systems,drawing from a “Study on Decentralization,Fiscal Systems, and Rural Development”. In theretreat, C. Annor-Frempong and SolomonBekure (Ghana), Eliseo Ponce (Philippines), JokoBudianto (Indonesia), and Matthew McMahon(Latin America) shared experience with coun-try decentralization initiatives. A discussionpaper was prepared by Gary Alex drawing onthe 1999 AKIS Retreat, review of other experi-

ence with decentralization, and discussions intwo AKIS team “shared learning seminars”.This Good Practice Note summarizes the find-ings and implications for decentralization ofagricultural extension services, and is intendedas a contribution to the exchange of ideas andexperience within the AKIS Thematic Team.

“AKIS Good Practice Notes” are designedto disseminate views, experiences, and ideasthat may assist World Bank Team Leaders, na-tional counterparts from Borrower counties, andother partners to prepare and implementprojects to strengthen agricultural research, ex-tension, and education programs. The GoodPractice Notes contain lessons learned from in-novative experiences in World Bank projectsand elsewhere, and make this informationreadily available for comment and use byproject teams.

This “AKIS Good Practice Note “ was pre-pared by the AKIS Thematic Team with inputsfrom Gary Alex, C. Annor-Frempong, SolomonBekure, Joko Budianto (Indonesia), DerekByerlee, Marie-Hélène Collion, Dely Gapasin,Chris Gerrard, Mahamood Kamara, JaakkoKangasniemi, Graham Kerr, MatthewMcMahon, Daniel Moreau, David Nielson,Eliseo Ponce (Philippines), Melissa Williams,and Willem Zijp.

Marie-Hélène CollionChair, AKIS Thematic Team

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Abbreviations

AKIS Agricultural Knowledge and Information SystemsIGFT Inter-Governmental Fiscal TransferNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationLGU Local Government UnitMOFA Ministry of Food and AgricultureNAES National Agricultural Extension System

Executive Summary

1

Over the past two decades many coun-tries have undertaken to decentralizegovernment functions and transfer au-

thority and responsibilities from central to in-termediate and local governments, and often tocommunities and the private sector. Decentrali-zation is potentially important to agriculturalknowledge and information systems, but decen-tralization is not an end in itself, and successfuldecentralization strategies must address threechallenges—establishing a national frameworkfor decentralization, developing subsector ap-proaches, and enhancing capacities of variousparticipants for coproduction of decentralizedgoods and services.

Agricultural extension services are underincreasing pressure to become more effective,more responsive to clients, and less costly togovernment. Decentralization is an increasinglycommon aspect of extension reforms. Field ex-tension advisory services are well suited to de-centralized approaches, but a comprehensiveextension system requires a range of extensionsupport services and programs, some of which(strategy formulation, training, monitoring andevaluation, specialized technical support) areoften best carried out at the central level.

Decentralization strategies appropriate toAKIS projects frequently include institutionalarrangements that:• Decentralize extension services where

possible, with emphasis on giving users con-trol over program planning, implementa-tion, and evaluation.

• Provide for adequate centralized supportsystems for decentralized extension ser-

vices, especially support for training, sub-ject matter specialists, and production ofextension materials.

• Adapt strategies to local institutional envi-ronments to accommodate country legalframeworks, political traditions, adminis-trative structures, and social and agro-ecological conditions. Extension strategiescan emphasize decentralization when thereis already a strong political decentralizationin the country, but should proceed cau-tiously when decentralization is not yet wellestablished.

• Determine on a case-by-case basis whetherdecentralized services should be managedby local governments, community/pro-ducer organizations, or local governmentsin conjunction with producer/communityorganizations.

• Provide clear division of responsibilitiesbetween the different levels of governmentand other program participants.

• Develop procedures for policy formulationand priority setting in mixed systems to rec-oncile central government financing andpolicy objectives (poverty alleviation, foodsecurity, and environmental conservation)with local peoples’ priorities that emergefrom the decentralized program gover-nance.

• Provide for needed fiscal transfers fromcentral government to decentralized imple-menting agencies to finance decentralized ex-tension services, recognizing that over theshort term decentralization rarely reduces re-quirements for central government financing.

2 Decentralizing Agricultural Extension

• Structure fiscal transfers to give users maxi-mum influence over programs and to pro-mote institutional pluralism in serviceprovision. This empowers users and de-velops capacities in a range of public andprivate providers, such that the most com-petent institutions are able to provide theservices.

• Provide for extensive planning, promotionof the rationale and principles behind re-forms, and training in new operational pro-cedures before launching decentralizationreforms.

• Provide for needed investments in develop-ment of local capacity (local governments,executing agencies, community or producergroups), as such implementation capacity iscritical to success of decentralization reforms.

• Establish effective systems to monitor andevaluate decentralized programs, and en-sure that the data are available at all appro-priate levels. Central monitoring should besensitive to equity issues and the possibil-ity of local elites capture of programs, thusexcluding services to the poor, women, orminority groups.

Decentralization (see Box 1) as transfer of au-thority and responsibility for government func-tions from central government to intermediateand local governments, and often to communi-ties and the private sector has become wide-spread over the 1980s and 1990s. Countries withdiverse systems and traditions of governmenthave pursued decentralization initiatives formany reasons, including especially the failureof government to meet expectations under cen-tralized approaches to economic managementand service provision. Decentralization is acomplex phenomenon involving a variety of

The Case for Decentralization

In a decentralized system, the folks atthe bottom are in charge. This is very

different from the past, and verydifficult for a lot of us to accept.

— Graham Kerr

approaches to organizing public administration.Though not yet widely applied to agriculturalresearch and extension, decentralization strat-egies are potentially important to these agricul-tural knowledge and information systems.

Decentralization is frequently viewed fromone of two different perspectives: 1. The demo-cratic view emphasizes the aspect of empower-ing local people to control and direct their ownpublic programs; and 2. The administrativeview emphasizes the efficiency gains resultingfrom improved administration and effective-ness of public programs due to local control.Decentralization is generally expected to: en-courage local financing and ownership of pro-grams, result in more efficient and equitableallocation of government resources, provideincentives for production and service delivery,ensure lower-cost service delivery, build localcapacity, and respond more effectively to localneeds.

3The Case for Decentralization

Box 1 Definitions

Definitions important to understanding decentrali-zation include three reform strategies that are nottrue decentralization:• Deconcentration involves central government

dispersing staff responsibilities to regional officeswithout changing the basis for authority and con-trol. This is not true decentralization and can ac-tually increase central control and influence.

• Delegation is the transfer of responsibility forpublic functions to lower levels of governmentor to other organizations, which implement pro-grams on behalf of the central government.

• Privatization is government transfer to theprivate sector of managerial, fiscal, and decision-

making control, while retaining normal regula-tory authority.True decentralization is considered to involve a

mix of three reform strategies:• Administrative decentralization is the transfer

of authority over regional staff from the centralgovernment to regional or local governments.

• Political decentralization (or democratic decen-tralization) is the selection of local governmentofficials by local election rather than by centralgovernment appointment.

• Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of respon-sibility for raising and spending program fundsto lower level government units.

For rural programs, decentralization offershope for correcting the urban bias that resultsfrom the geographic dispersion of rural people,the difficulties for them to organize to promotetheir interests, and the discrimination againstagriculture inherent in many country policyframeworks. Decentralization of agriculturalextension and research seeks to increase userparticipation in technology programs and makeprograms more accountable to users.

Enthusiasm for decentralization needs to betempered with some caution. In small countries,decentralization may be unnecessary and invery large countries decentralization to the stateor provincial level may still leave programs dis-tant from user influence. Definitive evidence ofthe impact of decentralization is limited and noteveryone benefits from any reform. Further-more, decentralization does little to improveintraregional disparities, may bring oppressiveelites into power, and can lead to greater in-equalities in allocation of government resources.Thus, decentralization has the potential to in-crease access to and cost of services, but spe-cific targeting mechanisms and strong centraloversight are needed to avoid inequities in ser-vice access and quality.

Principles in Decentralization Reform

Decentralization takes many forms with variedmixes of fiscal, administrative, and politicaldecentralization. Privatization, deconcentra-tion, and delegation initiatives can complementand reinforce an overall decentralization policy,but these do not constitute, and can in somecases work against, effective decentralization.Four requirements for successful decentraliza-tion are:• Providing local people with substantial real

influence over the local political system andlocal developmental activities;

• Ensuring availability of financial resourcesadequate for decentralized institutions toaccomplish their tasks;

• Ensuring adequate administrative capacityin local units to carry out their tasks; and

• Establishing reliable mechanisms for ac-countability of politicians and bureaucratsto local people.Deconcentration is nearly always the first—

and necessary—step in any process of decen-tralization. This puts staff from central admi-nistrations in closer contact with local people,problems, and conditions and provides a chan-


nel for local interaction with government. Un-fortunately, decentralization reforms frequentlystop at this point with central authorities retain-ing control over deconcentrated administrativestructures.

Administrative decentralization representsa more fundamental reform that replaces exist-ing centralized structures with a new adminis-trative structure of local government. Transferof power to decentralized offices increases lo-cal participation in decisionmaking and allowsprograms to be tailored to local needs.

Political decentralization makes decentral-ized bureaucracies accountable to locally electedofficials and officials accountable to the people.Elections, referenda, and local participatorydecisionmaking arrangements give people di-rect control over government programs, butshort of these formal political processes, a vari-ety of mechanisms (reflecting “participation”more than “decentralization”) can give peopleinfluence over government programs. Theseinclude: incorporating local representatives intogovernance and advisory boards, client surveys,polls, and program “report cards,” and rapidrural appraisal techniques.

Fiscal decentralization is often seen as away to reduce central government budgets byoff-loading tasks a central government can nolonger finance. In practice, however, decentrali-zation is likely to result in higher costs for cen-tral budgets. Fiscal decentralization maytransfer authority for expending funds, raisingtaxes, or borrowing, but intergovernmental fis-cal transfers (IGFTs or “grants”) are usually thekey means of financing decentralized programs.Concern over local administrative capacity fre-quently leads central governments to imposecontrols that are costly to administer and thatrestrict local flexibility in managing funds. Ex-perience would indicate that local governmentsare generally capable of assuming substantialresponsibility, and decentralized programs canprovide different financing packages to commu-nities with different levels of capacity.

Coproduction of Goods and Services

Significantly, most government programs in-volve a mix of goods and services that vary in:the economies of scale or scope inherent in theirproduction and financing; their economic char-acteristics (whether public, private, toll, or com-mon pool); users’ ability to withdraw from theiruse (exit) or influence their production or sup-ply (voice); and spatial and temporal consider-ations in the value of the good or service. Thesefactors determine the institution likely to havea comparative advantage for production of thegood or service.

Many programs are best implementedthrough “coproduction” or partnerships be-tween various actors—central government, lo-cal government, private sector, civil society, andthe individual—each providing the good or ser-vice for which it has a comparative advantage.Coproduction requires clarity in division of la-bor and clear “contracts” between differentpartners.

Privatization, delegation, and devolutionstrategies complement decentralization and,like decentralization, broaden the institutionalbase for administration and execution of tech-nology programs; reduce the burden on centralgovernments for provision of services (respon-sibilities in which they have been less than fullysuccessful); and increase stakeholder participa-tion and influence over programs. Advantagesof these complementary strategies are that:• Full privatization relieves government of

responsibility for production of privategoods and services with few externalities.Extension services for commercial cropsgrown by wealthier farmers, information onpostharvest handling and processing tech-nologies, and marketing of machinery orproduction inputs often fall in this category.

• Private provision of publicly financed ser-vices takes advantage of private providers’greater efficiency and flexibility in execut-ing programs. Government contracting of

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NGOs or private extension providers is acommon example.

• Delegation and devolution maintains somegovernment authority and financing, butgives implementing institutions operationalflexibility and ability to specialize. Govern-ments may delegate extension responsibili-ties to research institutes or devolveresponsibility for commodity extension toa commodity group.

Regional Governments vs. Local Communities

Decentralization strategies frequently mustchoose between decentralizing authority to lo-cal governments or to local community groups.The principle of subsidiarity would indicate thatauthority should go to the lowest level at whicheconomies of scale and scope are not compro-mised, and all costs and benefits are internal-ized. Giving local communities responsibilityfor programs is an attractive option in that itintegrates rural people fully into program de-sign and implementation. Furthermore, muchlocal knowledge and commitment of resourcescan only be accessed by increasing local par-ticipation and decentralizing program author-ity to the community level.

Even though shifting program responsibil-ity to the community level facilitates client par-ticipation and control over programs, strategiesthat accomplish this (rural investment funds)have the disadvantage that they bypass and re-strict development of local government capaci-ties. Community participation in programmanagement in collaboration with both localand national governments may be a preferredoption (for example, central government financ-ing for extension services managed by local

government units and implemented by pro-ducer organizations). Such strategies make itpossible to coordinate programs across abroader area, help ensure that interests of thepoor and remote areas are represented, facili-tate scaling-up of successful initiatives, and helpovercome local authoritarian enclaves.

National Frameworks for Decentralization

Decentralization requires an institutional settingwith an established legal framework, an activecivil society, adequate capacity in decentralizedinstitutions, and a system of accountability.Thus, the three challenges in implementingdecentralization strategies are developmentof:• National commitment and legal frame-

works for sharing responsibilities betweenadministrative levels and with the privatesector and civil society. Such a frameworkrequires political action to establish andempower locally elected governments as abase for decentralized service provision.

• Subsector strategies and institutional ar-rangements based on analysis of the natureof the specific services and the comparativeadvantages, capacities, and potential of eachparticipating institution.

• Institutional capacity to enable local gov-ernment units, national institutions, privatesector, and civil society to play their respec-tive role in service provision. Institutional-izing mechanisms for coordination ofcoproduction is the key challenge in decen-tralizing sector programs.Development of these enabling policies,

strategies, and capacities generally must pro-ceed concurrently as opportunities arise.

The Case for Decentralization


Pubic extension services are being forced tochange. In the 1990s agricultural extension ser-vices were attacked for being inefficient, irrel-evant, ineffective, and poorly targeted. The needfor reform was obvious and national systemsresponded with three major strategies—privatization, decentralization, and programrevitalization. Although cost reduction has beenthe force behind many changes, the principalobjective of reforms should be an attempt to im-prove quality of services to clients (see Box 2).

Decentralizing extension services, whenimplemented effectively, can transform exten-

Issues With Decentralizationof Public Sector Extension

sion and address a range of generic problems.Decentralized extension brings decisionmakingprocesses closer to clients and makes programsmore responsive to user needs. Service provid-ers become more accountable to clients and bet-ter oversight increases efficiency of operations.

Decentralization itself can introduce a newdynamism in programs and can promote diver-sity in service providers and program ap-proaches, thus serving as a first step towardprivatization. In addition, reforms to revitalizeand privatize programs can accompany decen-tralization reforms, which generally involve:

the exception of Chile, the reformed systems haveyet to prove themselves sustainable and there is needto further consolidate progress. Second generationproblems include:• Lack of national strategies can lead to an aggre-

gation of disparate, locally planned extensionactivities.

• Quality control, supervision, and oversight sys-tems are weak in many decentralized extensionsystems.

• Systems for knowledge flow to decentralizedextension are poorly developed, especially withregard to research-extension linkages and exten-sion agent training.

• Extension agents contracted by municipalities orfarmer organizations have little opportunity forcareer development.

• Program ownership by farmers is poor for pro-grams receiving heavy subsidies from govern-ments.

Source: Based on a presentation by Matthew McMahon,World Bank Task Team Leader in the Latin America andCaribbean Region at AKIS Retreat 1999.

Box 2 Latin America—“Modernization” of Agricultural Extension

In Latin America, many countries are undertaking ag-ricultural extension reforms that generally go beyonddecentralization to include a range of innovations,characterized as “modernization” of extension. Reformshave led to the demise of public sector extension agen-cies, which were often bureaucratic and unresponsiveto the needs of the farmers. New programs are targeted,decentralized, privately implemented, and havegreater farmer cofinancing and participation.

Concerns for fiscal restraint and financialsustainability have led to programs designed for re-stricted coverage and targeted to priority clientgroups. Delinking financing from implementationhas improved program management and helpeddevelop pluralistic systems. Opening up to privatesector service providers has created a market for ex-tension services, while involving farmers in planningand priority setting has empowered farmers andbegun to institutionalize cofinancing of extension.Farmers are substantially more committed to exten-sion programs when they pay a portion—even asmall portion—of program costs.

Reforms are headed in the right direction andthere is virtually no move to turn back. Still, with

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• Administrative decentralization—movingresponsibilities for extension to local levelsof government;

• Political decentralization—expanding userinfluence on program priority setting, plan-ning, and management; and

• Fiscal decentralization—giving financialmanagement responsibility to local govern-ments or requiring cofinancing from localgovernments and producer groups.Extension services differ from research in

two important ways that affect their potentialfor decentralization. First, extension advisoryservices (field extension services) come in di-rect contact with clients and provide servicesthat have a high private-goods content. Thesecharacteristics make field extension services amuch better candidate for decentralization thanresearch, which typically has a longer-term pay-off. Local producers are more willing to com-mit resources to pay for effective extensionservices from which they realize immediate di-rect benefits. Still, there remains a need for otherextension services to address “externalities”—environmental problems, food quality or safetyconcerns, or social equity issues (that is, specialneeds of small farmers)—that are in the publicinterest, but are not a priority for individualproducers or decentralized institutions. Thisrequires continued central support for exten-sion.

A second difference between research andextension is the scope and scale of programs.Research institutions are generally smaller andmore concentrated. Extension programs typi-cally operate across the country, provide infor-mation on a wide range of technologies fromvarious sources, and draw on traditional knowl-edge and farmer innovation to improve pro-ducer organization, management, production,and marketing functions. The broad demandson extension require strategies that incorporatea variety of approaches to providing services.

Despite the apparent suitability of extensionservice provision to be decentralized, they areoften highly centralized. A World Bank study

of 19 countries found that in the early 1990s 13countries or regions showed almost no evidenceof decentralization of extension services. Colom-bia, Jiangxi (China), the Philippines, and Nusa-Tenggarra-Timor (Indonesia) were relativelyhighly decentralized, and Poland and Tunisiashowed some decentralization. The study foundthat:• When extension is decentralized there is a

fairly good balance in fiscal, administrative,and political decentralization;

• Political decentralization (the role of electedofficials) lags other elements of decentrali-zation; and

• NGO involvement is moderate and farmerparticipation is significant in extension. Underlying these conclusions was the fact

that institutional development and civil societyprovide important support to decentralizingextension services.

Recognizing Multiple Extension Functions

National agricultural extension systems (NAESs)must incorporate a range of extension activitiesthat vary in suitability to decentralization. Fieldadvisory services, as the traditional extensionmethodology, are compatible with decentral-ized program strategies and in some cases aresuited to private service provision or completeprivatization. Other services to support fieldextension agents and complement field advi-sory services are often better suited to central-ized production.

Functions best centralized are those that:support national strategies and financingmechanisms; involve economies of scale andscope; serve a number of administrative regions;or require greater technical input and network-ing than can be managed at the local level. Ser-vices needed in a comprehensive extensionsystem include:• Extension policy, strategy formulation, and

planning (centralized);• Training programs for extension agents

(centralized or decentralized);

Issues with Decentralization of Public Sector Extension


In 1992, the Ghana Ministry of Food and Agricul-ture (MOFA) had nine technical departments oper-ating essentially parallel programs in each of thecountry’s 110 districts. The Local Government Act(1993) transferred responsibilities from central gov-ernment to districts and municipalities, and gavedistrict assemblies power to establish technical de-partments (including agriculture). Lack of politicalwill delayed implementation for nearly two years,but decentralization finally became effective in 1998,and ministry staff and budgets were transferred todistrict assemblies and regional administrations.Reforms left the following problems that interferewith efficient provision of extension services:• Most central technical departments continue

business-as-usual and have not adopted newroles in policy formulation, planning, coordi-nation, monitoring, and provision of technicalsupport.

• Some district assemblies delayed integration ofministry staff into district assembly structures.

• Misunderstandings persist regarding implica-tions of decentralization for personnel admin-istration (for example, promotions, use ofresources).

• Data collection for statistical purposes and pro-gram monitoring has been hampered by lack ofclear guidelines from the central ministry.

• Subject matter centers are largely nonfunctionaldue to inadequate staff and logistical support

Box 3 Ghana: Decentralization to Improve Program Coordination

and responsibilities are not clearly defined fordivision of labor in the operation of breedingfarms and stations.

• Staff transferred from other departments into theextension service have not received orientationtraining.

• Monitoring the use of government resources inthe regions and districts is not adequate.Lessons from Ghana’s experience include:

• Political commitment was essential to start re-forms, but loss of commitment delayed imple-mentation.

• The Ministry was able to initiate the programonly because of the existence of a conducive le-gal and policy framework.

• Clarity in objectives for decentralization, ad-equate preparation, and educational campaignsare necessary for effective implementation of de-centralization reforms.

• Educational programs are important to promoteattitudinal change, but a one-shot orientation isnot enough and sustained training (definingcommunication channels and job descriptions)is needed for all staff.

• Implementation of reforms requires dedicatedand committed leadership for program oversight.

Source: Based on presentation of a paper by C. Annor-Frempong and Solomon Bekure of The World Bank GhanaCountry Office at AKIS Retreat 1999.

• Technical specialist support to extensionagents (centralized);

• Production of extension publications, audio-visual materials, guidebooks, and othermaterials (generally centralized);

• Monitoring and evaluation to support pro-gram quality enhancement (needed at allmanagement levels);

• Training programs for farmers (generallydecentralized);

• Market information services (centralized);• Encouragement for (and possibly some

controls on) private sector extension (privati-zation with mixed centralized/decentral-ized controls);

• Mass media campaigns, including radio,television, agricultural magazines, newspa-pers, and letters (generally centralized, butmay be decentralized or privatized); and

• Internet and/or telephone dissemination ofinformation and fielding questions fromfarmers, agribusiness, or extension agents(centralized).

Administrative Decentralization

Deconcentration is intrinsic to extension ser-vices that are provided in dispersed fields andcommunities throughout a country. Croppingsystems, markets, agroecological zones, and eth-

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nic and cultural characteristics of farmers canvary widely within a country, and moving ad-ministration closer to field services can substan-tially improve program management throughbetter understanding of local conditions. Ad-ministrative decentralization goes further bymaking extension programs directly respon-sible to local authorities.

The challenge in any successful decentrali-zation reform is that of maintaining overall pro-gram quality and coherence. (see Box 4).Decentralized extension programs are limitedif the decentralized administration lacks aware-ness of new technologies, sources of assistance,and extension methodologies. Although decen-tralized administrations can effectively inte-grate local institutions, organizations, andtechnologies into an extension system, majorbenefits from formal extension often come fromintegrating external knowledge into the localsystem.

Lack of coordination between local admin-istrations can be a problem. If many localities

Box 4 Colombia—Successful Decentralizationin a Conducive Political Context

Relatively radical reforms in decentralizing exten-sion in Colombia led to a tripling of extension staffand municipal coverage of extension, an increasein number of beneficiaries by two and a half times,and a doubling in funding for the extension pro-gram. Success with these reforms was due to ex-istence of representative local governments,willingness of the center to decentralize, and avail-ability of adequate resources. Reforms were basi-cally an administrative decentralization. Politicaldecentralization was to be effected through sys-tem governance by municipal committees, but thishas not yet begun as planned.

Financial sustainability of the system remainsin question, as the reforms add considerably tothe cost of extension. Quality control is also a majoroperational problem, reflected in the need forcloser links with research, better training for ex-tension agents, and better oversight of extensionactivities.

promote a single commodity, the result mightbe overproduction and low prices. Similarly,separate localities might finance the same fea-sibility studies, training programs, or extensionmaterials. Implementing an integrated water-shed or regional development plan might proveimpossible if programs in each administrativeregion are completely independent. Other po-tential problems include the lack of career op-portunities for extension staff in decentralizedprograms, and difficulties with monitoring andevaluation when local administrative units lackability to compare targets, results, and achieve-ments with other areas.

Extension program quality depends fun-damentally on good linkages with other pro-grams—specialized training for extension agentsand farmers, technical backstopping by subjectmatter specialists and information services,other extension services (mass media, fairs), andother development programs (credit programs,market development programs, input supply).Some of these linkages can be maintained at thelocal level, but many require higher level coor-dination to ensure efficiency and quality sup-port.

Decentralized Governance—IntroducingAccountability

Decentralizing extension by involving farmersand local government in governance of pro-grams can improve program accountability,increase user ownership of programs, ensurerelevance to local needs, improve planning andinformation flows, and strengthen user capabili-ties. Transferring program responsibilities tolocally elected officials directly decentralizesprogram governance and accountability to lo-cal people. Perhaps equally important arealternate mechanisms that increase user partici-pation and influence over program content andoperations. Reforms that enhance farmer influ-ence over program governance include: incor-porating farmers into governance and oversightcommittees; adopting participatory extension



approaches; involving farmers in identifyingpriorities, planning, and monitoring; workingthrough farmer groups; and using participatoryevaluation and feedback mechanisms for pro-gram evaluation.

Decentralizing governance holds particularpromise for making extension programs (andagents) accountable to users. Farmers knowwhether they are receiving valuable servicesand should have the power to demand goodperformance by their service providers. Whenfarmers have authority to influence decisionson program funding, hiring and dismissingstaff, and staff incentives, they are truly empow-ered to improve services. At a minimum, allextension programs should seek farmer feed-back on the relevance, quality, and usefulnessof extension services.

A concern in decentralized extension sys-tems is the degree to which governance mecha-nisms are representative of all farmers in anarea. Women, small farmers, and ethnic or cul-tural minorities are often underrepresented ingovernance groups, but may be more in needof public services than those actually represent-ing local interests. Disadvantages of farmergovernance are the high up-front costs of par-ticipatory approaches, difficulties in ensuringtrue representation of participating groups, riskof aggravating conflicts or unduly raising ex-pectations, and the possibility of program cap-ture by elites.

As the traditional view of extension as afunction of government agencies gives way inthe face of multiple service providers, an ex-panding agenda, and a better understanding offarmer information and innovation systems,decentralized governance of extension servicesshould become both easier and more important.

Fiscal Decentralization of Extension Services

Government inability to sustain financial sup-port for large extension systems has been amotivation for the many reforms that attemptto reduce public sector funding, introduce pri-vate financing, or eliminate government pro-grams that compete with the private sector.Typically, these strategies tend to decentralizeextension financing (see Table 1).

Although an objective of many decentrali-zation reforms has been to reduce governmentexpenditures, local governments generally havelimited resources and limited ability to raisefunds. Central governments therefore must usu-ally continue financing for extension servicesthrough intergovernmental financial transfers(IGFTs), and must also finance the considerablecosts of reform and local capacity development.This increases total financing requirements forextension, at least over the short term. Over thelonger term, decentralizing extension servicesmight reduce government financing require-ments by: (1) increasing efficiencies through

Delivery of Services Funding for Extension Public Private

Public ♦ Deconcentration ♦ Delegation to parastatals ♦ Cost reductions ♦ Better targeting beneficiaries

♦ Cost-recovery and fee-for-service extension

♦ Levies

Private ♦ Contracting private suppliers of extension services

♦ Grants for user contracting for extension services

♦ Transfer to the private sector or NGOs

♦ User contracting of extension services

Table 1 Strategies Employed to Reduce Public Expenditures for Extension

Source: Adapted from Rivera (1996).

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better oversight and greater flexibility in fund-ing decisions and (2) increasing cofinancing bybeing more responsive, and demonstratinggreater benefits, to users.

Cofinancing grants (IGFTs) to local govern-ments or farmer groups are an important ele-ment of fiscal decentralization, but they presenttwo significant problems:• Many local organizations lack capacity to

plan, manage, and evaluate extension pro-grams and lack the contacts and financialmanagement capacity to procure neededservices; and

• Resource-rich farmers are better able tocofinance services and capture programbenefits, even if program objectives are toassist weaker elements of rural society.Still, many new initiatives are using sub-

grants of various types for local subprojects, andfuture program design can draw on this expe-rience (see Box 5).

Decentralization programs must addressthese two problems. Training and orientation,program promotion, and support services arecritical to enable target clients and local organi-zations to take over extension responsibilities

under new decentralized systems. Later, as pro-grams are implemented, a strong monitoringand evaluation system is needed to providemanagement with information necessary tounderstand who is benefiting from the programand what real impact it is having.

Transition to Decentralized Systems

Planning is important in any transition to de-centralized service provision. Implementationproblems are common, as reforms change es-tablished financing, operating, and reportingsystems, and challenge ingrained views of thecenter as the legitimate source of authority. Re-forms may shift program oversight responsibil-ity to new, nontechnical agencies, or rupturelinks with other technology programs. Centralministries may oppose reforms and fight per-ceived loss of power from transfer of programsto local government (see Box 6).

Short-term problems include the need to:revise terms of reference for all staff, establishnew reporting and supervisory relationships,adjust salaries and compensation plans, orga-nize and equip offices, agree on budgets, and

Many development groups are experimenting withcompetitive grants, demand-driven rural investmentfunds, and community action programs to financelocal development programs. These may be targetedexclusively to extension or technological innovation,or may permit this as one of a larger menu of pos-sible investments.

These programs permit extension programs tobe tailored to local needs and conditions, but withcentral government financing and oversight. Pro-grams use a variety of implementation strategies withalmost any mix of the following procedures:• Design of subproject: by central government,

local government, service providers, produceror community groups, or (often) a mix of these;

• Subproject selection: by competitive process,allocated according to government development

Box 5 Competitive and Demand-Driven Extension Projects

priorities, or by local request conforming to es-tablished criteria;

• Service contracting: by the central government,local government, or producer/community or-ganization;

• Financing: by contract or grant: and• Term: often one year with option for extension,

but may be for duration of the subproject.Programs may or may not be decentralized, as

central governments seem to continue to play sig-nificant roles in management and decisionmaking.This may decline over time, as governments becomemore confident of local capacities. Most programsare relatively recent and still evolving, and to datethere is little evidence as to their sustainability andlong-term impact.



The Philippine Local Government Code (1991) pro-vided that delivery of basic services, including agri-cultural extension, be devolved to local governmentunits (LGUs-provinces, cities, municipalities, andcommunities). Prior to reforms, extension serviceswere too generic to be useful, poorly managed, andnot adapted to local conditions. Following reforms,rapid restructuring of extension transferred 10,000staff to provincial and local governments. Reformswere to promote participatory, bottom-up planning,but the hastily implemented reforms resulted in:• Excessive fragmentation of planning and deliv-

ery of extension services;• Increased NGO collaboration with local govern-

ments on agricultural development projects, buton an area-specific basis with poor overall cov-erage.

• Exacerbation of the already weak research-ex-tension linkages;

• Use of IGFTs to increase salaries for LGU staffwith no benefits for nationally devolved exten-sion staff;

• Politicization of extension services at the munici-pal level, stifling professional growth and de-velopment of extension staff; and

• Inability of the Department of Agriculture toprovide technical assistance and financial sup-port to local government units.

The Philippine reforms were preceded bysubstantial planning and some pilot efforts. Decision-makers recognized that rapid reform would encoun-ter implementation problems, but concluded that agradual reform process could easily be stalled bypolitical and bureaucratic opposition. This experiencedemonstrates the importance of adequate prepara-tion by both national and local governments and theneed for reforms to recognize that:• Policies are important, but must be translated

into operational guidelines before implementa-tion;

• Adequate training is required for all officials atboth local and national levels;

• Phased implementation of decentralization re-forms may help avoid serious mistakes;

• Research-extension linkages are critical;• Incentives are important for all major players,

including (when possible) all extension servicestaff; and

• And, finally, reforms should be designed forsustainability by proper costing and attentionto future funding for decentralized services.

Source: Based on a presentation by Dr. Eliseo R. Ponce, Di-rector, Bureau of Agricultural Research in the Philippinesat AKIS Retreat 1999.

Box 6 The Philippines: Cautions in Decentralizing Extension Services

establish mechanisms for fiscal transfers fromthe center. Over the medium term, planning,priority settings, and coordination become im-portant issues. Over the long term, quality con-trol (training, specialist support, technicaloversight) becomes the major problem.

Adequate planning is essential to translatepolicies into operational guidelines, to developcapacity for decentralized implementation, toprovide essential support services, and to en-sure incentives for reform. Piloting reforms ina few areas can help to identify problems anddevelop plans for a smooth transition. Exten-sive promotional work fosters a wide apprecia-tion of the reasons for decentralization, andtraining and operational manuals ease introduc-tion of new operating procedures. Reforms

should avoid decentralizing heavy bureaucra-cies to local governments, where they may beeven less productive and a greater fiscal bur-den than they are in the center.

Good practice in extension system designmust recognize the diversity required in a com-prehensive extension system. Management offield advisory services might easily be decen-tralized, but other administration functions aredifficult to reconcile with a decentralized pro-gram. Monitoring and evaluation, specializedtechnical support, training, and program strat-egy development generally require support ata higher level, either national or regional withincountry. Decentralization initiatives need toinclude provisions for strengthening centralservices that enable decentralized programs to

13

function and maintain service quality. Althoughcentral programs can becoming supply-driven,various arrangements that enable producers orlocal government units to procure centrally pro-duced services introduce a demand-drive toproduction and facilitate private sector partici-pation in service delivery.

Although decentralization holds consid-erable promise to improve extension services,

Decentralization can be a useful tool for improv-ing the function of technology systems, but de-centralization must be seen as a tool and not an endin itself. The country context must guide anyapproach to reforming technology services,there is no single model for decentralization. Ifa country lacks a legal framework for decentrali-zation, extension alone cannot bring about re-form, and opportunity for sustainable programdecentralization might be quite limited. Goodpractice in decentralizing agricultural extensionservices can be summarized as follows:

Centralize or Decentralize ProgramsAs Appropriate To the Service

The major benefit from decentralizing extensionprograms may be the empowerment of produc-ers to express their demands for technologicalinnovation. Decentralization strategies increaseuser ownership and financial support for ser-vices, ensure greater program accountability,and develop constituencies for extension. Thesereforms strengthen the demand side of exten-

it requires local administrations and centralministries to reinforce and support each other.New models and mechanisms are needed tocoordinate activities of central units, local gov-ernment, and producers. Key to this is reorient-ing central governments from an attitude ofcontrol to one of supervision, facilitation, andsupport.

Good Practice for Decentralizationin AKIS Projects

sion systems, but simply decentralizing exten-sion to local governments does not guaranteethat beneficiaries will have more control overthe decisionmaking process.

Program execution and authority shouldrest at the level most appropriate to effectiveuser influence over the program, with the ap-propriate level likely to be:• The district, municipality, or community for

extension and adaptive research;• The national, provincial, or state level (de-

pending on size of country and state orprovince) for extension support services andstrategic and applied research; and

• The national (and international) level forbasic and strategic research and mainte-nance of a core agricultural science capabil-ity.Reforms should stress decentralized gover-

nance of extension and empower producers tomake decisions on the extension agenda byparticipatory planning, user cofinancing, andinvolving community organizations in imple-mentation. Both extension services and adap-

Good Practice for Decentralization in AKIS Projects


tive research are well suited to decentralizationas they offer fairly immediate benefits to users.Decentralized extension administration facili-tates beneficiary participation and encouragespartnerships between various players in thetechnology system, especially facilitating theinvolvement of NGOs. Private provision of ser-vices and privatization of some extension func-tions can improve cost efficiency. Decentralizedextension also offers important opportunities tointroduce fee-for-service and cost-sharing ar-rangements. Involving users in the evaluationof extension staff and programs and linking re-muneration of extension agents to performancecan be powerful means of enforcing account-ability in decentralized systems.

Adapt Strategies to Local InstitutionalEnvironments

Each country has its own legal framework, po-litical tradition, administrative structure, andsocial and agroecological setting. Decentraliza-tion initiatives must conform to local needs andpotentials. Local governments may be an ap-propriate locus for service provision if they haveadequate capacity and are accountable to thelocal population. Community and farmer orga-nizations are potentially important entities,whose role must be considered when decentral-izing extension programs. These organizationsoften have limited institutional capacity, re-stricted membership, and unstable leadership.They might require significant investments ininstitutional strengthening before being able toassume major program responsibility.

Extension program decentralization mustreflect the general status of political decentrali-zation in a country. If decentralized politicalinstitutions are well established and stronglysupported, decentralization of AKIS programscan proceed with some confidence. Alterna-tively, if a country’s institutions are still highlycentralized, options will be limited and it maybe advisable to limit reforms to deconcentration,introduction of participatory extension ap-

proaches, and contracting for private servicedelivery.

Strengthen Central Support Servicesfor Extension

Some technology system functions are best pro-vided centrally, due to economies of scope orscale in their production or the nature of theservice involved. These include system strategydevelopment, extension service quality control(training, subject matter specialist support, andproduction of extension materials), and moni-toring and evaluation. Quality of field exten-sion advisory services is dependent on some ofthese programs, which must be strengthened inany initiative to decentralize extension services.

Decentralized extension requires centralsupport to plan and coordinate programs, fa-cilitate effective institutional linkages, formu-late national policies, and ensure that nationalpriorities are addressed. Successful models forresearch-extension linkages in decentralizedsystems are still needed. Centralized monitor-ing and evaluation are also important as a ba-sis for national planning and for comparingprogram performance and impacts.

Provide Mechanisms for Policy Formulationin Mixed Systems

Central government financing of extension pro-grams must be directed toward national policyobjectives (poverty alleviation, food security,and environmental conservation). Reconcilingnational objectives with priorities emergingfrom decentralized programs requires flexibil-ity and planning and budgeting systems thatintegrate both sets of priorities.

Expect to Continue Public Sector Financing

In the short term, decentralization rarely re-duces requirements for central government fi-nancing for extension, and decentralizationinitiatives should count on increased central

15

government funding, at least during their ini-tial stages. This may be defensible, because tech-nological innovation in agriculture remains, inmany cases, a public good and warrants publicfunding. However, where government budgetsface fiscal restraints, the higher costs associatedwith decentralization and private sector servicedelivery (by NGOs and private firms) raises is-sues of sustainability. The question then be-comes how to best manage the same amount offunding, possibly implying a decreased servicecoverage balanced by improvement in effective-ness of services.

Although decentralization may initially in-crease the level of public funding required, overthe long term it offers opportunities for produc-ers to cofinance some technology services. Le-veraging funding from users and an increase inefficiency of service provision can increase to-tal financing available for extension programs.The feasibility and desirability of user cofinan-cing will vary depending on the local situation,but some financial participation—no matterhow small—increases beneficiaries’ ownershipand interest in technology programs.

Fiscal Transfers for Research and Extension

Fiscal transfers from the central government arealmost always required to finance decentralizedextension. These should be structured to giveusers maximum influence over programs andto promote institutional pluralism in serviceprovision. Empowering users to contract themost relevant and cost-effective services, anddeveloping a range of public and private pro-viders, should result in the most competent andefficient institutions being selected to provideservices.

Plan for Transition and LocalCapacity Development

Decentralization reforms imply fundamentalchanges in bureaucratic relationships and pro-gram operations. These transitions are difficult

and must be preceded by careful planning,promotion of the rationale and principles be-hind reforms, training in new operational pro-cedures, and preparation of new operatingmanuals and transition guidelines. Rapid intro-duction of reforms may be advisable to facili-tate a clean break with past practices, butdecisionmakers should expect delays in estab-lishing reforms and new operating procedures.Naming a transition team to manage reformsand address problems may facilitate the transi-tion process.

Building local government capacity is a pre-requisite for decentralizing extension services,because local governments (especially in Africa)often do not have the technical and managerialcapacity to take on responsibility for managingtechnology programs. Local institutions takingon responsibility for extension might requireinvestments in staff development, facilities, andmanagement systems. Policymakers must allowtime—perhaps several years—for local institu-tions to develop this capacity and experienceneeded for effective program management.

Ensure Monitoring and Evaluationof Decentralized Systems

Decentralized systems, especially in their earlystages, require strong centralized monitoringand evaluation systems to provide policy-makers with necessary information to under-stand how well programs are functioning, whois benefiting, and what impacts the programsare having. The monitoring and evaluation sys-tem must feed information to a planning sys-tem that can adjust program guidelines andpriorities as necessary. Decentralized imple-menting institutions require their own M&Esystems to support decisionmaking, programmanagement, and planning at the local level.In practice, M&E systems at the various levelsshould be integrated in a comprehensive sys-tem to provide for information needs at eachlevel and to maintain quality and reliability ofdata.

Good Practice for Decentralization in AKIS Projects


Feder, G., A. Willett, and W. Zijp. 1999. AgriculturalExtension: Generic Challenges and Some Ingredientsfor Solutions. Policy Research Working Paper No.2129. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Manor, J. 1999. The Political Economy of Decentraliza-tion. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

McLean, K., G. Kerr, S. Piriou-Sall, and M. Williams.1997. Decentralization: Progress in 15 Countries?”Slide Presentation on the Decentralization, FiscalSystems, and Rural Development Research Program.Rural Development Family, World Bank, Wash-ington, D.C.

Parker, A. 1995. Decentralization: The Way Forwardfor Rural Development? Policy Research WorkingPaper No. 1475. Agriculture and Natural Re-

Additional Readings and References

sources Department, The World Bank, Wash-ington, D.C.

Rivera, W. 1996. “Agricultural extension in transi-tion worldwide: structural, financial, and mana-gerial strategies for improving agriculturalextension” in Public Administration and Develop-ment. Vol. 16:151-161.

Umali, D., and L. Schwartz. 1994. Public and PrivateExtension: Beyond Traditional Frontiers: World BankDiscussion Paper No. 236. World Bank, Washing-ton, D.C.

Wiens, T. and M. Guadagni. 1998. Designing Rulesfor Demand-Driven Rural Investment Funds: TheLatin American Experience: World Bank TechnicalPaper No. 407. World Bank, Washington, D.C.