Father and Ford Revisited: Gender, Class and Employment Change in the NewMillennium

Linda McDowell

Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 26, No. 4. (2001), pp.448-464.

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Father and Ford revisited: gender, class and employment change in the new millennium

Linda McDowell

In the last decade in Britain the combination of women's continued entry into the labour market and the restructuring of welfare provision has exacerbated the growing demands on individuals and households in their allocation of time between productive and reproductive labour and the contradictions between the two spheres, as well as time and income inequalities between the rich and the poor. Since the election of the new Labour government in 1997, the concept of work/life balance, as well as a range of other policies to address these divisions have been introduced. This paper addresses the nature of the changes in the last decade, through the perspective of gender and class divisions and critically assesses key debates about the changing nature of working life as well as current policy provisions to support the increasing individualization of employment.

key words Britain work employment gender class work/life balance

Department of Geography, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WClH OAP email: l.mcdowell@ucl.ac.uk

revised manuscript received 30 July 2001

Introduction What I want to do here is to reflect on the changes in the last ten years, looking both at

Ten years ago I published a paper in the T Y ~ ~ z s -material changes and contemporary theoretical nctzons (McDowell 1991) in which I argued that the debates, as well as the implications of the election post-fordist compact in the UK was potentially of a new Labour government in 1997 and again in unstable because the decline of state provision in 2001. Despite the optimism felt by many on the left the sphere of reproduction coupled with women's at the defeat of the right, the first Blair government, growing labour market participation had increased by and large, has been a disappointment and social the total workload of most women. I also argued, and income inequalities have widened rather however, that there were growing differences than closed, despite new policies to address child opening up between women, as the living poverty. In its first four years, new Labour formed standards of women in professional occupations, a government that combined the rhetoric of social especially as members of high and dual income democracy with neo-liberal policies, especially in households, far exceeded those of women in cleri- the welfare sphere. It both encouraged women to cal and bottom end service sector employment. I enter the labour market and also, at least in the argued that for these women and for men in the first term, continued the Thatcherite policies of same class position, relative inequality appeared to restraints on public spending and reduction in be increasing and thus that the connections welfare costs (although policies are set to change between class and gender divisions were taking to some degree since the election to a second new and more complex forms. term in June 2001: both public expenditure and

Tvnlzs Jnst Bv Geogr I\jS 26 448-464 2001 ISSN 0020-2754 0Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2001

Fnt l~rraizd Ford vcvls~ted

privatization is planned to increase and to be extended into a range of social and welfare services including education and the health service). As I pointed out ten years ago, these policies are con- tradictory. The questions that I raised then about how reproductive labour is to be organized, if women are increasingly required to participate in waged labour and to replace previously state-provided services through their own labour or through purchase in market have become even more urgent.

This paper will examine these questions in a number of steps. First evidence about the nature of material changes in the division of labour in the workplace over the last decade will be examined, looking at changing gender divisions and the growth of inequalities between individuals and households. The extent to which these changing patterns have been encouraged or facilitated by policy shifts, especially the growing reliance on workfare programmes to increase overall partici- pation rates, will then be addressed. In the second major section, parallel changes in theoretical debates about the nature of work in contemporary industrial societies and its associations with the social construction of gendered identities will be analpsed. Here arguments about the impacts of restructuring, casualization, flexibility and de-traditionalization on social divisions and indi-vidual and group identities in post modern or risk societies will be explored, through the lens of the transformation of class and gender relations. In the final substantive section of the paper, the impli- cations of recent and proposed policy initiatives to facilitate the combination of waged and repro- ductive labour in circumstances where women's continued participation in the labour market is taken for granted will be examined, drawing out the continuing contradictions for many women and for social policy provision.

Changing gender divisions of labour in the workplace One of the most noticeable features of the last decade is that the rise in women's labour market participation rates has continued. Indeed, in the main, the 1990s were a decade of labour market expansion and increased rates of participation for most individuals, although not all. By the start of the new millennium, 75 per cent of the total UK

population of working age was in employment which is the highest participation rate in western Europe and higher than in the USA. Currently, 70 per cent of women of working age are employed compared to 80 per cent of men. One of the most interesting features of women's participation is that since 1991 the particular life cycle pattern of participation that distinguished women employees from men has virtually disappeared (Gregg and Wadsworth 1999), although, as I argue later, the distinct gender differences in, for example, pay rates and in hours worked that have long distin- guished wlomen's labour market participation remain. Until recently, however, a graph of wonl- en's participation rates by age was distinct from that of men's. It was marked by two peaks of high participation - among young women until their mid twenties, after which rates declined to peak again by about the age of 40. At the present time, however, this line is now almost flat, paralleling the pattern for men, with no distinction by age or status between women except for a decline after age 50. Thus, the pattern now7 mirrors that of men's participation, but about 10 per cent below it. The most significant changes in women's participation then, which have been evident since 1975, but especially noticeable since 1991, have been for women in their thirties with dependent children.

Part of the explanation for women's rising par- ticipation rates lies in the continued growth of service sector employment where there has been the expansion of a range of jobs and occupations regarded as particularly appropriate for women's skills - in a wide range of 'servicing' occupations at the bottom end of the labour market. But women have also been moving into professional services in growing numbers, reflecting their success in gaining educational and professional credentials. Young women's achievement now surpasses that of young men of the same age in the examinations that mark the end of compulsory schooling. By the middle of the decade, for example, in England and Wales, 49 per cent of girls aged 16 achieved five or more A-C grades GCSEs (regarded as good passes in the basic school-leaving certificate) compared with 40 per cent of boys, and, significantly, girls now out-perform boys in science, maths and tech- nology at age 16, although by the age of 18, in the Advanced Level examinations, the traditional gen- dered subject biases remain in place. However, more girls than boys now stay in education until they are 18 years old - 74 per cent compared with

68 per cent - and similar percentages of young men and young women now enter British universities as undergraduates, although young men con-tinue to dominate lower level vocational courses (McConville 1998). Young women, however, are now in the majority among students taking professional courses such as law, accountancy and medicine in many British universities.

It seems not unreasonable to expect that women's improved educational position and their possession of vocational skills should be reflected in financial remuneration and in a closing of the persistent gender gap between women's and men's pay rates. In a comparison of data from the mid 1980s and mid 1990s, Green et a1 (1998) found that whereas the average gross hourly pay of men was 1.55 times that of women in 1986, by 1997, the gap had narrowed to 1.42, concluding 'that women's job skills appear to be converging on those of men is consistent with the long-term narrowing of the male/female wage differential, and is further evi- dence of the increasing integration of women in the modern economy' (Green e f a1 1998 103). Although there has been a large and persistent sex differen- tial in pay in Britain throughout the twentieth century -women's pay was between half and two thirds that of men's based on adult full-time hourly earnings without overtime until the 1970s - it began to close in the post-Fordist era. When the Equal Pay legislation of the early 1970s was enforced, women's pay as a percentage of men's for full-time work rose from 64 per cent in 1970 to 74 per cent in 1976. However, the differential remained stubbornly stuck at this level for a dec- ade, reflecting persistent by vertical segregation within specific occupations, but it began a slow rise in late 1980s onwards - 77 per cent in 1989, to 80 per cent in 1995 where it has since remained. As part of the explanation for this reduction lies in the growth of poorly paid employment undertaken by men, the overall reduction does not necessarily indicate gains for women. However, the introduc- tion of the minimum wage in 1998 has benefited many previously exceptionally poorly paid women workers and it may be that the gap %rill begin to close again.

More optimist commentators, including Green et al,have begun to suggest that gender is becoming less significant as a dimension of differentiation in labour market inequality, as processes of de- segregation of occupations occur, loosening the boundaries between men's work and women's

Linda McDoii~ell

work, especially in the professions as women begin to make inroads into higher-paid occupations (Crompton 1997; Crompton et a1 1998; Jacobs 1999). However, a closer examination of pay differentials leads to less sanguine conclusions about growing equality. When the overall income distribution (including benefits as n7ell as earned income) for all adults is examined, more than half of all men fall into the top two quintiles and more than half of all women into the bottom two (Cabinet Office 1999). In a careful examination of income data for differ- ent occupations, Hakim (1996) has shown that, in full-time employment, women's earnings com-pared to men's are actually lower in the occu-pations where gender desegregation is most advanced. The gender pay gap is least evident in those occupations where women dominate, repre- senting more than 55 per cent of the workforce. However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the overall levels of pay are lowest in these female dominated occupations. It seems, therefore, that there is still a persistent binary distinction that operates in men's favour between men and women who are employed on a full-time basis in the British labour market.

The most marked gender difference, however, is in hours of employment. Despite the rise in non- standard patterns of work in the new flexible post-Fordist economy, standard full-time jobs still significantly outnumber non-standard contracts (by two to one for all employees in the mid 1990s) (Bradley et nl 2000) and it is men who dominate here. Despite a small rise, from a low basis, in the numbers of men working non-standard hours, at the end of the 1990s, three out of four men still worked on a full-time basis (some of whom work shifts or other forms of 'less standard', that is not nine to five, hours) compared to less than half of all employed women. Further, the 5.5 million part- timer workers currently in employment - almost all of whom are women - account for only 10 per cent of all hours worked (self-employed workers account for a further 15 per cent) and their rates of reward are low compared to men in full-time work at 61p for every £1.

These gendered patterns are, however, intercut by class distinctions, which are related to edu- cational credentials. Full-time work for women is astonishingly strongly class differentiated. Where- as 65 per cent of women in professional and managerial occupations work full-time, only 6 per cent of women in unskilled jobs do so, opening up

Father and Ford rev~s~ted a significant gap between women in their life chances. Conversely part-time work rises from 16 per cent to 57 per cent as women's occupational grade declines and so too, although to a lesser extent, does economic activity. These patterns are reflected by growing differentials between women in terms of rates of pay. In their inter-decennial comparison, Green ef al(1998) found clear evidence of increasing inequality zuiflzin each gender group as measured by the ratio of the ninetieth to the tenth percentiles of income distributions. Inequal- ity rose between 1986 and 1997 from 3.17 to 3.40 for men and even more sharply from 2.67 to 3.30 among women. Based on a shorter run of figures, I argued that there was evidence for a similar pat- tern in the early 1990s (McDowell 1991), and both sets of evidence of growing inequality within genders are substantiated by Gallie et al's (1998) recent large scale analyses. Burchell and Rubery (1994) have also noted growing inequalities between men and between women in the labour market. Thus, it is clear that there is a complex pattern of gender and class recomposition occur-ring in the shift to a service dominated economy and a labour market distinguished by the growing participation of women.

For men, however, the 1990s have seen a differ- ent pattern. Indeed, over the last two decades, the overall participation rates of men of working age have declined from 91 per cent in 1979 to 84 per cent by the end of the 1990s, an absolute decline of 3.5 million men in waged work. The fall has been particularly noticeable for men over 50, whose average participation rates now match those for women of their age, leading to the Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, in a speech in April 1999, to identify men aged between 50 and 65 as 'a lost generation', the victims both of corporate delayering and down sizing and the continuing decline of male-dominated manufacturing indus- tries. While middle class men affected by restruc- turing may register as unemployed and continue to actively seek work, many of the men in the former heavy industrial areas of the country have regis- tered as unfit for work, through sickness or dis- ability, thus disguising the actual rates of unemployment among late middle-aged men (Beatty and Fothergill 1999~1, b; Beatty et a1 2000). Because of the way in which the British benefits system operates, the wives/partners of these unemployed or disabled former workers may also withdraw from the labour market, thus widening

the gap between the growing number of dual income households and those with no employed household member (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996).

Women's growing participation has also had uneven effects on households, especially in class terms. Although feminists have long argued that it is important not to assume that earners share their income equitably between all household members (Pahl 1989), it is important to recognize that house- holds with dual or multiple earners, in most cases, will have a higher overall standard of living than those with a single income and, almost inevitably, than those with no earned income. Class, marriage or cohabitation patterns and women's work histo- ries appear to be inter-connected. Women who work continuously in full-time jobs not only tend themselves to hold higher status jobs than other women but also to be partnered by men in high status employment. The reverse pattern also holds. Women who break their working lives and return to part-time employment not only have poorer employment prospects themselves but their male partners are also lower in the occupational hier- archy (McRae 1991; Brannen et nl1994). The overall effect of women's growing participation in the labour market and these class differentiated pat- terns on overall income distributions and patterns of inequality is, however, unclear. Whilst the Borrie Commission (1994) in its report on social justice argued that the rise of dual income house-holds was exacerbating inequality in Britain, the Rowntree Report on Income and Wealth (1995) suggested to the contrary that the rising partici- pation of women had to some extent reduced income inequalities. The wages of middle class women, in particular, when added to their part- ners' income, reduced the extent of inequalities between the very richest households and the rest.

How is this related to overall patterns of income inequality which have changed significantly over the last 20 years? In 1997 there were twice as many people with incomes below half the national average (when the average weekly earnings were £367.6) than there were at the end of the 1970s. One of the main reasons was the rise of the number of workless households in the 1980s which has decreased somewhat in the 1990s but a key part of changing patterns of income inequality lies in the fact that there are also now more two-earner households and fewer single earner households than in the past. In the 1980s, 80 per cent of the new part-time jobs went to married women and a

woman married to an employed man was almost three times more likely to be in a job herself as a woman married to an unemployed man (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996,1999). Thus in the 1980s and into the 1990s, there was an increase in poverty among low-income workless households, driven by increases in male unemployment and inactivity rates and among lone parent households which increased in number over these decades, thus exac- erbating a polarization of families with children into 'work rich' and work poor' households. The latter depend in the main on state benefits and the rise in their value failed to keep pace with the growth in average incomes in the 1980s and 1990s.

There was also an increase in the inequality in the distribution of earnings itself as earnings rose faster for those at the top than at the bottom of the income distribution. This effect was exacerbated by changes in the structure of direct taxation between 1979 and 1992 and, since 1997, in indirect taxation which is regressive. In the four years since 1997, despite some progressive changes in benefits and credits for the working poor, the post-tax income gap between the rich and the poor began to expand again, after some slight reduction in inequality under the Conservative governments led by John Major, and was as wide at the end of the decade as at the beginning. According to the Office of National Statistics, in 2000 the poorest fifth of UK households had 6 per cent of national income after tax, while the top fifth had 45 per cent. While many of these poorest households are outside the labour market, in the main excluded by age and/or dis- ability, for the majority of the working age popu- lation, as I demonstrated earlier, labour market participation is increasing and earned incomes are a crucial part of access to decent living standards.

Workfare programmes - the individualization of waged workers The rising rates of labour market participation have been facilitated since 1997 by a government that has bought into the workfare ideal. Waged work is increasingly regarded as central to individuals' standard of living, to their status as citizens and to their self-respect, almost without regard to their other circumstances: older people are expected to continue to work - a current target, for example, is to increase the labour market participation rates of older men - at present only

Table I Government targets for jobs growth

Tnrget group Niilwber o$ ni,io jobs r1.y tiire~i

1.Parents into jobs 1,500,000 2. Disabled people into jobs 900,000 3. Men aged 50+ back into jobs 750,000 4. Ethnic minorities into jobs 100,000

Source: Institute of Public Policy Research, 2000, unpublished discussion document

two-thirds of men aged between 50 and 65 are currently in employment, which as I noted above is a trend that runs counter to the general rise in participation rates. Mothers of dependent children are also now expected to work, although currently only half of all lone parents are employed. How- ever, the second term Blair government set in its election manifesto a target of 70 per cent of all single parents in employment by 2004, and cuts in the state benefits payable to lone mothers without employment was one of the first and most despi- cable actions of the first new Labour government. The other group whose participation rates are rising to previously unsurpassed levels is students: most students in full-time higher education in the UK now have to engage in waged work as the inadequate loans that have replaced maintenance grants barely cover term time costs, let alone the costs of independent living in the vacations. There are also growing numbers of school students in employment (Lucas 1997; Mizen et nl 1999): a key group in the casualized labour force in low income service employment. Government targets are now set to 'encourage' recalcitrant and less able people into work and more jobs will be needed for them if these targets are to be achieved, as Table I illustrates. It shows the number of jobs that will be required if the groups identified there are to approach general participation rates within the next three years.

To facilitate rising participation rates, new work- fare programmes, often based on US initiatives, have been adopted to ensure that the people are 'work-ready': able to fill in forms, produce a cur- riculum vitae, and present themselves appropri- ately at a job interview. However, at present the New Deal and other workfare schemes concentrate on improving the quality of the labour supply tl~rough training in the main with little attention given to job creation (Peck 1998, 1999, 2000; Peck

Father and Ford revisited

and Theodore 1998). As Turok and Edge (1999) have documented there is a jobs' deficit in most of Britain's largest urban conurbations and, unless policies address this deficit, the ideal of partici- pation in employment for almost every adult in Britain aged between 18 and 65 as a central plank of employment and welfare policy in the UK will be impossible to achieve.

But it is not only the jobs deficit is certain parts of the country that is problematic. The implications for participation in reproductive labour are also immense. As feminists have long argued this labour is an essential part of the total amount of work undertaken in any economy and it is, more- over, carried out in the main by women - the very group for ~7hom, as I have just documented, obli- gations in the labour market are increasing. The growing emphasis on labour market participation for almost every adult is, of course, a remarkable change of emphasis in Government policy. There has been a shift from the notion of the wage earner - the breadwinner - as part of a household, a person (almost always a man) with dependants for whom he has to provide, to the worker as an individual. Throughout most of the twentieth cen- tury, except in periods of national emergency, the aim u7as to restrict complete or permanent access to the labour market for many women, in the main married women, in order to maintain the gender division of labour established under industrial capitalism in previous centuries in which many women undertook the most of the necessary work of daily and generational reproduction for 'love'. Two reminders from different dates in the last century are sufficient illustration of this earlier governmental reasoning. At the beginning of the last century, for example, the government, anxious about the appalling physical health of working class men that had been revealed during the Boer War, hoped to encourage women to leave the labour market or, indeed, never to enter it and so to aspire to higher standards of domestic care in order to raise living standards for men and children. Thus, in an inquiry into the conditions of family life in the midland Potteries district, published in 1904, this splendid argument about young women is to be found:

At thirteen years of age the majority of these women would have begun work in a factory, to handle their own earnings, to mix with a large number of people with all the excitement and gossip of factory life. They would in this case grow up entirely ignorant of every-

thing pertaining to domesticity . . . Until as girls they have been taught to find pleasure in domestic work and until there is a great supply of suitable recreations and amusements in reach of all women, to counteract the prevailing squalor and gloom of these pottery towns, it is useless to expect them to relinquish factory life (Great Britain cmnd 2175 1904 para 259).

Forty years later, as the Second World War ended, the Beveridge Report (1942) was equally anxious to dispel any notion that waged work might be more fun than domestic labour. Indeed during the war, the Government was so worried, but as it turned out unnecessarily, about falling birth rates, that in 1940 the War Aims Committee established as one of five key principles that were to underpin post-war reconstruction 'the domestic principle of the sanctity and solidarity of family life'. So, for example, in the arena of town planning the great urban historian Lewis Mumford writing in 1945 on the future of London noted that

. . the first consideration of town planning must be to provide an urban environment and an urban mode of life which will not be hostile to biological survival: rather to provide one in which processes of life and growth will be so normal to that life, so visible, that by sympathetic magic it will encourage in women of childbearing age the impulse to bear and raise children, as an essential attribute of their humanness, quite as interesting in all its possibilities as the most glamorous success in an office or a factory (Mumford 1945, 27).

The recreations and amusements that had been seen as necessary to encourage women to leave the workforce at the beginning of the century, were not to be on offer in the post-war period. Instead 'sympathetic magic' in the somewhat prosaic guise of a suburban home and a new kitchen was to be the lure. As Penny Summerfield (1984) and Jane Lewis (1992), social historians of the war and postwar years, have established many, but by no means all, women did leave the workforce at the end of the Second World War in order to re-create the traditional patterns of domestic responsibility, especially when they became mothers. It was not until the 1970s that the widespread labour market recruitment of married women with children became established in this country and, as I have argued earlier, another two decades or more before the life cycle pattern of participation that differen- tiated women's labour market behaviour from men's disappeared. Even so, the assumptions that women have a particular responsibility for reproductive labour - and time to do it - continue

to inform both academic and policy debates about the 'new' capitalism and its altered patterns of gender and class divisions. The remarkable shift of emphasis towards the notion of an obligation to participate in waged labour, regardless of house- hold and family circumstances, is a hugely signifi- cant change whose consequences are only partially recognized in current debates. In the next section I want to turn to current academic debates about the changing nature of work and employment. In the penultimate section I shall then assess current government attempts to reconcile women's domes- tic and workplace obligations and to accept the far-reaching implications of restructuring a labour market and welfare policies which until now are based on the male breadwinner model.

Work and identity in the 'new capitalism' Naturalistic associations between femininity, nature, domesticity and the private sphere and masculinity, rationality, action and the public sphere have, as feminist scholars have so persua- sively demonstrated in an expanding body of academic work since the late 1960s been written into the social institutions and material practices of modern societies. These associations affect the rela- tions between the sexes in all social arenas from the most intimate to the most public at every spatial scale. Furthermore, they are also the essential foundation of enlightenment social theory and its development in a wide range of disciplines, as well being significant in numerous forms of artistic representation (Bradley 1989; Pateman 1989; Walby 1986, 1997). As I argued in my earlier critique of mainstream post-Fordist theory, a binary distinc- tion between men and women, and women's association with a supposedly non-capitalist arena, blinded key theorists to both the significance and permanence of women's waged labour as well as to the contradictions between their growing par- ticipation and the contemporary reductions in wel- fare provision. While it is hard to imagine that any scholar working in industrial societies at present would claim that women are part of a 'another socio-economic structure' (50) compared to men, as Berger and Piore did in 1980, or that their waged labour is secondary, to either their households or to the economy as a whole, these gendered assump- tions continue to have a tenacious hold. In recent texts about the future of work, for example by key

Linda McDosi~i~ll

social theorists such Zygmunt Bauman (1998), Ulrich Beck (2000), Andre Gorz (1999) and Richard Sennett (1998), there is almost no discussion of women's role in waged labour and no analysis of the gender division of labour in reproductive work. Indeed, a number of recent analyses of the future of work are based on the oddly paradoxical claim of that waged work at the turn of the millennium is becoming less and not more impor- tant in the construction of personal identity. Here I am thinking in particular of Sennett's (1998) elegaic claims about the corrosion of the character of the working class: claims that on the face of it seen1 hard to support given the sorts of policies domi- nant in both the UK and the USA that stress the increasing centrality of employment.

As Carolyn Steedman (1986) acerbically pointed out more than 20 years ago, however, in the context of debates about the social consequences of the rise in consumerism in the 1950s and 1960s, the male left has a fondness for narratives of loss, that regret the supposed collapse of community or extended kinship consequent upon changes in men's lives, while turning a blind eye to changes in women's living circumstances. Thus if men's work changes or declines, and their attachment to the labour market seems more tenuous, it is seen as the basis for new theoretical arguments even when trends in female employment are clearly very different and challenge the claims made by these theorists. For many women their attachment to the labour mar- ket is a more significant part of their daily lives and their personal identities than in previous decades and, despite claims by key theorists about the growing casualization of work and loss of perma- nent attachment, women's job tenure with a single employer has increased rather than decreased in the last decade (Cully et 01 1999; Rubery et nl 1999). Further, not only do many of the contemporary theorists of work take for granted the traditional gendered association of waged work with men and masculine identity but they also tend to forget that many of their assumptions about the nature of waged work are temporally and spatially specific, based on that peculiar Fordist period in capitalist societies between, in the UK 1945 and 1973: a period of so called full employment in western industrial societies when the majority of men had full-time regular work, often for a single employee across their lifetime. Most women's labour market participation (and some men's) has never matched this ideal pattern and their participation was

Father and Ford revisited

ignored in the calculations of full employment in the post-war decades.

While work remains central to men's lives as a policy objective, there is, however, little doubt that the material conditions of labour have changed for many men. As 1 noted earlier, men in their fifties and sixties face declining opportunities to engage in waged work. At the opposite end of the age spectrum, too, men face growing inequalities in gaining access to well-paid employment. In a society in which overall participation rates in fur- ther and higher education are rising rapidly, young unskilled men, who previously might have found work in heavy industry, face declining opportuni- ties, perhaps especially in comparison with young women in the same position, for whom job pros- pects, although not relative wage rates, have improved (Egerton and Savage 2000 ;MacDonald 1997; McDon~ell 2000~1, b). Low skilled and poorly educated young men are turning out to be a liability in labour markets characterized by the continued growth in the 1990s of bottom end service jobs in which servility and deference -stereotypical feminine characteristics - are highly valued. These young men are probably the first generation of male workers - at least in the post Second World War period - who will experience downward mobility compared to their fathers (Finnegan 1998), whereas young working class women are doing better than mothers and possibly even than their fathers. This emphasis on male disadvantage is an interesting new turn in debates about the new gender order of post Fordism, both in the sphere of waged work and in welfare pro- .vision (Popay et a1 1998), that was not as evident a decade ago as it is now.

The new service-dominated labour market is also an increasingly polarized one. This polariz- ation affects the ways in which the relationships between gender, generation and occupational status are being recast. As Castells (2000), Sassen (1991) and others have argued, there is a growing division in the employment structure of advanced industrial economies. Highly paid and skilled occupations at the top end of the service sector and in the information economy as well as poorly paid and unskilled 'servicing' jobs at the bottom end of the occupational hierarchy are the fastest growing parts of the labour market. This division, between what Castells (2000) calls 'self programmable labour' and 'generic labour', parallels one between what Brush (1999) has aptly termed the 'high tech'

and 'high touch' occupations that increasingly dominate advanced industrial economies. It is a division that also, in large part, maps onto emerg- ing gender divisions - both between men and women and between women. The 'high tech' occupations in information-based production and services require the possession of high level edu- cational and professional credentials that are now being acquired by the growing numbers of women who are challenging men's previous domination of high status occupations (Crompton 1999; Crompton and Sanderson 1990). The 'high touch' jobs, on the other hand, in retail, entertainment, commodified personal and health care draw on traditional feminized skills of empathy, care and servicing and draw growing numbers of women into waged work in poorly-paying jobs.

The largely pessimistic views of commentators such as Richard Sennett about these new employ- ment divisions are partially countered by social analysts who focus on the conditions of employ- ment among the privileged group of employees: undertaking the programmable labour identified by Castells. Lash (1994) and Bauman (1998), for example, have pointed to the growing reflexivity or detraditionalization of elite workers, in high status occupations in which, they argued, they are increasingly freed from structural constraints of class position and bureaucratic organization, to construct an individual m~orkplace identity dependent on individual or team-based perform- ance. This emphasis on performativity, whether task-oriented (Casey 1995) or as a key aspect of personal identity in an age of aesthetisized work (Bauman 1998), has the potential to free agency from structure as 'individuals are increasingly untied from the rules, norms, expectations and traditions of modernity, such as those of class and gender' (Adkins 2000, 259). Beck, for example, in relation to gender, has argued that 'men and women are released from traditional forms and ascribed roles' (Beck 1992 105), although Adkins (1999,2000 ) has mounted a powerful and convinc- ing critique of his thesis in relation to women's continued segregation in the 'new' economy. Indeed, gender differences may be becoming more, not less, significant as traditional forms and work- place structures and ascribed roles are threatened and elite men are reluctant to relinquish their workplace privileges. Adkins (1999) has noted that in many occupational sectors women are recon- firmed as the 'servicing' class whether they work

in elite occupations or not. In organizations that have reconfigured workers into 'family-team forms' (133), for example, it is noticeable that it is women who perform most of the more menial and servicing social roles.

Even among the more privileged men in the new information economy and in the older professions, however, as Sennett (1998) is undoubtedly correct in noting, mobility and less job security is leading to decreasing loyalties within the workplace and, perhaps, a growing detachment from localities as occupational and residential mobility increases. Indeed, men's anxiety about work, which as Connell (1995) and other theorists of masculine identity (see for example, Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994; Mac an Ghaill 1996, Roper and Tosh 1991) have noted, is the central element in the social construction of acceptable and hegemonic versions of masculine identity, is a central aspect of the 'crisis in masculinity' that has recently been identified in both popular and academic debates (Clare 2000; Faludi 1999; McDowell 2000b). Men are exhibiting signs of growing anxiety about their position in a society in which they feel they are becoming increasingly redundant as, for example, women not only enter the workforce in growing numbers but also out-compete them in school examinations, as I noted earlier, and have the tendency to reject them as life-time partners (Campbell 1993; Willis 1984). The proportion of divorces initiated by women, for example, increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. There has also been a growing gender gap in suicide rates in the UK during the 1990s - the rate for men increased over the decade to 15 per 100,000 men whereas for women over the same period it declined slightly to 4.8 per 100,000. Somewhat controversially Giddens (1992) has argued that a further consequence of 'the current crisis of mas- culinity' has been growing male violence against women. Careful studies by a number of feminist scholars, among them Kelly (1988) and Stanko (1990) have shown, however, the long-term nature of violence against women as well as the difficul- ties is establishing clear empirical trends in such a complex area.

What is interesting about these new debates, however, whether about the corrosion of personal identity, about the aestheticization of work, about the performative aspects of workplace identity which are common in sociology, geography and feminist analyses, or about the detraditionalization

of workplace regulation is their common emphasis on cultural aspects of economic activities. There is no doubt that the 'cultural turn' and the associated debate about the social construction of multiple differences - ethnicity, age and sexuality for example as well as class differences - have had a hugely stimulating impact on our discipline, open- ing up to geographic analysis questions about representations and meanings, the body, discourse, style, cultural politics and much more. In economic geography alone the debate about regional, local and organizational structures now includes, intcs alia, analyses of untradable assets, the significance of knowledge communities, ideas about trust, workplace cultures, the language of work and embodied style (see for example, Amin 1999; Barnes and Sheppard 2001; Clark et a1 2000; Lee and Wills 1997; Storper and Salais 1997; Thrift and Olds 1996). However, an unproductive binary div- ision too often structures contemporary geographic scholarship in which the 'merely cultural' is dis- missed on the one hand and the complex ways in which material inequalities are part of the very construction of 'difference' is neglected on the other (see for example Amin and Thrift 2000; Barnes 1995; Sayer 1994).

A growing unease about the relative neglect of economic inequalities in the new emphasis on cultural diversity in contemporary geographical and feminist scholarship has recently become more evident. In an interesting editorial assessing the growing geographical literature about the body, for example, Robyn Dowling (1999) noted that it deals with everything but class distinctions. Neil Smith (2000) has recently asked 'what happened to class?' in contemporary geographic work and David Harvey (1996, 2000) consistently insists on the centrality of material inequalities. Geographers anxious about this neglect of class divisions and the gulf between analyses of cultural and economic inequalities might profitably turn to the recent work of feminist political theorist Anne Phillips (1997, 1999) where she mounts an impressive argument about the nature of equality. Phillips' contention is that the cultural politics of difference has pushed the consideration of basic economic inequality off the political and academic agenda. Careful to recognize the importance of struggles by women and minorities to gain equal respect and rights of participation, Phillips nevertheless worries that the significance of growing economic inequalities is being relatively ignored. I too

Father and Ford revisited

believe that a greater awareness of the ways in which women and men are differentially affected by economic restructuring and new income inequalities needs to inform the debates about gender differences. Recognition of difference with- out a politics of redistribution is insufficient to alter patterns of inequality. Although feminist scholars, and some geographers (Smith 2000 for example), are increasingly scrupulous in their recognition both of differences between women and the com- plexity of the ways in which gender and class divisions are inter-related, this recognition is hard to achieve in both theoretical and empirical analyses. Iris Young's (1990) work on re-theorizing inequality, for example, is a splendid and in-fluential effort to think about equality and differ- ence at the same time. Yet, as debates between Judith Butler (1998), Nancy Fraser (1995, 1997a) and Young (1997) herself have revealed, the prob- lems in trying to combine political economy and cultural perspectives are immense, even, some believe, insurmountable (see for example Coole (1996)).

What has been strikingly absent from most of these debates about cultural recognition versus material inequality, however, is discussion of the connections between the economic and the social, rather than the explicitly cultural arena. As I argued ten years ago, geographical work on the connections between waged and unwaged work and the extent of their variations across space is still limited. Despite feminist claims about the inseparability of the spheres of waged and unwaged work - often dubbed for ease of discus- sion the public and private spheres (although the penetration of waged relations into the home as I note below has disrupted this simple binary too) -there are still too few studies by geographers that focus on the multiple and varied ways in which what Miriam Glucksmann (1995) termed 'total social organization of labour' is carried out in different parts of the space economy. In all the analyses of men's changing participation in waged labour, for example, there is a very little emphasis on either theoretical or empirical explorations of the extent to which men's participation in domestic and voluntary activities might be increasing (although see Wheelock 1990; Willott and Griffin 1996) and whether it provides some compensation for their growing anxieties about their loss of centrality in the sphere of waged labour (Pearson 2000). To find more sustained consideration of

these issues, recently captured in the UK in the term 'work/life balance', we must look instead to recent policy initiatives that attempt to recognize the growing contradictions in what I identified ten years ago as a 'social speed up' in everyday life (McDowell 1991).

The politics of the gender distribution of time has become even more significant in the last ten years than in the previous post-Fordist decades as growing numbers of women enter the labour market at the same time as many men continue to work long hours. Unlike the rest of West Europe, the average hours worked by men in full-time employment in Britain have not declined over the decade. In 2000, for example, fathers worked an average of 47 hours each week, compared with an EU average of 42.7 hours (Reeves 2001). The death of the male breadwinner model of labour market organization that dominated the Fordist era, which at least recognized the significance of domestic labour, even though it depended on an inequitable gender division of labour, has placed the question of who is responsible for reproductive work and who is going to pay for it on the agenda of current social policy discussions.

Policy issues: worklife balance and doing the dirty work Ten years ago, I identified the increases in demands on women in both the labour market and in the provision of care in the home and the community as one of the key problems for the coming decade, suggesting that the then current division of labour was unstable without a significant increase in the state provision of substitutes for domestic pro- vision. In the intervening ten years, there has been a clear acceleration of alternative forms of pro-vision, but in the main by the market rather than the state. The commodification of domestic labour - both care for children and elderly dependants and of routine domestic tasks such as cleaning -has continued to expand. In the UK, a Mintel survey undertaken for Which, the consumer maga- zine, suggested that the amount spent annually on paid domestic workers and services increased fourfold from £1.1 billion in 1987 to £4.3 billion in 1996. The expansion of these services has, however, benefited mainly high income dual career house- holds who are able to afford to purchase substitute labour to undertake the 'dirty work' (Anderson

2000) and has intensified class and ethnic divisions between women. As a growing number of studies of commodified domestic work by geographers have shown, employees in this sector consist in the main of poor, working class and often minority women, who labour under some of the most exploited and marginal conditions in advanced economies (England 1996; England and Steill 1997; Gregson and Lowe 1994; Pratt 1997, 1999). They often work on a casual basis, with informal arrangements, sometimes paid in cash or even in kind and, because of the nature of the job, work in isolation in individual locations.

In most British homes, however, most of the domestic labour continues to be undertaken with- out financial reward by women family members. The extent of this work and the imputed value to the British economy is enormous. In 1997, the UK Office for National Statistics produced what was termed a Household Satellite Account (Murgatroyd and Neuberger 1997) in which the time spent doing domestic labour was calculated and its value imputed. A comprehensive time budget survey revealed that people spent one and a half times as long doing domestic tasks as they spent undertaking the activities of waged work. If the value of this time were to be costed at the average rate for waged employment, its worth would increase the gross domestic product by 120 per cent or a huge £739 billion per annum. If imputed values are calculated by disaggregating tasks and applying the average rates for nannies and childminders, cleaners, window cleaners and so forth to the separate jobs, the overall figure declines to £341 billion as these jobs are among the lowest paid in the labour market. Even on the basis of this latter calculation, the figure is 56 per cent of the then current GDP and larger than the whole of the manufacturing sector.

The time budget study on which these estimates are based was undertaken in 1995 and revealed the extent of continuing gender divisions in partici- pation in reproductive labour. Women spent an average 68 minutes a day cooking, 86 minutes looking after children, 23 minutes doing the wash- ing, 70 minutes cleaning and 46 minutes shopping. Men by comparison spent 28 minutes in the kitchen, 55 minutes with their children, 3 minutes doing laundry, 43 minutes cleaning and doing other household chores and 26 minutes shopping. For women who were also in waged work, the averages were lower but not substantially so; on

average for every extra hour of paid work, a woman's unpaid work drops by only half an hour. Interestingly the higher women's own wages were, the more even was the gender division of domestic responsibilities within the household. If a woman is highly paid in the labour market, the imputed value of her time seems to be reflected in the distribution of domestic labour between male and female household members, but it is also, as I noted above, substituted by the labour of a waged domestic worker, usually a working class woman and so exacerbating the growing class divisions between women.

As well as the expansion of commodified services there is, however, a growing recognition by the government of the increasing problems being generated by attempting to maintain what is currently termed work-life balance in the UK. Here European Union legislation has been an important spur to British initiatives, although in most cases the British Government has taken a somewhat minimalist approach to new policies, restricting the take up of new rights such as parental leave to as small as possible numbers. At present British rights to parental leave are the least generous in EU and they were introduced in 1999 for new parents only, and not backdated, as in some countries, to include women who gave birth in the year before the legislation became law. Britain was also one of the last members of the Union to introduce equality between full-time and part-time workers in terms of rights to leave and holiday entitlement, although they are now in place. Currently, initiatives to improve maternity rights and childcare provision are under Cabinet discussion, although flexible working hours as of right for parents have been rejected. The Chancellor also introduced the Working Families Tax Credit for low income work- ing families, as well as up-rated child benefit payments during the first new Labour adminis- tration. Childcare provision in the UK, however, remains inadequate. Currently there is only one subsidized childcare place for every 14 children in poverty and although the Government has promised to introduce 100 'centres of early excel- lence' and 900 neighbourhood nurseries in deprived neighbourhoods by 2004, it has been estimated that 10,000 children's centres, offering pre- and after-school care are actually needed, at a cost of around £10 billion (Riddell 2001). Most families with children currently rely on registered childminders or casual arrangements with friends

Father and Fovd revisited

and family members to cover their working hours.

However inadequate parental rights and this level of childcare provision may seem, a new and contentious debate has recently become evident in which it is claimed that women per se, whether mothers or not, may be disadvantaged by the new legislative 'improvements'. In 2000, The Industrial Society, a generally left-leaning independent think tank that comments on employment issues, pub- lished a critical report on the Blair Government's plans to improve the lives of working mothers. Based on a survey of firms, it was suggested that men's relative advantage as employees would increase compared to women in future, with some small firms not employing women at all, if the 'rights' for mothers continued to be emphasized. The author of the report, Richard Reeves (2000), argued that 'the government, the Equal Opportu- nities Commission, the TUC and most groups campaigning for parents all make the same mistake of thinking that the pay gap between men and women is irrational and some stern talking will do the trick. In fact, given the current policies and gender roles, it is entirely rational' (20). Reeves concluded that unless policies emphasized pauental and especially paternal rights to leave in order to break down the roles and responsibilities attached to fatherhood and motherhood, women would continue to be discriminated against as employees. While the way that the report was reported in the press was unfortunate - with headlines such as 'firms won't employ women' - his conclusions seem unexceptional, if extremely difficult to achieve in practice.

Radical thinking about a new and different gen- der order that is not based on assumptions of male superiority in the labour market and in the family is essential if Reeves' plea, and long-standing femi- nist campaigning, for the centrality of parental rights and responsibilities in both workplace and household organization is to be achieved. How- ever, as Reeves (2001) himself has argued in his recent book, Wovk (that is employment) 1s fun compared to many of the repetitive tasks involved in domestic labour, which as a cynical feminist might note partially explains why British men are so keen to do so much of the former and little of the latter. In his overly optimistic analysis, however, Reeves, ignored the implications of the growth of extremely poorly-paid and repetitive work at the bottom end of the labour market. But, as Arlie

Hochschild (1997) has recently demonstrated, for many women, too, it is the office rather than the home that is increasingly the site of self-fulfilment and pleasure. In a study of a progressive US employer, she found that many employees were reluctant to take advantage of newly introduced family-friendly policies. Comparative analyses of the reception of similar policies as they are intro- duced into different parts of the British labour market will be necessary to monitor their reception in the UK. At the end of 2000, the government introduced the Work-Life Balance Challenge Fund in the UK, under which 69 companies will receive free advice about reshaping their working prac- tices. Interestingly in the study published by the Department for Education and Employment (2000) to mark its initiation, working women who were questioned were found to be more reluctant than the men in the sample to consider working from home.

The 1990s have also seen a continuing decline in the British birth rate, linked, in popular comment, to women's increasing reluctance to jeopardize their careers and to their growing 'selfishness'. While not wanting to imply a direct relationship, it is evident that new opportunities and responsibili- ties in the sphere of waged work for women have consequences for their other life-choices. The pro- portion of women who will not give birth is at an all time high in most advanced industrial econ-omies, including the UK, but also in most western European states including Italy and Spain. (US figures are complicated and seem to have started rising slightly again, after a decline in the early 1990s, partly because of the growing Hispanic population.) For these women, if principles of equality of income, parity and respect in the labour market, as well as leisure time equality, can be achieved, then a new gender order based on a universal worker model would bring considerable advantages. At present gender parity in the labour market is far from achieved. Despite grow- ing income differences between well and less-well educated women, and between single and child- less women and mothers, it is salutary to remem- ber that a study undertaken for the Women's Unit in the British Cabinet Office in 1999 found that that all women, whether mothers or not, are subject to a sizeable gender deficit in their life time earnings because of the continuing patterns of horizontal and vertical gender segregation in the labour market. Cross national comparisons

(Harkness and Waldfogel 1999) support this British finding.

In an incisive analysis of different forms of social organization, Fraser (1997a) has assessed potential ways of moving towards greater gender equality in all spheres of life. The universal worker model, which Britain is fast moving towards, as Fraser has shown, falls far short of achieving full gender equality for individuals (currently women in the main) with significant domestic responsibilities. Although many domestic responsibilities can be successfully commodified (assuming sufficient income to purchase the necessary services) econo- mist Jean Gardiner (1997) has argued that those aspects of domestic provision that entail the giving of care are particularly resistant to commodifi-cation as the relations of exchange are not suscep- tible to monetary evaluation. To achieve more substantial gender equality, therefore, Fraser (1997) has argued that the universal worker model might perhaps be rejected in favour of what she terms a caregiver-parity model in which child rearing and informal domestic care are elevated to parity with formal paid labour, so that the current gender differences in participation in different types of work would become costless. However, as Fraser notes, unless men's participation in domestic work can be increased, so that caregiving becomes uni- versal, this model institutionalizes women's caring roles. In an assessment of the social policies of France and the UK, Diane Perrons (2000) has examined the extent to which each nation state approaches either model. At present the UK falls firmly on the side of the universal worker model, 'encouraging', as I noted above, all parents, includ- ing single mothers, to enter the labour market, if needs be by legally requiring them to attend inter- views with New Deal counsellors. This leads to an interesting question for feminist campaigning, at least in the short term, assuming slow change in, for example, the provision of decent childcare (current high quality childcare provision for low income families is completely inadequate, let alone within financial reach) and/or in universal efforts in care giving. Is it possible to campaign both for a woman's (or indeed a man's) right to remain at home when her/his children are young as ~7ell as demanding increased childcare provision, improved working conditions for women and mounting a continuing challenge to prevailing social expectations? Without radical policies such as a minimum state 'income' or entitlement for

caring responsibilities, the right to 'mother' may reinforce women's disadvantages in the labour market as well as increase material inequalities between women who are and are not mothers as well as between work-rich and work-poor house- holds. Further, as Perrons (1999) argued in an earlier comparison of EU social policy, partici- pation in the labour market enhances the power and esteem of working mothers, even though earned incomes are often insufficient for economic independence. A range of campaigns, within and without the trade union movement, by workers in the private as well as in the public sector, to, for example, improve the implementation of the working time directive, as well as for more adequate childcare, are needed to ensure that a broadly-based set of policies, flexible enough to cater for the increasing diversity in women's expectations and opportunities over their life cycle, are introduced. It is clear, however, that the achievement of an equitable new post-industrial or post-Fordist gender order will depend on a currently almost unimaginable re-evaluation of all forms of work, in terms both of its status and financial reward, from the most menial tasks of caregiving to the most exciting, highly paid and high status activities in the new economy, and their disassociation from current gender divisions of labour. The current social and cultural mean- ings of all forms of work will have to be disrupted.

Conclusions Ten years ago I concluded by arguing that the feminization of the labour market was one of the most-far reaching changes of the previous two decades and that geographers interested in eco- nomic and social restructuring must place the new gender order of post-Fordism on their research agenda. The material changes in gender relations that I identified then have both intensified and changed their nature and this conclusion needs reinforcing. New work about the social construc- tion of masculinity that was not previously part of the discussions of the post-Fordist transition has begun to enter the geographical corpus, in part stimulated by the recognition of changing labour market participation rates and their socially and spatially uneven impact on men. However, a series of geographic analyses at different spatial scales

Father a i d Ford rtvisited

and in different localities that focus on the costs and benefits associated with both masculinity and femininity in different sectors and locations needs to be undertaken to explore the consequences of these new divisions and debates.

The certainty of permanent life-time employ- ment for all men has now crumbled, at the same time as more women, especially mothers, are enter- ing waged work. And so the division of labour within and between productive and reproductive work needs to be renegotiated. Although the first new Labour government began to address the conflicts created between domestic and waged labour, through for example the development of a National Childcare Strategy, as well as taking steps towards addressing the problem of the working poor through the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit and the minimum wage which has improved the position of many poorly paid women workers, its growing commitment to the individualization of employees and to a univer- sal worker model of citizenship and benefit entitle- ment means that it has barely begun to recognize the continuing contradictions between different forms of work, nor to address the durable inequali- ties based on gender. Here too a new focus on policy initiatives and evaluations of their varied spatial impact in different local labour markets are needed.

These questions about the changing shape of the gender division of the labour of total social reproduction are not solely a concern in Britain nor even in the advanced industrial world. The widespread entry of women into the social rela- tions of waged employment is a global phenom- enon as the numbers who depend - directly and indirectly - on the sale of their labour power for their own daily reproduction are expanding. The World Bank estimated in 1995, for example, that the global proletariat numbered in total 2.5 billion, double the number only 20 years earlier (Panitch and Leys 2000). As capital becomes glo- bally mobile, exploiting a working class that is divided by race and gender in geographically- diverse ways, as work is casualized, trade union movements defeated and neo-liberal social poli- cies are implemented, it is theoretically and also politically crucial that geographers explore both the diverse dimensions of the new gender and class order of the twenty first century as well as ways in which this order may be challenged and made more equitable.

Acknowledgements I should like to thank Susan Ruddick for not only inviting me to participate in a session at the AAG conference in New York in February 2001 but also encouraging me to expand the paper that I gave there into this article. Thanks too are due to Diane Perrons and Ruth Pearson for continuing stimulat- ing conversations about these issues over the years that have helped me to think more critically about them and to the referees who suggested a number of useful changes and additional relevant articles. Part of the paper draws on an inaugural lecture that I gave at University College London in February 2001.

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Father and Ford Revisited: Gender, Class and Employment Change in the New MillenniumLinda McDowellTransactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 26, No. 4. (2001), pp.448-464.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-2754%282001%292%3A26%3A4%3C448%3AFAFRGC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

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References

From Registered Nurse to Registered Nanny: Discursive Geographies of Filipina DomesticWorkers in Vancouver, B.C.Geraldine PrattEconomic Geography, Vol. 75, No. 3. (Jul., 1999), pp. 215-236.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0095%28199907%2975%3A3%3C215%3AFRNTRN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory forFeminismJoan W. ScottFeminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Spring, 1988), pp. 32-50.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0046-3663%28198821%2914%3A1%3C32%3ADEOTUO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

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