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Page 1: Jomini : STRATEGIST

BARON ANTOINE-HENRI DE JOMINIContinental Strategy

Seminar Alpha

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SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

Background

Key Concepts of Jomini to Continental Strategy

Jomini’s Ideas and their Validation on the Nature of Warfare

Contributions in Advancing Strategic Art: Its Formulation and Practice

Other Significant Information that Impact the Conduct of Warfare

Conclusion

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BACKGROUND

Swiss general and military writer

General in the French and later the Russian service, and

One of the most celebrated writers on the Napoleonic Art of War

Organized the militia of the Helvetic Republic ib 1799

After 1804 served as staff officer in the French Army

After a clash with Marshal Berthier in Aug 1813, he defected to the Russian Army

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BACKGROUND

THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY

"That strategy is the key to warfare; that all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and that these principles perscribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory."

-JOMINI-

Rose to high rank in Russia, becoming a celebrated Authority on Strategy

His works include:

Campaigns of Frederick the Great;

Treatise on Grand Military Operations;

the French Revolutionary Wars; and

The Art of War.

Emphasized the capture of major points and the importance of superior numbers and lines of operation, and

he advocated the employment of speed and maneuver

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KEY CONCEPTS

Jomini’s views, like Clausewitz, strongly influenced by Napoleonic wars and Prussian military doctrine.

The French revolutionized warfare and enjoyed unprecedented results. Command was decentralized, the force was largely conscripted, and power, political and military, was vested in one leader.

Napoleon, influenced by Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar, was convinced that it was important to totally destroy the enemy through massed concentration of force.

THOUGHTS ON WAR

“In all military operations there is always some imperfection or weak point; but in judging operations we must apply principles with the objective in mind, and ask whether a given operation offers the best chance for victory”

-JOMINI-

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KEY CONCEPTS

Strategy Tactics, & LogisticsFundamental Principles of War

SimplicityMass & ConcentrationOffensive actionDecisive pointsInterior and Exterior LinesSpeed and ManeuverEconomy of ForceLeadershipTheater of Operation

-JOMINI-

Acquisition of territory is secondary

Observation of Napoleon's battle strategy strongly influenced Jomini's theory and became the foundation of his greatest work, 1836's Precis de l'art de la guerre, The Art of War, written to provide military instruction for the Grand Duke of Russia, the future Nicholas I.

Jomini believed after the age of Napoleon, war would no longer be considered the private affair of individual monarchs; instead it would be waged nation against nation.

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KEY CONCEPTS

Precis defined for the first time 3 main categories of military activity - strategy, tactics, and logistics - and postulated "Fundamental Principle of War"

His works - oriented toward a common theme:

conduct of war governed by fixed principles

the most important were:

1. one should seek a line of operations capable of threatening the communications of the enemy while protecting one's own; and

2. Key to victory lay in massing one's forces at what he famously called ‘the decisive point’.

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KEY CONCEPTS

1. To maneuver the mass of the army, successively upon decisive points of a theater of war, and attack the enemy's lines of communication as frequently as possible while still protecting one’s own;

2. To quickly maneuver and engage fractions of the enemy's army with the majority of one's own;

3. To focus the attack on a "decisive point," such as weak or undefended areas in the enemy lines; and

4. To economize own force on supporting attacks so that the focus of effort could attack surprise the decisive point at the proper time with sufficient force.

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KEY CONCEPTS

Use of turning movement and hot pursuit/exploitation

Leadership as a prime requirement for military success

A winning general would be the combination of intellect and natural leadership.

Simplicity and praised the Napoleonic strategy of a quick victory gained by quickly massing troops, and the objective of capturing capital cities as a signal of defeat.

Reduce War to its Fundamental Combinations

“All Strategic combinations are faulty if they do not conform to operating with the greatest possible force in a combined effort against the decisive point”

-JOMINI-

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KEY CONCEPTS

Early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation."

Cared little for political niceties of war; in his view govts choose the best commander possible, then free that person to wage war as he deems appropriate.

Maxim’s usefulness depends on the degree one is capable of finding this decisive point.

Military/Government Relationship

“A government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles. Governments should not neglect their armed forces, but they must not meddle in matters that only educated and experienced officers understand”

-JOMINI-

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

Jomini's 25 translated works, influenced military leaders in both Europe and North America for much of the 19th century.

Sought to codify the basic tenets of modern war in terms of a small number of timeless principles.

Stressed the following:advantages of fighting on interior lines;

maintaining secure communications while seeking to attack those of the enemy;

concentrating one's forces at what he called “the decisive point.”

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

Stressed the following:

His work suggested that the chaos and uncertainty of war could be mastered by means of a positivistic social science, and

the precise mental habits and systematic approach of the engineer and the industrial manager could find a use on the battlefield.

His ideas permeated the curriculum of the USMA in the antebellum era, and shaped the basic outlook of officers on both sides of the Civil War.

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

No modern army could dispense the enduring Principles of War for the conduct of operations and the education of officers.

In this respect, Jomini remains among the most influential of modern military theorists.

However, recent scholars have viewed Jomini as a chronicler of pre-modern warfare.

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

As a military strategist, often compared with Prussian contemporary Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), and his 1833 treatise Vom Kriege (On War).

Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini was vague on the importance of genius. Like Clausewitz, however, his focus remained on the Napoleonic "great battle" rather than the more modern war of multiple armed encounters.

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

In his time, Jomini had a much greater impact on doctrine than Clausewitz-

the American Civil War strategies employed by both sides were heavily influenced by Jominian theory.

Alfred Thayer Mahan uses Jomini's concept of land warfare to build his conception of naval strategy.

Modern operational art owes much to Jomini's tactical and operational thinking.

Jomini, a practical-minded soldier from a victorious French empire, offered more proscriptive insights than Clausewitz, a philosophical and abstract soldier from the defeated Prussian forces.

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

JOMINI vs CLAUSEWITZ

SIMILARITIES

Areas Jomini“The Art of War”

Clausewitz“On War”

Influence on war strategy

Influenced by Napoleonic wars and Prussian military doctrine

Historical Interest Campaigns of Frederick the Great

Known Written Works Read each other’s books.

Generalships Both attained

CareersDisenchanted with situation and accepted appointments to the Russian Army

Total Victory Only achieved thru attack

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

JOMINI vs CLAUSEWITZ

DIFFERENCES

AreasJomini

“The Art of War”Clausewitz

“On War”

Mentor/SupporterGeneral Henry Lloyd / General

Ney, influential leader in the French Army

• Gerhard von Scharnhost, a prominent Prussian Army General

Known WorksTreatise on Grand Military

Operations and Précis of the Art of War

• On War

On War and Politics

Little concern with political implications / A govt should choose its ablest mil comdr, then leave him free to wage war accdg to scientific principles

• War is an extreme but natural extension of political policy -- Ultimate tool of diplomacy / "War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means"

View of history Static and simplistic• In relative terms, rejecting

absolute categories, standards, and values

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

JOMINI vs CLAUSEWITZ

DIFFERENCES

AreasJomini

“The Art of War”Clausewitz

“On War”

Views on War

Scientific Enterprise / Chaos & Uncertainty of war could be mastered by means of positivistic social science / “winnable war”

• a violent clash of wills, driven by deep springs of political and social energy

Views on War “Extol the Napoleonic model of

massing, attacking, and quickly winning decisive victories."

• Concept of fog and friction in conjunction with individual genius will make the difference

Views on WarLines of Operation / Identify

decisive point and attack

• Concept of purpose, objectives, and means employed / Concentric attacks / Concept of the "culminating point of victory" and not overextending during the attack

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

JOMINI vs CLAUSEWITZ

DIFFERENCES

AreasJomini

“The Art of War”Clausewitz

“On War”

Views on WarWar as a "great drama," a stage

for heroes and military geniuses

• Trinity of War composed of violence & passion; uncertainty, chance, & probability / Enter into the mindsets and attitudes of a given period / "spirit of the age"

Views on War

Fundamentally unchanging phenomenon, modified only by superficial matters (list of dramatis personae, technology, & transient political motivations

• War can vary in its forms depending on the changing nature of policy and society within which it is waged.

Sea Power Partially considered• Not considered / but his

theories are easily adaptable to a total force concept.

Criticism Ideas as lacking flexibility, human

factor and too mechanical• Failure to address the ethical

considerations of war

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VALIDATION OF JOMINI’S IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF WARFARE

In general, most of what Jomini had contributed that was of real value were absorbed and written in practical doctrine while Clausewitz‘s, have not.

Given the brilliance and subtlety of Clausewitz's concepts, it is hard to see them as "conventional wisdom."

Jomini is important in a purely historical sense but in cultivating one’s understanding of war, past, present, and future, one must turn to Clausewitz

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CONTRIBUTIONS IN ADVANCING STRATEGIC ART

Antoine-Henri Jomini was credited with the title of founder of modern strategy, though uncertain in the point of view of some modern military analysts.

However, it cannot be denied that he defined the Principle of War whose concepts have survived up to this day and relate the three (3) main categories of military activity - strategy, tactics, and logistics – in warfare.

A good example of his theories’ enduring application is the US Army’s application of his concepts in the operational and tactical levels of war.

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CONTRIBUTIONS IN ADVANCING STRATEGIC ART

Although the U.S. Army presents itself as a Clausewitzian organization, at the tactical and operational levels however, it remains more firmly rooted in the ideals of Jomini.

Jomini’s scientific approach that espouses the collective genius of good staff work and the military decision-making process (MDMP) rather than the singular genius of mil comdr embraced by Clausewitz;

Link from Jomini’s Fundamental Principle of War - the U.S. Army’s reliance on mass, offensive, maneuver, and economy of force

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CONTRIBUTIONS IN ADVANCING STRATEGIC ART

Advocacy on the “offensive-defensive”, analogous to the Army’s mobile defense. Though Clausewitz also advocate offensive strategy, he was not to the same refinement as Jomini. Clausewitz relied more on maximum exertion of forces while Jomini required focus of strength at the decisive point.

US reliance on decisive points and the scientific application of military theory to provide the commander with solutions to problems in war

Espousal of Lines of Operation.

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CONTRIBUTIONS IN ADVANCING STRATEGIC ART

MDMP’s systemic approach to problem solving relies on simple rules governing the movement of forces, synchronization of their effects, and the discerned application of maximum power at decisive points on the battlefield. (Clarity and optimism that war can be controlled and the studious theoretician can master the application of violence)

Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrate the Army’s desire to conform to a linear, contiguous battle space concept.

The Army’s optimistic approach to combat operations, Jomini’s “Winnable War.”

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars revolutionized military strategy. Their impact was still felt in the American Civil War and the early phases of World War I.

With the advent of cheap small arms and rise of the drafted citizen soldier, armies grew rapidly in size to become massed formations.

Necessitated dividing the army into divisions and later into corps. Along with divisions came divisional artillery; light-weight, mobile and with great range and firepower.

The rigid formations of pikemen and musketeers firing massed volleys gave way to light infantry fighting in skirmish lines.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

Napoleon I of France and the "strategy of annihilation" to achieve decision in battle, with the sole aim of destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior maneuver. (As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures.)

In the Industrial Age, the evolution of military strategy continued in the American Civil War (1861-65). The practice of strategy was advanced by generals such as Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, all of whom had been influenced by the feats of Napoleon.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

However, the adherence to the Napoleonic principles in the face of technological advances such as the long-range infantry rifle led to disastrous consequences.

Time and space in war also changed. Railroads enabled swift movement of large forces but the maneuvering was constrained to narrow, vulnerable corridors. Steam power and ironclads changed transport and combat at sea.

In the 100 years, which passed between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the next general European war, things had changed considerably.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

A major lesson from Napoleonic Wars was the importance of the decisive battle, but the generals of World War I were unable to achieve it.

Indecisive fighting led to prolonged static warfare.

Jomini’s definition of strategy as the “art of making war upon the map,” seemed inadequate.

The armies were so large it was impossible for tactics alone to crush the enemy and achieve strategic aims. (Waterloo - 140,000 men faced each other, by 1914 a combined total of 3.3 million men struggled in the Battle of the Frontiers in France.

At the end of the Great War, military thinkers began to ponder the new lessons of warfare.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

The aftermath of World War I helped them understand the impact of expanded battlefield, industrialization, and mass armies.

Old framework of strategy and tactics was inadequate for the new changes.

This was the genesis of operational art in the industrial age and the foundation of new strategies and concepts adaptive to the new technological developments and approaches to warfare.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IMPACT THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE

Nevertheless, the following are principles of war that have survived and continued until the 21st Century that has bearing on Jominian thoughts, theories, and practices:

Objective and Offensive (taking the initiative),

Unity of Command / Unity of Effort,

focus on Mass and Concentration,

Economy of Force / Economy of Effort,

Maneuver,

Simplicity (Clarity),

Surprise, and

Security.

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CONCLUSION

In general, Jomini’s works on the Art of War has continued even to the modern age though development in military strategy due to the evolving changes in warfare methodologies, the advent of sea and air power, technological advancements, among others have provided corresponding variations in strategy.

Nevertheless, war principles such as offense, mass and concentration, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity, among others became one of the foundations where modern warfare has taken its roots.

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CONCLUSION

Jomini like Clauswitz, took no credit for uniqueness; the “truths” of his view of war had already been demonstrated by the great Commanders. He was “simply” the “first” to systematize and codify what they had done.

Much of what Jomini wrote has been passé by technological advances, but his analytical methodology and his thoughts on the strategic and policy level still have applicability.

There is no such thing as the single greatest strategist – each has made his own input to the total body of strategic contemplation

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End of PresentationGood day!