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8/12/2019 Ironies of History.contradictions in Khilafat Movement

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Ironies of History: Contradictions of The Khilafat Movement

by Hamza Alavi

The Khilafat Movement of 1919 -24, is probably quite unique inasmuch as it hasbeen glorified with one voice by Islamic ideologists, Indian nationalists andcommunists alike and along with them by Western scholars, as an anti-colonialmovement of Muslims of India, premised on the hostility of the British to theTurkish Sultan, their venerated Caliph.1 Little attempt has been made to examinethe premises on which the movement was founded, the rhetoric of its leadersbeing taken at face value. On closer examination we find extra-ordinaryparadoxes and contradictions behind that rhetoric.

As for the achievements of that Movement, its last ing legacy is the legitimisedplace that it gave the Muslim clergy at the centre of the modern political arena,armed with a political organisation in the form of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind (andits successors after the Partition) which the clergy have used to intervene activelyin both the political as well as the ideological sphere. Never before in IndianMuslim history was the clergy ever accorded such a place in political life.

The Khilafat Movement also introduced the religious idiom in the politics of Indian

Muslims. Contrary to some misconceptions (and misrepresentations) it was notthe Muslim League, the bearer of Muslim Nationalism in India, that introducedreligious ideology in the politics of Indian Muslims. Muslim Nationalism was amovement of Muslims and not a movement of Islam. It was an ethnic movementof disaffected Muslim professionals and the government-job-seeking educatedIndian Muslim middle class, mainly those of UP and Bihar and urban Punjab. Theirobjectives were modest, for they demanded not much more than fair quotas in jobs for Muslims and certain safeguards for their interests. Muslim Nationalism inIndia was a secular rather than a religious movement. Nor was it, in its origins, aHindu hating movement as is sometimes made out. To the contrary, by virtue ofthe Lucknow Pact of 1916 it had already moved decisively towards a commonplatform with the broader Indian National Movement and unity with the CongressParty. The Khilafat Movement intervened in that context in a way that decisivelykilled the politics of the Lucknow Pact. The intervention of the Khilafat Movement


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in Indian Muslim politics has had a considerable retrogressive ideologicalinfluence on the modern Indian Muslim mind that reverberates still in Muslimthinking and their politics in present day India and Pakistan. For that alone, itdeserves to be reviewed and re-evaluated.

The Khilafatist Claims

The arguments of the Indian Khilafatists were based on the claims that:

1) The Otto man Caliph was the Universal Caliph to whom all Muslims,everywhere in the world, owed allegiance;

2) That there was an ongoing war between the World of Christianity and theWorld of Islam, which, inter alia, caused loss of territories of the Ottoman Empirein Europe, a loss that Indian Muslims felt obliged to mourn;

3) That Britain in particular, was an enemy of the Ottoman Caliph; that afterWorld War I Britain held the Caliph captive in Istanbul. They demanded that theperson and the office of the Caliph be protected and preserved and hissovereignty, including that over Ottoman Arab colonies and the Muslim Holy

places, be respected and preserved.

A dispassionate examination of the relevant facts show that these claims were allquite dubious. In this short paper we can review these matters only quite briefly.

Origins of the Ottoman Caliphate

The acquisition of the status of Caliph by Ottoman Sultans is a disputed matter.When, in the modern era, they decided to describe themselves as Caliphs, theyclaimed that the Caliphate had been transferred three and a half centuries earlierto the Ottoman Sultan Selim I by al-Mutawakkil, a descendent of the Abbasids ofBaghdad, who was living in exile in Egypt as a pensioner of the Mamluk rulerBaybars, who was defeated in 1517 by Selim. Baybars, the most distinguished ofthe Mamluk rulers was originally a Turkoman slave. He had picked up al-Mutawakkils father, an uncle of last Abbasid Caliph, and installed him in Cairo


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with great po mp as, what scholars have labelled, a pseudo -Caliph 2 who carriedthe name but none of the authority of that office. Baybars object in installing himin Cairo was thereby to confer honour and legitimacy on his crown and give hiscourt an air of primacy in Muslim eyes. 3 Al-Mutawakkil succeeded his father inthat role. He claimed to be the legitimate bearer of the (late) Abbasid Caliphate,although he was a man without a country and without any authority. He had, atbest, only a symbolic value for Baybars, in view of his connections with theAbbasid dynasty. On his return to Istanbul Selim carried the hapless al-Mutawakkilwith him, to deny a potential future Mamluk any shred of legitimacy.

The claim that the Caliphate was transferred by al-Mutawakkil to Selim isconsidered by historians to be quite dubious. 4 It has been argued that al-

Mutawakkil was in no position to pass on the Caliphate to anyone, for he did nothave it himself, having neither a country nor any power or authority. Whatappears to the present writer to be a more telling argument against the veracityof that story is that neither Selim nor any of his descendants for nearly three andhalf centuries, called themselves Caliphs ! There was no Ottoman Caliphate for allthose centuries. The title that the Ottoman Sultanstook pride in using was that ofGhazi.

It had, however, become a common practice among medieval Muslims rulers tobe addressed as Caliph, but only informally so, along with other honorific titles,on ceremonial occasions. In Turkey such a practice also grew, imperceptibly andgradually. The title of Caliph came to be added to the many honorific titlesattached to the Ottoman Sultan. But, formally and officially, the title of Caliph wasnot used by the Ottomans until 1774, or over 2 50 years after Selims famousvictory over the Mamluks. In that year formal use of the title of Caliph for anOttoman Sultan came about purely by coincidence. During negotiations with the

victorious Russians of the Treaty of Kk Kaynarca, the Russian negotiatorsdescribed their Empress, Catherine the Great, as the Head of the entire ChristianOrthodox Church, thus laying a theoretical claim to the loyalties of Christiansubjects of the Ottomans. Not to be out done, a quick-witted negotiator of theSultannamed his master as the Caliph of all Muslims, thus laying a counter claim,


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to the loyalties of Muslim subjects of the Russian Empress. There was no more toit than that.

After that episode, despite the informal use of the title of Caliph, the Ottomans

still did not yet claim that they were legitimate Caliphs andreligious heads of allMuslims. That was to come much later. That was encouraged not least by theBritish who were staunch allies and patrons of the Ottomans, with an eye to theMuslims of India whom they hoped to be able to influence through the Caliph.Lewis writes: Under Abdul Aziz (1861 -76) the doctrine was advanced for the firsttime that the OttomanSultan was not only the head of the Ottoman Empire butalso the Caliph of all Muslims and the heir, in a sense not previously accepted, ofthe Caliphs of early times.

Legitimacy of Ottoman Caliphs

It was only by the late 19th century, that the Ottoman Sultans decided to layclaim to the Universal Caliphate. For that to be credible, they needed to establishan acceptable source of legitimacy in the eyes of the world. For that purpose,Turkish propaganda, (which was greatly to influence Urdu journalism and Indian

Muslim thought) dredged up the mythical story of transfer of the Caliphate toSelim, by al-Mutawakkil in 1517. It was necessary to take resort to that mythicalorigin of the Ottoman Caliphate which, it was hoped, would reinforce their claimfor legitimacy of their Caliphate. If they could show that it had been formallytransferred to them by a member of the House of Abbas who was supposed to bethe custodian-in-exile of the Abbasid Caliphate and held that legacy until he couldtransfer it to a Muslim Sultan who possessed secular power that could do justiceto that awesome office, their claim, they hoped, would thereby be

unchallengeable. The Ottomans resurrected al-Mutawakkil from the grave toprove their Caliphal credentials.

Indian Muslims were divided into at least two groups on the issue of recognitionof the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate, though its is remarkable that neitherside questioned the validity of the story that it had been passed on to Selim by al-Mutawakkil. Those who subscribed to the Barelvi tradition refused to accept the


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legitimacy of the Ottoman claim on an issue of principle and not by questioningthe truth of the story of the supposed transfer of the Caliphate by al-Mutawakkil.Barelvis did not disbelieve the story itself. Given years of Turkish propagandaabout it in the Urdu press, they took it for granted, like other Indian Muslims. TheBarelvi objection was that the Caliphate could be held only by someonedescended from the Quraysh clan. The Ottomans were not of Quraysh descent.They did not, therefore, satisfy an indispensable condition for Caliphate. In takingthat view they were in accord with an authoritative and established tradition inclassical Islam. Eminent scholars such as Imam al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi hadexpressed the view that only a descendent of the Quraysh could be Caliph. 6 Inthe light of the Barelvi rejection, and in order to rally Indian Muslims behind theOttoman Caliph, Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal issued a fatwa in February1919 laying down inter alia that Quraysh descent was not a necessary conditionfor Caliphate. Lined up against Bari were such major figures in Islamic learning asImam al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi. His ex cathedra judgement was rejected notonly by the Barelvis but also by influential groups of Deobandi Ulama. Minaultrecords the fact that several senior Ulama refused to sign the fatwa. Amongstthose who signed, says Minault, the Ulama of Deoband, Punjab and Bengal wereconspicuous by their absence.7

The Barelvi principled position on this issue has been totally ignored by scholarsalthough, arguably, they are the majority of Indian Muslims. Barelvis had afollowing not only in towns but also, and especially, amongst the vast majority ofthe rural population. A key difference between Barelvi beliefs and those of the so-called Deobandi Tradition (the tradition itself is much older than theeponymous Dar-Ul- Ulum at Deoband) is that Barelvis believe in intercessionbetween ordinary humans and Divine Grace which is accessed through theintervention of an ascending, linked and unbroken chain of holy personages, pirs,reaching out ultimately to Prophet Mohammad, who intercede on their behalfwith Allah.8 It is a more superstitious but also a more tolerant tradition of IndianIslam. The views of the Barelvi tradition of South Asian Islam are, by and large,ignored by scholars. Sanyals pioneering study is an exceptiona l and excellent newbeginning.


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The Unexamined Concept of Khalifa

Abul Kalam Azad, the principal theoretician of the Indian Khilafat Movementsummed up the fundamental ideological point of departure of the Movement,

quite succinctly, in the following statement:

It is an Islamic Shari law that in every age Muslims must have one *k+Khalifa andImam.11 By Khalifa we mean such an independent Muslim king or ruler ofgovernment and country who possesses full powers to protect Muslims and theterritory that they inhabit 12 and to promulgate and enforce Shari laws and ispowerful enough to confront the enemies of Islam.

The Sultan of Turkey, it was held by the Indian Khilafatists, was such a Muslim

ruler and Caliph and it was to him that Muslims of India should pay allegiance.

It is quite extra-ordinary that in the voluminous literature on the Indian KhilafatMovement this basic religious premise of the Movement , as stated by Azad andothers, is taken for granted and has not been subjected to critical examination.No proper evaluation of the Khilafat Movement is possible without an analysis indepth of the initial premises of the Movement.

To begin with, there is a basic contradiction between the Ottoman claim that theCaliphate was transferred to them, via Sultan Selim, by al-Mutawakkil, which theIndian Khilafatists took as the Ottomans charter, and the conditions for alegitimate Caliphate that are outlined by Azad. Those conditions render theOttoman claim to Caliphate flawed from the start. By virtue of the conditions asset out by Azad, al-Mutawakkil was not a legitimate custodian of the Caliphate.He was neither a Muslim king or ruler of any country nor was he independent,being a pensioner of Baybars, the Mamluk ruler. In the circumstances thequestion of his possessing the power to enforce Shari laws of course does notarise. al-Mutawakkil was in no position to transfer the Caliphate to the Ottomans,not being a valid Caliph himself. He had nothing to give. This objection to thevalidity of the Ottoman Caliphate is quite separate from that put forward by theBarelvis. Azads rhetoric, typically for him, is bound up in contradictions.

Meaning of the word Khalifa


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It is important to be clear at the outset about the meaning of the wordKhalifa andthe way in which that word was later transformed linguistically by UmayyadMonarchs to legitimise their rule, having seized power by military force. The wordKhalifa is derived from the Arabic root khalafawhich means to follow or to comeafter. It means a successor in the sequential sense, not in the sense ofinheritance of properties or qualities. When Prophet Mohammad died, HazratAbu Bakr was elected to succeed him. He was consequently called Khalifat al -Rasool Allah or the successor of the Messenger of Allah. In its true meaning(successor) the word Khalifadoes not indicate any kind of office or status such asthat of a ruler, the sense in which it came to be used later. Khalifa meaningsuccessor could be used meaningfully only with reference to a specifiedpredecessor. Hazrat Abu Bakr was Khalifa only with reference to his predecessor,al-Rasool Allah.

The head of the Muslim Umma, Hazrat Umar, who succeeded Hazrat Abu Bakrcould have been called Khalifat al-Khalif al- Rasool Allah, or the Successor to theSuccessor to the Messenger of Allah. With every succession thereafter one moreKhalifat al would have had to be inserted before such a title of the previous one.That would have been quite absurd. The question of using the word Khalifa forthose who came after Hazrat Abu Bakr simply did not arise. Instead, Hazrat AbuBakrs successors, Hazrat Umar, Hazrat Uthman and Hazrat Ali, the threesuccessive elected heads of the Umma were each designated by the title Amir al -Muminin or the Commander of the Faithful.

When the Umayyad Dynasty was set up in Damascus, its legitimacy was disputedand fought over. Unlike the elected headship of the umma, here was a seizure ofpower by military force. For that reason Maulana Maududi (1903-1979) has calledthe rise of the Umayyad dynasty a counter -revolution against Islam (Inquilab -e-

makoos) and a re version to Jahiliyaor the age of ignorance that is said to havepreceded the advent of Islam 13. The Umayyad rulers having become monarchsthrough military force, looked for a legitimating symbol to sanctify their regime.For that they chose the word Khalifa. They hoped thereby to attach to themselvesthe legitimacy that was associated with the title of Mohammads successor,HazratAbu Bakr. In so doing they changed the meaning of the word. The word Khalifa


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was no longer to mean successor to a specified pr edecessor. It was now to meanmonarch or ruler.

A new word had been invented. Although it was spelt and pronounced in exactly

the same way as the original word Khalifa that meant successor the sameutterance, in its sound and spelling, was now to have a new and totally unrelatedmeaning. It was a neologism, unconnected etymologically or semantically, withthe original word Khalifa the successor. The new word was to mean monarch orruler. Sir Syed Ahmad commented on that, saying: The term Khalifa wasabandoned by Hazrat Umar when he was elected to succeed Hazrat Abu Bakr.Instead, of that he adopted the title of Amir al- Muminin *Commander of theFaithful]. That title was used until the time ofHazrat Ali and for a time even after

him. After that and after the time ofImam Hussain, the people who had takenover power [viz. the Umayyads)arrogated to themselves the title of Khalifa 14because they thought that the title of Khalifa was more exalted (muqaddas) thanthat of Commander of the Faithful. 15

The word Khalifa, having been misused by Umayyad Monarchs as their title, tosanctify their monarchy, would have lost its force if it were not applied also to thefour successors of Prophet Mohammad. But there was a general recognition of

the obvious fact that the Umayyads were not in the same class as the latter.Therefore Hazrat Abu Bakr and his three successors were re-designated as'Khulafa-e-Rashidun' 16, or 'The Rightly Guided Caliphs'. If any religioussignificance attached to the first four, it was made clear that it did not apply tothe later 'Khulafa', starting with the Umayyads.

Under the Umayyads the word Khalifa was not yet impregnated with any religiousconnotations. For them the word was to be only a symbol of legitimacy of theirrule-a variant of the 'divine right of kings' as propounded in medieval Europe. Itwas only in later centuries that claims about religioussignificance of the title of'Khalifa' or Caliph were to be made. That was during the period of decay anddecline of the late Abbasid Caliphate, when the Caliph was reduced to being amere puppet in the hands of military commanders or regional princes. These trueholders of power needed to generate an ideology that would remove the Caliphfrom the centre of secular state power, as the ruler, and relegate him to the


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sidelines, as a nominal head of the state whose essential functions were supposedto lie in the religious sphere-where in practice, he had nothing of any significanceto do.

God's Caliph

In the Sunni tradition the religious domain is the domain of the Imam. But unlikethe Pope, the Imam does not have any religious authority. Islam, as it is oftensaid, does not recognise any priesthood or a Pope. It is a religion of the individualconscience. Imams are therefore essentially guides, persons who by virtue ofpersonal and religious perfection and excellence in scholarship come to berecognised as Imam. No one appoints Imams. In contradiction to that earlierusage, in the decadence of the late Abbasid period, a (nominal) religioussignificance began to be attached to the Caliph. Increasingly the practice grew ofconflating the concepts of Khalifa andImam. It is this later corrupted tradition thatAzad follows in his words quoted above.

There was also an escalation in religious attributes that were attached to theCaliph. The Caliph was even called Khalifat Allah, or 'Gods Caliph' or 'successor' !Azad in fact takes the phrase Khalifat Allah as his point of departure whenexpounding the meaning of the word Khalifa. The concept of Khalifat Allah (God'sCaliph), which Azad uses freely when expounding the concept of the Caliphatewas been strongly denounced by classical Islamic scholars in works of which Azadcould hardly have been ignorant of. Al-Mawardi, condemning the use of the termKhalifat Allah wrote in his classic work Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniya that: 'We disagreethat he can also be called Khalifat Allah The consensus of the Ulama hasprohibited this and condemned any one who says it as a fajir (i.e. a sinner or liar)because there can be a Khalifa (successor) only of such a person who hasdisappeared or who has died. Allah can neither disappear nor can he die.'17Goldziher writes: 'When the Umayyads used this pretentious title (KhalifatAllah) it was merely intended to convey the unlimited power of the ruler. Underthe later Abbasids the title was filled with theocratic content. The OttomanSultans were thought to have special claim for adopting these titles of the oldCaliphs just as the name Khalifat Allah was transferred to them'. 18 When Azad, inthe corrupted late Abbasid tradition, begins his exposition of the concept of


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Khalifa with the discredited notion of Khalifat Allah, 19 he follows the mostbackward and reactionary traditions in Islam.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's position on this issue is emphatically the opposite. He is

quite clear in distinguishing Khilafat, the secular domain and Imamatthe religiousdomain. He reiterated this, saying that 'After the death of the Prophet of Islam,Hazrat Abu Bakr was appointed Khalifat al-Rasool Allah(But) he had no religiousauthority (dini ikhtiarat). He repeatedly emphasised that the Caliph was not like aRoman Catholic Pope. HazratAbu Bakr, he pointed out, was simply theadministrative head of the community of Muslims. 20 Shaban, a contemporaryscholar, says exactly the same thing. He wrote: 'Mohammad could have no truesuccessor, since no other man could ever have the same divine sanction

Therefore Abu Bakr had no religious authority He was in no sense a grandcombination of Pope and Holy Roman Emperor'. 21

Under the late Abbasids when 'The Caliph had little left except the capital andeven there his authority was shadowy' 22 there was an escalation in his religiousattributes. The Caliph being divorced from effective control over state power waspresented to the people as a religious rather than a secular figure. The Caliphswere increasingly referred to as Imams. Goldziher notes that : 'Under the laterAbbasids the title was filled with theocratic content.(They, the Caliphs) claimed tobe Representatives of God's rule on earth and even as "God's shadow on earth".Their ideologues taught that the Caliph is the God's shadow on earth; all thosewho are troubled find refuge in it (zillu'Ilahi fi'l-ardi ya'wi ilayhi kullu malhafun).These pompous theocratic titles must have appeared to contemporaries theemptier the less of real power corresponded to them The Ottoman Sultans, as theprotagonists of Islam, were thought to have a special claim for adopting thesetitles of the old Caliphs, just as the name of Khalifat Allah, or Gods Caliph, wastransferred to them.' 23 The Ottoman propaganda machine played a large part inspreading the notion of the Caliph's supposed religious role, which by implicationprovided a basis for the Caliph's claim to the loyalty of Muslims everywhere,including India. The Indian clergy in particular welcomed this because as self-


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appointed guardians of Islam in India this enhanced their place in Indian societyand Indian Muslim politics as mediators between the Caliph and 'his people'.

It was not long before 'Muslim' intellectuals and scholars began to come forward

with 'authoritative' texts, inventing, emphasising and exaggerating the supposed'religious' role of the Caliph as Imam. Gone was the notion of an elected secularhead of state as it was under the Khulafa-e-Rashidun, the first four 'Rightly GuidedCaliphs'. The notions about the supposed religious role of the Caliph were incontradiction to the distinction made in original Islam between the head of thestate who was a secular figure (an office that remained secular even when it wasredesignated Khalifa by Umayyads rulers) and that of Imam, a religious guide whodwelt in the domain of faith. In the decadence of later days, the two concepts

were often collapsed one into the other so that, as we have seen from the abovequotation from Azad, the words Caliph and Imam were uttered in the samebreath (as Azad does when referring to the Ottoman Sultan) as if there was nodistinction between the two.

The Universal Caliphate

Azad's speeches suggest that there could be only one Caliph in every age. Onewould have to close one's eyes to much of Muslim history to accept Azad'sarbitrary condition at face value. The fact is that over many centuries there hasbeen a plurality of rival Caliphates and not just one that embraced the entireMuslim world. Several Caliphates have coexisted at the same time. The mostnotable of these, contemporary with the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, were theUmayyad Caliphate in Spain and the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt. Besides thesethree best known rival Caliphates, there were numerous independent Muslim

kingdoms whose heads claimed the title of Caliph. Bosworth's comprehensivesurvey offers an account of no less than 82 such Islamic 'Caliphates' ! 24Notwithstanding that fact of a long history of Islam, the Ottoman's propagandisedthe notion of a single 'Universal Caliph' for the whole Islamic world as a basiccomponent of Islamic polities. That was the basis on which they laid claim to the


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loyalties of Indian Muslims. The idea is pure fiction of course. And yet, that is theassumption on which the Khilafat Movement was premised.

Azad claimed that it was an Islamic Shar'i law that in every age Muslims must have

'one' (ek) Khalifa and Imam, the Universal Caliph. He does not indicate the sourceof that shar'i law where that is laid down, or the basis on which he makes thatstatement, for he has none. He was accustomed to making large and extravagantclaims without any foundation in the basic sources of Islam. It was enough thathis half educated and ill-informed audiences were captivated by the fluency of hisrhetoric laced with long 'quotations' in Arabic, which was virtually Azad's firstlanguage. 25 They had little time to reflect on the veracity of what Azad said andclaimed. In any case the content of what he (and others) said mattered little for

they had already made up their minds 'to be carried away' ! The scholars whopontificated before them were, for them, mere cheer-leaders.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan argued emphatically against the notion of a UniversalCaliphate. His view was that every Caliphate was confined to territories whichwere directly under the control of the claimant of that title. The Khilafatistsdismissed Sir Syed Ahmad's arguments, ad hominum, by accusing him of being aservile subject of the British and parroting their views. It was unworthy of them to

say so. It was Azad and not Syed Ahmad Khan who, on that issue, was in tune withthe pro-Ottoman British policy which strongly supported the notion of theOttoman Sultan as the Universal Caliph. Considering the charges so often laidagainst Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of servility towards the British, it is even moresignificant that on the issue of the Universal Caliphate Sir Syed held his ground asa matter of principle, although his views were diametrically opposed to those ofthe British. It was quite another matter that his political project for the future ofMuslims in India, as he saw it in mid-19th century, left him open to the charge of

being a British puppet. Pro-British he might have been at the time, rightly orwrongly. A puppet he was not, as this example shows. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan'sstance on the 'Universal Caliphate' defied both British and Turkish inspiredpropaganda.


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British Relations with Ottoman Caliphs

The British, far from being enemies of the Ottomans, as the Khilafat Movementpropaganda suggested, had remained their steadfast allies over many centuries.

Their enduring alliance with the Ottomans was motivated, as far as the Britishwere concerned, by a threat to British imperial interests that came fromexpansionist ambitions of Czarist Russia. The Ottomans were equally worriedabout the Russian threat, the more so with their increasing weakness. Theyneeded a strong and dependable ally which they found in Britain. The Ottomandecision to ally (but belatedly) with Germany in World War I was a temporarybreak in a centuries old British-Ottoman alliance. Turkey's aberrant Wartimealliance with Germany arose due to a peculiar combination of circumstances

within Turkey itself and despite every effort made by the British to prevent Turkeyfrom joining with the Central Powers in the War. Turkey stumbled into the war, inopposition to her traditional ally, by an uncalculated accident. It is an interestingepisode about which we shall have more to say below.

British relations with the Ottoman Empire were founded on Britain's own imperialinterests. That was dictated by the Ottoman Empire's strategic location vis--vis aperceived threat from Czarist Russia. For Britain the Ottoman Empire was a

valuable bulwark in Russia's way, in the context of a new age that had beeninaugurated by the great explosion of maritime trade and the correspondinglyincreased importance of naval power, from the 16th century onwards. Globalstrategic priorities were radically changed. Control of the high seas, and not oflarge land masses, was now to be the secret of Imperial power. Britain soonemerged as a major maritime power and extended its imperial might around theglobe.

Czarist Russia was handicapped in this new game of world power. Its naval powerwas constrained by geography. Its Baltic Fleet was vulnerable at the narrow straitsthat separated Sweden from Germany and Denmark. Its Black Sea fleet was evenmore vulnerable at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Its Eastern fleet atVladivostock was too far out of the way to play an effective role in the game. IfRussia was to become a major world power, it had to have free and open accessto the oceans of the world. The option before it was to push southwards, to


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conquer territory that would place it in a dominating position on the Persian Gulfand the Arabian Sea. But that would be a direct threat to British imperialinterests.

The Ottoman Empire stood in the Russia's way to the warm waters that lay to theSouth. It would have to break Ottoman power to be able to mount a successfulsouthward move. Russian policy was therefore consistently hostile to theOttomans. Given that equation, the Russian threat to move south was animmovable foundation on which an enduring alliance between the British and theOttomans was built. It was to last for centuries. They fought wars together asallies, most famously in the long and expensive war, in money and in blood, theCrimean War of 1854-56. That war ended, as the British desired, in a Treaty that

banned passage through the Bosphorous and Dardanelles of all naval units, whichfor all practical purposes meant Russian naval units. That effectively bottled upthe Russian Southern fleet in the Black Sea.

Ottoman Expansionism and Decline.

The Ottomans reached the height of their power by the end of the seventeenthcentury when the Sultan's army besieged Vienna for a second time but once againfailed to conquer it. From that moment began the steady decline of Turkish powerin Europe. Turkey was soon to lose her colonial possessions beyond the Danubeand the Sava river (in Yugoslavia) through expensive wars with Russia and theHabsburgs in the eighteenth century. But the final Ottoman decline was onlypartly the result of conflicts between Turkey and those two great powers. In themain the Turkish retreat was forced by nationalist struggles of the Southern Slavswho were quite as hostile to the colonial power of the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian empire as they were to the Ottomans. In their wars of nationalindependence the Southern Slavs fought against both those colonial empires, theOttoman as well as the Habsburg. In India, in the Urdu press particularly, this wasmisrepresented as a war of Christianity against Islam. It was a in fact a war ofnationalism against colonialism.

These were struggles for territory and power. Religion did not come into it.'Muslim' Ottomans did not hesitate to fight 'brother Muslims' too, such as the


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Arab people, to subjugate them under their colonial rule. They also led repeated,though unsuccessful, campaigns against the 'brother' Muslim Safavid rulers ofIran. Ottoman expansionism was not about religion. It was about territory andpower. Likewise, Muslim subjects of the Ottomans were no less keen to gain theirfreedom from their Muslim colonial masters. Stojanovic writes: 'The weakening ofthe Central Power encouraged the already strong separatist tendencies ofProvincial Pashas. The Porte (the Centre of the Ottoman Government) had tocope with a series of Moslem revolts'-including that of Mohammad Ali of Egypt 26(who, it must be said however, was a military adventurer rather than a leader of anationalist movement).

As for the charge that independence movements in the Balkans were 'Christian'

Movements against 'Islam', we can hardly forget that it was the assassination ofthe 'Christian' heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, by a'Christian' Serb nationalist at Sarajevo, that triggered off the First World War. It ispatently simplistic and absurd to describe the nationalist struggles in the Balkans,as it was being done by Indian Muslim publicists and bigoted Mullahs, as a war ofChristianity against Islam. The 19th century was the age of nationalist fermenteverywhere-as indeed in India too. The Balkan nationalist movements were a partof that global phenomenon, when subject peoples had begun to fight for freedomand independence from colonial rule.

Greek Independence

The Indian Khilafatists have made much of the idea that the British were Pro-Greek and anti-Turk. That charge can be made of Lloyd George who wastemporarily the Prime Minister of Britain in the War-time coalition government-the man who dictated the humiliating Treaty of Sveres, which even hisConservative cabinet colleagues such as Bonar Law did not like. That was onereason why the Treaty was never ratified and implemented. After the end of theWar-time coalition government, when Lloyd George was thrown out, and aconservative government returned, under Bonar Law, Britain returned to hertraditional pro-Turkish or, rather, pro-Ottomanpolicy (that distinction is notwithout significance).


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As for the long term strategy of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean, the ideathat British Governments were pro-Greek is patently false. Here again the threatfrom Czarist Russia entered into British calculations. In the Greek struggle forindependence from Turkish colonial rule, despite strong popular support in Britainfor the Greeks, the British Government itself was not at all in favour of Greekindependence. They feared that it would give Russia an ally and a foothold in theEastern Mediterranean. However, following an enormous upsurge of publicopinion in Britain, after the death in 1826 of the popular poet Lord Byron, whohad fought and died for the Greeks at Missolonghi, a reluctant BritishGovernment was finally pushed to join the alliance that had been initiated by theRussians in support of the Greeks. The outcome of that war was the Treaty ofAdrianople in 1829. But the British Government was quite as unhappy about thatTreaty as were the Turks. As Gewehr notes: 'Due to British fears of Russianpreponderance in the Balkans, it was not until 1832 that the final agreementregarding the territorial extent and the form of government in Greece was made.The new born Greek state was restricted to an area (which) excluded from itsboundaries many important centres A numerical majority of the Greek race wasactually left under Turkish sovereignty. That is explained by the fear of the EnglishPrime Minister, The Duke of Wellington, that Greece would become a satellite of

Russia and hence it must be restricted to a small area.'27 Britain's commitmentsto the Ottomans remained unshaken.

Ottoman Services to the British in IndiaThe acceptance by Muslims of India, of the Turkish Sultan as the Universal Caliphwas a relatively recent development. For Mughal India, there was no question ofsubmitting to the overlordship of the Turkish Sultan, whom they rivalled in powerand wealth and the size of the territory over which they ruled. It was during theperiod of British colonial rule in India that, with full British encouragement andsupport, the idea of accepting the Turkish Sultanas the Universal Caliph waspropagated amongst Indian Muslims, as their venerated Caliph to whom theyought to give allegiance. Given their alliance with the Ottomans, the Britishrealised the value of the ideology of the religious authority of the Ottoman Caliphover Muslims everywhere that could be brought into play to control Indian


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Muslims. The British welcomed that and encouraged propaganda on behalf of theCaliph. In return the Caliph served the British well.

The first major example of this was in 1789 when Tipu Sultan, as a gesture of

defiance against the Moghuls, paid formal allegiance to the Ottoman Caliph who,in return sent Tipu a sanad (charter of office) and Khil'at(robes of investiture) asruler of Mysore. Tipu is a legendary figure in Indian history as a fighter againstexpanding British colonial rule. In 1798, therefore, at British request, the OttomanCaliph sent a letter to Tipu, telling him that the British were his friends and askinghim to refrain from hostile action against them. The letter was sent to Tipu notdirectly but through Lord Wellesly who was leading the British forces against Tipu! Tipu replied to the Caliph, professing devotion but also telling him that the

Caliph was too far away to know the situation in India. He cheekily invited theCaliph to join hands with him so that, together, they may throw out the infidels !Another major occasion when the Ottoman Caliph came out in support of theBritish at a very difficult moment was at the time of India's War of NationalIndependence in 1857 (downgraded by historians as 'The Indian Mutiny'). True toform, the Ottoman Caliph Abdul Majid condemned the 'mutineers' and calledupon Indian Muslims to remain loyal to the British. The British, he said, were'Defenders of Islam'.

The idea that the Ottoman Caliph would be of value in controlling Muslims ofIndia was at the forefront of British calculations in their relationship with theOttoman Caliphs. That is illustrated by the reception that they gave to the tyrantSultan Abdul Aziz when he visited London in 1867. The British went overboardwith their lavish entertainment for the Caliph. Significantly though the hugeexpenses incurred were charged by the British Government to Indian revenues'on the ground that cordial relations with the Sultancontributed towards the good

government of India The Sultan as head of the Muslim religion, would propitiateIndian Muslims. 28

Shaping of Pro-Turkish Attitudes of Indian Muslims


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Until the beginning of the 19th century Indian Muslims were largely indifferent toTurkey and the Ottoman Caliph. Quite apart from British interest in it, two factorsof major social change combined to create conditions for successfully propagatingpro-Turkish sympathies among them. These two changes had quite separateorigins. But they were inter-twined, enough to constitute a single phenomenon.

The first of these was the emergence of a new educated Indian Muslim middleclass. This class of Muslims were brought up not in the traditional educationprovided by Madrassahs and the Ulama. They were products of the new Anglo-Vernacular system of education that was instituted by the colonial government,following Macaulay's Minute of February 1835. It was a system of education thatwas designed to produce men who would staff the colonial state apparatus; civil

servants and scribes. They were needed in state employment to mediate betweenthe English speaking Sahibs and the local population. Nehru called it aneducational system designed to produce a 'Nation of Clerks'. It was a new class,which I have elsewhere named thesalariat.29 The salariat was that section of themiddle class whose goal was state employment. They sought not 'education' but'educational qualifications' i.e. degrees and diplomas, that would serve as apassport for a government job. In colonised societies with an agrarian productionbase, thesalariat tends to dominate the urban society and is the most articulateclass which tends to pre-empt issues in political debate. The salariat thereforecame to be a class of enormous social and political significance. It also became anewspaper reading class, when newspapers became affordable.The Muslimsalariat, especially in the UP was a rather disgruntled class, for it had lost groundin state employment, especially in the more prestigious upper ranks of jobs inwhich they had been, so far, preponderant. Psychologically, this class neededavenues through which it could channel its discontent and pain. When newsbegan to come through of Turkey's defeats in the Balkans, which was representedto them as a War of Christianity against the World of Islam, that struck a chord intheir increasingly communalist minds. The 'fate of the Turks' seemed to mirrortheir own sense of decline. They responded with deep sympathy to the news ofthe 'Tragedy of the Turks' (Turkon ka almia). A powerful sense of solidarity wascreated and, poor as they were, they collected funds for Turkish aid. The British,for their part, greatly welcomed that development and did all they could to


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encourage it. They were happy to see a growing bond between Indian Muslimsand their protg, the Ottoman Caliph.

This potential political base on which strong pro-Ottoman sympathies weregenerated was fostered very effectively by a new development, namely theemergence of Urdu popular journalism. 30 The early newspapers had minusculecirculation, catering as they did to a handful of the wealthy and the powerful whoneeded to keep in touch with affairs of the state and of the world of commerce.Many of these 'newspapers' were produced in manuscript form. Urdu printingwas in vogue too, for Naskh metallic type for Urdu had been available for sometime. But Naskh was not popular with general readers and was also expensive.Calligraphic nastalique writing was immensely more popular. As it turned out, thebest method for printingnastalique script, namely lithography became widelyavailable precisely at that critical time in the history of the Indian Muslim salariat.Litho printing was invented in 1796. Further developments were needed before itcould be used to print newspapers in large numbers and cheaply. By 1850 the firstmechanised lithographic press became available. Later in the 19th century itbecame possible to build rotary presses by replacing stone by a zinc plate which

could be curved. These inventions made large scale litho printing innastaliquescript both possible and very cheap. Urdu newspapers could now be turned out inlarge numbers which 'everyone' could afford. For Urdu readers, the age of themass media had arrived. But the papers needed issues that could besensationalised, to build up their circulation. The drama of the 'Turkish tragedy'was just what they needed. They played it for all that they were worth.

Events of the First World War were a traumatic shock to Indian Muslims. They hadgrown up with the knowledge about friendship between Britain and theOttomans, which was regularly reflected in news items in the Urdu press. Thenews of Turkey and Britain being on opposite sides in the War was therefore atraumatic blow to them. Nothing illustrates this with more poignancy thanMaulana Mohammad Ali's long article entitled 'The Choice of the Turks' that hepublished in his journal The Comrade. After listing Turkish grievances againstBritain, he expressed his fervent hope that the Turks would remain neutral in


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spite of these slights. He closed his article with an assurance of Muslim loyalty toBritain. 31

Turkey and World War I

Turkey's decision to join Germany and the Central Powers in the World War was acomplete surprise to everyone, including the Turks themselves ! In 1908 a radicalgroup, called the 'Committee for Union and Progress' (the CUP), the so-called'Young Turks', seized power in Turkey in a coup, deposing the tyrannical CaliphAbdul Hamid II. In his place the CUP installed his brother Mohammad Reshad asCaliph. The Young Turk regime itself soon degenerated into a military oligarchy.Behind the scenes there was an ongoing triangular 'struggle for power within theTurkish state between the Caliph supported by conservatives and reactionaries,the High Bureaucrats supported by Liberals, and (on the third hand) the radicalUnionists', the Young Turks. 32

Despite differences within the Turkish ruling elite on internal questions, it wasquite remarkable that they were all unanimously pro-British. That was the legacyof their shared experience of centuries of British support for the Ottoman state.As far as the Turkish elite were concerned, the British had been their mostconsistent and reliable friends. Despite factional squabbles within the Turkishelite, there was no faction which was not pro-British. Turkey's decision to ally withthe Central Powers namely Germany and Habsburg Austria, in the First World Warwas therefore completely at odds with her long-standing attitudes and closefriendship with Britain and France. How so ?

Initially, Turkey itself approached Britain and the Allies offering to join them in theWar. Feroz Ahmad writes: 'After the traumatic experience of the Balkan Wardiplomacy the CUP was convinced that the Ottoman state could survive only as an

ally of one of the two blocs, preferably the Triple Entente (Britain, France andRussia). Delegations were despatched to London and Paris and finally to TsarNicholas The Unionists were pro-English and pro-French, rather than pro-Germanbecause they were sure that Turkish interests would be best served by theEntente powers.' 33 But, despite Britain's consistent alliance with Turkey overmany centuries and her commitment to preserve the safety and integrity of the


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Ottoman Empire (even if that was in pursuit of her own imperialist interests vis--vis Czarist Russia) the Western powers turned down Turkey's offer to ally withthem. Why ?

There are some clues to this puzzle to be found in the autobiography of the AghaKhan which throws some light on Turkey's ultimate decision. Although the Britishhad declined the Turkish offer to join them in the War, they were, nevertheless,most keen that it should stay neutral. The Agha Khan writes; 'Lord Kitchenerrequested me to use all my influence with the Turks to persuade them not to jointhe Central Powers but to preserve their neutrality. His opinion was shared andsupported by the Secretary of State for India, by the Foreign Secretary Sir EdwardGrey and by the Prime Minister Mr Asquith. Indeed even the King, when I had the

honour of lunching with him, referred to it.' 34 So the Agha Khan got in touchwith his 'old friend' Tawfiq Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London. They bothagreed that Turkey should be kept out of the war. The Young Turks were invitedto send a Ministerial delegation to London to enter into direct negotiations withthe British Government. The Agha Khan writes: 'Britain was prepared on her ownbehalf and on behalf of Russia and her other allies to give Turkey full guaranteesand assurances for the future.' 35 The Agha Khan added that neutrality wouldgive the Turks, after their recent losses, the time that they needed to carry outtheir programme of social, economic and military reform. That seemed to makesense.

Tawfiq Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, having meanwhile been briefed by hisown government, told the Agha Khan that their negotiations would have a muchbetter chance of success if the Allies were to ask the Turks to come and join themon their side in the War instead of staying neutral, as Britain had proposed 'for atthe end of the conflict no one would thank her for staying neutral.' But would

neutrality not have been better than lining up with the losing side ? And wouldneutrality be so bad an option if it was a position taken at the suggestion of thewinning side ?

Why did Britain decline having one more ally by her side in the war ? Theunderlying problem as so many times before, was Czarist Russia. Given Russia'santi-Turk attitude, there was a strong possibility that Britain, by taking Turkey as


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an ally in the face of Russian opposition, would have been left isolated, to face therising tide of German power, on her own. That was a risk that the British did notwish to take. Tawfiq Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London 'was alsoconvinced that Russia would never agree to Turkey joining the Allies, as such astep would put an end to all Russia's hopes of expansion at Turkey's expense,either in the North East around Erzerum, or Southwards.' 36 The British had littlechoice but to decline Turkey's generous offer to fight alongside her. Taking theTurks on as allies would have antagonised the Russians. Russian neutrality wouldhave left Britain at the mercy of the Germans.

After repeated Ottoman requests to the British to let them join them in the warhad been politely turned down, the Turkish Government adopted a policy of 'wait

and see', initially at least, rather than join Germany precipitately. But they alsocarefully avoided showing hostility to the Germans. They were keeping theiroptions open. While they were still debating which side to align with in the War,or whether to stay neutral, in October 1914 the Turks, as Lewis puts it, 'stumbledinto a major European war' 37 The Agha Khan writes that 'By the close of 1914the Central Powers were confident of quick victory on their own terms. Tragicallymisled by all these signs and portents dangled before their eyes by the exultantGermans the Turkish Government took the irrevocable step of declaring war onRussia. This automatically involved the Ottoman Empire in war with Great Britainand France.' 38 Looked at objectively, this was a disastrous move by the Turks, forwhich they had to pay a heavy price later. It was a decision, that defied logic.Staying neutral would have been their most sensible option.

The Caliph After World War I

'Young Turk' (CUP) leaders, who had led Turkey into the disastrous War, fled intoexile on board a German gunboat. In July 1918 the wartime Caliph MehmetReshad, the nominee of the CUP leaders, was deposed and Mehmet Vahdettin(Mohammad Wahiduddin), was installed in his place. Friends of Britain were inthe driving seat again. The government was reshuffled and an armistice wassigned on 30th October. According to Aksin, 'In March 1919 Damad Ferid Pasha,the Grand Vezir, sent a message to the British to the effect that "their entire hope


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was in God and in England, that a certain amount of financial aid was a must andthat they were prepared to arrest anyone the British wanted".' 39

During the War Britain had directed all its anti-Turk propaganda against the Young

Turks (the CUP) but had spared the Caliph himself for they looked forward to thepossibility of having to co-operate with him again after the war. The decision tospare the Caliph, was based on the recognition of three facts. Firstly they knewthat the Caliph was merely a figurehead and that it was the CUP, the Young Turkleaders, who were responsible for going to War. Secondly, and even moreimportantly, the British who were confident of victory, knew that the sympathiesof the Caliph and the old ruling class in Turkey were wholeheartedly with themand would continue to remain with them. The British knew that the Caliph knew

that the British were his most reliable protectors. Thirdly, Britain was still lookingforward to the value of being able to exploit the Caliph's claim to be the religioushead of the entire 'Muslim World', as they had done successfully in the past. TheCaliph had been a valuable asset for the British in the past who, they thought, wasworth preserving.

When, at the end of the War, the Young Turk leaders fled precipitately into exile,there was a power vacuum which was instantly filled by the old ruling class with

the Caliph at their head. This suited the British. Their protg was in charge.Contrary to the Khilafatist's charges against it, Britain was fully committed, afterher victory in the war, to preserve the Caliphate, to protect the Caliph, and in sofar as it was possible, to reinforce his authority in Turkey and abroad. In accusingBritain of being hostile to their venerated Caliph, the Khilafatists were fighting animaginary enemy. The real threat to the Caliph came from the rise of the powerfulTurkish Republican Nationalism with its secular and democratic aspirations. TheKhilafatists, proved to be quite incapable of perceiving the nature and significance

of that historic conflict between the monarchical rule of the Caliph and thedemocratic aspirations of the Republican Nationalists. Paradoxically they glorifiedthe arch-adversary of the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal, whom they gave the title ofGhazi, while at the same time they also glorified their venerated Caliph. Theycould not see that these two represented irreconcilable forces in Turkish societyand politics. Their failure to comprehend this is quite incredible. When the


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denouement of the struggle between those mutually contradictory forces finallycame about, with the victory of Turkish Republican Nationalism and the end ofthe Caliphate, the Khilafatists were left totally bewildered, unable to comprehendthe news that came to them.

A new Turkish state was emerging in Anatolia, led by men who rejected outrightthe Treaty of Svres and the principles that underlay it. They condemned thoseTurks who had accepted it, as traitors. The Indian Khilafatists shed endless tearsover injustices of the Treaty of Svres. But they could not yet see that it was nottheir beloved Caliph but the forces of the Republican Nationalist opposition whosuccessfully repudiated it. They were too pre-occupied lamenting the 'fate of theCaliph' to see the Turkish reality as it was actally unfolding before their eyes. The

supine Caliph had acquiesced in the iniquitous Treaty of Svres, which had beeninspired by Lloyd George's prejudices. But, thanks to the power of the RepublicanNationalists the Treaty of Svres remained a dead letter until the victoriousnationalists later re-negotiated a fresh treaty at the Peace Conference thatopened at Lausanne on 20th November 1922. In the words of Lord Curzon(quoted by 'Maulana' Mohammad Ali) the Treaty of Svres was 'dictation of termsat the point of the Bayonet Only when the terms had been drawn up was thebeaten enemy admitted, to be told his sentence. Far otherwise was it atLausanne. There the Turks sat at the table on a footing of equality with all theother powers.' 40

British Intrigues With the CaliphOn 9th November 1918, with the Caliph and his coterie back in charge, Calthorpethe newly appointed British High Commissioner in Istanbul wrote to ForeignSecretary Lord Balfour: 'The Turkish Ministers will try to present themselves asgenuine friends of the British and will try to win you over.' 41He emphasised to

his Government that the Caliph was an important factor vis--vis the Muslimworld as a whole, as well as in Turkey itself. The Caliph, he wrote, was very eagerthat they, the British, 'should settle in Istanbul'.

With the backing of the British, the Caliph's government prepared to confront theremnants of the Young Turks and following that the emerging force of theRepublican Nationalists. From now on 'One of the first tasks of the Turkish Sultan


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and his ministers was to crush the remnants of the Young Turks' 43. The newRepublican Nationalist Movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, had tobe suppressed, decisively. For their part, the Nationalists were getting organisedfor action. By July 1919 Kemal convened a Congress of Delegates from everydistrict which laid the foundations of a popular Grand National Assembly whichbegan to function from April 1920, to preside over the liberation of Turkey fromdynastic rule. That brought alarm to the Allies as well as their protg the Caliph.By August 1919 a declaration known as the Milli Misak or the 'National Pact' wasissued. In September, at the Second Congress of the Republican NationalAssembly Mustafa Kemal was elected as Chairman. The nationalist struggle waswell and truly launched.

To forestall a possible nationalist coup against their friend the Caliph (who haddesperately been calling for their help) British forces entered the Turkish quarterof Istanbul on 16 March 1920 (18 months after the Caliph had been back inbusiness) and began to round up known nationalists. True to the time-honouredrole of mullahs in such situations the Sheikh-ul-Islam,Drrezad Abdullah Effendi,issued a fatwa, on the invitation of the Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Pasha, declaringthat killing of the nationalists was a religious duty of Muslims. 44 The target ofthat fatwa included Mustafa Kemal himself, against whom a sentence of deathwas already pronounced. The Indian Khilafatists who venerated the Caliph andglorified Kemal Attatrk at the same time, appear to have received this news inuncomprehending silence. Given the prevalence of nationalist influences in theTurkish Army the Caliph did not trust it. He therefore continued the disarming ofTurkish forces. 45 To forestall a popular revolt or a coup d'tat, the Caliph, withBritish help, organised an independent special force known as quwwa-indibatiye('force for discipline and control') to fight the nationalists. The nationalists,however, went from strength to strength.

Kemal on 'The Friends of England'

Confronted by Republican Nationalism, the Caliph turned to the British for hissurvival. Mustafa Kemal, in his remarkable retrospective '6 day speech' of October1927 spoke about a 'Society of the Friends of England' that was formed, as he putit, by some 'misguided' persons. He pointed out that: 'At the head of the Society


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were Vahdettin, who bore the title of Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, Damat FeridPasha (the Grand Vezir), Ali Kemal, Minister of the Interior ' (Kemal named otherleading figures of the ancien rgime). Kemal charged that the Society 'openlysought the protection of England ' , that 'it worked in secret', and that 'its real aimwas to incite the people to revolt by forming organisations in the Interior, toparalyse the National Conscience and encourage foreign countries to interfere.'

Kemal pointed out that: 'Without knowing it, the nation had no longer any one tolead it' 48 He continued, 'The Nation and the Army had no suspicion at all of thePadishah-Caliph's treachery.49 On the contrary, on account of religious andtraditional ties handed down for centuries, they remained loyal to the throne andits occupant. That the country could possibly be saved without a Caliph and

without a Padishah was an idea too impossible for them to comprehend.' Hecontinued: 'To labour for the maintenance of the Ottoman Dynasty and itssovereign would have been to inflict the greatest harm, to the Turkish nation. Wewere compelled to rebel against the Ottoman Government, against the Padishah,against the Caliph of all Mohamedans, and we had to bring the whole nation andthe army into a state of rebellion.' 50 Kemal made it clear that he had made adecision to get rid of the Caliph from the very start of the Republican Revolution,although prudence and tactical considerations dictated that the ground must beprepared for it before the Caliphate was ended, step by step. That was finallydone in 1924. He said: 'From the first I anticipated this historical progress. But Idid not disclose all of my views, although I have maintained them all of the timeThe only practical and safe road to success lay in dealing with each problem at theright time.' 51

Kemal's statement made it crystal clear that the Caliph was in league with theBritish and the European powers. The British for their part, banked on the Caliph

as a bulwark against the advancing forces of Turkish nationalism. Their own longterm interests lay in securing the Caliph in a position of authority in the Turkishstate to hold back the nationalists. This reality was only partly obscured by theextravagant and chauvinistic anti-Turk and pro-Greek rhetoric of Lloyd Georgeand Asquith, who had headed the War time Coalition government in Britain. Theywere both soon to be ousted with the fall of the Wartime Coalition Government


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and the formation of a Conservative Government under Bonar Law. The BonarLaw Government immediately reverted to Britain's time honoured policy vis--visTurkey and the Caliph, with the exception of its new plans, made in League withthe French, to carve up between themselves Turkish colonial possessions inArabia.

Arabia: A Change in British Geopolitical Priorities

The British were still interested in maintaining their friend the Ottoman Caliph atthe head of affairs in Turkey, if they could manage it. But the War had broughtabout a basic change in the historical reasons for British strategic support for theOttomans. Britain's centuries old alliance with Turkey had been founded onBritish fears about the threat of a southward drive of Czarist Russia. Until theWar, Ottoman Turkey was a bulwark against Russian southwards expansionism.The Communist Revolution of 1917 in Russia radically changed the strategic map.There was now an entirely new configuration of strategic calculations for theregion. One of the first things that the Soviets did after winning power was torenounce all unequal treaties with neighbouring states, which were a legacy fromthe Czarist days. They had no ambitions, nor indeed any capacity, for a drive tothe south. Britain no longer needed a strong Ottoman state as a bulwark against a

possible Russian threat, as it had needed hitherto. Its priorities changed.

The British and the French could now contemplate carving up the Arab colonies ofthe Ottomans between themselves. But Arab Nationalist Movements had alreadybegun make themselves felt, demanding their freedom from all colonial rule.However, sadly, the Turkish Republican Nationalists were no less committed tohold on to their Empire, in Arab lands, than the Caliphs before them. IndianKhilafatists slavishly followed Turkish slogans demanding preservation of Turkishcolonial rule over the Arabs, rather than take a principled stand on the questionof the right of the Arabs for national self- determination. The Arab territorieswere already under the de facto control of Britain and France. The IndianKhilafatists slogans therefore demanded re-imposition of Turkish colonialauthority rather than Arab freedom. They asked for restoration of Turkishcolonialism under the guise of a demand that Muslim holy places should remainunder Muslim rule. Arabs too were Muslims ! The Khilafat slogan on this was


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sheer humbug when seen against the struggles of the Arab people for their ownfreedom. Given the claim of the Khilafatists to be Indian nationalists, their standvis--vis Arab nationalism was quite shameful. But this was hardly surprising,coming from a movement that was dominated by the ignorant and bigoted IndianMuslim clergy and reactionary Ulama such as Azad.

The Indian Khilafatists' not only betrayed Arab Nationalism. In Turkey itself theirslogan for the authority of the Caliph to be preserved was also reactionary. Theywere asking for the preservation of an outmoded monarchy in the face of a risingtide of republican democracy. Their campaign was misconceived, based onignorance and prejudice and, founded on discredited interpretations of thesupposed religious role of the Caliph. Their perception of reality was twisted bythe distorting prism of their narrow dogmatic and utterly reactionary ideologyfashioned by the Muslim clergy and Ulama such as Azad.

The Caliph as Prisoner of the British !

The whole case of the Indian Khilafatists campaign was based on the charge thatafter the War the British held the Caliph 'captive', that they had undermined his

authority and threatened his existence. The reality, as we know, was exactly thereverse. The real threat to the Caliph came from the Republican Nationalists. Onthe other hand, the British were the Caliph's patrons and protectors-and theywere quite as hostile to the Nationalists as the Caliph was himself. How did theIndian Khilafatists come to hold such an upside-down view of the Turkish reality ?

Republican Nationalism was a direct threat to the Caliph for its aim was to put anend to monarchic rule under a Caliph. The British on the other hand wanted tokeep the Caliph. The British and the Caliph faced the threat of the RepublicanNationalists together. The Caliph had one weapon that he could deploy againstthe Republican Nationalists. That was Islamic ideology, of which he claimed to bethe guardian. The Caliph played the religious card for all it was worth. Hedenounced the Republican Nationalists as atheists and enemies of Allah and hisCaliph. By that he hoped to alienate the mass of the Turkish people from theRepublican Nationalist leadership.


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Despite their rapidly growing strength, the Republican Nationalists were as yet atan early stage of their great enterprise. They felt threatened by the Caliph's

campaign. They felt that they could not ignore it. As Kemal's speeches show, theyfeared that Islamic ideology could still be a powerful factor among the Turkishpeople and that the Caliph's propaganda might do their cause much harm. FerozAhmad commenting on this, writes: 'The nationalists took great pains to counterthe Caliph's religious propaganda, for they understood the powerful influence ofIslam in Turkish society. Their task became easier when Istanbul was occupied byAnglo-French forces. Now they could describe the Sultan-Caliph as the captive ofChristian powers, waiting to be liberated.' 52 These forces had entered Istanbul

on 16th March 1920, no less than 18 months after the end of the War, when theCaliph had got back in business in Istanbul. The Republican Nationalist counter-propaganda on this score did not have much ground to stand on. But it was anideological war. And any weapon that came to hand was welcome. British forcescame into Istanbul only when the Republican Nationalists were gaining ground. Itwas feared, not without reason, that there might be a Republican coup againstthe Caliph. After all, that is what they were fighting for. The British wanted topreserve and protect the Caliph, for he was their man. If it had been the intentionof the British to keep the Caliph as their 'captive' they would have moved in a yearand a half earlier.

Whatever the Turkish people themselves may have made of the RepublicanNationalists' defensive propaganda that the Caliph was a prisoner of the British,the leaders of the Indian Khilafat Movement seem to have swallowed it, hook,line and sinker. The liberation of the Caliph from the clutches of the Britishbecame their central slogan. Indeed that became theraison d'tre of their

campaign. These worldly wise leaders did not consider the possibility that theCaliph could actually be a willing collaborator with the British, acting in collusionwith the Western powers with whom he had common cause to make against theRepublican Nationalists. Nor was this a matter that could not have been easilyverified-it was important enough for them at least to have made an effort. Thiswas a simple matter. All that they needed to do was to send a delegation to


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Istanbul, to see things for themselves. They had extensive personal contacts at alllevels, amongst all groups, in Istanbul. They would have had no difficulty it gettingto the bottom of things if they had wanted to do so. But they did not do that.

One might suspect that they did not really want to get to the bottom of it, for thatwould have punctured the balloon of their Movement before it even got off theground. The Maulanas and mullahs behind the campaign needed the Movementfor its own sake. Whatever it may or may not have done for their revered Caliph,it was doing a lot for them. The campaign was lifting them up to the forefront ofIndian Muslim politics, for a while totally eclipsing secular educated Muslimleadership. Because of the Khilafat Movement the Indian Muslim clergy was ablesecure a legitimate place for itself in the political arena and masquerade as men

with a nationalist conscience. In the process they also built up a politicalorganisation in the form of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind.

Indian Khilafatists and Turkish Reality

The Indian Khilafatists could not comprehend the significance of the forces thatwere reshaping Turkey and the momentous changes that were in train. Abbasi, anUrdu journalist and a leading participant in the Khilafat Movement, for example,explains Turkish politics of that period in terms of purely personal differences andintrigues. 53 He praises Mustafa Kemal as a great Ghazi, for victories againstGreeks, but also bemoans the fate of the Caliph. Abbasi goes on to write that'Mustafa Kemal challenged theKhalifat-e-Muslmeen and the Sultan foundhimself to be helpless. At last he complained to his Western Masters (aqayan-firang) But they were not prepared to take any decisive step against theRepublican Movement.' 54That statement by an important figure in the KhilafatMovement exemplifies their confusion and utter lack of comprehension of eventsin Turkey. It is sad to see a leading Indian Khilafatist, a champion of the cause ofanti-colonialism, actually bemoan the fact that the British did not interveneagainst the Turkish nationalists and resolve the Khalifa's 'helplessness' ! Abbasi'scontradictory posture was by no means unique. It reflects the widely heldattitudes of the Indian Khilafatists and their inability to understand the forces thatwere at work in Turkey and historic struggles that were reshaping it. At no pointdid they reflect on the significance of the Republican Nationalist Movement and


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ask themselves whether their own Movement on behalf of the Caliph had notbeen overtaken by events.

It is not surprising that the Government of India was not only tolerant but even

supportive of the Khilafat Movement. Until the launching of Gandhi's Civil-disobedience Movement (quite a different kind of issue) the British responded tothe Khilafat Movement in quite good humour. It is not without significance that itwas at the time when the Khilafat Movement had only just begun to gather steamthat the colonial government released from war-time detention Mohammad Ali,Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and Zafar Ali Khan, who were leading and effectivefigures of the Movement. In the post-war situation their pro-Caliph sympathieswere no longer a threat to British interests, but quite the contrary.

Nothing reveals the stance of the Government of India vis--vis the Khilafatistsmore clearly than its decision to finance a Khilafat delegation to go to Europe toplead their case. In January 1920 a Khilafat delegation, led by Dr. Ansari, met theViceroy, Lord Chelmsford, who promised them every assistance. A telling 'pettydetail' arising out of it is that, following the meeting, Shaukat Ali wrote a letter on20th January 1920 to an official, Mr. Maffey, requesting the Government of Indiato provide five first class return tickets for the Khilafat delegation to go to England

to plead the Khilafat cause before the British public and parliament and the PeaceConference in Paris-a curious request from champions of a supposedly Anti-Colonial Movement to their colonial masters ! The Secretary to the HomeDepartment of the Government of India immediately cabled the Government ofBombay asking them to arrange the passages accordingly, emphasising its politicalimportance. 55 This is a clear illustration of the fact that the Government of Indiadid not see the Khilafat Movement as a dangerous anti-colonial movement,hostile towards the British Empire. British repression was let loose only later with

the launching of the Congress Civil Disobedience Movement, when appeals weremade, by some individuals, to Muslims not to serve in the British army. Thatindeed was a threat to British Imperial interests. But those appeals were born outof the Congress Civil Disobedience movement and were disowned by someKhilafat leaders.


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The Khilafat Movement has been idealised as an anti-colonial movement. But themain 'achievement' of the Movement was the turning away of Indian Muslimsfrom a secular understanding of politics, towards a religious and communalistone. It has left a legacy of political activism of the Muslim clergy that bedevilsIndian and Pakistani politics to this day. One final irony of it is that the Movementbetrayed both Turkish Nationalism and also Arab Nationalism.Unfortunately MrGandhi's leadership of the Movement has led Indian Nationalist scholars toacclaim the Movement and Gandhi's role in it, uncritically. On the other hand,Jinnah (who in the present writer's view, has been accused, quite inaccurately ofbeing a 'communalist leader' rather than one with a secular outlook) gotphysically beaten up by 'Maulana' Shaukat Ali for opposing that atavistic religiousmovement, which has had such a major negative impact on Indian (and Pakistani)Muslim political thought. Finally, the Khilafat Movement laid the foundations ofpolitical leadership of the Muslim clergy, for which it was to be acclaimed byIslamic ideologists !

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