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India's Third Communist PartyAuthor(s): Marcus F. FrandaReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 11 (Nov., 1969), pp. 797-817Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642225 .

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INDIA'STHIRDCOMMUNIST ARTYMARCUSF. FRANDA

On May Day, 1969. ongprocessions ended heirwaythroughthestreets f Calcutta nd eventuallyssembled nthe arge open spaceinthe enter fthe itywhich s known s themaidan.A crowdofmore han10,000peopleheard hefollowingtatementyKanu Sanyal, he eaderofthe Communistarty f ndia (Marxist-Leninist),r CPML, India'sthirdcommunistarty.With reat ride ndboundlessoy wish o announceoday t thismeetinghatwe haveformed genuine ommunistarty-theCom-munist arty f ndia (Marxist-Leninist). . Our Partywas formedona memorableayofthe nternationalommunist ovement-the100th irthdayf he reat enin.When urPartywasborn,he istoricNinth ational ongressf hegreat ommunistarty fChinawas nsession nder hepersonal uidance fChairman ao Tse-tung. feelproud hat hetask of making hishistoric nnouncementas been

givenome. firmlyelieve hat hegreat ndianpeoplewillwarmlywelcomehis vent, ill ealise he ormationf his artys anhistoricstep orwardor he ndian evolution,nd will come orwardo raisethe truggleoa highertage nder he eadershipftheParty.'The CMPL is madeup almost xclusivelyfpeoplewhohavebrokenwiththeCommunistarty f ndia (Marxist),orCPM,which ad split romheregular ommunistartyof India (CPI) in 1964. Even thoughmostofIndia's communistsre still rganizedwithin heCPI and CPM (claimingcombinedmembershipf morethan200,000),the CPML has alreadybe-come significantolitical orce n several ndian tates. he newparty asattracted membershiphat s estimated t twenty r thirtyhousand; heIndian HomeMinister as been seeking dditional owers o deal with t;andthe wo stablishedommunistartieshave viewed heCPML as botha political nd deological hallenge.The formationfa third ommunistarty aisesa number fquestionsofparticularelevanceothose nterestedn theoperation f ndia'spoliticalsystem,henaturef ndiancommunism,ndtherelationshipf ndians othe nternationalommunist ovementndto internationalolitics.Whatarethe actorshat edtothe ormationfa third ommunistartyn ndia?What s theCPML seekingoaccomplishnd how doesithope to achieve1The fulltext ofKanu Sanyal's May Day address is reprintedn Liberation (PartyOrgan of theCPML), Vol. II, No. 7 (1969), pp. 110-122.The quotation s takenfromp. 119 of this publishedtext of theaddress.

797


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798 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYit's goals? How do India's three ommunistarties nteract newith n-other?What s the ikely mpact fa third ommunist arty n regional,national, nd internationaloliticaldevelopments? he following ssayseeksto furnishentativenswers o thesequestions,n such a wayas toprovide n overview or hose nterestednmoredetailed esearch.SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT

The communist ovementn India has been ed by essentiallyhe sameleadership or hepast three ecades.The main portion f this eadership,which ad oined the CPI in the ails and colleges n the 1930's and early1940's, was drawn rom amilies frelatively igh status.Whenthe CPIheld t's first artyCongressn 1943,more han wo-thirdsf the delegatesto theconference92 of 139) listedthemselvess landlords, raders, rmembers f "the ntelligentsia,"hile lmost alfof the delegates ad col-lege degrees nd more han90% (126 of 139) had been to collegeforatleast year.2 hemorehighly ducatedmong his eadership ere ttractedto communismy thewritingsfJawaharlal ehru,Rabindranath agore,R. PalmeDutt,HaroldLaski,John trachey,nd otherMarxistwriters,ndmany fthem ad established ontactsver heyearswith he eadership fEuropean ocialist nd communist ovements.3hose who acked collegedegreesweregenerally rawn romheformererroristroups rfrom heCongress ocialist organization,men whohad initially bandonedtheireducation o takepart n the organizationf resistance o theBritish. heintellectualsn the ndian communist ovement ererecruitedn Indianand European collegesand universities;he organizationaleaderswererecruitednthe ails.4When his eadershipoined theCPI inthe ate1930'sandearly 940's trepresentednewgenerationn ndianpolitics: lmost 0% ofthedelegatestotheFirstPartyCongressn 1943were essthan35 years n age.5 Subse-quently, owever,hese eoplemanaged o retain heir ontrol fthemain-streamof the Indian Communistmovementnly by excluding eadersyoungerhan hemselvesrom hemostprominent ositionsn the move-ment.The extent o whichthe older, pre-Independenceeadershipnowdominates he Central xecutive ommitteesfboth heCPI and CPM isindicatedythe verage ge of the CPI Central ecretariat, hich n Feb-ruary, 968 was justover60, andbythefact hat ll butoneof theninemembersf heCPI Central ecretariataveheldparty eadership ositions

2Figures orthefirst arty Congressofthe CPI are taken from eople's War,Vol. II(June 13,1943), p. 1 and ibid.,August 1, 1943,p. 8.'The intellectual ackground fIndian communisms tracedout in SibnarayanRay,"India: Intellectuals nd Rural Problems,"Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism:Essayson theHistory fMarxist deas (London: George Allen and Unwin,1962), pp. 374-386.'See myforthcomingolumeon Bengali Communism or an analysis of recruitmentpatterns mong ndian communists n West Bengal: The Phenomenon of Leftism nWestBengal,MIT, 1970.'People's War,June13, 1943,p. 1.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 799since he1940's.6 imilarly,he verage ge oftheninemembers ftheCPMPolitbureau,n January, 969was ust under 0 and all ninemembers adbeen activeCommunisteadersn the1940's.7The Chairman f theCPI (S.A. Dange) was born n 1899 and the General ecretary f the CPM (P.Sundarayya)was born n 1913.In contrast o the two olderCommunist arties, he CPML is led by aconsiderably oungereadership. he Chairman f the new party,KanuSanyal,was born n 1932. Theoldestmember f the CPML Politbureau sthe party heoretician,haruMajumdar,who was born n 1920, butevenhe s younger han ll membersf heCentral xecutive ommitteesfboththeCPI and CPM.8 It is obvious, herefore,hat he CPML's Politbureaumembers re considerably ounger han those n the CentralExecutiveCommitteesf both he CPI and CPM. Moreover, he eadership f thoseagitationalmovementsnwhich heCPML has been nvolved ave alsobeendominated y menofthegenerationf Kanu Sanyal,who became ctive nIndian politics fterndependence. one of theknownCPML leadershaveeverheldparty ositions t thenational evel, ndindeedvery ewofthemhave even had experiencen state eadership ositions, uthave insteadbeen drawn rom arty ommitteest the district nd branch evelsofthemovement.n largepart hemotivationor heformationf theCPML canbe explainedn terms fthefrustrationsxperienced ythis ower evelofIndiancommunisteadershipn it's attemptso rise withinhemovement.Therevolt fyoungerndiancommunisteadersbeganto assume ignifi-cant proportionsn the early1960's, whenmanypartymembers ecamedisenchanted ith he events urroundinghe splitbetween heCPI andCPM.9Theyoungereadershipfthe ndiancommunist ovementadbeenrecruitedfterndependence,hrough ommunistartymassorganizationsandcultural ront roups, ndit's contributionsothe movementhrough-out the 1950's had been confined lmost xclusively o electoral olitics.By the early1960's,however, number fyounger eaders had become

'The members f the Central Secretariat of the CPI are listed in New 4ge (CPIWeekly), February 5, 1968,p. 6. Informationn the ninemembers-S. A. Dange, C.Rajeswara Rao, BhupeshGupta,YogindraSharma,N. K. Krishnan,S. G. Sardesai, C.AchuthaMenon,Avtar Singh Malhotra, and Bhowani Sen-was gatheredfromWho'sWho,Legislativebiographies, ewspaperclippings,personal interviews,nd fromthebiographical ketchesfurnished n Gene D. Overstreet nd Marshall Windmiller, om-munism n India (Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1959), pp. 556-575.'Members of theCPM Politbureau-P. Sundarayya,B. T. Ranadive,M. Basavapun-niah, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, ramodeDas Gupta, JyotiBasu, P. Ramamurti,Harki-shan Singh Surjeet,and A. K. Gopalan-are listed in People's Democracy: Organ oftheCPM, January 2, 1969,p. 1. Biographical data on the CPM was obtained from hesame source as those isted n footnote .8Whilebiographicaldata on leaders of the CPML is not readilyavailable, some in-sight nto thenature f the eadership an be gained from atindranathChakravorti,AParty is Born,"Now: A Political and Cultural Weekly (Calcutta), June 6, 1969, pp.8.10 and June13, 1969, pp. 9-11.Data on CPML leaderswas also gatheredfromnews-paper clippings nd personal nterviews.9An nner-partyescription f theactivities ftheyoungereadership nWestBengalis contained nTheGrowth fAdventurismn WestBengal: CentralCommitteenforma-tionDocument (Calcutta: Communist arty of India Marxist, 1967).


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800 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYseverely ritical f theoldergenerationf Indian politicians communistand non-communistlike) whohad beenunable to revolutionizendia'sbasic political, conomic,ndsocial alignments.f specialconcern o theyoungermembersf heunited PI wasthe ncreasingmphasis f hepartyon electoralndconstitutionalolitics nd thefailure f theparty oescapefrom t'sbourgeoismoorings. hroughoutheperiodprecedinghesplitnumber fyoungereaders hereforelliedthemselves ith he older eftcommunistaction n India,whichformedhenucleusof the CPM after1964.10Butwhen ven heCPMbegantomove wayfrom eft ommunismafter he plit-by oiningMinisterialoalitionsn WestBengal ndKeralain 1967andbecoming vermore ritical fChina-the youngereadersoftheparty egan oslowly stablishn independentosition or hemselves.

Thecatalystor he penrevolt f heyoungermembers f heLeft actionwas thedecision nthepartof theCPM to enter tateMinisterialoalitionsin alliancewith he revisionist"PI andotherbourgeois" artiesn 1967.As soonas thisdecisionwasmadeknown, number fyoungereft actiongroupshroughouthe ountryegan oaccuse heCPM leadershipf "neo-revisionism,"ndfactionalismecame o intenseymid-1967 hat numberofundergroundartyournals egan o appear, ttackinghedecision ftheparty.-"n earlyMay,1967, thedissidentsn WestBengalorganized heAntar arty odhanbadBirodhi angramnommittee"The CommitteeoResistRevisionismWithinheParty") on an ad hocbasisandby ateMayhad found n issue aroundwhich hey ould buildnational upport. hiswas the ssueofthe Naxalbaripeasantagitation f thesummer f 1967,which tartednNaxalbari ubdivisionfDarjeelingDistrictin thenorth-ernportion fWestBengal), and eventuallypreadto three ontiguoussubdivisionsn the amedistrictPhansideoa,Kharibari, nd Siliguri).Theadministrativerea inwhich hedisturbancesccurred, hich orpurposesofbrevity e will call "the Naxalbari area,"comprise pproximately00squaremilesofhighlytrategicerritory,ordered n the westbyNepal,on theeastby Pakistan, nd lying30-50 miles from ikkim, ibet,andBhutan o the north.This area is located at precisely hatpointwhereIndia's narrowestorridor,3 to14 mileswide, onnectshemainportionsof ndiawitht'snortheasterntates ndterritoriesAssam,NEFA,Naga-land,Manipur, ndTripura).

"0The plit n 1964 is traced out in Harry Gelman,"The Communist artyof India:Sino-SovietBattleground,"n A. Doak Barnett (ed.), CommunistStrategies n Asia(New York: FrederickA. Praeger,1963), pp. 101-147; Ralph H. Retzlaff,Revisionismand Dogmatismn theCommunist artyof India," in RobertA. Scalapino (ed.), TheCommunist evolution n Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements Englewood Cliffs,New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 965), pp. 309-342; and JohnB. Wood, "Observationsonthe Indian Communist arty Split," PacificAffairs, ol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (1965), pp.47-63.l"The mostprominentmongtheundergroundournals wereCommune, hhatraFaul(Student'sArmy), Dakshin Desh (The SouthCountry),Bidroha (Struggle), and San-trash (Terror). For a descriptionof factionalismn the CPM immediately fterthe1967elections, ee The Statesman Calcutta), May31, 1967, p. 1 and Link (New Delhi),May7, 1967,p. 16 andJuly , 1967,p. 16.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 801A smallgroup f dissidentsn the CPM chosetheNaxalbari rea as anappropriatelaceto test heresolve f theWestBengalUnitedFrontgov-ernmentn 1967, n an efforto embarrasshe eadership f theCPM.12

Armedwith ribalweapons ndcommunistlags, hedissidentsed smallbandsof followersooccupy ands"illegally eldbyvestednterests"ndattemptedotake directction" nthe ideoftribal nd peasant ultivatorswho hadfelt hemselvesrongedn land disputes. hroughouthe ummerof1967 theCPM dissidents ereaccusedof nnumerableolitical ssassi-nations,rsonistttacks,ndrobberies,nda numberf ndiannewspapersand political roups egan odemand oliceaction gainst he"Naxalites"[supportersf theNaxalbari gitation].13incetheCommunist-lednitedFronthad pledgedn it's nitial18-point rogramto recognize he rightsofworkersnd peasants o voicetheir ustdemands nd grievances,"ndsince thad also pledged not to suppress hedemocraticnd legitimatestrugglesfthepeople," heUnited ront UF) Ministryouldtakepoliceaction gainst heNaxalbari gitatorsnlyby abelling hem s enemies ftheCommunist-dominatedtate overnmentf WestBengal.Theleadershipof theCPM thereforettemptedo mediatebetween heUF and it's ownparty issidents,n an attemptostop he"sectarianndadventuristctivi-tiesoftheNaxalites," ut ventuallyven omeoftheolderLeftCommunistfactioneaders uccumbedo public pinion andto threatsrom he entralgovernmentomeMinistry)ndagreed oa wave of arrestsf thepotentialguerillas.n mid-July,967,the policeeffectivelyuashedtheNaxalbariagitation,ndmany ftheCPM dissidentslowly egan towithdrawromtheparty.'4Perhaps venmore ignificanthan hedecision ftheCPM to acquiescein the rrestsf heNaxalbari gitators as the upport hich heNaxalbarimovementvoked hroughoutndia. The movementppealedprimarilyoyoung eople nd to urban ntellectuals,ut t struck esponsivehords nmany ther egmentsf ndian society s well.Kanu Sanyal, he eaderoftheNaxalbarimovement,as sincebeenwidely epictedn the ndianpress

"2Conflictsetweenthe Naxalbari and state unitsof the CPM are described n theCPM inner-partyocument, ituation n Naxalbari Area: Siliguri Local Committee'sReport, a 19-pagereportwhichappears in On Left Deviation (Calcutta: CPM, 1967),pp. 25-44. Data on the Naxalbari agitationwas also compiledfrompersonal nterviewsin Naxalbari nApril,1969."3Most f the rumorsnd speculation bout Naxalbari are brought ogethern Naxal-bari Agitation: Some Facts and Consequences [Reports Submittedto Bharatiya JanaSangh WorkingCommittee t its meeting t Simla on June 30 and July1 and 2, 1967by Bengal Pradesh Secretary] Delhi. BharatiyaJana Sangh,1967) ; see especially pp.17-19."4For three perceptiveanalyses of the Naxalbari agitation from radically differ-ent pointsof view, ee FlibbertigibbetNiranjanMajumdar], "TroubleUp North,"TheEconomic and Political Weekly Bombay), June3, 1967,pp. 993-994; JohnSlee, "PoliceAction n Naxalbari,"The WeekendReview (New Delhi), July22, 1967,pp. 15-18; andBiswanathMukherjee, Two Faces of Naxalbari,"Link, August 20, 1967,pp. 24-30.


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802 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYas anheroic, evolutionaryeader,n themold f ndia's nationalisteroes.'His willingnesso surrender is landed wealth n order o "integrate im-self"withpeasantshas beenemphasizedn a manner eminiscentf thefreedom ighters hofought orthe independencef thecountry.'6Hispersonal ackground,nd thepublicitywhichhis movementas receivedthroughoutndia andtheworld, as invitedomparisonsndcontrasts ithMahatmaGandhi, ubhasBose,and a host fterroristeroes ftheBengalipast.'7 n the yes f manyndians and especially engalis) Sanyal s oneof thefewmodern olitical eaderswho qualifies s a "genuine evolution-ary,"seekinghesupport f "themasses" in orderto do awaywith heelectoralystem, hile heCPI and CPM havecompromisedheir evolu-tionaryervory allyingwith ourgeois arties n oining heMinistries.nthis omantictmosphere,anyal nd theNaxalbari gitators avefrequent-lybeenviewed s thevanguard f a newwave of revolutionariesn India,aleadershiphatdeserves he upportf thosewho are notyetwilling o suc-cumb o the dictates f the ndianpolitical ystem.The CPML was conceived n the summer f 1967, whentheNaxalbariagitation eganto attract ttentionhroughoutndia and theworld, nd itquickly ained upport rom issident eftCommunistactionsna numberofIndian states."8n an attempto promote ome kind of all-Indiaunityamong hesevarious upportersf the Naxalbarimovement,ounger eftcommunistactionmembersgreed o form n all-IndiaCo-ordinationom-mittee f Communist evolutionariesAICCCR) which metthroughout1967and1968to discuss trategynd tactics.19 espite he lmostdentical

1"Inthewords of a correspondent orLink,forexample,Kanu Sanyal was describedas follows: "The leader who commandsextra-ordinaryespect among the peasants,workers nd themass of thepeople is Kanu Sanyal. He does notownany land.... Hehas greatcontempt or hesmugmiddle class. . . He has been a dreamer ince his boy-hood and has alwaystakenextremepositions.His revolutionarypirittook him to theCommunist arty . . butevenpolicemen eemto have a softcornerforKanu, themis-guideddreamer." ink (Delhi Weekly),August15, 1967, p. 85."6For epresentativeiscussionsof Indian attitudes owardSanyal and theNaxalites,see AmitavaDas Gupta, "Chavan's WrongTackling of Naxalite Communists," indu-sthanStandard (Calcutta daily), May 13, 1969, p. 4; Ananda Bazaar Patrika (Calcuttadaily), May 2, 1969,pp. 1, 5; and Samanta Banerjee, "Naxalbari: BetweenYesterdayand Tomorrow," rontier Calcuttaweekly),May 17, 1969, pp. 8-10and May 24, 1969,pp. 10-11.17Even number of Gandhians in India have expressedsupportfor the Naxalbarimovement. he most articulatespokesmanof this sentimenthas been JayaprakashNarayan, Gandhian of greatconviction,who statedin June,1969 thathis sympathyfortheNaxalbari Movement nd its supporters temmedfromhis desire to "do some-thingfor harecroppers." arayan explained thathe hoped "to persuade theNaxalitesto give up violentmeans," but he doubted "whetherby democraticmeans the socialrevolution ould be achieved."He was willingto support heNaxalites,he argued,be-cause ofhiswillingness o "take to violence . . if I am convinced hatthere s no de-liverance of the people except throughviolence." See "Gandhians and Naxalites;"Thought Delhi Weekly), June21, 1969. p. 5.18Pannalal Das Gupta,"What is theNaxalbari Path?" Mainstream Delhi Weekly),July ,1967,pp. 9-11.19A summaryfthe activities ftheNaxalitesAICCCR is contained n 0. P. Sangal,"AlphabetofMao: AICCCR," The Citizenand WeekendReview (New Delhi), Vol. I,No. 5 (May 10,1969), pp.21.23.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 803programs doptedby thevarious eft ommunistactional roups n eachof the tates, he eadership ftheAICCCR couldnotagreeon the tructureof theproposed hirdCommunist arty.Personality ifferencesetweenTarimelaNagireddyn Andhra nd theWestBengalAICCCR surfaced na number f occasions,while onsiderableuggling or eadership ositionswas reported o have disrupted everalAICCCR meetings.20n thefinalanalysis he West Bengal Naxalites ould agree on a leadership enteredaroundKanu Sanyal,but Sanyal and his colleagueswere unacceptable omany ftheNaxalites nAndhra, erala, and other arts f ndia. In early1969, hereforeheNaxalites n WestBengaldecided o aunch third om-munist arty ntheir wn.Thus farthenewpartyhas attractedn all-Indiamembership hich susually stimatedt twentyr thirtyhousand, ut thas been most ctivein only hreendianstates-Andhra,Kerala,andWestBengal. n Andhraithas beencompeting ith he eft ommunisteadership entered roundTarimelaNagireddywhohasnot oinedtheCPML andmight imselforma fourthommunistarty)for upport ftheGirij n tribals f Srikakulamdistrict.n WestBengal heCPML has attractedn active ollowing hichis estimatedt5-10,000,nd t's upportsdrawn rommorediverseources.The leadership f thepartyn bothregions s derived rom heyoungermembers f the eft action ftheCPM (Kanu Sanyal s PartyChairman)and it has recruitedmembers rom oth theCPM and CPI.21 Moreover,since heCPM has relaxed arty iscipline onsiderablyn order opreventdefectionsotheCPML,somemembersftheCPMhavebeencollaboratingwith heCPMLwhilemaintainingheirmembershipn theCPM.22 In addi-tion, he CPML has attracted number f new politicalparticipants,ri-marily mongcollege tudents nd thedisenchantedrbanmiddle-class.It's leadership, owever,s notyetderived rom he owerclasses and thedisadvantaged.ndeed,many fthemost ctivemembersftheparty husfarhave beendrawnfrom mong graduates fAmerican nd Europeancolleges ndgraduate chools, osuch n extenthat heCPMhasfrequentlycharged heCPML withCIA collaborationistnstincts.23Becauseofthe ecrecyhathas pervadedCPML affairs ince t's forma-tion,data on the nner eadership f theparty s difficulto obtain.TheleadersoftheCPML haveargued hat hey regoing opursue lugantarstrategyather han heAnushilantrategyollowed ytheCPM andCPI,a referenceo the wooldterroristederationsfBengal'snationalistmove-ment.Unlikethe Anushilan amity,whichorganized n muchthe samemannersthe resentommunistartiesnWestBengal with rontroups,mass organizations,nd so forth),the lugantarrevolutionaries erea

"0The ositionf heAndhra axalitess statednAnOpenLetteroPartyMembers,byTarimela agireddy,tal. (Hyderabad: .p., 968),pp.1-26.2"Link, ay 6,1969, . 11.-2Ibid.'8See TheGrowthfAdventurismnWestBengal," nOnLeftDeviationCalcutta:CPM,1967),p.24.


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804 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYhighly ecretiverganizationhat urfaced nly o carry utdramatic er-rorist cts (such as armory aids and political ssassinations).24 Openlyacknowledgingheir dherenceoa Jugantartyle frevolutionaryrgani-zation, heCPML leadership asagreed omeet ecretly,o shift heir artyheadquartersrequently,o guard gainst ublic wareness f party ctivi-ties, nd tosurface nlywhenrevolutionaryctivities emandpublicacts.An organization f thistypeobviously equiresfar more discipline haneither heCPMor CPI have thusfarbeenable to impose n theirmember-ships, nd mustnecessarilye evenmore litist han ither he CPI ortheCPM.As theJugantargroupwas alwaysdependentn oneortwo eaderswhocontrolledheoperation ftheentire rganization,he CPML can beexpected o representhepoliticalwill ofKanu Sanyalandperhaps fewof his closest ssociates.THE PROGRAM OF THE CPML

Internationalupport or heCPML hascomefrom heCommunistartyof China CCP), whichnowrecognizesheCPML as "theonlyCommunistParty n India."While here s no realevidence fChina supplyingmoneyand arms o thenewparty,members ftheCPML have statednpublic hatthey ully xpect uchsupport o be forthcoming,ndconstant erbal up-port or heCPML bytheCCP makes heallegationsf a Chinese-Naxaliteconspiracy elievable o many ndians.Throughhe1960's China has pur-suedanextremelyctive oreign olicynSouthAsia,designed resumablyto ncreasenstabilitynthe ubcontinentndto nvolve othNewDelhiandRawalpindin anarmamentsacethatwoulddetract romconomic evelop-mentnbothnations.25nthe akistani idePeking as effecteddiplomaticrapprochementith hePakistan overnmentin opposition o ndia) whilesimultaneouslyending upport o internal ommunistolitical eaders.26With egardo ndia,Chinese iplomaticelations avebeen everelytrainedbythe ingering ino-Indian orderdispute.Chinese ttemptso preventbothAmerica nd the SovietUnion frompromotingheirobjectives nSouthAsia havethus arfailed,with heresult hat heChinese aveadoptedan increasinglyostile tance oward hepresentndianregime. his hasinvolved oth continuingonfrontationftroops ntheSino-Indian or-der ndChinese upport or herebels n theNaga Hillsand in other arts

24For comparison f the Anushilan and Jugantar rganizations, ee Cobinda LallBanerjee, Dynamics of RevolutionaryMovement n India (Calcutta: Sudhir KumarGhosh, 965), pp. 18-20.2"China'sforeign olicy n SouthAsia is tracedout in Russell Brines,The Indo-Paki-staniConflictLondon: Pall Mall Press,1968), pp. 160-213.26For n excellent series of articleson Pakistan, see Dilip Mukherjee, "Pakistan,"The Statesman Calcutta), September30, October1-3,1968. For an analysis of the n-ternalpoliticsof East Pakistan byan Indian Bengali, see JayantaKumar Ray, Democ-racy and Nationalismon Trial: A Studyof East Pakistan (Simla: Indian InstituteofAdvanced tudy, 968).


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 805of ndiawhere otentialuerrillamovementsxist.27romChina'spoint-of-viewtheCPML is a potential uerilla orce hat anbe used to disruptheorderly unctioningfthe ndianpolitical ystem.

Thefirstndicationf Chinese upport or heNaxaliteswithinheCPMcame ntheform fa radiobroadcast verRadioPeking nJune 8,1967,during heperiod hat heUnitedFrontwas in theprocessof evolvingpolicy hat ed topolice ction gainst heNaxalbari gitators.nwhatwasbilled s "a talkon therevolutionaryrmed trugglefthe ndianpeople,"RadioPeking escribedheNaxalbarimovements follows:Aphase fpeasants'rmedtruggleedby he evolutionariesftheIndianCommunistarty asbeen etupin the ountrysidenDarjeel-ingDistrictfWest engal tate f ndia.This sthefrontawof herevolutionaryrmedtruggleaunchedythe ndianpeople nderheguidancefMaoTse-tung'seachings.hisrepresentshegeneral ri-entationf the ndianrevolutiont thepresentime. he peopleofIndia,China nd he est f heworld ailthe mergencef his evolu-tionaryrmed truggle.28

In thesame broadcast,nd in subsequent eclarationsromPeking, hecommunist-lednited ront overnmentsn India,and the woolder stab-lishedCommunistarties, avebeendescribed y theCCP as "toolsoftheIndianreactionarieso deceive hepeopleandbenumb heir evolutionarymilitancy," hile hedecision oenter heMinistries asbeendescribeds"reactionaryounter-revolutionaryouble-dealing."While theres evidence hatChinais supplyingmoney nd armsto anumber f other evolutionariesn India,29 he ndianHomeMinistry as-thusar rgued hat hineseupport or heCPMLhas beenentirelyerbal.The HomeMinistryas stated n a number foccasions hat we arenotsilent pectators" ith egard o theevents urroundingheformationftheCPML and it'sattachmentsith heChinese, nd theHomeMinisterhimself as publiclyontemplatednumber fmeasures hathe mightaketorepresshenewparty, utthusfartheUnion governmentas had littleto gain by taking eterminedctionagainst heNaxalites.Of particularconcern o New Delhi, of course, s the possibilityhat centralgovern-ment ction gainstheNaxalitesmightithermake martyrs"ftheCPMLleaders,or alternativelyight vokea center-stateonflictn those areaswhere he ommunistsaveattained artialpoliticalpower.

27In December,1968, the Union Ministerof statefor ExternalAffairs, . R. Bhagat,confirmed eports hat at least 1,000 Naga rebels had been trained n China forpur-poses of guerillawarfare nd were attempting o infiltrate ack into ndia. For extensivecoverage, ee AmritaBazaar Patrika (Calcutta), December 24, 1968, p. 1. For Peking'sattitudes towards ndian communism, ee Hemen Ray, "Peking and the Indian CP,"ProblemsofCommunism, ol. XV (November1966), pp. 87-92."8The complete ext of the June 28 and June 30, 1967 broadcasts on the Naxalbariagitation by Peking Radio are reprintedn Mainstream New Delhi), July8, 1967, pp.14-16.Quotations re takenfrom his publishedversion.29Asummary fsome of these activities s provided n AnmitaBazaar Patrika: Cal.cutta daily), December10,1968, p. 7. See also Brines,op. cit., pp. 429 ff.


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806 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYTherecan be little uestion, owever,hat heCPML is making deter-mined fforto maintainhe support f China and to emulate heChineseexample f a communistevolutionbased n peasantuprisings. ollowing

thepronouncementsftheCCP, thepolitical rogram f theCPML arguesthat he ndiannationalist ovement as ed by "the omprador-bureaucratbig bourgeoisie f India,"whose "principal oliticalmouthpiecewas theIndianNationalCongress."30 fterndependence,heprogram ontinues,the. ongress betrayed he nationalfreedomtruggleo serve[its] ownnarrow eactionarylass interests" y becoming imperialism'sgentforruling he country":Britishmperialistxploitationas not nly ontinuedninterrupted,but ven ncreased. oreover,ther mperialists,nd speciallysic],U.S. mperialism,heNo. 1 enemy f heworld's eople nd Soviet o-cial-imperialism,he No. 1 accomplice fU.S. imperialism,hoarejointlyworking orworld ominationnd forre-dividingheworldamonghemselves,avepenetratednto ndia at an increasinglyapidrate.

In the hinkingftheCPML, "the onlyway to achieve iberation rom heexisting eactionaryystem . . is resolutelyo overthrowy armedforcethefour nemies- U. S. imperialism,oviet social-imperialismnd theirlackeys n this ountry,hecomprador-bureaucratig bourgeoisie nd the,feudal andlords . ." But, n thewords f theprogram,the o-called om-munists ndtheother olitical arties n India have refused o undertakethis evolutionaryask."According otheCP1\IL,heolderCommunistndMarxist-leftarties payonly ip service o Marxism-Leninismut, nprac-tice,have never ared oeducate heworkers,easants, outh,tudentsndthebroadmasses n Marxism-Leninismordirectedheir truggleslongtheMarxist-Leninistine.On thecontrary,heyhave keptthe movementstrictly ithin heboundsof laws whichare based on exploitation nddraggedhem own nto hemire feconomism,eformismndparliamen-tarism."Unlike heCPI andCPM,both fwhich owenvisage two-stageevolu-tion in India, and both of which are participatingn stateLegislativeAssemblies,he CPML is convincedhat ndian Communists ust rejectthehoaxofparliamentarism"n order obring bout an immediateevolu-tion .. throughevolutionaryeople'swar":

Today hebasic ask s to iberate he ural reas hroughevolution-ary rmed grarian evolutionndencircle he cities nd,finally,oliberate he cities nd thuscomplete he revolutionhroughouthecountry."0Theprogramof the CPML is contained n two documentsdrafted n early 1969:"Political Resolutionof the Communist artyof India (Marxist-Leninist),"n Libera-tion,Vol. II, No. 7 (1969), pp. 4-16 and "DraftPolitical Programme ortheRevolution-aryStudentand Youth Movement," iberation,Vol. II, No. 6 (1969), pp. 57-67.Allquotationsnototherwise otedare taken from hesetwodocuments.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 807Relyingheavilyon analogies o Cuba and Vietnam,heCPML programarguesthat ndia presents n "excellent evolutionaryituation: . . TheU. S. imperialistsnd their hief ccomplice,he Sovietrevisionists,refacing ncreasing ifficultyn their irty ffortso redivide ndenslave hewholeworld . ., thereactionaryuling lasses refacingnsoluble ontra-dictions t home."Ontheother and, heprogramrgues, SocialistChinais performing iracles f socialist onstruction.he greatproletarianul-tural evolutionas consolidatedhedictatorshipftheproletariatneverysphere f ife nd created onditionsor he ocialistman." n hisMayDayspeechannouncingheformationftheCPML, Kanu Sanyal quotedthedeclarationftheCCP to the ffecthat . . . bytheyear2,000, hat s,only31 years rom ow, hepeopleofthewholeworldwillbe liberated rom llkinds f xploitationfmanbyman nd will elebrate heworldwide ictoryof Marxism, eninism,Mao Tse-tung'shought."n thewordsof Sanyal,"This is no meredeclaration,t is an historic irective. hrough his thegreat ommunistarty f Chinapoints utto theCommunistsfthewholeworld ow xcellentheworld ituations formaking evolution,nd,atthesametime, irects ll ofthem o march orward oldly .. thehistoric e-sponsibilityfcarryingorwardhe Indian revolution as fallen on ourshoulders."In order o takeadvantage f the"excellent evolutionaryituation"nIndia,theCPML has thusfarconcentratedn twotypes f activities: )theorganizationndeducation fstudent roups n a number f Indiancollege ampuses; nd 2) partywork n rural reasamong ribal nd land-less aborers. hemajorthrustfCPML activitiess tobridge hegap thathas always xistedn Indian Communistarties etween lite eadersandmassfollowers.n thewords f theparty rogram:

... the dvanced ection theurbanyouthndcollege tudents] illget solatedromheoverwhelmingajority. . if ttries o advanceinto he truggley tselfwithoutaring o nspire hebackwardec-tions n order o make hem articipatectivelynthe truggle.ak-ing he pportunityrovided ythe solationf the dvanced ection,the eactionariessuch s theCongressarty, ill]organisehebroadsectionsf hebackward asses nd utilisehemoserve heneeds fcounter-revolution.

To bridge hegap between lite eadersand mass followers,he CPMLproposes oconcentraten thebuilding f a newmasspolitical rganizationofstudentsndyouths, ullyntegratedith easants ndworkers,n which"theyouth mong he ntelligensia,he youth nd studentmasses, will]notonly ecome n advanced ection,n importantetachment,n theanti-imperialistnti-feudalemocraticevolutionn ourcountry,ut [will] be-comeonewithworkers ndpeasants." n thewordsof Charu Mazumdar,"...there canonlybe one criteriony whichwe should udge whetheryouth ra students a revolutionary.his criterionswhether r nothe iswilling o ntegrateimself ith hebroad masses f workersndpeasants,


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808 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYdoes so inpractice, ndcarries n masswork .. thosewho cannot re atfirst on-revolutionariesnd may in some cases join the counter-revolu-tionary amp fterwards.his s a lessonwhichwe getnotonlyfrom hinabutfrom very ountryn theworld."31THE CPML AND INDIAN COMMUNISM

The formationf a third ommunistarty n Indiahascreated numberofdifficultiesor oth f ndia's older ommunistarties,nd couldconceiv-ably nfluencehenature f nternationalommunistolicies owardsndiaas well.The significancef the CPML stems rom hefact hatbothof theolderparties re activelynvolved n stateMinisterialoalitions,withtheresult hat heCPML andotherNaxalitegroups rovide he onlyorganiza-tional lternativesor hosemilitantections fthe ndiancommunist ove-mentwhohave ongbeenopposed o a heavyreliance n electoral olitics.Theolder ommunistsanattempto offsethepotentialppeal oftheCPMLeither yworkingwithin he present onstitutionalrameworko garnersupport rommoremoderateegmentsf the ndianpopulation,hus off-setting he loss of the militant ommunistringe, r, alternatively,anattemptooutbid heCPMLformilitantupport ydemonstratinghe ffec-tivenessfministerial ffice orrevolutionizingey groups nd classes nthose tateswhere ommunistsave gainedpartialpoliticalpower.Whileboth f he lder ommunistarties avebeendivided s to the trategyachshouldpursue oward heNaxalites, he eadership ftheCPI has thusfaremphasizedheformerfthe wo trategies entionedbove,while heCPMhas opted or he atter. he strategieseingpursued y the woolder om-munist arties oward heNaxalites re nturn result fthegeneral oliti-cal programshat achhas evolved incethe split n 1964.Ever ince he plit heCPI hasfocussedtsattentionnnational olitics,attemptingo furtherhegoalsof nternationalommunismyallyingtselfunequivocally ith heCPSU and the foreign olicyofthe SovietUnion.The CPML is appealing or upportrom hina nd t's socialist llies,whiletheCPM leaders re known o have establishedontactswithRumania nda few ther ommunistartiesnominallyiedto theCPSU,32andthe CPIunquestionablyas thebacking ftheSoviets.TheChairman ftheCPI isknown n Moscowas "the oyalDange,"theCPI has beenfavoredwith llofthevisits nd nvitationso andfromMoscow, ndthose ransactionshathave takenplace betweenMoscowand the CPM have been carriedout(throughheviamediaoftheCPI. To furtherhegoalsof t'sbrandofcom-munismn India theSoviet Unionhas attemptedo maintain politically3"CharuMazumdar, To the Youth and theStudents,"Deshabrati (Calcuttaweekly),May 2, 1968,pp. 1,4.32None f the leaders of the CPM attendedthe Moscow Conferenceof CommunistParties in June,1969, but several of them-M. Basavapunniah, Pramode Das Gupta,and others-did travelto Rumania and to England, where they kept abreast of de-velopmentsn the internationalmovement. ee AmitavaDas Gupta, "Mini-Summit fCommunists," industhan tandard,June 3, 1969, p. 4.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 809correct nd co-operativeiplomatic elations ith ndia" while t the ametimeseeking o furtherhegrowth f the Indian communistmovement.Soviet nsistence as led to "united rontrombove" tactics nthepartofthe CPI, underwhichpro-Moscow ommunists ave sought o ally with"progressivelements f thenational ourgeoisie" nd to build eftunityaround sloganofnational emocracy.33In this tmospherehe eadershipftheCPI has argued hat heorganiza-tionofa third ommunistarty oses two "dangers"forthe ndian com-munistmovement:irst,hepossibilityhat he formationof theCPML]willcarry plittismnddisruption stepfurther"nd, second, hedangerthat he ctivitiesf henewpartywill mean hedissipationf omerevolu-tionary nergy nto whollywrong nd self-defeatinghannels."34 atherthan aunch nsurrectionistovementsn India's ruralareas,theCPI hasargued or an electoral llianceof all left nddemocraticorces o defeattheCongresst theCentren1972,"13a policywhich n turn tems romheCPI assessmentftherevolutionaryituationn India atthispoint f time.In the eyesof theCPI leadership:

There s not ghost fa chance or hat ype f a longdrawnoutarmed uerilla arfare hich ent n n China or 2years o succeedin ndia.Here nd here ome ype f rmed esistance ight oonforsome ime. ut t cannot akeyou o final ictorys in China. n Indiaany evolutionan succeed nly nderhedirecteadershipfthepro-letariat, ith itiess the eading enterfrevolution.36In thewordsof theGeneral ecretary f theCPI, the new party an only"help he eactionaryorces,andlords nd other lood-suckersfthepeopleto confusenddiverthepeople's ttentionnd forfightinghe communistmovementnd other rogressive orces."37By splitting heCommunistmovementurther,heCPI argues, heCPML will notonly diminish heimpact fthecommunistndprogressiveorces utwill also enable"theHome Ministernd theCongress o suppress he eftforceswithgreaterviolence."38

"3Theprogram f the CPI is tracedout in detail in DocumentsAdopted by EighthCongressof theCommunist arty of India, Patna, 7-15 February,1968 (New Delhi:CPI, 1968). See especiallypp. 315ff.,n whichtheprogram peaks of the nstallation fa "victoriousnational democraticfront"which"will form national democraticgov-ernment . . with a view to. ransformingheexisting ocial-political rder and lay thefoundations orbuildingof socialism."For an excellentbrief ummary f Sovietgoalsin SouthAsia, see William E. Griffith,ino-SovietRelations,1964-65 Cambridge: MITPress,1967), pp. 117-118.84NewAge (Weekly), May11, 1969,p. 2.35TheCPI's assessment f its electoralposition n India is containedin Review ofFourthGeneralElection, dopted bytheNationalCouncilof CPI, Calcutta,23-30April,1967 (New Delhi: CPI, 1967). The quotation s from . 48"6C.Rajeswara Rao, "Naxalite Movement:Originand HarmfulConsequences,"NewAge (Weekly),June 9, 1969,p. 9.37Ibid.8S. A. Dange, Law and Order: Whoseand for Whom? (New Delhi: People's Pub-lishing, ouse, 1967), p. 14.


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810 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYOfparticularoncern o theCPI is theway n which heCPML andotherNaxalitegroupshave penetratednto student nions nd youth roups nIndia,attheexpense fthetwoolderCommunistarties.n thewordsof

one CPI theoretician,It is but nopen ecret hat arge ections mongherank nd fileofthe woCommunistarties n Kerala are silentlynsupportf theextremistNaxalite] erroristctivities.n privatealkthey ailtheterrorists,houghheyre not urewhetherhetime s ripefor uchactivities. . Left-orientedtudentshroughoutheStateare fullofpraise or heheroic oungeaders' f heNaxalite ttacks.39To cope with hedisenchantmentf theyounger eneration fIndian eft-ists, he CPI has attemptedo lecture heNaxalites nd to establish tudycircles n which heparty rograms explainedn greatdetail, nd has alsoexpressed upport ormanyof themovementsaunchedby thenewparty.In addition, othofthe olderCommunistartieshaveacknowledgedheirfailure o organize hetribals nd landless ultivatorsy intensifyingheiractivitiesnthese pheres.n thefinal nalysis, owever,he woolderCom-munist arties an satisfyheNaxalites nlyby withdrawingrom he tateMinistriesn which hey reparticipating,nd by adoptingmore xtremistpolicies, nd this heolderpartieshave beenunwilling o do.

Theprincipal ttacks ftheNaxalites n theolderCommunisteadershiphasthus ar enteredn theCPM, which as dominated he lectoral oali-tions n bothWestBengalandKerala since1967. In its party ropaganda,andthroughgitationalctivities irectedgainst hegovernmentsfKeralaandWestBengal, he CPML has attemptedo "expose" theUnitedFrontgovernmentsn thetwo statesby "revealing heir ruenature."The "truenature" f the CPM-dominatedoalitions s described s follows:. . . the United ront' overnmentsre pledgedo maintainhe ldre-lations f production.aithful o the IndianConstitution,hey reneitherble norwillingo solve hebasicproblem,heproblemf and.Theexperiencef he United ront' overnmentsas once gaindem-onstratedhatwithoutmashinghe tatemachineryf the big and-lords ndthebigbourgeoisiend withoutestroyingeudalismn thecountryside,o benefitan be renderedothemasses nd the talk f'relief'rreforms pure eception.40

Ina similarmannerheKerala stateCPM is chargedwith playing he amegame s theCongress arty-thegameofthe ndianreactionariesndtheirmasters, . S. imperialistsnd Sovietneo-colonialists,"nd ChiefMinisterE. M. S. Namboodiripads said to be "grovellingt the feet f big busi-ness."41 t the ametime, heCPM in WestBengal s labelled neo-fascist"because t has "resortedo lathi-chargendshooting y thepolice as daily30C.Surendran, Extremism nd LeftMovement,"Mainstream (New Delhi), April5,1969,p. 28."0Liberation,ol. II, No. 3 (1969), p. 6."Partha Choudhuri,Phrases and Facts AboutKerala," ibid.,pp. 28, 31.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 811occurrences,s inCongress ays," nd theMinisterialeaderoftheCPM inWestBengalhasbeen abelledby theNaxalites s "theneo-revisionistcabof a police minister amedJyoti asu."42

In reaction othese ttacks y theNaxalites, heCPM itself s splitoverthe trategiest should ursue owards heCPML andother olitical orcesin ndia, ndfactionallignmentsithin heCPM haveshiftedonsiderably.The older eft actioneadership fthe CPM, led by60-year-oldramodeDas Gupta,has launched widespread ampaign o persuade heyoungermembers f theCPMthat heparty an remainwithinheMinistries hilepreservingt'srevolutionaryervor.n a maidanpeech hortly fter he1969 specialelectionn WestBengal,for xample, as Guptatold his fol-lowers:Wehave dopted emocracyn order ostrengthenhedemocraticstruggle,utwefirmlyelieve hatwe would otbe able to reach urgoal througharliamentaryemocracy.urgoal s socialism nd forthat s requiredhebloody evolution. e want oreach hestate fclashbetweenheCentre ndthe tate hroughhepath fParliamen-tary emocracyo such level hat t would park ff hebloody ev-olution.43

Within hepartyDas Gupta nitially ttemptedo stem he tide of revoltamong oungereft actionmembersyproposing campaign gainst hose"bourgeois arties"withwhich heCommunistsllied themselvesn WestBengal nd Kerala n 1967,but thisproposalwasvoteddownby theCPMCentralCommittee.44fter hepolice action n Naxalbari n 1967, DasCuptathen egan oargue hat nless heCPM pulledout oftheMinistries,theparty ould esplit or second ime, utthis oo failed o stir heCPMCentral ommittee.45ith larger hareof the tateMinistriesn thesec-ondUF governmentn WestBengal,Das Guptahas now tarted campaignto woo individual rominent axalites ack intotheparty n an effortoinfluenceheothershrough ersonal ersuasion. n thefinal nalysis, asGuptahas notbeenentirely ithoutnfluence,ithern thestatecouncilsoftheparty r with heNaxalites, uthisprevious osition funquestioneddominancever he eft ommunistaction and the nfluence hich ccruedto him as a result f thisdominance)has beenseverelynderminedince1967.The ironyof Das Gupta's position ince 1967 is thathe now mustprevent stampedeo theLeft.Ofparticularoncern oDas Gupta retheactivitiesfsomemembers f theCPM whoare concerned rimarily ithelectoral olitics, howould iketoenforce arty isciplinendexpelfromtheCPAMll ofthosemembers hohaveactively upportedhe"leftdevia-

42Ibid., ol. II, No. 8 (1969), pp. 6-7.43Hindusthan tandard (Calcutta daily), February 17, 1969, p. 7. Das Gupta issueda public modifyingmendmento this statement fewmonths fter t was published,underpressure rom isown party nd from entralgovernmenteaders."Link (Delhi Weekly),April23,1967,p. 9."Ibid., June , 1967,p. 17.


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812 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYtionist"Naxalites estimatedt4,000-6,000 f the CPM's 17,000 membersin WestBengal alone).~4 Das Guptahas agreed to theexpulsion of some oftheprincipaleaders f theNaxalitefactions,utanyaction nthepartof'theCPM to expel themajority f thosesidingwiththeNaxaliteswouldvirtually ipeout his ownfactionalupport. as Guptahas thusfarsuc-ceeded n at least lowing herateof withdrawalsrom heparty, utonlybyrelaxing herulesofparty iscipline o thepointwherenner-partye-bates are carriedout in publicand partymembers egularly ttackoneanothernthepress.In addition othe nfluence hich heNaxaliteshaveexerted n inner-party lignments ithin heCPM, the newpartyhas had a considerableimpact nthepoliciesofthe tateMinistriesed bytheCPM, andparticu-larly nWestBengal.Within he stateMinistries heCPM has beenhighlyconscious ftheparty's elatively eakposition s the eaderofshaky tate-widecoalitions.Whiletheparty ubliclyabelled he1967 elections esultsas "another reat andmarkn theprogress f our people'sstruggle,"t'sinternalssessmentf t'selectoral ositionwas muchmorerealistic. n areview fthe1967elections,heCentral ommitteeftheCPM pointed uttopartymembershatbothofthemajorCommunistartieshad beenout-polledon an all-Indiabasisbyfourothernationalparties Congress, anSangh, watantra,ndSSP), and that hemargin ywhichCongressostit'smajorityn eight tates n 1967was "veryclose."Furthermore:[Congress] aspolled 7.87 sic] per ent fthevotes for heLokSabha] as against 4.72percent n1962 . . [but] exceptnKeralaandMadras, vennthe states herethasbeen educedo a minority,themarginetweentandthe ombinedppositionsverymall. veninKeralaandMadras thaspolled 5.4percent nd41.5 percent fthevotes espectively.o thedemocratic ovementi.e.,theCommu-nists]must otunderestimatehe trengthfreactionndmust lwaysbepreparedofacethecounter-attackftheCongress artyndthe

vestednterests. hat ormtwill ake ndwhat ounter-measureshedemocraticovernmentndthedemocraticorcesmust dopt, retobe carefullytudiedndevolved.47Comparedwith heCongress, hich ecured tleastone-thirdf thevoteineveryndian taten1967, heCPMwas most uccessfulnKerala,whereitobtained nly 3.51% ofthevote, nd inWestBengal,wheretreceived18.11%. In all otherndianstates heCPM finished ith essthan8% ofthevote, nd t'stotals or heLokSabhawere mere .21% as comparedwith 0.73% for heCongress.n light ftheobviousminorityosition ftheparty,tboth tate ndcentralevels, heCPM Central ommittee as"'Ibid.,May 5,1969, . 11.'7Election Reviewand Party'sTasks. AdoptedbytheCentralCommittee ftheCom-munistPartyof India (Marxist) at its session in Calcutta,April 10 to 16, 1967 (Cal-cutta: CPM, 1967), pp. 4-5. The official lectionvolumeofthe Election Commission orthe 1967 elections ists the Congresstotal fortheLok Sabha at 40.73% of thevote, asignificantlyighertotal thanthatmentioned y the CPM in its electionreview.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 813opted or nimmediatehort-runtrategyfstrengtheningheparty rgani-zationandmassmovementsn those wo tateswhere heparty s alreadystrong,n an attempt o solidify hehold of thepartyon thetwostateministries.48 uestionsofnational and internationalmportanceto commu-nistshavenotbeenneglectedntirely,uttheyhave temporarilyecededinto hebackgroundnlight f thenecessityoconsolidatewostrongtatepartyorganizations.Inthis ontext,he evolt f he eft action ftheCPMandthe ubsequentformationftheCPMLhas beenofcentralmportanceo theformulationofCPM policieswithinheMinistries.f itwerenotfortherevolt f theyoungereft actionmembers ithinheCPM,thepartymight e able topursue hefairly igorous rogramhathas beenoutlined yCPM theore-ticians ince he lectoraluccess f theUnited ront overnmentsn 1967.According o thisprogram heCPM shouldbe pursuing "neo-Maoist"strategynd"united ront rom elow"tactics, policywhich alls foratwo-stageevolution ith heCommunistsoming o complete oweronlyin the econd tage, nd onlyafter reconditionsavebeenestablishednthefirst.49uring hefirsttage heCommunistsretoallywith hebroad-est trata fthepopulationparticularlyeasants ndworkers,ut also thepetty ourgeoisie nd theanti-imperialistections f thebourgeoisie)byoutbiddinghenationalistndreformistarties suchas theCongress nditsoffshoots)or heirupport. oreover, "neo-Maoist"trategynsists nleadershipfthealliancebythe true"communistarty, nd on a powerbasefor he true" ommunistartywhichs separate romhat fboth henationalistarties nd theother arties n thealliance.5This latter nsis-tence tems rom heneed to constantlyxertpressure n thenationalistparties nd topreventarties lliedwith he"true" ommunistsrom ack-sliding ntheroadtothe econd tageoftherevolution.n short,he nsis-tence nleadership ftheUnited ronts n WestBengalandKeralabytheCPM stems romheneedfor united ront rom elow. n thewordsofaresolutionftheCPM Central ommittee:The main illar four acticss united rontromelow. hat s sobecause heres a powerfulrgefor nityn themasses ndwithoutgivingxpressiono it,withouttrengtheningndturningt into nactive orce, hereformistndrevisionisteaderswillnothave ointaction runity f ction.Withoutressureromelow, romhe anks

"This is pointedout nPoliticalResolutionAdoptedby theEighthCongress,Cochin,December23-29, 968 (Calcutta: CPM, 1969), pp. 45 ff."While the CPM has publisheda separate pamphletunderthe titleProgramme fthe CPI(M), the partyprogram s elucidated in much greater detail in two otherpamphlets irected gainst he deologicalattacksoftheNaxalites.See LettertoAndhraComrades (Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp. 11-17 and WVhy he Ultra-'Left'Deviation?(Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp.49-52.'0For an analysisofthe"neo-Maoist"communisttrategynd "unitedfront rom e.low" tactics, ee JohnH. Kautsky,Moscowand theCommunist artyof ndia: A Studyin the Postwar Evolutionof InternationalCommunist trategy (Cambridge: Massa,chusettsnstitute fTechnology, 956), pp. 10 ff.


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814 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYand the masses n general, he reformists ill continue o evade jointaction and weaken and disrupt he struggle.51

If it were not for the existence of theCPML, the CPM mightbe able tocount on the support of all of the left communistforces in India, and itcould thenconcentrate n using these forces to exertpressure on nationalistand reformistprogressiveelements"formore radical policies. However,in the present ituation, heCPML and theNaxalites have soughtto cooptthe eftcommunist orces for themselves,with the result that the CPM hashad to struggle gainst "conspiracies" on the eftas well as the right.More-over,the effectivenessf the CPML and the Naxalites has been enhanced bytheirwillingnessand ability to align themselveson a short-term acticalbasis with "bourgeois" and "reactionary" forces (including the Congressand someofthe UF partners f the C.PM) in theirefforts o "reveal thetruenature of theneo-revisionists."52Perhapsthedilemmas which the Naxalites pose fortheCPM in this com-plicated electoral and ideological situation can be explained more clearlywith referenceto concrete cases. To take one example, the CPML hassoughtto invitepolice attacks against itself n both Kerala and West Bengalin an attempt o expose therepressivenatureof the two CPM-led coalitionMinistries. n the face of provocation,thepolice have insisted on at least aminimaldegree of law and order,and have therefore ccasionally resortedtopolice firingsnwhichNaxalite demonstrators ave been killed.The WestBengal Police Association has even issued a reportwhich has been sum-marized as follows:. . . policemen ave been sufferingrom sense of nsecurity,articular-lysincethe .. attackbystudentsn thefamily uarters of policemenat Durgapur] . . . recently he policehave been subjected to assaultand humiliation y riotousmobs as a resultof which he moraleof theforce as been shattered. herehave beenmany uch ncidents t Kasba,Islampur,Kultali, Amdanga, nd Bally.Recently he police n West Bengalhas not onlybeen debarredfromperformingts minimum utiesof maintaining aw and order but itsfunctionings being nterfered ithbythe ocal partybosses. ... Po-licemendo not even have the right o defend hemselves nd theirfam-ilies inthe faceofmobfury . . the policeforce s no longerpreparedto take this kind of thing yingdown.53

Faced witha potentialrevoltofthe state police force, he CPM-led UnitedFront n WestBengal has been seriouslydivided as to what can and should51Tasks n theTrade UnionFront,Resolutionof the CentralCommittee fthe Com-munist arty f ndia,Marxist Calcutta: CPM, 1967), p. 33."20fparticular oncernto theCPM has been thewillingness ftheNaxalite studentsin West Bengal and Kerala to ally withCongress studentgroups in anti-UF demon-strations. ee, forexample,"The StudentFront n West Bengal," People's Democracy,May25,1969,p. 10.5""Policemenn West Bengal," The Citizenand WeekendReview (New Delhi fort-nightly), une14,1969,p. 21.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 815be done.One section f the tate overnment,edbytheCongress issidentsin theBangla Congress, as advocated ternerepressivemeasures gainsttheNaxalites nda conscious olicy fmaintainingawandorder thus herepression ftheNaxalbarimovement). owever ucha policyhas servedto increase hefactionalism ithin oth heCPI andCPM,and hasworkedto the advantage ftheNaxalites.Both Communistartiesnowstaunchlyopposesucha policy. nsteadof working ortherepression f Naxaliteactivities,heWestBengalHome Ministrywhich s headedbythe egisla-tive eaderof theCPM) is now attemptingodiscipline hepoliceforce nthose nstanceswhere he police have used strongmeasures gainsttheCPML.But while hispolicyhas thusfar preventedarge-scale efectionsftheNaxalites rom heCPM, it has virtually estroyedheeffectivenessftheCPM party rogram. s theCPM has increasinglyidedwith heNaxalites,the aw and order ituationn WestBengal has deterioratedonsiderably,with resultingoss n industrial roduction nd agriculturalutput. hisin turn as alienatedmany f thosevery egmentsf thepopulationwhichtheCPM seeks o attract.54n it's attemptso become ll things o all people-allying with hebroadest trata f thepopulationwhile idingwith leftcommunistringe hich s militantlypposed o the llies of theCPM-theUF governmentas become neffectualnd is confronted ith ncreasingopposition rom number f directions.THE IMPACT OF THE CPML

If ndia werenot highly egmentednd pluralist ation, nemight rguethat he ommunist-ledinistriesn Kerala and WestBengalwouldhave aninterestn creating haotic nd anarchic ituationsn these wohighly ola-tileareas. Feeding n anarchy n Kerala and WestBengal, he communistscouldconceivably evolutionize ore nd moreof the population n thesetwo tates-or at east onvince ignificantumbershat lectoral emocracyis inadequate or ndia's needs-and thisfeelingmight hen pread o otherparts f ndia. But, s MyronWeinerhas pointed ut, ndia is both ociallyandpoliticallyegmentedo a degreeunknownn any othermaj r nationof theworld:

To a remarkableegree hosepolitical evelopmentshich ccurin onesegmentonot ffectevelopmentsn another . . one conse-quence f egmentations that iscontents localized nd nstabilitiesareoftenuarantined.hisfeature f the ndian ystem ayhelp usunderstandhyt s that tany netimemany f he ndian tates reunstable,ut henational overnments unaffectednd unperturbed.Were ll the tates nstableimultaneously,henational ongressr-ganizationnd the national overnmentouldhardly emain table.54Production rends n West Bengal since the assumptionof power by the UnitedFrontare tracedout n "Industry nWest Bengal," a 12-pagesupplement f The States-mnanCalcutta), June 2, 1969.


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816 INDIA'S THIRD COMMUNIST PARTYBut typically nlyfour rfive tates t anyone time re seriously is-turbed ..An analogymight e made to a large twelve-wheelruckwithfourtireson each of three xles. A flat n one tiredoes notcreatea flat nanother, nd it is possible for the vehicleto keep moving ven if oneor two ires re notfunctioning.n any event, he driver arriesenoughsparestokeepthevehicleworkingo longas he does not have a largenumber f flats imultaneously.55

It is preciselythesegmentation f Indian political and social life thathasplagued the communistmovement ince Independence.For, while the com-munists have increased their strength n Kerala and West Bengal rathersteadily, he movementhas declined in two other states (Andhra and Pun-jab) and has remained relatively nsignificant n the rest of India. Theobvious danger for the two older Communistparties in thepresentcontextis thatineffective overnmentsn Kerala and West Bengal may diminishtheirelectoralsupport even in thesetwo states,without ffectingherestofIndia.Moreover, he possibilityofa communist evolutionbeing stagedin Indiain the near future s considered bymost communists includingboth of theolder communist arties and the CPSU) to be much more remote thantheNaxaliteswould like to think.Even if the Congress should lose it's electoralmajority n New Delhi in the 1972 elections,thereis a strong possibilitythat it will be able to form a stable coalition government, ither with therightist arties (Swatantra and Jan Sangh) or with regional parties (suchas the Dravida Munetra Kazagharn of Madras or the Akali Dal in Punjab),all of which are more well-established n state political systems han are theCommunists. hould Ministerial coalitions fail in New Delhi at some pointin the future he Communistswouldthenhave to face severe opposition froma highly nstitutionalizedmilitary, olice, and bureaucratic networkwhichis unreservedly nti-Communist nd highly ntent n maintainingthe unityof the nation. Conscious of the task which confrontshem, he CPM has at-tempted o educate theNaxalites and the CPML on the realities of Indianpolitical life:

They [the Naxalites] are anxious to teach the ignorant'CPM theelementaryruth hatthe present ndian state s a bourgeoise-landlordstate ed by the big bourgeoisie, nd that tate poweressentially ies inthemilitary, olice, courts, udiciary nd bureaucracy. ince the statepower s not n any way brokenor weakened due to the electoralde-featsof theCongressparty, t is 'atrocious'on the part of the CPM tospeak about breaking he Congressmonopoly f power!'.. . May we,first f all, tell our critics hat heydo not understandthedifferenceetween he concept f breaking tatepower nd the con-

"5MyronWeiner,"Political Development n the Indian States," in MyronWeiner(ed.), States Politics in India (Princeton,New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity ress,1968), p. 53.


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MARCUS F. FRANDA 817cept of breaking he monopoly f that power by one politicalparty,namely the CongressParty?The bourgeoi.s-landlordtate power can never be broken exceptthrough people's democratic evolution r socialistrevolution. utbefore that . . . breaking up the one-partymonopoly of power is con-sideredas an importanttepforward,nd thusthesloganofbreakingtheCongressmonopolys advanced. f anyone s to understandt as asubstituteo thepeople'sdemocratic evolutionwhich lone can breakthe bourgeois-landlordtatepower,he shouldblamehis colossal politi-cal ignorance n thematter.56

Many of theCPML leaders and theoreticians re fullyconscious of thedifference etween the concepts of breaking statepower and breakingthemonopolyoftheCongress,yetthey re convincedthat the focusof the com-munistsshould be on the formerratherthan the latter.These people lookforwardto a period of great chaos in India in thenextfewyears,perhapsbroughtabout by the defeatof the Congress in 1972, perhaps as a result ofCongresspartyfactionalism nd major splits n theCongressmovement, rperhapsas a consequenceof economiccollapse.They look forward o a seriesof internecinewars between ndia's competingregional politicians, and toChinese assistancefortheirguerilla activities,which are intendedto takeadvantage of a stateof anarchy.But because oftheir emphasis on historianmodels-Russia, China,Cuba, Vietnam-the ideologyof thenewpartyhasan air of unreality bout it whichis reminiscent f India's experiencewithCommunism ince the1920's. In thewords of CPI theoreticianMohit Sen," [theNaxalites] havecultivated remarkable bility o simply xpungefromtheirmindsthesummingup of fourdecades of revolutionary ctivity;theyseen to be unawareof thebasic tenetof successfulCommunists n this cen-tury, hatthe deology does not commit .. therevolutionariesn any coun-tryto onlyone formof revolution, ny one type of struggle."57 ike theirolder formercomrades in the Indian communistmovement, he Naxalitesare possessed with revolutionary ervor, nd they appear to be at least astenacious and perseveringas those who have been attempting ince the1930's to promote heinterests f the communistmovement n India. How-ever,while theywill certainly ave some impacton theshape of Indian poli-tics during thecourse of their ifetimes, ne can onlywonder if theywillcome any closer to the revolutionarygoals that have been espoused byIndian communists orso many years.

"Ideological Debate SummedUp ByPolitbureau (Calcutta: CPM, 1968), pp. 163-164.Italics in original."Mohit Sen, "What is a Revolutionary?"Mainstream,April 19, 1969, p. 31.MARCUS F. FRANDA is a member fthePoliticalScience Department t ColgateUni-versity nd is currentlyn India as a SeniorResearch Fellow oftheAmerican nstituteof Indian Studies.