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NuclearPowerandSmallModularReactors

inIndonesia:PotentialandChallenges

BernadetteK.Cogswell,NataliawatiSiahaan,FrigaSieraR,M.V.Ramana,andRichardTanter

IndonesianInstituteforEnergyEconomicsNautilusInstituteforSecurityandSustainability

April2017

NuclearPowerandSmallModularReactorsinIndonesia

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Authoraffiliationsandaddresses:

BernadetteK.Cogswell,1NataliawatiSiahaan,2FrigaSieraR,2M.V.Ramana,1,4andRichardTanter31ProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity,PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,USA2IndonesianInstituteforEnergyEconomics,Jakarta,Indonesia3NautilusInstituteforSecurityandSustainabilityandUniversityofMelbourne,Melbourne,Australia4Currentaddress:LiuInstituteforGlobalIssues,UniversityofBritishColumbia,6476NWMarineDrive,Vancouver,BC,CanadaV6T1Z2

Contactemail:[email protected]

Coverimage

ThisschematicismodifiedfromafigureinAlexanderGlaseretal.,SmallModularReactors:AWindowonNuclearEnergy,AnEnergyTechnologyDistillate(Princeton,N.J.:AndlingerCenterforEnergyandtheEnvironmentatPrincetonUniversity,June2015),http://acee.princeton.edu/distillates/distillates/small-modular-reactors/TheviewsexpressedinthisreportdonotnecessarilyreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheNautilusInstitute.ReadersshouldnotethatNautilusseeksadiversityofviewsandopinionsonsignificanttopicsinordertoidentifycommonground.


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ExecutiveSummary

Indonesiahasbeeninterestedinbuildingnuclearpowerplantssincethelate1950sundertheaegisofBadanTenagaNuklirNasional(BATAN,theNationalNuclearEnergyAgency).Sincetheturnofthecentury,BATANhasbeenactivelyinterestedinanewclassofnuclearpowerplants,smallmodularreactors(SMRs),thatarebeingdesigned,developed,andadvocatedbysomesectionsofthenuclearpowerindustryasawaytoaddresssomeofthechallengesconfrontingtheexpansionofthetechnology.BATAN’sinterestinSMRsispropelledbyreasonsthatpertaintonuclearpoweringeneral,suchaslowlevelsofelectricityconsumptionamongthepopulationofIndonesia,growingenergyneeds,andclaimsaboutalackofalternatemeanstomeettheseneeds,andreasonsthatarespecifictoSMRs,suchasthepresenceofremoteareasandsmallislandsthatdonothavethedemandleveltosupportconstructionofalargenuclearreactor,andthelowerfinancialcostofSMRs.BATANhasexploredanumberofpossibilities,includingimportingasmallfloatingpowerplantfromRussia,anSMRfromKoreathatcanalsodesalinateoceanwater,andahightemperaturegascooledreactorfromRussia.BATANhasconductedanumberofnuclearpowerplantsitingstudies,includingfollow-uptechnicalandeconomicfeasibilitystudiesinsomecases.ThesestudieshavealsoincludedsomeSMRpossibilitiesinmuchgreaterdetail.Butapartfromanexperimentalpowerreactor(EPR),noneoftheotherproposalshasadvancedtowardsactualconstruction.Indonesiahasanextensivenetworkofgovernmentagenciesinvolvedintheenergysectorand,hence,holdingastakeinthenuclearpowerdebate,aswellasanextensivebodyoflawsandregulationsthatcouldaffecttheeventualimplementationofcommercialnuclearpower.ThepotentialforadoptionofSMRsinIndonesiaisaffectedbyanumberofregulations,includingtherequirementthatlocallymadecomponentsorservicesconductedbydomesticprovidershavetobeusedinenergyinfrastructure,therequirementthatonlyreactorsbasedon“proventechnology”willbelicensed,andarequirementthatreactorsbesitedonlyonland.AnotherreasonthatIndonesiamightnotchoosetoconstructanSMRisthat,asweshowthroughcalculations,thecostofgeneratingelectricityusingSMRswilllikelybegreaterthanlargenuclearpowerplantsaswellassolarphotovoltaicplants.StudiestestifytothelargepotentialofsolarenergyinIndonesiaandthegovernmenthasbeenadoptingpoliciesthatpromisetoacceleratetheconstructionofsignificantamountsofsolarcapacity.BecauseSMRshavelowerpowercapacity,producingthesameamountofelectricityusingtheseasopposedtolargereactorswouldrequiredealingwithpublicresistanceatmanymoresites.Publicoppositionhasplayedamajorroleinstoppingconstructionofnuclearpowerplantssofar.Asaresultofallthesefactors,itwouldseemthattheconstructionofSMRsisunlikely,especiallyinlargeenoughnumberstomakeasizeablecontributiontoIndonesia’selectricitygeneration.


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1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................52 OverviewofInterestinNuclearPowerandPublicOpposition.....................................62.1 History.....................................................................................................................................................62.2 IndonesianInterestinSMRs..........................................................................................................112.3 ExperiencewithNuclearTechnology..........................................................................................142.4 PublicOpinionandOppositiontoNuclearPower..................................................................15

3 SitingStudiesandLargeNuclearPlantProposals...........................................................163.1 MuriaPeninsulaStudy.....................................................................................................................203.2 BangkaIslandStudy..........................................................................................................................203.3 BantenNuclearPowerPlantStudy..............................................................................................21

4 SmallModularReactorProposals.........................................................................................224.1 Serpong,BantenExperimentalPowerReactor(EPR)...........................................................224.2 GorontaloFloatingSmallNPPProposal.....................................................................................244.3 MaduraDesalinationSmallNPPProposal.................................................................................254.4 WestKalimantanNPPProposal....................................................................................................26

5 InstitutionalandRegulatoryLandscape.............................................................................275.1 RelevantGovernmentAgencies....................................................................................................275.2 GovernmentRegulationsPertainingtoNuclearPower........................................................295.3 LocalContentRequirements..........................................................................................................305.4 Land-BasedSitingRequirements.................................................................................................315.5 ProvenTechnologyCriteria...........................................................................................................32

6 ElectricityLandscapeandComparisonofCosts...............................................................326.1 CurrentSourcesofElectricity........................................................................................................336.2 ElectrificationwithintheArchipelago........................................................................................366.3 ProposedElectricityTargets..........................................................................................................386.4 ComparisonofCostsofGeneratingElectricity.........................................................................40

7 Conclusions...................................................................................................................................478 Appendices....................................................................................................................................508.1 TableofAbbreviations.....................................................................................................................508.2 Appendix-AgenciesinIndonesiaAffectingNuclearPower................................................538.3 Appendix-OverviewofSmallModularReactors....................................................................588.3.1 DescriptionofSmallModularReactors(SMRs)..............................................................................588.3.2 SMRDeploymentScenarios.....................................................................................................................588.3.3 CostofSMRs....................................................................................................................................................598.3.4 SafetyandSMRs............................................................................................................................................618.3.5 HistoryofSMRs.............................................................................................................................................61

8.4 Appendix–SummaryTablesofRegulationsRelatingtoNuclearPowerinIndonesia 628.5 Appendix-InstitutionalStructureofElectricityGenerationinIndonesia....................678.6 Appendix-EnergyDistributionEfficiencyinIndonesia.......................................................688.7 Appendix-SolarPowerinIndonesia..........................................................................................698.8 Appendix–SummaryTableofElectrificationinIndonesia................................................718.9 Appendix–EstimateofCurrentCostofElectricityGeneration..........................................738.10 Appendix–OverviewofWorkshop...........................................................................................75


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1 Introduction

In 2013 the Indonesian news media reported that the Head of Badan Tenaga NuklirNasional(BATAN,theNationalNuclearEnergyAgency)statedthatIndonesiawasreadytobuildaSmallModularReactor(SMR)andthatBATANisenthusiasticabouttheidea.1SMRsare reactors with electrical power outputs of less than 300 megawatts and are beingpromoted by nuclear establishments in many countries.2The term “small” is used toindicatethatthepowerlevelismuchlowerthantheaveragepowerdeliveredbycurrentlyoperatingreactors.“Modular”meansthatthereactorisassembledfromfactory-fabricatedpartsormodules.Eachmodulerepresentsaportionofthefinishedplantbuiltinafactoryandshippedtothereactorsite.Modularityisalsousedtoindicatetheideathatratherthanconstructing one large reactor, the equivalent power output will be generated usingmultiplesmallerreactorsthatallowforgreatertailoringofgenerationcapacitytodemand.Indonesia’sinterestinbuildingSMRsisnotentirelynew;Indonesiahasbeeninterestedinnuclearpowersincethelate1950s,includingininstallingsmallreactors.Indeed,theveryfirst proposed reactor for Indonesia was a small reactor: a mission undertaken by theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyin1959reportedthatsomeIndonesianauthoritiesfelt“that the installation of a small nuclear power plant in a remote eastern region of thecountrymightbefeasibleinthenearfuture”.3ThepotentialforbuildingSMRsinIndonesiaandthechallengesinvolvedinsuchaneffort,withinthebroadercontextofthediscussiononnuclearpower,arethefocusofthisreport.The report begins with a historical overview of the plans for setting up nuclear powerplants in Indonesia, aswell as the Indonesian nuclear energy establishment’s interest insmallreactors.ThisisfollowedbyshortdiscussionsofBATAN’sexperiencewithoperatingsmall research reactors and public attitudes towards nuclear power. The report thendiscusses siting studies carried out by BATAN, and specific locations considered forconstructinglargenuclearpowerplants.Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionofspecificsmallnuclearpowerplantproposals.Thenextsectiondealswiththeinstitutionalandregulatorylandscape, aswell as brief overviews of the government regulations that are relevant toconsidering SMRs. Following this is a discussion of the electricity landscape and acomparativeevaluationof thecostsofgeneratingpowerusingdifferentkindsofsources.We conclude with a summary of our findings on the potential role for small modularreactors.Anumberofappendiceswithrelevantinformationarealsoincludedattheend.

1MariaRosary,“IndonesiaSiapBangunReaktorNuklirKecil-Menengah(IndonesiaReadytoBuildSmall-to-Medium-SizedNuclearReactors),”AntaraNews,August19,2013,accessedDecember30,2015,http://www.antaranews.com/berita/391241/indonesia-siap-bangun-reaktor-nuklir-kecil-menengah.2GiorgioLocatelli,ChrisBingham,andMauroMancini,“SmallModularReactors:AComprehensiveOverviewofTheirEconomicsandStrategicAspects,”ProgressinNuclearEnergy73(2014):75–85;JasminaVujićetal.,“SmallModularReactors:Simpler,Safer,Cheaper?,”Energy45,no.1(2012):288–295;NEA,CurrentStatus,TechnicalFeasibility,andEconomicsofSmallNuclearReactors(Paris:NuclearEnergyAgency,OECD,2011);D.T.Ingersoll,“DeliberatelySmallReactorsandtheSecondNuclearEra,”ProgressinNuclearEnergy51,no.4–5(2009):589–603.3IAEA,“SurveyinSouth-EastAsia,”IAEABulletin1(July1959):8.


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2 OverviewofInterestinNuclearPowerandPublicOpposition

2.1 History

IndonesiangovernmentshavehadaninterestinnuclearpowerfromthefirstdecadeoftheRepublic’sexistenceattheheightoftheColdWar.ConcernaboutradioactivefalloutfromPacificnucleartestsledPresidentSukarnoandPrimeMinisterAliSastromidjojo’scabinettoestablishaStateCommitteefortheInvestigationofRadioactivity(PanitiaNegarauntukPenyelidikanRadioaktivet) in 1954.4Four years later, in an attempt to shift attention tonuclear power generation, Sukarno established the Council for Atomic Energy (DewanEnergi Atom) and shortly thereafter, the Institute of Atomic Energy (Lembaga TenagaAtom)in1959.5Fiveyearslater,asdomesticandregionalpoliticaltensionsmountedintheGuidedDemocracyperiod,Sukarnoelevated the Institute toministerial status in1964 inthe form of the National Atomic Power Agency (Badan Tenaga AtomNasional- BATAN),nowtheNationalNuclearPowerAgency(BadanTenagaNuklirNasional–BATAN).6This decade-long institutional processwas driven by two connected factors. On the onehand, Indonesiawanted tobuild the foundationsof amodernpower sectorbyacceptingU.S. and Soviet offers of nuclear energy assistance. Substantial numbers of IndonesianstudentswenttoboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUniontostudynuclearphysicsandengineeringinthefirsthalfofthe1960s.In1961undertheAtomsforPeaceprogramtheUnited States provided a $350,000 grant to fund the construction of a TRIGA Mark IIreactor in Bandung,which reached criticality in 1964,with two other research reactorsfollowing.7Ontheotherhand,Indonesia’sGuidedDemocracycabinet(1959-1965)wantedtoacquireordevelopanuclearweaponscapacity.8TheincomingNewOrder(1966-1998)immediatelyabandonedSukarno’snuclearweaponsinterest after1966.With its three research reactorsBATAN focusedonnuclear researchandprovisionofmedicalisotopes,anditsassociatedacademicinstitutionsgrewtobethelargestnuclearestablishment inSoutheastAsia,employinghundredsof researcherswithdegreesinnuclearscienceandengineering.9EarlyintheNewOrder,BATAN,theMinistry4DanielPoneman,NuclearPowerintheDevelopingWorld(London:Allen&Unwin,1982),99.5PeraturanPemerintahNo.65tahun1958,padatanggal5Desember1958[GovernmentRegulationNo.65,1958,on5December1958].6UUNo.31tahun1964tentangKetentuan-ketentuanPokokTenagaAtom[LawconcerningAtomicEnergyProvisions].From1997BATANhasbeendesignatedasNon-DepartmentalGovernmentBody[LembagaPemerintahNonDepartemen]responsibletothePresident,withitsactivitiescoordinatedbytheMinisterforResearchandTechnology.SeeUUNo.10Tahun1997tentangKetenaganukliran[LawNo.101997concerningNuclearEnergy]andKeppresRINo.64Tahun2005[RepublicofIndonesiaPresidentialDecisionNo.64,2005].7Poneman,NuclearPowerintheDevelopingWorld,100;DouglasM.Fouquet,JunaidRazvi,andWilliamL.Whittemore,“TRIGAResearchReactors:APathwaytothePeacefulApplicationsofNuclearEnergy,”NuclearNews,November2003.8RobertM.Cornejo,“WhenSukarnoSoughttheBomb:IndonesianNuclearAspirationsinthemid-1960s,”TheNonproliferationReview7,no.2(June1,2000):31–43.9In2000,BATANemployed98staffmemberswithdoctorates,233withmastersdegrees,975withunspecified“scientificandengineeringdegrees”,andanother502withunspecifiedbachelordegrees.Thesefiguresaregraduallyincreasing.SeeM.S.Ardisasmita,“PreservationandEnhancementofNuclearKnowledgetowardsIndonesia’sPlantoOperateFirstNuclearPowerPlantby2016”(presentedattheInternationalconferenceon


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of Electricity, and the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara - PLN), incooperationwiththeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),showedstrong interestin building a nuclear power plant, with several studies resulting in a formalrecommendationtothegovernmentin1980thatincludedpossiblesitesinCentralandEastJava,aswellasSulawesi.Plans forastronglynuclearpowered futurewereverymuch inthe air: a national energy seminar conducted in July 1974 by the Indonesian NationalCommitteeoftheWorldEnergyConferenceconcludedthatnuclearenergywouldcomprisearound23-29percentofIndonesia’sinstalledelectricitycapacitybytheyear2000,whichtranslatedtoroughly15000to25000MW.10

Figure1:Comparisonofelectricityprojectionsused in IAEA1976planningstudyandactualconsumptionforIndonesiafrom1986-1996

In1975,theIAEAconductedadetailedtechno-economicstudythatcalculatedtheoptimaladditionsofdifferentkindsofelectricalgenerationcapacitytomeettheprojectedgrowthin energy demand on the island of Java.11The study used two forecasts for projecteddemand, a high case and a low case. Figure 1 shows a comparison of the high and lowscenarioIAEAprojectionsfordemandinIndonesiafortheyears1986,1991,and1996.12

nuclearknowledgemanagement:Strategies,informationmanagementandhumanresourcedevelopment,Saclay,France:IAEA,2004),accessedNovember29,2015,https://www.iaea.org/km/cnkm/papers/ardisasmita.pdf.Severalofthecountry’smostprestigiousuniversitieshavesubstantialundergraduateandprogramsinnuclearscienceandengineeringfeedingintoBATAN.10Poneman,NuclearPowerintheDevelopingWorld,105.11IAEA,NuclearPowerPlanningStudyforIndonesia(JavaIsland)(Vienna:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,1976).12Ibid.,4.

0

50

100

150

200

250

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996

InstalledCapacity(M

W)

HighForecastDemand(TWh) LowForecastDemand(TWh)

ActualEnergyProduced(TWh)


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Toputthefigure inperspective,actualhistoricaldataforthecorrespondingyears isalsoshown.13Evidently,eventheIAEA’slowforecastover-estimatedthedemand.In the 1970s, the Preparatory Commission for Development of a Nuclear Power Plant(Komisi Persiapan Pembangunan Pembangkit Listrik Tenanga Nuklir – KP2-PLTN) wasestablished,whichin1975proposedtothegovernmentfourteenlocationsontheislandofJavaforfurtherstudy.14Thefourteensitesincluded,amongothers,Pasuruan,Bondowoso,Lasem, theMuria Peninsula (Ujung Grengganan, UjungWatu and Ujung Lemahabang),15Tanjung Pujut, Ujung Genteng, Pangandaran and South Malang. Of these, the MuriaPeninsulasitesemergedastheleadingcontendersforanuclearplant.BATAN and its supporters in the Indonesian government, principally the Ministry ofResearch and Technology (Kementerian Riset dan Teknologi orMenristek; renamed theMinistry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education or Menristekdikti in 2014),subsequentlymade threeseriousattempts topersuade thegovernment tocommit to theconstructionofalargenuclearpowerplantatitspreferredsitesontheMuriaPeninsulaonthe north coast of Central Java near the city of Jepara. The first of these attempts toconstructareactorontheMuriaPeninsulatookplace inthe late1980sandwasstronglysupportedbythenMinisterforResearchandTechnologyB.J.Habibie,butfacedoppositionfrom the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance, combined with the then dominantmilitary’s suspicion ofHabibie’s influence and ambition. The second attempt in themid-1990s endedwith the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent fall of the NewOrder.16Oneachievementof thisperiodwastheestablishmentof theNuclearRegulatoryAgency(BAPETEN)asabodyindependentofBATANin1998.17ThethirdversionoftheMuriaproposalemergedin2002-2003,andgatheredstrengthinthefollowingyears,fedbythreesetsofpressures:concerntoalleviatethegreenhousegasemissions from coal-fired electricity plants; the inadequacy of the existing electricitysupply in Java; and the desire of Japanese, Korean, and French nuclear power plantmanufacturers—andtheirgovernments—tofindexportmarketstounderwritethecostsofdomesticproduction.

13EIA,“InternationalEnergyStatistics,”InternationalEnergyStatistics,lastmodified2015,accessedNovember29,2015,http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=7;BP,StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy2015(London:BP,June10,2015),accessedAugust23,2015,http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.14RanggaD.Fadillah,“Indonesia’sLong,WindingRoadtoNuclearPower,”JakartaPost,December5,2011,accessedAugust5,2016,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/05/indonesia-s-long-winding-road-nuclear-power.html.15RichardTanterandArabellaImhoff,“SiteSelectionHistory,”IndonesianNuclearPowerProposalsBriefingBook,NautilusInstituteforSecurityandSustainability,lastmodifiedJanuary19,2009,accessedAugust5,2016,http://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/aus-indo/aust-ind-nuclear1/ind-np-old/muria/site-selection-history/.16Inthisperiod,theIAEAandBATANconsideredtheMuriaprojectandtheUjungLemahabang(DesaBalong)siteas“oneofthebestcandidate”sitesforanSMR.SeeIAEA,GuidanceforPreparingUserRequirementsDocumentsforSmallandMediumReactorsandTheirApplication(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2000),75.17KeputusanPresidenRepublikIndonesiaNo.76Tahun1998tentangBadanPengawasTenagaNuklirtanggal19Mei1998[RepublicofIndonesiaPresidentialDecisionNo.76,1998,concerningaNuclearEnergyRegulatoryAgency].


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Intheearly2000s, theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencysponsoredaresearchprojectcalled the Comprehensive Assessment of Different Energy Sources for ElectricityGeneration in Indonesia (CADES).18The project was conducted by BATAN, BadanPengkajiandanPenerapanTeknologi(BPPT;AgencyfortheAssessmentandApplicationofTechnology), ESDM, the State Electricity Company (PLN), BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik –Central Statistics Agency) and the Ministry of Research and Technology. The projectconcludedthattheoptimumNPPcapacitythatcouldbeaccommodatedwasdeterminedtobe approximately 4,000MWe. A crucial assumption underlying this conclusionwas thatnuclearpowerwaslessexpensivecomparedtoothersources.19In2004-2005BATANbegan,onceagain,topubliclypressthecasefornuclearenergy,andin January 2006, a presidential decision by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonodetermined that “new” energy sources, including nuclear power, would make up fivepercent of the nation’s electricity supply by 2025. Later that year, Energy and MineralResourcesMinisterPurnomoYusgiantoroannouncedthatthegovernmentexpectedtobecallingfortendersfor4000MWofnuclearcapacityinMuria,aimingforacompletiondateof2016.20In2009theIAEAconductedanIntegratedNuclearInfrastructureReview(INIR)missiontoIndonesia.21TheIAEAalsosenttwoexpertsinearlyOctober2012tomeetwithpersonnelfromBATAN,BAPETEN,theUniversityofGadjahMada,andotherexpertsinordertocarryoutaNuclearEnergySystemAssessment(NESA).22By2010,andpossiblyearlier,BATANhadbeguntobackawayfromtheMuriaplan.Itwasclearly impeded by decades-long local opposition in Jepara, increasing skepticism aboutseismicsafetyclaims,andlackofsupportfromthelargerbureaucraticplayerswithintheIndonesiangovernment.23

18SulfikarAmir,“TheStateandtheReactor:NuclearPoliticsinPost-SuhartoIndonesia,”Indonesia89,no.April(2010):101–149.19Ibid.,116.20Xinhua,“Indonesia’sNukePlantTenderSetfor2007,”People’sDailyOnline,June29,2006,accessedJuly8,2016,http://en.people.cn/200606/29/eng20060629_278473.html.21K.Huda,B.Rohman,andA.N.Lasman,“ChallengesforIndonesiainEmbarkingtoNuclearPower,”JournalofEnergyandPowerEngineering5,no.4(2011):381.22IAEA,“NESAReviewMissiontoIndonesia,”NuclearPowerNewsletter,January2013.23RichardTanter,withArabellaImhoffandDavidVonHippel,NuclearPower,RiskManagementandDemocraticAccountabilityinIndonesia:Volcanic,regulatoryandfinancialriskintheMuriapeninsulanuclearpowerproposal,NautilusInstitute,AustralPolicyForum09-22A,7December2009,http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/tanter-muria-risk.pdf.OntheoppositiontotheMuriaNPPprojectinCentralJavaseeRichardTanter,NuclearFatwa:IslamicJurisprudenceandtheMuriaNuclearPowerStationProposal,APSNetPolicyForum,NautilusInstitute,December13,2007,accessedNovember29,2015,http://nautilus.org/apsnet/nuclear-fatwa-islamic-jurisprudence-and-the-muria-nuclear-power-station-proposal/;SulfikarAmir,“NuclearRevivalinPost-SuhartoIndonesia,”AsianSurvey50,no.2(March1,2010):265–286;AchmadUzairFauzanandJimSchiller,AfterFukushima:TheRiseofResistancetoNuclearEnergyinIndonesia(Essen,Germany:GermanAsiaFoundation,July2011),http://www.asienhaus.de/public/archiv/resistance-in-indonesia-after-fukushima.pdf;MelyCaballero-Anthony,LinaAlexandra,andKevinD.G.Punzalan,“CivilSocietyOrganizationsandthePoliticsofNuclearEnergyinSoutheastAsia:ExploringProcessesofEngagement,”inNuclearPowerandEnergySecurityinAsia,ed.RajeshBasrurandKohSweeLeanCollin(NewYork:Routledge,2012),170–193.


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BATANthenannouncedalternativestotheMuriasite,focusedonthemuchlessseismicallysensitiveislandofBangka.InJune2009,BATANsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwiththeBangka-Belitungprovincialgovernmentforthe‘UtilizationofNuclearScienceandTechnology for the Welfare of the Community of Bangka-Belitung.’24Two sites wereidentified: one inWestBangkaatTeluk Inggris andanother in SouthBangkaatTanjungBerani/Tanjung Krasak.25Within a few years, a feasibility study had confirmed theirsuitability,recommendingconstructionofuptotenlargereactors,sixontheTelukInggrissite and four on the SouthBangka site.26Local environmental organizations came out inoppositiontotheplan,inpartbecausethespecificsitechosenfortheNPPinTelukInggrisislocatedinaProtectedCoastalForest(HutanLindungPantai)area.27Despite the many attempts by BATAN to construct power reactors since the 1970s,28Indonesiastilldoesnotyethaveanoperationalpowerreactor.Mostrecentindicationsarethat nuclear power plant construction is unlikely in the foreseeable future. InDecember2015,forexample,thenEnergyandMineralResourcesMinisterSudirmanSaidstated:“Wehavearrivedattheconclusionthatthisisnotthetimetobuildupnuclearpowercapacity.We still have many alternatives and we do not need to raise any controversies”.29Subsequently,inMarch2016,MinisterSudirmanSaidstatedthatnuclearenergymightbeused if current development and resources of renewable energy fail tomeet the energydemand by 2025.30In May 2016, President Joko Widodo rebuffed Russian PresidentVladimir Putin’s offer of nuclear technology because he wanted Indonesia to focus onrenewable energy.31Nevertheless, BATAN still continues on its quest to build nuclearpowerplantsanditispossiblethatatsomepointinthefutureIndonesiamightconstructone.Thisreport,therefore,evaluatesonepossibilityforthereactorchosen.24‘PemanfaatanIlmuPengetahuandanTeknologiNukliruntukKesejahteraanMasyarakatBangkaBelitung’[UtilizationofnuclearscienceandtechnologyforpublicwelfareinBangka-Belitung].CitedinPenandatangananMoUBATAN—BangkaBelitung,PusatRekayasaPerangkatNuklir(PRPN),[SigningofBATAN–Bangka-BelitungMOU,NuclearDevicesEngineeringCentre(PRPN)],BATAN,15June2009.25PengumumanPeringkatTeknisNomor:88IPL00OlIPBJ312011,Pekerjaan:PengawasanKegiatanPenyiapanTapakPLTNdiPulauBangkaProvinsiKepulauanBangkaBelitung[Technicalratingannouncementnumber:88IPL00OlIPBJ312011,Job:SupervisionofBangkanuclearpowerplantsitepreparationactivities,Bangka-Belitungprovince].PanitiaPengadaanJasaKonsultansi,PusatPengembanganEnergiNuklir[CommitteeforProcurementofConsultancyServices,CentreforNuclearEngineeringDevelopment],BATAN,1April2011.26YariantoSugengBudiSusilo,BATANFeasibilityStudyProjectforSMRDeploymentinBangka-Belitung,IAEA,Jakarta,19-20August2013.27Alza,“WalhiMenentangPinjamPakaiKawasanHutanLindung(WALHIopposesUsageofProtectedForestAreas),”BangkaPos,lastmodifiedMarch24,2011,accessedAugust11,2016,http://bangka.tribunnews.com/2011/03/24/walhi-menentang-pinjam-pakai-kawasan-hutan-lindung.28DanielPoneman,“NuclearPoliciesinDevelopingCountries,”InternationalAffairs,Vol.57,no.4(October1,1981):568–584.29JG,“IndonesiaVowsNoNuclearPowerUntil2050,”JakartaGlobe,December12,2015,accessedDecember15,2015,http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/business/indonesia-vows-no-nuclear-power-2050/.30PebriantoEkoWicaksono,“DENSiapkanSkenarioPengembanganEnergiNuklir[DENPreparesNuclearEnergyDevelopmentScenarios],"liputan6.com,çMarch18,2016,accessedJuly8,2016,http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/2462227/den-siapkan-skenario-pengembangan-energi-nuklir.31SilvanusAlvin,“JokowiTolak2PermintaanPutin,ApaSaja?[JokowirefusesPutin'stworequests:whatarethey?],”liputan6.com,May19,2016,accessedJuly8,2016,http://news.liputan6.com/read/2510495/jokowi-tolak-2-permintaan-putin-apa-saja.


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2.2 IndonesianInterestinSMRs

Sincetheturnofthecentury,Indonesia’sexplorationofthenuclearoptionhasexpandedtoinclude a new class of nuclear power plants, small modular reactors (SMRs), beingdesigned,developed,andadvocatedby thenuclearpower industry.Thehopesplacedonthese designs is clearly expressed in the words of officials from BATANwhowent to ameetingorganizedby the InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency inCairoon thestatusandprospectsforsmallandmediumsizedreactors:

“[s]ince the late 1970s, the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) has beeninvolved in convincing the Government of Indonesia on the need to embark on anuclear power programme.However, no state-owned company is in a position toundertake large investments, hence no nuclear power plant could be built inIndonesia in the foreseeable future. A possible breakthrough would be theintroductionof SMR in the formof the fourth generationof nuclear powerplantswhose goal is low generation cost, able to competewith gas combine cycle; highsafety, free from catastrophic accidents; low amount of waste; and proliferationproof”.32

BATANofficialsarenotuniqueinplacingsuchhopesonSMRs.Nuclearestablishmentsinmany countries, and developers of these designs, have expressed the expectation that anewgenerationofreactorscanalterthecourseofnuclearpower,33whoseshareofglobalelectricitygenerationhasbeendecliningcontinuouslysincethemid-1990s.34However,adecadeandahalf later itwouldbe fair tosaythatthepossiblebreakthroughhopedforbyBATANofficialsandothershasnotyetoccurred.ThereisnoSMRevenatthedesignstagethatmeetsallthecriteriaspecifiedbyBATANsimultaneously.35SpecificSMRdesignsoftenaddressoneormoreofthemotivationsmentionedabove,butitisnotalwayspossibletoaddressalldesirablecriteria(safety,proliferationresistance,reductionofwastegeneration)simultaneously.Mostimportantly,noneoftheSMRsthatareconsiderednearlyreadyforconstructionmeetsthelowgenerationcostcriterion.Despitethisreality,therehasbeenamajoreffortundertakenbyvariousreactorvendorstomarket SMRs.Anumberof reasonshavebeenadvanced topursue thedevelopment andconstruction of SMRs and these are directed both at industrialized countries anddevelopingcountries.Thelatter,inparticular,isamajortargetmarketforSMRs,includingmany countries that have no commercial nuclear capacity at present, such as Indonesia.The IAEA suggests that SMRs “may provide an attractive and affordable nuclear-poweroption for many developing countries” because of their smaller electrical grids, limited32Arbie,Sudarsono,andSubki,“StrategyforIntroductionofSmallandMediumReactorsinIndonesia,”733.33BenjaminK.SovacoolandM.V.Ramana,“BacktotheFuture:SmallModularReactors,NuclearFantasies,andSymbolicConvergence,”Science,Technology,&HumanValues40,no.1(2015):96–125.34M.V.Ramana,“SecondLifeorHalf-Life?TheContestedFutureofNuclearPowerandItsPotentialRoleinaSustainableEnergyTransition,”inEnergyTransitions,ed.FlorianKern,AlgraveHandbookoftheInternationalPoliticalEconomyofEnergy(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2016);M.V.Ramana,“TheFrontiersofEnergy:AGradualDecline?,”NatureEnergy1,no.1(January11,2016):7.35M.V.RamanaandZiaMian,“OneSizeDoesn’tFitAll:SocialPrioritiesandTechnicalConflictsforSmallModularReactors,”EnergyResearch&SocialScience2(June2014):115–124.


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infrastructureandrestrictedinvestmentcapability.36Likewise,oneanalystfromtheWorldBank argues, “Given their lower capital requirements and small size,whichmakes themsuitable for small electric grids, SMRs canmore effectively address the energy needs ofsmalldevelopingcountries”.37Indonesia has demonstrated an interest in SMRs by being an active participant in theIAEA’smeetingsonSMRs.Infact,IndonesiawasamongthefirstcountriesthatpreparedanIAEA“UserRequirementDocument”forSMRs,havingdonesointheyear2000.38BATAN’sreasonsforinterestinSMRsfallintotwocategories.Thefirstcategoryofreasonsarecommontoitsgeneralinterestinnuclearpower,whetherwithlargeorsmallreactors:this includes low levels of electricity consumption among the population of Indonesia,growingenergyneeds,and(claimsabout) lackofalternatemeans tomeet theseneeds.39Thesecondcategoryofreasonsarespecific toSMRs: this includes the fact that therearemanyremoteareasandsmallislandsthatdorequireelectricityorenergybutdonothavethedemand level tosupportconstructionofa largenuclearreactor,andthe fact that thetotalfinancialcostofSMRsisexpectedtobelowerthanalargereactor.40BATAN has explored the possibility of importing different kinds of SMRs from nuclearvendorsindifferentcountries.Aswediscussbelow,thisincludesthepossibilityofasmallfloatingpowerplantfromRussia,anSMRfromKoreathatcanalsodesalinateoceanwater,andahightemperaturegascooledreactor(HTGR),oneofthefourfamiliesofSMRsunderdevelopmentaroundtheworld,41againfromRussia.Whatisoddaboutthelastpossibilityis that Russia has no experience in constructing HTGRs, unlike for example Germany.

36SeetheIAEAwebsite:IAEA,“SMR-NuclearPower,”SmallandMediumSizedReactors(SMRs)Development,AssessmentandDeployment,lastmodified2015,accessedDecember25,2015,https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/SMR/.NotethattheIAEAincludesreactorsofupto700MWandusesthetermSmallandMediumReactors(againwiththeacronymSMR)ratherthanSmallModularReactorsinitsdeliberations.Thereis,however,alargeoverlapinthetwocategories.37IoannisN.Kessides,“TheFutureoftheNuclearIndustryReconsidered:Risks,Uncertainties,andContinuedPromise,”EnergyPolicy48(2012):185–208.38IAEA,GuidanceforPreparingUserRequirementsDocumentsforSmallandMediumReactorsandTheirApplication,71–93.39YohannesSardjono,“SMRApplicationStudyinIndonesia:CaseStudyforKalimantanSite,”inTopicalIssuesonInfrastructureDevelopment:ManagingtheDevelopmentofaNationalInfrastructureforNuclearPowerPlants(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2012).40Syahril,JMCJohari,andSunarko,“ProspectsofSMRsinIndonesia’sEnergySystem”(presentedattheTechnicalMeetingonOptionstoEnhanceEnergySupplySecurityusingNPPsbasedonSMRs,Vienna,Austria:IAEAHeadquarters,2011),http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Technology/meetings/2011-Oct-3-6-SMR-TM/2-Tuesday/9_INDONESIA_BATAN_Sunarko_TM3-4Oct2011.pdf;BakriArbie,BudiSudarsono,andIyosR.Subki,“StrategyforIntroductionofSmallandMediumReactorsinIndonesia,”inSmallandMediumSizedReactors:StatusandProspects(Cairo,Egypt:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2001),733–742,accessedDecember31,2015,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CSPS-14-P/CSP-14_part5.pdf.Syahriletal.states:“ManyregionsinIndonesiadonothavesufficientsupplyofelectricity,esp.inremoteareasandsmallislands[andthese]areasmaybenefitfromNewandRenewableEnergy,includingNuclearthroughSMRtechnology.”41AlexanderGlaseretal.,SmallModularReactors:AWindowonNuclearEnergy,AnEnergyTechnologyDistillate(Princeton,N.J.:AndlingerCenterforEnergyandtheEnvironmentatPrincetonUniversity,June2015),accessedJuly29,2015,http://acee.princeton.edu/distillates/distillates/small-modular-reactors/.


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BATAN has also signed an agreement with the French company DCNS,42which hastraditionally been involved in a range of naval defence systems but more recently isdevelopingasubmarinebasedelectricitygeneratingreactorprojectcalledFlexblue.43Theideaistoparkthesubmarineontheoceanfloorandrunacablefromittolandtosupplyelectricity.Indonesia also started a “Pre Feasibility Study to introduce SMR to Bangka BelitungProvincein2009”asrequestedbythethengovernorofBangkaBelitungProvince.44TherehasalsobeenaproposaltoconsideranSMRforKalimantan.45BATANofficialshave identified several challenges concerningSMRs, includingchallengesrelating to the stability of the electricity grid, the necessary regulatory framework, theregulatory requirement for designs being based on “proven technology” (this concern isdiscussedinmoredetaillaterinsection5.5),safetyconcernssuchasthoseassociatedwithconstructioninseismicallyactiveareasandemergencypreparedness,andthenecessityofpoliticalcommitmentfromthegovernmentandacceptancebythepublic.46BATANofficialshaveusedoneof thestandardmethodsrecommendedbythe IAEA,47theKepner Tregoemethodology,which dates back to the 1960s,48to identify potential SMRdesignsofinterest.49Basedonthisapproach,BATANclaimstohaveidentifiedalistofsixSMR designs as having the “most potential”.50However, BATAN officials have beensomewhat inconsistent in their identification of these designs. According to a talkpresented by BATAN officials at the IAEA in 2011, thesewere the ChineseHTR-PM, theRussianKLT-40S, the Japanese4S, theArgentinianCAREM-25, theSouthKoreanSMART,andtheAmericanNuScaledesigns.51Incontrast,inanothertalkbyaBATANofficialattheIAEAinthesameyear,NuScalewasnotmentionedatall,buttheIRIS,whichisnolonger42Batan,“NationalNuclearEnergyAgency-France-IndonesiaCooperationtoDevelopPowerReactor”(Jakarta,Indonesia,February11,2015),accessedJanuary1,2016,http://www.batan.go.id/index.php/id/berita-bhhk/611-perancis-indonesia-kembangkan-kerjasama-reaktor-daya.43PEI,“BlueSubmarine:TheFlexblueOffshoreNuclearReactor,”PowerEngineering,January5,2011,accessedJanuary2,2016,http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/print/volume-19/issue-5/features/blue-submarine-the-flexblue-offshore-nuclear-reactor.html.44JupiterSitorusPane,“AnOverviewofDevelopingNationalRequirementsforProliferationResistanceAssessmentofNuclearEnergySystemIncludingSMRinIndonesia,”in3rdTechnicalMeetingonOptiontoIncorporateIntrinsicProliferationFeaturetoNuclearPowerPlantswithInnovativeSmallandMediumSizedReactors(SMRs)(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2011).45YohannesSardjono,“ProspectsandTechnicalRequirementsonSMR:IndonesianCaseStudy,”inConsultants’MeetingontheStatusofInnovativeSmallandMediumSizedReactor(SMR)TechnologyandDesignswiththePotentialforNearTermDeployment(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2011).46Syahril,Johari,andSunarko,“ProspectsofSMRsinIndonesia’sEnergySystem.”47IAEA,NuclearReactorTechnologyAssessmentfornearTermDeployment(Vienna:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2013),accessedDecember31,2015,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1597_web.pdf.48CharlesHigginsKepnerandBenjaminB.Tregoe,TheRationalManager:ASystematicApproachtoProblemSolvingandDecisionMaking(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1965).49Pane,“AnOverviewofDevelopingNationalRequirementsforProliferationResistanceAssessmentofNuclearEnergySystemIncludingSMRinIndonesia.”50Ibid.51Syahril,Johari,andSunarko,“ProspectsofSMRsinIndonesia’sEnergySystem.”


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under active development, and a number of other designs were listed as possessing“potentialofavailability”.52AswithSMRproponentsaroundtheworld,53BATANhasbeenoptimisticaboutthetimeframeinwhichmanyoftheSMRdesignstheyhaveidentifiedwillactually be available. Among the designs identified as being available by 2015were theKLT-40S, the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, HTR-PM, PBMR, and the 4S,54not one ofwhichhasactuallybeenconstructedanywhere(asofDecember2016).

2.3 ExperiencewithNuclearTechnology

BATAN has several decades of experience with operating research reactors. There arethreeexistingnuclearresearchreactorsinIndonesia:

• TrigaMarkIIReactoratBandung

ThefirstreactorbuiltinIndonesiawasaTrigaMarkII,whichreachedcriticalityin1964,55and is located close to the Bandung Institute of Technology (InstitutTeknologiBandung/ITB).Initially,theoperatingpowerofthereactorwas250kW.By1971thepowerratingwasincreasedto1MWandthenin2000itwasincreasedagainto2MW.56

• KartiniReactor

The second reactor, also a TrigaMark II design, was inaugurated in 1979 and islocatedinYogyakarta.Thepowercapacityofthisreactoris100kW.57

• G.A.SiwabessyReactor

Themostrecentlybuiltresearchreactor,whichuseslocalfuelelementsfabricatedin Indonesia, became critical in 1987. It has a power capacity of 30 MW and islocatedinSerpong.58

52Pane,“AnOverviewofDevelopingNationalRequirementsforProliferationResistanceAssessmentofNuclearEnergySystemIncludingSMRinIndonesia.”53MycleSchneiderandAntonyFroggatt,TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2015(Paris:MycleSchneiderConsulting,2015),68–77,accessedNovember13,2015,http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-2015-.html.54Pane,“AnOverviewofDevelopingNationalRequirementsforProliferationResistanceAssessmentofNuclearEnergySystemIncludingSMRinIndonesia.”55Poneman,NuclearPowerintheDevelopingWorld,100.56Sriyana,“CurrentStatusofIndonesia’sNuclearPowerProgramme,”inTechnicalMeeting/WorkshoponTopicalIssuesonInfrastructureDevelopment:ManagingtheDevelopmentofNationalInfrastructureforNPP(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2012).57Ibid.58Huda,Rohman,andLasman,“ChallengesforIndonesiainEmbarkingtoNuclearPower”;RatihLangenati,“TheCurrentStatusOfResearchAndDevelopmentActivitiesInNuclearFuelAtBatan,”inTechnicalMeeting/ontheNuclearFuelCycleInformationSystem(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014),accessedDecember26,2015,https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/NE/NEFW/Technical-Areas/NFC/documents/infcis/NFCIS-2014/21-ratih_presentation_draft_win_gks-rev.pdf.


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2.4 PublicOpinionandOppositiontoNuclearPower

Unfavorable public opinion has been a significant constraint on nuclear powerdevelopment in Indonesia and in many other countries around the world.59Apart fromlocaloppositionfrominhabitantsoftheregionsidentifiedaspotentiallocationsfornuclearpower plants, the popularity of nuclear power, or lack thereof, among the generalpopulation is often identified as a factor in whether or not a country develops nuclearpower,includingbytheIndonesiangovernment.ThereiswidevariationintheresultsofstudiesofpublicattitudestowardsnuclearpowerinIndonesia.ApollpreparedfortheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencybyGlobeScan,acommercialpollingagency,inOctober2005foundthatonly33percentofthosepolledfeltthatnuclearwassafeandthatmoreplantsshouldbebuilt;incomparison,28percentfeltthatnuclearpowerwasdangerousandallplantsshouldbecloseddownwhile31percentagreedwiththe“middleopinion”thatwhatwasalreadythereshouldbeusedbutnonewplantsshouldbeconstructed.60In 2011, an IPSOSpoll conducted after Fukushima found that 33percent of Indonesiansstrongly oppose nuclear powerwhile 34 percentwere somewhat opposed.61About two-thirdsofthosepolledsaidthattheiropinionwasnotinfluencedbytheFukushimaaccidentinJapan.

Figure2:SurveyofpublicacceptanceofnuclearpowerplantsbyBATANin2013

Source:NationalNuclearEnergyAgency,ReportonAccountabilityofPerformanceofGovernmentInstitution2013NationalNuclearEnergyAgency.2014,NationalNuclearEnergyAgency:Jakarta.p.43.

BATAN’s surveys give somewhat different results (Figure2) and its 2013polls had60.4percent of respondents agreeing with the idea of establishing nuclear power plants in59M.V.Ramana,“NuclearPowerandthePublic,”BulletinoftheAtomicScientists67,no.4(2011):43–51.60GlobeScan,GlobalPublicOpiniononNuclearIssuesandtheIAEA:FinalReportfrom18Countries(London:PreparedfortheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencybyGlobeScanIncorporated,2005),19.61IPSOS,GlobalCitizenReactiontotheFukushimaNuclearPlantDisaster(Ipsos,June2011),http://www.ipsos-na.com.

59.70% 49.50% 52.93%

60.40%

40.73% 50.50% 47.07%

39.60%

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00%

2010 2011 2012 2013

Agree

Disagree

Year


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Indonesia. According to BATAN, the public acceptance of NPPs decreased from 2010 to2011 in the wake of the events in Fukushima, Japan. In response, BATAN activelyundertook activities designed to increase public support for nuclear power, which,accordingtothesurveyresults,mayhavebeensomewhatsuccessful.As inmany countries, there is a strident debate regarding the pros and cons of nuclearpower in Indonesia. Civil society organizations have played an important role in thisdebate.62In broad strokes, opposition to nuclear power in Indonesia can be categorizedinto:1)alaysegment;2)asegmentconsistingofNon-GovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs)and academic circles; and 3) a segment consisting of current and former governmentofficialsintheenergy,electricityandnuclearsectors.OrganizationsthathaveplayedapartinopposingnuclearreactorsaretheIndonesianAnti-NuclearCommunity(MasyarakatAntiNuklir Indonesia – MANUSIA), the Indonesian Forum for Environment (WahanaLingkunganHidup Indonesia –WALHI), Greenpeace, and religious organizations such astheNahdlatulUlama(especiallyitsCentralJavadivision).63Some of the reasons that underlie opposition to nuclear power include concerns aboutsecurity of reactor operations, the reliability of reactor designs, radioactive waste, thepotentialfornuclearproliferation,Indonesia'sgeographicalpositionwithintheseismicallyactive Pacific Ring of Fire and/or the proximity of nuclear sites to seismic faults orvolcanoes, high economic costs, future dependence on foreign parties for nucleartechnologyorfuel,andapreferenceforlocalrenewableenergyresources.

3 SitingStudiesandLargeNuclearPlantProposals

BATAN has conducted a number of studies of sites that have been considered forcommercial nuclear power plants. Two types of studies have been done, those thatinvestigatethefeasibilityofaspecificsiteforinstallationofnuclearpower,andstudiesthatexplore issues that are not site specific although they do relate to the proposed nuclearfacility.Thepreliminarysitestudy isdivided into threephases,whichprogressivelynarrows thelistofcandidatesites:1. PotentialSiteIdentification:Apreliminarysurveyisusedtoobtainpotentialsitesthat

maybesuitableforanuclearpowerplant.Atthisstage,aspectsoflocalsitesuitabilitysuch as topography, seismology, volcanology, hydrology, meteorology, and humanactivityintheproposedareaareinvestigated.Forexample,sitesonthenorthcoastofJavapassedthispreliminarycandidacyphase,whilesitesonthesouthernpartofJavafailed for seismic reasons, as didWest Sumatra, which is close to the Sunda (Java)Trench,aregionwellknownforhighseismicactivity.

62Caballero-Anthony,Alexandra,andPunzalan,“CivilSocietyOrganizationsandthePoliticsofNuclearEnergyinSoutheastAsia:ExploringProcessesofEngagement.”63FauzanandSchiller,AfterFukushima:TheRiseofResistancetoNuclearEnergyinIndonesia;Amir,“TheStateandtheReactor:NuclearPoliticsinPost-SuhartoIndonesia”;Tanter,NuclearFatwa:IslamicJurisprudenceandtheMuriaNuclearPowerStationProposal.


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2. CandidateSiteIdentification: In this phase, the list of candidate sites is narrowed byinvestigatingadditionalaspectsoftheproposedsites,includinglandandwateruseaswellaslocalecologyandculturalhistorythatmaybeimpactedbyconstruction.

3. Selected Site Identification: In the final phase, the “best and final” site is identified.Additionalcriteriathatareinvestigatedincludeconsiderationsofradiationdispersionanddisasterpreparedness.

Following thesitestudies,additional follow-up technicalandeconomic feasibilitystudiesarethenconductedfortheselectedsite,whichconsistof:1. Technical Feasibility Study: This study is used to determine candidate nuclear

technologies for the proposed site. This includes the reliability of a proposed NPP’sperformanceanditsfuelsecurity,theavailabilityofthetechnology,thecompatibilityoftheNPPwiththelocalgridandtheselectionofapotentialnuclearsupplier.

2. Economic Feasibility Study: This study estimates the electricity generation cost bypotential vendor. This cost depends on the selected technology and location of thevendors.Assumptionsaboutdifferent fundingscenariosaffect theassessedeconomicfeasibilityofagivenNPP.Forexample,whetherthecapitalcostwillbefinancedbythegovernmentorbyinternationalfinancialinstitutionsimpactsthecostestimate.

To date, BATAN has conducted site studies on at least 14 potential sites. Below are thedescriptionsofsomeofthemainNPPproposalsandstudiesinIndonesia.Thestatusofthemainproposalsconsideredduringtheperiod2010-2015issummarizedinTable1.


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Table1.StatusofmainNPPproposalsconsideredfrom2010-2015

Location Region Purpose Size Partners/Collaborators

Status

1 TanahAbang,DesaBalong

MuriaPeninsula,CentralJava

LargeNPP

4x1,000MW

BATAN;IAEA Feasibilitystudycompleted(1996);“5yearsfurtherstudyrequired”(2012)

2 Muntok/TelukInggris,WestBangka

Bangka-Belitung

LargeNPP

6x1,000MW

BATAN;Bangka-Belitungprovincialgovernment

Feasibilitystudycompleted(2011)

3 TanjungBarani(orBerani),SouthBangka

Bangka-Belitung

LargeNPP

4x1,000MW

BATAN;Bangka-Belitungprovincialgovernment

Feasibilitystudycompleted(2011)

4 Unspecified Bangka-Belitung

SMR BATAN ProposedAugust(2013)

5 BerauandEastKutai

EastKalimantan

LargeNPP

1,000MW

BATAN;EastKalimantanprovincialgovernment;MinistryofResearchandTechnology

Min.ofResearchandTechnologysupport(2012);provincialgovernmentsupport(2015);Feasibilitystudyreportedasbeinginpreparation(2015)

6 DekanPutih,KubuRaya,andKetapang

WestKalimantan

LargeNPP

30MW BATAN;WestKalimantanprovincialgovernment

Feasibilitystudyreportedasbeinginpreparation(2015)

7 Unspecified CentralKalimantan

Pertamina;CentralKalimantanprovincialgovernment

Feasibilitystudyproposedbyprovincialgovernment(2015)

8 Gorontalo Gorontalo

FloatingNPP(SMR)

90MW Gorontaloprovincialgovernment;RAOUES(UnifiedEnergySystemofRussia);Rosatom

EnthusiasticallypursuedbyRAOUES/Rosatomandtheprovincialgovernmentinmid-2000s;subsequentlydormantbutre-


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emergedin20109 Pulau

Panjang,Banten

WestJava

LargeNPP

10 Kramatwaru-Bojonegara,Banten

WestJava

LargeNPP

11 Serpong WestJava

10MWe

BATAN

12 Serpong WestJava

NCPR64 30MWe

BATAN

13 Subang WestJava

600MW

BATANTeknologi;Rosatom

14 Unspecified HTGR 10-30MWe

BATAN/JapanAtomicEnergyAgency

Demonstrationplanttostartoperations“by2020”

15 TangerangSelatan,Banten65

HTGR 10MWth

BATAN;RENUKO;Rosatom

15 Unspecified TravellingWaveReactor

500MW

BATANTeknologi;TerraPower

BATANTeknologiproposal(2014)

16 Batam Riau LargeNPP

2x1,200MW

Riauprovincialgovernment;Rosatom;BATAN

AdaptedfromRichardTanter,Table:Indonesiannuclearpowerreactors,undergovernmentalconsideration,2010–2015,athttp://nautilus.org/network/associates/richard-tanter/publications/andRichardTanter,“TheSlovakian‘Inspirasi’forIndonesianNuclearPower–the‘Success’ofaPermanentlyFailingOrganisation,”AsianPerspective,Volume39,issue4(October-December2015),pp.667-694.Thosedocumentsincludethesourcesonwhichthetableisbased.

64“Batanmaybeginconstructionofnuclearpowerplantin2015”,Antara,17Dec2013,athttp://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91826/batan-may-begin-construction-of-nuclear-power-plant-in-2015;andRenoAlamsyah,Currentstatusofnationalpositiononnuclearpower:Indonesia,BuildingaNationalPositiononaNewNuclearPowerProgramme,IAEA,Vienna,24–26June2014,athttps://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-06-24-06-26-TM-INIG/NP_Current_Status_Indonesia.pdf.65TopanSetiadipura,“Indonesia’sExperimentalPowerReactorProject”(Seminar,IdahoFalls,Idaho,USA,September23,2015),https://catatanstudi.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/rde_project_topaninl.pdf;TopanSetiadipura,“RequirementsofPebbleBedReactor’sPlantInformationModel”(IAEANuclearKnowledgeManagement,Vienna,Austria,June22,2015),https://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/nuclearknowledge/Events/2015/2015-06-22-26-TM-PIM/.


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Below,wediscusssomeofthespecificsitesthathavebeenconsideredfortheconstructionof(large)nuclearplants.

3.1 MuriaPeninsulaStudy

TheMuriaPeninsulasiteshavebeenthelongeststudiedinIndonesia.Thisregionhasbeenpromoted as the appropriate site for a large nuclear power station for around threedecadesbyBATAN,theMinistryofEnergyandMineralResources(KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral – ESDM), theMinistry of Research andTechnology, the IAEA, andsomenuclearpowervendors(Japan,Korea,andRussia).In1983,BATAN, incooperationwiththeItaliannuclearengineeringfirmNIRA(NuclearsItaliana Reacttori Avancatti), studied and selected the Muria Peninsula as BATAN’spreferred site.66The Muria proposal subsequently involved New Japan EngineeringConsultants (NEWJEC Inc.), a Japanese engineering consultant firmand subsidiaryof theMitsubishicomplex,whichconducted feasibilitystudies forapotential Japanese-suppliednuclearplantontheMuriaPeninsulafrom1991-1996.In1993,NEWJECproducedathree-volumereportentitledFeasibilityStudyoftheFirstNuclearPowerPlantsatMuriaPeninsulaRegion that again projected the energy demand and supply to make a case for nuclearpower.67ThereportadvisedIndonesiatobuildtwelve600MWreactorsstartingin1996;theseweretostartoperatingcommerciallyby2003.68NEWJEC focused on three sites on the north coast of the Muria Peninsula regarded assuitable: Ujung Lemahabang and Ujung Grengganan in the village of Balong, and UjungWatu,afewkilometerseast.UjungLemahabangemergedasthepreferredsiteaccordingtoBATAN; apart from other advantages in terms of land and sea access, relatively lowpopulation density and location, and ground characteristics, Ujung Lemahabang had themost favorable ranking of these three sites in terms of volcanic and seismic hazards.Nevertheless, there was serious criticism of the seismic hazards of the site given itsproximitytomajorfaultlinesandpoorsoilstructure,andproximitytotheMuriavolcaniccomplex 25 kilometers away,which IAEA geologists and volcanologists regarded as stillcapableoferuptingintheexpectedlifetimeoftheplant.69

3.2 BangkaIslandStudy

The most recent study of potential nuclear sites carried out by BATAN was on BangkaIsland.OnJune15,2009,BATANsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwiththeBangka-Belitungprovincialgovernmentforthe“UtilizationofNuclearScienceandTechnologyfor

66RichardTanterandArabellaImhoff,“TheMuriaPeninsulaNuclearPowerProposal:StateofPlay,”AustralPolicyForum09-1A,NautilusInstitute,19January2009,accessedNovember29,2015,http://nautilus.org/apsnet/muria-nuclear-power/.67AugustSchlapfer,ReactorsontheRingofFire:ImplicationsforIndonesia’sNuclearProgram(Perth,Australia:AsiaResearchCentreonSocial,PoliticalandEconomicChange,MurdochUniversity,1996).68Amir,“NuclearRevivalinPost-SuhartoIndonesia,”273.69SeetheacademicstudybytheIAEAvolcanologystudyteam:AlexanderR.McBirneyetal.,“VolcanicandSeismicHazardsataProposedNuclearPowerSiteinCentralJava,”JournalofVolcanologyandGeothermalResearch126,no.1–2(2003):11–30.


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theWelfareof theCommunityofBangka-Belitung”.70Between2011and2013, feasibilitystudieswere conducted for two sites: Tanjungular,MuntokinWestBangka, and SebaginVillageCoast,PermisinSouthBangka.71Theresultsofthesefeasibilitystudiesshowedbothlocations were suitable for nuclear plants and estimated that the combination of sixreactors at the Muntok site in West Bangka and four units at the Permis site in SouthBangkacouldaccommodate10GWeofnuclearcapacity.72However,due toa change inprovincial government in2013, continued local support forthe Bangka project has receded somewhat.73The provincial government of Bangka-BelitungrequestedthatBATANandBAPETENreviewtheBangkaNPPdevelopmentplan,especiallyintheMuntokregion,WestBangka.TherequestwasfiledbasedonthefactthatBangkaIsland’sfeasibilityasanuclearsitemaybecompromisedbyunsustainableminingactivitiesthathavedamagedtheisland’slandstability,creatingdisaster-proneareas.74

3.3 BantenNuclearPowerPlantStudy

ThethirdareawhereBATANhasconsideredconstructinganuclearplantisBanten,WestJavaProvince.ThespecificsitethathasbeenconsideredisTanjungPujut,whichwaslistedasapotentialsiteevenintheIAEAstudyinthemid-1970s.75Inaddition,othersiteshavebeenconsideredonthenortherncoast.So far no potential sites in that region have, as yet, successfully met all the selectioncriteria. Coincidentally, as happened at theMuriaPeninsula, an earthquake also recentlyoccurred in Banten on November 4, 2015,76highlighting the seismic instability of theregion. The center of the earthquake was located about 88 kilometers southwest ofPandeglanginBanten,anditsmagnitudewasestimatedatcloseto5.0ontheRichterscale.

70RichardTanter,“TheSlovakian‘Inspirasi’forIndonesianNuclearPower:The‘Success’ofaPermanentlyFailingOrganization,”AsianPerspective39,no.4(2015):675–676.71IAEA,“Indonesia2013,”CountryNuclearPowerProfiles,2013,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2013_CD/countryprofiles/Indonesia/Indonesia.htm;Kamis,“BatanRecommendsBangkaBelitongasLocationforNuclearPowerPlant,”AntaraNews,August4,2016,http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/106093/batan-recommends-bangka-belitong-as-location-for-nuclear-power-plant;Sabtu,“IndonesianNuclearIsNotforWar,”AntaraNews,October15,2011,http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/76591/indonesian-nuclear-is-not-for-war.72NuclearPowerinIndonesia.June2015[cited2015October20];Availablefrom:http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Indonesia/.73WNA,“NuclearPowerinIndonesia,”WorldNuclearAssociation,lastmodifiedDecember2015,accessedDecember27,2015,http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Indonesia/.74CitinganarticleinTempofromFebruary3,2014(“PembangunanPLTNdiBangkadimintakajiulang”[ReviewofNPPinBangkarequested]http://nasional.tempo.co),Tanter(“TheSlovakian‘Inspirasi’forIndonesianNuclearPower:The‘Success’ofaPermanentlyFailingOrganization,”676.)describesitthus:“byearly2014,followingtheemergenceoflocalopposition,theheadoftheprovincialDisasterManagementAgencywrotetoBATANandtheincreasinglyprofessionalNuclearRegulatoryAgency,BAPETEN,askingforaformalreviewofthepossibleeffectsofBATAN’sBangkaNPPplanonthe‘fragileconditionofBangka’.Hedescribedtheconditionas‘alreadyveryalarmingduetorampantminingforaboutacentury’reflectingtheregion’shistoryofsevereenvironmentaldegradation.”75IAEA,NuclearPowerPlanningStudyforIndonesia(JavaIsland),59.76"5.2magnitudequakehitsJakarta",JakartaPost,4November2015,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/04/52-magnitude-quake-hits-jakarta.html.


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ThisearthquakeinPandeglangisthethirdtimeanearthquakehasshakenthearea,whichisnotfarfromtheKrakatauvolcano.

4 SmallModularReactorProposals

InadditiontoageneralinterestinSMRs,theIndonesiannuclearestablishmenthasstudiedsomeSMRpossibilitiesinmuchgreaterdetail.

4.1 Serpong,BantenExperimentalPowerReactor(EPR)

In December 2013, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources announced a plan tobuild a non-commercial power reactor (Reaktor Daya Non-Komersial; or ExperimentalPowerReactor:EPR77)andagammairradiationfacilityatSerponginBantenProvince,onthe edge of the city of Jakarta.78As the name suggests, this reactor is not intended as apowersupplyoption,butonlyasanexperimentalproject.The site isnext to theBATANnuclearcomplexinSerpong.79

TheExperimentalPowerReactorisaHighTemperatureGasCooledReactor.Accordingtoofficials, BATAN has examined the feasibility of HTGRs since 2010, and solicited expertinsight from HTGR research groups in different countries, including Japan, Russia, andChina in 2014.80Between 2010 and 2013, researchers at BATAN created a conceptualdesignofaHTGRusingcomputer-basedtools.81However,in2014,BATANonlydescribedthe“conceptualdesign”as“stillinprogress”.82

Sincethen,BATANseemstohaveabandonedthisdesign,oratleastlowereditspriorityincomparison toadifferentHTGRdesign, tobe imported fromRussiaand in2015,BATANentered into an agreement with Nukem Technology, a subsidiary of Russian nuclear

77NottobeconfusedwiththelargerEuropeanPowerReactor.78WNA,“NuclearPowerinIndonesia.”79YariantoSusilo,“TheIndonesianEPRProject,”inTrainingCourseonHighTemperatureGasCooledReactor(HTGR)Technology(Serpong,Indonesia:IAEA,2015),accessedDecember26,2015,https://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/nuclearpower/Downloadable/Meetings/2015/2015-10-19-10-23/DOC/D2_RDE_PROJECT_STATUS_(Oct_2015).pdf.80TaswandaTaryo,“DevelopmentofIndonesianExperimentalPowerReactorProgram:AnApproachtoInnovativeR&D,NuclearCogenerationandPublicAcceptance,”inINPRODialogueForumonInternationalCollaborationonInnovationstoSupportGloballySustainableEnergySystems(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014),accessedDecember27,2015,https://www.iaea.org/INPRO/9th_Dialogue_Forum/04_SessionPresentations/Day3_Planery4/7_Taryo-Indonesia-Day-3-Plenary-4.pdf.81M.DhandhangPurwadi,“StatusofGCRPrograminIndonesia”(presentedatthe23rdTWG-GCRMeeting,Vienna,Austria,March5,2013).82TagorSembiring,“CurrentStatusoftheHTGRConceptualDesigninBATAN,”inTechnicalMeetingontheSafetyofHighTemperatureGasCooledReactorsintheLightoftheFukushimaDaiichiAccident(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014),accessedDecember29,2015,https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-04-08-04-11-TM-NPTDS/8_Sembiring01.pdf.


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company Rosatom, to build this reactor.83 Unlike the conceptual design developed byBATANthathadapoweroutputof200MW(thermal),thedesignfromRussiahasapoweroutputofonly10MW(thermal).84Thereareotherdifferencesaswell.

Design work for the Serpong Experimental Power Reactor is to be carried out by theRENUKO Consortium of Russian and Indonesian companies. The lead on the project isNUKEMTechnologiesGmbH,aformallyGermancompanyownedbyRosatom,theRussianState Atomic Energy Company. Other Rosatom-linked companies involved includeAtomstroyexport and the reactor engineering design company OKBM Afrikantov.Indonesian companies involved include PT Rekayasa Engineering and PT Kogas DriyapKonsultan.85Thebudget for the reactor is reportedasbeing1.7 trillionRupiahs (around$130million).86

InAugust2016,BATAN signed an agreementwith theChinaNuclearEngineeringGroupCorporation (CNEC) to jointly develop HTGRs and train professionals.87CNEC has beenworkingwithTsinghuaUniversitytocommercializeHTGRs.88Fromnewsreports,itseemsthis agreement with BATAN resulted from CNEC looking for potential customers.89However, theagreement isalsosimilar toagreements thatBATANhasentered intowithother agencies involved in the promotion of HTGRs. In August 2014, BATAN signed acooperation agreement with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency on research anddevelopmentofHTGRs.90

83“ReaktorDayaEksperimenBatanAkanDibangunRusia[BATANExperimentalPowerReactorwillbebuiltbyRussia],”Kompas,April16,2015,accessedDecember26,2015,http://print.kompas.com/baca/2015/04/16/Reaktor-Daya-Eksperimen-Batan-Akan-Dibangun-Rusia?utm_source=bacajuga;"EconomyinBrief:BATANInchesClosertoExperimentalReactor,”JakartaPost,August27,2015,accessedDecember27,2015,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/27/economy-brief-batan-inches-closer-experimental-reactor.html.84Sembiring,“CurrentStatusoftheHTGRConceptualDesigninBATAN”;Susilo,“TheIndonesianEPRProject.”85“IndonesiaRulesoutNuclearasMajorPowerSource,”NuclearEngineeringInternational,December14,2015,accessedDecember15,2015,http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsindonesia-rules-out-nuclear-as-major-power-source-4752814.86MuhammadKurnianto,“BatantoBuildNuclearReactorWorthRp1.7tninSerpong,”Tempo,July1,2015,accessedDecember26,2015,http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2015/07/01/055679905/Batan-to-Build-Nuclear-Reactor-Worth-Rp17tn-in-Serpong.87YuanCan,“China’sNuclearGianttoPromoteHTGRinIndonesia-People’sDailyOnline,”People’sDailyOnline,August4,2016,accessedAugust7,2016,http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0804/c90000-9095521.html.88NECEShangguanZiying,“CNECandTHUMadeProgresstowardsFurtherCooperation,”CNECHighTemperatureReactorHoldings,lastmodifiedDecember31,2014,accessedAugust13,2016,http://en.cnechtr.com/ContentDetailInfo.aspx?menuid=3&columnid=13&dataid=35.89NewsreportssuggestthatWangShoujun,chairmanofChinaNuclearEngineeringGroupCorporationvisitedBATANinJune2016inordertobetterunderstandtheIndonesianmarket.Seehttp://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0804/c90000-9095521.html90WNN,“ChinaandIndonesiatoJointlyDevelopHTGR,”WorldNuclearNews,August4,2016,accessedAugust7,2016,http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-China-and-Indonesia-to-jointly-develop-HTGR-0408165.html.


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4.2 GorontaloFloatingSmallNPPProposal

TheoldestnuclearproposaldirectlyrelevanttoSMRtechnologystemsfromthemid-2000swhen the Russian nuclear supplier Rosatom proposed a small Russian floating nuclearpowerplanttosupplyelectricitytoGorontaloProvince,Sulawesi.91Floatingnuclearpowerplants are modeled after the reactors used to power a small fleet of nuclear-poweredicebreakersoperatedbyRussia fordecades.The ideaofacivilian floatingnuclearpowerplantprojecthasbeenaroundinRussiasincethe1990s,butprogresshasbeenslowanderratic.92The United States also explored the idea of commercial floating nuclear powerplants,onlytoabandontheideaasuneconomicalafterspendingmillionsofdollars.93InOctober2006, theGovernorofGorontaloannounced that theprovincealreadyhadanagreementwiththethenstate-ownedRaoues(UnifiedEnergySystemofRussia) tobuyafloating power plant.94BATAN confirmed the desire of Gorontalo’s local government toobtainafloatingNPP.Despite enthusiasm for the proposal on the part of the Government of Gorontalo, theIndonesian Minister of Research and Technology rejected the idea of using a floatingnuclearpowerplant.AsNatioLasman,thendeputychairmanofIndonesia'snuclearagencyandlaterchairoftheNuclearRegulatoryAgency(BAPETEN),toldtheWallStreetJournal,“Idon'twantIndonesiatobeusedasanexperiment”.95Thereseemedtobeapreferenceforland-based NPPs. In the meanwhile, construction of the Akademik Lomonosov, the firstprototypeshipbasedon the floatingnuclearplantdesign,hasbeensignificantlydelayed,andtherehavebeencorrespondingcostoverruns.96InMay2015,theprovincialgovernmentsontheislandofSulawesiencouragedtheCentralGovernment of Indonesia to build nuclear power plants because the region wasexperiencing a shortage of power.97The Secretary General of the Sulawesi Regional91TomWrightandGregoryL.White,“RussiaFloatsPlanForNuclearPlantAboardaBoat,”WallStreetJournal,August21,2007,sec.News,accessedDecember28,2015,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118765859256303633.92AlexandrNikitinandLeonidAndreyev,“FloatingNuclearPowerPlants”(Oslo:BellonaFoundation,2011),http://spb.org.ru/bellona/ehome/russia/nfl/nfl8.htm.93TedSherman,“FloatingNuclearPlants?TheWorstIdeaN.J.UtilityHasEverHad?,”NJ.com,accessedOctober4,2016,http://www.nj.com/inside-jersey/index.ssf/2016/08/offshore_nuclear_power_plants_nj_utility_once_considered_the_idea.html.94DianAbraham,“TheBattletowardsIndonesianFirstCommercialNuclearReactor,”inNoNukesAsiaForum(Indonesia,2008).95WrightandWhite,“RussiaFloatsPlanForNuclearPlantAboardaBoat.”96CharlesDigges,“RussiaAnnouncesyetNewerDeliveryDateforFirstFloatingNuclearPowerPlant,”Bellona.org,lastmodifiedOctober28,2014,accessedMay19,2015,http://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/nuclear-russia/2014-10-russia-announces-yet-newer-delivery-date-first-floating-nuclear-power-plant;CharlesDigges,“NewDocumentsShowCostofRussianFloatingNuclearPowerPlantSkyrockets,”Bellona.org,lastmodifiedMay25,2015,accessedDecember28,2015,http://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2015-05-new-documents-show-cost-russian-nuclear-power-plant-skyrockets;M.V.Ramana,LauraBerzakHopkins,andAlexanderGlaser,“LicensingSmallModularReactors,”Energy61(2013):555–564.97MuhammadIdris,“ListrikSeringByar-Pet,PemdaSulawesiMintaJokowiBangunPLTN[Frequentelectricityblackouts,theGovernmentofSulawesiRequestJokowiBuildNPP],”Detikfinance,lastmodifiedMay15,2015,accessedAugust5,2016,http://finance.detik.com/read/2015/05/15/150358/2915733/1034/listrik-sering-byar-pet-pemda-sulawesi-minta-jokowi-bangun-pltn.


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Development Cooperation Agency (Sekretaris Jenderal Badan Kerjasama PembangunanRegional Sulawesi – BKPRS) also confirmed that opinion.98In addition to the need forelectricity in theseprovinces, thesecondreasonadvanced forbuildinganuclearplant inSulawesiwasthediscoveryofuraniumresourcesinWestSulawesi—reportedlythelargesturaniumdepositinIndonesia.99Thefirstofthestatedrationales—electricityshortages—mightnolongerprovideastrongmotivationtobuildanuclearplant.InSeptember2015,PLNstartedconstructionofa100MW (four 25MW plants) gas-fired power plant in Pohuwatu, Gorontalo to alleviate thepower shortage in the province.100The first phase of the plant, capable of generating 50MWofelectricity,startedfunctioninginJanuary2016.101GiventhatPLN’sestimateofthepeakelectricitydemandinGorontaloisaround80-85MW,102thecommissioningofthefullplantshouldeasethepowershortage.Secondly, although Indonesia is not the only country to talk about the availability ofuraniuminthecountryasafactorindecidingtoconsidernuclearpowerplants,thereisnogoodreasontoconnectthetwo.Uraniumisaveryminorelementinthecostofgeneratingnuclear power and there is little or no difficulty in procuring nuclear fuel on theinternationalmarketatcompetitiveprices.

4.3 MaduraDesalinationSmallNPPProposal

MaduraisalargeislandnorthoftheportofSurabayainEastJava.InOctober2001,underthe framework of the Interregional Technical Cooperation Project of the IAEA, BATANsignedanagreementwithKoreaAtomicEnergyResearchInstitute(KAERI)toundertakeajointstudyentitled“Apreliminaryeconomicfeasibilityassessmentofnucleardesalinationin Madura Island”.103KAERI has been developing a small modular reactor called theSystem-IntegratedModularAdvancedReactor (SMART) since 1996.104 This plant designinvolvedtworeactorunitsthatcouldeachproduce100MWofelectricalpoweraswellas

98Ibid.99DewantiLestari,“Indonesiamilikicadanganuranium70.000ton'[‘Indonesiahas70,000tonsofuraniumreserves],”Antara,May20,2013,http://www.antaranews.com/berita/375792/indonesia-miliki-cadangan-uranium-70000-ton.“ListrikSeringByar-Pet,PemdaSulawesiMintaJokowiBangunPLTN,”Detikfinance.100"EconomyinBrief:PLNtoBuildNewPowerPlantinGorontalo,”JakartaPost,September11,2015,accessedDecember29,2015,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/11/economy-brief-pln-build-new-power-plant-gorontalo.html.101PTPLN,“PLNStartsOperatingGasPowerPlantGorontalo,”RambuEnergy,lastmodifiedJanuary18,2016,accessedAugust5,2016,http://www.rambuenergy.com/2016/01/pln-starts-operating-gas-power-plant-gorontalo/.102Ibid.103Si-hwanKimetal.,“APreliminaryEconomicFeasibilityAssessmentofNuclearDesalinationinMaduraIsland,”InternationalJournalofNuclearDesalination1,no.4(2005):466–476.104KyooHwanBaeetal.,“SafetyEvaluationoftheInherentandPassiveSafetyFeaturesoftheSmartDesign,”AnnalsofNuclearEnergy28,no.4(2001):333–349.


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4,000 cubic meters/day of fresh water through desalination.105The initial projectenvisionedplantoperationstocommencein2015.106Under the feasibility study, BATAN along with other partners projected a gap betweenwater demand and supply and argued that nuclear desalination was an appropriatesolutiontothisdeficit.107TheythenconductedaseriesofworkshopsinMaduratopromotethe idea.BATANalsoconductedseismicandeconomicfeasibilitystudies.108However, theideadoesnotseemtohavebeenpursuedinrecentyears.

4.4 WestKalimantanNPPProposal

Another region that has been identified by BATAN as a potential site for smallmodularreactors isWest Kalimantan, in part because of the paucity of grid infrastructure in thearea.Thisplanappearstohavethesupportoftheprovincialgovernment,whichissuedtheWestKalimantanGovernor’sDecreeNo.4[Bappeda/2013].109Thedecreepromulgatestheformation of a Nuclear Power Plant Development Coordination Team, taking intoconsiderationthefactthatWestKalimantanhaslocaluraniumreservesinboththeNangaElladistrictandtheMelawidistrict.AsinthecaseofSulawesi,whythislocalavailabilityofuranium has any relevance to constructing a nuclear reactor in this area has not beenclarified.Anargument that is technicallymoresound is that the total installedelectricitycapacity in theWest Kalimantan grid is relatively low, less than 350 MW,110and is notexpected to grow sufficiently even in the long term to be able to accommodate a largenuclear power plant. Therefore, if a nuclear plant were to be built at all, then it would

105Kimetal.,“APreliminaryEconomicFeasibilityAssessmentofNuclearDesalinationinMaduraIsland,”469.106InternationalNuclearDesalinationAdvisoryGroup,“IndonesiaandKorea,Rep.of,”INDAGNewsletter,September2003.107BambangSuprawoto,AzizJakfar,andIdaEkawati,“FeasibilityStudyforNuclearDesalinationPlantConstructioninMaduraIsland,”inInternationalConferenceonNon-ElectricApplicationofNuclearPower(Oarai,Japan:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2007),451–460,accessedDecember29,2015,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/P_1354_CD/PDF/P_1354.pdf.108Ngadeninetal.,“PemetaanGeologiDanIdentifikasiSesarAktifDiLokasiCalonTapakInstalasiPembangkitListrikTenagaNuklir(PLTN)KetapangDanSekitarnya;Madura[GeologicalMappingandIdentificationofActiveFaultLocationinOnNuclearPowerPlant(NPP)CandidateSitesinKetapangandSurrounding;Madura],”inSeminarGeologiNuklirDanSumberdayaTambangTahun2004[SeminaronNuclearGeologyAndMiningResources2004],(Jakarta,Indonesia:PusatPengembanganBahanGalianDanGeologiNuklir-BATAN,2004),164–183;SudiAriyanto,Moch.DjokoBirmano,andSuparman,“EconomicandFinancialAssessmentofNuclearDesalinationPlantinMaduraIsland,”inInternationalConferenceonNon-ElectricApplicationofNuclearPower(Oarai,Japan:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2007),238–249,accessedDecember29,2015,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/P_1354_CD/PDF/P_1354.pdf.109KeputusanGubernurKalimantanBaratNo.4[Bappeda/2013]tentangPembentukanTimKoordinasiPembangunanPembangkitListrikTenagaNuklir(PLTN)diKalimantanBarat.2013[DecisionoftheGovernorofWestKalimantan,No.4(Bappeda/2013)ontheFormationofaCoordinatingTeamfortheDevelopmentofaNuclearPowerPlantinWestKalimantan,2013),http://database.kalbarprov.go.id/_hukum/berkas_hukum/SK%20Gub%20Nomor%204%20Tahun%202013.pdf.110HendroTjahjono,“RecentStatusofNuclearPowerAssessmentinIndonesia”(presentedattheTechnicalMeetingonTechnologyAssessmentforNewNuclearPowerProgrammes,Vienna,Austria,September1,2015),accessedAugust6,2016,https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Meetings/2015/2015-09-01-09-03-NPTDS.html;PTPLN,StatisticofElectricity2014(Jakarta,Indonesia:MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2014).


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necessarilyhavetobeaSMR.That,ofcourse,isnotthesameasassertingthataSMRshouldbebuilt.

The Nuclear Power Plant Development Coordination Team consists of local governmentofficials,mainlyfromtheDevelopmentPlanningAgencyattheSub-NationalLevel,regionalPLNofficials,andacademiciansandistaskedwiththefollowingduties:

1. To develop a “General Development Planning of Nuclear Power Plant” in WestKalimantan;

2. TocoordinatetheresultsoftheGeneralDevelopmentPlanningofNuclearPowerPlantin West Kalimantan with the Ministry/Institution, related Regional Working Group(SatuanKerjaPerangkatDaerah–SKPD)intheregency/City;

3. To facilitate the planning policy program of the Ministry/Institution to the relatedSKPDintheprovinceandcity/district;

4. ToconductmonitoringofprogramimplementationandcoordinationofplanningforaNPPinWestKalimantan.

BATAN has identified four locations as being suitable for potential nuclear power plantconstruction.Incurrentpriorityordertheyare:(i)Kendawangansub-districtofKetapang;(ii) Sukadanadistrict inNorthKayongdistrict; (iii) the sub-districtofNorthMatanHilir;and(iv)thesub-districtofSouthMatanHilir,Ketapang.111

5 InstitutionalandRegulatoryLandscape

5.1 RelevantGovernmentAgencies

A comprehensive list of governmental agencies involved with the energy sector inIndonesia, and hence the nuclear power decision-making framework, would be lengthybecauseofthearchipelagicnatureofIndonesia,whichhasledtoanextensivehierarchyofagenciesthathaveavoiceintheenergydebatefromthenationaldowntothelocal level.Additionally,suchalonglistwouldnotshedlightonhowtheseandotherplayersinteractin reality. However, an orientation to the political ecology affecting nuclear power inIndonesia is a useful starting point. Table 2 provides an overview of many of the keyparticipants in the nuclear debate, divided among four broad sectors: government,nongovernmental, foreign, andmultilateral.112 This gives a snapshot of themany voicesand interests at play in the nuclear debate in Indonesia. For a brief description of keyIndonesianagencies,thereaderisreferredtoAppendix8.2.

111Susiati,H.,PenentuanTapakPotensialPLTNDenganMetodeSigDiWilayahPesisirPropinsiKalimantanBarat[DeterminationofPotentialNPPSitesInCoastalAreasofWestKalimantanProvince,UsingSigMethods],B.PusatKajianSistemEnergiNuklir-PKSEN,Editor.2014,PusatKajianSistemEnergiNuklir-PKSEN,BATAN.Inits2014IndonesiaNuclearEnergyOutlook,BATANmentionsfivepotentialareasinWestKalimantan.112Derived fromRichard Tanter, “Democratic Accountability andRiskAssessment in IndonesianNuclear PowerProposals” (GoNERI Project, School of Engineering, Tokyo University, March 4, 2010),http://nautilus.org/network/associates/richard-tanter/talks/.


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Table 2: Overview of the Indonesian nuclear political ecology and key players(agenciesmarkedwithanasterisk(*)aredescribedinAppendix8.2)

Indonesia–GovernmentNationalLevel

PresidentCabinet/coordinatingministersNationallegislature[DPR]/partiesDPRKomisiVIIBATAN(NationalNuclearEnergyAgency)*BAPETEN(NationalNuclearRegulatoryAgency)*

MinistryofResearch&Technology*MinistryofEnergy&MineralResources*MinistryofFinanceMinistryofStateEnterprisesMinistryofEnvironmentIndonesianNationalArmedForces(TNI)

RegionalLevelRegionalanddistrict(propinsi/kabupaten)governments

Indonesia–NongovernmentalNationalLevel

WALHIGreenpeaceWWFIndonesiaIndonesianInstituteforEnergyEconomics

InstituteforInfrastructureReform

PelangiIndonesiaAnti-NuclearSociety(Manusia)

CSISScientificgroups

RegionalLevel(e.g.Jepara/Balong)

PersatuanMasyarakatBalong(BalongCommunityUnion)

MAREM(MasyarakatReksoBumi)

GardaMuria;MuriaInstitute

NahdlatulUlamaCentralJava/JeparaandNU-related

Localindustry

CorporatePLN*Indonesianproposedpartners

Coalandgaselectricitygenerators

NuclearEstablishment

UniversitiesBATANalumniPro-nucleargroups


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5.2 GovernmentRegulationsPertainingtoNuclearPower

Liketheexistenceofanextensivenetworkofgovernmentagenciesinvolvedintheenergysectorand,hence,holdingastake in thenuclearpowerdebate, there isanequally extensive body of laws and regulations that could affect the eventualimplementationofcommercialnuclearpowerinIndonesia.Anoverviewofrelevantregulationrelating to licensing, safety, liabilityconcernsandso forth,whichcouldaffectnuclearpowerdevelopmentinIndonesia,isincludedintheAppendices.Onlythekeylawsandbroaderframeworkarereviewedinthissection.TheoverallhierarchyofrulesinIndonesia,asregulatedbyLawNo.12/2011ontheformulationofLawandRegulations,isasfollows:1) ConstitutionoftheRepublicofIndonesia1945(Undang-UndangDasarNegara

RepublikIndonesia1945orUUD’45);2) People's Consultative Council Decree (Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan

Rakyat);3) Lawand/orGovernmentRegulationinlieuofLaw(Undang-Undang/Peraturan

PemerintahPenggantiUndang-Undang);4) GovernmentRegulation(PeraturanPemerintah);5) PresidentialRegulation(PeraturanPresiden);6) ProvincialRegulation(PeraturanDaerahProvinsi);7) Regencyand/orMunicipalityRegulation(PeraturanDaerahKabupaten/Kota).In the post New Order period, there has been a significant increase in theconstitutional position of provincial, district and city (propinsi/kabupaten/kota)authorities andwill influence anynucleardecision-makingprocess.ThishasbeenthecaseintheBangkaandthevariousKalimantanproposals.In addition, there are other legal instruments in the form of PresidentialInstructions or Decrees andMinisterial Decrees that providemore detailed rulesthat support the larger Laws and Government Regulations. The three mostimportantpiecesofregulationaffectingnuclearpoweraresummarizedbelow.LawNo.10/1997onNuclearEnergy

The legal basis for nuclear energy in Indonesia is Law No. 10/1997 on NuclearEnergy(in lieuofLawNo.31/1964onAtomicEnergy).LawNo.10/1997aims tobalance considerations regarding advances in the use of nuclear energy that canbenefitpeoplewithconsiderationsregardingradiationhazardsinherentinnuclearpower and that require the regulation and supervision of nuclear energy for thesafety,security,peace,andhealthofworkers,thepublic,andtheenvironment.TheLaw highlights regulation concerning institutions, research and development,radioactivewastemanagement,andliabilityfornucleardamage.LawNo.30/2007onEnergy

The legal basis for energy regulation is Law No. 30/2007 on Energy. The Lawhighlights energy resources, the energy buffer reserve, energy crisis and energy


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emergency issues, energy price, safety and the environment, local contentrequirements,nationalenergypolicyandtheestablishmentof thenationalenergycouncil,energymanagement,andtheauthorityofthecentralandlocalgovernment.GovernmentRegulationNo.79/2014onNationalEnergyPolicy

TheGovernmentofIndonesiarecentlyissueditsnewnationalenergypolicyunderGovernment Regulation No. 79/2014 to replace the older national energy policy(PresidentialRegulationNo.5/2006).Oneofthepoliciessupportedunderthenewregulationis“energydiversification.”OnegoalofthispieceofnationalenergypolicylegislationistohelpachievetheoptimalenergymixforIndonesia.Theshareofnewandrenewableenergyisexpectedtobe23percentby2025and31percentby2050.However, the specific share for nuclear energy, which falls under new andrenewable energy, is not explicitly stated in the document. This suggests thatnuclearenergyhasnotyetbecomeamainpriorityinIndonesiaand/orthatthereisnotyetanysenseofurgencyindefiningarolefornuclearpowerinIndonesia,sincenoexplicit,legislation-driventargetshavebeenset.

5.3 LocalContentRequirements

OneareaofregulationpolicythatmayespeciallyimpactSMRadoptioninIndonesiais the local content requirement. Indonesia has shown interest in boosting theadoption of local content, i.e., locallymade components or services conducted bydomestic providers, by issuing regulations affecting electricity infrastructure. Anoverview of the various local content requirements and minimum local contenttargets for various goods and services,which varywidely across plant types andwith plant size, is presented in the Appendices. The ranges for the various localcontributionsvaryfrombetween25to100percent.At present, the Government of Indonesia has not yet established local contentregulationsforlargenuclearpowerplants,sincetherehasbeennofirmGovernmentdecision on pursuing commercial nuclear power. According to the Minister ofIndustry’sregulationNo.54/2012onGuidelinesfortheUseofDomesticProducttoElectricityInfrastructureDevelopment,thelocalcontentrequirementisappliedonacase-by-casebasistoeachauctionandcontract.Yet,accordingtointerviewsthatIIEE(Indonesian Institute forEnergyEconomics)conducted in2015withexperts,theregulationisnotstrictlyenforcedsincelocal industryhasbeenunabletomeettherequirements.This may prove an area of active debate if SMRs are seriously considered byIndonesia in the future. SMR designers and vendors often highlight the modularnatureofthesesmallreactors,meaningthatthevariouselementsofthereactorsaretobefabricatedinafacilitylocatedinthevendor’shostcountryandthenshippedtothe final site for assembly into the reactor, thereby minimizing the amount ofconstruction to be done in the country that is importing the reactor. GivenIndonesia’spushforincreasedlocalcontent,tosupportlocalindustry,anumberofissues are highlighted: How would Indonesia decide on the SMR and/or NPPcomponentsandservicesthatitmightconsiderforregulationunderalocalcontent


31

requirement?WouldthelocalcontentrequirementvarybetweenlargeNPPprojectsand smaller SMR projects? This would also be a problem with the build-own-operate(BOO)modelthatRosatomhasfollowedinthecaseoftheAkkuyuprojectinTurkey,wherethevendorwillconstruct,operate,andmaintainmostaspectsofthenuclearpowerplantforseveralyearsinitially.113IfIndonesiaweretoconsiderpurchasingafloatingpowerplant,itispossiblethatitwould be covered under a BOO model. If so, it is not clear how local contentrequirements affect Indonesia’s consideration of such a project. There are manyother such details that would have to be settled in the event of Indonesia goingforwardwithacquiringanSMR.

5.4 Land-BasedSitingRequirements

Another piece of existing legislation could affect the kind of SMR designs underconsiderationnoworinthefuture.Accordingtoexistingregulations(GovernmentRegulationNo.54/2012andGovernmentRegulationNo.43/2006),Indonesiaonlyofficially recognizes land-based nuclear reactor site proposals. The language ofGovernment RegulationNo. 43/2006 stipulates that the term “site” refers to “thelocationonlandwhichisusedfortheconstruction,operation,anddecommissioningofoneormorenuclearreactorsalongwithotherrelatedsystems.”Therefore, there appears to be a contradiction between existing policy and, forexample,theGorontalofloatingpowerplantproposal,andmayruleoutIndonesia’sconsiderationofSMRdesignsbasedonfloatingnuclearpropulsionreactors,liketheRussian KLT-40S. The KLT-40S design is intended to be deployed on a floatingplatform.Whatformwouldasitestudytakeifthereactoriscapableoffloatingfromlocation to location?What unique requirements in assessing feasibilitymight thispresent?Furthermore,itisunclearhowthisland-basedrequirementmayormaynotimpactIndonesia’sconsiderationofotherevenmorespeculativeSMRconcepts. Take, forexample, France’s Flexblue. Flexblue’s design is derived from that of nuclearreactorsusedtopowerFrenchsubmarinesandthepowerplantistobeinstalledonthe ocean floor. However, this technology has never seen operational experienceandthereareseveralquestionsthatwouldcomeupwithrespecttosuchamodeofdeployment.HowwillIndonesiaengageinadebateregardingthedefinitionoftheterm“site”ifcertain local stakeholders or foreign vendors continue to champion one of thesemoreunconventional SMRdesigns? Would the list of attractive SMRdesigns and

113MycleSchneiderandAntonyFroggatt,TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2016(Paris:MycleSchneiderConsulting,2016),46,accessedAugust3,2016,http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2016-HTML.html.Atthefour-unitAkkuyuprojectinTurkey,Rosatomhasenteredintoa15-yearPowerPurchaseAgreement(PPA),whichguaranteesthepurchaseof70percentoftheelectricityproducedfromunits1and2and30percentofunits3and4,withtheresttobesoldontheelectricitymarket.


32

vendors narrow, or would the regulatory definitions broaden? As with the localcontent requirement, existing policy in Indonesia raises more questions than itanswerswithregardstotheadoptionofSMRs.

5.5 ProvenTechnologyCriteria

OnelastelementofcurrentpolicyinIndonesiathatwilllikelyaffectnuclearpowerin Indonesia, and especially the adoption of SMRs, is the proven technologycriterion. Inaccordancewithexisting regulation,nuclear reactors that canobtainlicenses include both commercial and non-commercial power reactors andcommercial and non-commercial non-power reactors. Originally, as stipulated inGovernment RegulationNo. 43/2006, the license for a commercial power reactorcould be granted where the relevant technology had already been “proven”. TheRegulation states: "What is meant bytested technology (proven technology) is atechnology used in a design that has been proven through a reactor operatingexperienceofminimum3(three)yearssafelywithanaveragecapacityfactorofatleast75%(seventyfivepercent)[Article4,Para.2]."However, throughthenewGovernmentRegulationNo.2/2014, theterm“proven”has been extended to include all structures, systems and components of nuclearreactors important to the reactor’s safety, in a relevant environment or inaccordancewithoperatingconditions,andthatareappliedinaprototype[Article6,Para.4a]. Additionally, intermsoftechnologyuse,havingacommercialoperatinglicense fromtheregulatorybodyof thevendor’shomecountry, foracountry thathas already built a commercial NPP, now constitutes a demonstration of proventechnology.Therefore, thenewlegislationlessstrictlydefines“proventechnology”byrelaxingtherequirementofademonstratedhistoryofsafeoperationofthedesigninfavorofrelying on the assessment of the regulatory body of the vendor’s home country.Thisshiftcouldperhapssmooththeregulatorypathtowardtheadoptionof,asyet,largelyunprovenSMRdesignswhile leaving theregulatory topographyessentiallythe same for future large power reactors. While the original definition did notpreclude the possibility of Indonesia approving SMR designs for regions such asWestKalimantan,itwouldhavesignificantlyslowedthelicensingprocess,sinceanydesigns would have had to have a demonstrated operational history in anothercountrypriortoobtaininglicensingapprovalinIndonesia.Thenewer,morerelaxeddefinition,shortensthetimetoapprovalandopensupthepossibilitythatIndonesiacould choose to be the first to operate a novel SMR design supplied by a foreigncountry.

6 ElectricityLandscapeandComparisonofCosts

InJune1998,theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyconductedanAdvisoryGroupMeeting and Consultancy Meeting on “SMR User Requirements for DevelopingCountries” in Vienna. At that meeting, BATAN enunciated an economic target in


33

simple terms: “the levelled [sic] cost of electricity from nuclear plants should belower than from coal plant with cleanup system based on prevailing nationalregulation”.114Elsewhere,BATANhasclaimedthatasmall-sizedreactor“canenterthecost-optimalsolutionby2027andonlywhentheovernightcostisbelow4,000USD/kWe(3,500USD/kWe).”115Althoughthisstatementisunclearaboutwhatallisincluded in the cost figure and the significance of the year mentioned, it clearlyestablishes that the cost of electricity from SMRs is a critical component of anydecisionmakingprocessregardingtheiracquisition.Inthissection,weexaminethelikelycostofelectricitygenerationfromSMRsandcomparethatwithothersourcesofelectricity.

6.1 CurrentSourcesofElectricity

Indonesia is the largest archipelago in theworld. The country ismadeupof fivelarge,denselypopulatedislands,butcontainsmorethan17,000islandstotal,witharound 900 or more islands being permanently inhabited.116Therefore, thecountry’s geography inherently presents a unique challenge to meeting thecountry’sevolvingelectricityneeds.Foranoverviewoftheinstitutionalframeworkaffecting the electricity sector, see the Appendices. In this section the discussionfocusesonwhat in the Indonesiangovernment’s terminology is regardedas “newandrenewableenergy,”which,somewhatunusually,includesnuclearenergyasonesuchsource.117Indonesiaisendowedwithbothfossilandnon-fossilenergyresources.BasedontheMinistryofEnergyandMineralResources’datain2015,itisestimatedthatalmost94percent of Indonesia’s total primary energy supply (not just electricity) comesfrom fossil fuel resources.118Of the estimated 13Million tonnes of Oil Equivalent(MTOE) of new and renewable energy sources that were utilized in 2015, theMinistryofEnergyandMineralResourceslistsgeothermalasconstituting6MTOE,biofuel as comprising 4 MTOE, biomass as comprising 2 MTOE, and hydropower

114IAEA,GuidanceforPreparingUserRequirementsDocumentsforSmallandMediumReactorsandTheirApplication,90.115Syahril,Johari,andSunarko,“ProspectsofSMRsinIndonesia’sEnergySystem.”Both$4000/kWeand$3,500/kWehavebeenmentionedbutwithoutanyclarificationonwhatthetwonumberssignify.116EmbassyoftheRepublicofIndonesia,WashingtonD.C.,AccessedNovember2015,http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/wordpress/?page_id=494;Wikipedia,AccessedNovember2015,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_islands_of_Indonesia.Notethattherearedisagreementsabouttheexactnumberofislands,althoughthesedifferencesareirrelevantforourpurpose.117AccordingtoGovernmentRegulationNo.79/2014onNationalEnergyPolicy,nucleariscategorizedasanewenergyresourcesinceitcanbeproducedbynewtechnology.118RidaMulyana,“RenewableEnergyasANationalDevelopmentPriority,”inClimateChangeandREDD+intheNationalMediumTermDevelopmentPlan(Jakarta,Indonesia,2015),accessedDecember31,2015,http://www.unorcid.org/upload/Ministry_of_Energy_and_Mineral_Resources_UNORID_Dialogue_Series_9_March_2015.pdf.


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comprising only 1MTOE.119However, other data sources show that hydroelectricpowerconstitutes3.4percentofthetotalprimaryenergy.120Coming to just electricity, the shares of different sources, according to the state-owned utility PT PLN and includingwhatwas purchased from other utilities, areshowninTable3,incontrasttothe2013figures.Table 3 Shares of electrical energy production 2013 and 2014(includingpurchasesfromotherutilities)

Source

Electrical EnergyProduced(GWh)

Share(%)

2013 2014 2013 2014

Coal 74,269 84,076 51.50 47.96

NaturalGas 41,254 49,312 28.61 28.13

Hydropower 13,010 26,433 9.02 15.08

Oil 11,307 11,164 7.84 6.37

Geothermal 4,345 4,285 3.01 2.44

Source:PTPLN,PLNStatistics2013(Jakarta,Indonesia:MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2013),iii.

Thenumbersgiven in the tableundercutoneof theargumentsoftenadvancedbyproponents of nuclear power in Indonesia, namely that oil will run out, therebynecessitatingtheconstructionofreactors.AnillustrationisastatementmadebyaseniorBATANresearchertotheJakartaPostin2011totheeffectthat“consideringtheconstructionofnuclearpowerplantswouldbenecessarygiventhatIndonesia’spetroleumreserveswouldbeusedupby2025”.121ThisismisleadingbecauseoilisnotasignificantsourceofelectricityinIndonesia.Further,although Indonesiahasanabundanceof localnewandrenewableenergyresources, the installed capacity to generate electricity from these availableresources isstillquitesmall,asshowninTable4.ThemostdevelopedintheNewandRenewableEnergycategory ishydro,whichmakesuseofabout10percentoftheavailableresources.Thereisthusamplescopeforexpansionoftheserenewablesourcesofelectricity.Althoughthetableindicatesthatthereissomeuraniumbased(i.e.nuclear)capacity,thisissomewhatmisleading.Todate,thereisnocontributionofnuclearpowertoelectricityproductioninthecountry.Theonlyreactorsbasedonuraniumthathavebeensetupareforresearchpurposes.

119Ibid.,10.120BP,StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy2015.121“NuclearPowerNeededbefore2025,WarnExperts,”JakartaPost,November12,2011,accessedJanuary1,2016,http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/12/nuclear-power-needed-2025-warn-experts.html.


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Table4.Potentialandrealizedcapacityofnewandrenewableenergyresources

New & RenewableEnergy

Resources Installed Capacity(IC)

Ratio ofIC/Resources

Hydro 75,000MW 7,572MW 10.1%

Geothermal 28,910MW 1,403.5MW 4.9%

Biomass 32,654MW 1,717.9MW 5.4%

Solar 4.80kWh/m2/day 48.05MW -

Wind 3-6m/s 1.87MW -

Ocean 49GW***) 0.01MW****) -

Uranium 3,000MW*) 30MW**) -

Notes:*)OnlyinKalan-WestBorneo;**)Asacenterofresearch,non-energy;***)Source:NationalEnergyCouncil;****)BPPT’sPrototype;Source:Mulyana,Rida.“RenewableEnergyasANationalDevelopmentPriority,”inClimateChangeandREDD+intheNationalMediumTermDevelopmentPlan.Jakarta,Indonesia,2015.http://www.unorcid.org/upload/Ministry_of_Energy_and_Mineral_Resources_UNORID_Dialogue_Series_9_March_2015.pdf.

Among the various renewable resources, solarhasnot yet beendeveloped to anysignificant extent within Indonesia. Independent estimates suggest that the totalpotential forgridconnectedphotovoltaicelectricitycouldbeashighas1492TWhper year.122In comparison, according to PT PLN, Indonesia generated a total of175.2TWhin2014.123Thus,solarenergyhasavastcapacityincomparisonwiththeamount of electricity used in Indonesia, and thismay be one reason Indonesia isacceleratingtheinstallationofsolarenergy.InDecember2015,PresidentJokoWidodoinaugurateda5MWsolarpowerplant,currently thebiggest in Indonesia, located inKupang.124Severalmoreprojectsareunder development; for example, in October 2015, the local providers PT BuanaEnergySuryaPersadaandPTIndoSolusiUtamasignedacontractwiththeGermanenergyfirmConergytodevelopthree1MWprojectstoprovidepowertohomesinthreetownsintheEastNusaTenggaraprovince.125(MorediscussionofthestatusofsolarprojectsoperatedbyPTPLNcanbefoundintheAppendices.)

122A.J.VeldhuisandA.H.M.E.Reinders,“ReviewingthePotentialandCost-EffectivenessofGrid-ConnectedSolarPVinIndonesiaonaProvincialLevel,”RenewableandSustainableEnergyReviews27(November2013):322.123PTPLN,StatisticofElectricity2014.124YohanesSeo,“JokowiInauguratestheBiggestPLTSinIndonesia,”December28,2015,accessedJanuary2,2016,http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2015/12/28/056731067/Jokowi-Inaugurates-the-Biggest-PLTS-in-Indonesia.125KathieZipp,“ConergyCompletesPlantinIndonesiaandClosesProjectsinAsia,”SolarPowerWorld,October15,2015,accessedAugust6,2016,http://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2015/10/conergy-completes-plant-in-indonesia-and-closes-projects-in-asia/.


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6.2 ElectrificationwithintheArchipelago

Indonesia’s geographic profile of a collection of many islands is reflected in thevariabilityofthe installedcapacityandelectrificationratesofvariousregions.TheIndonesianNationalElectrificationSystemcanbedividedintotwomaincategories:an interconnected electrification system and isolated electrification systems.126Generallyspeaking,Indonesiaconsistsofseveralmainislands(inadditiontomanysmaller ones),which are Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Nusa TenggaraIslands, theMaluku Islands, and Papua. Electricity provision in Jawa-Madura-Baliand Sumatra are the most developed, as compared to other regions. Theelectrification system in areas outside of Jawa-Madura-Bali and Sumatra is stillbeing developed and has not been fully interconnected to any sort of centralizedgrid.Asof2015,thetotalinstalledcapacityinIndonesiaisestimatedtobearound53,065MW.127The largest shares of this capacity are in the Java region (Java, Bali, andMadura)andtheSumatraregion(comprisingSumatra,Riau,andBangkaBelitung).Thisaccountsforroughly86percentofthetotalinstalledcapacityinthecountry.Incontrast,smalleroutlyingislandssuchastheNusaTenggararegion(includingWestand East Nusa Tenggara) had an installed capacity of 747MW or only about 1.4percent of the country total. The countrywide electrification ratio was 84.35percentin2014,butthisvariesfromalowof58.91percentinEastNusaTenggarato95.53percentinBangkaBelitung.128Theproblematicvarianceininstalledcapacityiscompoundedbynearly10percentenergylosses.129Thiscompriseslossesof2.37percentatthetransmissionleveland7.52percent at thedistribution level. In comparison, the corresponding figures in2013forThailand,Singapore,andMalaysiawere6percent,0percent,and4percentrespectively, according to the World Bank.130Understanding the causes of therelatively high levels of losses in Indonesia is difficult. The primary electricityproviderPTPLNdoesnotmaintainmeteringdevicesonitsdistributionnetwork.131This complicatesmanaging the flow of electricity since accurate data on demandcannotbeobtained.Furthermore,thelackofmeteringobscuresillegalconnectionsand the additional load they place on the system. Taken in combination, these126IEA,Indonesia2015(Paris:InternationalEnergyAgency,2015),accessedAugust6,2016,https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/energy-policies-beyond-iea-countries---indonesia-2015.html.127RUKN,RencanaUmumKetenagalistrikanNasional2015-2034[NationalElectricityGeneralPlan2015-2034],(Jakarta,Indonesia:KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral,2015),42,accessedAugust6,2016,http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/index.php/rencana-ketenagalistrikan/rukn-djk.128DirektoratJenderalKetenagalistrikan,StatistikKetenagalistrikan2014[ElectricityStatistics2014],(Jakarta,Indonesia:KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral,2015),26,accessedAugust6,2016,http://www.djk.esdm.go.id/index.php/statistik-ketenagalistrikan.129Ibid.,27.130WorldBank,“ElectricPowerTransmissionandDistributionLosses(%ofOutput),”Data,lastmodified2013,accessedAugust6,2016,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS.131IEA,Indonesia2015,109.


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features of Indonesia’s present electricity supply structure havemade it prone towidespreadservicedisruptions.Forfurtherinformationregardingvariousaspectsof the distribution network and installed capacity, the reader is referred toAppendix8.6andAppendix8.8.Therecentplanstoconstructsolarphotovoltaic(PV)plantsinEastNusaTenggaraprovinceprovidesagoodexampleofthegeography-specificchallengesthatimpactelectrification plans in Indonesia and which will impact the broader discussionregardingnuclearpowerandsmallmodularreactors.Itisestimatedthatalmost50percentof theresidentsofSumba Island lackaccess toreliableelectricity,and forSumbaresidentswithservice,85percentoftheavailableelectricityissourcedfromdiesel.132Thereisthereforeanunderlyingtensionbetweenmeetingtheincreasingelectricitydemands of densely populated areas that already have access to large grids andfulfillingthedesiretocompleteelectrificationofthecountrysoastoprovideatleasta little electricity to communities and regionswith limited or no grid access. ThefirstconstraintisborneoutbyPLN’sstatistics,whichsuggeststhatinseveralareasthe growth of power generation capacity does not keep up with increasingconsumption demands.133In Sumatra, the average demand growth is 9.4 percentper year, whereas power generation capacity is only growing at 5.2 percent peryear.InKalimantan,the1percentgrowthofpowergenerationcapacityisfarfrombalancingout the10.7percentdemandgrowthper year. In Sulawesi, the averagedemand growth is 11 percent per year, whereas the average growth capacity ofpower generation is 2.7 percent per year. The continued discrepancy betweendemandgrowthandgenerationcapacitygrowthhascausedchronicpowercrisesinmanyareas.Many of Indonesia’s small islands do not have access to the electric grid; themajority of people still use electrical appliances powered by individual dieselgenerators. However, diesel fuel is often expensive on small islands and dieselgenerators can only be operated for limited hours each day. Since 2010, thegovernmenthasstatedthatthedevelopmentofsmallislandsisaStatepriority,witha focus on underdeveloped, outermost, and post-conflict regions in Indonesia. Asalreadymentioned, because Indonesia is an archipelagic countrywith the largestnumberofislandsintheworld,itfacesparticularchallengesinaddressingthegapbetween big and small islands in terms of providing infrastructure like access toelectricity.AccordingtoLawNo.27/2007concerningManagementofCoastalAreasandSmall Islands,asmall island isdefinedas “an islandwithanarea less thanorequalto2000km2,includingitsecosystemunity.”132Zipp,“ConergyCompletesPlantinIndonesiaandClosesProjectsinAsia.”133“ElectricitySupplyBusinessPlanPTPLN(RUPTLPTPLN)for2015-2024”(Jakarta,Indonesia:Ministryof Energy and Mineral Resources, 2015), 27–28,http://www.pln.co.id/dataweb/RUPTL/RUPTL%20PLN%202015-2024.pdf; “Electricity Supply BusinessPlan PT PLN (RUPTL PT PLN) for 2016-2025” (Jakarta, Indonesia: Ministry of Energy and MineralResources,2016),53–54,http://www.pln.co.id/dataweb/RUPTL/RUPTL%20PLN%202015-2024.pdf.


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In recent years, the electrification of small islands seems to have become moreurgent, due to the current President’s plan to strengthen Indonesia’s maritimeposition, which has inspired an acceleration in developing the infrastructure ofsmall islands in the Indonesian archipelago.A number of government institutionshavebeeninvolvedinprogramsfordevelopingsolarpowerforsmallislands,whichismoreeasilyaccommodatedtolowerelectricalbaseloads,dispersedandisolatedpopulations,andareaswithlimitedaccesstotransmissionlines.Thispatternofdemandforelectricityisoneargumentfornuclearpower,boththeproposalsbasedonlargepowerreactors(suchasinMuriaorBangka-Belitung)andproposalsbasedonsmallreactors(suchasinWestKalimantan).But,therearealsoother efforts at increasing electricity generation capacity that may be deliveringresultsearlier.TheIndonesiangovernmenthaslaunchedanaccelerationprograminthepowersectorin2006,whichincludetwophasesofFastTrackPrograms,whichinvolvedtheconstructionofamixtureofgeothermal,hydropower,coalandnaturalgas; many of these are to be constructed and operated by private companies.134More recently, the government has set a target of adding 35,000 MW of newgeneratingcapacityby2019.135Totheextentthattheseplanshavebeensuccessful,theywouldhavereducedthedemandfornuclearpower.

6.3 ProposedElectricityTargets

In-countryprojectionsofthefutureenergymixby2050seektoincreasetheshareofnewandrenewableenergy.The fuelmix in thepowersector isprojected tobedominated by coal and gas based plants.136The total NRE target for Indonesia’senergy is set at 31percent by2050 (as shown in Figure3). Thenational energypolicy targetsanelectricity supplyof115GWby2025and430GWby2050, andelectricityper capita to grow to around2,500kWh in2025and to7,000kWhby2050.137Inlightofpastfailurestomeetvarioustargets,whetherthesetargetswillbeachievedremainstobeseen.Accordingtothesameprojections,nuclearpowerplantsare“estimatedtoentertheJava-Balielectricitysystemin2030withacapacityof2GW”andthisisprojectedto“increase up to 6 GW in 2050”.138 Other organizations involved in energy policyhave put out other scenarios. According to one such scenario, the 2014 NationalEnergyPolicyScenario(SkenarioKebijakanEnergiNasional),nuclearpowergrowsfromzeroin2020to74.89TWhin2050(Table5).Giventhatsuchscenarioshave

134IEA,Indonesia2015,103.135BPPT,OutlookEnergiIndonesia2015(Jakarta,Indonesia:PusatTeknologiPengembanganSumberDayaEnergi,2015),22,accessedAugust11,2016,http://repositori.bppt.go.id/index.php?action=download&dir=_data%2FDownload%2FOUTLOOK+ENERGI+2015&item=BPPT-Outlook+Energi+Indonesia+2015.pdf&order=name&srt=yes&lang=en.136Ibid.,70–73.137Ibid.,21.138Ibid.,67.


39

beendrawnupbefore,andnotmaterialized,theseshouldbetreatedasjustthat—scenarios—ratherthananyprognosisofwhatislikelytobeconstructed.

Figure3:Indonesia’stargetenergymixby2050:1000MTOE

Source:RidaMulyana,“RenewableEnergyasANationalDevelopmentPriority,”inClimateChangeandREDD+inthe National Medium Term Development Plan (Jakarta, Indonesia, 2015),http://www.unorcid.org/upload/Ministry_of_Energy_and_Mineral_Resources_UNORID_Dialogue_Series_9_March_2015.pdf.

The National Development Planning Agency has incorporated plans for nuclearenergy into the NationalMid-Term Development Plan 2015-2019 (RPJMN) andnuclear is also included in themost recentGovernmentWorkPlan.139The formerdocumentlistsplansforconstructionofapilotnuclearpowerplantwithanoutputof 10 MW, and the latter mentions an ongoing procurement process.140A pilotpowerplantwould,ofcourse,notcontributetomeetingtheelectricitydemand.The longer–term scenario does not specify what kind of nuclear reactors will bebuilt. To the extent that there is anymention of nuclear power, these projectionsseem to implicitly assume that only largeNPPswould be constructed and do notgenerallydiscusssmallSMR-typeplants.Ofcourse,asmentionedearlier,thisisonlya scenario rather than a clear statement of plans for construction and thus theabsence of SMRs in these scenarios does not mean that the country will notconstructsmallreactors—orthatitwillindeedconstructlargenuclearpowerplantsinpreferencetoSMRs.

139MNDP,NationalMidTermDevelopmentPlan2015-2019,BookIofNationalDevelopmentAgenda(Jakarta,Indonesia:MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning,2014).140Ibid,219;GovernmentWorkPlan2016(Jakarta,Indonesia:MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning,2014).

Coal,25%

Gas,24%Oil,20%

Bioenergy,14%

Geothermal,6%

Hydro,2%OtherNRE,9%


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Table 5. Projection for nuclear power plants under the 2014National Energy Policyscenario

Year ElectricityProduction of NPP(TWh)

Installed Capacity ofNPP(GW)

2013 - -

2020 - -

2025 5.18 1

2030 4.69 1

2035 27.88 6

2040 28.50 6

2045 29.40 6

2050 74.89 15

Source:DewanEnergiNasional.OutlookEnergiIndonesia2014.Jakarta,Indonesia:DewanEnergiNasional,December23,2014,pp.151-152.

6.4 ComparisonofCostsofGeneratingElectricity

Thetotalcostofgeneratingelectricityforagiventypeofpowerplantconsistsofacombinationof investmentcosts, fuel costs, andboth fixedandvariableoperationandmaintenance (O&M) costs. The calculation of the generation cost for a givenplant type is sensitive to several factors, including the plant’s efficiency, capacityfactor (the ratioof theamountof electricity generated in a year to theamountofelectricitythatwouldbeproducediftheplantran24hoursaday,365daysayear),andprojected lifetime.Another importantvariable is thediscount rate,which isameasureofhowfuturebenefitsarevaluedrelativetocurrentcosts.An implicit variable that is especially important to this study is the scale of theproject, which can determine the investment cost as well as the efficiency of theplant. As discussed in the appendix, the smaller scale of SMRs is an advantage insome respects but poses an economic challenge because the capital cost of theprojectperunitofelectricitygenerationcapacitybecomeslowerforlargernuclearreactors,i.e.,economiesofscale.Thisisalsotrueforsolarphotovoltaics;perunitofcapacity, utility scale projects are typically much cheaper than small rooftopphotovoltaicinstallations.SMRsalsotendtobelessefficientintheiruseoffuel.There are two broad categories of power plants in Indonesia, namely fossil-fuelpower plants and renewable energy power plants. Despite the government’scategorization of nuclear power as part of “Renewable & New Energy”, nuclearenergyfitsneitherofthesecategories.RenewableenergypowerplantsinIndonesiaincludesolar(PembangkitListrikTenagaSurya–PLTS),wind(PembangkitListrikTenaga Bayu – PLTB), hydro power (Hydro Power,Mini Hydro Power andMicroHydroPower),biomass,andocean,whichiscurrentlyatthedevelopmentstage.


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Table6:EstimateofcostsofgeneratingelectricityinIndonesiabytypeofpowerplantandfuelused.

Technology

Fuel Size(MW)

Capital Cost(USD/kW)

Lifetime(Years)

SpecificFuelConsumption[1]

FuelPrice[2]

CapacityFactor

GenerationCost

(USD/kWh)

GenerationCost

(IDR/kWh)

SteamPP

Coal 600 2,031 30 0.502kg/kWh

80USD/ton

0.729 0.081 842.40

NaturalGas

120 2,314 30 0.01mscf/kWh

7USD/mscf

0.220 0.221 2309.48

Oil(Javagrid)

120 2,314 30 0.382liter/kWh

0.7USD/liter

0.067 0.753 7875.12

GasTurbinePP

NaturalGas

120 591 30 0.013mscf/kWh

7USD/mscf

0.123 0.155 1619.47

CombinedCyclePP

NaturalGas

(Javagrid)

500 1,123 30 0.008mscf/kWh

7USD/mscf

0.472 0.088 917.26

DieselPP

Oil 3.5 1,978 30 0.266liter/kWh

0.86USD/liter

0.129 0.451 4721.22

HydroPP

Hydro-large

>10 2,268 50 - - 0.425 0.073 762.99

SolarPV

Solar 0.001

3,517 25 - - 0.070 0.823 8612.52

Geothermal

Geothermal

(JavaGrid)

55 1,686 30 - - 0.870 0.053 553.94

Sources:[1]Electricitystatistics,2013,theDirectorGeneralofElectricity,MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources&[2]ElectricalPowerSupplyBusinessPlanofPTPLN(Persero)2015-2024.

Fossil-fuelpowerplantsinIndonesiaincludesteamcoal(PembangkitListrikTenagaUap Batubara – PLTU-B), steam natural gas (Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Uap GasAlam– PLTU-GA), steamoil (Pembangkit ListrikTenagaUapMinyak – PLTU-M),diesel (PLTD), oil gas turbine (Pembangkit ListrikTenagaGasMinyak –PLTG-M),gas turbine (Pembangkit ListrikTenagaGasAlam–PLTG-GA), oil combined cycle


42

(PembangkitListrikTenagaGasdanUapMinyak–PLTGU-M),naturalgascombinedcycle(PembangkitListrikTenagaGasdanUap–PLTGU-G)andoilgas(PembangkitListrikTenagaMinyakGas–PLTM-G).Thegeneration costs forpowerplants thathavealreadybeen setup in Indonesiaare given in Table 6.141These use a discount rate of 10 percent. For comparison,Table16intheappendixshowsPTPLN’sreportedvaluesofthenationalaverageofgenerationcostsbyplanttype.Thecapacityfactor(CF)valuesusedintheestimateswerecalculatedbytakingtheratiooftheelectricityproducedbyacertainplanttypeinagivenyearasreportedbyPTPLNin2013tothemaximumproductioncapacityiftheplantwereoperatedatfullcapacityforanentireyear.TheimportanceoftheCFwillbeapparentwhenconsidering the potential costs of future large-scale PV plants. The solar plantsoperating in 2013 in Indonesia were mostly household-scale installations. Thesetend to get disrupted frequently due to a lack of capacity of local operators orcommunitiestomaintaintheequipment.Additionally,whileutility-scaleplantscanbedesigned tomaximize light collection throughout theday inorder tomaximizethe capacity factor, small solar installations, especially fixed-direction rooftopdesigns, do not have this flexibility, leading to lower capacity factors. In contrast,utility-scalePVplantscanhavecapacityfactorsthatareafactorofthreelarger.BATANhaslongarguedthatnuclearpowerisaffordable.In2014,BATANpresenteditsestimatesoftheeconomicsofapotentialIndonesianNPPatameetingconvenedby the International Atomic Energy Agency. 142 BATAN made a number ofassumptionsinitscalculations,includingsometechnicalparametersconcerningthenuclear reactor itself, such as its power output, the internal consumption ofelectricityatthepowerplantitself,theanticipatedcapacityfactor,andthelengthofperiod forwhich the reactorwouldoperate inaneconomical fashion, the costsofthe different elements of the construction of the reactor, the initial fuel, and thevarious financingparameters, suchas the interestduring construction.Two caseswerediscussed,areactorinWestBangkaandoneinSouthBangka.ThevariousassumptionsusedbyBATANarepresentedinTable7andTable8,andtheresultsofBATAN’scalculationarepresentedinTable9.Theseassumptionsandthe results raisemore questions than they answer.Onepuzzle is that the reactoroutputwasassumedtobe1,180MW,whichdoesnotcorrespondtoanyreactorthatwas actually on themarket in 2014. It is, instead, the output of theWatts Bar IIreactorthatwasunderconstructionintheUnitedStatessincethe1970sandcameonlinein2016.143Noothercountryisconstructingareactorwiththatpoweroutputlevel.141IndonesianInstituteforEconomics(IIEE),in-housecalculation,Jakarta,2015.142Suparman,“EconomicIndicatorsAssessmentofNPPProjectinIndonesia,”in8thINPRODialogueForum:TowardNuclearEnergySystemSustainability:Economics,ResourceAvailability,andInstitutionalArrangements(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014),https://www.iaea.org/INPRO/8th_Dialogue_Forum/index.html.143SchneiderandFroggatt,TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2016.


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Table7.CostassumptionsmadeinBATAN’sBangkanuclearpowercostcalculation

Item W.Bangka S.Bangka

Mechanical&Electricalsystemcost(millionUSD) 6,107 6,107Buildingcost(millionUSD) 659 571

Civilcost(millionUSD) 1,060 987

Initialcorefuelcost(millionUSD) 553 553

Contingency(millionUSD) 1,676 1,644

Owner’scost(millionUSD) 1,398 1,385

IDC(millionUSD) 1,467 1,442

VAT(millionUSD) 1,175 1,154

Total(millionUSD) 14,095 13,843

Unitcost(USD/kW) 5,972 5,866Source:Suparman, “Economic Indicators Assessment of NPP Project in Indonesia,” in 8th INPRODialogueForum:TowardNuclearEnergySystemSustainability:Economics,ResourceAvailability,andInstitutionalArrangements(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014).

Table8.TechnicalinputsusedinBATAN’sBangkanuclearpowercostcalculation

ReactorOutput(2reactors/unit) 1,180MWe

EconomicLifeTime 40years

InternalConsumption 5%

Availability 93%

DiscountRate 10%Source:Suparman, “Economic Indicators Assessment of NPP Project in Indonesia,” in 8th INPRODialogueForum:TowardNuclearEnergySystemSustainability:Economics,ResourceAvailability,andInstitutionalArrangements(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014).

Table9.BATAN’sestimatedcostofgenerationofnuclearpower

GenerationCost W.Bangka S.Bangka

Capitalcost(USD/kWh) 0.036 0.0353

Operationandmaintenancecost(USD/kWh) 0.011 0.011

Fuelcosts(USD/kWh) 0.0122 0.0122

Decommissioningcost(USD/kWh) 0.0017 0.0017

Total(USD/kWh) 0.0609 0.0602Source:Suparman, “Economic Indicators Assessment of NPP Project in Indonesia,” in 8th INPRODialogueForum:TowardNuclearEnergySystemSustainability:Economics,ResourceAvailability,andInstitutionalArrangements(Vienna,Austria:InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,2014).


44

Theresultsalsoraiseimportantquestions.Atadiscountrateof10percent,aprojectwithaunitcapitalcostof5972USD/kWimpliesthatjustthecapitalcostcomponentofthegenerationcostwillbe7.9cents/kWh.This ismorethantwicethefigureof3.6 cents/kWh that BATAN has estimated. It is therefore not clear whatmethodologyorotherassumptionswereused.Finally, it isnotevidentwhatBATANhasassumedaboutonecriticalvariable: thetimeperiodittakestoconstructanuclearpowerplant.Becauseofthedependenceonfinancingparameters,thelevelizedcostissensitivetothisassumption.Thisisaparticularproblemfornuclearreactors,becausetheynotonlytakelongperiodstoconstruct,butmanyprojectshaveexperiencedmajorconstructiondelaysthathaveresulted in huge cost overruns.144Even without delays, building a country’s firstnuclearpowerplantcantakeaconsiderableperiodoftime.Somenumbersfortheconstructiontimes—betweenthefirstpourofconcreteandtheplantbeingdeclaredcommercial—for the first reactors in developing countries that have just onenuclearpowerplant(with1or2reactors)are19years(Brazil),16years(Mexico),and38years(Iran).This is a significant period of time that must be taken into consideration whencomparing the economic competitiveness of nuclear power to renewables; solarprojects typicallyhavea1 to2years constructionperiod.Therefore, any fair costcomparison must be based on what alternative sources of electricity generationmightcost in2030,orat least2025, rather than today’s costs.This isparticularlyrelevant to renewable sources of energy, in particular, solar photovoltaic systemsbecausetheircostshavebeenfallingveryrapidly.145Therefore, as describedbelow,we carry out a separate calculationwith the samecostfigure.Asacomparison,wealsocalculatewhatthecostofgeneratingelectricityatautility-scalesolarpowerplantmightbeinIndonesia.Asmentionedearlier,theexperienceso farhasonlybeenwithrelativelysmall-scalesolarplants thatwouldgenerate electricity at significantly higher costs than large-scale plants. However,

144BenjaminK.SovacoolandC.J.Cooper,TheGovernanceofEnergyMegaprojects:Politics,HubrisandEnergySecurity(Cheltenham:EdwardElgarPublishing,2013);BenjaminK.Sovacool,AlexGilbert,andDanielNugent,“AnInternationalComparativeAssessmentofConstructionCostOverrunsforElectricityInfrastructure,”EnergyResearch&SocialScience3(September2014):152–160.145ArnauddeLaTour,MatthieuGlachant,andYannMénière,“PredictingtheCostsofPhotovoltaicSolarModulesin2020UsingExperienceCurveModels,”Energy62(December1,2013):341–348;GalenBarboseetal.,TrackingtheSunVI:AnHistoricalSummaryoftheInstalledPriceofPhotovoltaicsintheUnitedStatesfrom1998to2012(Berkeley,CA:LawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory,July2013),accessedSeptember26,2015,http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2j2888zv;StefanReichelsteinandMichaelYorston,“TheProspectsforCostCompetitiveSolarPVPower,”EnergyPolicy55(2013):117–127;MarkBolinger,SamanthaWeaver,andJarettZuboy,“Is$50/MWhSolarforReal?FallingProjectPricesandRisingCapacityFactorsDriveUtility-ScalePVtowardEconomicCompetitiveness,”ProgressinPhotovoltaics:ResearchandApplications(May1,2015),accessedSeptember21,2015,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pip.2630/abstract.


45

the Indonesian government has been promoting utility-scale solar photovoltaicplants,withplansforsettingup5000MWofcapacitywithin2or3years.146ForthecapitalcostofalargeNPP,wefirststartwiththeaverageofthetwoBATANfigures(5972and5866USD/kW)toobtain5919USD/kW.Weinflatethisto2015currencyusing theGDPdeflatordataestimatedby theWorldBank,147to comeupwith a capital cost of 6500 USD/kW (rounded off). This is lower than the costestimatesforsomenewnuclearplantsintheUnitedStates;forexample,theNorthAnna plant in Virginia is estimated to cost 8,593USD/kW.148For comparison, thecostof autility scale (5MW)solarplantbuiltbyPTLen Industri inKupang,EastNusa Tenggara is said to be Rp 125 billion, which translates to about 1825USD/kW.149For photovoltaic plants in the 2025-2030 time frame, we use the InternationalEnergy Agency’s projection that “utility-scale capital expenditures cost would fallbelowUSD 1/W by 2030 on average, but the cheapest systemswould reach thatmarkbyabout2020”.150Thistranslatestoaunitcapitalcostof1000USD/kW.The operational and fueling costs for nuclear plants are derived from the latestreport on Projected costs of generating electricity by the OECD’s Nuclear EnergyAgency.151ForSMRs,whichareassumedtobe200MWcapacity, theconstruction,fuelingandoperationalcostsareestimatedtobehigherthanthoseofalargeNPPby40percent forreasonsexplained inAppendix8.3.3.152Thediscountratechosen isthesameasBATAN’sassumption,i.e.,10percent.BecauseofthelackofexperiencewithSMRconstruction,wehaveassumedanearlyevendistributionofcosts,withequalannualexpendituresduringmostoftheyearsexcept for the first and last year. For a largenuclearpowerplant,we assume thesamedistribution as in the case of the Summer 2&3nuclear plants being built inSouthCarolinaintheUnitedStates.153ThesedistributionsareshowninFigure4.ItisassumedthatsolarPVplantswillbeconstructedinoneyear.146“IndonesiaPlanstoAdd5GWofSolarPVCapacityin2–3Years,”SolarServer,August15,2016,http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-news/current/2016/kw33/indonesia-plans-to-add-5-gw-of-solar-pv-capacity-in-2-3-years.html.147WorldBank,“GDP(currentUS$),”Data,lastmodified2015,accessedAugust13,2016,http://data.worldbank.org/.148OAG,DirectTestimony&Exhibits(Richmond,Virgina,USA:OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,September15,2015),accessedAugust13,2016,http://www.scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/34bx01!.PDF.149BISNIS.COM,“Indonesia’sLargestSolarPowerPlantReadyforOperation,”Tempo,December16,2015,accessedDecember29,2015,http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2015/12/16/056728193/Indonesias-Largest-Solar-Power-Plant-Ready-for-Operation.150IEA,TechnologyRoadmap:SolarPhotovoltaicEnergy,2014Edition(Paris:OECDPublishing,2014),22.151NEA,ProjectedCostsofGeneratingElectricity(Paris:NuclearEnergyAgency,OECD,2015).152AlexanderGlaser,LauraBerzakHopkins,andM.V.Ramana,“ResourceRequirementsandProliferationRisksAssociatedwithSmallModularReactors,”NuclearTechnology184(2013):121–129.153DavidA.Schlissel,BadChoice:TheRisks,CostsandViabilityofProposedU.S.NuclearReactorsinIndia(Cleveland,OH:InstituteforEnergyEconomicsandFinancialAnalysis,March2016),26.


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Figure4:Cumulativeexpenditurepatternforlargenuclearpowerplantsandsmallmodularreactors

Table10:Costsofgeneratingelectricityusinglargenuclearpowerplants,smallmodularreactors,andutility-scalesolarphotovoltaicplants

Nuclear(NPP)

Nuclear(SMR)

Solar(PV)

Unitcapitalcost[2015$/kW] $6,500.00 $9,100.00 $1,000.00

O&M[$/MWh] $13.17 $18.44 $10.00

Fuelingcosts[$/MWh] $10.00 $14.00 $0.00

Economiclife[years] 40 40 25

Capacityfactor 90% 90% 20%

Auxiliaryconsumption 5% 5% 0.50%

Discountrate 10% 10% 10%

Generationcost[$/MWh] $183.63 $222.15 $73.25

Generationcost[cents/kWh] 18.36 22.22 7.32

Generationcost(IDR/kWh) 2416.13 2923.09 963.78

TheresultsofourcalculationsareshowninTable10.Thecurrencyconversionrateassumed is1IndonesianRupiahequals0.000076USDollar.Onecandrawat leasttwo conclusions from these results. The cost of generating electricity using SMRswill likelybegreater than largeNPPs,byover20percent.As solarPV technologybecomes cheaper and more efficient, it will cost significantly less to generateelectricityusingthistechnologythannuclearpowerplants.There are, of course, significant uncertainties involved, especially with the SMRnumbers.Thiswillbetrueforanysuchcalculationinvolvingthistechnology.Since

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00%

100.00%

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

LargeNPP

SMR


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noSMRshavebeenactuallyconstructed,thedatasimplydoesnotexistonwhichtobase a detailed cost of energy calculation. Nevertheless, the qualitative picturesuggests that one cannot be too optimistic that SMRs will succeed in beingeconomicalwherelargeNPPshavenot.There is one objection that is usually brought upbypromoters of nuclear energywhenitiscomparedwithrenewableenergytechnologies,thatofintermittency.Theargument is that solar and wind energy can be generated only when the sun isshining or thewind is blowing, and this characteristicmakes themunsuitable forsupporting the grid. While intermittency is a challenge, it is by no meansinsurmountable. To start with, intermittency becomes a problem only when theshareof renewables inelectricitygenerationbecomesquitehigh.A2014study inoneofthelargeelectricalgridsintheUnitedStatesconcludedthattherewouldnotbe“anysignificantreliabilityissuesoperatingwithupto30percentofitsenergy(asdistinct fromcapacity)providedbywindandsolargeneration”.154Indonesia is farfromthoselevels.Andfinallyevenathighlevelsofrenewables,therearearangeofstrategies that can be implemented to deal with the intermittency, including theincorporationofstorageandtheuseofdemandsidemanagementtoshiftloads.

7 Conclusions

The purpose of this report has been to survey and synthesize the historical andcontemporary factors affecting nuclear power in Indonesia, specifically for SMRdevelopment in Indonesia. Among the elements that support the potentialconstructionofSMRsinIndonesia,themostnotableisahostofinstitutionalactors,including agencies like BATAN, that have had a long-standing interest in nuclearpower, including the construction of SMRs, and regions of the archipelago withdecentralized,limitedcapacityelectricalgridsthatwouldbebettersuitedtoasmall(ratherthanlarge)nuclearpowerplant.GrowingenergydemandsintheregionsofIndonesia that have more developed electrical infrastructure also offers anargument for nuclear power, but the general consensus seems to be that suchdemandswillbebettermetusinglargenuclearreactors.Asaresult,therehavebeenanumberofproposalsfor largenuclearreactors(Table1),althoughnoneofthemhaveprogressedbeyondtheplanningstagetoactualconstruction.Interestwithin important institutionsassociatedwithenergyplanning isapparentfrom the many projections for future electricity generation capacity that involvenuclearpower,especiallyinthe2030to2050timeframe.However,thesehavetobeseeninthecontextofahistoryofprojectionsfornuclearpowersincethe1970sthathavenotmaterialized.This report has also outlined many challenges that would have to be overcomebefore any SMRs are constructed in Indonesia, including a lack of support for

154PJM,“RenewableIntegrationStudyReports,”PJMInterconnection,lastmodifiedFebruary28,2014,accessedAugust14,2016,http://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/subcommittees/irs/pris.aspx.


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nuclear power at the highest (and lower) political levels, public opposition tonuclear power, the absence of tested SMR designs, and the higher electricitygeneration costs associated with SMR technology. There are also legislativeregulations that could becomeobstacles for specific technologies, such as floatingpowerplants,andthemodelofSMRconstructionthatinvolvefabricationofthebulkofthereactorinfactories.Thefirstfactor,theabsenceofwidespreadandsustainedpoliticalsupport,hasbeenthe major roadblock for the establishment of nuclear power in general. TheIndonesian nuclear establishment has been trying to set up nuclear power plantssince the 1970s but has so far not managed to persuade government leaders.Indeed, inDecember2015, thenEnergyandMineralResourcesMinisterSudirmanSaid announced publicly that the government had concluded that “this is not thetimetobuildupnuclearpowercapacity.Westillhavemanyalternativesandwedonotneed toraiseanycontroversies”.155Although thisdecisionmightberevised inthe future, it testifies to lack of broad-based political support. Given this context,thoseadvocatingconstructingSMRsinacountrylikeIndonesiathathasnonuclearpower capacity face the basic conundrum: building untested nuclear technologiesthat might lead to higher electricity generation costs is going to be more of apolitical challenge than constructing nuclear reactor designs that have beenoperatedinothercountries.ThehigherelectricitygenerationcostassociatedwithSMRsshouldbeseennotjustincomparisonwiththecostofgeneratingelectricitywithalargeNPPbutalsowitharangeofalternativesthatareavailable in Indonesia.Of these, thedecliningcostofsolar photovoltaic technology is particularly relevant. Studies testify to the largepotential of solar energy in Indonesia and the government has been adoptingpolicies thatpromisetoacceleratetheconstructionofsignificantamountsofsolarcapacity.The smallerpower level of SMRsalso implies thatproducing the sameamountofelectricity using these as opposed to large reactors would require dealing withpublicresistanceatmanymoresites.Becausepublicoppositionhasplayedamajorrole in stopping construction of nuclear power plants so far, constructing SMRsmight be even more of a challenge than large reactors; for SMRs, the potentialbenefitsaccruingfromelectricitygenerationcomesatahighereconomicandsocialcost.Asaresult,itwouldseemthattheconstructionofSMRsisunlikely,especiallyin largeenoughnumberstomakeasizeablecontributionto Indonesia’selectricitygeneration.

155NEI,“IndonesiaRulesoutNuclearasMajorPowerSource.”


49

AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank all those who participated in the workshop on“Nuclear Power and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in Indonesia: Potential andChallenges”inJakartaon25June2015andofferedtheirviews.Wewouldalsothankthosewho met specially with us to discuss issues related to the subject of thisreport, inparticular,ArnoldSoetrisnanto,NengahSudja,FabbyTumiwa,AiMelani,Dahlia Sinaga, and Dian Abraham.MVRwould also like to thank Ali Ahmad, AlexGlaser,andZiaMianfortheirinputs.Noneofthem,however,areresponsibleforthecontentsortheconclusionofthisreport.ThisworkwassupportedinpartbyagrantfromtheMacArthurFoundation.


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8 Appendices

8.1 TableofAbbreviations

Abbreviation English Indonesian

BAKOREN NationalEnergyCoordinatingAgency BadanKoordinasiEnergiNasional

Bapeten NuclearEnergyRegulatoryAgency BadanPengawasTenagaNuklir

Bappeda RegionalBodyforPlanningandDevelopment

BadanPerencanaPembangunanDaerah

Bappenas MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency

BadanPerencanaanPembangunanNasional

BATAN NationalNuclearEnergyAgency BadanTenagaNuklirNasional

BKPRS SecretaryGeneraloftheSulawesiRegionalDevelopmentCooperationAgency

SekretarisJenderalBadanKerjasamaPembangunanRegionalSulawesi

BPPT AgencyfortheAssessmentandApplicationofTechnology

BadanPengkajiandanPenerapanTeknologi

BPS CentralAgencyonStatistics BadanPusatStatistik

CADES ComprehensiveAssessmentofDifferentEnergySourcesforPowerGeneration

CF CapacityFactor

DEN NationalEnergyCouncil DewanEnergiNasional

EPR ExperimentalPowerReactor

ESDM MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral

GIS GeographicSystemInformation

GW Gigawatt

GWe Gigawattelectrical

HTGR HighTemperature(Gas-cooled)Reactor

HVDC HighVoltageDirectCurrent

IAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency

IDT SiteDataInformation InformasiDataTread

IOnon-BBM Non-FossilFuelOperatingPermit IzinOperasinonBahanBakarMinyak

IPP IndependentPowerProducer

ITB InstituteofTechnologyBandung InstitutTeknologiBandung

JBIC JapanBankforInternationalCooperation

KAERI KoreanAtomicEnergyResearchInstitute


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KEN NationalEnergyPolicy KebijakanEnergiNasional

KKP MinistryofMarineAffairsandFisheries KementerianKelautandanPerikanan

KP2-PLTN PreparatoryCommissionforNuclearPowerPlant

KomisiPersiapanPembangunanPembangkitListrikTenagaNuklir

kV Kilovolts

kWh Kilowatthour

kWp Kilowattpeak

LDT SiteDataReport LaporanDataTread

LET SiteEvaluationReport LaporanEvaluasiTread

LIPI IndonesianInstituteofScience LembagaIlmuPengetahuanIndonesia

MANUSIA IndonesianAnti-NuclearCommunity MasyarakatAntiNuklirIndonesia

MAREM EarthNurturingSociety MasyarakatReksoBumi

MED Multiple-EffectDistillation

Menristek MinistryofResearchandTechnology KementerianTeknologi,Riset,danPerguruanTinggi

Menristekdikti MinistryofResearch,Technology,andHigherEducation

KementerianRiset,TeknologidanPendidikanTinggi

MSF Multi-StageFlash

MW Megawatt

MWe Megawattelectrical

MWp Megawattpeak

MTOE MillionTonsofOilEquivalent

NEPIO NuclearEnergyProgramImplementingOrganization

NESA NuclearEnergySystemAssessment

NEWJEC NewJapanEngineeringConsultants

NIRA NuclearsItalianaReacttoriAvancatti

NRE NewandRenewableEnergy

PBMR PebbleBedModularReactor

Pertamina StateOilandNaturalGasMiningCompany

PGI CommunionofChurchesinIndonesia PersatuanGerejaIndonesia

PLN StateElectricityCompany PerusahaanListrikNegara

PLTB WindGeneratedPowerPlants PembangkitListrikTenagaBayu


52


PLTD DieselPowerPlants PembangkitListrikTenagaDiesel

PLTG-GA GasTurbinePowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaGasAlam

PLTG-M OilGasTurbinePowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaGasMinyak

PLTGU-G NaturalGasCombinedCyclePowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaGasdanUap

PLTGU-M OilCombinedCyclePowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaGasdanUapMinyak

PLTM-G OilGasPowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaMinyakGas

PLTS SolarPowerPlants PembangkitListrikTenagaSurya

PLTU-B SteamCoalPowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaUapBatubara

PLTU-GA SteamNaturalGasPowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaUapGasAlam

PLTU-M SteamOilPowerPlant PembangkitListrikTenagaUapMinyak

PPA PowerPurchaseAgreement

PPU PrivatePowerUtility

Puspitek CenterforScience,Research,andTechnology

PusatPenelitianIlmuPengetahuandanTeknologi

PUTL PublicWorksandPower PekerjaanUmumdanTenagaListrik

PV Photovoltaic

PWR PressurizedWaterReactors

RAOUES UnifiedEnergySystemofRussia

RDE ExperimentalPowerReactor ReaktorDayaExperimental

RDNK Non-CommercialPowerReactor ReaktorDayaNon-Komersial

Rosatom StateAtomicEnergyCorporation(Russia)

RPJMN NationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan RencanaPembangunanJarakMenengahNasional

RPJPN NationalLong-TermDevelopmentPlan RencanaPembangunanJarakPanjangNasional

RUEN RencanaUmumEnergiNasional GeneralPlanonNationalEnergy

RUKN RencanaUmumKetenagalistrikanNasional NationalElectricityGeneralPlan

SKPD RegionalPlanningUnit SatuanKerjaPerangkatDaerah


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SMART SystemintegratedModularAdvancedTechnology

SMR SmallModularReactor

Sumbagut NorthSumatraRegion SumaterabagianUtara

SUTET ExtraHighVoltageTransmissionLine SaluranUdaraTeganganExtraTinggi

SUTT HighVoltageTransmissionLine SaluranUdaraTeganganTinggi

TWh Terawatthour

USGS UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey

WALHI TheIndonesianForumforEnvironment WahanaLingkunganHidupIndonesia

8.2 Appendix-AgenciesinIndonesiaAffectingNuclearPower

In this appendix, the main national-level government institutions involved inpolicymaking and regulation of the energy sector, with an emphasis on nuclearpower,arelistedinalphabeticalorder(byacronym)andbrieflydescribed.NuclearEnergyRegulatoryAgency(BAPETEN)

BadanPengawasTenagaNuklir

BAPETEN is the Indonesian nuclear regulatory body. It supervises all activitiesinvolvingtheutilizationofnuclearenergybyorganizingregulations, licensing,andinspectionsrelatedtothoseactivitiesundertheauspicesofGovernmentRegulationNo.12/2014.InordertobuildanuclearpowerplantinIndonesia,aseriesofpermitsmust be obtained from BAPETEN that cover the entire lifecycle of the plant,including site, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioninglicenses.In the past BAPETEN has been able to lean heavily on IAEA and internationalexperience gained in other countrieswith traditional lightwater reactor designs.More recently, however, it appears that BAPETEN has been engaged with thechallengeoftryingtodeterminehowtodrawonasmallerbodyofexistingexpertiseas it navigatesmaking licensingdecisionswith regards toHTGRdesigns,156whichare the currently preferred reactor design for BATAN’s plans at the EPR Serpongfacility.TherearetwodifferentelementstoBAPETEN’scurrentsituation.ThefirstisthesmallbodyofexpertisegloballyavailableonHTGRsandSMRsmoregenerally.The second is that as BAPETEN assumes full regulatory responsibility it mustbecome more independent of BATAN, from which its staff were initially drawn,

156Interviewwithstakeholders.


54

since its primary task is to regulate BATAN-related activities. This reduces itslocallyavailablepoolofexpertise.BAPETEN’s experience and the decision-making framework that will result fromthisprocessofconsideringHTGRsareofinterestsincetheglobalbodyofexpertiseregardingSMRsisevenmorelimitedthanthatforHTGR’s.Therefore,futureplansin Indonesia regarding the adoption of SMR technology may draw upon lessonslearned fromBAPETEN’sexperiencewith licensingHTGRs. However,howexactlythiswillplayoutintheevolutionofthenationalnucleardebateremainstobeseen.NationalNuclearEnergyAgency(BATAN)

BadanTenagaNuklirNasional

BATAN carries out government duties in the field of research, development, andutilization of nuclear science and technology. Although it is outside BATAN’smandate tobedirectly involved in thedevelopmentoroperationof a commercialnuclear power plant, the agency has consistently sustained the national debateregardingsuchfacilitiesandhasoftenbeenaprimeforceinvolvedinfeasibilityandsite studies. It also engages in the promotion of the idea of nuclear power as apotentialsourceofenergyforIndonesia.The National Mid Term Development Plan 2015-2019 mentions that BATAN isexpectedtosupportthepreparationofNPPconstructionby(1)increasingmasteryofnuclearpowerplanttechnologyforthedeploymentofcommercialnuclearpowerplants, (2) capacity building for NPPs human resources, (3) training in projectmanagement for commercial NPPs, and (4) increasing public acceptance of NPPs.Also,preparation includes improvingtheabilityofBATANtoproducenuclear fuelandtomanagenuclearwasteforNPPs.157

AgencyfortheAssessmentandApplicationofTechnology(BPPT)

BadanPengkajiandanPenerapanTeknologi

BPPT is a non-Ministerial institution (LPNK), like BATAN and BAPETEN, whichreports directly to the President and is under the coordination of theMinistry ofResearch and Technology. BPPT has the authority to draw up a comprehensivenational plan and formulate policies to support national-scale developmentinitiatives.Inaddition,itisauthorizedtoformulateandimplementspecificpoliciesin the field of assessment and application of technology as well as to providerecommendationsandperformauditsoftheapplicationofvarioustechnologies.158Theagencyisalsotaskedwithfosteringtechnologytransfer.

157MNDP,NationalMidTermDevelopmentPlan2015-2019,BookIofNationalDevelopmentAgenda.158BPPT,“TugasDanFungsi[TasksandFunctions],”BadanPengkajianDanPenerapanTeknologi,lastmodified2015,accessedAugust14,2016,http://www.bppt.go.id/index.php/profil/tugas-dan-fungsi.


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With regards to the development of nuclear power in Indonesia, BPPT has beensupportiveofnuclearpowerandhascalled formakinga constructiondecisionby2020,sothatanuclearplantcanbeinoperationby2030.159BPPThasconsistentlyincludedintheiroutlookdocumentsprojectionsinvolvingtheuseofnuclearenergy.In its Indonesia Energy Outlook 2015, nuclear is listed as one of the new andrenewableenergycontributorstobeincludedintheenergymixby2025andwhichistobeincreaseduntil2050.160NationalEnergyCouncil(DEN)

DewanEnergiNasional

DENwasestablishedin2008tohandleenergypolicy,underthemandateofLawNo.30/2007 on Energy and Presidential Regulation No. 26/2008 concerning theEstablishment of the National Energy Council and Screening Procedures formembers of DEN. Within the council, the President of Indonesia serves as theChairmanandtheIndonesianVicePresidentservesastheViceChairman,whiletheMinister of Energy andMineral Resources has a position as daily Chairman. Thecouncil also has additional members from government sectors (seven ministers)andfromstakeholderorganizations.ThemaintasksofDENare:

• TodesignandformulateaNationalEnergyPolicy(KebijakanEnergiNasional–KEN)tobedeterminedbytheGovernmentwiththeapprovalofParliament;

• To determine a General Plan on National Energy (Rencana Umum EnergiNasional–RUEN);

• Todeterminemitigationmeasuresinresponsetosituationsofenergycrisisandemergency;

• Tooverseetheimplementationofenergypoliciesacrossenergysectors.Like BPPT, DEN included nuclear power as one of the options for the nationalenergypolicyscenario in itsearlierIndonesiaEnergyOutlook2014,whichincludedprojections for the addition of capacity from nuclear power plants beginning in2025. In the specific caseofnuclear energy, theNationalEnergyPolicydocumentplacesitasa“lastresort”,161giventhatIndonesiahasmanyalternativecleanenergyoptions,suchasnaturalgas,solar,hydro,wind,biomass,etc.TheformulationandissueofthefirstKENin2014,sixyearsaftertheestablishmentof theCouncil, suggests thatdrawingup theNationalEnergyPolicywasa lengthy159BPPT,“KongresTeknologiNasional2016 :TeknologiUntukWujudkanKetahananEnergiNasional,”BadanPengkajianDanPenerapanTeknologi[NationalTechnologyCongress2016:TechnologytoAchieveNationalEnergySecurity]”,July31,2016,http://www.bppt.go.id/layanan-informasi-publik/2680-kongres-teknologi-nasional-2016-teknologi-untuk-wujudkan-ketahanan-energi-nasional.160BPPT,OutlookEnergiIndonesia2015(Jakarta,Indonesia:PusatTeknologiPengembanganSumberDayaEnergi,2015),74,accessedAugust11,2016,http://repositori.bppt.go.id/index.php?action=download&dir=_data%2FDownload%2FOUTLOOK+ENERGI+2015&item=BPPT-Outlook+Energi+Indonesia+2015.pdf&order=name&srt=yes&lang=en.161RUKN,RencanaUmumKetenagalistrikanNasional2015-2034[NationalElectricityGeneralPlan2015-2034],10.


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process.ThismaybeareflectionofthediversityofvoicesinDENthatareengagedinthenationalenergypolicy, includinggovernmentelements(MinistryofFinance,Ministry of National Development Planning Agency, Ministry of Transportation,MinistryofIndustry,MinistryofAgriculture,MinistryofResearch,TechnologyandHigher Education, and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry) and otherstakeholderelementsaswell(twoacademics,tworepresentativesfromtheindustrysector, a representative from the technology sector, a representative from theenvironmentsector,andtworepresentativesfromtheconsumersector).Given thenumberof interest groups involved inpolicy-making, this suggests thatobtainingorimplementingadecisiononnuclearpowerwillnotbeaneasyroadinIndonesia(asalsoalreadyevidencedbythe lengthyhistoricaldebate)sincepolicydecisionswillcontinuetobeinfluencedbymanyactorswithstrongdirectinfluenceonthepolicy-makingprocessandwithdifferentvestedinterestswithregardstothedevelopmentofnuclearpower.Thediversityof viewpoints is further complicatedby Indonesia’s currentpolitical structure.Atpresent, the countryhas tenpoliticalpartiesinParliamentfortheperiod2014-2019,eachwiththeirowninterests.Thestructure of DEN suggests that navigating the diverse political landscape inIndonesia, in order to successfully push through a definitive decision on nuclearpower, and especially novel SMR technology, will likely pose a significant andlengthychallenge.MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources(ESDM)

KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral

The ESDM oversees affairs related to energy and mineral resources. One of itsfunctionsisnationalpolicyformulation,policyimplementationandtechnicalpolicyinthefieldofenergyandmineralresources.AccordingtoArticle17oftheEnergyLaw, ESDM is in charge of developing the General Plan on National Energy withreferencetotheNationalEnergyPolicy.Atpresent,thegovernmentisdraftingthispolicy,which involvescross-sectorcollaborationofmultiplegovernmentelementsatthenationallevel.ItisstillnotknownwhetherornottheGeneralPlanwilladoptNPPconstruction in thePlan.Considering that it isassumedthat theGeneralPlanshallbeinkeepingwiththeKEN,itisarguedthatNPPswillnotbeincorporatedintheplan,sincenuclearislistedonlyasalastresort.In2014,theDirectorateGeneralofElectricitywithintheMinistryundertookastudytoestimatethenuclearpowerplantcapacityneeded.Theresult,containedinaso-called White Book, projects that a total installed NPP capacity of 5,000 MW isexpected to be necessary by the period 2024-2025. At present, a lack oftransparencyregardingtheassumptionsandsimulationsusedtoobtainthefiguresintheWhiteBookhasraisedquestionsamongvariousstakeholders.However,therelease of these figures is in keepingwith a general trend toward support of thenuclearpoweroptionwithinIndonesiangovernmentagencies.


57

MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning/NationalDevelopmentPlanning

Agency(PPN/Bappenas)

KementerianPerencanaanPembangunanNasional/BadanPerencanaan

PembangunanNasional

Bappenas is the Ministry in charge of policy-making for the National Long-TermDevelopment Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jarak Panjang Nasional – RPJPN), theNationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan(RencanaPembangunanJarakMenengahNasional – RPJMN), and the Government Work Plan. Nuclear power plantdevelopment and preparation has beenmentioned in both theRPJPN andRPJMNnational development plans. The RPJPN mentions the possibility of developingnuclear power and discusses a number of in-depth research activities relating tosafety of the technology, geographic location, and potential risks for theconstructionofnuclearpowerplants.Furthermore,theRPJMN2015-2019andtheGovernmentWorkPlan(RencanaKerjaPemerintah)for2016alsocontainanumberofreferencestonuclearpowerplants.

MinistryofResearchandTechnology(RISTEKDIKTI)

KementerianRisetTeknologidanPendidikanTinggi

The Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education has the task ofconducting affairs of government in the field of research, technology, and highereducation in service of the President. RISTEKDIKTI is also assigned to coordinatesomeLPNKs,orNon-MinisterialBodies, includingBATAN,BAPETEN,andBPPT.162One can presume that RISTEKDIKTI supports nuclear power development inIndonesia from its role in the creation of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council(Majelis Pertimbangan Tenaga Nuklir ; MPTN) in 2014.163The MPTN consists ofseven members, made up of experts, academics, and community leaders. ThisCouncil is an independent body and exists under the auspices of the President.MPTNisresponsibleforadvisingthePresidentregardingtheuseofnuclearenergy.

PTIndustriNuklirIndonesia

PT Industri Nuklir Indonesia, formerly known as PT Batan Teknologi, is a State-owned company, which acts as a service provider for radioisotope production,production of nuclearmaterial and nuclear engineering services aswell as in theapplicationofnucleartechnologyinvariousfields.

162RISTEKDIKTI,“LPNK[Non-MinisterialBodies],”MinistryofResearchTechnologyandHigherEducationoftheRepublicofIndonesia,lastmodified2016,accessedAugust14,2016,http://ristekdikti.go.id/lpnk/.163GustiGrehenson,“RistekBentukMajelisPertimbanganTenagaNuklir[ResearchandTechnologyFormsNuclearEnergyAdvisoryCouncil],”UniversitasGadjahMada,August28,2014,accessedAugust14,2016,https://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/9226-ristek.bentuk.majelis.pertimbangan.tenaga.nuklir.


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PTPLN

Persero

PTPLNisaState-ownedutilitycompany,whosemaintaskistoprovideelectricityfor public use. The company oversees activities pertaining to the planning,development, andconstructionof facilities toprovideelectricalpower;generatinganddistributingelectricalpower;andpowersupplysales.Inaddition,thecompanyalsoprovideselectricitysupportandotherservices.As a reference to the public, the company prepares anElectricitySupplyBusinessPlan(RencanaUmumPenyediaanTenagaListrik-RUPTL).InitsRUPTL2015-2024,PTPLNdidnot includenuclearpower in itsbusinessplan for thisperiod,but thecompany has considered nuclear power plants as an option for the future, sincefossilenergypricesareprojectedtobecomemoreexpensiveandtoreducecarbonemissions,whilealsoexpressingtheideathatitshouldbeusedasalastresort.164

8.3 Appendix-OverviewofSmallModularReactors

Thisappendixoffersabriefdescriptionofsmallmodularreactorsandoutlinessomeof the features that help evaluate the attractiveness of SMRs, including possibledeployment,cost,andsafetyissues.165

8.3.1 DescriptionofSmallModularReactors(SMRs)

Smallmodularreactors(SMRs)referstoproposednuclearreactordesignsthatareenvisioned to be distinct frommost commercial reactors operating today in twoprincipalways.First,astheadjectivesmallinthenamesuggests,SMRswillhaveanoperatingcapacityoflessthan300MW,muchlessthanthetypically1,000to1,500MWreactors thatarecommonof reactorsunderconstruction. Second, “modular”refers to the fact that many components of the reactor are to be fabricated infactories by the manufacturer and the resulting component(s) or reactor unit(s)shippedtothepurchasingcountry,essentiallyreadytobeinstalled.Therefore,itishoped, some of the uncertainties associated with manufacturing on-site will bereduced.More than the modularity, it is the smaller capacity of SMRs that affects howproposedSMRdesignswouldcomparetocurrentlyoperatedNPPsintermsofcost,safety,anddeploymentscenarios.

8.3.2 SMRDeploymentScenarios

Howwould SMRs be deployed? The smallmodular design of SMRs permits twodifferenttypesofinstallations.ThefirstkindofemplacementwouldbesingleSMR

164RUKN,RencanaUmumKetenagalistrikanNasional2015-2034[NationalElectricityGeneralPlan2015-2034],10.165Glaseretal.,SmallModularReactors:AWindowonNuclearEnergy.


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unitsinstalledatvariousindividualsites,a“loneunit”scenario(alsoknownasthe“one-at-a-time” strategy). The second kind of emplacement would be groups ofSMRs installed at a single site, a “multi-unit” scenario. Each emplacement isenvisionedtobeabletoaddressdifferentenergymixneeds,accordingtolocalgridcapacity.The lone unit deployment scenario is suited to areas with limited electrificationresulting in a small grid (low total electricity demand)where a large NPPwouldrepresent a too-large share of the supplied power, subjecting the grid tounnecessarysystemicrisk.Thereisaruleofthumbthatnosinglegenerationunitinthe electricity mix should account for more than a 10 percent share of the totalgeneration capacity. This protects the robustness of the overall grid should onegenerationfacilityexperienceafailure.Incontrast,themulti-unitdeploymentscenarioissuitedtoareaswithlargergrids.In this case multiple SMR units could be installed in place of one large NPP, forexample, five200MWSMRsinsteadofone1,000MWNPP. Or,alternatively,SMRunits could be continually added to a site over time in order to accommodate agrowingelectricitydemand.The other deployment decision has to dowithwhere the SMR is constructed, onlandorinthesea.InsomeSMRdesigns,thereactorwouldbeplacedonaship(orsomefloatingplatform)orontheoceanfloor.Althoughthereisonefloatingnuclearpower plant under construction in Russia,166there is no commercial reactordeployedonafloatingplatformorinasubmarine.

8.3.3 CostofSMRs

Atpresent cost comparisonsbetween SMRs andNPPs are speculative since SMRshaveyet tobebuiltoroperated.However, thereare twoeconomicprinciples thatwillcomeintoplay.Thefirstprincipleiseconomyofscale.Itistypicallycheapertoproduceoneunitofelectricityfromalargepowerplantthanfromasmallpowerplantusingthesametechnology. For example, electricity from a 1,000 MW NPP would typically becheaperthanelectricityfroma200MWNPPwithessentiallythesamedesign.Thisis because the1,000MWplantdoesnot require five times asmuch concrete, nordoesitemployfivetimesasmanyworkersasthe200MWplant.

166WNA,“AkademikLomonosov2,”WNAReactorDatabase,lastmodified2015,accessedMay23,2015,http://world-nuclear.org/NuclearDatabase/reactordetails.aspx?id=27570&rid=A0D78EB7-B62A-48FF-9D78-21A8E4534D90;“BaltiyskyZavodShipyardStartsHarborTestsofWorld’sFirstFloatingNuclearPowerPlantAkademikLomonosov,”PortNews,lastmodifiedJuly1,2016,accessedJuly29,2016,http://en.portnews.ru/news/222051/.


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Thegeneralruleofthumbgoverningcapitalcostsofproductionfacilitiesisknownas the 0.6 power rule.167 This rule states that the capital costs,K1 andK2, of twoplantsofsizeS1andS2arerelatedas:

6.0

2

1

2

1÷÷ø

öççè

æ=SS

KK

Thisimpliesthat,allelsebeingequal,ifa1,000MWnuclearpowerplantcosts$6.5billion (i.e., $6500/kW), an SMR with a power capacity of 200 MW would beexpected to have a construction cost of $2.5 billion or around $12,400/kW (90%higher cost per unit capacity). Similarly, operating an SMR will also be moreexpensiveincomparisonwithalargereactorduetodiseconomiesofscale.Thesecondinfluencingprincipleiseconomiesofserialproduction.Asatechnologyis produced repeatedly over time, the process becomes increasingly efficient as aresult of lessons learned. This brings down the cost of production as productionmethods are streamlined. Therefore, the cost of building a later unitwill be lessexpensivethanthecostofbuildinganearlierunit.Inthisway,thecapitalcostperSMRunitmaydecreaseovertimeasaresultofeconomiesofserialproduction.Therateatwhichthisdecreasewilloccurisameasureoftheeffectoflearning,andthereislittlefactualinformationtobaseanyreliableestimateofthislearningrate.Indeed,large nuclear power plants have shown negative learning rates, with costsincreasingovertime.168Therefore,evenassumingrelativelyoptimisticlearningratesonewouldexpecttheunit costs of SMRs to be higher than those of large reactors. This is also theconclusion of experts drawn from, or closely associated with, the nuclearindustry.169Reflectingthisprediction,thegenerationcostestimatepresentedinthisreport assumes that the construction cost, the operation and maintenance costsassociatedwithSMRswouldbeonly40percenthigherthanthatofalargereactor.In otherwords,we are assuming $9100/kW rather than $12,400/kW thatwouldresult fromtheusual0.6power lawscaling.Fuelingcostswouldalsobehigher inthecaseofSMRsbecauseoflowerefficienciesofuseofuranium.170

167NationalResearchCouncil,NuclearWastes:TechnologiesforSeparationsandTransmutation(Washington,D.C.:NationalAcademyPress,1996),421.168ArnulfGrubler,“TheCostsoftheFrenchNuclearScale-up:ACaseofNegativeLearningbyDoing,”EnergyPolicy38,no.9(2010):5174–5188;JonathanGKoomeyandNathanEHultman,“AReactor-LevelAnalysisofBusbarCostsforUSNuclearPlants,1970–2005,”EnergyPolicy35(2007):5630–5642;NathanE.Hultman,JonathanG.Koomey,andDanielM.Kammen,“WhatHistoryCanTeachUsabouttheFutureCostsofU.S.NuclearPower,”EnvironmentalScience&Technology40,no.7(2007):2088–94.169AhmedAbdulla,InêsLimaAzevedo,andM.GrangerMorgan,“ExpertAssessmentsoftheCostofLightWaterSmallModularReactors,”ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences110,no.24(2013):9686–9691.170Glaser,Hopkins,andRamana,“ResourceRequirementsandProliferationRisksAssociatedwithSmallModularReactors.”


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8.3.4 SafetyandSMRs

TherearebothinherentandpotentialdifferencesinthesafetyfeaturesofSMRsascomparedtoNPPs.Onesafetyadvantagewithsmallreactorsisthattheycanmoreeasilyincorporatepassivesafetyfeatures,whichdonotrequirepowertobeactivelysuppliedtothereactorunittohelpwiththeir functions.Thesmallerphysicalsize,forexample,meansthatthewallscandissipatesomeoftheheatfromthecore.The smaller generating capacity of SMRsmeans they have a smaller inventory ofradioactivematerialswhencompared to largenuclearpowerplants.Therefore, intheeventofacatastrophicaccident,thereislessradioactivematerialthatcouldbereleasedascomparedtoasinglelargereactoratanNPP.Whilethisisthecasewitha single SMR unit, this safety feature might not extend to a multi-unit SMRdeployment and it is unclear how the increase in the number of units and theirspecific on-site deployment would affect the likelihood or projected outcomes ofvariousaccidentscenarios.ThemultiplereactoraccidentsattheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplantinJapaninMarch2011illustratedhowmanagingaccidentsatsites with multiple nuclear reactors is far more complicated and events at onereactorcouldcauseproblemsforotherreactorsatthesamesite.Despitethesafetycomplications,nuclear reactorvendorsandutilitiespursuemulti-unitdeploymentfor economic reasons, an exampleof thedifficulty in simultaneouslypursuing thedifferentprioritiesconfrontingSMRdesigners.171Atthispoint,muchofthisisspeculative.SinceSMRdesignsaremostlyconceptual,there are still questions about whether safety features will operate as expected.Again,theSMRdeploymentstrategywillalsolikelyaffecttheoverallsafety.Hence,thereisnoclear-cutwaytocomparethesafetyofSMRsrelativetoNPPs.

8.3.5 HistoryofSMRs

Although SMRs are talked about as new, there is in fact a long history of nuclearadvocates promoting the idea that small reactors could help electrify developingcountries.172Smallreactorswerealsosupposedtobeagoodfitforelectricutilitiesin the United States and several suchmodels were constructed. All of them shutdownwellbeforetheirlicensedlifetimesbecauseofpooreconomics.173

171RamanaandMian,“OneSizeDoesn’tFitAll.”172Atthe1955Genevaconference,forexample,theDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsoftheUnitedNationsargued:“Thepresentvolumeofenergyconsumptioninmostunder-developedcountries,however,doesnotjustifytheemploymentoflargethermalpowerstationsandthesamewillbetrue,inmanycases,oflarge-sizereactors.Inotherwords,nuclearpowerinunderdevelopedcountrieswouldhavetobegeneratedinplantswitharelativelysmallcapacity”.DepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,UnitedNations,“SomeEconomicImplicationsofNuclearPowerforUnder-DevelopedCountries,”inFirstInternationalConferenceonthePeacefulUsesofAtomicEnergy(Geneva:UnitedNations,1955),341–345.173M.V.Ramana,“TheForgottenHistoryofSmallNuclearReactors,”IEEESpectrum,May2015,accessedMay24,2015,http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/the-forgotten-history-of-small-nuclear-reactors.


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ThereisalsosomeexperiencewiththeHTGRsthatBATANhasbeeninterestedin.Inparticular, therewere four commercialHTGRsconstructed inGermanyand in theUnited States and some test reactors were constructed in the United Kingdom,Japan,andChina.Allof theseoperatingHTGRsunderwentawidevarietyof smallfailuresandunplannedevents,includingingressofwateroroil,andfuelfailures;allhadpoorloadfactorsanddidnotoperatefortheexpectedlifetimes.174ThereisthusreasontoexpectpoorperformancewithfutureHTGRsaswell.Comingtothemorerecentperiod,despitetheexpectationthatdevelopingcountrieswith small grids and limited financial resources that are interested in developingnuclearpowerwouldchooseanSMRinpreferencetoalargereactor,sofarnoneofthem have actually purchased an SMR. Jordan, a prime candidate, has recentlyenteredintoanagreementwithRussiatoacquiretwolargeconventionallightwaterreactors. It turnsout thatalthoughSMRswouldbemuchbettersuited to Jordan’scircumstances, the SMR option raises new problems, including locating sites formultiple reactors, finding water to cool these reactors, and the higher cost ofelectricitygeneration.175Likewise,Ghana,anothercountrythathasbeenconsideredapotentialcustomerforSMRs,mayalsopurchasealargereactorfromRussia.TheexplanationforthisdecisionispartlybecausetheGhanaAtomicEnergyCommissionprefersalargereactorincomparisontoanSMRbecauseitallowsGAECtopositionitselfasacomplete,one-stopsolutiontoGhana’selectricitycrisis.176Inshort,anexaminationofthehistoryofSMRssuggeststhattherewill likelybeabig gap between how SMRs will do in the real world and how SMRs operatetheoreticallyonpaper.

8.4 Appendix–SummaryTablesofRegulationsRelatingtoNuclearPower inIndonesia

Table11belowliststheregulationsthatpertaintonuclearpower inIndonesia. Inaddition,thetablealsobrieflymentionsthepurposeorimpactoftheregulation.

Table11.RegulatoryframeworkaffectingnuclearpowerinIndonesia

RegulationsRelatedtoNuclearPower Remarks

Government Regulation No. 63/2000 onSafety and Health in the Utilization ofIonicRadiation

It regulates the dose limitation systemrequirements, radiation safety managementsystems, calibration, preparedness andmitigationofradiationaccidents.

174M.V.Ramana,“TheCheckeredOperationalHistoryofHighTemperatureGasCooledReactors,”BulletinoftheAtomicScientists72,no.3(2016):171–179.175M.V.RamanaandAliAhmad,“WishfulThinkingandRealProblems:SmallModularReactors,PlanningConstraints,andNuclearPowerinJordan,”EnergyPolicy93(2016):236–245.176M.V.RamanaandPriscillaAgyapong,“ThinkingBig?Ghana,SmallReactors,andNuclearPower,”EnergyResearch&SocialScience21(November2016):101–113.


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Government Regulation No. 64/2000 onLicenseforNuclearEnergyUse

Thisregulationcontainstherequirementsandprocedures for obtaining permits, the term oflicense, obligations and responsibilities of thelicenseholder.

Government Regulation No. 26/2002 onSafety in the Transportation ofRadioactiveSubstances

It regulates the safety of the transport ofradioactivesubstances,coveringlicense,dutiesand responsibilities,packaging, radiation protection programs,training, programs on quality assurance, typeandlimitofradioactivesubstances,radioactivesubstances activity with its danger, andemergencycountermeasures.

Government Regulation No. 27/2002 onRadioactiveWasteManagement

It regulates the classification of radioactivewaste, permissions management, processing,transportation, and storage of radioactivewaste, quality assurance program,management and monitoring of theenvironment, and processing of radioactivewaste from mining and decommissioningprograms.

Government Regulation No. 43/2006 onLicenseforNuclearReactor

Itregulatesthelicensingofnuclearreactorsforeach stage in thedevelopment, operation, anddecommissioningofnuclearreactors.

Government Regulation No. 33/2007 onSafety of Ionizing Radiation and SecurityofRadioactiveSources

It regulates radiation safety for workers,communities,andtheenvironment,securityofradioactive sources, and inspection of nuclearenergyutilization.

Government Regulation No. 29/2008 onLicenseforIonizingRadiationSourceandNuclearSubstanceUtilization

It regulates requirements and licensingprocedures for ionizing radiation sources andnuclear substance utilization. Therequirements includeadministrative, technicalandspecialrequirements.

Government Regulation No. 46/2009 onLimitofLiabilityforNuclearDamage

This regulation highlights the nuclear damageliability limit that shall be fulfilled byentrepreneurs of nuclear installations andnuclearinstallationvendors.


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Government Regulation No. 54/2012 onSafety and Security of NuclearInstallations

This regulationdealswith the technical safetyofnuclearinstallations(sitemonitoringbeforedesign and construction, design andconstruction, commissioning and operation,safeguards changes and physical protectionsystems, safety evaluation, anddecommissioning), safety and security ofnuclear installation management,preparednessandcountermeasuresincaseofanuclearemergency.

Government Regulation No. 2/2014 onLicense for Nuclear Installations andNuclearUtilization

It regulates nuclear reactor licensing, nuclearinstallation licensing, and nuclear materialutilizationlicensing.

Presidential Regulation No. 74/2012 onNuclearLiability

Itregulatestheliabilitylimitforentrepreneursof nuclear installations in terms of nucleardamageforeachnuclear installationoccurringeitherwithinthenuclearinstallationorduringthetransportofnuclearfuel/spentfuel.

Presidential Regulation No. 46/2013 onNationalNuclearEnergyAgency

It regulates the existence, tasks, andresponsibilitiesoftheNationalNuclearEnergyAgency.

AsdiscussedinSection5.3,oneareaofregulationpolicythatmayespeciallyimpactSMRadoptioninIndonesiaisthelocalcontentrequirement.ThesearelistedbelowinTable12.

Table12.Localcontentrequirementsforelectricityinfrastructure177

GenerationType

InstalledCapacity

MinimumLevelofLocalContentforGoods

MinimumLevelofLocalContentfor

Services

MinimumLevelofCombinedLocal

ContentforGoodsandServices

Remarks

PLTU/SteamPowerPlant

Upto15MW

67.95% 96.31% 70.79% Goodscomponent:steamturbine,>15–25 45.36% 91.99% 49.09%

177AccordingtoArticle6-13intheMinisterofIndustry’sRegulationNo.54/2012onGuidelinesfortheUseofDomesticProducttoElectricityInfrastructureDevelopment.OriginalTitleoftheregulation:PeraturanMenteriPerindustrianRepublikIndonesiaNo.54/M-IND/PER/3/2012tentangPedomanPenggunaanProdukDalamNegeriUntukPembangunanInfrastrukturKetenagalistrikan.


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MW boiler,generator,electrical,instrumentandcontrol,balanceofplantand/orcivilandsteelstructureServices:feasibilitystudy,engineering,procurementandconstruction,inspection,testing,certificationand/orsupportingservice

>25–100MW

40.85% 88.07% 44.14%

>100–600MW

38.00% 71.33% 40.00%

>600MW 36.10% 71.33% 38.21%

PLTA/HydroPowerPlant-NonStoragePump

Upto15MW

64.20% 86.06% 70.76% Goodscomponent:civil,metalwork,turbine,generator,electrical,instrumentandcontrolServices:feasibilitystudy,engineering,procurementandconstruction,inspection,testing,certificationand/orsupportingservice

>15–50MW

49.84% 55.54% 51.60%

>50–150MW

48.11% 51.10% 49.00%

>150MW 47.82% 46.98% 47.60%

PLTP/GeothermalPowerPlant

Upto5MW 31.30% 89.18% 42% Goodscomponent:steamturbine,boiler,generator,electrical,instrumentandcontrol,balanceofplantand/orcivilandsteelstructureServices:

>5–10MW 21.00% 82.30% 40.45%>10–60MW

15.70% 74.10% 33.24%

>60–110MW

16.30% 60.10% 29.21%

>110MW 16.00% 58.40% 28.95%


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feasibilitystudy,engineering,procurementandconstruction,inspection,testing,certificationand/orsupportingservice

PLTG/GasTurbinePowerPlant

Upto100MWperblock

43.69% 96.31% 48.96% Goodscomponent:gasturbine,generator,electrical,instrumentandcontrol,balanceofplant,civilandsteelstructureServices:feasibilitystudy,engineering,procurementandconstruction,inspection,testing,certificationand/orsupportingservice

PLTGU/CombinedCyclePowerPlant

Upto50MWperblock

40.00% 71.53% 47.88% Goodscomponent:gasturbine,generator,heatrecoverysystemgenerator,steamturbine,electrical,instrumentandcontrol,balanceofplant,civilandsteelstructureServices:feasibilitystudy,engineering,procurementandconstruction,inspection,

>50–100MWperblock

35.71% 71.53% 40.00%

>100–300MWperblock

30.67% 71.53% 34.76%

>300MWperblock

25.63% 71.53% 30.22%


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testing,certificationand/orsupportingservice

PLTS/SolarPowerPlant–SolarHomeSystem

30.14% 100% 53.07% Goodscomponent:solarmodule,batteryandaccessories,batterycontrolunit,lamp,accessoriesandsupportService:delivery,installation

PLTS/SolarPowerPlant–Centralized/Communal

25.63% 100% 43.85% Goodscomponent:solarmodule,batterycontrolunit,inverter,lightsystem,electricitydistributionsystem,accessoriesandsupportService:delivery,installation

8.5 Appendix-InstitutionalStructureofElectricityGenerationinIndonesia

The main legislation that governs the electricity sector in Indonesia is Law No.30/2009 on Electricity.178Passed in 2009, the law ruled that the state-owned PTPLN would no longer have a monopoly on the electricity sector and increasedregional autonomy and the participation of the private sector in the business ofpowersupply,includingpowergeneration,transmission,distributionandthesaleofpower to consumers. The government and regional governments, in accordancewith their respective authority, determine policies, regulation, supervision, andmanagement of the power supply business. Figure 5 illustrates schematically thecurrentinstitutionallandscapeoftheIndonesianpowersector.

178IEA,“ElectricityLaw(No.30/2009),”PoliciesandMeasures:Indonesia,lastmodifiedMarch20,2015,accessedAugust1,2016,http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/indonesia/name-140166-en.php.


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The roleof theprivate sector in Indonesia’spower supplybusiness ismostly stilllimitedtopowergeneration;thereislittleprivatesectorparticipationinelectricitytransmission and distribution. Investors tend to participate in power generationbecausetheinvestmentingenerationischeaperandmoreprofitable.Independentpowerproducers(IPPs)maygenerateandsellelectricitytoPTPLNunderaPowerPurchase Agreement (PPA). Meanwhile, in terms of the transmission anddistributionnetworks,governmentregulationprovidestheopportunityforjointuseof transmission anddistribution networks between the license holder of a powersupply business and those who will utilize the transmission and distributionnetworks. The price for the lease of electricity transmission and distributionnetworksmustbeapprovedbythegovernment.

Figure5:SchematicofStructureofElectricitySectorinIndonesia

8.6 Appendix-EnergyDistributionEfficiencyinIndonesia

AlthoughtotalenergylossesinIndonesiahavebeendecreasingforthepast7years,thenumbersarestillhigh(seeTable13),hoveringaround10percent.Inthetable,thepercentagesarecalculatedbydividingtheenergylostduringtransmissionanddistribution by the total net energy produced (in kWh). Net energy productioncomes from all PT PLN plants as well as IPP providers, after subtracting off theenergyusedatthepointofgeneration.According to the World Bank, the corresponding figures in 2013 for Thailand,Singapore, andMalaysiawere 6 percent, 0 percent, and4 percent respectively.179Largeenergy losses in Indonesiacontribute toa lackofefficiencybetweenenergyproduction and distribution to consumers, potentially inflating the apparent needfor electricity growth. Mitigation of energy losses in the transmission anddistributionsystemscouldhelpreducetheoverallgenerationcostofelectricityandtheneedforsignificanttargetcapacityincreases.

179WorldBank,“ElectricPowerTransmissionandDistributionLosses(%ofOutput).”

Policies,Regulation,SupervisionandManagePowerSupplyBusiness

§ Government

§ RegionalGovernment

PowerSupplyBusiness

§ State-owned enterprises(PTPLN)

§ Regional ownedenterprises

§ Privateentities

§ Cooperatives

Customer

§ ResidentialSector

§ CommercialSector

§ IndustrialSector

§ Self-use(Captive)


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Table13.EnergylossesintheIndonesianelectricitysysteminrecentyears

Year Transmission(%) Distribution(%) TOTAL(%)

2008 2.17 8.29 10.45

2009 2.18 7.93 10.11

2010 2.25 7.64 9.89

2011 2.25 7.34 9.41

2012 2.44 6.95 9.21

2013 2.33 7.77 9.91

2014 2.37 7.52 9.71

Source:PLNStatistics,2014

8.7 Appendix-SolarPowerinIndonesia

The development of solar power has strong potential in a tropical location likeIndonesia. The total potential for grid-connected solar photovoltaics in Indonesiahasbeenestimatedat1492TWh,muchmorethanthetotalelectricitygeneratedinthe country currently.180The installed capacity of solar power in 2014 reached71.02MWinthecountry,andwascomprisedof5MWofpowerinter-connectedtoPTPLN’sgrid(on-grid)and66.02MWoff-grid.181Table14describesthethreetypesofsolarpower installationscurrently foundon Indonesiansmall islands,basedondata recordedbyDirectorateofDevelopmentof Small Islandsand theMinistryofMarineAffairsandFisheries(KementerianKelautandanPerikanan–KKP)for2014.In addition, PT PLN has launched a number of programs to foster solar powerdevelopmentinIndonesia:

1. TouristIslandsPVProgram:6locationswithatotalcapacityof0.92MWp.2. FrontierIslandsPVProgram:8locationswithatotalcapacityof1.34MWp.3. 100IslandsPVProgram:phase1includes36locationswithatotalcapacityof

7 MWp and phase 2, which is still in the planning stages, is scheduled toinclude78locationswithatotalcapacityof13MWp.

4. 1,000 Islands Solar PV Program: which is still at the stage of fundingpreparation, but was launched in 2012; the number of locations in thisprojectmaybeasmanyas672siteswithatotalcapacityof119MWp.

180VeldhuisandReinders,“ReviewingthePotentialandCost-EffectivenessofGrid-ConnectedSolarPVinIndonesiaonaProvincialLevel.”181ESDM, “Rencana Strategis Kementerian ESDM Tahun 2015-2019 [Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Strategic Plan 2015-2019],” (Jakarta, Indonesia: Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, April 10, 2015), 43, http://prokum.esdm.go.id/renstra%202015/DATA%20to%20MAIL%20NEW%20REV%20BUKU%20RENSTRA%202015.pdf.


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Table14.TypesofsolarpowerinstallationsonIndonesiansmallislands

Type Implementation NumberofIslands

Solar HomeSystem(SHS)

Thistypeisindividuallyoperatedandpeoplecandirectly turn on and off the electricity supply.Electricity is provided from solar panels withcapacityofaround50-80Wp,whichareusuallyinstalledin3-5pointstoturnon3wattLEDlightbulbs.

By 2014, 47 smallislands in Indonesiahave been electrifiedbySHS

HybridSystem This type uses 2 or more power generationplants with different energy sources, such asSolar Power Plants, micro hydro, and windpower. This kindof system is suitable for areasout of reach from PLN or Diesel Power Plants(PembangkitListrikTenagaDiesel–PLTD)

By 2014, 9 smallislands in Indonesiahave been electrifiedbyHybridSystems

CentralizedSystem

All the major components in a centralizedsystem, such as solar modules, regulators,inverters, and electric power breakers, areinstalled in one location. This type has thecapacityof1to500kWp,whichcancatertotheelectricityneedsofupto200households.Energysupplied by a centralized Solar Power Plant isdistributed to houses through low voltage(200V) and medium voltage (20kV) alternativecurrent.

By 2014, 11 smallislands in Indonesiahave been electrifiedbyCentralizedSystem

Source:DirectorateGeneralofElectricity,StatisticofElectricity2014,MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources:Jakarta.

To boost the utilization of solar power, the government has recently issued aprogramtodevelopsolarpoweronrooftops.InRUPTL2015-2024,PTPLNhassetup aplan for small-scale solarpowerplantswith a total installed capacity of 321MWp by 2024.182Furthermore, in a bid to attract private sector participation insolarPVdevelopment, thegovernmenthasalso issued regulation settinga ceilingpriceforsolarPV.Despite its low utilization at present, the contribution of solar power to theelectricitysectorisprojectedtoincreaseinthefuture.AccordingtoonescenariointheNationalEnergyPolicyOutlook2014,theinstalledcapacityofsolarpowerintheperiod2013-2050isprojectedtoincreasebyanaverageof14percentperyear.183

182OoAbdulRosyid,“OpportunitiesandChallengesforSolarPVRooftopinIndonesia”(presentedattheThe2ndAsiaRenewableEnergyWorkshop“fromResearchtoIndustrialization,”Jakarta,Indonesia,December2,2015),accessedAugust1,2016,https://www.asiabiomass.jp/item/arew2016/arew02_08_4.pdf.183DewanEnergiNasional,OutlookEnergiIndonesia2014(Jakarta,Indonesia:DewanEnergiNasional,December23,2014),120.


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8.8 Appendix–SummaryTableofElectrificationinIndonesia

Table15.PowerGenerationandPowerTransmissioninIndonesia

Area PowerGeneration PowerTransmission

Sumatra

(allprovincesinSumatra Island,Riau Islands,and BangkaBelitung)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 10,295 MW whichconsistsof7,269MWbyPTPLN,980MWby IndependentPowerProducer (IPP), 689 MW byPrivatePowerUtility(PPU),and1,358 MW by Non-Fossil FuelOperating Permit (Izin Operasinon Bahan Bakar Minyak – IOnon-BBM).

Two main interconnectedelectrification systemsownedbyPTPLN:

North Sumatra InterconnectionSystem (Sumatera bagian Utara –Sumbagut), connecting Aceh andNorth Sumatra province through150 kV High Voltage TransmissionLine (Saluran Udara TeganganTinggi–SUTT).

Central and South SumatraInterconnection System (Sumaterabagian Selatan Tengah –Sumbagselteng), connecting WestSumatra, Riau, Bengkulu, Jambi,South Sumatra, and Lampungthrough 150 kV SUTT. However,Lahat and Kiliran Jao are served by275 kV Extra High VoltageTransmission Line (Saluran UdaraTeganganExtraTinggi)SUTET.

In Batam Island, a 150 kV SUTT isowned and operated by PT PLNBatam. In August 2006 Sumbagutand Sumbaselteng were connectedby a 150 kV SUTT, however due totechnical reasons the systems arestillseparated.

Java

(allprovincesinJavaIsland,Bali,andMadura)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 35,783 MW whichconsists of 25,342 MW by PLN,8744 MW by IPP, 1518 MW byPPU, and 179 MW by IO non-BBM.

Jawa-Bali Interconnection System,consistingofthreevoltagetypes:

500 kV Extra High Voltage AirTransmission (SUTET) as thebackbone

150 kV and 70 kV High Voltage AirTransmission (SUTT) as theconnectinglinetothecentralcharge

Kalimantan

(allprovincesinKalimantan andTarakan

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 2,512 MW whichconsists of 2,027 MW by PLN,282 MW by IPP, 143 MW by

A small 150 kV SUTT have beeninstalled in small areas ofWest andEast Kalimantan, as well as someareas in Central Kalimantan whichareconnectedtoSouthKalimantan’s


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Area PowerGeneration PowerTransmission

Islands) PPU,and55MWbyIOnon-BBM. electricitygenerationsystem.

Sulawesi

(allprovincesinSulawesiIsland)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 2942 MW whichconsists of 1560 MW by PLN,898MWbyIPP,and485MWbyIOnon-BBM.

Sulbagut electrification systemconnects North Sulawesi andGorontalobya150kVSUTT

Sulselbar electrification systemconnects South Sulawesi and WestSulawesibya150kVSUTT.A275kVSUTET is used for energy transferfrom PosoWind Generated PowerPlanttotheSulselbarsystem

Nusa TenggaraIslands

(West NusaTenggara andEast NusaTenggaraIslands)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 747 MW whichconsists of 611MW by PLN, 16MW by IPP, and 120MW by IOnon-BBM.

In West Nusa Tenggara, a 150 kVSUTT is used for energy transferfrom Lombok Steam GeneratedPower Plant to the central charge.Neither SUTET nor SUTT areinstalled inEastNusaTenggaradueto isolated and scatteredelectrificationsystemandlowpowergenerationcapacity.

MalukuIslands

(Maluku andNorthMaluku)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof2014was295MWbyPLN.

Neither SUTET nor SUTT areinstalled in Maluku due to isolatedand scattered electrification systemandlowpowergenerationcapacity.

Papua

(Papua andWestPapua)

Installedpowerplantcapacityasof 2014 was 491 MW whichconsists of 275MW by PLN, 21MW by IPP, and 195MW by IOnon-BBM.

PT Freeport installed a 230 kVSUTETforindividualuse.

Source: RUKN draft report, 2015, see Rencana Umum Ketenagalistrikan Nasional 2015 -2034(2015):KementerianEnergidanSumberDayaMineral.


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8.9 Appendix–EstimateofCurrentCostofElectricityGeneration

Theaveragegenerationcostofelectricity forvarioustypesofpowerplants,basedon2014PTPLNdata,ispresentedinTable16.

Table16.PTPLN’sself-reportedaveragecostofgeneratingelectricityin2014

GenerationType

AverageGenerationCostperkWh(Rp/kWh) Total

Fuel* Maintenance

Depreciation

Others

Personnel Total USD/kWh

****

Hydro 23.97 41.65 99.31 3.47 20.80 189.19 0.02

Steam 565.30 48.94 106.11 1.44 4.57 726.37 0.06

Diesel**) 2,448.35 356.07 128.37 14.76 116.75 3,064.30 0.26

GasTurbine 2,472.46 127.97 270.56 2.82 18.99 2,892.80 0.25

Geothermal 1,007.56 137.87 144.56 1.62 15.28 1,306.88 0.11

CombinedCycle 1,203.06 48.11 75.26 3.52 5.79 1,335.74 0.12

Solar - 465.85 3,144.13 0.95 - 3,610.93 0.31

Average 1,115.37 62.84 105.68 2.56 10.27 1,296.73 0.11

Rented*** - - - - - 375.49 0.03

Note:*Includinglubricant;**)Includingdieselgas;***Rentalcostofdieselandgasturbinepowerplants;****Assumption:Exchangeratein2014,1USD=11,600IDR

There is also a sizeablebill for subsidies for electricity in the statebudget,whichtends to increase every year. To overcome the heavy electricity subsidy thegovernment, together with PT PLN, has engaged in a number of efforts, such asreducing thebasiccostof theelectricitysupplyandadjusting theelectricalpowertariff.Figure6showsthetrendinvariouselectricity-relatedcostsinrecentyears.


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Figure6:Theevolutionofelectricitysubsidies,powertariffs,andthebasiccostof

electricityfrom2010-2014

Note:Electricitysubsidyfigurein2014inaccordancewithRevisedStateBudget;Source:StateBudget2015andMinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2015

57.6

90.4 94.58100 103.8

703 738 745819

9281,008

1,251 1,272 1,289 1,271

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Trillion IDRIDR/kWh

Electricity Subsidy (Trillion IDR)

Electrical Power Tariff

Basic Cost of Electricity Supply


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8.10 Appendix–OverviewofWorkshop

On25June2015,membersoftheProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity,PrincetonUniversity and the Indonesian Institute of Energy Economics (IIEE) organized aworkshop in Jakarta on “Nuclear Power and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) inIndonesia:PotentialandChallenges”.Awidevarietyofpolicymakersandofficialsattended.SomeoftheinstitutionsthatsentrepresentativesincludedtheDirectorateof VariousNew andRenewable Energy, theDirectorate General of Electricity, theDirectorate of Defense Strategy - Ministry of Defense, BATAN, Indonesia NuclearSociety,andtheNationalEnergyCouncil.Otherswhoparticipatedincludedvariousstakeholders in the national debate on the role of nuclear energy in Indonesia,includingpresentandformermembersofgovernment,academia,andcivilsocieties.This group of leaders and expertswere brought together and through a series ofbrief talks andopendiscussions, their viewsonnuclear power in Indonesiawereelicited.ThediscussionsreflectedthepolarizednatureofthedebateovernuclearpowerinIndonesia. Thereweremanywho felt that nuclear powerwas inevitable becauseothersourcesofenergywouldnotmeetprojecteddemand,andmanywhofeltthatnuclearenergywaseconomicallyunattractiveandcould,atbest,beconsideredthelastoption forsupplying Indonesia’senergyneeds.For themostpart, theseviewsdid not differentiate between nuclear power based on small reactors and largereactors. One exception was a speaker from the Indonesia Nuclear Society whomade a case for constructing SMRs in West Kalimantan based on the limitedelectricalgridcapacitythere.