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A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs

February 1990 HQDA PB 6-90-1Art ic les

7 Israeli Artillery Tactics and WeaponsLessons Learned in Combatby Brigadier General (Reserves) Arie Mizrachi, IDF

11 ROK Artill eryPresent and Futureby Major John Gordon IV

20 The Evolution of the French Field Artilleryby Lieutenant General Daniel Valery, Inspector of the French Artillery

25 Fighting the Field Artillery in the British Corps Battle of the 1990s by Major General T.D.G. Quayle, Royal Artillery

32 l'Artillerie royal Canadienne/The Royal Canadian Artil leryby Colonel L.T.B. Mintz, RCA

37 Quo Vadis Artil lery?

by Lieutenant Colonel Werner Klingenberg,Deutsche Bundeswehr43 Arc tic Thunder at 60 Below

by Captain Patrick J. Sweeney

46 Simulation SeriesFOST: Innovative Training for Tomorrow 's Battlefield

by Captains Joseph P. Nizolak, Jr., and William T.Drummond, Jr., and Dr. Michael J. Zyda

51 HIPVisions and Realityby Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William W. Breen

Features1 On the Move

2 Incoming

16 Redleg News18 Fire for Effect

Field Artillery Hotlines

Unit Training HotlineAV 639-5004 or(405) 351-5004: ARTEP, AMTP, SQT, MQS,

TEC and ACCP. Redleg HotlineAV 639-4020 or (405)351-4020: NTC, JRTC and Other ArtillerySubjects.30 View from the Blockhouse

DISCLAIMER: Field Artillerya bimonthly professional bulletin for Redlegs (ISSN 0899-2525)ispublished by Headquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of the US Army Field ArtillerySchool, Fort Sill, OK. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department ofDefense or its elements.Field Artillery'scontent doesn't necessarily reflect the US Army's position and doesn't supersedeinformation in other official Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of theiraccuracy nor product endorsement.PURPOSE(as stated in the first Field Artillery Journalin 1911): To publish a journal for disseminatingprofessional knowledge and furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress, developmentand best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powerand limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of heartycooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer

bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.SUBSCRIPTIONS: May be obtained through the US Field Artillery Association, PO Box 33027, FortSill, OK 73503-0027. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON 639-5121/6806 or commercial (405)355-4677. Dues are $16.00 per year ($31.00 for two years and $46.00 for three years) to US and

APO addresses. All other addresses should add $9.00 per subscription year for postage.SUBMISSIONS:Address all letters and articles to Editor, Field Artillery,PO Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK73503-0311.

REPRINTS:Field Artilleryis pleased to grant permission to reprint articles. Please credit the authorand Field Artillery.POSTMASTERS: Second-class official mail postage is paid by the Department of the Army, atLawton, OK 73501. Send address changes to Field Artillery,PO Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

Flexible Perspective

An extended period of relative peacehas allowed our Army in general and theField Artillery in particular to refine itsdoctrine and become comfortable with itsposition on just about everythingat leastuntil very recently. We've made a concerted

effort to focus our attention on joint andcombined-arms operations, as well weshould. And our comprehension of thephrase "spectrum of conflict" is universal.There is nothing inherently bad in all of this,unless we let our arrogance blind us toother points of view. And there are otherpoints of viewthose of our Alliesworldwide.

In this Allied edition of Field Artillery,you'll encounter many different approachesto fire support. As an example, IsraeliBrigadier General Arie Mizrachi's use of hishowitzers in the 1974 War of Attrition runscounter to the conventional USemployment of similar systems in AirLandBattle. His mental flexibility allowed him todefeat an overwhelmingly superior force byconcentrating his indirect-fire assets at achokepoint and digging them in so as toallow the use of overhead covernot atechnique you're to likely encounter at acombat training center. General Mizrachi'sflexible perspective made the differencebetween victory and defeat. Each of theexcellent articles in this edition can instructus through its similarities and differences tothe US approach.

Now that "peace is breaking out all over"and the attendant instability makesoperational planning even more complexand difficult, better understanding andworking more closely with our Allies may

make the critical difference between peaceand war, victory and defeat.

Editor

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of StaffOfficial:William J. Meehan IIBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant GeneralRaphael J. HalladaMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

Staff

Editor:Major Charles W. Pope, Jr.Managing Editor: Patrecia SlaydenHollis

Art Direc tor :Donna Jeanne CovertAss istant Editor: Joanne AlexanderBrown


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On the MoveMAJOR GENERAL RAPHAEL J. HALLADA

"Theworld is changing" is a statement that's beginning to seem

overusedbut it's certainly true. Theevents we've witnessed for thepast few months have been simply incredible and would have beenunheard of even a year ago: packed "f reedom trains" heading West;hundreds of thousands marching in the streets of Eastern Europeancities, demanding reformsand being heard; and citizens of bothEast and West hammering down sections of the Berlin Wall, whileonce-feared border guards are lost in a river of humanity pouringthrough its checkpoints.

y all appearances, the Cold Warthat has dominated our defense

planning for the past 40-plus yearsis ending...or at least going through adramatic metamorphosis. NATO canclaim a cautious measure of victory asthe Warsaw Pact fragments and wewitness the democratization of some ofthe world's hardest-line Communistgovernments.

Still Formidable ThreatGiven these events, is this the time to

pat ourselves on the back, exchange

congratulations with our Allies for a jobwell done and pack up our belongingsand come home? Not hardly.

The threat in Europe hasn't gone away,though the face of it is changing. Whilethe Soviet Union is reducing its forces,its military is also going through a periodof major restructuring and modernization.And while the ultimate aim of the SovietUnion is a subject far beyond the scopeof this column, we must maintain ourfocus on its continued formidablemilitary power.

Global Challenges

Meanwhile, the threats we face inother parts of the world continue togrow. The military power of manyThird World nations is increasing

beyond that of some of our fiercestenemies of wars past. The globalchallenges we face as an army and a nation

today are more diverse and complex thanat any time in our history. Concurrently,the realities of fiscal constraint are

forcing us to rethink our approaches tothese challenges. Our need for closecooperation and understanding with our

partners is more important than ever.

Renewed Partnerships

information, as do the Alliedrepresentatives at our Field ArtillerySchool. The US Field Artillery groups in

Europe work closest of all with ourAllies, and their concern goes beyondtheir very demanding custodial duties toensuring "total surety"assisting ourAllies in all ways, to include training onand maintaining delivery systems whenneeded.

B

Indeed, this period of uncertainty andturbulence is a time for renewed

partnerships with our Allies, for mutualgrowth and sharing of knowledge, andfor meaningful dialogue in areas thathaven't previously been fully explored.It's a time to ensure commonality of ourworld views as the issues become more

complex and the threats perhaps lessobvious. Few of the situations we'llencounter will be entirely new, andthrough the years many of our Allieshave faced similar circumstances andachieved successexperiences we canlearn from.

Cooperative Combat Developments.Afacet of our relationship with our Alliesthat we must continue to expand is ourcooperation in combat developments.Several important projects of the pastfew years have shown great possiblitiesin cooperative research and development

activities. Examples include our verysuccessful co-development of thehowitzer improvement program (HIP)with Israel, our adoption of the Britishlight gun (M119 105-mm howitzer) andour development of the multiple launchrocket system (MLRS), munitions andcommand and control systems with our

NATO Allies.Mutual Reliance. In these times ofausterity templated over increasingrequirements, there's no doubt we'llcontinue to see an increasing reliance onthe combat power of fire support in ourland forces, as well as those of ourAllies. We of the fire supportcommunity have traditionally had a very

close working relationship with ourAllies that has proved advantageous toall. Our forwardly deployed units havegood host-nation partnership andinteroperability programs. OurTRADOC representatives at our Allies'artillery schools provide for a

productive interchange of ideas and

Forward Thinking

As we begin this new decade, it's clearwe have great challenges ahead,challenges we may find very difficult tomeet on our own. But by fostering even

closer ties with our Allies and continuingthe forward thinking that's a hallmark ofthe Field Artillery, freedom's Kings ofBattlewill meet the challenges and leadour combined forces into the nextcentury.

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IncomingLETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Why Do TFT/GFT and BCS Disagree?

I am an FDO [fire direction officer] in

a self-propelled 155-mm battery.Recently, my FDC [fire direction center]section and I were computing GFT[graphic firing table] settings from the

battery computer system [BCS]. Werealized that even though there were nospecial corrections applied (i.e., allconditions were standard), the

BCS-derived quadrant was not equal to

the elevation from the TFT/GFT [tabularfiring table/GFT] plus site. As weinvestigated this phenomenon further,we realized that as range increased thedifference between the BCS quadrantand the TFT/GFT increased.

I cannot see why this difference existsunless the data from the AM-2 TFT are

outdated or the BCS somehow accounts

for increased probable error bymanipulating the quadrant. Would youplease comment on the cause for thisdifference.

1LT Calvin T. Harris, FAHow Btry, 3 Sqdn, 11th ACR

West Germany

Here's Why They Disagree

Why doesn't the BCSbatterycomputer unit (BCU)quadrant match

the GFT/TFT elevation plus site, evenwhen the BCU data base reflects"standard conditions"?

The GFT (AM-2) basically representsa "hand-held" (partial) Table F from theTFT (AM-2). Both are based onstandard conditions. The TFT hasadditional tables and information thatallow you to determine corrections fornonstandard conditions.

The BCU uses equations of motion tosolve a ballistic trajectory. Thoseequations are essentially the same asthose used to produce the data contained

in the TFT. When computing a ballisticsolution, the BCU uses its data base as ameasure of nonstandard conditions.Corrections for the nonstandardconditions are then applied to determinethe firing data necessary to engage thetarget.

The BCU operator has both direct andindirect influence on the measure ofnonstandard conditions represented bythe data base. For example, the operatordirectly "tells" the BCU a nonstandard

propellant temperature of + 80 F;however, he indirectly tells the BCU a

measure of nonstandard rotation of theearth when inputting the unit and targetlocations. The BCU contains the

programmed information necessary todetermine these corrections just as theGFT/TFT-equipped computer candetermine them using each of theappropriate tables.

Even if an operator were to try to set

all conditions in the BCU data base tostandard, there would still exist

nonstandard conditions in the data basethat the operator has no direct access to.The operator cannot tell the BCU not toapply range or azimuth corrections dueto the rotation of the earth. (It's possible,however, to creatively producesituations where the effects of thenonstandard conditions that the operatorhas no direct access to can be made"zero.") By simply entering the batterylocation into the BCU, the operator hasintroduced nonstandard conditions forwhich the GFT alone can't account.

Why doesn't the BCU quadrant match

the GFT when using a BCU-derivedGFT setting?

If the GFT setting were derivedcorrectly and no changes to the data

base have occurred, the two solutionswould match at the range that the GFTsetting was derived. As the range to agiven target increases or decreases fromthe derived range, the solution would

begin to differ.With a one-plot GFT setting, the

range K (fuze K) varies with range. Thisrate has been approximated from anaverage percentage determined from 50

nonstandard trajectories at five differentranges. (For more information on rangeK and fuze K, see the Ballistic ResearchLaboratory or BRL MemorandumReport BRLMR-2035.)

The BCU, however, determines itsown range K based on the informationobtained from a registration, whererange K equals the range correction

divided by the registration range. ThisBCU-derived range K is then multiplied

by the chart range for a given mission,and the result is added to the chart range.This provides a range adjusted for therange correction of the registration.

Why does the difference increase asthe range increases?

The difference increases because therange-K rates for the BCU differ. Thefarther a mission's chart range is fromthe registration range, the larger thedifference between solutions. If theBCU-determined range-K matched therate represented by the range-K line ofthe GFT, the solutions between the BCU

and GFT (with BCU-derived GFTsetting) would match. Changes to theBCU's data base after the GFT setting isderived or applied also will affect thetwo comparative solutions.

Does the BCU account for increasedprobable error at increasing range bymanipulating the quadrant?

The BCU doesn't account forprobaable errors in aim-point selectionor firing-data calculations.

If you or others have questions aboutthis information or would like a copy of

the BRL Memorandum, call the CannonDivision, Gunnery Department, FieldArtillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, atAUTOVON 639-2622 or commercial(405) 351-2622.

Capt Steven M. Hanscom, USMCGunnery DepartmentField Artillery School

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No Mortars in Heavy Forces

A great deal has been written of lateabout mortars. The big issue seems to bewhether they should be an Infantry orField Artillery system. I propose theyshould be neitherat least not in theheavy forces. As I see it, the Army simplycan't afford to keep mortars in mechanizedinfantry and armor battalions.

Mortar Problems

From a materiel standpoint, thecurrent 4.2-inch mortar has somesignificant problems. In an effort toincrease the range, we bought a newhigh-explosive round. This round

provides a slight increase in range, but italso presents some new problems. Theround has rifling that must be alignedwith the rifling in the tube. In addition toreducing the maximum rate of fire by

some 30 to 40 percent, the new roundhas a tendency to stick in the tube.The mortar's two other munitions also

have problems. Safety problems with thewhite phosphorous round preclude its usein training, and the illumination round is

plagued by an excessive dud rate.

The majority of our forces will be stuck withthe outdated and problem-plagued 4.2-inchmortar for many years to come.

New 120-mm Mortar. The 4.2-inchmortar is scheduled to be replaced bythe 120-mm mortar. This mortar has asmooth bore that eliminates thealignment and sticking problems. It also

provides a faster rate of fire and a slight

increase in range. However, as of thelast information available, we're buyingonly enough 120-mm mortars to equipabout one-third of the force. Themajority of our forces will be stuck withthe outdated and problem-plagued4.2-inch mortar for many years to come.

We must consider that the Army will

have two separate heavy mortars to trainwith, maintain and employ. Fundingconstraints also have impacted on our

buying 120-mm mortar ammunition.We're buying high-explosive munitionsat a less than desired quantity, andalthough the illumination round is beingtype-classified, there are no plans to buythe round.

Mortar Carrier. The carrier for the4.2-inch mortar is the M106, basically amodified M113 armored personnelcarrier. As the 120-mm mortar comesinto the force, the old 4.2-inch mortar

carriers are going to be revamped andused for the new mortar.

This carrier lacks the mobility of theBradley fighting vehicles and Abramstanks of the supported forces and

provides only limited protection againstsmall arms and shrapnel. It's also veryvulnerable to overhead artillery fire.This, coupled with the ease with whichhigh-angle mortar fire can be acquired

by radar, makes our mortar systemparticularly vulnerable.

Mortar Organizations.Mortars are not

in much better shape organizationallythan they are from a materiel standpoint.They suffer from being an indirect-firesystem in a direct-fire unit. Theygenerally receive less emphasis than theline platoons, and although there may beexceptions, commanding a mortar

platoon isn't generally a sought-afterposition for the young lieutenant.

Combat service support for mortars isshared with the other systems of a

battalion. Aside from the mortar carriers,we have no dedicated ammunitionhauling or resupply capability for the

mortars.

Mortar Training

Ask most commanders what theproblem is with mortars, and they'llprobably tell you it's the training.Interestingly, this is the same answergiven for many years.

Mortar training seems to be an

ongoing problem. The primarycontributor to this is that mortars arecommanded by those whose primary

business and orientation is direct-firemaneuver systems. By comparison, ifthe Field Artillery battalion had aninfantry platoon, it would probably bethe most poorly trained platoon in the

battalion.While being an indirect-fire system in

a maneuver battalion may be part of thetraining problem, the issue goes evendeeper. It could be that commanders justdon't consider their mortars a primarycombat contributor. If maneuver

battalion commanders knew theirsuccess on the battlefield depended onmortars, they'd probably train their units

better on them. I suspect commandersthink they can get along without mortars,so they don't emphasize them. If theyhad to choose one platoon to "do

without" in a battle, it would beinteresting to see how many tank ormechanized infantry commanders wouldopt for keeping their mortars to give upa Bradley or Abrams platoon.

The New Battlefield

So far I've said that mortars havemateriel, organizational and training

problems. We could fix these problems,but the real question is whether mortarcontributions to the battle make themworthwhile. The battlefield has changedand is going to change even more as we

move into the 1990s.The Threat. On the Threat side, we'reseeing an ever-increasing emphasis onmounted operations. Indications are thatin a heavy scenario, the enemy won'tdismount until he has closed to withinabout 500 meters. From a mortarsurvivability standpoint, we also areseeing increased vulnerability becauseof the improved radar systems of our

potential adversaries.Our Army.On our side, there have also

been some significant changes. TheBradley has changed our thinking from

its being merely a vehicle to bringsoldiers forward to being one that joinsin the battle.

The fight itself has moved deeper.We're no longer looking at just usinghigh-explosive (HE) munitions tosuppress the enemy when he closes.We're looking at more lethal andsophisticated

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munitions to destroy him before hecloses.

Mortar Contributions

Perhaps the best approach toarticulating the contributions of mortarsis to look at them from a subjective

point of view. We must ask ourselves

what the mortar does that we can'taccomplish or compensate for by usingother systems. Illumination. From anillumination standpoint, we must takeinto account the high dud rate of4.2-inch illumination rounds and the factthat we're not buying illumination forthe 120-mm mortar. But, there are someother considerations. Althoughillumination still is required on the

battlefield, we won't rely on it as muchbecause of the proliferation ofnight-vision devices.

A second consideration is that the

Field Artillery also can provide theillumination and at a greater range. If weeliminated illumination from the FieldArtillery, the case for mortars might bestronger. But, there always will be timeswhen the mortars can't put the illum outto the necessary ranges. In fact, we could

probably make a case for eliminating theillumination mission for mortars, leavingit to the Field Artillery. It goes withoutsaying that we can't justify heavy mortarsfor illumination alone.Smoke. Mortars have been touted asexcellent "smokers." Right now, that's not

the case; they only have white phosphorous(WP) smoke. Although mortars providesmoke quickly, their rounds don't have theduration to build smoke screens. Smokescreens are best accomplished with thehexachloroethane (HC) smoke round foundin the Field Artillery.

Smoke really comes into play on theoffense, and experience shows thatmortars can't meet the requirement. The

problem is their range is too short for afast-moving offensive situation. So theField Artillery is still going to have tomeet a large portion of our smoke

requirements.Lethality. The real issue is mortars inthe killing role. In this area, the mortarshave the HE round and, when comparedto Field Artillery, have a high rate of fire.Mortar HE is useful for suppressingcombat vehicles and defeatingdismounted forces. It's in these roles thatthe mortar must defend its usefulness.

In the past, we've relied heavily on

suppressingcombat vehicles as a meansof reducing the enemy's direct-firecapability. However, the extended depthof the battlefield and the use ofsophisticated acquisition systems andmunitions is shifting the emphasis tokillingcombat vehicles before they close.There will always be a requirement to

cope with enemy combat vehicles in theclose battle, but the contribution ofmortars to this task is questionable. Thecannon, with its greater range and morelethal munitions, is a more effectivealternative.

A primary role of mortars is to defeatdismounted forces. The HE munitionand rapid rate of fire make the mortarsuited to this task. However, we need toask ourselves whether we really needthe mortar's ability to defeat dismountedforces to win the battle. Ideally, we'lldefeat the enemy in depth with

long-range artillery and high-lethalitymunitions. But setting that aside, let'sconsider the capability of the mortaragainst the dismounted threat and alsoconsider alternatives.

The dismounted infantry fight haschanged. With the advent of infantryfighting vehicles with improved armorand weapon systems, there's anincreased emphasis on mountedoperations. We can expect to see enemyforces staying mounted until they haveclosed to within about 500 meters.These close ranges demand accurate

fires, both to increase the killing ofenemy forces and for the safety of ourown. The mortar, with its inherent andoperationally induced inaccuracies, isn'twell suited for this role.

Conversely, the cannon provides agreater inherent accuracy and has theadvantages provided by accurate

position location and the application ofmeteorological and muzzle velocitycorrections. The cannon also deliversmore lethal munitions.

There are alternatives to defeatingdismounted infantry. In looking at the

need for mortars in this role, we mustconsider the contributions of the 25-mmgun on the infantry fighting vehicle andother possible systems. The 60-mmmortar may be a better choice for theclose battle. Used as a direct-lay system,it provides instant responsiveness,requires no fire direction center orcommunications and has a goodcapability against dismounted infantry.

The real advantage of the 60-mm mortar isthat it might be incorporated into amechanized infantry platoon withoutcreating a separate organization.

While it's bursting radius is only abouthalf that of the 120-mm mortar, its rate offire is more than double that of its heavier

brother. The real advantage of the 60-mmis that it might be incorporated into amechanized infantry platoon withoutcreating a separate organization.

Another alternative that appearsparticularly attractive is the newautomatic grenade launcher. Thesystem's high rates of fire make it idealfor attacking dismounted forces. Itwould provide immediateresponsiveness, require no specialorganization and could be manned bythe infantry platoon.

Mortar "Bills"A major argument for mortars is that

since we already have them, why givethem up? Mortars aren't free! Evenwithout fixing the materiel problems,they do cost us.Spaces. There are several thousand

personnel spaces in the mortar platoonsof the heavy forces, and this

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number includes only the minimumpersonnel required to fire the mortars. Itdoesn't account for any overhead

beyond the platoon headquarters or anysupport and sustainment personnel.Putting this number in perspective, we'retalking about several battalions' worth offorce structure.

Associated Materiel. We also havemateriel costs associated with themortars. They use about 200 M577command post carriers, a vehiclecritically short in the Army. Thosecommand post carriers would more thanmeet the needs of the program toconvert 8-inch howitzer battalions tomultiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

There are also about 500 trackedmortar carriers. It might be possible tochange some of these carriers to meetthe equipment shortfalls holding up thefielding of combat observation lasing

teams (COLTs).Mortars use 1,000-plus radios, not

counting the planned fielding of theenhanced position locating and reportingsystem (EPLRS). Significantly, firesupport teams and fire support sectionsneed about 50 percent of these radios

just to manage mortar fires.

Operations. But the cost of mortars ismore than personnel spaces andequipment; there are operational costs aswell. If one lays down the fire supportcommand, control and communications

structure in a heavy task force, itbecomes obvious that mortars placesignificant demands on the system. Firerequests from observers must becoordinated between mortars and FieldArtillery, placing additional demands onthe fire support team headquarters andon the battalion fire support element.

Streamlined Fire SupportThe final argument for mortars is that

they're responsive to the needs of thetask-force commander. However, if weeliminated the heavy mortars, the firesupport command and control systemwould be greatly streamlined, increasingits overall responsiveness.

If the concern is that we don't haveenough artillery to "take up the slack,"then we should consider using the mortarforce-structure spaces to "beef up" thedirect-support artillery, increasing the

number of cannons in the battalion.From a cost standpoint, we probablycould get more firepower for the dollar

by going to a single indirect-fire systemwhere we'd be concerned with only onecaliber of munition, one set of firedirection frequencies, etc. From anoperational standpoint, the longer rangeand greater variety of artillery munitionsgives the maneuver commander moreflexibility.

The Bottom Line

The bottom line is that the heavy

mortar is not a cost-effective system inthe heavy forces. In this era of aconstrained force and constrained

budget, we need to look at streamliningour force by eliminating mortars in ourheavy forces. The Field Artillery "bit the

bullet" and is eliminating its 8-inchhowitzer. Now it's time for the Infantry

to bite the bullet with regard to theheavy mortar.

120-mm Mortars forLight Forces

As a closing note, perhaps I shoulddiscuss what we might do with the120-mm mortars we're committed to

buying. We could offer them up forforeign military sales, but there's anotheralternative.

The current buy of 120-mm mortarsis only enough for about one-third of theheavy force. However, it's about the

right amount for the light forces! Lightforces generally face dismounted forces,they don't move at the speeds of armorand mechanized forces, and their rangerequirements are not as great. They needa system that's easily deployed withminimal air sorties. These factors seemto point to using the 120-mm to increasethe firepower of our light forces.

Edward J. StilesConcepts and Studies

Directorate of Combat DevelopmentsField Artillery School

Author's Response to Article Critique

The Soviet 2S1 122-mm howitzer, like any otherself-propelled cannon system with collectiveoverpressure protection, breaks its seal when it fires.

Captain [Donald R.] Sims, thankyou for your reflections [Incoming,June 1989, Page 6] on my article"Soviet Artillery: Myth versus Reality"[April, 1989]. Your attention to the

problem posed by our potentialadversary is noteworthy, and yourcomments have some merit. However,I feel your criticisms have missed the

point somewhat.You said the 2S1 breaks its seal

when it fires, making it dangerous inan NBC environment. The 2S1, or anyother self-propelled cannon systemwith collective overpressure protection,will break its seal anytimeit fires. It isimpossible to open the breech to reload

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the weapon without doing so. However,during the brief time the breech is openor that the cartridge case ejection port onthe 2S1 is open, the air is being forcedoutside by the pressure. In fact, theloader's hatch on the 2S1 is positionedso a powerful stream of air blows outthe hatch whenever it is opened. Any

contaminant that might enter thefighting compartment would benegligible.

The Soviets obviously chose aless-than-perfect system over none at all,as was the choice for the M109. Thisargument is a little like criticizing theneighbor's sports car because it's thewrong color when you're driving aclunker. By the way, the caption for the

photograph on Page 6 is incorrect: thehowitzers are not 2S1s as says Soviet

Military Powerbut are D-30s, as can beseen by the towing lunette visible

forward of the muzzle brake. [Thepicture was provided by Field Artillery.]

The comment about the MI-2 artillerycorrection and reconnaissancehelicopter's not being comparable to ourOH58D is misleading. The MI-2spotting variant is the second such

aircraft fielded by the Soviets since the1960s. A recent Soviet publicationdetailing a comparison of Warsaw Pactand NATO equipment pointed out the"...MI-8 and MI-24 reconnaissance andspotting aircraft...," and an East German

publication reported that a trainer wasbeing developed for a "...reconnaissance

and spotting helicopter with laser anddata transmission equipment...." Aspotting variant of the MI-24,

presumably with a laser range finder ordesignator and a link to automated C

3

[command, control andcommunications], would represent amajor improvement in heliborneartillery spotting.

Last, the comments about the Sovietartillery headquarters' operatingmanually, as opposed to usingautomation, are incorrect. The Soviets(like their Bulgarian, Hungarian, East

German and Czechoslovakian allies)have developed their own modernizedartillery command and control system.

The system has digital messageequipment in the command observation

posts, battalion and battery fire directioncenters, mobile reconnaissance posts,

radar stations and, presumably, inaircraft. There are digitally linkedcomputers at battalion and higher levelsand probably at battery level as well.This system has been described in detailin a recent article in Voyennie Vestnikand doubtlessly has been in the field forseveral years.

As I mentioned at the close of thearticle, the Soviets have vulnerabilities.These include limited numbers ofhigher-level artillery headquarters,extensive use of the infrastructure formovement, individual soldier

performance and others. They are,however, very good planners andexcellent designers.

The qualitative edge we held in the1970s has been squandered, in part,

because we have been arrogant and notgiven the Warsaw Pact credit where itwas due. We now have to accept its

advances, buckle down and catch up.

Michael D. HolthusIntelligence Research Specialist

Foreign Science and Technology CenterCharlottesville, VA

General ClarkeNot Palmer

Having received the October 1989copy of Field Artillery, I immediately

began devouring its contents. In myjoint assignment, it is my only link tothe Field Artillery Community.

As I have come to expect, it is full ofinformation and worthwhile articles. Iespecially enjoyed the three HistoryWriting Contest submissions. The article"Danger Close: A Historical Perspectiveon Today's Close Support" by Major

Thomas Waller was certainly worthy ofFirst Prize.

I must, however, point out that onPage 12 in the discussion of the Battleof Saint Vith, Major Waller states that

Combat Command B of the 7thArmored Division was commanded byBrigadier General Bruce Palmer. More

precisely he wrote, "the infantry ofBrigadier General Palmer's CombatCommand B...." I can only assumeMajor Waller meant to say BrigadierGeneral Bruce Clarke, one of the US

Army's finest leaders.General Clarke led CCB of the 7th AD

in a fight that had at least the samesignificance as the Battle at Bastogne indetermining the outcome of "The Bulge."

I'm sure Major Waller made an honesterror, and this is strictly to set the recordstraight.

CPT Richard J. Lyons, FAField Command

Defense Nuclear AgencyKirtland AFB, NM

"A good camouflage job, besidesoffering concealment, also makes agreat dinner salad."

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Israeli Artillery

Tactics and

WeaponsLessons Learned

in Combatby Brigadier General (Reserves) Arie Mizrachi, IDF

The M109, firing in Lebanon, is deployed in accordance with terrain features.

irepower played a major role inthe 1982 Lebanon War. ThisWar, one of many in the long

and continuous conflicts of theMiddle-East, was in fact, "TheArtillery War." The "secret" of theIsrael Defence Forces (IDF) artillery'ssuccess rested in the correctcombination of new tactics that hademerged from the lessons of the 1973Yom Kippur War and modern, locallydeveloped weapon systems.

Characteristics of theLebanon War

F

The 1982 confrontation was thefirst war in which the IDF hademployed large quantities of theM109A1 and A2 self-propelledhowitzers (SPHs). The main portion ofthe divisional artillery's combatequipment was based on those M109SPHs and the M107 175-mm guns,which were converted, in certaincases, into 8-inch tubes. The IDF alsoused rocket artillery in the form of the

medium artillery rocket (MAR) 290.As far as I am aware, this was the

first war in which each battery had anintegral battery computer system. Ourforward observers (FOs) at all levelsused laser range finders (LRF) whileremotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) wereused for target acquisition, fire controland damage assessment. Our Smartfire control radar, still in its prototype

version at the time, also wassuccessfully used for registrationmissions.

The 1982 War was, in fact, the firstin history where 155-mm improvedconventional munitions (ICMs)coupled with rocket artillery were usedwidely. This had a tremendous"impact" on the enemy, affecting hisarmor, infantry, artillery batteries and

built-up areas. Direct-fire techniques,implemented by the M109s and the8-inch tubes against pinpoint targets,

also proved very effective.The well-known American military

historian, Richard A. Gabriel in his

book, Operation Peace forGalileeThe Israeli-PLO War in

Lebanon (Hill and Wang, New York,1984), described the role of the IDFartillery during the 1982 Lebanon War,as follows:

Artillery is the newest combat arm of

the IDF, created out of whole cloth after

the 1973 War. In 1973, the IDF had

about 300 artillery guns, most of which

February 1990 7


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In addition, it used the new Rafael

David fire-control computer system

(made in Israel), which made it fairly

effective at sheaving artillery and

linking concentrated fires. It also

deployed a number of new fire modes

built around the new Telkoor M131

multi-option fuse.

In Beirut, the artillery played acrucial role in suppressing enemy fire

and destroying PLO strongpoints within

the camps and the city. Often, in

responding to PLO Katyusha and

mortar fire, the IDF was able to sheave

its artillery rapidly and respond almost

immediately by pouring scores of shells

on a single area....During the siege of

Beirut, the IDF seems to have

discovered the technique of "sniping" with

large-caliber artillery pieces by firing

single rounds into PLO military targets

at point-blank range.Artillery performed well in Lebanon

with no major problems. However,

battle conditions presented it with

considerable advantages that it may not

have on a different battlefield in the

future. The conditions of battle inLebanon did not allow for a true test of

the artillery and structure envisioned in

1973. Its new role was to deploy in

support of rapidly moving armored

infantry forces in a closely coordinated

combined-arms attack. A test of that

role will have to wait for the future.Many subjects regarding the

performance of the artillery in 1982 wouldinterest American Redlegs. However in

An enemy Syrian gun sits damaged after being hit by Israeli artillery in Lebanon.

were towed pieces. By 1982, the

number of guns had increased to more

than 958, most of which were

self-propelled, large-caliber artillery.Prior to 1973, artillery played

essentially a support role, with limited

mobility in support of the tank. Today

[1984] IDF artillery is completely

mobile to keep up with the rapid

advance of tanks and armored

personnel carriers; it has become a full

partner in the combined-arms team.

Its weaponry is comprised mostly ofM109s and M107s, added to a number

of locally produced Soltam M71s and

L33s. In addition, it deploys a

considerable number of 160-mm

mortars mounted on old Sherman

chassis, as well as a number of M50

105-mm guns mounted on Super

Sherman chassis. Mobility is further

augmented by the ability of the IDF to

move artillery pieces to the battlefront

on transporters.Artillery proved effective in most

instances during the Lebanon War,

although to some extent its effectivenesswas reduced by the terrain, which

prevented its playing the highly mobile,

fast-moving role envisioned for it in the

new combined-arms doctrine developed

since 1973. Operations were often

slowed to a crawl by terrain and hostile

fire in urban areas.In the east, artillery proved effective

in counterbattery fire against Syrian

positions, a fact helped considerably

by the Syrians' refusal to redeploy

artillery rapidly with the changing

tactical situation. The effectiveness of

artillery in the eastern zone also wasincreased considerably by the Israelis'

complete air superiority.In the west, the effectiveness of

artillery was reduced by self-imposed

restrictions to limit property damage

and civilian casualties. However, the

artillery was technically very good. It

made good use of new devices such as

the RPVs...[and] intelligence gathered

by aircraft flying over the battlefield.

Smart Antenna Vehicle. The Smart fire-control radar proved to be a significant force multiplierduring the War in Lebanon.

8 Field Artillery


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this article, I'll concentrate on threesignificant issues: direct fire for selfdefence, battery deployment andsurvivability and large concentrations offires.

Direct Fire for Self Defence

In the 1973 War, the IDF had only 23

short-barrel M109 SPHs. I was servingas an M109 battalion commander in theGolan Heights, and one of my batteries(Battery B) was deployed in thesouthern part of the Golanright on themain axis of the Syrian armor penetrationroute.

That place, known as the Tel-FaresGap, was defended by an Israeliarmored brigade that had already facedtwo Syrian divisions. The artillery ratiowas 15:1, with our being greatlyoutnumbered by the Syrians.

In the first seven hours, from 1400

until about 2100, Battery B fired morethan 1,000 rounds on various targets. Inthe evening, a Syrian T-55 tankcompany attacked it from a range ofabout 40 meters. Three of our fourhowitzers were destroyed and so was theM113 fire direction center (FDC).

The immediate lesson we learnedfrom that battle was we urgently neededto improve the ability of our crews todefend themselves. We increased oursurvivability by better using thesection's main weaponthehowitzerfor defence purposes.

To fulfill such an objective, wedeveloped direct-fire techniques dealingwith such issues as fighting enemy tanksat various ranges, maximizing theduration of our stay in firing positionsand commanding and controlling batteryfire. We also developed a new3,000-meter telescope capable of firingwith a charge 9 propellant (US203).

From 1976 to 1982, we dedicated alarge percentage of our training time andammunition to direct-fire drills. Toencourage our crews, we evenconducted some tests on the effects of

155-mm fire against T-62 tanks.

The results of these technique, tacticand training efforts were indeedapparent in the Lebanon War. We usedM109A2 and 8-inch M110 battalionsvery effectively in direct-fire missions.It was natural for our crews to use directfire whenever neededfor battery selfdefence as well as against strongholds,and particularly in built-up areas.

Better Deployment andSurvivability

At the start of the 1973 Yom KippurWar in the Golan Heights, the Israeliartillery was heavily outnumbered (15:1)

by the Syrian artillery forces. The ratioimproved to 7:1 after we mobilized our

reserve forces, a ratio we maintainedthroughout the 1974 War of Attrition(which has the same name as the 1970War) in the Golan Heights. The name ofthe game was, thus,survivability.

During the 1974 War of Attrition, myBattery C was deployed near theforward edge of the battle area (FEBA)approximately 35 kilometers fromDamascus in an area that had beencaptured from the Syrians in 1973.

The entire area had been wellobserved by the Syrian forces situatedon the highlands, and "Shoot and Scoot"

tactics were not effective. The enemyforces would accompany ourleapfrogging with counterbattery firesand make sure that such fires would"welcome" us in our new positions.Because our mission was to provideclose support for our front-line forces,we had no choice but to remain in thesame positions and keep on firing.

The Battery Commander devised away to increase our survivability bydeploying his SPHs in deserted Syriantrenches with the hulls and turretsalmost concealed. For each SPH, the

tube was practically the only part thatwasn't in the trench, allowing us to firefull-circle (360 degrees).

We solved the ammunition supplyproblem by converting one of thehowitzers into a Field Artilleryammunition support vehicle (FAASV).We also put 70 to 80 rounds on the floorof each SPH.

The M109, thus, was completely shut,using distant reference points instead ofaiming rods. All the crew members wore

armored vests. The Battery remained inthe same position for three weeks,continuously providing effective firesupport with no casualties during that

period.The outcomes of this lesson were

twowe changed our tactics andimproved our howitzers.

New TacticsWe began using new deployment

techniques that came to be known as"deployment in accordance with terrainfeatures." We taught our section chiefsto exercise independence in the selectionof their positions. The batterydeployment area covered some 400 to600 meters, with each section chief'shaving to find his own trench, cover andconcealment. We deployed the M109with all hatches shut and all activitiesand procedures carried out from within

the crew compartment.

Used in Lebanon, the Israelis developed theMT 18/19 laser range finder for both forwardand firing echelons.

The Palestine Liberation Organization used this Soviet-made Katyusha rocket launcher inLebanon.

February 1990 9


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The data from the FDC were sentseparately to each specific gun, due to thedifferent muzzle velocities (MVs), andwas computed by the battery computer,which included the different gun

positions in its computations. We thusenhanced survivability by takingadvantage of the capabilities of the M109and battery computer.

Howitzer Improvements

Artillery movement necessarily results

in the reduction of artillery fire support tofront-line units and implies greaterdanger for the latter. But to enable ourcrews to follow the new tactics, we had tofurther reduce our vulnerabilities. We hadto give them a system that would increasesurvivability and allow our artillery toaccomplish its mission successfully.

An improved weapon system had toallow us to remain in one firing positionwith hatches shut and receive all neededdata digitally from the FDC while theSPH provided the navigation and layingdata. The improved system also had to

Increase the quantity of on-boardammunition, allowing crew members toremain in the crew compartmentthroughout the firing process. Improve the rate of fire and reduce

the time it takes to shift from one target tothe next, allowing us to engage the largenumber of targets we faced as we wereseverely outnumbered.

One should remember that, statistically,ammunition is most effective in the first fewminutes while the enemy is taken bysurprise. This entails our firing largequantities in a short time and requires

significant improvements in our rate of fire.

Large Concentrationsof FiresDuring the 1973 Yom Kippur War, I alsoserved as the fire support officer (FSO) ofthe 7th Armored Brigade in the GolanHeights. One of the most severe

problems we encountered in the defencewas the ratio between enemy tank

quantities and our own.On the most crucial day of battle, we

were at a quantitative disadvantage of

150 enemy tanks to our 10, which at thattime were still undamaged. The enemytanks had assaulted us in a final attemptto break through our defence line.

Our solution was to concentrate thefires of 21 artillery batteries, which wereat my disposal at the time, together withthe fires of an additional artillery240-mm rocket battalion. The shockcreated by such a massive concentrationof firesespecially the distressing effectthe 144 240-mm rockets caused on enemymoraleforced some of the enemy unitsto stop and the rest to at least slow their

progress. We gained much-needed timethat allowed our tanks to reach their

positions and receive reinforcements. Theenemy withdrew and the battle wasdecided.

As a result of that battle, we betterunderstood the importance of firingaccurately and taking the enemy bysurprise to cause maximum damage. Wealso developed new, more appropriatetarget registration techniques.These techniques allow the divisionartillery the maximum flexibility whenconcentrating fires. We simplified the

techniques by using the battery firecomputer, which quickly andautomatically adjusts the fires of a singlegun, to adjust the fires of the entiredivision artillery. In the Lebanon War, wecould concentrate the firepower of 20artillery battalions on one target withinminutes, without having to adjust.

The device we developed for thispurpose is the Smart system. Smart is a

fire-control radar system whose rangeallows us to use it far behind firingartillery pieces. Smart's range and

accuracy proved to be remarkable,exceeding our expectations. This radarenabled us to concentrate fires andexploit artillery flexibility in bothmountainous and built-up areas.

One of the Israelis' locally developed systems is their version of a position and azimuthdetermining system (PADS).

SummaryThe lessons of the 1973 War emerged

into operational requirements, which ledto our developing new tactics, techniquesand weapon systems to accommodatethose requirements. By 1982, the IDFartillery could exploit its potential fullyand became a decisive arm on the

battlefield.

Brigadier General (Reserves) ArieMizrachi is President of a consultingfirm he started in Ganei Tiqva, Israel.He spent 24 years in the Israel DefenceForces and was Chief Artillery Officerwhen he was released in 1983. GeneralMizrachi's combat experience includesserving as a combat officer (S3) andbattery commander during the Six-DayWar (1967), as a battery commanderand deputy battalion commander in theWar of Attrition (1970), as battalioncommander and armoured brigadecommander for fire support in the YomKippur War (1973) and as ArtilleryCorps Commander in the LebaneseWar (1982). He also served as ArtilleryCommander of the Israeli NorthernCommand and as the CommandingOfficer of the IDF Artillery School.General Mizrachi is an honor graduateof the US Army Field Artillery OfficerAdvanced Course (1975), Fort Sill ,Oklahoma.

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ROK ArtilleryPresent andFuture

by Ma

t may come as a surprise that of allAmerica's allies, the nation thatmaintains the largest amount of

artillery is not a NATO nation, but theRepublic of Korea, commonly referredto as South Korea. In this article, Iexamine the organization of theRepublic of Korea Army (ROKA)artillery and its weapons and tactics. Inaddition, I review the future trends ofthe ROKA artillery toward reorganizingits force and modernizing its equipment.To put the ROKA situation into the

proper perspective, I first briefly

examine the Threat fit faces.

jor John Gordon IV

North Korean Threat

The Democratic People's Republic ofKorea, usually referred to as NorthKorea, maintains the third largeststanding army in Asia, with anactive-duty strength of about 750,000men. Only the armies of the People'sRepublic of China and Vietnam arelarger. The North Korean Armyconsists of 25 active-duty infantrydivisions and 35 armored andmechanized brigades, some of which

are subordinated to infantry corps whileothers are formed into four armored ormechanized corps, each of which islarger than an American armoreddivision.

Supporting these ground forces is ahuge artillery organization. The totalartillery weapons available to the NorthKorean Army's divisional and

non-divisional artillery units numberroughly 4,000 guns and howitzers andabout 2,500 multiple rocket launchers(MRLs). Many of these weapons arenow produced in North Korea.

The North's army is by any standardlarge and is a huge drain on a nation ofonly 22 million people. It's organizedand deployed for a short-noticeoffensive against South Korea, and itsartillery would be a major factor in suchan offensive, particularly in the initial

phases of any attack. North Koreanforces are large, but much of its

equipment, particularly its tanks andcertainly its air force, is obsolescent.When faced with the prospect of

breaking through well-organized ROKAdefensive positions along the 150-mileDemilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Northwould have to rely primarily on itsmassive artillery organization.

HARTS

Just north of the DMZ are hundredsof hardened artillery sites (HARTS) thathave been constructed since the end ofopen hostilities in August 1953. During

the first phase of an attack against theSouth, the North Korean artillery would

be able to find shelter in these sites,some of which are bunkers and otherstunnels in hillsides. For the first 10 to 15kilometers of an advance against theSouth, the vast majority of the NorthKorean artillery would be able to firefrom these well-protected positions.

If the attack were successful and theadvance continued, the North's artillerywould have to leave its protected

positions to follow and support theadvancing armored and infantry units.However, the advantage the HARTS

provide in the early phases of an attackcan't be overstated. These positions, as Idiscuss later, represent a majorchallenge to the ROKA artillery.

Artillery Upgrades

The North has spent the past fewyears transforming much of its artilleryfrom 1940s to 1950s-style Soviet towedweapons into a self-propelled force. Ithas accomplished this by mounting122-mm, 130-mm and 152-mm weaponson armored personnel and tractor chassis,usually with limited crew protection andtraverse capabilities. Nevertheless, theseconversions have greatly increased the

North Korean artillery's ability to followand support advancing maneuver units.In addition, the North has deployed anumber of long-range, self-propelled180-mm guns, which would certainly be

used very early in any war to terror-shellSeoul for propaganda purposes.(There isdisagreement about the caliber of guns;some sources say they're 170 or175-mm.)

North Korea is a major threat to theRepublic of Korea. The North's army islarge, apparently well-trained and armedwith a large number of serviceable

February 1990 11

I


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but increasingly outmoded weapons.The artillery arm of its army isformidable, with the ability to generatethe massive firepower needed to crackROKA defensive positions along theDMZ.

ROK Army

In June 1950 when the North KoreanArmy swept across the 38th Parallel, theROK artillery was very poorly armedand trained. Its heaviest weapons were a

few hundred US World War II-vintage105-mm towed howitzers. This forcewasn't prepared to deal with thewell-equipped forces of the North. Formany years after the Korean War, theROKA's dependence on US Armyhand-me-downs was to continue. Todaythat situation is rapidly changing.

The ROK Army currently consists ofapproximately 540,000 men on activeduty organized into two mechanizeddivisions, 19 infantry divisions and anumber of non-divisional infantry, armorand artillery brigades. Backing up this

force, which is larger than that of any ofour NATO allies, is a reserve structurethat includes 23 reserve infantry divisionsof various types and several millionreservists. A prominent part of this armyis its powerful artillery force.

This ROKA 105-mm howitzer in a concretebunker is aimed at the DMZ. Notice thethickness of the overhead cover.

Artillery Organization

The basic unit in the ROK Army isthe infantry division. By current USArmy standards, these would be lightinfantry divisions since they are, for themost part, foot-mobile and contain veryfew armored vehicles. At full strength,these divisions number roughly 15,000

officers and men. The majority of theirfirepower comes from their organicartillery regiments.

Figure 1 shows the typical artilleryorganization in a ROKA infantry division.All battalions consist of three firing

batteries and a total of 18 cannons. Ascurrently organized, three battalions havetowed 105-mm howitzers, either US- orROK-made M101s or ROK-producedKH-178s 105-mm howitzers, which aresuperior to the US M101s.

These direct-support battalions arehabitually associated with one of the three

infantry regiments of the infantry division.The fourth battalion is the divisionalgeneral-support battalion, which is armedwith either American-made M114 orKorean-produced KH-179 155-mmhowitzers. The total number of weapons inthe Korean artillery regiment is 72, whichcompares favorably with its North Koreancounterpart. A North Korean divisionusually has four, 18-gun battalions.

Division Artillery. The artilleryorganization of the two ROKAmechanized infantry divisions is shown in

Figure 2. The Capital and 20thMechanized Divisions are elite forces inthe ROK Army and are much moreheavily armed than are the regular infantrydivisions. It's here that the modern, SouthKorean-produced K-88 tanks are found.

The artillery regiment consists entirelyof self-propelled weapons. The 8-inchhowitzers are short-tube M110 weapons,which were dropped from USactive-force service roughly a decadeago. But the M109A2s have the samecapabilities as the M109-serieshowitzers found in American

mechanized and armored units. TheM109A2 is also the direct-supportweapon in the artillery battalions of theROKA non-divisional armored brigades.

Corps Artillery Brigades. In additionto its divisional artillery force, theROKA maintains a large number ofseparate artillery organizations. TheROKA has several artillery brigadesassigned to the corps that are positioned

along the DMZ. The number of artillerybrigades in each corps varies, dependingon the part of the DMZ the corps isdefending. Unlike the divisional artilleryregiments that are fixed in structure,there's considerable variation in theorganization of the corps artillery

brigades.

Figure 3 shows a typical organizationof a corps artillery brigade. Note thenumber of battalions will varyconsiderably, as will the type of weapon.

A number of artillery systems at thecorps level don't show up in thedivisional organizations. These includeAmerican-made M107 175-mmself-propelled, long-range guns andM115 8-inch towed howitzers. Eachcorps artillery brigade also has atwo-launcher Honest John rocket batteryand a battalion of Korean-made 130-mmKooryong MRLs. Unlike the North

Korean Army, the ROKA doesn't usuallyassign MRLs to divisions.

A ROKA M110 howitzer moves through atypical Korean town.

The ROKA M109A2 howitzers of the eliteCapital Mechanized Division line up afterTeam Spirit 89.

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Figure 1: The Typical Organization of a ROKA Infantry Division Artillery

Figure 2: The Organization of the Two Elite ROKA Mechanized Infantry DivisionsArtilleriesThe Capital and 20th Divisions

Figure 3: The Organization of a ROKA Corps Field Artillery Brigade, Though the Number ofBattalions Varies

ROKAUnitedKingdom France

WestGermany

NumberofGuns/Howitzers

3,300(+) 550 786 1,223

Figure 4: Comparison of Selected NATO Armies and ROKA Field Artillery

Reserve Artillery. As was mentionedearlier, the active-duty elements of theROKA are supported by a very largereserve system that can field 23 reservedivisions in a matter of a few days aftermobilization. There're two types of reservedivisions: mobilization reserve divisions(MRDs) and homeland defense divisions

(HDDs). These vary in function andorganization.

The MRDs are organized in a similarmanner to the standard active-duty infantrydivisions, and their artillery includes theusual mix of 105-mm and 155-mmweapons found in the active army. Theseformations are able to take their place in thefront line beside active-duty forces severaldays after mobilization.

The HDDs. however, are designedprimarily for rear-area defense. This is nosmall task considering the massive NorthKorean Special Purpose Forces dedicated to

infiltrating the ROKA rear area throughoutthe depth of the ROK.

The HDDs are weak in artillery. Somedivisions have only one battalion ofartillery, 105-mm. This organization is inkeeping with the mission of these divisions.

Figure 4 shows a comparison of the totalartillery strength of the ROKA, includingthe reserves, compared to that of selected

NATO armies. The artillery of the ROKArmy is very formidable, even thoughoutnumbered by its potential North Koreanenemies.

Artillery DoctrineDue to its long, close association with

the United States Army, it isn't surprisingthat ROKA artillery doctrine is very similarto ours. In fact, the ROKA artillery FieldManual 6-20, is virtually a copy of theAmerican FM 6-20 Fire Support.There are,however, several differences between howthe US artillery and ROKA would fight.

In terms of artillery missions, there's nodifference between the two armies. Directsupport, reinforcing, general-supportreinforcing and general support areconcepts both armies share. This greatly

facilitates coordination among US andROK artillery commanders.

Some of the important differences at thetactical and operational levels are The ROKA tends to move artillery

battalions in one bound. The role of the corps artillery staff is

similar to that of a US corps artillery duringWorld War II. Because frontages

February 1990 13


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are much smaller for divisions in Koreathan they would be for us in Europe, theROKA corps artillery headquarters caneffectively retain tactical control of aconsiderable amount of artillery. Somefront-line ROKA corps have frontagesabout the same as a US Army divisionwould have in Europe. This means thecorps artillery headquarters can controlthe counterfire battle and retain control ofa significant number of firing battalions. The ROKA artillery retains the

forward observer concept, as opposed to aUS fire support team. The ROKA artillery doesn't

emphasize deep battle, as does the USartillery. It pays a great deal of attention tothe close-support mission.

Artillery Equipment

The days are rapidly passing when theROKA has to rely on US hand-outs for itsartillery. South Korea is now capable of

producing a variety of artillery systemsfor its own forces and for export.

M101.For some years now, the ROK hasproduced this split-trail 105-mm towedweapon. It's still the most commonartillery piece in the ROK Army.Produced by Daewoo Corporation, it'sidentical to the M101 howitzer made forthe US Army for many years. The ROKArecognizes that this weapon is rapidly

becoming outmoded and is taking steps tochange the situation.

KH-178. A much more modern 105-mmweapon is this howitzer, designed and

produced in Korea. The KIA MachineTool Company took samples of the

excellent British 105-mm light gun andthe experimental West GermanRheinmetall version of the M101 andincorporated the better points of each intoits KH-178.

This towed weapon, in productionsince 1984, can fire current 105-mmammunition to 14,700 meters, nearly a 30

percent increase in range over the M101howitzer. If it fires a rocket-assisted

projectile (RAP), the KH-178 has a rangeof 18,000 meters.

M114A2.Like the M101, this is a Koreanversion of a proven American 155-mmartillery piece. Produced by DaewooCorporation, the Korean M114 is usuallyin the general-support artillery battalion ofinfantry divisions. Its performance is

identical to that of the old Americanversion, but the Koreans have produced aRAP, which extends its range from 14,600to 19,500 meters.

KH-179.In service with the ROK Armysince 1983, this weapon gives thegeneral-support battalions of the ROKartillery a much greater range than theyhad before. Using the carriage of theM114A1, the Koreans mounted a new39-caliber barrel that increased the rangeto 22,000 meters for most projectiles.With a rocket assist, this weapon can fire30,000 meters.

Thus the KH-179 has a performancevery similar to the US M198, and the KIAMachine Tool Company produces it at amuch cheaper cost. The ROK Army hasordered several hundred of these weaponsfor the general-support battalions ininfantry divisions to replace M114s andfor many corps artillery battalions.

M-109A2. The first self-propelledartillery piece produced in the ROK, thisweapon is built under license by SamsungShipbuilding and Heavy Industries withcertain components coming from theUnited States. The initial order was for

272 systems, and as will be shown later,the ROKA has plans to do much morewith this weapon. Currently it's in theCapital and 20th Mechanized Divisions'separate armored brigades and severalcorps artillery battalions.

MRL.Like so many Soviet-style armies,the North Korean Army uses thousands ofMRLs. The first such weapon in theROKA is the domestically produced130-mm 36-round, truck-mountedKooryong MRL. This powerful weaponcan fire a high-explosive, variable-timewarhead to a range of 32 kilometers.Reloading takes about 10 minutes.Currently, these weapons are in18-launcher MRL battalions at the corpslevel. It's produced by Daewoo HeavyIndustries.

Computerized Firing Data. At thebattalion and battery levels, the artillerynow uses a computer to determine firingdata. Currently, these are issued one to

each firing battery and one at the battalionfire direction center.

Ammunition. A number of plants inSouth Korea produce ammunition for allcalibers of weapons used by the ROKAartillery and for the export market. Thevariety of ammunition produced is quiteextensive and includes M444 105-mm

armor-piercing improved conventionalmunitions (APICM), but not dual-purpose(DPICM) for their 155-mm howitzers.And although the ROKA has acannon-launched guided projectile in itsForce Improvement Plan (FIP), there's nosuch round produced in the ROK at thistime. Commonality of ammunition withUS Army units stationed in the ROKwould, of course, facilitate transfer ofmunitions from US Army to ROKAartillery in times of crisis.

Areas of Concern

Despite the very impressive advancesmade by the ROKA artillery in the pastdecade, there are many areas that needimprovement. First, it lacks adequatetarget acquisition equipment.

Counterfire Radars

Since the Korean War, the ROKAartillery has had to rely on sound and flashto locate enemy artillery and mortars.Given the hilly nature of the terrain,which provides ample reverse-slope firing

positions for both sides, these methodsleave much to be desired.

The ROKA artillery currently has nocountermortar or counterartillery radars.This weakness is readily acknowledged

by ROK artillery officers. Given the hugenumber of artillery pieces that

ROKA soldiers receive instructions for theKorean-produced KH-179 towed howitzerduring a training exercise.

14 Field Artillery


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mobile armored force. Despite the factthat most of its forces are infantry, itcan field more than 5,000 tanks andarmored personnel carriers. As wasmentioned earlier, much of the North'sartillery is now mounted onself-propelled chassis, which are atleast partly armored. The ROKA

artillery's lack of significant anti-armormunitions is an area that should beaddressed.

As mentioned earlier, the ROKA FIPspecifies a requirement for acannon-launched projectile that canengage armored targets. The supportrequirements and cost of such a systemare, however, formidable.

A more feasible solution would befor the ROKA to add a large reserve ofDPICM and anti-armor family ofscatterable mines (FASCAM) that theartillery could employ with very little

additional training. Ammunitionproduction facilities in South Korea arecertainly capable of producing suchmunitions.

Future Trends

Some of ROKA's plans to improveits artillery focus on organization,others on equipment.

Heavy Division

As mentioned earlier, the ROKArmy is predominently a light infantryforce with the 105-mm howitzer its

primary direct-support artilleryweapon. There's a possibility that thiswill change in the next decade.

Recently, the ROK Army convertedone of its 19 light infantry divisions

into an experimental heavy infantrydivision. The implications of this changefor the artillery of the ROK Army are

profound. In place of the 54 105-mmhowitzers currently found in the lightinfantry division, this new formation hasthree battalions of 54 M109A2self-propelled 155-mm howitzers. The

divisional general-support battalions arearmed with 18 KH-179 155-mmhowitzers, which have a longer rangethan the M109.

Strengthen Reserves

Should the ROK Army decide theheavy infantry division is a better, moreaffordable successor to the current lightinfantry division, the artillery willrequire many hundreds of additionalM109s over a period of years to convertto the new organization. An additional17 division's worth of M109s means theROKA would have to buy more than900 more self-propelled weapons. TheSouth Korean defense industry can

produce that quantity, should the Armydecide it wants the weapons. Such adecision would also have greatimplications for the reserve infantrydivisions in the ROK Army.

As M109s would replace the existingM101s and KH-178s in the direct-support

battalions of active-duty ROKA infantrydivisions, those older weapons would be

passed down to the MRDs and HDDs inthe reserves. To a limited extent, this

process has already been taking place asKH-179s replace the older M114howitzers in the general-support

battalions of divisions and corps artillery.Such a transition would strengthen thereserve divisions

This ROKA fire direction computer is used atthe battery and battalion levels.

the North Koreans would employ in anoffensive against the South, the rapiddetection and destruction of the enemy'sartillery is a must for the ROKA. Thelack of counterfire radars is the mostserious weakness in the ROKA artillery.

Enemy HARTS

As was mentioned earlier, thepresence north of the DMZ of literallyhundreds of HARTS presents a veryserious threat to ROKA artillery andmaneuver units. This threat is magnified

by the ROKA's mission of stopping anattack as close to the DMZ as possible,which by definition means ROKA forceswill be exposed to intense artillery firefrom heavily fortified enemy positions.

There is constant discussion among

the US and ROK fire supportcommunities as to how to effectivelydeal with this threat. A solution probablywill be a combination of hardware anddoctrine. But at least for the present, the

burden of combating the HARTS willfall on the already outnumbered ROKAartillery, much of which also has its ownhardened positions. This could prove to

be a substantial drain on ROKA artilleryresources that also will be heavily taskedto provide close support for maneuverforces. The result almost certainly would

be an epic artillery duel, the likes of

which has not been seen since WorldWar I.

Munitions

While the ROKA artillery issupported by a growing defense industrythat can provide the vast majority of itsneeds, it still needs more advancedmunitions. As compared to 1950, the

North Korean Army is a much moreA ROKA 105-mm howitzer, produced by Daewoo Corporation, is identical to the US M101.

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that make up a considerable portion ofthe ROK Army's combat power.

Artillery-Locating Radars

Of almost equal importance is theneed to buy modern target acquisitionequipment. After several years ofindecision, the ROK Artillery seemsready to make its move.

In terms of the number of howitzers itfields, the US 2d Infantry Division is anegligible addition to the artillery of theROK Army. What the US 2d Infantry

Division Artillery does have that theROKA needs is artillery-locating radars.

For several years, the US Army hastried to interest the ROK artillery in theFirefinder Q36 and Q37 radars, butseveral in-country tests didn't satisfy theROK Army. The most recent testing wasconducted in late 1988 with US-trainedROKA crews manning the systems.

It now appears the ROK Army hasdecided to buy a number of these radars.At some point in the near future, theQ36 and or Q37 will begin to be fielded,

probably in the corps target acquisition

battalions.

The addition of those modern radarswill greatly improve the efficiency ofthe ROK artillery and will remove itsdependence on the US to provide suchcapabilities. The ROK artillery will thengain the ability to detect North Koreanartillery, once it leaves the HARTS.

Guided Munitions

Farther in the future, there's thepossibility of the ROKA artillery'sbuying guided munitions. The ROKAartillery needs a guided anti-armorartillery projectile in its FIP, but it hasn'tdecided on such a round.

The South Koreans occasionally haverequested information on ourCopperhead. But the expense of theround and the requirement forsupporting systems such as theground-vehicular laser locatordesignator (GVLLD) and its past

reliability problems have kept ROKinterest well short of a decision to buy.Possibly, the ROK artillery will waitseveral years to see if its domestic armsindustry can develop such a munition.

Conclusion

The rise in the capabilities of the ROKdomestic arms industry and a recentSouth Korean desire to shop around fornon-American weapons will noticeablychange past practices of acceptingex-American weapons. In recent years,

the South Korean Air Force and Navy

have been showing much more interest inEuropean systems, and it's possible theROK Army will begin to broaden itsmarket also.

The ROKA is considering significantorganizational and equipment changes forits artillery. But with the vast majority ofits artillery equipment US-produced or

Korean-built weapons similar toAmerican systems, it probably will take anumber of years for this trend to affectthe ROKA artillery.

Major John Gordon IV, a frequentcontributor to Field Artillery, is aTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) Systems Staff Officer i n theFirepower Directorate, CombatDevelopments, at TRADOCHeadquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia.He recently completed his second tourin South Korea, where he was the FireSupport Officer for the 1st Brigade, 2dInfantry Division. Major Gordon hasalso served in the 82d AirborneDivision, Fort Bragg, North Carolina,and the 5th Recruiting Brigade, SanAntonio, Texas, and as a GunneryInstructor at t he Field Artillery School,Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He's a graduate ofThe Citadel, Charleston, SouthCarolina, and holds a master's inInternational Relations from SaintMary's University, San Antonio. MajorGordon also has published in Army, Naval Institute Proceedings and

Military Reviewmagazines.

Redleg NewsITEMS OF GENERAL INTEREST

PERSCOM Update:Field Arti llery Officer Branch

Promotions

Upcoming Selection Boards

Captain 27 Feb-30 MarColonel 3-27 AprLieutenant Colonel 12 Jun-6 JulMajor 5 Sep-19 Oct

Promotion Pin-on Points. The current promotion pin-onpoints for officers selected in the primary zone ofconsideration is shown below. The Defense OfficerPersonnel Management Act (DOPMA) "goal" is shown forcomparison.

Grade DOPMA Goal ProjectionCaptain 4 yrs 4 yrs, 4 mosMajor 10 yrs +/- 12 mos 11 yrs, 10 mosLieutenant Colonel 16 yrs +/- 12 mos 17 yrs, 10 mosColonel 22 yrs +/- 12 mos 22 yrs, 8 mos

Officer Record Brief. Your record brief (ORB) is

extremely important because it serves as your resume. Theservicing military personnel office (MILPO) will receive andreview your promotion ORB approximately one month beforethe convening date of the board. You should not wait until thento correct your ORB. Initiate corrections wellin advance. Youcan get a copy of your ORB at the same time you request amicrofiche.

Traditionally, the biggest problem on the ORB is correctingcivilian education data. You can forward a short note andappropriate documentation (transcripts) to Branch to input

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the correct data. The young soldiers at the MILPOs simplydon't have all the input data for civilian education updates.

If you have experience at one of our Combat TrainingCenters, notify your MILPO of this fact. MILPO messagenumber 89-42 was sent to the field in December 1988,providing instructions to annotate this experience.Comments on your officer efficiency report (OER) or onsigned, verified copies of the OER Support Form 67-8-1

documents this experience. These data will be in Section Xof the ORB.

Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). You canorder a current copy of your microfiche and ORB byforwarding a request to: US Army Personnel Command(PERSCOM), ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall Street,Alexandria, Virginia 22332-0444.

Send a signed request, including your name, social securitynumber and current mailing address. The average turnaroundtime is six weeks, so don't delay ordering a copy.

DA Photos. The importance of maintaining anup-to-date photograph can't be overstressed. The DA photois the one document that branches are responsible for

maintaining. The best way to ensure a photo is on file withBranch is to forward the photo directly to Branch.Assignment officers will acknowledge receipt of photos bysending you a 209 card.

Many posts or MILPOs insist on forwarding the photodirectly to the PERSCOM records section. In this case,request additional "personal" copies from the photo lab andsend one of these to Branch.

A photo is out of date if it's more than three years olderthan the current year and month. Unfortunately, someofficers aren't keeping photos up to date.

Files submitted to the majors' promotion board had asubstantial number of missing or outdated photos. The

primary zone had more than 5 percent and thebelow-the-zone had more than 22 percent of the files withoutdated or missing photos. Your photo isn't onlyconsidered by promotion boards, it's also used in nearly allactions taken by Branch.

Command and Staff College (CSC)

The 1989 CSC board met from 1 May to 6 June 1989.Those officers selected for promotion to major on the 1988promotion list (FY 79) had their first look during this board.In addition, officers in Year Groups 76, 77 and 78 whohadn't been previously selected were eligible.

During the four years of eligibility, approximately 45 to50 percent of a given year group will be selected for CSC

resident attendance. The chart depicts the statisticalbreakout of selectees from Year Groups 76 (last look)through 79 (first look).

The figures indicate that the first two looks are the best.The number of seats available for CSC drives the selectionrates of each year group.

It's strongly recommended that you start nonresidentCGSC if you're not selected for the resident course afterthe second look. This will give you enough time tocomplete the nonresident requirements and also increaseyour assignment opportunities. The most important thing is

to finish the course before going before the selection boardfor lieutenant colonel. Don't wait until the last minute toget serious about it!

Branch Qualification as a Major

There's much confusion about this subject in the field.To enhance the probability of being selected for 0-5 in thefuture, all artillerymen should strive to become branchqualified as an O-4.

There are two requirements for this to occur. First, youmust complete a CSC school, either resident or nonresident.Failure to meet this requirement will mean almost certainnon-selection to 0-5.

The second requirement is to spend time with troops as amajor. This is defined as spending a minimum of 12months as a brigade fire support officer of a direct-supportbattalion, battalion S3, battalion executive officer or beingin a command billet as a major.

TACFIRE Fire Support Schooling

In the past, Field Artillery Advanced Course (FAOAC)graduates who were destined for fire support jobs in thenext unit were scheduled for the Tactical Fire DirectionSystem (TACFIRE) Fire Support Element (FSE) Course.TACFIRE FSE is an all-ranks course that teaches 13Fskills.

A new course has now been created at Fort SilltheAutomated Fire Support Leader's Course. The Course isoffered four times a year coincidental with the end datesof each FAOAC. It provides fire support, liaison andtactical operations center (TOC) officers the knowledgeand skills required to supervise variable-format messageentry device (VFMED)-equipped fire support and liaisonsections, TOCs and electronic tactical display(ETD)-equipped counterfire cells. The Course is fiveweeks, four days long.

Conclusion

If you have questions about any of this information, callBranch: Field GradeAUTOVON 221-0118 or 7817 or

commercial (202) 325-0118 or 7817; CompanyGradeAUTOVON 221-0116 or 0187 or commercial (202)325-0116 or 0187.

YG Previous Select Sel This Board Approximate # Remaining Total SelectedAppr ox imate Percent

Select

76 90 13 0 103 48%77 90 33 5 128 47%78 52 69 25 146 45%79 32 37 55 124 47%

February 1990 17


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Fire for EffectSENIOR LEADERS SPEAK OUT

The Art of

Leadershipby David G. Halloran

CynthiaBoggessStewart

n a serene setting in the SantaYnez Hills in California, a retiredAT&T executive named Art

Leazenby was teaching management tocharges whose companies had sentthem off to school for a week. In theseyoung men and women resided the

skills of engineering, science,manufacturing and quality control,finance and sales (we didn't call itmarketing then, and I wish we didn'ttoday). In 1958 as now in industry,academe and the military, our greaterneed was in the skills of ourmanagersour leadersmore so than inour workers, soldiers and professors.Like parenthood, leadership is a difficultart, supported by some scientific data.

Art Leazenby opened his seminar:"Management, like sales, is the art ofallowing the other guy to have your way."

What he said affected my professionaland personal life from then on.

Art came from the telephone company,which was important because itrepresented a midpoint between industryin the private sector (which emulates thecharacteristics of democracy in oursociety) and the military in thegovernment sector (which, by necessityof combat, is autocratic). Fromdemocracy to autocracy, "management[leadership in any institution] is the art ofallowing the other guy [your trooper] tohave your way."

Worth DefinedEmbodied in those words is the

fundamental distinction between a freeand democratic society and a totalitariansociety. That distinction is democracy'suniversal recognition of thefundamental worth of every member ofour societyour group, our battery, our

ball club. Everyone has talents,

hopes and desires worth something, andwe're bound by our ideals, theConstitution and law to respect thatworth.

Do we show that respect all the time?Sadly, not as some of our racially driventragedies have shown. But we're

working toward that goal, and nowherehas it been shown better than on thebattlefield. The heroics of Grenada,Vietnam, Korea, the World Wars andthose conflicts throughout the history ofour great country are replete with storiesof troopers who died for their friends.Why? Because others have worth.

Worth Comes Full Circle

A good leader follows that principleearly in his career. And when he askshis followers to act, there's nohesitation. The leader has allowed his

followers to conclude they want to dowhat he has asked. By showing hevalues his followers, the key principlecomes full circlethey find him worthyto be their leader.

For example in the industrial world,take the perennial case of the proposalthat's due immediately after theChristmas holidays. Those of us ingovernment and industry who have togenerate our business via proposalshave all experienced the sinkingsensation when we learn the proposal isdue December 31.

How do you motivate yourself andyour group to give up the most joyoustime of the year for families because a

proposal is due? How do you do thatwithout generating doubt that you, theleader, really see the worth of that timeto your people and their families fortheir religious and social activities?

First, you appeal the schedule on thegrounds of personal and family interest,

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asking for a one- or two-week delay.Some have been successful at that; itdoesn't occur to many even to try.

If the first step fails, the second is to"tell it like it is" to the whole group, withregret, but no apologies. When peopleknow their leader works on their behalfand "pulls no punches," no problem is

insurmountable for his team.Another exampleduring the latesixties in Los Angeles, the Greater LosAngeles AUSA Chapter and the VeteransAdministration set up a program to helpyoung soldiers returning from Vietnamfind jobs. Jobs were scarce, and thereturning Vietnam Vet wasn't given the

breaks of his predecessors from theKorean War or World War II.

Most came from the infantry, artilleryor armor whose skills didn't fit readilyinto the civilian work force. Further, wewere working in Watts and East Los

Angeles, Black and Hispaniccommunities, where the walls ofprejudice had not exactly come tumblingdown.

The challenge, simply stated, was tofind Vietnam Vets jobs in a recessionaryeconomy. Because we told it like it was ina number of large group meetings andcounselled them on how to capitalize onthe leads we developed, we met thechallenge. The Vets teased us about ourcomments on their shoeshines, haircutsand "f" words, but they followed our lead.

Joey Wilkins, who epitomized the Vet

description, said it best, "Hey man, all wewant is a chance!" They got it, and mosttook advantage of it. The leaders believedin worth and laid it out straight, and thefollowers chimed in and were allowed tohave the leaders' way. When you thinkabout it, it was really their way.

Do or DieThere are the times in combat (military

or the warfare of the marketplace) whenthe only solution is "...not to reasonwhy...but to do and die" ("Charge of theLight Brigade" by Alfred, Lord

Tennyson). We must follow orders for thecommon good, even though we thinkthem wrong or, worse still, stupid. Wetrust our Commander-in-Chief and hisdelegates.

There will be mistakes because we'rehuman. But, when timing andresponsiveness are crucial for gaining theobjective, we must follow orders. Suchdiscipline makes our military mighty and

the strategic deterrent that it is.

Know When to Fold 'Em

Good leaders, however, recognize thatautocratic leadership is rarely necessary,can be dehumanizing and can utterlydiscourage good people. The greatleaders know the difference, or as Kenny

Rogers says, "Know when to hold 'emand know when to fold 'em."

The image of the Army today, forthose of us in the Army Industry Family,is there are many good leaders. Peoplelike the Army. Soldiers are getting achance to "be all they can be."

The quality of today's soldiers issuperior, and thei